sartre on the choice to be god

8/9/2019 Sartre on the Choice to Be God

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The Choice to Be GodAndy Gustafson

This paper is focused on an apparent dilemma which arises in Sartre's work, Being and

Nothingness. The dilemma is this: In some sections of Being and Nothingness Sartre claims that

man fundamentally is the choice to be God, yet he also suggests that this can be turned away

from, particularly in Notebook On Ethics. ere I will first e!plain and document what the

fundamental God"pro#ect is, then pro$ide earlier te!ts where he says that %an must choose to

stri$e to be God , and then pro$ide later te!ts where Sartre claims man can turn away from the

causa sui pro#ect. %y &solution to the dilemma relies on a reading of Sartre that are ( senses or

types of god"pro#ects: the first is the what I call the necessary-god-project original fundamental

pro#ect which desires and $alues to be a causa sui, but this pro#ect I can turn away from) the

second pro#ect, which I call the contingent-god-project, is what I cannot escape"" the fact that I

am the contingent creator of my own $alues"" that my for"itself, all along, is god. So, as I will

show, while I turn away from the pro#ect to be an in"itself"for"itself *to be e!plained below+ I turn

to the fact that I am the creator of my on $alues, and in this sense god. ither way, I am choosing

to be God"" although the fundamental pro#ect is a desire to be necessary, while in the second

choice I accept my actual contingent godhood.

Towards the end of Being and Nothingness *- /0/"01+, and more clearly in Notebook

On Ethics * 2/1"/0+, Sartre suggests a con$ersion whereby we free oursel$es from this

original being"necessary"God pro#ect and accept the fact that ultimately, our for"itself is

contingent"god insofar as it is the sole creator of $alues. %an is ine$itably a necessary"god"

pro#ect to begin with. -ut e$entually he must either choose to continue to stri$e to be a causa sui

*an impossible pro#ect doomed to failure+ or choose to accept the fact that he is the creator of his

own $alues *in effect, accepting the fact that causa sui pro#ect is dead, God is missing, and my

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for"itself is the only god left+, but in either case, he is choosing to be God, because he is either

stri$ing to be eternal and necessary in"itself"for"itself, or accepting his fate to be the contingent

god of his own world as a for"itself. As I will show, it would make no sense to say that man must

be able to choose that his for"itself not be contingent"creator"god if he really has a choice, because

my God pro#ect is intimately bound up with my freedom and so, to be able to choose to not be

contingent"God would be to be able to choose to not be free"" which would be to choose not to

be man. The choice we do ha$e is, whether or not to stri$e to be the causa sui"" which is, will I

stri$e to escape contingency, or will I accept responsibility for my freedom4.

5ltimately, my freedom to choose determined in this twofold way: a+ in that I must ha$e

a pro#ect and b+ that this pro#ect is a pro#ect to become god. 6hat is not determined is which of

the two sorts of god I plan to be, and how I will act out the pro#ect, whiche$er one I choose.

ere I will argue that once we understand clearly what the two god"pro#ects are, as well as what

con$ersion entails, and what freedom really is, it will become apparent that we are ine$itably free

and that the choice we ha$e is what kind of god we will try to become"" the first pro#ect is a

useless passion, while the second choice is a stoic resolution to li$e without any god but oneself.

I can refuse to stri$e after the impossible God"pro#ect and instead embrace my necessary freedom

and in so doing accept that I am the creator of my own self and world by being the creator of my

own $alues.

1. God Project #1: To Be the Causa Sui

a. Explanation of being-for-itself, being-in-itself, and being-for-others.

To understand Sartre, we must first grasp the three forms of being which are rele$ant to

human e!istence: -eing"for"itself, -eing"in"itself and -eing"for"others. ach of us is contingent

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and changing, always ha$ing a goal of what it is we want to become"" for e!ample, a popular

person, a wise man, or a fit person. Insofar as we stri$e towards that goal of what we are not yet,

we are stri$ing for that being"" the being"in"itself"" the futoral goal. 6e are constantly trying to

escape this contingency by achie$ing an identicalness with that goal, so that we finally can once

and for all become what we think it is we are to be"" so that we can fulfill our pro#ected essence.

