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IPCS Forecasts

Pakistan in 2015 Peshawar Attack as Tipping Point I Zarb‐e‐Azb I Military Courts I Internal

Political Interactions I Strategy towards Afghanistan and India I

Salma Malik

IPCS Special Report # 171 January 2015

IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #171, January 2015

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About the Author

Salma Malik

Salma Malik is an

Assistant Professor at

the Defence and

Strategic Studies in

Quaid‐i‐Azam University, Islamabad.

She writes a column for the IPCS titled Dateline

Islamabad. See

http://www.ipcs.org/columnist/salma‐malik/

This report is an updated and compiled version of

her earlier commentaries for her column during

2014.

© IPCS, 2015

B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor

Safdarjung Enclave

New Delhi 110029

Tel: 91‐11‐4100 1900, 4100 1901

Fax: (91‐11) 41001902

Cover Photo Credit:

CONTENTS

Section‐I

Pakistan in 2015: A Forecast

Internal Politics

Countering

Terrorism: Peshawar

as a Tipping Point

Military Courts,

Zarb‐e‐Azab and

Civil‐Military

Relations

Afghanistan and

India: Pakistan’s

Likely Strategies

Relations with US

and China

Section‐II

Pakistan in 2014: A Review

Pakistan in 2015

IPCS Forecasts

Pakistan in 2015 Salma Malik

AssistantProfessor,DefenceandStrategicStudiesinQuaid‐i‐AzamUniversity,Islamabad& IPCS Columnist (Dateline Islamabad) on Pakistan

Pakistanin2015:AForecastOfthefewgooddevelopmentsin2015,overwhichPakistancanbecautiouslyoptimisticincluderelations with Afghanistan and the possibility of better cooperation relating to cross borderterrorism and militancy. Beyond this, at the onset, there does not appear any radicalturnaround,unlessadramaticdevelopment turns the tide forbetterorworse.Unfortunately,this year has started on a predictable note vis‐a‐vis India ‐ Pakistan relations. And themostpressingdomesticissueforPakistanwillremainaddressinganderadicatingterrorism.Better is alwayswelcomed, but the question is, can Pakistan afford furtherworsening of thesituation,howeverpragmaticweremain?Lastyear (2014)has left in itswakequiteabloodyandbrutaltrail,claimingnolessthan7500lives,withthePeshawarschoolattackcondemnedandmournedworldwide.Thetraditionalflashpointsremainedactive.TheeasternborderwithIndia ‐ with sporadic exchange of fire along the Line of Control and working boundary andresultant casualtiesbothmilitary and civilian,worked as apolitical template for thebilateralrelations.TheWesternborderwith IranandAfghanistanalsohad its shareof flare‐ups,withefforts from all sides to unsuccessfully clamp cross bordermovement and trafficking, failinglargelyduetopoliticalsensitivitiesanddivergence.Crossbordermovementofnon‐stateactorscastadeepimpactoncounterterrorismefforts,aswhenevertherespectivestatestriedtopursueterroristsandinsurgents, theporousnatureofthe border and sanctuaries available would provide adequate cover to these elements. ThisissuehasbeenamootpointbetweenPakistan,AfghanistanaswellastheISAFforces.ThoughthebarbaricschoolkillingshasnotonlyopenedavenuesofbettersecuritycooperationbetweenKabul and Islamabad, but has also now put into practice, the realization that unless bothcountriestackleterrorismimpartiallyasacommongoal,thismenacecannotbebeaten.InternalPolitics:NatureofInteractionsbetweenthepoliticalpartiesandleadershipin2015While2014wastheyearofDharnapolitics,2015wouldenforcethepoliticalpartiestoaddresspressing issues such as terrorism, law enforcement and restoring peace and order in thecountryfromacommonplatform.Beyondthis,thepoliticswouldremainmoreorlessthesame.Thiscooperationwouldnotbeamarriageof choiceasmuchas thatbroughtunderbypublicpressure, which visibly brought about an all parties’ national action plan. Very interestingly,


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“democratically”electedpoliticalactorsagreedtotheestablishmentofmilitarycourts,makingspaceforconstitutionalamendmentsandthusbecomingsidelinespectatorstowhatisthemostcritical national concern. More than the military, the civilian actors have to be blamed forallowing the state of affairs to degenerate to such a point. Prior to 16 December 2014, thecountry appeared to be dividedbetweenpro and anti‐dharna elements, leaving loudgappingvoidsintermsofsocio‐economicprogressandgovernance.With military now in command of counter terrorism efforts, two critical tasks before thepoliticalleadersincludethefollowing.Firstistoworktogethertocarryoutmeasuresandbuildcivilian capacity for counter terrorism. And the second involves placing the house in order.Interestingly, the protestmarch and sit‐in by the PAT and PTI brought together all previouspolitical actors together. Though more an effort to save themselves, than the institution ofdemocracy, foronce,allpoliticalactorsstoodtogetheronasingularplatformagainstbuddingdemocraticchallenges.Althoughthesit‐insanddharnasmaynothavebeenabletochangethegovernment,theyhaveawakened and sensitized the general public to the state of affairs.Will this public awarenesswork as a pressure group?Will the political consensus continue against all challenges? Theanswertothelatterquestionisno,thedifferenceshoweversuperficial,itisunrealistictoexpectaunanimityof thoughtandaction.As for the firstquestion, thepublicawarenesshasmade itdifficult for political actors not to perform, and it is time for the political representatives totacklethepressingquestionsofgovernanceandstatehood.CounteringTerrorism:WillPeshawarattackbethetippingpoint?The intensityandcrueltyof theattack,was such thateveryonehomeandabroadwasdeeplyaffectedandshockedbyit,andofthefewstepstakenimmediatelywithinhourscertainlyareagamechanger.ThemilitaryChief’semergencymeetingwithAfghan leadershipandconsultingtheAmericanmilitarycommandandassurancefromKabulhasbeenfirstofthecrucialpositivesrequiredinwinningthecounterterrorismefforts.TherehavebeenAfghanledmilitarystrikesagainst militant strongholds, providing sanctuary to the perpetrators. The message sent outjointlyisclear,thattherearenolongeranysafehavensortoleranceforgoodorbadTalibaninbothAfghanistanandPakistan.Theneedistocontinuewiththismomentum.ImmediatelyinthewakeofPeshawarattack,thegovernmentonanemergencybasisformedanall parties’ committee to reach a consensus based National Action Plan to prioritize andstrategizecounterterrorismmeasures.Theinitialkneejerkreactionwasliftingthemoratoriumondeathsentenceandsettingupofmilitarycourts.Howeverthedawnof2015sawthesetwoissuesbeinggivenfarmorecentralitythananyoftheothertwentyoddrecommendationsputforth.Will2015seeaterrorismfreePakistanasaresultoftheaboveactions?Unfortunately,thismaynotbethecaseasthesituationmayworsenbeforeitstartstogetbetter,andthistoowilltaketime.Most of the persons executed so far, though booked under terrorism act and definitelyguiltyofheinousactionsarestillnotthe“topcategory”terrorists.Asterrorists(imprisonedorat large)stillstandtobenefitfromthewideloopholesinthe judicialprocess, lackofevidenceresulting fromanabsentandmuchdemandedwitnessprotectionprogram, life threats to the

