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Seafarer Training and the Availability of Training Berths: The Case of the South African Shipping
Industry
BY
Debby Bonnin (University of Natal) and Geoffrey Woods (Middlesex University)
(Assisted by Shaun Ruggunan, University of Natal)
June 2002
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements Executive Summary
1. Introduction 2. Methodology 3. International Regulation of Maritime Training
3.1. International Maritime Organisation 3.2. The STCW-95 training and qualifications system
4. Seafarer Training in South Africa
4.1. Accreditation and certification 4.2. Training institutions
5. The Problem of Training Berth Availability
5.1. Training institutions and the availability of training berths 5.2. Reasons for the declining availability of training berths 5.3. Conclusions
6. Shipping Companies and Training Berths
6.1. Unicorn Shipping / Grindrod 6.2. Safmarine 6.3. Smit Pentow 6.4. De Beers Marine and De Beers Marine Namibia 6.5. Attempts by training institutions to forge new links 6.6. Foreign shipping companies 6.7. Shipping companies perceptions of training institutions
7. Evaluating Policy Options
7.1. The South African Ships Register 7.2. Linking tonnage tax and training 7.3. Using the South African Navy 7.4. Dedicated training ship 7.5. Simulator training 7.6. Crewing agencies – the Filipino option 7.7. The viability of vessels calling at South African ports being compelled
to take on South African cadets 7.8. Subsidising training
8. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 9. References
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank all those who agreed to be interviewed for this report (a
full list is found in the references). Special thanks needs to go to those who
commented on the draft report: Ivan Bandle (National Ports Authority),
Deanna Collins (Safmarine), Nicholas Hagan (De Beers Marine), Andrew
Morris (Wingfield Technical College), Alan Parkinson (Durban Institute of
Technology), Daniel Sabwelera (Durban Institute of Technology), Jackie
Stemmers (Transport Education and Training Authority), Richard Snook
(Unicorn Shipping), Ed Snyders (Cape Technikon), Tony Stewart (Grindrod)
and Robert Young (Unicorn Shipping); your contributions and the time you
gave is much appreciated. Shuan Ruggunan did much of the interviewing
required for this report – his assistance and participation was invaluable.
Finally, special thanks to Jackie Stemmers of the Transport, Education and
Training Authority for her support and guidance along the way. However,
despite the assistance of those mentioned the authors must take full
responsibility for the opinions expressed.
The research was funded by the Maritime Section of the Transport, Education
and Training Authority (TETA).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This research investigates the recent crisis that has developed in the South
African maritime industry around training berth availability. Given the STCW-
95 requirement that all students have a twelve-month experiential training
component in order to complete their qualification, the shortage of training
berths has serious implications.
The research, through in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in the South
African maritime industry, investigates the reasons behind the shortage of
training berths. It examines on a company-by-company basis the current
availability of training berths and the capacity of shipping companies to create
more berths. Finally, the report presents and evaluates various policy options
that could be investigated as a way to resolve this crisis.
Key amongst the recommendations are an examination of the disjuncture
between technikon output and berth availability; the resolution of the issues
surrounding the South African ships register; the involvement of Government
in sourcing new providers, with the possibility of using training subsidies as
incentives; a need to discuss ways in which the South African navy and the
merchant navy could collaborate; and, the need to look to other more
successful environments for lessons. In particular, the report recommends
that Government becomes more proactive in the maritime sector.
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1. INTRODUCTION
South Africa has a strong seafaring tradition and history. However, within the
South African shipping industry, the legacy of apartheid persists in the form of
a deeply embedded racial division of labour. Training and development in the
South African shipping industry has not only to take on board the exigencies
of global competition, and new certification regimes, but also the pressing
need to promote equity, and, above all, to facilitate the upward mobility of
black seafarers.
In 1978, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping (STCW) agreement governing training and accreditation of
seafarers was promulgated. Subsequently, a Diplomatic Conference led to
substantial amendments, known as STCW-95. These came into effect on 1
February 1997. These amendments were prompted by concerns as to the
unevenness in training globally, particularly of ratings, and sought to promote
a more flexible modular approach to training. The 1995 amendments apply to
all states that were party to the 1978 Convention, under the "tacit acceptance"
procedures adopted by the United Nations' International Maritime
Organisation (IMO).
STCW-95 aims to impart practical skills and the value of any training
programme remain contingent on the capacity to obtain training berths for
those completing it. South African ratings have battled to compete on the
world labour market, especially given increasing competition from the Far
East. Officers find it easier to obtain employment given the global shortages,
but it appears the throughput of ‘new’ officers is just as hampered by the
shortage of training berths. Legally speaking, South African registered ships
are bound to make use of South Africans wherever possible. However, it is
relatively easy to get exemptions if the ship owner can prove that no suitably
qualified locals can be found.
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All South African training institutions have found in recent years that their
students are not able to secure training berths. According to the research
results the situation is of such a serious nature that if there are no changes
South African training institutions will soon be forced to consider their viability.
The current crisis in our shipping industry echoes many of the concerns raised
by some of the traditional maritime nations, as their Ships Registers declined
in the face of Flag of Convenience competition. Firstly, South Africa is also
faced with rapidly declining employment opportunities for its seafarers due to
intense competition from other regions of the world, particularly, South-East
Asia and more recently China. Secondly, the expertise, skills, and
technological knowledge of seafarers are under threat as our pool of
seafarers continues to decline. Our seafarer training institutions and the
maritime expertise contained within them are also under threat as training
berths for South African cadets become increasingly more difficult to obtain
from shipping companies. Like the Europeans, albeit for different reasons we
are faced with a crisis in the training and employment of our seafarers.
This study begins by reviewing the international maritime training regulations
before looking at the state and nature of seafarer training in South Africa. It
then goes on to problematise the predicament of training berth availability and
provides a discussion of the various reasons that have been put forward to
explain the recent decline in training berths. The conclusion of this section
provides an evaluation of these reasons.
Section six provides a company-by-company account of the availability of
training berths, what is currently available and their capacity to create
additional berths. It also looks at recent initiatives by training institutions to
forge new partnerships in order to assist their students in obtaining berths.
Finally it examines the allegations that some institutions have been
marginalised by the industry because of negative perceptions.
Section seven presents and evaluates various policy options that could be
investigated as a way forward in resolving this crisis. In presenting these
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options it responds to the reasons that have been put forward to explain the
decline in training berth availability amongst the South African merchant navy.
These policy options also draw on some international examples and
experiences, notably the United Kingdom / European Union and the
Philippines.
The study concludes by suggesting that there is no easy solution to this crisis.
Any way forward will require the involvement and co-ordination of many
different stakeholders. However, mostly importantly it will need their whole-
hearted commitment to resolving the problem.
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2. METHODOLOGY
The research was carried out over a period of two months (May to June
2002). It centred on in-depth interviews conducted with shipping companies
(Safmarine, Unicorn, De Beers Marine, Smit Pentow, Dudula Shipping and
P&O Nedloyd), training institutions (Durban Institute of Technology, Cape
Technikon, Wingfield Technical College, Portnet Training Academy, Cape
Maritime Academy), port authorities (Portnet), qualifications authorities
operating in the shipping industry (SAMSA) and key individuals (maritime
lawyers and consultants).1
The interviewer guided each interview with the aid of an interview schedule.
There was a degree of flexibility within the structure provided, as several of
the interviewees discussed issues not specifically noted on the schedule, yet
these were relevant to the topic. It was believed that semi-structured
interviews with open-ended response categories would allow for the
exploration of the subjective meanings encountered during the interview
process (Bailey, 1982).
As adverse to eliciting responses within a standardised close-ended format
purely to facilitate comparison with other individuals or groups, open-ended
interviews enable subjective meanings to be taken into account, meanings
that would enrich the data obtained (see Bailey, 1982). There had to be
considerable flexibility in the timing of the interviews, as they had to fit into the
respondents’ work schedules. The primary aim was to obtain a broad cross-
section of perspectives in greater detail than would be possible through a
close-ended questionnaire (see Bailey 1982:182-189).
The interviews were supplemented through reference to primary documentary
sources and secondary material. We also examined appropriate web sites,
conducted keyword searches on the Internet and reviewed the relevant
1 A full list of those interviewed is contained in the references.
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literature. A draft copy of the report was circulated to all those interviewed for
comment.
A major limitation of this research is that we were not able to secure
interviews either with the South African Navy or with global shipping
companies operating out of South Africa. Despite numerous attempts key
people were too busy and telephone messages went unanswered.
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3. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARITIME TRAINING
3.1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO)2 was formally established in
Geneva in 1948 when an international conference adopted a convention.
However, the Convention only became fully established in 1958 and the
organisation met for the first time the following year. The purposes of the IMO
are
“to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.” (Article 1(a) of the Convention, www.imo.org)
The IMO is concerned with safety at sea and to this effect has adopted a
number of conventions. The most important is the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). It has also put in place a number of
measures to tackle environmental and pollution problems caused by shipping.
Integral to both safety at sea and pollution is the training of crew. Thus the
IMO is the international organisation responsible for setting and monitoring
training standards.
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978 was the first internationally agreed
Convention to speak to the question of minimum standards of competence for
seafarers. In 1995 the STCW Convention was revised and updated in order
to clarify the standards of competence required and provide effective
enforcement mechanisms.
2 Known as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) until 1982.
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Among the provisions is an obligation that Parties to the Convention provide
the IMO with the measures they have adopted to implement the Convention
nationally. This information is scrutinised by the IMO to ensure that “full and
complete effect” is being given to the Convention. If this is so, the Party is
added to the “List of confirmed STCW Parties”, otherwise known as the White
List.
3.2. THE STCW-95 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM
3.2.1. Origins of the STCW-95 System
Prior to the 1978 STCW Convention the standards of training, certification and
watchkeeping of officers and ratings were established by individual
governments, frequently without reference to practices in other countries. As
a result standards and procedures varied widely.
The international shipping industry is founded on a global labour market.
Crews are often recruited from a range of different nations, from widely
disparate backgrounds, and may experience considerable difficulties in
communicating with each other (Cooper, 1995). Shipping firms engage in
aggressive regime shopping; there is a continual search for cheaper officers
and ratings (Cooper, 1995:17). A close correlation exists between the
acceptance low wages and poor conditions at sea, and the lack of viable
alternative employment onshore (Cooper, 1995:17). This, among other
reasons, has led to workers from a limited number of low wage economies,
such as China and the Philippines dominating the shipping labour market. By
1995, there were over 1.2 million seafarers in the world, an estimated sixty
percent coming from Asia (Cooper, 1999:17). As a result, workers from both
the advanced societies, as well as a large number of developing societies
have faced the prospect of increasing marginalisation.
This problem was exacerbated by the growing use of Flags of Convenience
(FOCs). Ships at sea constitute floating parts of the nation-states whose flags
they carry (Koch-Baumgarten, 2000:135). In the inter and immediate post
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world war two period, merchant ships became subject to increasing legal and
collective regulation. National fleets showed a genuine link to their country of
origin, with parent country staffing and labour relations. However, by 1950, a
small number of ships - estimated at some 4.5 percent of the world's
merchant fleet - flew the flags of a handful of developing nations (Koch-
Baumgarten, 2000:136). The latter included Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica
and Liberia. Ships flying FOCs were free of taxation and national control, and
rarely have a genuine link to their flag state (Koch-Baumgarten, 2000:136). In
the 1950s, American shipping companies increasingly resorted to FOCs to
escape domestic legal requirements and collective agreements, replacing US
with cheaper European labour. By the 1970s, increasing numbers of
European shipping firms were themselves resorting to FOCs, replacing
domestic with cheaper foreign labour (Koch-Baumgarten, 2000:136). Most
FOC crews are now recruited in South-East Asia, with the overall FOC share
of world shipping reaching some forty percent by the 1990s (Koch-
Baumgarten, 2000:136).
From the 1950s onwards, trade unions have lobbied for a political solution to
the FOC problem. However, in the face of resistance from the United States
authorities, and increased competition on the basis of cost, European
governments were gradually forced to accept the inevitability of FOCs.
However, very real concerns about safety have led to the dilution of FOC
sovereignty; the principle of port state control is now embedded in
international law (Koch-Baumgarten, 2000:138). Port state controls today
encompass technical and safety matters, as well as the social norms of
International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, although the primary
focus has been on the former (Koch-Baumgarten, 2000:138). In addition, the
International Transport Federation (ITF) began to co-ordinate the organisation
of FOC crews. In 1957, only four percent of shipping crews were covered by
collective bargaining; by the 1990s, this had risen to 25-29 percent (Koch-
Baumgarten, 2000:140). However, some ITF affiliates may assist in breaking
the rules, covering up the low standards under which their members may
work, in order to ensure that "cheap sailors" can continue to compete in the
international labour market on the grounds of cost (Koch-Baumgarten,
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2000:140). In addition, some authoritarian Asian governments have
deliberately sought to undermine effective unionism amongst their nationals
(Koch-Baumgarten, 2000:140). Despite attempts at collectivisation, FOCs
continue to enable shipping firms to employ labour at the lowest possible cost.
Indeed, even between low wage economies, seafarers face intense
competition; geographical locale and differing regulatory regimes have
resulted in African seafarers being particularly vulnerable in the face of Far
Eastern competition.
Many FOC states have a long history of failing to ensure that minimum
international standards were upheld (Selander, 1995). In response to
alleviate some of the worst consequences of the above-mentioned regime
shopping, including increasing disquiet as to safety on board FOC ships, an
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping (STCW) was negotiated in 1978. The Convention prescribed
minimum standards relating to training and watchkeeping for seafarers which
countries are obliged to meet or exceed. The Articles of the Convention
included requirements relating to certification and port State control. Manning
levels were dealt with in SOLAS and subsequent resolutions on ‘Principals of
safe manning’ (see IMO, www.imo.org) adopted by the IMO.