Sartre says, 7uman reality is a perpetual surpassing toward a coincidence with itself which is

ne$er gi$en7 *-, 380+ This is our desire to become an eternal unchanging self"caused

something, independent of contingency, while at the same time remaining a for"itself. This is the

impossible synthesis, which is the goal of the necessary"God"pro#ect. *-, 329+

The being"for"itself is the lack of being, and the in"itself is what is pro#ected or construed

as lacked. Together they form a dyad, for the for"itself must ha$e the in"itself to stri$e toward,

and the being of the in"itself could not e!ist without the for"itself. *- 323+ 6e e!ist as a lack

stri$ing to be what it is not, and not being what it thinks it is.

The result of this dyad is that humans cannot but help desiring to be what they are not,

according to Sartre. -ut unable to be what they are not, they are destined to be unhappy:

The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted bya totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain thein"itself without losing itself as for"itself. uman reality therefore is by nature anunhappy consciousness ith no possibilit! of surpassing its unhappy state. *- 329+

Sartre immediately raises the uestion of what the nature of this being"in"itself is: 7-ut

what e!actly is the nature of this being toward which unhappy consciousness surpasses

itself47 *- 329+ ;irst, we know that man is fundamentally the for"itself stri$ing for thein"itself, so the in"itself, as a pro#ection, is somehow fundamental to human e!istence.

Sartre's famous line that man 7is + Sartre admits

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that 7consciousness can e!ist only as engaged in this being which surrounds it on all sides

and which paraly?es it with its phantom presence7 *- 329+ In other words, man is the

perpetual stri$ing of being"for"itself towards being"in"itself, so this 7phantom presence7

which is the being that being"for"itself lacks is a necessary condition for consciousness.

-ut on the other hand, man cannot simply be this in"itself, for then his consciousness

would be annihilated. *- 380"29+ In addition, we must remain clear that being-in-itself

is not God *causa sui+: 7-ut the being toward which human reality surpasses itself is not a

transcendent God) it is at the heart of human reality) it is only human reality itself as

totality.7 *- 380+ God is both what he is and not what he is and is what he is not all at

once"" in other words, God is both the for"itself and in"itself simultaneously. That is what

man wants to be, but cannot, because it is an impossible state. In wanting to be both the

in"itself and for"itself simultaneously, man wants to be God, but being"in"itself per se is not

God.

The being that I stri$e for is ultimately value. *- 328+ As Sartre cryptically puts

it, 7Its being is to be $alue) that is, not"to"be being. Thus the being of $alue ua $alue is

the being of what does not ha$e being.7 *- 328+ The $alue is stri$en for, but not

apprehended. This $alue is that absolute being of the self. -ut that I want to both attain

that $alue *and become an in"itself+, while simultaneously wanting to continue stri$ing in

consciousness and freedom is the impossible task of being for"itself and in"itself

simultaneous"" the pro#ect to be necessary"God, or the in"itself"for"itself. 5ltimately,

Sartre says or the in"itself and the in"itself"for"itself that

%an is neither the one nor the other of these beings, for strictly speaking, weshould ne$er say of him that he is at all. e is what he is not and he is not what heis) he is the nihilation of the contingent In"itself in so far as the self of this nihilationof the contingent In"itself in so far as the self of this nihilation is its flight aheadtoward the In"itself as self"cause.7 *- /8>+

As the one who nihilates himself perpetually"" the self"nihilator"" man e!ists. -ut as he

e!ists, he does not e!ist, strictly speaking, as either being"in"itself or in"itself"for"itself, but

as nihilation of the in"itself by the nothingness of the for"itself. That continual act is

human e!istence, and that is li$ed freedom.

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-eing"for"others, the third mode of being, is an entirely separate frustration for the

one who is attempting to secure his escape from contingency"" yet it is important for

understanding the necessary"God pro#ect. %y being"for"others consists of my appearance

to the other"" their opinion about me. %y awareness of the look of the other, or e$en the

possible look of the other affects me in a way that is outside of my control. *- 82@">2+

I cannot control the look of the other, or my being"for"other, because its origin is in the

freedom of the other, which eludes my grasp. *- 839+ o$e is an attempt to solidify my

pro#ect through the other. *- 2//+

The other threatens me because she has control o$er my being"for"other. All of

my relations with the Bther are go$erned by this frustration with the Bthers ha$ing

control of my being"for"other, which is beyond my power. *- 2/8+ This aspect of

myself is beyond my control, and so the other thwarts my pro#ect to be independently self"

caused. To o$ercome this dangerous otherness, I attempt to domesticate the other so as

to control my being"for"other and thereby maintain control o$er the other as cause of that

aspect of my being *my being"for"other+. I do not want the other to be forced to see me

as I want her to see me *as though I would brainwash her, or make her a robot, or gi$e her

a lobotomy+, rather"" and this is the parado!"" I want her to freely see me as I want her to

see me. CI can seek to reco$er that freedom and to possess it without remo$ing from it its

character of freedom.D *- 2/8+

b. "reedo and Conscio$sness

6hat we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of 7human reality.7%an does not e!ist first in order to be free subseuently) there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free" *-, @9+

