sd b1 airlines fdr- 8-18-03 letter from air transport association (different red actions- see dm b1...

8/14/2019 SD B1 Airlines Fdr- 8-18-03 Letter From Air Transport Association (Different Red Actions- See DM B1 Airlines Fdr)715

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A I R T R A N S P O R TA S S O C I A T I O N

JAMES C. MAY

P R E S I D E N TA N D C E O

August 18, 2003

Mr. Daniel Marcus, EsquireGeneral CounselN ational C ommissionon Terrorist A ttacks301 7 th Street, SW Room 5125Washington,D C 20407

Re: Air Transport Association of America, Inc. - Response to Request forAdditional Information

DearMr. Marcus:

I welcome the opportunityto provide additional informationto theN ational C ommissionon Terrorist A ttacks("Commission") and to supplementmy May22nd testimony. A sindicated in that testimony, A TA and its member airlinesfully support the C omm ission'sefforts to explore the events of September11, 2001; we will all benefitfrom theCommission's review, analysis,an d recommendationsfor the future.1

W ith regardto your July18th request, I will address each itemas fully as possible. Ianticipate, however, that some of my responses may leave you with more questions. TheATA , a nonprofit trade association not regulated by theFA A ,is notprivy to much of thegovernment's sensitive security information about the events of September11 th thatmight be responsive to your requests. My responses are ma de on behalf of A TA , the

Members are: A irborne Express, A laska A irlines, A loha A irlines, Am erica West A irlines, Am ericanA irlines, A star Air Cargo(formerly D HL A irways) , A TA A irl ines(formerly A merican Trans A ir), AtlasA i r, C ontinental A irlines, D elta A ir Lines, E mery W orldwide, E vergreen International A irlines, FederalE xpress, Hawaiian A irlines, JetBlue A irways, Midwest A irlines, N orthwest A irlines, Polar A ir C argo,Southw est Airlines, United A irlines, United Parcel Service, and US A irways. A ssociate members are:A erovias deMexico, A ir Canada,A ir Jamaica, KLM-Royal D utch A irlines,an d Mexicanade A viacion.

NOTICE: This document contains SENSITIVE SECURITY INFOR MAT ION (SSI) that is subjectto 49 CFR Part 1520. Release of the information contained herein noted as SSI, or the materialssubmitted herewith marked as SSI, is prohibited without the express written approval of theAdministrator of the Transportation Security Administration.

AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.

1 3 0 1 P E N N S Y L V A N I AA V E N U E ,N W S U I T E1100 W A S H I N G T O N ,D C 20004-17072 0 2 . 6 2 6 . 4 1 6 8 FA X2 0 2 . 6 2 6 . 4 1 6 6


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entity, based on knowledge and information in thepossession of ATA employees,andnot on behalf of individualairlines or with knowledge of information they m aypossess.Likewise, others m ay be in a position to m orefully answer your questions as, both pre

and post-September 11 th, ATA does not gather security intelligenceno r provide an yindependent analy sis of security intelligence to our mem bers.

Finally, as indicated in several of my responses, the A TA and its member airlines, and, infact, the public, all rely on agencies of the U.S. governm ent (particularly the FAA prior toSeptember 11 th ) to utilize al l resources and information they have availableto them todevelop a threat picture, provide relevan t intelligence inform ation to the airlines and toformulate appropriate security responses. As stated in the 1997 Gore Com missionReport, "terrorist attacks on civil av iation are directed at the UnitedStates...there shouldbe an ongoing federal commitment to reducing the threats that theypose." 3 We believethe federal gove rnm ent's continued respon sibility for the acquisition, ana lysis and

dissemination of appropriate threat inform ation and securityprocedures is essential.

1. From the airlines' perspective, how wou ld you characterize thepre-September 11,2001 performance of the aviation security system in gen eral and the bagg age andpassenger screening system in particular? What methods did you use to evaluatethis performance? W hat steps did you take to impro ve the system?Pleaseprovide any docum ent or reports generated by A TA w ith respect to theeffectiveness of the aviation security system.