However, the effects of the Convention were rather mixed. Whilst general lip
service was paid to the provisions of the Convention, it came apparent that
many developing nations were issuing Certificates to obviously incompetent
and poorly trained seafarers (Dearsley, 1995:24). In short, whilst the system
was widely ratified, many member states were happy to flout it, with little fear
of enforcement (Dearsley, 1995).
This led to increasing pressure for new, more easily enforceable, standards
for the training of seafarers (Dearsley, 1995). In 1995, a Diplomatic
Conference led to substantial amendments to the 1978 convention, known as
STCW -95. These came into effect on 1 February 1997. However, its
implementation reached a crucial stage in February 2002 by which all
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seafarers must be trained, in compliance with its provisions and carry
certificates to that effect.
3.2.2. The Structure and Consequences of STCW-95 The 1995 amendments will apply to all states that were party to the 1978
Convention, under the "tacit acceptance" procedures adopted by the
International Maritime Organisation (RMP, 1998). Whilst the implications for
those countries that fail to comply are unclear, few governments have
appeared willing to openly place themselves in this category. The basic
articles of the 1978 convention have not changed, however, fundamental
changes took place in the Regulations, above all regarding enforcement.
Essentially, the 1995 Convention aims to ensure that standards become more
uniform and to establish a system of auditing and monitoring (RMP, 1998).
For inclusion on the approved “White List”, countries have to submit detailed
reports to the IMO on legal and administrative measures implemented
nationally to ensure compliance with the convention with regard to training,
assessment and certification (Vanuatu, 1998). In additions, details have to be
supplied on training courses, assessment and certificates, and national
procedures for approving the conduct of training and assessment nationally
(Vanuatu, 1998). Of the 132 countries, which are party to the Convention, 82
met the first deadline for submitting their information to the IMO. Of these
more than twelve percent are still trying to achieve White List status.
Countries are entitled via their Port Control inspectors to use the White List to
decide which nationalities of individual seafarers should be targeted for
inspection purposes (Vanuatu, 1998). Non-party States will be required to
comply with the Convention when visiting ports of States, which are Parties to
the Convention. Article X requires Parties to apply the control measures to
ships of all flags, the difficulties which could then arise for these vessels is
one reason why the Convention has been so widely accepted. By December
2000 STCW-95 had 135 Parties which represented 97.53 percent of world
shipping tonnage (www.imo.org).
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Countries not included on the White List will not have the qualifications they
issue to seamen recognised by the authorities of other countries (RMP, 1998).
If crew members on a particular ship are found to be under-qualified, the ship
can be deemed undermanned, and thus prevented from sailing by the
relevant coastal state until "qualified" seamen are found (RMP, 1998). In
other words, shipping companies have little option but to adhere to the
Convention, by ensuring that their crew members are suitably qualified, if they
wish to engage in international trade, no matter how lax their host regime.
This, in effect, establishes two lines of defence: firstly through IMO auditing of
qualifications/training processes, and secondly, via the port authorities (port
state control inspectors) of individual states (RMP, 1998). Irrespective of
whether they have training institutions or supply seafarers to ships under
other flags, countries on the White List will have to monitor ships of countries
under their port state control (RMP, 1998). All countries party to the
Convention will have to incorporate all mandatory provisions of the Articles,
Regulations and Codes into national law, either through amending their
shipping legislation or through the promulgation of new laws (RMP, 1998).
Countries that do not apply to the STCW convention may face their ships
being subject to detention or entry denial at foreign ports (Federated States of
Micronesia, 1998). In short, governments are under pressure to take the
regulations seriously in order to ensure that their own citizens can compete in
the global shipping market through being adequately qualified, and that they
are not being undercut by inadequately qualified seafarers from elsewhere.
Key implications of STCW-95 include the introduction of the following by
individual countries:
Certified Port State Control Inspectors.
Management Plan and Certificate Structures.
Ensuring medical standards and documentation meet requirements; this
would include a Panel of Medical Practitioners.
New Maritime Certificates, including provisions for endorsements.
Required Training Courses and associated resources - this would include
comprehensive curriculum packages, and has resource implications for
training institutions, both in terms of staffing and physical infrastructure.
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Seafarers database, keeping an up-to-date record of seafarers.
Develop quality management systems.
Supply STCW checklist to local shipping industry. (Samoa 1998).
The STCW-95 allows for a more modular approach to training. IMO model
courses include papers in ship safety, proficiency in survival crafts, gas
tankers familiarisation courses, restricted radio operators, first aid at sea, and
a radio operators course (Tonga 1998).
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4. SEAFARER TRAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA
Broadly there are two categories of seafarers on merchant navy vessels –
officers and ratings and within these categories a further division between
deck and engine-room – each with different training requirements. Officers
spend three years at a tertiary institution and upon completion of these formal
course requirements are required to undergo twelve months sea-time before
their qualification is recognised. Ratings enter into a six-week course at an
accredited institution (frequently a specialised training college), thereafter they
are also required to undergo twelve months sea-time before their qualification
is recognised.
South Africa has been able to achieve IMO White List status. All accredited
training needs to be STCW-95 compliant.
4.1. ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION
The training and certification of seafarers is regulated internationally and
nationally. In South Africa, two monitoring and certifying bodies exist: the
South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) and the Transport
Education and Training Authority (TETA).
The official certifying body in terms of STCW-95 in South Africa is the South
African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA). SAMSA represents South Africa
at the IMO. It issues certification for training programmes that comply with the
international Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping of
Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995 (STCW-95) under the United Nations’
IMO. SAMSA is primarily funded by levies from the South African shipping
industry. All seafarers undergoing training in South Africa, including foreign
seafarers, are certified by SAMSA and their names recorded on SAMSA’s
register (Interview, Zanders 2001).
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The TETA has been established in terms of the legislation associated with the
Skills Development Act and the National Qualification Framework (NQF). The
NQF aims to promote greater upward mobility and mobility between different
vocations. In terms of the legislation the TETA is authorised as the Education
and Training Quality Assurance Body (ETQA) for the transport industry. All
training providers in the industry must be accredited by TETA’s ETQA body.
Thus all those who were previously accredited by SAMSA have to reapply to
the TETA for Training Provider Accreditation. This ensures that the quality of
learning for all training can be maintained according to unit standards and
industry qualifications. However, as SAMSA has the technical expertise they
are involved in the process of accrediting training providers by assessing the
course materials and being involved in the audit process. A Memorandum of
Understanding has been drawn up between the TETA’s ETQA and SAMSA.
The TETA accredits training providers according to courses that are linked to
specific unit standards.
Seafarer training in South Africa not only has to meet STCW-95 standards,
but also fit into the NQF. Thus all current learning has to be translated into
the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) format in order to be
registered on the NQF. In terms of the 1995 South African Qualifications
Authority Act (No 58), accredited courses have to be designed in such a
manner as to promote transferability of skills. In other words, a seafarer
undergoing STCW-95 training in South Africa will gain credits which are
transferable to other educational institutions should the relevant individual
wish to switch careers. If learning is acquired according to unit standards that
have been registered on the NQF then the credits obtained will be nationally
recognised regardless of where the learning was acquired. The NQF also
recognises that learning can be acquired through non-academic means.
4.2. TRAINING INSTITUTIONS
4.2.1. Ratings Training
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As in many other parts of the world, South Africa’s principal shipping
companies have a history of conducting much of their training for ratings in-
house. These companies – Unicorn, and previously Safmarine3 ran their own
accredited training institutions. They recruited trainees according to their
employment needs, sent them to their in-house training centres and provided
training berths on their vessels. However, given the global oversupply of
ratings the Unicorn Training School has, over the last four years, reduced its
ratings training substantially (Communication Richard Snook, Unicorn).
Currently, the only fully accredited training institution for seafarers in terms of
STCW-95 is the (private) Unicorn Training School in Durban (Interview,
Zanders 2001). The other training institution for ratings in South Africa, the
Wingfield Technical College in Cape Town offers a limited number of STCW-
95 ratings courses.4
(a) Unicorn Training School Unicorn Shipping started their own training school in Durban in the 1970s,
given the lack of a ratings training institution in South Africa's largest port; until
then, all ratings training had taken place in Cape Town. Initially, the School
only trained Unicorn employees. However, persistent requests from other
shipping firms led to the school being opened to the whole industry along the
East Coast. Soon, the bulk of students were non-Unicorn employees. The
open nature of the school helped ensure its survival once the demand for
ratings began to dry up. In addition to STCW-95 training, it also offers a
range of short courses tailored to meet the changing needs of the industry.
The Unicorn School was quick to bring its courses in line with the
requirements of STCW-95. However according to the then head Captain
Johnsen (Interview, 2000):
"STCW-95 requirements are a minimum. In our training we go far beyond what is required of us".
3 The Safmarine Training Centre closed in 1978. It offered the following qualifications Efficient Deck Ratings, Efficient Engine Ratings and Cook Ratings. (Communication Deanna Collins, Safmarine). 4 Plans are underway to ensure all courses are STCW-95 complient.
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While there was a two-year period when they did not train any new recruits for
their own purposes, over the last year there has been “a fairly steady trickle of
new entrant ratings under training”, according to Unicorn crewing manager
Richard Snook (personal communication). They also run refresher courses
for Unicorn ratings. Furthermore, the School trains ratings on behalf of third
party customers, this includes refresher training for qualified ratings as well as
new entrant ratings. During 2001 they trained ninety-six ratings from various
African countries to enable them to obtain STCW-95 Able Seaman or Oiler
certificates (see Bonnin & Wood, 2001a). This was sponsored by the
International Transport Federation.
Captain Johnsen believed that the implementation of the NQF would more
likely be of assistance to those seeking to further training in order to leave the
industry, rather than those wishing to enter it:
"... you can't submit your application for a boiler or engine examination if you have done all your sea-time on the deck. The maritime authority requires that they do their sea-time in the appropriate place".
The possibility thus exists of a conflict between the requirements of STCW-95
and the NQF as
“the NQF recognises that skills are transferable, so if there are skills that the learner has acquired in one context that applies in another they don’t have to reacquire those skills, their prior learning would be recognised.” (Communication, Jackie Stemmers, TETA)
However, as all seafarer training has to be in accordance with the
requirements of the IMO in order for a country to attain white list status, and
without this status seafarers trained in that country will not be able to obtain
employment in the global labour market, it is unlikely that SAMSA will be able
to change their regulations to fit neatly into South Africa’s new education and
training legislation. Therefore as Jackie Stemmers commented it is important
that both parties work closely together to see how they might resolve this.
(b) Wingfield Technical College Unlike the Portnet and Unicorn centres, Wingfield is a statutory organisation,
albeit one heavily dependant on fee income. According to Captain Andy
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Morris (head of the Table Bay Campus of Wingfield College), retired Master
Mariner Captain Jenkins initiated the Training Centre for Seamen in 1964. It
was managed by the then Department of Coloured Affairs to provide training
for coloured ratings and fishermen as there were no facilities for them in
South Africa.5
“… the only training establishment at that time was the Merchant Navy Academy, General Botha down the road for whites and that was for officers. In 1970 I was appointed and one man, one classroom, one student we grew to in the early 90s twenty-five staff, we put through to date twenty-six odd thousand enrolments …” (Interview, Morris 2002)
In 1999 the Training Centre for Seamen amalgamated with Wingfield
Technical College (which offered marine engineering courses) and is no
longer a specialised, dedicated seafarer training institution.
Wingfield courses are accredited by SAMSA and they are in the process of
bringing all their ratings courses in line with STCW-95. They are accredited to
offer the following ratings courses - Able Seaman, Proficiency in Life Rafts
and Basic Training (which includes Personal Safety and Social
Responsibility).6 In any event, ratings' training only constitutes a small
proportion of Wingfield’s current activities. Given the small demand for ratings
labour, few shipping companies have sent staff for training to Wingfield over
the past few years (Interview, Fourie 2001). The majority of the current
students come from the fishing industry
“… we have had up to seventy-year-olds come here sometimes for the private courses for leisure vessels, but most of them we seem to find are late twenty’s, early thirty’s fishermen. They are mature, they are married, they’ve got families, they are employed, they want to learn …” (Interview, Morris 2002)
Wingfield also offer a limited number of marine engineering courses.
Currently they offer SAMSA approved marine engineering officer class three
and class four and marine motormen. These are not STCW-95 accredited
5 Educational facilities at that time being segregated along racial lines according to apartheid policy. 6 Currently Wingfield is in the process of getting the Oilers Course accredited. Then it will be fully STCW-95 compliant for all ratings courses.
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and are only available to the fishing industry. However, it is anticipated that
within the next year the fishing industry will be regulated by STCW-F (fishing)
and then they will not be able to offer these courses any longer. Currently
there are few students in these courses as potential students are aware of the
impending change to STCW-F. In addition they are accredited by SAMSA to
offer Engineering Watchkeeping Level Four qualifications. However,
according to Captain Andy Morris head of the Table Bay Campus, the future
of this course is doubtful as the shipping industry, in particular Safmarine,
require marine engineers with qualifications above NQF level four and as a
Further Education and Training Institute they are only able to offer
qualifications between NQF level two and four. Therefore it seems likely that
in the future all marine engineering qualifications will have to be offered
through the technikons.
4.2.2. Officers Training Those who aspire to a career as a deck officer in the merchant navy are
required to complete a minimum of a three-year National Diploma in Maritime
Studies at an appropriate tertiary institution. This academic training needs to
be followed by twelve months sea-time before the qualification is complete.
Two institutions offer the National Diploma – Durban Institute of Technology
and Cape Technikon – and both are SAMSA accredited and STCW-95
compliant.