Pakistan in 2015

prosecutorsandjudges,aswellasseenrecentlytothefamiliesofthevictims.Anexampleistherecent attack on a Shia gatheringwhich claimed seven lives. After a long break, educationalinstitutionshavebeenreopened,withgovernmentalassurancesofbettersecuritymeasures,yetmeasuressuchasbanningcellularphonesorallowingteacherstocarryweaponsbytwooftheprovincialgovernmentsarenotonlyincorrectbutsimplyfailtoaddressthelargerquestion.For the moment, the central and provincial governments should also keep in mind that thebannedterroristoutfitsmaynotcarryoutbigstrikesimmediately,buttheywillpatientlyabidetheirtimeandoncelikeallothersuchgruesomethresholdsthePakistanisocietyhascrossedinitslongandsilentstruggleagainstterrorism,theywillthenstrikewithmuchgorierstrategies.Thetimeforcomplicityandwoolgatheringaboutthegoodnessinmilitantsislonggone.2015 will be crucial in terms of the very tough and hard decisions which not only thegovernmentmustundertake,butalsothecivilsocietyhastorealizethattheseactionsmayalsoaffect them. The vibrant and free media, which is ever changing its tone, also needs to befactored in. These stringent measures should not only focus on the physical securityparameters,butregulatingthe flowofmoneyboththrough formaland informalchannels, thenexus between criminal and terrorist networks, curbing hate and parochial narrative andliterature, reviewing of text books and a strong deliberate attempt towards depoliticizingreligion.Stronger lawenforcementalongwitha secureand impartial judiciary,policyofnon‐appeasementandnurturingfavoritesandweakpolitickinghastobecomeathingofpast,ifweneedtoputourhouseinorder.Thesefactorsalsoneedtobecounterbalancedbytreadingthefine line between human and civil rights, as well as reasonable level of transparency andaccountability.Pakistan has already approached and must also prevent friendly states from sponsoringcharities, seminaries and actors within Pakistan. With independent means of funding andpatrons outside the country, it becomes possible for actors to defy the state. Given thecomplexityof the issue,counteringterrorismisadauntingandchallengingtaskyetofutmostimportance,making2015averytoughyear.MilitaryCourts,Zarb‐e‐AzabandCivil‐MilitaryRelations:Will2015bringbettercoordination?Overwhelmed by grief and emotions, the entire country feels safe and comforted by theestablishment of special military courts. Given the critical nature of the problem as well asjudicial inactionespecially in carryingoutanti‐terrorismmeasures, these courtsappear tobetheorderoftheday.Secondly,theyhavebeenestablishedforaperiodoftwoyearsinitially.Yetsuchactionsmaycarrylongtermconsequences,thatwouldworkincontrarytocivilandhumanrights.Carryingout targetedmilitaryoperations,suchasZarb‐e‐Azabthough initiallydelayedduetolack of political consensus, are as much necessary and important as civilian led counterterrorism efforts. The delay provided awindow of opportunity to terrorist elements to seeksanctuaries elsewhere, yet the Peshawar incident proved that despite their leaving Pakistaniterritory,carryingoutstrikeswithinPakistanwhetherfortheirownbenefitoractingasproxiestoregionalorextraregionalactorsisaharrowingpossibility.


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The civilian actors must realize the importance of being equal partners and stakeholders incounterterrorismefforts,ratherthanleavingtheeffortsentirelytothemilitary.Ithastakenadifficultsixplusyearstobuildgroundsforabalancedcivil–militaryequation.Themilitaryisnotonlyawareoftheuneasyconsequencesofatake‐overandhowmessyitcanbetomeddleinto civilian affairs, but also how it impactsmilitary professionalism. The civilian actors alsoneed to carryout stronger governancemeasures, so asnot to leaveopenpolitical voids tobefilled by any other institution. The need is to implement in parallel all necessary measuresnecessarytostrengthenandempowerciviliancapacitytoaddressthreatssuchasterrorism,lawandorderandothergovernanceproblems,ratherthanblamingthemilitaryinhindsight.The other important area which has been traditionally considered as a moot point betweencivil‐militaryleadershipisimprovingtieswithIndia.YetthemorerestivetheLoCbecomes,andmoreaggressivethethreatposturingbyIndiancivil‐militaryleadership,lesserwillbethespaceforcivilianactorstonegotiatepeace.Orevenbuildadomesticconstituencyforbetterbilateralrelations.AfghanistanandIndia:LikelyTrajectoryforPakistanin20152014 was an important year in terms of the Afghan transition. Eventually, the US andinternationalcommunityengagedinAfghanistanalsoafteryearsofblamingPakistanforallthetroubles in Afghanistan. Aftermarginalizing Islamabad’s opinions and interests in a peacefulandstablepost‐transitionAfghanistan,theyhavenowfinallyadmittedPakistan’srelevanceandcentralityinanyfutureresolution.In the foreseeable future,whatmattersmost is thebilateralAfghan‐Pakistan relations,whichfor the moment, under the new Unity government appear promising. For the US, Pakistan’srelevance remained largely conditional to the former’s decade and a half long war againstterror, in which Islamabad’s all out cooperation was deemed essential. The result of thiscooperationwasadeathtollwhichhasbeenconservativelyestimatedaround50,000includingmilitarycasualties,ahighlypolarizedcivilsocietyandavisiblyhighanti‐Americansentiment,whichwouldgain furtherstrengthwith incidentssuchasSalalacheckpost fire, theRaymondDavisaffairanddronestrikeswhichkilledmorenon‐combatantsandcivilianpopulation,thanhardcoremilitants.ThemilitarywasopenlyconsideredasanextensionoftheUSinterests inthePakistan;themilitantsbesidescarryingoutterroriststrikesagainstcivilianstocreateshockandawe,alsospecificallytargetedthemilitary,ofwhichtheDecember16thschoolmassacreisonesuchgruesomeexample.With regards foreign relations, US Secretary of State JohnKerry’s latest visit to the region isbeing interpreted differently by both the neighbors. Although, the US remains consistent ondemanding Pakistan to keep “doing more,” yet Pakistan’s concern about alleged Indianinvolvement in cross border terrorism via afghan route, belligerent statements adding to theeffect by the Indian National Security Advisor, as well as tension escalation spreading bothverticallyinnumbersofcasualtiesandoccurrencesaswellashorizontallyfromLineofControltotheworkingboundaryhavemetkeenandreceptiveears.