Response to Request No. 1. Because ATA did nothave in place a process or procedure toevaluate the performance of the aviation security system prior to September11, 2001 (nor

do we have such a process now), we can only offer the observation th at, fromourperspective, the aviation security system g enerally performedas it was intended in that itwas responsive to the security threats the Govern me nt iden tified.

Althoughthen and now A TA disseminates regulatory updatesand advocates positionsinregulatory proceedings on security matters on behalf of our members, as a tradeassociation w e did notformally evaluate, audit or analyz e the airlines' compliance with

2 ATA is providing certain documentsthat contain Sensitive SecurityInformation(SSI) and, therefore,subject to the terms of the Nondisclosure Agreem ent executed by youroffice. ATA is followingthe TSA'sdirection as to theidentificationand treatment of these docum ents. Docu ments containing SSI are markedaccordingly, as arecertain sectionsof this letter. In addition,ATA has a general three-year recordsretention policy and w as unab le to locate some of the requested documents. Responsive documents thatATA was able to locate (both within and outside this timeframe)have been provided.

White House C omm ission on A viation Safety and Security, Final Report to President Clinton. February12, 1997, Recommendation3.1, page 26.


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regulatory requirem ents. That is not ourrole.4 At the direction of the ATA Board ofDirectors, A TA consistently wo rks to imp rove the civil aviation secu rity system and willcontinue to do so. Both pre-and post-September11 th, ATA has worked withinthe

existing regulatory an d legislative frameworkby providing information aboutairlineindustrypractices, operations, and concerns; par ticipatin g in govern me nt/industryworkinggroups to review a wide rangeof security concerns;and cooperating fully withthe federal gove rnme nt'sefforts. Even with these varied activities, we did not have day-to-day exposure to the perform ance of the civil aviation system and, therefore, can notcharacterizeits performance.

2. What did the ATA and theairlines know aboutthe terrorist threat to civil aviationin the 3-month period leadingup to 9/11? W hat specific stepsdid ATA or theairlines takein response to such threats? In your testimon y,you indicate thattheFAA provided the airlines with no specific, credible threat information about

hijackingsduring 2001 priorto September 11. Do youbelieve thiswas becausethe FAA did not receive such informa tionfrom the intelligence comm unity,because the FAA did not adequately transmit wha t it knew to the airlines, or somecombination of the two?

3. You testified thatFAA provided the airlineswith no specific, credible informationabout hijack ings dur ing all of 2001 up to and inclu ding September11 and issuedno relevant Secu rity Directives during that period. Yet, former A ssociateAdm inistrator for C ivil Av iation Security Canav an testified that heightenedconcern was communicated to the airlines via15 Information Circulars(IC's) an dfive Security D irectives(SD's) during that time span.The SD's are a form of

comm unications which your testimony indicated"deals with more definite threatinformationwarranting a mod ification of securityprocedures." How do yourespond to Mr. Canavan'sassertion?

Response to Request Nos.2 and 3. ATA's knowledge as to any alleged terrorist threat tocivil aviationin the three-month period leadingup to September 11 th is based oninformation it received from the FAA. As I indicated in my May 22nd testimony, in 2001(prior to September 11 th), FAA issued fifteen InformationCirculars relating securityinformation to the airlines. No ne were directedat nor required actionby ATA. Four ICsmentionedthe term "hijacking"- three of them makinga generic referenceto the threatan d one providing a more descriptive reference to a conven tional hijacking concern.None contained specific information about the threat of hijackings similar to those that

4ATA did conduct a review of non-airline employee em ploymen t history investigations conducted in the

summer of 2001. Under the Air Carrier Standard Security Program("ACSSP"), a compilation of securityrequirements that FAA required carriers to implement, airlines were required to conduct a limited reviewand reverification of these investigations. W hile ATAreverified investig ations on behalf of some of ourmembers, the A TA did not evaluate, audit or analyze the results. A summ ary overview of the review and areport subm itted to the FAA are located in Tab1.