These courses provide the opportunity for deck officers (or persons wishing to
qualify as deck officers) to obtain diplomas or certificates of competency. A
certificate of competency enables the student to serve aboard vessels as a
certified deck officer while the National Diploma is also accepted by marine-
orientated commerce and industry.
An alternative is a career as a marine engineer. This qualification is being
reintroduced into the technikons from this year (2002). Students would
register for a National Diploma in Mechanical Engineering and take maritime
options during the three-years of study. As with the deck qualification, the
academic training also needs to be followed by twelve months sea-time
- 23 -
(experiential learning) before the qualification is complete. Until 1992 the
qualification was offered at the technikons, thereafter it was only offered by
Wingfield Technical College.7 However, with the requirement for STCW-95
compliance (as well as, according to Captain Parkinson of DIT, pressure from
AP Moller/Maersk after their purchase of Safmarine) there was a need to
reintroduce it at a higher level.8 As the qualification at both technikons had
fallen away SAMSA accreditation had also lapsed and it is necessary to
reapply for accreditation in order for it to be STCW-95 compliant.9
(a) Durban Institute of Technology The Durban Institute of Technology is the new name of the recently merged
Natal and ML Sultan technikons. Maritime Studies is located on the Steve
Biko campus ie the former Natal Technikon. The Department of Maritime
Studies was established in 1979 and until 1996 its student population was
exclusively white and male, in 2002 it is ninety percent black but still ninety
percent male (Interview, Sabwelera 2002). It offers the three-year National
Diploma in Maritime Studies and the one-year National Higher Diploma in
Maritime Studies which leads to a certificate of competency as a Navigation
Officer Class One.10
At full capacity the department can graduate sixty cadets per annum. Its 2001
student compliment was fifty. According to staff the shortage of training
berths forces them to operate under their full capacity.
7 According to Captain Parkinson of Maritime Studies at DIT, those in the industry felt that a tertiary qualification for marine engineering was not necessary and they withdrew their support from the technikons. As a result between 1992 and 2001 the qualification, at the lower level, was only available at Wingfield Technical College. 8 In order to offer the qualification marine engineer officer class one and two it is necessary that the modules are taught by someone with the qualification of chief engineer. 9 Previously students would undertake the studies and then present themselves for examination at SAMSA. However, with the introduction of the STCW-95 system they need to study at an accredited institution in order for their qualification to be STCW-95 accredited. 10 According to the head of department, Captain Parkinson the curriculum is under review. It is likely that in the future the National Diploma will provide the officer class one qualification, the Higher National Diploma will be phased out and replace by the B.Tech, however, the B.Tech will not be a STCW-95 requirement. He claims that shipping companies “don’t want NQF level 7 but are happy with master’s qualifications at NQF level 6” (personal communication).
- 24 -
In the past the department left it to students to find their own sea-time,
however, in the light of the difficulties of the past few years (see section 5.1.
p.28) they are now trying to establish links with shipping companies in order to
secure their commitment.
This year the department has, in conjunction with the Department of
Mechanical Engineering, reintroduced marine engineering qualifications.
Students are required to register for the three-year National Diploma in
Mechanical Engineering. Their first semester courses (each semester is six
months) are the same as the other mechanical engineering students.
However, from the second semester they begin to take marine options, these
are offered through the Department of Maritime Studies. In semester two,
three and four they are required to register for a variety of subjects that will
allow them to comply with the IMO requirements for marine engineering.
Presently the courses are not SAMSA accredited or recognised as STCW-95
compliant therefore at the end of four semesters students will present their
credits to SAMSA and sit an oral examination (administered by SAMSA). As
for deck officers the academic training needs to be followed by twelve months
sea-time (experiential learning). Successful candidates will then, according to
Captain Parkinson head of department, receive an IMO qualification for
Marine Engineering. As this is the first year (and as at the time of writing
students have not yet begun the second semester) the department was
unsure how many would take the marine options. DIT are in the process of
reapplying for accreditation with SAMSA but until this is finalised they are
following the old system of SAMSA examination.
(b) Cape Technikon The main training institution (for officer training) was set up in Cape Town in
1921 (Grutter, 1973). This was the General Botha College and in accordance
with the legislation at the time only enrolled white students11 – all of whom
were male. The College was handed over to Cape Technikon in 1990.
11 In line with policy at the time black students would only be admitted if special ministerial permission was sought. These applications were made through the shipping companies.
- 25 -
Enrolment figures show that since the mid-90s on average ninety percent of
students are male and sixty percent are white.
The Department of Maritime Studies at the Cape Technikon provides courses
leading to the three-year National Diploma in Maritime Studies. It also offers
the one-year National Higher Diploma in Maritime Studies, which leads to a
certificate of competency as a Navigation Officer Class One. Both these
diplomas also require a period of experiential training ie sea-time.
The department has increased the number of students in their programme by
50-60 percent in the past five years (Interview, Snyders & Stohr 2002),
whereas in 1996 they had twenty-eight students in a class, there are fifty-five
in 2002.
Cape Technikon has also reintroduced marine engineering training but on a
trial basis for the year (Communication, Snyders). To allow those engineers
already in the industry to upgrade their qualification for example, from a class
four engineer to a class two or one, they have introduced a number of block
courses. These are not the traditional technikon semester courses but are
organised to suit the industry as they release people from employment.12
These block courses are accredited by SAMSA and are STCW-95 compliant.
Currently they have a group of about twenty-five students enrolled, however,
according to Dr Snyders the numbers are growing all the time as people are
released from sea. In the future Cape Technikon might offer the dual
qualification of a National Diploma in Mechanical Engineering (Marine
Engineer. This qualification with sea-time would provide the marine
engineering qualification. Students would register for a National Diploma in
Mechanical Engineering and take the necessary maritime subjects. One of
the obstacles to introducing this course full-time is the difficultly with recruiting
qualified lecturing staff given the high wages that chief engineers can earn at
sea.13 Without the correctly qualified staff it will be impossible to get the
12 Please note the name changes that have occurred. Class four is now known as an engineer officer, class two as a second engineer officer > 3000 kilowatts and class one as a chief engineer > 3000 kilowatts. 13 According to Dr Snyders a chief engineer will earn the equivalent of R85000 per month tax free
- 26 -
courses accredited by SAMSA. If they were to introduce this dual qualification
they would then have to seek SAMSA accreditation for it.
Linked to the Department is the Cape Technikon Survival Centre. The
Survival Centre offers sea survival training, recruiting learners from the
aviation, fishing, merchant navy and offshore mining industries. This is a self-
funded centre and does not draw on any government subsidy. Courses are
offered at both the introductory or advanced level. The courses are governed
by SAMSA and IMO regulations and are STCW-95 compliant. Furthermore,
it is also an ISO 9001-approved centre by Lloyds.
4.2.3. Portnet Training Academy The Portnet Training Academy trains solely for the National Port Authority’s
needs.
“… our marine department has tug masters, smaller vessel masters, pilots, engineers, there is the crew on those vessels. We do have some internal training programmes where we can train people in ports on our craft from ratings through to master and then, we have training programmes for sea-going trainees for cadets, that’s where we rely to a large extent on the tertiary institutions to do the academics and then our people sail with shipping companies.” (Interview, Fritchley & Bandle 2002)
The courses offered by Portnet are STCW-95 compliant. They rely on
Unicorn Shipping and Safmarine for sea-time experience.
4.2.4. Naval training In 1966 merchant navy training was physically separated from naval training.
Prior to this both were conducted at the Gordon’s Bay based college but in
March 1966 merchant navy training moved to Granger Bay. Since then naval
training has been conducted at the South African Naval College at Gordon’s
Bay. The type of officer training offered by the South African Navy depends
on the previous qualifications of the candidate. Matriculants with the correct
matric subjects under-go an initial eight-week training period in which they
receive basic skills, thereafter they undergo assessment and go before the
officers selection board. All candidates, whether selected for officers training
which is five times a technikon lecturer’s salary.
- 27 -
or not do basic fire-fighting and damage control training in Simon’s Town.
Those candidates selected for officer’s training return to the SA Naval College
to begin a thirty-five week officer training course and become midshipmen.14
Those who were unsuccessful will either have their contracts terminated or
will be offered a two-year contract to serve the Navy as ratings.
Those who already had an appropriate diploma or degree enter a different
training path. Selected midshipmen receive twenty-three weeks training. The
first phase is a four-week course providing basic skills, knowledge and
attitudes. Upon completion they continue with nineteen weeks of officer
training. Senior ratings selected for officer training only participate in the
nineteen week officer training course.
The course content is divided into four groupings – officership (leadership,
management, divisional duties and naval officership), communications (naval
communications, instructional technique, communication and English), military
studies (including military law, SANDF and SA Navy organisations, SA Navy
mission, finance, logistics, intelligence, seamanship, boatwork, maritime
warfare amongst others) and environmental studies (including physical
oceanography, labour relations, naval history, computer skills, guard and
sentries amongst others). They also do practical training or sea-time. The
courses are very different to those undertaken at the Technikon although
there is some overlap. According to Sabwelera at the DIT navy vessel sea-
time does not constitute qualifying time for the merchant navy certificate of
competence requirement according to the STCW-95 convention.
Midshipmen who successfully complete officer training are given an
opportunity to select a specialisation from amongst combat officers, naval
engineers, personnel officers, finance officers, logistics officers and
intelligence officers. They also have an opportunity to receive tertiary training
which may be conducted at the Military Academy in Saldanha, Stellenbosch
University or Cape Technikon.
14 The equivalent to the cadet in the merchant navy.
- 28 -
5. THE PROBLEM OF TRAINING BERTH AVAILABILITY
Maritime training in South Africa has an excellent international reputation and
all the institutions and training centres are accredited institutions offering
STCW-95 compliant courses. However, the capacity of these training
institutions has not been matched by the availability of sufficient training
berths for significant numbers of trainees to gain the required amount of sea-
time. Whilst it is essential that South African ratings are equipped with
STCW-95 qualifications, and in particular black officers enter the labour
market there is little point in providing formal training in the absence of
opportunities to accumulate sea-time. The anomaly is that there is a shortage
of skilled seafarers in key areas such as tankers, particularly on regional
routes.
All training institutions, with the possible exception of the Unicorn Training
School, which is industry-linked and would train Unicorn ratings on demand,
require individual students to find their own training berths. Given the global
oversupply of ratings only very few, if any, are being trained for the merchant
navy (see Bonnin and Wood, 2001a and Bonnin and Wood, 2001b). The
situation for Technikon students has become direr over the last four years.
Portnet also reported problems with finding training berths for their cadets
(Interview, Fritchley & Bandle 2002).
Without access to training berths, potential seafarers are not able to utilise
their academic qualifications in the job market. The problem of an
increasingly limited number of training berths has been recognised by the
industry as grave.
"The lack of training berths is very serious, not at this stage with regard to ratings but with officers. There's not really a lack of berths for ratings. Any spare berth is presently taken up for cadet officer training. We haven’t had a requirement to train new ratings for Unicorn employment for two years now. When the need to surfaces, we will. Then the lack of berths [for ratings] will be a
- 29 -
serious problem". (Captain Johnsen, Head of the Unicorn Training School, cited in Bonnin & Wood, 2001a:52).
5.1. TRAINING INSTITUTIONS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING BERTHS
The exact nature of the problem can be understood when looking at the
figures supplied by technikons. Between 1996 and 2000 all students from
Cape Technikon were placed. However, in 2001 only two-thirds of the
students were placed. Natal Technikon claimed that 1999 was the first year
that all their students did not find a training berth (Interview, Sabwelera 2002).
Their students experienced problems with finding sea-time earlier than did
Cape Technikon students (see table 1 below). Natal Technikon also drew
attention to the compounded nature of the problem. Only twenty-five percent
of the 2000 graduates managed to find a training berth immediately. The
remaining seventy-five percent of the class eventually found training berths
the following year, however, their placement impacted on the possibilities of
the next group finding training berths with only thirty percent of the 2001
cohort finding training berths immediately.
Table 1: Technikon Student Placements, 1996-2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Berth No Berth No Berth No Berth No Berth No Berth NoCape Tech
22 100%
0 28 100%
0 13 100%
0 22 100%
0 33 100%
0 22 66%
11
DIT15 100%
100%
100%
25%
15 30%
35
According to the staff at DIT since 1996 there has been a decline in the
number of training berths offered, by Unicorn, Safmarine and Smit Pentow, to
DIT cadets. 1998 was the last year that the full complement of graduates 15 Unfortunately the Durban Institute of Technology was not able to provide us with more exact figures.
- 30 -
obtained training berths from these shipping companies. In 2000 only a
quarter of the cadet class were successful in attaining training berths, the
percentage increasing slightly in 2001 with thirty percent of the students
procuring berths. Those who did not secure births in 2000 did manage to get
them the following year, but of the 2001 cadets the majority are still without
berths and remain unemployed.
Cape Technikon only encountered problems in 2001, however over the last
five or six years Unicorn have not provided any training berths to their cadets
(Interview, Snyders & Stohr 2002).16 However their students did get training
berths from Maersk Safmarine but “that has all changed” (Interview, Snyders
& Stohr 2002) and smaller companies like Smit Pentow and De Beers took a
few. Those students who did not obtain training berths in 2001 have
continued with their academic training
“… suggested they do their T3 and T4 programme so they are not entirely lost with industry they are still accommodated in some way. … Not the ideal scenario perhaps but at least we are keeping them in the system. (Interview, Snyders & Stohr 2002)
However as Captain Stohr commented without the sea-time component the
academic qualifications “mean nothing”.
Portnet are also finding it increasingly difficult to find training berths for their
personnel on the cadet side.