Bnce we understand the relationship of being"for"itself to being"in"itself and being"

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for"others, we can understand what freedom is"" and this is, as I understand it, why my for"

itself ends up being creator"god. * 21>+ I am fundamentally free, and central to the fact

of this freedom is that I must determine my own $alues and in so doing arrange the order of

the world myself"" I 7choose the order of our bits of knowledge.7 *-, 29(+ That I am a

free being does not mean that I can accomplish this or that so much as I am saddled with

the sole responsibility of creating my own $alues, and in this sense I am God. *- 328"22+

;reedom must not be considered in the typical sense of a power or ability. Eather,

freedom is principally a lack: 7Thus freedom is a lack of being in relation not a gi$en being)

it is not the upsurge of full being7 *- @(2+ Sartre also calls this lack the 7hole in being.7

*- @(2+ ;reedom is the $ery lack which is what for"itself e!periences as it wants to

control the disruption which the other is, as well as to attempt to become simultaneous

with the being"in"itself. *-, 380, 32/+ This pro#ect is the pro#ect of man, and the

freedom 7is the $ery stuff of my being) and as in my being, my being is in uestion I must

necessarily possess a certain comprehension of freedom.7 *- >@@+ There is no choice

whether or not to be free"" 7I am condemned to be free7 *-, >@/+ Again he says, 7It

+ I am necessarily free""

necessarily lacking) and without this lack, which stri$es towards a pro#ected fullness of

being *my for"itself stri$ing towards my pro#ected $alue which is the in"itself+ I would not

e!ist as human being. %y freedom arises from the fact that my for"itself is a lack"" the

source of nothingness. ow, 7othingness is not, othingness 'is made"to"be,' . . .7 and

that is also what man is"" not made, and ongoing work, and the lack which makes this

open"endedness the central feature of what I am is my for"itself, and this condition is my

freedom. The for"itself parcels up the world as it secretes nothingness, and this is

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consciousness which Sartre euates with choice. *- >0, @2+ %y freedom is related to

choice then in this way: I ha$e no eternal self"same being, and am therefore thrust into the

world without any essential ualities or characters. 6e ha$e no irreducible tastes or

inclinations, for e!ample. *- /12+ 6e ha$e no essence or nature to fulfill:

uman reality can not recei$e its ends, as we ha$e seen, either from outside offrom a so"called inner 7nature.7 It chooses them and by this $ery choice confersupon them a transcendent e!istence as the e!ternal limit of its pro#ects. *- >/(+

Again, that limit is the $alue, the in"itself as the end which the for"itself stri$es towards. I

am free because I ha$e no essence, but produce myself through acti$e e!istence:

It is therefore the positing of my ultimate ends which characteri?es my being and

which is identical with the sudden thrust of the freedom which is mine. And thisthrust is existence) it has nothing to do with an essence . . .7 *- >/(+

%y e!istence is fundamentally free, because I am the creator of my own $alues and limits,

and I ha$e no essence or nature which I am to fulfill. I am, uite simply, conscious

freedom, which is also to say, a being forced to choose what I will be.

In inauthenticity, I stri$e to be necessary"God"" I attempt to attain being"in"itself"

for"itself"" the stability, permanence and eternality of God, while remaining conscious. I

attempt to gain control of my own self, and to create myself out of nothingness by getting

the other to constitute me in a way which satisfies my $ision of what I want to be. ittle

do I know in this situation that I am stri$ing towards a futile goal"" to be what I ought to

be. I am creating myself, but pretending that I am fulfilling what I am destined to be. I

rest in the comfort of what I think is destined, but this comfort is self"deception. *- 1/"

11+ 6e spend much of our li$es trying to pretend we are not free. Authentic e!istence is

li$ing with full acceptance of my freedom, and my own determination of $alue. 6e are

free and willing $alues whether or not we admit it. Inauthenticity is an unowned willing""

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a willing while con$incing myself I'm not willing *i.e., while con$incing myself that I am

being compelled+. 6hile I want to belie$e that there is something I should become"" some

destiny or nature to fulfill, the fact is that I am without such a goal or #ustification or plan.