Pakistan in 2015

Will2015seeanyturnaroundinUSpolicestowardsPakistan,moresoafterachangedscenarioinAfghanistan?Again, itwouldbeacasebasedapproach,wheretherewouldremainpositiveengagementandinteractionincertainsectorssuchasenergy,educationandmicro‐levelhealthand infrastructural development, yet terrorism, nuclear and conventional build up aswell asIndo‐Pakistan relations would remain a point of contention. The US much to the detractorschagrinhaspledgedtoreleasethe$532milliontrancheundertheKerry‐LugarbilltoPakistan,whichhasbeenseverelyfrowneduponbyNewDelhiandlobbyistsworkingagainstthemeritofthisassistance.TheforthcomingpresidentialvisitbyBarakObamaisgoingtofurtherestablishthefuturedriftofrelationsbyconsolidatingandimprovingthestrategicrelations,mainlyontheeconomicfront.OnAfghanistan,fortunatelybothcountriessharesimilarvisiononsecurityandfutureregionalstability.Theunitygovernment,ledbyPresidentAshrafGhaniunlikehispredecessorconsidersPakistanapartnerratherthanaspoilerwhenitcomestobilateralrelations.However,thereisalsoaneedtofactorinthedomesticconstraintsandstakeholdersonbothsides,aswellastheconcerns and intent of regional and extra‐regional actors involved in Afghanistan,mainly USandIndia.TheUnitygovernmentis intheinitialphasesof formingthecabinet,andhasyettoencounter any difficulties. However the coming months will not only decide the drift of thepoliticalsetup,buttheshapeofAfghanistan’ssecurity,itsinternaldynamicsandhowthenon‐state actors will respond. Last but not least, its relations with concerned actors includingPakistanandIndia.Aftera longtime,Pakistanhasa friendlygovernment inKabul,whichwillprovebeneficialtoboththecountries.Howeveronemustalsofactorintheconsequenceoftheunity government failing and what kind of political and security crisis would occur as aconsequence.FinallytheIndiaPakistanrelations,whetherhash‐tagged,hyphenated,orde‐hyphenatedwouldremaininterlockedinacomplexintractablechemistry.Although,thedriftofModigovernmentatthispointisnotatalltowardsarapprochementwithPakistanfortheforeseeablemonths,yetat some point, both countries need to reconnect and coordinate their paths. The electionmanifesto,sloganeering,statementsandposturingbyDelhigovernmentaremorethanenoughto ring the alarm bells continuously in Islamabad. Complemented by the LoC violations andevidence ofDelhi using anti‐Pakistan elements on theWestern front as a viableproxywouldwiden the drift between the two countries. Tough Pakistan remains cognizant of India’slegitimateinterestsintheregion,butwillcertainlyworkhardtoprotectandadvanceitsown.2015 will keep Islamabad busy, facing similar elements as before, and responding to themthroughthemixbagofpolicyoptionsavailable.Withpressingconcernssuchasterrorism,LoCfiringandgovernanceproblem,thestateanditsinstitutionswouldfindthemselvesthroughtheyearinhandlingthem.Dotheydoabetterjobtotheaffect?Againitdependsonhowwellweexerciseouroptions.Post2014:Pakistan’sRelationswithUSandChinaWill Islamabad’srelationswithChinabeaffected inanycapacity in thecomingyears?BeijinghasalwaysbeenagoodandpragmaticfriendtoIslamabad,givinggoodadvicewhenandwheresought. Pakistan’s recentmilitary cooperationwithRussia has beenmuch talked about in all


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quarters,yetBeijinghasnotshownanysignofdiscomfort,astheformerhaswellestablishedeconomicandinfrastructural ties, thatwouldnotbeaffectedbyanynewactors.ForPakistan,Beijingprovestobeareliableactor,especiallyinawesterndominatedenvironment,whichcanbeextremelydiscriminatoryandpartialdependingontheactors’interests.Pakistan in its critical quest formore energy corridors and options,would remain reliant oncooperationandinfrastructuralhelpbothfromWashingtonaswellasBeijing,andinthisregardtheciviliannuclearcooperationwouldagaincastashadowonPakistan’srelationswiththeUSaswell ashowunder the strategic cooperation, from thisyearonwards,NewDelhiwouldbegetting fissile material from NSG states. In this regard, not only China, but Iran is also animportantneighbor,throughwhichenergyandcooperationlineswouldwork.IranandPakistanbothneedtoworkbetterinthecomingmonthsonthesectarianconcernsandsupportprovidedcrossbordertointerestgroups,aswellasjointactiononcounteringterrorism.