“… Safmarine have gone to Maersk, so that option is diminishing, the number that they are taking on is much lower and then you find with Unicorn also out … it is becoming increasingly difficult to get berths.” (Interview, Fritchley and Bandle 2002)
5.2. REASONS FOR THE DECLINING AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING BERTHS
A wide range of reasons were identified by our informants as contributing to
the decline in the availability of training berths.
16 According to Unicorn Shipping they did recruit a Cape Technikon cadet in 1999 (Communication Richard Snook).
- 31 -
5.2.1. The Sale of Safmarine Many in the shipping industry regarded Safmarine as the pride of the South
African merchant navy. Formed in 1946 Safmarine was involved in the liner
trade as well as deep-sea dry-bulk. They owned a large number of vessels,
which were registered on the South African ships register. Safmarine also
made a major contribution to the training of South African seafarers and is
seen historically to have
“trained the majority of merchant navy seafarers for this country and also the maritime leaders serving ashore in the broader maritime industry through its Deck and Engineering cadetships” (Collins, 2001).
It had its own training centre and Safmarine trained-crew were well regarded
internationally.
In 1999 Safren (Safmarine and Rennies Holdings Limited formed in 1984)
unbundled when insurance giant Old Mutual sold its share. The shipping
group was split. Capital Finance (a Greek company) acquired the deep-sea
dry bulk side ie the non-liner side; they currently trade as the South African
Marine Corporation. The AP Moller Group acquired the liner shipping
interests and the trading name Safmarine.
There is widespread opinion in the industry that the sale of Safmarine has
denied training berths to South African cadets. Firstly, thirteen of the Safren
vessels were acquired by Capital Finance. Secondly, Safmarine vessels are
no longer on the South African ships register, with four of the last five ‘big
whites’ being taken off in April 2002.
“they have sold their last four ships, they have chartered them … so the number of berths availability has enormous implications.” (Interview, Snyders & Stohr 2002)
While the sale of Safmarine undoubtedly does have an impact on the number
of training berths available, it also needs to be read against the recent events
surrounding the South African ships register (see section 5.2.2. p.31).
Secondly, now that Safmarine is owned by a foreign company there is no
longer the exclusive provision of training berths to South African cadets.
- 32 -
5.2.2. The South African Ships Register The South African ships register is in a dismal state. According to most of our
informants the South African register has, with regard to blue water shipping,
all but collapsed. The register is, according to University of Cape Town
maritime lawyer John Hare (Interview, May 2002), ‘cluttered’ with small craft
and dominated by the fishing industry. While the fishing industry (they are
obliged to have a South African registration) brings employment and other
benefits to the economy; small craft bring few benefits and many costs as
they take up surveyor’s time. The situation with regard to ocean-going
vessels is very different. Over the last decade the few large vessels that were
on the South African register have withdrawn. Policy interventions to reverse
the situation and build an enabling environment have not resulted in the
necessary legislative changes or if they have these have not been instituted
swiftly enough.
Ships Registered
The vast majority of vessels registered on the South African Ships Register
are fishing vessels, there are also harbour vessels and a smattering of yachts.
In 2001 seven ‘big’ ships appeared on the South African Register (Steyn,
2001:2). A search of the latest ships’ register available from the South African
Maritime Authority (SAMSA), indicate that these included five vessels owned
by Safmarine Agencies (Maersk Constantia, SA Helderberg, SA Sederberg,
SA Winterberg, and Safmarine Oranje), one by Safmarine Pty Ltd (Safmarine
Vaal), and one by the South African Marine Corporation (Transvaal). De
Beers had two of its vessels registered (Coral Sea and Douglas Bay), while
Smit Pentow Marine had three (Sa Kuswag I, SA Kuswag II and SA Kuswag
IV), and Pentow Marine had one (Marine Excellence). The significant vessels
owned by Grindrod (Unicorn Shipping), Safmarine and the South African
Marine Corporation were all flagged offshore as were most of Smit Pentow’s
vessels. Many companies charter in their vessels (eg Grindrod) and in such
cases they have no say over the flagging of the vessel concerned. By 2002
the situation had worsened. De Beers Marine sold two of their vessels and
- 33 -
transferred the other four to Namibia as part of their agreement with the
Namibian Government. Safmarine had decided to remove from the South
African Register its five ‘big whites’ (the remaining liners on the South African
register). This, according to Bester (Interview, 2002), being a direct result of
government’s failure to promulgate the new legislation. In addition, after
some debate, Unicorn decided not to register two new acquisitions under the
South African flag.
Legislation
The issues affecting the national flag have been reviewed within the context of
an overall review of transport policy undertaken by government in the post-
1994 period. In August 1993 the government Committee of Inquiry into a
National Maritime Policy presented their report. The report highlighted a
range of problems (including the ships register, fiscal and labour matters) with
South Africa’s maritime industry and presented various recommendations
(RSA, 1993). Many of these recommendations were captured in the green
paper on National Transport Policy presented in March 1996 (RSA, 1996). In
August 1996 the Department of Transport presented the white paper, which
was accepted by cabinet in September 1997 (RSA, 1997). The white paper
provided a policy framework for a legislative review that would “contribute to
the release of the full potential of the maritime industry in South Africa and to
the modernisation of shipping administration in South Africa.”
One of the most important pieces of legislation that resulted was the Ship
Registration Act, No 58 of 1998. It is suggested by Steyn (2001:2) that the
new legislation was a response by government to criticism of the existing
legislation by industry speakers at the 1997 and 1999 National Maritime
Conference. This legislation was intended to replace the Merchant Shipping
Act (1951). It should be regulating the South African Ships Register and is
one of the key pieces of legislation affecting the national flagging issue. Yet
while the Act was passed by parliament in 1998 it is yet to be promulgated,
delaying the implementation of a new enabling environment and discouraging
ship owners from even considering registering vessels in South Africa.
- 34 -
The decreasing number of big ships registered on the South African Register
has, according to Steyn (2001) been blamed squarely on the restrictive
provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act (and more immediately on
government’s failure to act decisively). In particular Steyn identified three
problematic areas. Firstly, all ships of 25 GRT or more owned by SA
nationals were subject to mandatory registration on the SA Register.
Secondly, no ship where a non-South African held any of the possible 64
shares could be registered on the Register. And thirdly, only crew certified
according to the Merchant Shipping Act could be employed on a South
African ship ie only South African nationals or residents.
The new legislation is intended to bring in some significant changes to the
operation of the South African Ships Register (Steyn, 2001).
1. South African nationals are no longer obliged to register their ships on the
Register; the new legislation entitles them to do so.
2. In accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention that all ships must have
a nationality, the Act declares that all ships registered in terms of the Act
as well as unregistered ships, entitled to be registered, are South African
ships.
3. As long as the majority of the partners owning a ship are South African
nationals a ship may now be registered on the South African Ships
Register.
4. It is also now possible to register ships that are on bareboat charter to
South African nationals. However, the bareboat charter has to be for a
minimum of five years in order for it to be eligible for registration.
5. Small craft may now be registered; which allows them to be financed
subject to a registered mortgage. This right of registration is also extended
to foreign nationals who are resident or domiciled in South Africa.
It is suggested that the legislation has created a quality ship’s register, which
complies with the stringent requirements of the United Nations. Government’s
wish is that these changes will be sufficient to attract registrations back to the
South African flag. A short-coming of the changes according to one shipping
company is that the legislative amendments still do not allow for the dual
- 35 -
registration of ships. Many South African shipping companies charter vessels
and the flag of the vessel is determined by the owner. Unless the changes
that allowed for the registration of ships on bareboat charter to South African
nationals were expanded to allow for dual registration this change is likely to
be ineffective.
Despite these changes, the last few years have seen the few large remaining
vessels that were on the South African register leave, furthermore South
African shipping companies that were investigating the registration of their
ships under the South African flag have decided not to do so (Interview,
Unicorn).
A number of factors have resulted in this situation. Firstly, the failure of the
government to promulgate the Act has created disillusionment amongst key
industry players. Safmarine cited the non-promulgation of the Act as a key
reason behind their registration of ships elsewhere
“... the reason that the vessels are re-flagged is because of a timing issue in that the Department of Transport could not finalise the Ships Registration Bill. ... the company overseas could not wait indefinitely.” (Interview, Collins)
“... at the time of sale they couldn’t guarantee that the Act would be in place to re-register the ships in South Africa. Now the ships are of course all registered in the Bahamas, ...” (Interview, Bester)
However, besides the Ships Registration Act those in the industry have
indicated (see Steyn, 2001; interviews, Unicorn, Safmarine, Smit Pentow)
that there are other issues affecting the shipping industry that also play a role
in their decision of where to register vessels. In particular these are South
African income tax legislation, exchange control regulations and labour laws.
However also mentioned as important by informants are factors related to the
mortgage and the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act. In the interviews
shipping companies made it clear that the bundle of conditions in South Africa
do not permit an environment, which could successfully compete with flag-of-
convenience or second-flag registries. Until this was so it was highly unlikely
they would register their ships on the South African flag. One shipping
company expressed their views as such:
- 36 -
“... there is just no way we as a shipping company will move [to the South African flag], ... We just can’t compete [globally] if we have to pay tax here in South Africa.”
There seems to be a general feeling among South African shipping
companies that a change to a tonnage tax would be important factor in
encouraging ships to register with the South African flag. In essence tonnage
tax is calculated on the basis of the vessel’s size and is independent from the
companies profits or losses (Bertheau, 1997). This taxation system has been
introduced by a number of countries - Panama, Britain, Netherlands, Norway,
Greece and Singapore to name a few - with slight variations in each case (see
Bertheau, 1997; van Niekerk ,1997; Millard, 1999). In Millard’s (1999:7)
opinion tonnage tax is likely to ‘emerge as the standard tax for ship ownership
in the EU’.
This support for the introduction of tonnage tax initially expressed by the
South African Shipowners Association in 1995 (cited in Restis, 2001:9) was
reiterated in our interviews. The government has acknowledged the need to
review the way in which taxable income is calculated (RSA white paper,
1997). In 1997 the Department of Transport in collaboration with the
Department of Finance appointed experts to investigate and make
recommendations on a tax regime that would promote government efforts to
increase the number of ocean-going vessels on the South African register
(van Niekerk, 1997:7). However, despite the sentiment and these initiatives,
to date government have done nothing about this.
The second issue emerging from the interviews concerned exchange control
regulations. Shipping markets and assets are US dollar based, moving funds
in and out of a currency known for its weakness against the dollar increases
costs particularly in a capital intensive market like shipping (Restis, 2002:8).
Reserve bank permission needs to be sought to move large amounts of
money out of the country, which allows the Reserve Bank to effectively veto
the purchase of a vessel (Interview, South African Shipping Company Anon
2002). Furthermore, there is consensus amongst ship owners that there is
- 37 -
little chance of attracting significant foreign investment to the maritime
industry in a climate of exchange control regulation (cited in Restis, 2002:8).
South African labour laws were another problem area raised by shipping
companies. Once ships are registered in South Africa, employing South
African crew, they fall under South African labour legislation.17 In line with
international practises South Africa does not tax the earnings of seafarers
employed in international shipping (van Niekerk, 1997). However, the
concern expressed by shipping companies is that they are not then able to
test their crew for HIV/Aids.18 It is perceived that crew members who are
HIV+ are likely to be a risk in terms of exposing other crew members to the
virus through accidents at sea and furthermore, their costs are likely to
increase due to increased health care needs. According to Richard Snook
(communication) of Unicorn Shipping these perceptions have a real impact on
attempts find employment for South African crew internationally,
“The widespread international media coverage given to Aids in Africa, and the negative perceptions that accompany such coverage, is a barrier to the employment of South Africans by foreign shipowners. A few years ago when we were downsizing our fleet we tried to market our black ratings internationally. We had no joy and concerns were expressed regarding Aids. This is an obstacle that needs to be addressed.”
Under the ‘old’ legislation and the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act the South African
mortgage did not fit the requirements of international banks that finance the
purchase of vessels. The ships mortgage needs to be registered in the flag in
which the ship is registered (Interview, Hare 2002). The problem as stated is
17 The four main pieces of legislation are the Labour Relations Act (No 66 of 1995), the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (No 65 of 1997), the Employment Equity Act (No 55 of 1998) and the Skills Development Act (No 97 of 1998). 18 The Employment Equity Act (No 55 of 1998) states in section seven that medical testing of an employee is prohitited unless (a) legislation permits or requires the testing; or (b) it is justifiable in the light of medical facts, employment conditions, social policy, the fair distribution of employee benefits or the inherent requirements of a job. In section six the Act states that no person may be unfairly discriminated against on the basis of, amongst other things, HIV status. Any authorisation for HIV testing would be need to be sort from the Labour Court. The industry would have to demonstrate that it was an inherent requirement for the job (see Heywood, 2000). In a recent judement "A" vs South African Airways, SAA was ordered to offer employment to a man who had originally been denied employment because of his HIV status (Mail and Guardian, 28 September 2000).
- 38 -
that international banks are not prepared to finance a South African mortgage
as South African legislation is unique in ranking mortgage claims after claims
for necessary supplies (ie bunkers, fuel, stores). Previously Safmarine were
only able to obtain finance for their vessel purchases by providing additional
collateral. To some extent, according to Hare (Interview, 2002), this ‘problem’
was a misconception as the ranking only occurred when the ship was sold in
South Africa. Nevertheless, it has had serious implications for companies
wishing to register their vessels on the South African flag as international
banks were not prepared to grant finance under those circumstances
(Interview, Unicorn 2002). According to Richard Snook of Unicorn Shipping,
when sourcing finance for vessels shipowners are subject to the mortagee
bank’s requirements, and until such time as the ranking of mortgage claims
are addressed no bank will favour flagging a vessel in South Africa. This
problem was recognised by the white paper, which promised to ‘review the
ranking of claims under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act in line with
international practice and conventions’.