%y e!istence *meaning, my actions and intentions in the world+ is the origin of what I am

to become. *- 388+

C. %ll h$an beings desire to be God&

According to Sartre, man is fundamentally a lack, and human desire alone is

enough to pro$e this. 7uman reality by which lack appears in the world must be itself a

lack. ;or lack can come into being only through lack) . . .7 *- 38@+ ere, I think, we

see the necessary origin of the fundamental God"pro#ect. I am a perpetual lack because I

lack being, and my for"itself *which is the source of nothingness+ desires to gain the

fullness and density of being"in"itself"for"itself. Traditionally, God is the source of

stability for $alues, or the Good. * 32>, - 329 + Insofar as I stri$e to be a non"

contingent necessary being as a conscious being, I stri$e to be my own autonomous

foundation"" causa sui. *-, 329+

It is clear that we are fundamentally free and that we act only insofar as we are

free: 7$ery for"itself is a free choice) each of its acts"" the most insignificant as well as the

most weighty"" e!presses this choice and emanates from it. This is what we ha$e called

our freedom7 *- /@2+ But Sartre says more than #ust that I am fundamentally free"" he

also says that this freedom is my choice to be God:

Thus my freedom is a choice of being God and all my acts, all my pro#ects translate thischoice and reflect it in a thousand and one ways, for there is an infinity of ways of beingand of ways of ha$ing7 *- /@2+

t see!s then that, since a! funda!entally a free being, a! also funda!entally a

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project of choosing to be God-- insofar as a! the creator of !y on values# It is upon

my shoulders to determine my own $alues, which isF I am the organi?er of my world, yet I

dont want this responsibility, and stri$e to attain a non"contingent state instead. ;reedom

is the origin of my necessary"God"pro#ect insofar as the contingency of freedom is what I

am trying to escape, fruitlessly.

%any passages lead us to the same conclusion"" that human e!istence is

fundamentally a pro#ect to choose to be God. ;or e!ample, Sartre says that 7uman

reality is the pure effort to become God without there being any gi$en substratum for that

effort, without there being anything which so endea$ors.7 *- /8>+ The pro#ect of the

for"itself *the non"being or not anything which secretes nothingness into the world+ to

stri$e to metamorphose into the in"itself is what human reality ultimately is, and it is a

futile pro#ect, because such a pro#ect is impossible. 6hen Sartre speaks of this passionate

struggle to be God as a fundamental condition, he often does it without using talk of

7choice7:

ach human reality is at the same time a direct pro#ect to metamorphose itsown ;or"itself into an In"itself";or"itself and a pro#ect of the appropriation ofthe world as a totality of being"in"itself, in the form of a fundamental uality.$ery human reality is a passion in that it pro#ects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute the In"itself which escapescontingency by being its own foundation, the ens causa sui, which religionscall God. Thus the passion of man is the re$erse of that of hrist, for manloses himself as man in order that God may be born. -ut the idea of God iscontradictory and we lose oursel$es in $ain. %an is a useless passion. *-/12+

The charade here is that man pretends to ha$e an essence to fulfill. e pretends that he is

an ob#ect in the world"" passi$e, acted upon and eternally while being a self"same thing

which undergoes $arious e!periences"" rather than accepting his contingent sub#ecti$ity.

%an pursues being blindly by hiding from himself the free pro#ect which is this

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pursuit. e makes himself such that he is aited for by all the tasks placed alonghis way. Bb#ects are mute demands, and he is nothing in himself but the passi$eobedience to these demands.7 *- /0@+

Sartre says that the for"itself is doomed to perpetual failure because it wants to be

its own foundation, as a causa"sui like God *unchanging, immo$able, self"sustaining and

completely independent+, yet it is necessarily merely Cthe foundation only of itself as

nothingnessD *- 380+ Cuman reality is a perpetual surpassing toward a coincidence

with itself which is ne$er gi$en.D *- 380+ %an wants to surpass himself, and he does,

but he wants to surpass himself to become God, to reach a point where the continual

surpassing ceases, yet to remain free and conscious. All man can actually do is continually

surpass himself. 6hile he wants so much to become non"contingent, he can only remain

perpetually contingent, stri$ing towards being"in"itself.

6hy does he continue to transcend what he is4 -ecause for man to become this

pure in"itself would be anhiliation, and to become an in"itself"for"itself is a contradiction.