Pakistanin2014:AReview

IInternalPoliticalEquations

OfInquilabandtheInquilabis1

Revolutions,likepopularrealityshows,havebeguntoappearinallfontsandcolors.FromtheonceclassicconnotationofMao’sLongMarch,bloodyrevolutionssuchastheBolshevikorIranianthatleftdeepimprintsonglobalpoliticstothemodernsoft‐paddledrevolutions,stage‐managedbytheUS,supportingcolorfulnamessuchasvelvetsorsprings,thechoicesareunlimited.Butisitfairtotermeverypopularuprisingorcivicunrestasarevolution?Isarevolutionpossibleanywhereandeverywhere?

Theanswerisnoandthissimplistictakeofaverymultifarioussocio‐politicaloccurrencehasmadethe“revolution”gameallthemoreproblematicanddifficulttoexplain.Whensellingtheconceptofrevolutionorinqilabtoaneageraudience,oftenomittedisthefactthatrevolutioninitspureandclassicsensesoughtultimatesacrificeandbloodshed.Thereneverwasapromisethatarevolutionarychangewouldoccurwithoutclaimingisfairshareofcollateral.

Pakistan–aftermonthsoffascinatingsneakpeeksandgoodmarketingstrategythatreallykeptthepublicengagedandinterested–hasbeenexperiencingitsownpoliticalrealityshowfornearlythethirdmarathonweek.Theplotwassimplebutconvincing:twopublicfigureswithamplepublicsupportholdontoaconvincingagendaandmarchontothecapitalcity.Ifthingsweretotamperdown,abitofreal‐timeentertainmentwithmediagoingballisticwith24/7coverageandbreaking‐newstickersdodamage‐control.Butwhatmakessuch“revolutionaries”successful?First,apublicthatismorethanwillingtogivechancetonewpeoplewhoempathise

1 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 8 September 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-pakistan/of-inquilab-and-the-inquilabis-4648.html

Pakistan in 2015

withthelatterand/orunderstandtheirdailywoesandarewillingtoofferanalternative.Second,therulingpartythataftermakingtallpromiseswhileelectioneering,verytypicallyseversitsconnectionwiththesamepublicthatvotesittopower.

If,asSouthAsians,welookaroundtheneighborhood,wefindsimilarsymptoms.Thereisdemocracy,butusedandabusedatwillbythedemocrats.Theprocessofelectioneeringandthevariousattachedinstitutionshavebeenabusedandcorruptedandthisisjustthetipoftheiceberg.TheTahirulQadri‐ImranKhandouble‐marchintoIslamabadcamewithalotofhype.Supportingcomplimentaryagendas,boththeinqilabishadtheirloyalsupporters.20dayson,thesiegestandsstrong,butsodoesthegovernment.OnedemandputforthbyQadriregardinganFIRagainsttheprimeminister,thechiefministerandmanyPunjabassemblyinfluentialsforthekillingof14Minhajworkerswasfinallylodgedaftermuchdelay–exposingthebiasesandlaxitiesofthejusticesystem.Demandsforelectoralandlegislativereforms,thoughbeinggivensubstantiallip‐service,haven’tyetbeengivenseriousconsiderationbyconcernedquarters.

30August‐1Septemberprovedtobethemosthappening,asnotonlywereattemptsmadetocleartheconstitutionavenueofftheinqilabiswhowereegged‐onbytheirimaginativeleadershiptomarchontotheparliamenthouse–withtheprimeminister’sresidenceasthenextstop–whichresultedintear‐gasandrubberbulletshellingbyanequallyboredpoliceforcebroughtingreatnumbersfromalloverPunjab.Islamabad,whichalreadysportedahauntedlookcourtesytheumpteenthconfiscatedcontainersstrategicallyblockingonethirdofthecity’smainarteries(notwithstandingtheotherquarterdug‐upforamegatransportproject)becameabattleground.Speculationsofa“soft”militarytakeoverfacilitatinganinterimsetupaswellasalternatenamesforanewchiefministerbecamerife.Addingspicetothispoliticalcurry,allegedsupportersofthetwoprotestingpartiesstagedatokentakeoverofthestatetelevisionchannel.

Whathappenednext?UnfortunatelyforthoseseekingarepeatofdistributingsweetswhenPervezMusharrafstagedatakeover,themilitaryfirmlyexercisedrestraint,thoughcorrectingthepoliticalgovernment,ifeverittriedtoentangletheformerinthemess,ormisquoteit.Forthegovernment,withopensupportfromitsalliesandoppositionintheparliament,itstandsstrongandseemstohaveregainedtheconfidenceitlackedbefore30August.AsaptlystatedbyoppositionleaderAitzazAhsanthatonegoodoutcomeofthiscrisiswasthattheprimeministerfinallymadeanappearanceinthenationalassembly.ForKhanandQadri,thelongerthesiegemaintains,thelesserthechancesforsalvagingtheirpartiesandpoliticalideals–unlessthevariousinterlocutorsfacilitateawin‐winsituationforallpartiesconcerned.

Doesthismeanthegovernmentwon?Atimelybattleyes,buttheSharifswhowerefamouslyvotedinfortheirbettergovernanceandfinancialprowesstodaystandseverelycriticisedbytheirone‐timeloyalconstituentsfornotlivinguptotheirpromises.

Investinginprojectsthathavefailedtobringshorttolong‐termreliefforthecommonmanandtheentireN‐Leaguemaintaininganarrogantattitudetowardseverythingonlymadethemmoreunpopular.Thegeneralpublic,althoughnotfullysupportiveofKhanandQadri,areunhappywiththerulingclass.Unfortunately,thesiegehassetaprecedentforanypoliticalactortogarnersufficientsupportandcampinfrontoftheparliament.Thedemandsputforthbytheprotestorsandtheirleadersarenotunjust;buttheinterlocutorsmustfacilitateapassageforgenuinereformsandchangesinthelegislativeandelectoralprocesstocheckandprevent


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malpracticestoensuregreatertransparencyasanecessaryfirststeptowardsgenuinedemocraticrule.