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occurred on September 1 l lh . In addi t ion ,in 2001 (priorto September 11 th), FA A i s s u e ds ix Secur i ty D irec t ives ,a ll r equ i r i ng ac t i onby the a i r l i ne s . None weredirected a t no rrequired act ionby ATA . A s Ii n d i c a t e di n m y M a y22n d t e s ti m o n y, n o n e w e r e r e l e v a n to r

conta ined spec i f ic ,credible i n fo rma t ion po in t i ngto a h i jack in g s imi l a rto t hose occu r r ingon September 11 th. Nei the rth e I n fo r m a t i o n C i r c u l a r snor theSecu r i t y D i r ec t i ve sp rov ided an y i n fo rma t ion r e l a t i ng t o a s ecu r i t y t h rea tdi ffe ren tf rom th rea t s t he FAA hadprev ious lydescribed to the a i r l i ne s .

S in c e ATA w a s s i m p l y a r e c i p ie n t o f s e c u r i ty i n f o r m a t i o n f ro m t he FA A , A TA h a s n oa b i l i t yt o fo rm a be l i e f a s t o whe the r FAA d id no t r ece ive ce r t a in i n fo rm a t ion f rom thei n t e l l i g e n c eco m m un i ty, o r did no t ade qua t e ly t r ansm i t the i n fo rm a t ion i t re ce ived t o thea i r l i ne s .

4. How dideconomic f ac to r saffec t th e c i v i l a v i a t i o nsecur i ty sys tem pr iortoSeptember 11, 2001? How did thea i r l i n e s b a l a n c e e c o n o m i ca n d secu r i t yin t e r e s t sw i t h i n t h a t sys t em ? Wha t ro le d id eco nom ic fac to r s p l ay i n c r ea t i ng t hesys temy o u c a l l e d"p reven tor defer" ra ther than "preventa n d detect"? Pleasedescribe th e d i f f e r ences be tween the setw o approaches .

Response to Request 4, Pr ior to September 11 th, th e a i r l i n e swere sub j ec tto ane x t e n s i v eregu la to ry s ecu r i t y s chem e deve lopeda n d a d m i n i s t e r e dby the FA A . The FAAde t e rminedthe r egu l a to ry pu rposes , goa l s , p rog ram requ i r e me n t s ,a n d e n f o r c e m e n tpa rame te rs . Ne i the r t he ATA n o r the a i r l i n e s ma de the se de t e rm ina t i ons ; i n s t ead , t hea i r l i ne s imp lem en ted them a s di r ec t ed by t he FAA . Fo r t h i s r ea son , t he a i r l i n e s d id no t"balance e c o n o m i ca n d secur i ty in te res t s . "I can o n l y a s s u m e t h a ta n u m b e rof factorsi n f l u e n c e dth e a g e n c y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ,bu t ATA c a n n o tassess th e effec t of e c o n o m i cfactorson theFAA's r egu l a to ry s chemein p lace p r io rto September 11 th. I would no t etha t seve ra l P re s iden t i a lOrders and r egu l a t i ons f rom theOffice o f M a n a g e m e n t a n dBudge t r equ i r eagencies, i n c l u d i n gth e FA A , to c o n d u c ta m e a n i n g f u lcos t /bene f i tanalys is of cer ta incategories of p roposed r egu l a to ry r equ i r em en t s . I n t h i s con t ex t , ATAwould provide i ndus t ry i npu ton both th e es t imated cos tsa n d l i ke ly ope ra ti ona l impac t sof proposals .

TSA CONSIDERS THIS TEXT AS SSI AND SUBJECT TO THE SSINONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT. The FA A . in the i n i t i a l"Purpose" sec t ionof the

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5. Specifically, wh at was the status of box cutte rs at each of the airport securitycheckpointsthat the hijackers passed th roug h on Septembe r 11,2001? You statein you r testimo ny that bo x-cutters were a "restricteditem" in CheckpointOperations Guides. W asthis the case at all of the checkpoin ts the hijackerspassed through? You further indicate that the screening systems in place on9/11were "not designedto detect or prohibi t these typesof small items." Under thesecircumstances, how were box-cutters to beidentified and kept off anaircraftpursuant to the Checkpoint Operat ions G uides?