*- 380"329+ %an is being"for"itself which is thrown towards the world again and again,

continually becoming what it is not, and not being what it is. Sartre says, 7I choose

myself perpetually and can ne$er be merely by $irtue of ha$ing"been"chosen) otherwise I

should fall into the pure and simple e!istence of the in"itself7 *- @3/+ %an cannot be

both for"itself and in"itself simultaneously. ;or man, a being"for"itself to become an in"itself would be for man to cease to e!ist as man, since man is fundamentally being"for"

itself. Sartre says of the notion of 7God7,

It is the impossible synthesis of the for"itself and the in"itself) it would be its ownfoundation not as nothingness but as being and would preser$e within it the necessarytranslucency of consciousness along with the coincidence with itself of being"in"itself. . .-ut this return to the self would be without distance) it would not be presence to itself, butidentity with itself. *- 329+

The $ery notion of God is a self"contradiction, yet this is what man wants to be. So man

is doomed to be Cby nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its

unhappy state.D *- 329+ The unhappy state is that man wants to become what cannot

be, but instead he continually becomes what he doesnt want to be"" contingently

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continuously changing and transcending himself o$er and o$er fore$er. -ut this

contingency is the nature of the for"itself, and is the nature of freedom, which is what man

is"" a conscious freedom. The only way to escape this unhappy state, as we will see, will

be to gain a new $alue, a new goal.

'. Con(ersion to a )ecessar! *ission of Contingenc! and "reedo +contingent-god

I ha$e shown that Sartre says that the god"pro#ect is fundamental to e!isting as a

human being, that freedom is not chosen but forced, and that my being free is my

necessary god pro#ect. ;rom that it seems clear that the god pro#ect cannot be turned

away from. Het in Notebook On Ethics Sartre speaks clearly of a con$ersion by which one

turns away from the pro#ect of being a causa sui# $en in Being and Nothingness Sartre

suggests the possibility of an ethics which has as its fundamental pro#ect something other

than the desire to be causa sui"" a pro#ect 7which has freedom for its foundation and its

goal . . .7 *- /2(+ So how can we make sense of this4 I think we must make the

distinction between the pro#ect to be my own causa sui, and the general pro#ect of

freedom which is that I am the contingent creator of my own $alues. I can turn away from

the attempt to be causa sui, yet I can ne$er stop the perpetual and contingent state of

being"for"itself which is what man fundamentally is. There is e$idence for such a

distinction within Being and Nothingness itself. %y reading is an attempt to

sympathetically make sense of Sartre, rather than throwing up my hands in bewilderment.

To begin with, it should be noted *from the uote abo$e+ that Sartre did ha$e belief

in the possibility of a pro#ect radically different than the one to become the causa sui as

laid out in Being and Nothingness. Second, it should be noted that he puts this pro#ect

off towards a later time"" a time when he wrote Notebook On Ethics where he lays out this

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pro#ect of con$ersion. I am sympathetic with those who think that there is not simply a

radical re$ersal by Sartre in the Notebook On Ethics, and I think support can be found

within Being and Nothingness itself to support a more cohesi$e $iew. To seek out a

cohesi$e solution seems to be in accord with how Sartre saw things, since he was alluding

already in Being and Nothingness to other sorts of pro#ects. Third, it should be noted that

Sartre does not claim that the ethics of freedom would be counter to 7the pro#ect of being"

God7, but only that the 7full details7 of the ethical pro#ect's relation to the God"pro#ect

would ha$e to be laid out. *- /2(+

Bne thing we can be sure of is that human reality is fundamentally the pro#ection of

the for"itself towards what it is not, or the in"itself: 7uman reality is indeed the being

hich is alays beyond its being-there7 *- /9(+ That we ha$e such a pro#ect is

ine$itable"" due to the facticity of freedom, which is the fact of not being able to not be

free. *- @(>+ -ut it seems that this uest for the in"itself is open"ended"" one need not

choose the causa sui *to become in"itself and for"itself simultaneously+ as its $alue. In

fact, it is this freedom which makes it possible for me to accept or re#ect the original

being"necessary"God pro#ect. I can decide to choose this original pro#ect and continue, or

I can, since I am the determiner of my own $alues, choose to seek another $alue. -ut

ob$iously, that I can turn away from the original causa sui pro#ect is due to the fact that I

am the determiner of my own $alues *i.e., creator"god+.