Pakistan:OfMessiahsandMarches2

ItisbothtragicandfunnyhowthepoorPakistanistakeanyoneandeveryoneforthepoliticalmessiah.Allthisproverbialmessiahneedstodoissaytherightthingswithpassionandfervour.Interestingly,thewayPakistanidecision‐makersrunthecountry’sdailyaffairsandtaketheirsubjectsforfools,makesthemessiahs’workeasierandconvenient.Whetherthesemessiahsdeliverwhattheypromisedisamatterofgreatdebate.

Thelatestinthisseriesarethenot‐so‐newImranKhan,andTahirul‐Qadri.Bothpromisetobringrevolutionbyleadinglongmarchesintothecapitalcitytotheaddeddiscomfortandmiseryofthegeneralpublic–whoarequitedonewithlongmarches,cordonedcities,roadblocks,cellularservicesshutfordaysandtherecentaddition:gasstationsrunningoutofsupplies.Itisessentiallylikebeinginastateofemergency,witheveryoneanticipatingtheworseandwishingforstability.Butthereisalwaysasegmentofthepopulationthatiswillingtomarchalong.

Inaway,thisisallaboutdemocracy–peoplevoicingtheirsentimentinacountrythathasnotbeenfamousfordemocratictraditions.Thepreviousmilitaryrulepavedwayforademocraticgovernment,albeithingedonextremelyfragilefoundations.However,despitetheinherentfragility,thePakistanPeople’sParty‐led(PPP)governmentnotonlysurvivedthepromisedfiveyearsbutalsoinstitutedconstitutionalreformsthatwould,inthelongrun,strengthenthecountry’sdemocraticfoundations,andsuccessfullyconcludeditstenureviaasmoothandnear‐peacefulpoliticaltransition.Thishappeneddespitetheexistenceofastrong,belligerentoppositionandahyperactivejudiciary.However,themessiahsandmarcheshauntedthePPPjustasmuch,primarilybecauseofthefactthattheyfailedtoperformonthegovernancemeter–withareadyexcusethattherewasnospaceforthemtoperform.

ForthecurrentgovernmentledbyPrimeMinisterNawazSharif,however,thisexcusecannotwork.Votedintopowerwithcontrolofthemostpowerfulprovinceinthecountry,thePakistanMuslimLeague‐Nawaz’s(PML‐N)strengthhasbeenitsstrongteamoftechnocrats,itsinvestor‐friendlyvisionandunlikethePPP,thatwasoftenconsideredtherichandcorruptboys’clubandpassionatelydislikedbythekingmakers,theformerhasfriendsandprotectorsintherightplacesandenjoysasizeableclout.Actingasamessiahthemselves,theSharifsandtheirteamusedtherightlanguagetoaroaringsuccessinthe2013election;andfollowedcloselybylacapitain–ImranKhan–whowasconsideredthebestthingtohappentoPakistaninalongtime.ThePML‐Nvoterswereasteadytraditionalvotebasewhoinvariablycasttheirfateintheirparty’sfavour.Thecaptain’svoterswerethefirst‐timers,young,vibrant,andholdingontothepromisethattheirvotereallymatters,andtheyinfusedenergyintoskepticstocasttheirvotesaswell.

Easilydistinguishablefromtheiryouthfullooksandsparklingeyesasiftheywererevolutionariesandnotpartofanevolutionaryprocess.ButthisisthelatestfadledbyUncleSam,wherethediscourseonrevolutionhasbeenreinventedandreinterpreted.SotheTV‐

2 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 11 August 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-pakistan/pakistan-of-messiahs-and-marches-4602.html

Pakistan in 2015

anglesiteTahirul‐QadrilandedfromCanadaandmarchedintoIslamabadaftermakingstrong“revolutionary”declarationsatmammothralliesacrossPunjab,withalargenumberoffollowersinJanuary2013.Afterathree‐daysit‐inseekingtheendofinjusticecommittedbytheincumbentgovernmentinharshweather,hewenthomeinthecomfortofhistrailerwithallpromisesfrozen,makingamockeryofeverything.

Then,asnow,ImranKhanwastheotherrevolutionarytorch‐bearer,butnotjoininghandswithQadri.Onceagain,theywillfindblindfollowers,similarintheirpassion,butdifferentintheiroutlook,carryingthesamesentimentwithwhichamajorityofthemwenttovote:transformingthecountryintothepromisethesemessiahsthrowatthem.Yet,theseinnocentsfailtorealisethatthesemessiahsareindependentinneithertheirthoughtsnoractions.Indulginginconspiracytheories–thatisaSouthAsiannorm–theirhandlershaveadifferentagendatoplay.Whiletheincumbentgovernment’smegatransportationschemeswillnotchangethelotandeffectpositivechangeinthelivesofordinarycitizenssufferingthedailybruntongrossmis‐governance,theseemptyhistrionicswilltoowillnotleadustothePromisedLandthepublicendlesslyseeks.

Atatimewhenthecountryisundergoingatremendoussecuritytransformationandfacesmassiveinternalgovernanceissues,theneedisnotfortherulerstoactwithparanoiaandconvertthecountryintoabattlefield–whichmay,owingtotheirmishandlingoftheissue,pushthecountryintocivilunrest–buttoshowwisdomandinsightandhandletheproblemathand,managethepoliticalcrisesthataremuchtheirowncreation;andoncesettled,introspectivelytryandbedemocraticandgovernthecountryinamannerbefittingdemocrats;happilybidfarewelltotheMaulanatoprepareforanothermarch;andallowthepublictoleadourdailylives.