Response to Request No. 5. In response to thefirst two quest ions, ATA has noinformationas to the "status" of box cutters at each of the airport security checkp oin ts thehijackers passed through on September11 th, As indicate d in my M ay 22nd test imon y, theCheckpoint Operat ions Guide("COG") was a non -regula tory, no n-b in ding guidancedocument developed by the FAA, Regiona lAirl in e Associat ion, and ATA, with theFAA 's a pproval in the interpretat ion of FAA regulat ions. The COG guidance l is ted boxcutters as "restricted" i tems posinga potential danger.

TSA CONSIDERS THIS TEXT AS SSI AND SUBJECT TO THE SSI

NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT. Under the COG guidance,if an alarm sounded

9/11 Closed by Statut e


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6. Published reports indicate that at least nine of the nineteen hijackers were selectedfor special security scrutin y prior to boarding the hijacked flights: six by thecomputer-assisted prescreening (CAPPS) system, two because of identificatio n

document irregularities, and one because he was traveling w ith one of the lattertwo. Are these reports accurate? Specifically,what triggered each selection?Ineach case, what was done as a result of the selection?

Response to RequestNo. 6. ATA has no information as to whether some of theSeptember 11 th hijackers were selected for special security screening prior to boardingand, therefore, cann ot con firm whether the published reports described in your requestare accurate or wh at may have occurred prior or subsequent to the purported selections.

7. Please describe the roles and actions of ATA and the individ ual airlines, as ofSeptember 11, 2001, with respect to aviation security rulema king, policy

development and implementation. Please providecopies of the airline industry'scomm ents to the Departm ent of Transportation in response to No tices of ProposedRulem aking on issues related to civil aviation security, for the follow ingrulemaking proceedings:

a. Criminal record checksfor all airport em ployees(NPRM by FAApublished on 2/13/92 in response to recommendation ofPresident'sCommission onAviation Security and Terrorism; NPRM by FAApublished on3/19/97 in response to recommendation of White HouseCommissionon Aviation Safetyand Security)

b. Passenger/baggagematching (FAA issuedfinal amendment to ACSSPeffective 12/8/90 in response to recommendationof President's

Commission on Aviation Securityand Terrorism)c. Identification and pre-boarding security procedures for airline passengers(FAA issued initial proposed agreem ent to ACSSP on3/28/97 in responseto recommendation of White House C ommission on A viation Safety andSecurity)

d. Revision of federal regulationsfor airportand air carrier security(published in theFederal Registerof 8/1/97)

e. Certificatio n of screening comp anies and improve men t of screenerperformance(Advance NPR M issued by FAA on3/17/97 in response torecommendationof W hite House Commissionon Aviation SafetyandSecurity)

f. FAA rulemakingon Aircraft Operation Security which beganwith theissuance of No tice 92-12 to revise Part 108 on A ugu st 1, 1997 andculminatedwith the issuanceof the final rule in the Federal RegisterofJuly 17, 2001 (D ocket No.FAA-2001-8725).

Response toRequestNo 7. As indicated, pre-September11 th, ATA often providedinformationabout ind ustry practices, operations,an d concerns with respectto aviationsecurity rulemaking, policy development, and implem entation. AT A's role included the


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Daniel Marcus, Esq.Nat iona lCommiss ionon TerroristAttacksAugus t 18, 2003Page?

submission of wri t ten comm ents to the PublicDocket in formalru lemakings ,andparticipationin agency/industry work groupsand task forces, public "listeningsessions,"an d informaland formal indu stry me etings attendedby representat ivesof the FAA.

Copies of the writ ten comments requestedare located in Tabs 3A . (Request 7a.); 3C .(Request 7c.); 3D./F. (Requests 7d . and/.); and 3E.(Request 7e.) ATA was unab letolocate th e document requestedin Request 7b,

8. You test if ied, "The air l in e indu stryhas long beenon record advocating that , overt ime,the TSA security system e volveto focus more intensivelyon looking atpeoplerather than searching solelyfo r things," and youment ionedthe so-calledCAPPS II program TSA is developing . Whatis your current eva lua t ionof TSA'swork in th is regard? Do youhave any r ecommenda t ionsfor thedesign of the newsystem? Ho w wi l lCAPPS n be better thanth e original system whichwas inplace on 9/11? Do youbel ievethe newsystem will be able to alleviate yourpassengers 'concerns abo ut both security and privacy?