Sartre is clear that I can choose my $alues and ends *- 328, @80+, although I

cannot choose to not choose, for I am necessarily free. Sartre goes so far *perhaps too

far+ as to say that e!ternal limits to freedom, like class, race, or societies' rules"" e$en

sla$ery"" are limits only if they are recogni?ed by the self. *- @19+ Het he says that

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ontology and e!istential psychoanalysis show us that the original attitude or choice is a

desire for lacked being, and in particular, the being"in"itself"for itself which constitutes the

original causa sui pro#ect. *- /83, /2/+ Het at the conclusion of his analysis in Being

and Nothingness Sartre concludes that the goal of his analysis is to 7re$eal to man the real

goal of his pursuit, which is being as a synthetic fusion of the in"itself with the for"itself)7

*- /0/+ -ut it is possible to reali?e this fact, and still not attain 7sal$ation7, according

to Sartre. Some reali?e this pro#ect, and that helps them to keep from appropriating things

for their own sake, but this can lea$e them with despair because they might still e!pect

that 7their mission of effecting the e!istence of the in"itself"for"itself is written in things7

and if they do, they are condemned to despair because they maintain the causa sui pro#ect

as their ultimate gi$en $alue. *- /0/+ -ut the analysis must go further than this, if it is

to ha$e its full effect and relie$e man from the spirit of seriousness. *- >0@ ff+ It must

also 7re$eal to the moral agent that he is the being by ho! values exist . It is then that

his freedom will become conscious of itself and will re$eal itself in anguish as the uniue

source of $alue and the nothingness by which the world e!ists.7 *- /0/+ Bne might say,

in ierkegaardian terms, that one must go beyond a state of resignation. -ut up to this

point, while different particular pro#ects were seen to be chosen or re#ected *to be a doctor

or a dentist or a farmer, etc+ the underlying unifying pro#ect was originally thought to be

7the $alue or the ideal presence of the ens causa sui7 *- /0/+ -ut, as Sartre says,

6hat will become of freedom if it turns its back upon this $alue4 6ill freedomcarry this $alue along with it whate$er it does and e$en in its $ery turning back


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fundamental pro#ect than the God"pro#ect to pursue. -ut he is not suggesting that we will

not be free, that is, that we will ha$e an option to not ha$e to choose to be the creator of

our own $alues. Eather, the $alue we may choose instead could be freedom itself: 7In

particular is it possible for freedom to take itself for a $alue as the source of all $alue, or

must it necessarily be defined in relation to a transcendental $alue which haunts it47 *-

/01+ In other words, might freedom itself become our $alue"" could it will itself as its

own possible and determining $alue4 -ut here Sartre wonders, 7what would this mean47

6ould this #ust be another act of bad faith4 Br could it be an altogether different

fundamental attitude4 ere Sartre only raises the possibility. 5ltimately, Being and

Nothingness will not answer these uestions Sartre raises in the last paragraphs. -ut

Notebook on Ethics pro$ides us with some answers.

Con(ersion

ere I will refer to some te!ts of the Notebooks on Ethics to show that one can

turn away from the original god"pro#ect *the attempt to be a causa sui$, but that one

actually can only turn away from the original causa sui pro#ect without accepting the fact

that one is creator"god already.

;irst, it must be made clear that one can ne$er escape the contingency of e!istence.

The attempt to escape that contingency is the attempt to become a causa sui. -ut one can

turn from this desire to escape contingency, despite the fact that one will always be a for"

itself stri$ing to be some sort of being. 6hile Sartre says in the thics otebooks that

con$ersion from the pro#ect to be God is possible, he simultaneously thinks that the for"

itself must take upon itself a pro#ect to be a god of a lesser sort, in light of the death of the

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old God"pro#ect outlined in Being and Nothingness. Inauthentic man hopes to be a God

which he cannot be"" a God who is not moti$ated from outside itself * >(/+, infinitely

rich and strong and the one who Cought to beD * 32>, 32/+.

Instead of this, I accept the fact that I am a being who perpetually surpasses itself,

that I am what I am not, and am not what I am, as a contingent e!isting finite being. -ut

as I make this con$ersion, I also accept the fact that I am the one who creates my own

$alues, and determine what I will become. In this sense then, con$ersion leads me to

accept responsibility for being my own god, in the sense that I am the creator of $alues,

creator of myself, and lord of my destiny. The only God there is, is man. * >(9, >(@+

Instead, as I turn away from this attempt to be my own necessary foundation, I reali?e that

I am God: 7The ;or"itself is God in that it decides that -eing has a meaning,. . .7