The 1998 Ships Registration Act changed the situation by ‘giving proper
status to the mortgage’ (Interview, Hare 2002). Furthermore a proposed
amendment to the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act altered the ranking of claims.
However, both of these legislative changes have not yet come into effect. As
discussed the Ships Registration Act has not been promulgated and the
amendment to section 11 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, expected to be
passed in 1999 (Hare, Lloyds List Africa Weekly, 6 November 1998), has ‘also
got stuck’ (Interview, Hare 2002).
It appears that before South Africa can hope to attract vessels to its flag the
legislative situation needs to be resolved. It is imperative that the Ships
Registration Act is promulgated and the amendments to the Admiralty
Jurisdiction Regulation Act settled. Furthermore, the South African
government needs to take the fiscal environment offered by other flags
seriously. Unless there are changes the South African register is not going to
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attract vessels – and if it does not attract vessels there is little chance of
increasing the number of training berths available to South Africans.
“… in line with our (Unicorn) greatly reduced fleet (primarily as a result of the Asian crisis and substantial losses suffered in the global shipping economy, we’ve come down from some sixteen ships to five now which has also reduced our cadet intake. That reduction in cadets is purely based on the fact there is a certain number of bunks on each ship. When those bunks are full, then you can’t carry any more. It’s as simple as that. Our ships are chock-a-block. I think the same can be said about the other South African shipping companies.” (Interview, Snook 2001)
Behind this inertia on the part of government lies, in the opinion of many, a
lack of commitment to developing South Africa as a maritime nation. This is
compounded by maritime issues falling under (and between) too many
government ministries - Department of Transport, Finance, Environmental
Affairs, Defence and Labour. While some feel that the battle for the South
African flag is lost because the government has left things so long (eg
Interview, Cox), others feel that through swift action the situation can still be
salvaged (eg Interview, Hare).
5.2.3. Registration of ‘South African’ Vessels on Other Registers Given the tax implications of flagging vessels on the South African Ships
Register as well as the requirements of international banks South African
companies have often had no alternative but to register their vessels on other
registers (see section 5.2.2. p.31). This could have implications for the
provision of training berths for South African cadets.
Many countries, for example the United Kingdom, which have implemented
tonnage tax link it to training (see section 7.2. p.56). Companies may register
their vessels on the United Kingdom Ships Register but in order to qualify for
tonnage tax they need to fulfil certain training requirements. By implication
South African companies that have vessels registered on the UK register are
providing training berths for British cadets. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that in many situations companies which are required to provide training for
foreign cadets in terms of their tonnage tax commitments do in fact outsource
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this training and treat it as part of their tonnage tax costs (Anonymous
source).
South African shipping companies were adamant that the registration of their
vessels in the United Kingdom under tonnage tax had not affected the number
of training berths available to South African cadets. However, this situation
does serve as a warning. It remains a possibility that in an environment
where registering on the South African flag continues to be unattractive or
even impossible (given the position of international financial institutions), and
thus South African shipping companies register their vessels on other flags,
particularly where they have their own training requirements, that some
training berths could become unavailable to South African cadets.
5.2.4. New Technologies The shipping industry, in common with most other industries, has not been
immune to the impact of new technologies. This has had a profound impact
on the restructuring of the shipping industry and employment. In 1991, the
Joint Maritime Commission recognised that the rise of new maritime
technologies has had a significant effect in reducing employment at sea (ILO
Report, 2001).
There have been many important technological breakthroughs in the shipping
industry such as an increase in ship size and speed. The development of
containerisation remains the most important development in cargo unitisation.
Even though container systems require an initial high level of investment they
more than make up for this in the turn around rate of cargo handling (Hemson,
2001; Interview, Snook 2001). Furthermore, containerisation provides a
“seamless link with other modes of transport” which fits it into the horizontal
and vertical integrationist nature of the new shipping company. Cellular
guides do away with significant amounts of dock labour since lashing of cargo
onto the vessel is only minimally, if at all required with containerisation. This
also reduces the turnaround time of ships at ports and hence the number of
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hours or days of labour for dock-workers (Hemson, 2001). Turnaround times
in single digit figures are now the norm for container services.
The development of the microchip, in the 1970s, saw the introduction of
computers to monitor and control engine room activity. This led to a reduction
in the engine room staff. The introduction of satellite communications has
also had major repercussions on ships’ crew. Ship management is now able
to communicate directly with shore management effectively reducing the
notion of line management. Also the introduction of electronic distress
communications has abolished the position of radio officer (ILO, 2001).
The effect of the new technologies on the labour market is not to be
underestimated. According to Richard Snook the crewing manager for
Unicorn Shipping (Interview, 2001), the size of crews since the introduction of
these new technologies has drastically diminished.
“In the old days ships were far more labour intensive and many were operating with large crews of a hundred plus. Now we are looking at a crew of twenty-three operating a 40 000 ton ship. That is quite feasible.”
The implication being that with the need for fewer crew, there would be fewer
training berths on vessels.
5.2.5. The Global Economic Crisis The Asian crisis of the late 1990s had an acute effect on the global shipping
industry and on South African shipping companies. Many shipping
companies had expanded their trade to Asia in order to meet the demands of
the growing Asian tiger economies. A large number of goods were being
traded, both for import and export, between these economies and the rest of
the world with much of this trade being sea-borne. When these economies
collapsed there was also a reduction in the requirement for ships to carry
goods to and from these countries. Overnight the shipping market became
overtraded, competition increased and margins were reduced.
“Ships were laid up all over, anchored up rivers even, with skeleton crews just to keep them ticking over.” (Communication, Snook 2002)
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In particular the container market was severely affected. According to Robert
Young of Unicorn Shipping, the rate at which one could ‘buy’ a feeder
container vessel dropped from US$14000 per day to US$6000 per day.
As a result many shipping companies and this was the case with South
African shipping companies as well (Interview, Unicorn) sold off vessels
during this period. Fewer vessels translated into fewer training berths.
Captain Stohr from Cape Technikon pointed to the “enormous slump in
shipping worldwide” (Interview, 2002) as being a major factor contributing to
the decline in training berths.
5.2.5. Racial Discrimination While South Africa has a long tradition of training seafarers, historically it has
tended to be fragmented, until the ending of apartheid, on racial lines. In the
absence of special ministerial permission officer training was not open to
blacks. The General Botha Maritime Academy19, located in the Cape, was in
line with Apartheid-education policy a whites-only institution. Black students20
were admitted upon application by shipping companies to the Department of
Internal Affairs. In the mid-1980s the government tried to introduce self-
regulation into tertiary institutions via a quota system for black students. The
proposed legislation was fiercely opposed by the white English-speaking
universities. After 1988 some universities began to openly defy government
policy and admitted black students without ministerial permission. However,
both the DIT21 and Cape Technikon22 only opened access to black students in
1996 (Interviews, Sabwelera 2002, Snyders & Stohr 2002).
19 See section 4.2.2. on officers training (p.22) and in particular part (b) on Cape Technikon (p.24). 20 This term is being used broadly to include Indians, Africans and coloureds. 21 The Department of Maritime Studies was established in 1979 at the former Natal Technikon. 22 The General Botha College was handed over to Cape Technikon in 1990.
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Ratings training was primarily industry-linked ie through Safmarine or Unicorn
or through the Training Centre for Seaman (see section 4.2.1. pp18-22) was
predominately black. This historical situation has resulted in a maritime
industry where the more skilled occupations are white-dominated and the
lesser skilled levels are black-dominated. This point is illustrated by table 2
(below) – unfortunately the latest figures available from Statistics South Africa
are for 1994, however while there would have been some changes in the last
eight years it is likely that the overall trends will still be similar.
Table 2: Merchant Navy Occupation by Race and Gender, 1994
African Coloured Indian White Total
T F T F T F T F
TOTALS 671 0 851 0 25 0 1320 4 2870
Sea Captain and related merchant navy supervisor
1 0 70 0 2 0 314 0 389
Navigator, helmsman 2 0 64 0 11 0 112 3 189
Ships’ engineer 26 0 178 0 9 0 384 1 597
Sailor, stoker, boatswain 282 149 0 104 0 0 0 28 0
Merchant navy occupations not elsewhere classified
493 0 435 0 3 0 482 0 1413
Source: Manpower Survey 1994 Occupational Information, CSS Report No 02-01-01 (1994)
Previous interviews have suggested deeply embedded racial, ethnic and
cultural stereotypes are still evident in certain quarters of the shipping industry
(Bonnin & Woods, 2001b).23 Furthermore, black students still have to contend
with labour market disadvantage24 (Standing, 1996:385-418) whereby maths
23 Note this is not only at the South African level but also internationally. 24 There are many labour market mechanisms that contribute to the racial and gendered fragmentation of the South African labour market. Discrimination in employment is defined by the ILO as a distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, gender, sex etc (Standing, 1996:382). However, often the playing fields at the time of entry into the labour market are not equal and this is where the notion of labour market disadvantage is useful. Standing (1996:386-401) in his study of the South African labour market identifies seven forms of labour market disadvantage. These are unequal schooling and training, recruitment practices, occupational crowding, sector of employment, work status, income and worker representation insecurity.
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and science education at matric level (a prerequisite for entry into tertiary level
maritime studies) at schools located in former black areas is limited.
The Maritime Studies Department at the Durban Institute of Technology
(formerly Technikon Natal) alleges that discrimination against black graduates
dominates recruitment attitudes and this is the main reason that their students
have been unable to obtain training berths.
“... in sum we offer a majority of black cadets and South African shipping companies have reservations about taking on black cadets.” (Interview, Sabwelera 2002)
This is counter to the experience of Cape Technikon. Cape Technikon has
had no trouble placing their black cadets. In the past five years the
percentage of previously disadvantaged students have ranged from 22-55
percent of the class. All have found training berths with the exception of
eleven students in 2001, of which nine are white.
Both Safmarine and Unicorn Shipping disagree with the view that they
discriminate against black cadets. They point to their current crop of cadets.
There are eighty South Africans in the AP Moller pool of one thousand two
hundred cadets, of these thirty-three (forty-one percent) are white, twenty-
seven (thirty-four percent) are black, sixteen (twenty percent) are coloured
and four (five percent) are Asian (Collins, 2001). Furthermore, since 1995
Safmarine have launched a career awareness programmes to attract African
youth and students to careers at sea with the intake of African cadets
beginning in 1996. Fifty-six percent of cadets recruited since 1996 have been
from designated groups, with twenty-seven percent being African (Safmarine,
2002).
Unicorn Shipping opened their cadet scheme to black candidates in 1974. On
behalf of the candidates they applied to the Minister for permission for them to
study at white institutions. According to Richard Snook of Unicorn
“from the documentation on file it seemed like a routine request with routine approval.”
Currently (in 2002) there are twenty-six cadets under training by Unicorn, this
includes cadets being trained by Unicorn on behalf of third parties ie National
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Ports Authority, Namport and De Beers. Of these twenty-six cadets sixty-five
percent are black, fifteen percent are Indian, twelve percent coloured and
eight percent white.
5.3. CONCLUSIONS
As can be seen from the various issues discussed in this section different role
players have different perceptions and understandings of the reasons
underlying the shortage of training berths. Nevertheless, for those providing
the academic component of the training the shortage has reached crisis
proportions. Durban Institute of Technology says that if they are not able to
secure sufficient training berths for their students they may have to move from
training seafarers to training for shore-based maritime jobs (Interview,
Sabwelera 2002). While Cape Technikon staff believe that the Technikon can
no longer recruit and train students to cadet level if training berths are not
forthcoming.
“… We are reaching critical stages and if we lose this institution it is going to be a terrible day for South Africa. … if I tell our director at the end of the year there are thirty-five private students and there are only five or four taken and the rest are floating around, so can you push them up one level, at least in the next class, it will cost them a lot of money. And we do that a couple of year, I think he will say no, maritime studies is finished, because it’s immoral. … but we are sitting now with that problem and I think we must act before there are executions.” (Interview, Snyders & Stohr 2002)
All of the factors identified above have had a role to play in creating the
shortage of training berths. The reality is that there are fewer large merchant
navy vessels on the South African ships register. These are the vessels that
are required for training if the cadet wishes to acquire an open certificate. The
reasons for this have been documented; they include the problems with the
register, which encourages companies to register offshore and the sale of
Safmarine. This situation, compounded by the overall reduction of crew on
vessels (ie fewer berths on the vessel anyway) and the global economic
climate (which resulted in the sale of vessels) has led to fewer training berths
being available. In the current economic climate shipping companies have
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reassessed their priorities and according to Dr Snyders (Interview, 2002) of
Cape Technikon
“… the writing was on the wall in May of 2001 at the (maritime) conference where the vessel owners said look guys our core field is not training … “
It is against the backdrop of a decrease in the number of training berths that
educational institutions – trying to meet the demands for transformation and
economic viability – are increasing the number of students in their
programmes. For example between 1996 and 2002 student numbers at Cape
Technikon increased by ninety percent. Thus an increasing number of
students are entering a cadet labour market characterised by a shrinking
number of training berths.
While the allegations of overt racial discrimination in the cadet recruitment
process are not borne out by the cadet figures supplied by Safmarine and
Unicorn (or the experiences of Cape Technikon), the declining availability of
training berths does have implications for the transformation of the shipping
industry as a whole. South Africa’s apartheid past has resulted in a racially
skewed labour market in the shipping industry as in all other sectors of the
South African economy, it will become difficult to correct these patterns in a
situation where there are decreased training, and given the close relationship
between training and employment in the shipping industry, by implication
employment, opportunities.
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6. SHIPPING COMPANIES AND TRAINING BERTHS
South African shipping companies Safmarine and Unicorn traditionally formed
the backbone of cadet training. Smit Pentow offered some training berths,
however, the drawback is that they work in a specialised field and so cadets
would have restrictions on their certificates (Interview, Snyders and Stohr
2002).