Response to Request No. 8.A TA canno t eva lua teTSA's work in developing the CAPPSII system becauseour in format ionaboutTSA's efforts is l im i t ed . To date, ATA hasreceived onlygeneral informationabout the system's current design and has not beenasked to participate in theformulat ionof screening criteria, system pa rame ters o r testing.ATA's knowledge aboutTSA's current effortsto address passengers' pr ivacyconcernsisl imited and comes prim ari ly fromin format ionconta inedin the Pr ivacyA ct Notice,Interim F inalRule ,and Requ est for Further Com men ts in theFederal Register on August1 (DHSATSA 2003-1, 68 Fed. Reg.45265 ( A u g u s t1, 2003). A TA supportsTSA's effortsand curren tly is review ing the N otice.

Based on the industry 's experiencewith CAPPS I, I believe it is possible to design amore sophisticated system usingth e signif icant lyenhanced intel l igence informationgathered by the federal government post-September11 th. This system shouldbetterident i fy those passengersfo r who m addi t ional screeningis recommended, whileaddressingthe pub l ic ' s unders tanda ble pr ivacyconcerns. The federal government,andnot ATA or the air l ines,is in the best posi t ion to gather infor ma tion , eva luate the threatposed by poten tial air l i ne passengers,and design a highly focused screeningsystem.A TA wou ld welcomethe oppor tun i tyto learn aboutth e TSA's progress and offer o urviews.

9. For therecord, please supplyth e Commission witha description of the "new and

improved trainin g programsfo r crew members,"you referred to in yourtes t imony.

Response to Request No. 9. TSA CONSIDERS THIS TEXT AS SSI AND SUBJECTTO THE SSI NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT. Revised Crewmember Tra in ing

I 9 / 1 1 Closed b y S t a t u t e I


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9/11 Closed by Sta tu t e

10. At thehearings,you were asked to clarify an apparent discrepancy between pre-9/11 statementsby ATA claimin g thatth e airl ine industrywas spendingonebilliondollars a year on securityand more recent statementswhichplace thisfigureat approximately$300 milliona year. Yo u testified that the $1 billio nfigurewas just an off-handestimateby an ATAofficial. Yet press accountsindicatethatATA submitted thisfigure inresponseto anofficial G AO inquiry.Please expla in this discrepancyand detailfor therecord what securitycostestimatesATA hasdeveloped overthe last five years,up to andinc lud ingthepresent. In add itio n, please provideth e Commission withth e basis fo r theseestimates.

Response to Request No. 10.I will try toaddress th e differencesin these secu rity costestimatesas directlyas possible because,unfortunately,there is much confusion abouttheirbases. The contrast between the$1 billionand $300 millioncost estimates has beenused by some to suggestbad faith on thepartof theairlines. Thisis not thecase. Thedifferentialis understandable due to the components and nature of theestimates.

The originof the $1bil l ionestimatewas arequestfrom th e General AccountingOffice("GAO") in April2000 concerningairlinepassenger and baggage screeningcosts. TheG AO requestis located at Tab 5. One of thedifficultiesin developingcost estimatesisthe variancesin internal systems am ongthe carriers,inc ludinghow costs are defined,interpreted,an d accou nted for,as well as thescopeof security requiremen tsat issue.Because this datawas notspecificallytrackedin a consistent manneracross theindustry,the ATA Security Committee agreedto try todevelopan estimate,to thedegree possible,in an effort to assist th e G A O . In Aug ust 2001,ATA provideda short memorandumtothe GAObased on responses from some,but notall ,ATA member airl ines.