21>+. It is the for"itself that gi$es rise to -eing * 218+ and the for"itself is god

inasmuch as it is the origin of itself and the world * 21>+"" not as the uncon$erted man

had hoped for, but in fact in the $ery way he dreaded and desired to escape. *The way of

perpetually self"transcending being"for"itself.+ Sartre goes so far as to say, CThrough me,

-eing e!ists for the absolute and this absolute is me. Through me permanence, eternity

*atemporality+, right fit, absolute immanence, purity *to be what one is+ enter into the

absolute and this absolute is me.D * 20>+

on$ersion for Sartre is the turning away from my pro#ect to manipulate the other

to gain control of the ground of my being with necessity. In the original pro#ect I

attempted to be God, but as I accept the death of God"" of this impossible goal of

becoming a causa sui"" I face the fact that the closest thing to a self cause left is me"" a

finite contingent being. 7 . . . man finds himself the heir of the mission of the dead God: to

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draw -eing from its perpetual collapse into the absolute indistinctness of night. An infinite

mission.7 * 202+ I am the finite being left with the infinite mission"" the unending

mission which is, as ierkegaard would say, the task of a lifetime. I must continually be in

perpetual transition, and this freedom from essential grounding is an openness which will

be filled in and created by my actions. Bur mission is infinite because it does not end and

continues into our future. At death the mission ends, but so do I, so insofar as -eing is, is

has an unfinished mission. 7I choose to lose myself so that the world can e!ist, . . . I

choose to be nothing so that the world can be e$erything, and in this way, since I am the

Eelation and the reation in my being, I choose to be what I am . I do not ha$e to gi$e

myself the mission of bringing it about that there be -eingF I am that mission.7 * 200+

I am the mission, and yet, I choose to be that mission.

The Choice to %ccept the "act of "reedo

The parado! is, until man stops wanting to be God, he will not be able toauthenitcally embrace his freedom and accept the fac that he is the contingent creator ofhis own $alues *that the for"itself is God+.

As soon as man loses himself, or gi$es up his uest to be an eternal self"same something, he will

be God, although not the permanent eternal unchanging God, but a dynamic self"creating and

perpetually contingent God"" a lesser god than he first was hoping for"" not the causa sui#

Insofar as man seeks to be an eternally self"same unchanging In"itself *causa sui+ he seeks to be

God in the first sense, but e$en if this pro#ect is put off, one still will become God, although a

different sort of God. In authenticity, I do not ha$e the same God"pro#ect in mind, but in

authenticity I do reali?e that I am God, in a lesser sense. So whether or not I am in

inauthenticity, I continue to will to be God, and by con$ersion, I in fact achie$e my goal,

although I am not the eternal self"same God which I tried to become in inauthenticity, but rather,

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a dynamic ongoing self"creating becomer, who is ne$er yet what I am, and always is what I am

not. Insofar as I am free, I continue to be God, necessarily, as I perpetually choose what I will be.

6hat I gain in con$ersion is an authentic freedo!:

A freedom which wills itself freedom is in fact a being"which"is"not"what"it"is and which"is"what"it"is"not, and which chooses as the ideal of being, being"what"it"is"not and not" being"what"it"is.

This freedom chooses then not to reco$er itself


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freedom, which is to say, an undetermined possibility to become what I will"" not an unfulfilled

essence, but rather, a without"essence *inessential+ being whose only trait is this open"endedness

and indeterminacy. That is e!actly what my freedom is.

Bf course I am not free to ha$e an essence, for that would be a freedom to not be free""

but this is a contradictory demand, and much like demanding omnipotent God to create a rock to

hea$y for him to lift, or for a suare circle to come into being. To ask that the free human ha$e

an option to not choose to be God is absurd, because, again, either one will choose to not be the

contingent being that one is *which means that one would attempt to transcend one's contingent

self to become an In"itself beyond contingency+ or one can choose to accept the fact that one is

contingent and self"determined in which case one has accepted the death of the original god

pro#ect lea$ing only me to fill the gap. ither way, I am bound to choose to be God. I need not

accept my contingency, but I am only fooling myself because I am free whether I want to admit

it or not, although this freedom is not the sort of isolated independent non"contingency which the

original God"pro#ect en$isions as the ultimate freedom"" that of the causa sui. To ha$e the

option to not choose to be God would be to ha$e the option to choose to become what I must

become"" some less"than godlike essence. -ut that is impossible because there is no such

essence for me to fulfill.