The recommended benchmark for cadets is that one should be recruited
annually for every fifteen officers employed.
6.1. UNICORN SHIPPING / GRINDROD
Grindrod Shipping Services comprise shipowning, operating and bulk
shipping. There are five operations within the group. Unicorn Shipping is the
ship-owning and operating arm of Grindrod. Unicorn Lines concentrates on
coastal liner shipping. Island View Shipping focuses on bulk shipping and is
the largest bulk shipping operator in South Africa. Southern Tankers (a joint
empowerment venture with Dudula Shipping) focuses on petrochemical
shipping and was formed to serve the southern African oil industry. Quadrant
Container Line concentrates on container shipping.
The crewing and training component falls under Unicorn Shipping. The
average number of training berths per vessel is three. According to Richard
Snook Unicorn Crewing Manager (Interview, 2002).
“the number of berths per vessel has remained constant, but the size of our fleet has reduced quite substantially. It has come down from about eighteen ships in 1997 to a fleet of four of five. So that has obviously had an impact on the number of berths that we have available.”
According to Unicorn the reduction in their fleet has been the only factor
responsible for the reduction in the number of training berths they offer. This
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was as a result of the decision to withdraw from the highly competitive and
oversupplied container shipowning market following the Asian crisis and the
selling of old and diverse dry cargo tonnage in favour of new tankers and
other vessels (see section 5.2.5. p.40). It should be noted that this reduction
coincides with Cape Technikon’s observation that Unicorn have offered a
minimal number of training berths to their students over the last five years.
Unicorn has provided training berths for students from the Durban Institute of
Technology. They also provide cadet training berths for Portnet, Namport and
De Beers (Interview, Snook 2001). However in 2001 they only recruited an
additional two new cadets for future Unicorn employment.
“because we already have a cadet programme of twenty-five odd cadets, which is a large number of cadets in relation to the number of ships we have in our fleet.” (Interview, Snook 2001)
Unicorn shipping employs fifty-five to sixty officers which according to the
norm translates into a recommended cadet contingent of twelve over three
years. Their current numbers put them at double the recommended norm.
On the whole Snook is optimistic about the future of crew training. He
pointed to a number of new initiatives that signal Unicorn is about to enter a
growth period.
“Southern Tankers has a new building tanker on order and one of the requirements for that tanker is that it has a good number of training berths. So between that and further plans that we have to start slowly expanding our fleet again, I am actually quite positive about the outlook. (Interview, Snook 2002)
It should be noted that this tanker is only due for delivery in 2004 (Grindrod,
2001). A subsequent order has been placed for an additional tanker which
will also be due for delivery in 2004 (Communication, Snook).
The 2001 Grindrod Annual Report mentions other developments in the
company. Two Chinese newbuilding handysize bulk carriers are due for
delivery in 2002. Island View Shipping has also recently chartered eight
handysize bulk carriers with various shipowners, including two vessels from
Unicorn Shipping. However, the question that arises is where will these be
- 49 -
flagged and will they have any training capacity for South African cadets. In a
recent interview with representatives from Unicorn shipping (Interview,
Unicorn 2002) they indicated that the current situation with the South African
register had forced them not to consider registering the two new vessels on
the South African flag and that they had flagged them abroad.
“Although partly owned by Unicorn, these vessels will not be operated, managed or crewed by Unicorn. There will, however, be training berths available on these vessels.” (Interview, Unicorn 2002)
6.2. SAFMARINE
The Safren liner business was sold to the Danish company AP Moller /
Maersk and currently trades as the separately-managed company Safmarine
Pty Ltd. Liner shipping services are offered to all parts of the world.
Safmarine is one of the largest north/south operators and is rapidly expanding
into the east/west trade lanes. It has a fleet of some forty owned and
chartered vessels, which transport a diverse range of commodities.
The size of the Safmarine fleet varies which allows for different training berth
configurations. Five of their vessels will take between six and seven cadets;
however, other vessels only have space for two cadets. Deanne Collins the
Safmarine Marine Training Projects Manager also noted a decrease in
training berth availability in her company.
“The training berths are getting less and less and less with the sale of vessels. Before the sale of Safmarine’s liner and non-liner businesses to different overseas companies, we had twenty-four vessels under our technical management. Since then we had eleven liner vessels under our management and are now down to nine vessels. From one hundred and nineteen training berths (with eleven vessels) we are now down to eighty-three training berths on board the vessels.” (Interview, Collins 2002)
It does seem as if the sale of Safmarine has indeed had a negative effect on
the availability of training berths. However, since ‘the sale’, the sale of three
of their larger vessels, each with the capacity for ten training berths, has
compounded the impact as Safmarine’s training capacity dropped by thirty.
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However Collins notes that as the
“training comprises different components, if you are creative in how you logistically schedule sea and shore appointments, you are able to help all of those to obtain sea-time. So we keep an eye on our forward schedule all the time and look for all opportunities that may exist, for example request the Master to transfer any of his cadets across to another vessel without of course compromising the safety or the numbers. So we continue to manage that process and that is a job all on its own as we have to prepare the trainee for a sea appointment ie book flights, ensure travel and medication certificates are valid, complete statutory documentation all as part of the administrative process. … In July we appoint another group, those that were not available for appointment in January. Included are four from Simon’s Town High School who had to complete subject rewrites for their Maritime Studies course. We have already appointed all of the seven SAMSA cadets who are now getting their sea-time. We bring our first year engineer cadets ashore in July, so it is never a constant. … because the training programme is structured between sea and college phases so you have to carefully and creatively plan ahead to meet training and berth requirements.” (Interview, Collins 2002)
Through careful logistical planning Safmarine is managing to accommodate
eighty-three cadets even though they only have fifty berths.
Safmarine has provided training berths for students from the Durban Institute
of Technology and Cape Technikon. These students are required to fill in
application forms and are accepted on the basis of a rigorous selection
interview.
“they interview them one-by-one for about one-and-a-half hours depending ...they do tests generated and evaluated by Maersk Denmark in basic maths, science and English language.” (Interview, Snyders & Stohr 2002)
They are also providing the training berths for SAMSA’s marine surveyor
training programme based at the Durban Institute of Technology.25 They
conduct deep-sea navigational courses for the South African Navy.
Safmarine provide the sea-time components for Portnet’s pilots, tug masters
and port operations personnel. Over the last six years they have carried out
the training for Namibia’s Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources coastal
patrol fleet up to Command level. They have trained the officers for De Beers
25 A total of thirty students were recruited. Their sea-time is staggered with their academic training. Not all of them are at sea at the same time.
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- now that De Beers are so heavily engaged in Namibia these are mostly
Namibians - and they also work closely with Smit Pentow. They have
provided deck officer training for the Ivory Coast (Safmarine, 2002).
Safmarine is also involved with maritime studies at school level. It sponsors
the maritime studies department at Simon’s Town School. Currently there are
ninety students in grades ten to twelve doing maritime studies.
Their current training budget is R18.6 million. Fourteen million is allocated to
officers and ratings and R4.6 million to cadet training. Since 1996 they have
recruited a total of 196 cadets for deck and engineering officer training. Of
these forty-five were African officer trainees, thirty-eight coloureds and eleven
Indians. Those who have already qualified include twenty-two Africans,
twenty-four coloureds and two Indians (Safmarine, 2002).
Safmarine has applied to the Transport Education Training Authority (TETA)
for the registration of their deck and engineering cadetships as learnerships,
they hoped this would entitle them to funding from the National Skills
Development Fund (Collins, 2001).26
6.3. SMIT PENTOW
Smit Pentow Marine is a leading provider of specialist marine services in
Southern Africa. Smit Pentow resulted from the purchase by Smit
International of Rotterdam of the Pentow Group. They are involved in marine
(including ocean towage, salvage and emergency marine response, offshore
oilfield support and oil pollution abatement); terminals (turn-key Offshore
Tanker Terminal operations providing single point of responsibility); bunker
delivery (the in-port delivery of marine fuels and lubricants to ships); subsea
26 Unfortunately learnerships can only be registered if Unit Standards are in place. Currently no officer or ratings Unit Standards exist for either deck or engineering cadets or ratings. Given this situation funding can only be requested from the TETA for Training Programmes. For the 2001/2002 year Discretionary Grant Applications were approved for four companies, claims where approved totalled R1 477 699 for seventy-two learners for the training of both officers and ratings for deck and engineering. (Communication , Jackie Stemmers TETA)
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(technical underwater services and support); and, ship management (the
provision of manning, maintenance and management services). Their fleet
consists of two deep-sea salvage tugs, several anchor handling tugs and
supply vessels as a fleet of oil pollution patrol and abatement vessels and a
patrol aircraft (a total of seventeen vessels). These are work boats and do not
carry any cargo (www.smitmarine.co.za ; Interview, MacLennan 2002).
Smit Pentow’s training operation is based in Cape Town. They manage a
fleet of twenty-nine vessels, with seven or eight permanently based in Cape
Town and three based in Durban. There are approximately two training
berths available on each vessel and four on the scientific vessels they
manage for the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA). However, at
least three of their vessels have a very small crew complement and there is
insufficient space for cadets. Unlike the other companies Smit Pentow’s
training berth capacity has increased slightly over the past two years. This
has been as a result of the increase in the DEA fleet.
Smit Pentow run work vessels and if cadets do their sea-time on these
vessels only they will get restrictions on their certificates (Interview, Snyders &
Stohr 2002). Currently they have a total of sixteen cadets, nine taken on in
2001 and seven recruited in 2002. Smit Pentow have historically recruited
from Cape Technikon as the logistics of managing Durban-based cadets out
of Cape Town was just too costly. However this year they reconsidered this
decision and seven of their intake were Durban Institute of Technology
students (Interview, MacLennan 2002).
According to MacLennan (Interview, 2002) Smit Pentow are committed to
training.
“… from a company point of view we have identified the need to train, we are busy talking to our parent company about expanding our training base in South Africa and it is to meet our own manpower requirements. We have made an assumption that we will be growing and hence we need to get our act together for that growth, to anticipate that growth.”
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Smit Pentow are also discussing the possibility of their parent company in
Holland taking on South African cadets on their ships. However, no decision
has been reached on this as yet (Interview, MacLennan 2002).
6.4. DE BEERS MARINE AND DE BEERS MARINE NAMIBIA
De Beers Marine and De Beers Marine Namibia are world leaders in off-shore
exploration and mining. In 2000 De Beers signed an agreement with the
Namibian Government and the Namdeb Diamond Corporation to form De
Beers Marine Namibia. Namdeb Diamond Corporation is owned in equal
shares by the Namibian government and De Beers Centenary AG. Namdeb's
predecessor, Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM), was a wholly owned
subsidiary of De Beers until 1994. (www.namdeb.com/operations)
De Beers Marine’s four mining vessels, which operated on contract for
Namdeb, have been transferred to De Beers Marine Namibia in which
Namdeb has a thirty percent interest. In return De Beers Marine will be the
exclusive marine contractor of Namdeb until 2020. Namibian law requires a
commitment to the employment and training of Namibian citizens and eighty
percent of their trainees are Namibian. This has implications for South
Africans and De Beers Marine no longer recruits South African cadets.
According to Captain Hagan of De Beers Marine, they employ approximately
thirty-two cadets (Interview, 2002). Deck cadets are seconded to Unicorn
Shipping amongst others in order to obtain sea-time while steaming. If the
cadets only do sea-time on De Beers vessels they will get a mining-endorsed
ticket on their certificates (Interview, Hagan 2002). Many of their cadets are
sent to Cape Technikon and Wingfield Technical College as sponsored
students to do their academic training.
De Beers Marine Namibia has over the last few years increased the number
of cadets they have recruited. In 2002 alone they recruited an additional six
cadets.
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“… the company has split and the majority of ships are now registered in Namibia. Namibian labour legislation requires Namibians to be employed on Namibian registered vessels. Currently De Beers Marine is training and developing as many Namibians as possible. In fact we haven’t taken any South African cadets this year.” (Interview, Hagan 2002)
6.5. ATTEMPTS BY TRAINING INSTITUTIONS TO FORGE NEW LINKS
With the exception of Smit Pentow all the shipping companies that have
traditionally provided training berths for South African cadets have decreased
the number of training berths available. The results, as have been discussed,
were that students unable to complete their qualifications. In the light of this
scenario the technikons had to look at securing training berths from other
sources.
“… up to now we are sort of very tied up to our local national marine industry … the weak link at the moment is the ship owners and especially South African ship owners, now I am saying we have to look for new partners in this whole game.” (Interview, Snyders & Stohr 2002)
Cape Technikon feel that they have exhausted “every opportunity”. They
have managed to secure a few berths on a company called TK Tankers.
Another company operating off-shore in Angola called Tidewater will also take
a few of their students. A number of foreign students register for their course,
however, these students usually already have placements. According to Dr
Snyders and Captain Stohr (Interview, 2002) it is the South Africans who need
assistance.
The Durban Institute of Technology together with SAMSA managed to secure
training berths for their marine surveyor students with Safmarine. While
Safmarine is not technically a new partner, this was a new scheme and
shipping companies were unprepared for the influx of thirty students who
would require training. DIT also managed to secure training berths for their
students with Smit Pentow – again not traditionally associated with DIT
“… and even Pentow Marine last year after much badgering.” (Interview, Sabwelera 2002)
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According to Sabwelera (Interview 2002) DIT have been in negotiations with
P&O Nedloyd27 to accommodate their students in training berths. They have
made a number of presentations to the parent company in Belgium and are
hoping to secure ten training berths.
Both technikons feel that the South African government needs to intervene in
this issue as the level of negotiation required needs to be at a higher level.