Extrapolatingfrom the l imitedand diverseinformationprovided,it estimatedcosts to theentire industryto implementall federalsecurity requirem entsand conduct requiredsecurityprograms at $1bil l ion. ATA 's m em oran dum is located at Tab 5. This roughestimateincluded,amon g other i tems, security equipm entfundedby thegovernment ,totalsecurity programcosts, foreignlocation security screening expenses, tr ain ing ,etc.5Unfortunately,with the eventsof Septemberll lh , this very rough estimate becameaquick reference pointfor theCongress,the Administration,and theindustry. Despiterepeatedexplanat ionas to itsorigin,and theacknowledgment thatit was notbased on acomp rehensive set ofdata derivedfrom reliable , com plete cost reporting, this "shorthand"$1 billionestimatewas citedwithoutthe requisitel imitat ions.

5 This rough estimate was an attem pt to project an industry -wide estim ate based o n a limited num ber ofairlineresponses that , becauseof thedifficultieslisted, contained varied data,descriptions, an dcomponents.


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I understand that the origin of the$300 million estimate is the federal govern men t's shorthandreferenceto the estimated, aggregated securityscreening costs submittedby the

airlinesin responseto therequirementsof the Av iation Security Infrastructure Fee,67Fed. Reg. 7926 (February20, 2002)(the"Rule"). Underthe Rule,the airlines wererequired to subm it their cost data relating solely to the screening of passengers andbaggage(not all security costs)in the year2000 to theTSA. The data, used to determinea carrier's infrastruc ture fee, was to be subm itted in prescribed categories contained in anappendixto theRule. ATA and theAm erican Instituteof Certified Public Accountantsexpressed concerns aboutthe rigidcost categoriesin the appendixand theabilityof theairlinesto segregate the costs in this fashion. Alt hou gh the TSA issued supplemen taryguidance in response to some of the concerns, the cost categories in the appen dix wereno t altered. It is my un derstand ing tha t some carriers did not include certain costs becausethey were verydifficult to determine . In addition , some carriersfelt certain costs should

no t have been included in the basis of the carrier's infrastruc ture fee because the TSA hadnot assumed responsibilityfor thesecurityfunction (and, therefore, carriers wou ldbepayingthese costs tw ice), or for other reasons, and that limitations w ere noted as such.Any screening costs om ittedfor theseor other reasons w ould resultin a lower aggregatedamount.

With regard to security cost estimates developed by ATA, in M arch 2003, A TA releasedAirlines in Crisis/The Perfect Economic Storm, a report describingthe economic crisisconfrontingthe airline industryand forecastingthe impactof the then expected invasionof Iraq. 6 The report estimates that post-September11 th taxes, fees andunfundedmanda tes have added morethan $4 billionto theind ustry 's annu al burden. This report

includesincremen tal pretax estimated costs (extrapolated from estimates from twe lveATA member airlinesand six oftheir regionalaffiliates)of num erous airport relatedandotherrequired security enhancements,new postal service restrictions, increased insuranc ecosts, DO T fee for passenger screening (approx imated according to TSA reports), federalair marshal o pportunity costs,freight restrictions, new security tax, and cockpit doorfortifications.7 A copy of the reportis locatedin Tab 5.

W hile ATA m ade other attem pts to capture and project security costs, none weresuccessful. In February 2002, A TA attem pted to estimate2000 industry-wide screeningcosts, but did notfinalizeor releasean y estimate. As with prior efforts,it wasdeterminedthat the product would be unreliable since the cost da ta was submitted by

some but not all ATAmember airlinesand it wasincompleteand subjecttointerpretation,as the differences in data designation and collection could not beovercome. It is markedconfidentialand was never released. Subject to your executionof the nondisclosure agreement(as toconfidentialATA documents) betweenATA and

6 Airlines inCrisis/The Perfect Economic Storm,AirTransport A ssociation.

Airlines in Crisis/The Perfect Economic Storm,Chart10, p. 16.


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Daniel M arcus, Esq.NationalComm ission on Terrorist AttacksAugust 18, 2003Page 10

the Comm ission attached hereto,a summary tableis located at Tab 5. In February 2002,at FAA's request ATA also attempted to estimate the cost of securityoffice space atairports, but, again,due to thelimited response(four airlines) an d difficulty in comparing

costs, the results were considered incomplete and unreliable. The summary results aremarked confidential. Subject to the nondisclosure agreement (as to confidential ATAdocuments) betweenATA and the Commission, the summary is located at Tab 5. InOctober 2001, at FAA's request AT A distributed an FAA survey form requesting aninventoryof screening equipment/personnel to thecarriers. ATA forwarded the carriersubmissionsdirectly to the FAA. A copy of the FAA survey form is located at Tab 5(TSA also has identified this information as SSI).