IIZarb‐e‐Azb

TheDecisiveStrike3

OperationZarb‐e‐Azb,launchedagainstmilitantsinNorthWaziristanbythePakistanimilitaryon15Juneisnowenteringthesecondphaseofclearingandreclaiminglostspaces.Afewdaysago,Miranshah,animportantcity,was80%reclaimedandforthefirsttimesincethelaunchoftheoperation,thepresscorpswasallowedaguidedtouroftheplace.TheOperationwasonthecardsforaverylongtimeandarecentinterviewofthepreviousmilitaryspokespersoninwhichhehintedanintentionaldelaybythepreviousmilitarychief,hasaddedtothelistofcontroversiesastowhythisdecisiontooksolongtobesetintomotion.ThepublicsentimentwasunanimouslyagainstthemilitantsandterroristsandheavilyinfavourofaSriLankatypeoperationthatbroughtdowntheLiberationTigersoftheTamilEelam,withoutrealisingtheprosandconsoftheproblem.Simultaneously,afactioncomprisingtheclergy,theirsupportersandempathisersaswellaspoliticalpartiespitcheddialoguewiththeangryanddisgruntledbrethrenasameanstoappeaseandbringthembackinthemainstream.

3 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 14 July 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/zarb-e-azb-the-decisive-strike-4559.html


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Thoughthecollateralpartcouldn’tmorebeaccurate,sincethe1980sAfghanwar,Pakistanhasundergoneadrastictransformation,whichhasaffectedtheentiresocio‐political,economicandculturalfabricofthesociety.Thedecision‐makersoftheColdWardays,judgingthegeopoliticaldevelopments,madecriticalbutmisinformeddecisionswhichservedwellinshorttermbutproveddisastrousinthelongterm.Resultantly,twogenerationshavepaidaheavypriceforthemilitancyandterrorismthathauntstheirdailylives.Therefore,theargumentthatthisisnotourwarisasfarfromthetruthastheUS’initialclaimsofinnocenceoverstatefailureinAfghanistan.

TheelectedleadershipinitiallyfavouredandoptedforanalmostunconditionaldialoguewiththeTehrik–i‐TalibanPakistan(TTP)operatingintheconcernedareaalone,againststiffpublicuproarandoppositionfrompoliticalpartiesandconcernedquarters.Inonesense,theofferandopeningachannelfordialoguewasagoodtacticalmeasure;butithadtwosevereconsequences:themilitarylostprecioustimeandthemilitantsgainedadvantageandcrossedovertosaferareasacrossborderoranyotherplaceofchoice,withtheirmenandfirepower.Themilitants,astheygainedtime,tooktheinactionandagenerallackofconsensusinthepoliticalranksasasignofweaknessandinflictedheavydamageswhichincludedthemasskillingof26capturedsecuritypersonnel,andmountedattacksonKarachiAirport.

Anyharbouredillusionshavesincebeenlaidtorestandsincemid‐June,thePakistaniarmedforcesareengagedinthemilitaryoperation.With30,000troopscommittedtoclearmilitantsanctuaries,strongholdsandhideoutsfromthetwomainareasofMiranshahandMirali,thetaskathandhasbeenenormous.Thetimingwasbad,giventhatsummercouldnotbemoreunsuitableforthetroops,compoundedbythebeginningoftheIslamicmonthofRamzanwithinafortnightoftheoperation.

Theherculeantaskofevacuationandsafepassagetothelocalpopulation,whosenumbersaccordingtotheavailabledatawasaround500,000butbynowtheauthoritieshavearegisteredafigurearound833,274people.Furthermore,Pakistaniauthorities,afterrepeatedrequests,managedtosecuretheHamidKarzaigovernmentinKabul’scooperationinsealingtheborder–especiallyinNuristanandKunarprovinces,andalsodisallowsanctuariestofleeingmilitantsonAfghansoil;butthisarrangementnowappearsinjeopardyafterafatalstrikefromtheAfghansideonaPakistanimilitarypatrol,claimingseverallives.

Theresolvewithwhichthemilitaryisdealingthisdecisiveblowisevidenttoall,butnotwithoutskepticsandcriticism.Theprimecriticismisthatthemilitarystrikeoccurredtoolateintheday,allowinganeasyandtimelyescapetothemainculprits.Yet,thezerotolerancepolicytowardstheTTPanditslocalorforeignaffiliatesiswhatwaslongneeded.Intheabsenceofanembeddedmedia,theonlynarrativeavailableisthemilitary’s.Inresponse,themilitaryprovidedaguidedtourofthe80%clearedtownofMiranshahtothemedia.Willthemilitaryoperationbesufficientinflushingoutthemilitantsandthelargerissueofterrorism?Definitelynot.Thisisjustoneaspectofthelargernationwideeffort,whichneedstotacklemilitantstrongholdsandnurseriesinotherpartsofthecountry;checktheinflowofmoneyandsupporttheseactorsreceivefromallquarters;maintainazerotoleranceapproach,andstrengthengovernance,lawandorderaswellasjudicialprotocolsinhandlingsuchissues.Thiswon’tbeeasy,givenhowdespiteapublicdemandforstiffersecuritymeasures,theProtectionofPakistanordinance(POPO)hasmetwithenormouscriticism.Todate,theauthoritiesremainindecisiveovertheplacementoftheNationalCounter‐terrorismAuthority.

Pakistan in 2015

Atthemoment,thegreaterchallengeistheassistanceandfinallyrehabilitationandresettlementoftheInternallyDisplacedPersons,supplementedbydevelopinginfrastructureandself‐sustaininginstitutionalmechanismsfortheaffectedpopulation.Itishightimethegovernmentbreaksoldgreatgamebuffermyths,abolishtheBritishmadeFCR,andaccordfullprovincialstatustothesevenagencies.ThesuccessoftheOperationwillcarrypositivedividendsforbothPakistanandAfghanistan.Thereisaneedtostandunitedforasustained,stableandpeacefulfuturethatcanhelpassureprosperityandbetterregionalrelations.

TTP:DialogueorMilitaryAction?4

Theverdictisout:insteadofsupportingdecisivemilitaryactiontobreakthebackofinsurgents,thegovernmentchosetodialogue,withumpteenthcommitteestoname,shame,blameandfootdrag.Interestingly,wherethedialogueoptionhashaltedgovernmentmilitaryactionasaconfidence‐buildingandreconciliatorymeasure,notonlyaretheTalibancarryingouttheirsignaturestrikes(suchasthelatestatacinemahouseinPeshawarandadirectattackagainstsecurityforces)butarealreadypickingonsofttargetssuchasthepeacefulIsmailia(Shia)populationinGilgitBaltistanareatoconvertorscarethemintovacatingtheirhomeland.ThisisalsobeingattemptedagainsttheharmlessKailashtribes,asaretargetedstrikesagainstgovernmentempathisersandAman(peace)Jirgamembers,tofurthertheirreignofterrorandconveythemessagethattheyarestillincontrol.