For example, suggest Cape Technikon, the government could negotiate
bilateral agreements similar to the one that Indonesia has with P&O Nedloyd
whereby they train a number of Indonesian cadets every year (Interview,
Snyders & Stohr 2002). DIT, however, suggested legislated interventions
around training berth provision (Interview, Sabwelera 2002).
6.6. FOREIGN SHIPPING COMPANIES A large number of foreign-based shipping companies are involved in trade
between South Africa and international destinations. The most well known of
these companies are P&O Nedloyd, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC)
and MACS Lines. These companies have offices in all of South Africa’s major
ports. As large global companies their vessels operate worldwide including to
South African ports and increasingly take feeder cargo up and down the
South African coast. MSC is the second largest global carrier in respect of
the number of vessels it operates (www.mscgva.ch).
According to their website P&O Nedloyd concentrate their cadet training in the
United Kingdom and The Netherlands. While the Dutch section is not
specific, one of the entry requirements for the UK programme is that cadets
must be British nationals, preferably resident in the United Kingdom.
“Our cadet training schemes rely on the provision of UK government grants and consequently applicants must be UK nationals normally resident in the UK.” (www.ponl.com)
27 P&O Nedloyd are a large international shipping company, the result of a merger between a British and Dutch company. Its vessels operate worldwide including to South African ports and increasingly it takes feeder cargo up and down the South African coast.
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See below (section 7.2, p.56) for a discussion of the training requirements
linked to tonnage tax.
According to Porcia Groenewald, P&O Nedloyd Skills Development Facilitator
in Cape Town, she is not aware of any South African cadets on P&O vessels.
Her office has recently launched a graduate recruitment programme focussing
on shore-based training and this is where their efforts are at the moment. In
her opinion it is unlikely that P&O through its South African offices will be able
to offer cadet-training berths in the near future (Telephone discussion,
Groenewald, 2002).28
6.7. SHIPPING COMPANIES PERCEPTIONS OF TRAINING INSTITUTIONS
Other than Smit Pentow who expressed a preference for Cape Technikon
students on the basis of logistics, it was strongly stated by shipping
companies that it was the student who was evaluated and not the institution
from which they came. According to Snook (Interview, 2002) at Unicorn
“Our company has recruited cadets from both organisations and recruits from both have gone on to do pretty well, with one or two exceptions in both cases.”
If we have the right applicants it doesn’t matter where they come from. First and foremost I want to see quality. (Interview, Collins 2002)
Smit Pentow did express a preference for Cape Technikon students
“because of the convenience of managing the whole operation … I mean to have somebody having to fly up to Durban once a month to see that the youngsters are doing what they are supposed to be doing and keeping in touch with the training institutions is not as logical as doing it in Cape Town where you just pop down the road whenever it suits you …” (Interview, MacLennan 2002)
However, in the light of criticisms by the Durban Institute of Technology that
they were marginalising Durban students Smit Pentow considered the issue
28 Note she was unaware of the DIT discussions with P&O Nedloyd's Belgium office.
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carefully. This year (2002) they have taken seven cadets from Natal and one
from Cape Technikon.
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7. EVALUATING POLICY OPTIONS 7.1. THE SOUTH AFRICAN SHIPS REGISTER
The research has indicated that the inertia surrounding the South African
ships register has been a key factor in reducing the number of training berths
available. Companies that might have registered vessels on the South
African register changed their minds given the lack of movement with regard
to promulgating the Ships Register Act and bringing fiscal matters in line with
the international norms associated with successful registers.
Related to this is the link that a number of European countries have created
between registration, tonnage tax and training.
7.2. LINKING TONNAGE TAX AND TRAINING
Since the 1970s the number of European seafarers has been steadily
declining, due to the restructuring of the shipping industry. The rise of flag of
convenience (FOC) shipping has made the hiring of labour from the
developing world economically more attractive to shipping companies. A
consequence of the trend to move away from employing seafarers from the
traditional maritime nations of Europe is a decline in the number of skilled
European seafarers. According to Brownrigg et al (2001) European training
providers and government transport departments are concerned that as the
need for seaborne trade increases, European shipowners will be forced to rely
on and employ ‘non- European’ seafarers. Furthermore, the European Union
Commission into Merchant Navy Training and Employment is afraid that
besides having a negative impact on job opportunities for European seafarers,
there will be a loss of technical knowledge and skills as the pool of European
seafarers continues to decline and increasingly ages.
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Members of the European Union (EU) have, since 1998, actively promoted
the maritime professions in their countries as a means of attracting new
seafarer trainees. This serves to increase the available pool of European
seafarers in addition to ensuring that maritime skills are maintained within
Europe. The move to recruit new candidates was integrated with a move by
European governments to engage European ship owners in a more proactive
way to ensure the training and employment of new recruits, through the
implementation of tonnage tax (see section 7.2.2. p.58).
According to the EU commission, the first step in increasing the pool of
European seafarers is to promote the maritime profession to potential new
recruits. It is by doing this that a country develops a ‘maritime tradition’.
7.2.1. British Shipping: Chartering a New Course In 1998 the United Kingdom’s Department of Transport’s Environment,
Transport and Regional Affairs Committee’s report on The future of the United
Kingdom’s shipping industry stated,
“We believe that the case for ensuring that the United Kingdom has a strong shipping industry, and particularly a successful register and a large number of seafarers is overwhelming.” (Paragraph 32: The Tonnage Tax Training Commitment, Trojanowska, 1999)
Responding positively to the findings of the commission the British
Government subsequently published a document containing thirty-three action
points. There were designed to:
Develop the United Kingdom’s maritime skills.
Secure British seafarer employment.
Make the United Kingdom’s ship register more attractive to ship owners.
Furthermore, the Committee suggested that seafarer training could not be
divorced from seafarer employment and a successful national ships register.
Hence any plan to deal with training or employment also had to engage with
policies to make national ship registers more attractive to ship owners. It is
this integrated approach to training that makes the implementation of tonnage
tax as a training intervention so feasible.
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Tonnage tax is a fiscal system that allows companies to have their taxable
profits from shipping activities determined at fixed rates by reference to the
tonnage of their ships, rather than by reference to their variable profits.
Hence a flat tax rate is levied what ever the performance of the shipping
company. Companies enrol or agree to be taxed according to this method for
a ten year period, at the end of which they can elect to renew with the register
or reregister elsewhere.
On the one hand tonnage tax attempts to be fiscally rewarding for ship
owners, on the other hand however, it consists of a bundle of measures to aid
in the training and employment of seafarers. In the United Kingdom
legislation to this effect was passed in January 2000 (Dirks, 2002).
7.2.2. The Tonnage Tax Minimum Training Commitment A condition of acceptance into the UK tonnage tax regime is that a company
or group of companies has to agree to provide training for seafarers. The
company also has to provide or fund training berths for an agreed number of
cadets, depending on the size of its fleet and the number of officers it
employs. It will also be asked to consider a set of measures to develop
ratings.
This process falls into three stages. Firstly, the company calculates the
number of officer training berths it will have to provide and specifies the types
of trainees it plans to recruit to fill them. It submits similar plans for ratings.
The Department of Transport must approve the company’s plans before they
can apply for tonnage tax. Secondly, the company tracks the trainees on a
month-to-month basis to ensure that the original training commitment
continues to be met. Thirdly, the company calculates any adjustments
needed to maintain the minimum training commitment. This may involve
making a payment if the number of trainees has fallen below the original
commitment or the number of ships entered for tonnage tax has increased.
Adjustment monitoring reports are submitted every four months.
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Under this regime each company commits to a Core Training Commitment
(CTC). This constitutes an annual plan, produced by the shipping company
and approved by the Department of Transport, setting out the companies
training obligation and detailing how it will be met. The legislation recognises
that there are instances where some companies will be unable to provide in-
house training. In such cases, the first option should be to contract out the
training. Where this is not possible, a company may upon approval of the
Department of Transport, discharge itself of the CTC by a ‘Payment in Lieu of
Training’ (PILOT) to the Maritime Training Trust. In such a case the company
would need to provide substantial evidence for its inability to comply with the
Minimum Training Obligation (MTO) and CTC.
With regard to officers the MTO is to train one cadet per year for every fifteen
deck and engineer officer posts in the company’s effective officer
complement. In order to calculate the officer total, every deck and engineer
officer post is included regardless of the nationality of the present incumbent
or the flag of the vessel. Companies chartering in or chartering out vessels
also have a MTO in respect of such vessels. Exceptions only occur where
vessels are chartered between companies within a tonnage tax group. In
such cases the training obligation applies once to each vessel entered by the
company into the tonnage tax system (Brownrigg et al, 2001).
The MTO with regard to ratings requires that companies review annually the
ratings development and employability options put forward by the Ratings
Task Force (a tripartite group consisting of unions, government and industry
and chaired by the Chamber of Shipping).
The United Kingdom’s and European Union’s tonnage tax legislation states
that only EU nationals, or in the case of the UK, British citizens from the
Channel Islands or Isle of Man, are eligible to participate in the MTO and can
be legitimately counted against the officer training commitment of the tonnage
tax system. 7.2.3. South African Ship Companies and Tonnage Tax
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As Section 5.2.2 shows there is support amongst South African shipping
companies for the introduction of tonnage tax. Furthermore, some shipping
companies are flagging their vessels abroad and participating in the tonnage
tax system.
Opinion amongst those we interviewed was that such a regime provided a
positive example for South Africa.
“I am sure if this country had to do something similar, offer an attractive tonnage tax type scheme to ship owners, and if we could attract more ship owners to flag in South Africa it would increase the number of berths available for training. The training requirement is attached to the vessels being registered in terms of a tonnage tax scheme … I am sure that if South Africa offered such a scheme we could expand the South African flag and expand training and employment opportunities as well.” (Interview, Snook 2002)
7.3. USING THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY
In some countries, for example the Philippines the national navy has assisted
in providing sea-time (Interview, Hagan 2002). Thus an option would be to
explore if the South African navy would be able to assist training institutions
with sea-time.
Previous agreements between the Navy and Safmarine were referred to
where Safmarine cadets did fire fighting training at the Navy training
establishments in Simon’s Town and in return Safmarine offered astro-
navigation training to Navy officers (Interview, Snook 2002).
The role of the navy could only be limited, as given the specificities of their
vessels; they can only offer certain aspects of the training. However, as
Safmarine’s Collins (Interview) noted it is possible through careful logistical
planning to fit more cadets into fewer berths thus despite these limitations it
would, with careful planning, still be possible to utilise the Navy for certain
aspects of sea-time.
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Opinion on the desirability of using the Navy to provide sea-time for merchant
navy cadets varied.
“I would say that the experience that we have had with ex-South African Navy Officers that are now working of us, it that the culture is totally different and because the culture is so different I believe that you will be losing from both if you combine that. Their focus is different, they are geared up for a different kind of training… Based on my experience on how does the Navy guy think, I would hate to get cadets that have been trained by them.” (Interview, MacLennan 2002)
“I think if the South African Navy received funding from other departments they would probably be more than happy to assist. I know that they have mine sweepers, for example which are under utilised and which provide very good training platforms from a seamanship and a coastal navigation point of view. The combat support vessels (SAS Drakensberg and Outeniqua) would probably be better suited to assist with merchant navy cadet training as they involve a fair amount of cargo work and size-wise they are similar to the average merchant vessel. Although there are similarities between navy and merchant navy officer training there are also distinct differences. They majority of navy vessels provide very little exposure to cargo handling which is an integral part of the merchant navy officer’s job. By the same token, the average merchant vessel provides few shiphandling opportunities to officers down the line and obviously no exposure to naval tactics, manoeuvring and warfare. Bridge and engine room watchkeeping, shiphandling, navigation, seamanship, fire fighting and first aid are examples of areas where commonality exists between the navy and the merchant navy training requirements. These common training requirements offer scope for co-operation with the Navy.” (Interview, Snook 2002)
“My personal view is that we are missing a golden opportunity here … but unless the qualification is somehow merged, it would be unfair to expect the Navy to provide training berths for merchant seafarers and vice versa. The qualification structure in both areas I believe needs to addressed.“ (Interview, Collins 2002)
Two constraints to co-operation were mentioned. Firstly the Navy would
require funding if it were to participate in such training. Currently, the Navy is
operating under serious financial constraints and it appears to be
experiencing difficulty in meeting its own training and operational
commitments (Interview, Snook 2002, Snyders & Stohr 2002). Secondly, it
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was suggested that the Navy itself is in a training crisis (Interview, Zaaiman
2002, Collins 2002). Due to fiscal constraints they are hard-pressed to
address their own training requirements and don’t themselves have an ideal
number of operational vessels at sea to provide practical experience
(Interview, Zaaiman 2002). Furthermore with the impending arrival of the new
corvettes and submarines as part of the arms procurement programme they
have the challenge of training additional Navy personnel to man these vessels
(Interview, Collins 2002).
7.4 . DEDICATED TRAINING SHIP A further option is to commission a dedicated training ship. This is not a new
idea in the South African context. Previously there was a training ship, The
RSA, but unfortunately the project couldn’t be sustained (Interview, Collins
2002). Furthermore, according to Deanne Collins, Safmarine in its time has
investigated such schemes on a number of occasions. But each time the
financial costs of the project meant that it did not get past the proposal stage.
While many in the industry were supportive of such an idea they all felt that
given the costs it was an unrealistic option (Interview, Hagan 2002, Snook
2002, Collins 2002, MacLennan 2002)
“I would be very much in favour of something like that. Unfortunately it is a very expensive way of training, the running costs of a ship are enormous and you would obviously have to have a qualified crew on board over and above the trainees.” (Interview, Snook 2002)
According to Collins (Interview, 2002) the cost factor inhibits most countries
from using training ships to acquire sea-time for their cadets and ratings.