11. Was ATA contacted by an airline or the FAA on September11, 2001 prior to thegrounding of allcivil aviation? If so, please describe the communicationsindetail. Did the A TA play any role in coordinating response to the events o n 9/11?

If so , please describe this role, the actions takenand with whomATA personnelcoordinated.

Response to Request No. 11. It is my understanding that employeesat ATA's mainoffices in Washington,DC were no t contacted by the FAA prior to FAA's issuanceof thenationwide ground stop on September11, 2001. At some point that morning, ATAattemptedto contact the FA A Adm inistrator to advise that ATA believed all civil aviationshould be grounded, but was able only to leave a message to that effect with th eAdministrator'sAssistant. After FAA made th e decision to issue th e nationwide groundstop, and several m inutes beforeits formal issuance,ATA employees at the Air TrafficControl System Command Center (ATCSCC)in Herndon, VA were advised by FAA

employees at the ATCSCC thatFAA was about to issue an ATCSCC Advisory orderingthe nationwide ground stop.

ATA personnel had no role in FAA's decision to issue the ground stop and did notcoordinate a response to it. When ATA staff at the ATCSSC were advised thatFAA wasgoing to issue th e nationw ide ground stop w ithin several m inutes, they began attemptingto notify ATA member airlines by telephone that the groundstop was imminent. Afterthe ground stop was issued, ATA contacted the Chief Executive Officers at severalairlines toadvise them that it had been issued,and was advised th atthe FAA hadalreadynotified the airlines.

Prior to the issuanceof the nationwide group stop,ATA personnel at its main offices andat the Command Center were contacted by various ATA member airlines requestinginformationabout media accountsan d status reports.


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12 . Please submit a copy of AT A 's comm ents or recomm endations to the GoreCommission, including thoseon profiling.

Response to Request No. 12.Copies of ATA's comments or recommendations to theGore Comm ission are located at Tab 6.

13. Please submit any documents or other records ATA has produced or receivedfrom the airlines with regard to any analysisof the events of 9/11, such as after-action reports.

Response to RequestNo. 13. ATA has not producednor received from the airlines an ydocumentor other record relating to any analysis of the events ofSeptember 11 th.

14. Please provide a copy of AT A's comm unications to internationalbodies,

including the International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO), on issues relatedto civil aviation securityfrom 1995 th roug h 2001. Please provide a copy ofATA's communicationswith individu als or organizations representing U.S.interests to the ICAOfrom 1995 through2001.

Response to RequestNo. 14. ATA has been unableto locate an y documents on issuesrelating tocivil aviation se curity thatit provided to ICAO or to individualsororganizationsrepresenting U.S. interests to ICAOfrom 1995 through 2001.

15. Please supplyall material relatingto ATA assessmentsof the aviation securitysystems at Dulles, Loganand Newark Airportsfrom 1998 through 2001.

Response to RequestNo. 15. ATA has done no assessmentsof the aviation securitysystems at Dulles, Loganor Newarkfrom 1998 thro ugh 2001,or at any other time.

16. Please providea copy of all the audiovisualand written materialsfor screenertraining ineffect on 9/11/01, such as "The First Lineof Defense" and "SecurityScreener."

Response to RequestNo. 16. Written and audiovisual materials usedin the ATA "Trainthe Trainer Seminar" are specifically designated as SSI and sub ject to the SSINondisclosureAgreem ent. The w ritten materials are located in a separate binder entitled

"Passenger Screeningan d Advanced Equipm ent: Trainthe Trainer Seminar" provided tothe Com mission today. Four audiovisual tapes are also provided.


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Daniel Marcus,Esq.National Commissionon Terrorist AttacksAugust 18,2003Page 12

17. Please provide all materials conce rning comm unications between ATA and anyATA representativesat FAA facilities (includingall FAA Operations Centers)onSeptember 11,2001.