Whatwillbetheimplicationofthesetalks?Willthetalksbesuccessful?Willtheyusherpeace?OrwillnegotiatingwiththeinsurgentsleadtothepopularlydreadedTalibaninterpretedShariah?SomefeelthatitistheTalibanandnotthegovernmentwhoareataweakerwicket,andwithtimetheformerstandstolosemorethangain.Thisisbecausesuchviolentmovementsareinherentlyself‐annihilatinginnature,andusually,factionalism,powerstruggle,andtheirgettingtoobigfortheirsizewillcausetheireventualdownfall.However,thereislittlecomfortinthistheory,asnotonlywillsuchascenarioentailheavycollateraldamages,butwouldendupsubstantiallydestroyingcriticalinfrastructureanddistortthesocio‐politicalfabricbeforeitceases.

Sowhatdothetalkshold,andwhatistheirmeasureofsuccess?Wouldtheyresultinbringingforthapro‐governmentorpro‐Talibanstanceorawin‐winsituationforboth?Eitheroftheoptionsdoesnotpromiselastingpeace.Allowinginsurgentsandanti‐stateelementsaplatformtovoicetheirdemandsandformeventhegovernmentalcommitteewithafewmembersthatenjoyTalibanapprovalnotonlylegitimisestheinsurgentsbuthasalreadyplacedthemonasuperiorfooting.Todate,exceptforsupportingtheoptionofdialogueandachockeddemandtoremainwithintheconstitutionalframework,thereisapparentlynoothergovernmentalstance.AnydemandsandpreconditionsplacedhavebeenentirelybytheTTP,whetheritbeanapparentunilateralceasefirefromthegovernment’sside,seekingthereleaseofTTPprisoners,stayonexecutionsaswellasretainingtheirweapons.

Sincethecommencementofthenegotiations,besidesphoto‐opsandTalibaninterlocutorsenjoyingjoyridesonhelicoptersfueledbytax‐payermoney,theTalibanhavenotevenbeenaskedtogiveuptheirweaponsorputahalttothedailydoseofselectkillingsandterrorism,

4 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 17 February 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/pakistan-and-ttp-dialogue-or-military-action-4312.html


14

beyondlipservicebytheotherwiseglibinteriorminister.Interestingly,noneofthepreviousaccordssignedbetweeninsurgentsandgovernmentforcessuchasShakai(2004),Srarogha(2005)andSwat(2008),couldconvincethemilitantstodisarm.Andascommonsensesuggests,ifthereisnodisarmamentthereislittlelogicandincentivetodemobilise.Andasexpected,verysoonaftertheconclusionofanyoftheseaccords,themilitantsfoundanexcusetoviolatethepeacetermsandbecamemorelethal.

Asarmchairanalysts,itiseasytosupport‘decisive’militaryaction,withasimilarstancetakenbythemedia.However,oneisremindedof2008,whenGeneralMusharrafwasurgedbyamajorityofthepeople,amongwhomprominentmediafigureswerethemostvocal,tocrushtheLalMasjidvigilantebrigade.WhathappenednextwaswhattheGeneralhadapprehensivelyvoiced.Thesecurityforcesusedtheirlethalmight,andwithinminutes,themedia‐steeredpublicopinionturnedagainstthegovernment.Nooneraisedaquestionaboutwhyaholyplacewasstashedwithweaponsbetter‐suitedforaprivatearmy,andwhohadgiventhevigilantesandtheirhandlersthepermissiontoterrorisethepeopleandholdthecapitalcityhostage.WhateveryonefocusedonwashowbrutalthegovernmentwasandthatthosekilledinsidethemosquewereyoungHafiz‐e‐Qurangirlsandboys.Besidesthisimmediateandseverebacklash,thebiggestfalloutofthisoperationwasachainofbombingsacrossthecountry,insurgencyinSwatandorganisedsuicideattacks.

Priortoitscommencement,mostofthepoliticalpartiessupporteddialogue,whichhasbeendulyinitiated.TakingacuefromtheTTP’sactions,thereislittlehopeforthepromisedpeacethatpoliticalactorsensureasafollow‐uptodialogue.ThetalkswillalsonotsucceedintermsofTTPagreeingwiththestateperspective.Inaway,themuchcriticiseddialoguenotonlyleavesnooptionunexploredbutinthelonger‐run,alsoclearsalldoubtsaboutwhatisthecorrectcourseofactiontotake.Usuallysuchdialoguessucceedonlyiftheotherpartyisatarelativedisadvantageandperceivesincentivesinpeacetalks.Secondly,thecallforShariahalsoraisesseveralquestions:whowouldbetheAmirulMomineen‐theelectedprimeministerortheheadofTTP?IftheTTP’sversionofthedialogueissuccessful,woulditremainaPakhtoon‐dominatedorganisationorhavethevariousethnic‘chapter’lendingthesupremecommandertheirfullsupportandallegiance?ThatiswhereonecanoptimisticallypresumetheinitiationoffactionalismandinfightingamongsttheTTPcadres.Butthisremainsathoughtonly.Finally,whenthecountry’sconstitutionisalreadydraftedinaccordancewiththeIslamiccode,thereisleftnotspacefordissentingvoices.

Incasethetalksfail,fullycoordinatedandcrushingmilitaryactionappearstobetheonlyoptionleft.Therewillbeviolations,collateraldamage,killingofownpopulation,deadlyreprisalattacksandsoon.Media‐leddebatesandprintanalyseshaveaveryshortshelflife.Decisivemilitaryactionwouldyieldresultsonlyifthereisabroad‐basedpoliticalconsensussupplementedbypublicsupport.Themilitaryasastateinstitutionhasalreadypaidaheavypriceinthisinfighting,andcannotactaloneunlesstheentirestatemachineryincludingjudiciaryandlawenforcementagenciesmoveinsync.Thetimeforalternateoptionsisclosinginandthegovernmenthasverytoughdecisionstomake.