“When you look around the world, who has actually got training vessels, surprisingly enough you find very few and you ask yourself why.”
One country that does use training ships, is Korea - they have two dedicated
training ships (Interview, Snook 2002). According to Collins (Interview, 2002)
AP Moller are also considering a future investment in a training ship.
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“… one of the masters who heads up this initiative in Singapore has shown me a prototype of a new building. It is a huge container ship that has on board an entire training facility equipped with a training room, laboratories, simulator equipment and which would carry lecturing and training personnel. In essence a commercial vessel, carrying cargo thus generating income whilst at the same time offering a full training facility on board. This type of innovative operation would work.”
7.4.1. The Cape Maritime Academy The Cape Maritime Academy represented by Harry Zaaiman (Interview,
Zaaiman 2002) is initiating a new training project based in Cape Town. This
project will provide the experiential training that needs to accompany the
academic component of seafarer training. The project has three components.
The first component is stimulator training centres for the training of watch-
keepers, both engine room and bridge. Their target is to train up to five
hundred new recruits per annum for both the engine room and the bridge.
Secondly, they intend operating a training ship in order to provide the
necessary sea-time. Their intention is to put five hundred cadets through their
sea-time on the training vessel. This vessel will also be a working ship
operating on the East and West African coast. Thirdly, when the vessel is in
port it will offer short courses to local mariners.
Eventually it is anticipated that the initiative will also develop a crewing
agency side.
“Once we train the guys they are now part of our pool. Eventually we hope to have a pool of about 5000 trained watch-keepers … We put those out into the international market and we control their careers for them, so that we manage them all the time …” (Interview, Zaaiman 2002)
According to Zaaiman (Interview, 2002) the financing for this initiative will
come from two sources. They are hoping to get international finance through
a German source and from their commercial activities (both training and
cargo). Other training ship initiatives have floundered on the financial viability
aspect. However, Zaaiman maintains that this was because they only
targeted South Africans. The student population will be drawn from other
SADC countries as well as South America.
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Other industry players are very sceptical of this scheme, a view not lost on
Zaaiman. The main problem they point to is the cost of running such a
venture (Interview, Hagan 2002, MacLennan 2002), and they are doubtful of
its viability as a commercial venture.
“… you can’t have a dedicated training ship being run by a commercial company that is going to pick up the cost for that. So there are smarter ways of doing it. However if the government takes a holistic view and says from an industry-wide point of view, the fact that there is a world-wide shortage of officers, the fact that we are able to secure employment for our people that will bring in foreign exchange. Provided you meet all the quality criteria, I think it is the project that I could get very excited about.” (Interview, MacLennan 2002)
It appears that this scheme is very much in the early stages. The venture
capital is not yet secured, the costing – both for students and of the scheme
itself – has not been worked out in detail and discussions with technikons are
still in their infancy.
7.5 . SIMULATOR TRAINING
The AP Moller group, which owns Safmarine and Maersk Sealand, is planning
to invest R25 million in a maritime training academy in the Western Cape (The
Mercury Business Report, 18th June 2002). The primary focus of this
academy will be simulator training (Interview, Collins 2002). It will be based at
the Simon’s Town High School. Through the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (Nepad) the training academy will also be accessible to
seafarers from other maritime nations in southern Africa and others further
afield. At home the academy will provide skills training for the merchant
marine, harbour craft, the fishing industry and the navy. The Maritime
Training Academy will be run as a Section 21 company.
The project has its roots in the commitment AP Moller made to the South
African government when they bought part of Safren in 1999/2000. According
to Collins (Interview, 2002) advanced simulator training will bring the training
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of South African seafarers in line with training offered by the most advanced
environments internationally. Simulator training can be used at all levels –
from the cadet to upgrading the skills of senior officers. Collins (Interview,
2002) sees this initiative as increasing the opportunities for employment in the
global labour market.
“If we do this there will then be opportunities for our guys to integrate into a larger pool, which has since happened and I would say that half of our staff are now employed in the Maersk.”
It is anticipated that the student throughput per annum would be 1370 - all of
Safmarine’s officers and cadets will go through the Centre. Currently the
Safmarine crewing office based on the Isle of Man sends their staff to
Southshields in the UK for the same training. They expect to run a total of
328 courses. On the basis of their costing they believe that it will be
internationally competitive.
According to MacLennan (Interview, 2002) the benefits of simulator training
are threefold. Firstly, it simulates what could and might happen at sea and
thus gives the trainees exposure to terrible situations with minimal cost to life
and limb. Secondly, and this he believes is more beneficial, it allows an
assessment of “an individual’s performance under a predetermined crisis
situation” and thus through exposing their strengths and weaknesses focuses
the learning situation. Thirdly, it provides a consistent high quality output – if
someone has been through simulator training, as an employer you know what
you are getting.
Richard Snook of Unicorn (Interview, 2002) shares these positive sentiments.
“… I think its an excellent initiative and one which can only benefit the country … I’ve had first hand experience in operating a simulator and first hand experience in seeing the very positive results that have come out of it. There is no question in my mind at all that it is going to be a huge asset to the South African marine training fraternity. It is something that will add credibility to the South African qualification …”
Others are a little more circumspect about the benefits of simulator training
believing that it does not match ‘hands-on experience’.
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“… a lot of cadets from Portnet and all the people that have been sent to Rotterdam and all the rest put on simulators they failed hopelessly. The reason for that is because they haven’t had the practical experience and background.” (Interview, Hagan 2002).
According to Hagan, it should only be used as an aid; it should not be used to
reduce sea-time or any ‘knowledge-type basis’ either.
According to maritime consultant Kieran Cox (Interview, 2002) the AP Moller
simulator initiative is misdirected. He raises questions about the operating
costs, the skill levels required to run the simulators, the duplication of different
initiatives and the costs of maintaining the technology.
Whatever its benefits or limitations, simulator training will not directly address
South Africa’s most serious training problem - the shortage of training berths
(see Interview, Snyders & Stohr 2002). Students still have to fulfil their
twelve months sea-time in order to receive their qualification. However,
Zaaiman (Interview, 2002) does point out that the Dutch have managed to get
their sea-time reduced from three hundred and sixty days to three hundred
days as a result of simulator training.
As Snook observes simulator training will bring the South African qualification
in line with other maritime training nations all over the world (Interview, Snook
2002). Thus while it will not directly create jobs or add more training berths to
the pool, it is likely to enhance the attractiveness of South African trained
seafarers and cadets to the labour market.
7.6. CREWING AGENCIES – THE FILIPINO OPTION
The Philippines is well-known for its dominance of the global seafaring labour
market. Much of the placement of this labour is through crewing agencies.
These agencies also play a vital role in the placement of cadets who are then
able to acquire the necessary sea-time for their qualification. Most crewing
agencies appear to have a training section, which attempts to place both
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cadet officers and ratings who need to acquire their experiential training.
Once trained these seafarers remain ‘on the books’ of the crewing agency.
The El Greco Ship Manning and Management Agency, based in Manila,
(www.elgrecomanila.com) advertise their cadet apprenticeship programme
and training programme for professional ratings as follows:
“These programmes provide principals with two advantages: apprentices and trainees receive lower wages; and, because their contracts are not as binding as standard contracts, obligations and liabilities of the principal are reduced.”
They also point out that their training programmes ensure that the officers and
ratings available through El Greco have been trained on the vessels of the
companies contracting them ie the quality of training is assured.29
Furthermore, once trained the seafarers are likely to be exceptionally loyal to
the company that offered them that opportunity.
At present, while there has been some talk of establishing a local crewing
agency, (Interviews, Zaaiman 2002, Dudula Shipping 2001) there are no
crewing agencies in South Africa.
7.7. THE VIABILITY OF VESSELS CALLING AT SOUTH AFRICAN PORTS BEING COMPELLED TO TAKE ON SOUTH AFRICAN CADETS
It has been suggested that there should be measures in place to ensure that
companies, which are using South African ports, offer training berths to South
African cadets. Such a proposal elicited a mixed response.
In general those South African companies involved in the shipping industry
thought it was an excellent idea (see Interviews, Snook 2002, Bester 2002,
MacLennan 2002). However, ideas on the implementation of the proposal
were limited and illustrated the difficulties. For example, it would be extremely
29 Another crewing company which has a deck and engine officer cadet programme is C.F. Sharp (www.cfsharp.com/manning/seafarers_training.asp)
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difficult if not impossible to compel a vessel that wasn’t operating exclusively
in South Africa to offer training berths. Most agreed that it would be difficult to
legislate and that it should rather be a voluntary agreement with incentives
attached.
It is possible that such conditions could be built into government tenders or
contracts. These could contain conditions that compel the successful
company to offer training berths and/or employ a certain percentage of South
African crew.
“So it is only if you are issuing a contract for something that the Government or some local South African company is paying for that you should be in a position to insist on that, and there is nothing that prevents us form doing it now. It’s just a question of making people aware of it.” (Interview, MacLennan 2002)
“… in West Africa, our ships going there were forced to take a percentage of Nigerians, Angolans on board our ships, to show the government that we are also committed to help with their unemployment rate.” (Interview, Bester 2002)
South African companies as well as the South African government should be
encouraged to look more closely at the contracts they enter into with shipping
companies to see if there are the possibilities to link those contracts to training
berths. Perhaps Proudly South Africa could be approached on this issue.
Furthermore, it would be profitable to explore the issue of incentives and here
the example of linking ship registration, tonnage tax and training is prime.
7.8. SUBSIDISING TRAINING
The cost of training a deck or engineering cadet from entry level to the first
junior officer qualification costs approximately US$17000 (Collins, 2001).
Within the AP Moller Group/Maersk Line there are a total of 1200 deck and
engineering cadets, these cadets are of different nationalities and do their
training through the various owned entities of the Group. In the majority of
these cases the largest contributor to seafarer training comes through the
form of government subsidies (Collins, 2001).
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An alternative (or addition) to including the provision of training berths as a
component of government tenders or contracts would be to investigate
offering incentives, to shipping companies (both foreign and local), in the form
of subsidising cadetships. To cite Collins (Interview, 2002)
“another way of doing it, is by giving them resources in return for training people on board the vessel … “.
The subsidies could come direct from government or via the TETA. The
TETA has a number of funding routes; these are through learnership funding,
project funding, a discretionary grant application or the TETA could apply to
the Department of Labour for additional funding. Companies (Interview,
Collins 2002) have pointed to the ‘reams of paper’ involved in the existing
application procedures, thus it is imperative to have simplified processes.
Secondly, it needs to be noted that many of the existing funding routes would
not be available to foreign shipping companies.
While this proposal would not resolve the difficulty of the physical limit to the
number of training berths aboard a vessel as mentioned by the South African
companies interviewed, however, it could provide an inducement to foreign
shipping companies operating on the South African coast to enter into
agreements with the technikons to provide training berths for their students.
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The research has demonstrated that there is a real crisis around training berth
availability. Over the last five years South African shipping companies have
reduced their training berths. As there has been litte demand for ratings, the
available training berths are allocated to deck and engine-room cadets. This
reduction has coincided with a growth period in technikon training. However,
it is not a completely bleak picture as at least two companies (Unicorn and
Smit Pentow) anticipate growth in the short-to-medium term. One possible
option is that technikons decrease their student admissions in the short-term
until companies have more training berths available. While it might be argued
that such a decision would have a negative impact on questions of equity and
transformation in the shipping industry, the reality is that the decrease in
training berths is already having such an impact.
An alternative is to look beyond the traditional providers of training berths and
source new partners. Already the technikons have begun to embark on this
with some, if limited, success. The debate here is whether this should be the
responsibility of government or individual educational institutions. It seems
that government has far more power and leverage to enter into agreements
that might secure training berths than do the educational institutions. This is
particularly so if government tenders are used as a way of securing training
berths (and possibly employment for South African seafarers). Furthermore,
government is able to put this issue onto the agenda of international trade
visits. Government also has a role to play in the proposal for the subsidisation
of training berths as an enticement to new partners. This could also assist the
technikons in their quest for new partners.
It is imperative that the Ships Registration Act is promulgated and that the
fiscal issues impacting on the shipping industry are resolved. As the report
has illustrated these two factors have had an extremely negative effect on the
conservation of existing training berths and the acquisition of new ones. The
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introduction of tonnage tax linked to training requirements should be
considered.
It seems unlikely that the South African Navy is in a position that would allow
it to intervene in alleviating the training berth crisis. It appears to have its own
skills crisis. However, what could be fruitful is some sort of co-operative
agreement between training institutions, shipping companies and the South
African Navy. Co-operation already exists on some levels eg Naval
midshipmen (cadets) attend the Cape Technikon and the Navy will be one of
the users of the AP Moller / Safmarine South African Training Academy. This
co-operation could be extended into the area of sea-time, however, the
question of finance would need to be resolved.
The advantage of training ships and simulators is that they provide
transparent and standardised training. Furthermore, prospective employers
can easily evaluate the quality of the training. The financial investment, not
only the initial outlay but the ongoing maintenance costs are enormous and
beyond the scope of individual companies, unless they are perhaps one of the
large global shipping companies. This is clearly a place for government or
industry-wide investment.
Finally there are lessons to be learnt from other environments – some of
these are alluded to in the report. For example the Indonesian agreement
with P&O Nedloyd and the Koreans’ use of training ships, as well as, the
Filipino emphasis on linking training and crewing agencies (which is
discussed in some detail). South-East Asia dominates the international labour
market for seafarers. It could be profitable to investigate their solutions to this
problem in more detail.
There are no magic solutions to the crisis of training berth availability. The
way forward requires the involvement and co-ordination of many different
stakeholders, it requires innovative and creative thinking. In particular
Government needs to become more proactive in the maritime sector. But
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most importantly it requires a wholehearted commitment to resolving the
problem and the need to put the solution above individual interests.