Response to Request No. 17.Prior to the FAA 's issuance of the na tionwid e ground stop,there were telephone conversations between A TA em ployees at ATA 's mainoffices andat the ATCSCC in Herndon,VA about media accountsan d updates on events.After theground stop was issued, and throug hou t the day, ATA em ployees at the ATCSCC inHerndon telephoned employees at ATA 's mainoffices (and at homes in the W ashingtonarea whe re ATA em ployees had gatheredafter the offices were evacuated) every twe ntyto thirty minu tes with status reports. ATA em ployees at the ATCSCC also faxed toATA copies of the FAA'sATCSCC advisoriesand variousFAA NOTAM s(Notices toAirmen)concerning informationas to when certain airports would reopento ATAemployees in W ashington. Copies of the advisories are located in Tab 7. Although AT A

does not have copies of the NOTA M s, the FAA m ay have copies of NO TAM s it issuedon September 11th.

The ATC SCC in Herndon is the only FAA operations center where ATA employees werelocated.

I would like to reiterate that ATA wishes to cooperatefully with the Com mission'sefforts. Please contact me if you have any questions abou t these responses or wou ld liketo discussan y issues further.


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CONFIDENTIAL ATADocuments

NondisclosureAgreement

I understand that ATA considers the following documents created by ATA asCONFIDENTIAL, incomplete, and not for public dissemination or discussion:

2000 Screening Costs (February 2002 estimate) marked "CONFIDENTIAL- NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE"; summary table located at Tab 5. Cost of Security Space at Airports (February 2002 estimate) marked

"CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE"; summary resultslocated at Tab 5.

I agree not to discuss these documents, or their contents, with anyone other thanthe members of the Commission and members of the Commission staff, and I agreenot to disclose such documents, or their contents, to anyone other than members ofthe Commission and members of the Commission staff.

Signature

Printed Name

Date

Please return signed form to: Air Transport Association, John Meenan, Fax (202)626-4166.


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ATA RESPONSE TO NCTA REQUESTDated July 18, 2003

INDEX

Tab 1 (Response to Request1)

ATA Summaryand Individual Carrier Resultsfrom ACSSP Change 57 Review


COG pages 4-1 through 4-13,3 pages numbered4- , and pages 5-1 through5-8


A. ATA Comments/Docket26763 filed May 15, 1992 ATA Comments/Docket28859 filed May 19, 1997

C. ATA Letters to Adm. Flynn dated May 23, 1997 ATA Letters to Adm. Flynn dated October10, 1997

D./F. ATA Comments/Docket28978 dated December1, 1997

E. ATA/FAA Comments/Docket1999-6673 dated May 1, 2000 ATA Comments/Docket1999-6673 dated May 11, 2001

ATA Comments/Docket28852 datedMay 1,1997Tab 4 (Response to Request9)

AOSSP Change72, 03/01/2003 (4 pages) an d Appendix XH I(6 pages); "CrewTraining Common S trategy, Detailed Guidance"

Tab 5 (Responseto Request10)

GAO Letter to Do ubrava dated April6, 2000 Doubrava Memoto GAO dated August 22, 2001

ATA-Summaryof Domestic Security Screening Costs Calendar Year 2000"Confidential-Not for Public Release" DOT Security Screening Surveyre Security Office Space "Confidential-NotforPublic

Release" DOT/FAA Form re Security Equipm ent (Blank) Airlines in Crisis/The Perfect Economic Storm

August 18 , 2003


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Tab 6 (Response to Request 12)

Letter from Hallett to Loh dated August23, 1996 (two attachments) Hallett testimony dated September5, 1996 Letter from Hallett to VP Gore dated September 13, 1996 Letter from Hallett to Moran dated O ctober16, 1996 Letter from Hallett to Kauvar dated December 17, 1996 Letter from Hallett to VP Gore dated February3, 1997

Tab 7 (Response to Request 17)

Advisory037 9/11/01 Advisory 036 9/11/01 Advisory031 9/11/01 Advisory032 9/11/01 Advisory033 9/11/01

August 18, 2003