"init$de and "$t$re

on$ersion is ultimately the acceptance of an open"ended future, and my acceptance of

the fact that what I will become is perpetually contingent upon my free decisions and actions. If

I were not finite and contingent, I could not be free. As Sartre says, 7In a word, a consciousness

is necessarily finite and free) free because it is finite. In its contingent finitude, therefore,

consciousness is able to grasp the necessary condition of its freedom and its e!istence) it cannot

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refuse it without refusing itself7 * 20(+ To ask why man must be free is to ask why man must

be man. I am a source of nothing, a pro#ecting pro#ector. 6ithout future, we cannot make sense

of what man is but the fact that my future is &essential to me is the $ery reason I do not ha$e an

essence, and am contingent 7the future is not yet determined. Self as accident7 *20(+

The future pro$ides the open"endedness which is the condition for the possibility of the ongoing

pro#ection which is the life of man. I continue to stri$e towards what I am not, for this is what I

am as manF but after con$ersion I refuse the pro#ect to escape this futoral and time"oriented

e!istence. After con$ersion I accept this freedom of indeterminacy which is what I must be, in

any case. I must gi$e up the pro#ect to be timeless and without future or pastF the pro#ect to

become sub specie eternitatus F but I ne$er gi$e up the pro#ect of being"for"itself which pro#ects

itself towards identities which I want to stri$e towards, fully knowing that I can ne$er CbecomeD

something and ne$er change. The goal"orientation has not been gi$en up, but the old goal has.

Concl$sion

6e began with the uestion of how it can be that I both choose to try to be God and that

the God pro#ect is fundamental to being human. I ha$e argued that part of the way out of this

apparent dilemma is to acknowledge that while one is ine$itably in$ol$ed in the god"pro#ect at

first, one is free to choose to turn from the original God"pro#ect. In addition, the $ery condition

for the possibility of that con$ersion is the reali?ation that I am contingent because I am the

perpetual source of my own $alues, being, and world"" the reali?ation that I am all the god there

e$er will be. So the reali?ation that I create myself and my world leads me to gi$e up the pro#ect

to become a self"same causa sui, because I reali?e the futility of that goal once I reali?e that I am

shot through with contingency.

;rom the start, I li$e unauthentically pursuing being"God as my pro#ect. ater, I am free

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to choose to accept the original God"pro#ect, but I am free to accept the death of that pro#ect and

con$ert to a more authentic pro#ect"" a more realistic pro#ect. I do ha$e alternati$es, but there

are some things I ha$e no choice about. I can either choose to continue to try to become God or

not, but I cannot a$oid the either or choice of either creating my own $alues *as I accept

responsibility as creator of my $alues+, or to stri$e to escape contingency, feigning permanence

as causa sui. I can either choose the futile path of attempting to be God by means of attaining

an eternal self"same identity and essence, or I can re#ect this pro#ect and accept my contingent

self"creating state, embracing my freedom. I cannot choose to ha$e a pro#ect to stri$e for, for

that is what I am as a humanF a constant stri$ing towards the future, but I can choose which

pro#ect that will be"" whether to be a permanent unchanging *yet conscioius+ being"" causa sui,

or to accept the fact that I am the contingent creator of my $alues.

Bibliograph!

Anderson, Thomas. Sartres Two thics: ;rom Authenticity to Integral umanity hicago: Bpen ourt Jress, 3008.

aws, Jeter. Sartre -oston: Eoutledge and eagan Jaul, 30/0.

harlesworth, %a!. The !istentialists and Kean"Jaul Sartre ew Hork: St. %artins Jress,30/>.

Lesan, 6ilfrid. The Tragic ;inale: An ssay on the Jhilosophy of Kean"Jaul Sartre ew Hork:arper M Eow, 30@9.

Greene, orman . Kean"Jaul Sartre: The !istentialist thic Ann Arbor, %I: 5ni$ersity of %ichigan Jress, 30@3. *h >+

ing, Thomas %. *SK+ Sartre and the Sacred hicago: 5ni$ersity of hicago Jress, 30/2.2@"21

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%urdoch, Iris. Sartre: Eomantic Eationalist ew a$en, T: Hale 5ni$ersity Jress, 30@9. *h>+

Sartre, Kean Jaul. -eing and othingness. Trans. by a?el . -arnes. ew Hork: 6ashingtonSuare Jress, 30>@.

%%%%%%%%%%%# otebook Bn thics.

Sheridan, Kames ;. Sartre: The Eadical on$ersion Athens, B: Bhio 5ni$ersity Jress, 30@0.

(3

sartre on the choice to be god

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