IIIPakistanandAfghanistan

Pakistan in 2015

BuryingthePast:ANewBeginningforPakistanandAfghanistan5

Thenewly‐electedPresidentofAfghanistan,AshrafGhani,whileaddressingajointpressconferenceattheendofhistwo‐dayvisittoPakistan,said“Wemustovercomethepast…wewillnotpermitthepasttodestroythefuture.”ItwasindeedaveryoptimisticandpragmaticmessageforinterestedandwatchfulaudiencesnotonlyinPakistanandAfghanistan,butforallthosekeenlymonitoringthetransitionKabulisundergoing.

Athree‐prongedtrackthatentailspolitical,securityandeconomictransitionhasalreadywitnessedsomeprogressonthepoliticalandsecurityfront,withtheunitygovernmentfinallycomingintopowerafteramonths‐longelectoralimpasse.Onthesecurityfront,thesigningoftheUS‐AfghanistanBilateralSecurityAgreement(BSA)hasprovidedasenseofcertaintyandlaidtorestthespeculationsthattherewouldbeacompletetroopwithdrawalpost2014.ThoughUSPresidentBarackObamahadstatedthat9800troopswouldremaininAfghanistanfromDecember2014tillthe2016completewithdrawaldeadline,thefinaldecisionwasdependentonthesigningoftheBSA.

Pakistanhadstrivedtostandbyitspledgeregardingnon‐interventionandnon‐interferenceinAfghanaffairs,andwouldhavewhole‐heartedlyacceptedandhonouredwhatevertheelectionoutcome.Yet,manyconsideredAshrafGhaniasamorefavourablecandidate,primarilyduetohisrelativelyapoliticalstatureandtechnocraticbackground.Now,withGhaniasthepresidentandAbdullahAbdullahasthechiefexecutiveofficer(CEO)ofAfghanistan,thebiggestpoliticalchallengeKabulfacesisthesuccessfulpowerbalancebetweenthetwo.TheentiresuccessofAfghanistan’sinternalaswellasexternalrelationshingesonthissinglefactor.Anycrackinthisrelationshipwillstrengthenthenegativeforcesthatareeveronawatchtoexploitsuchopportunities.

Correspondingly,ifthereispoliticalinstabilityinKabul,afactortheUShasandwilltryitslevelbesttopreventandsecure,itwillimpactthephysicalsecurityandeconomicsituation–ascenariothatneitherKabulnoranystatepartylinkedwithAfghanistancanafford,leastofthembeingPakistan.Astable,secureandpeacefulAfghanistanisasmuchinIslamabad’sinterestasmilitancy‐free,securePakistanisinKabul’s.

TheAfghanpresident’svisittoPakistanwasprecededbythePakistaniArmyChiefGeneralRaheelSharif’sbriefvisittoKabul,andPakistaniNationalSecurityAdvisorSartajAziz’sday‐longtriptoKabul,duringwhichheextendedGhanianinvitationtovisitPakistan.Allthreevisitscarriedasimilartenor:overcomingthetrustdeficit,buildingpositiverelationsandacommonvisionforastrong,enduringandcomprehensivepartnershipbetweenthetwocounties.ThesearenotmerewordsbutthekeytothefutureofstabilityandpeacebetweenthetwocountriestheformerAfghanPresidentHamidKarzaitermedasconjoinedtwins.

Whiletherewasalotoftalkregardingimprovingrelations,animportantfactorthatcannotbeignoredisthepressingneedtoenhancecooperationinareasofcounter‐terrorismandothersecurityissues.Bothcountrieshavelongaccusedeachotheroflackofcooperationvis‐à‐visterrorism,cross‐bordersanctuariesforterroristsaswellasonbordermanagement.The

5 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 18 November 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-afghanistan/burying-the-past-a-new-beginning-for-pakistan-and-afghanistan-4743.html


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Pakistanimilitary’sOperationZarb‐e‐AzabhasbeendeclaredsuccessfulinflushingoutmilitantsfromthetroubledNorthWaziristanagency,aswellasinmakingthespaceuninhabitableforelementssuchastheHaqqaniNetwork,whicheventheUSmilitarygrudginglyacknowledged.However,withthesecuritysituationstillfluidinsideAfghanistanandtheAfghanNationalSecurityForces(ANSF),despiteyearsoftraining,notyetstrongenoughtoaddressthesepressingchallenges,unlessthereisacoordinatedapproachtotackleterrorismandmilitancy,bothcountrieswillbeataloss;anditisbynomeansasimpletask,giventhemanystakesinvolved.

WithterroroutfitsnowmoreadaptableandopentoembracingemergingactorsandtrendssuchastheIslamicStatewhoseideologyismorefarlethalanddestructivethanallthepreviousnon‐stateactors’,thereisverylittletimetoloseandtheneedisforreducingtheincentiveforsuchelementstogainphysicalandideologicalspace.Pakistan’sproposaltooffersecurityanddefencecooperationandtrainingopportunitiestoAfghanistanhavebeenreceivedpositively.AsthetwoheadsofgovernmentstogetherenjoyedAfghanistanwinanexhibitioncricketmatch,therealsoexiststherealisationthatbettereconomiccooperation,jointventuresinenergyandtradecorridorsandincreasedinvestmentininfrastructuraldevelopmentleadingtosustainabledevelopmentandprovidesaviablealternativetoconflicteconomyisthesmartresponsetothepoorgovernanceindicatorsandtheprolongingofconflict.Foraprosperousandsecurefuture,thereisaneedtonotonlyovercomebutalsonotrevisitthepastandworktogethertodefeattheoddsthatarenotonlyinternalbuthaveexternalsourcesaswell.

AfghanistanandPakistan:ConsequencesoftheAmericanExit6

TheannouncementofadrawdowntimelineforUStroopsfromAfghanistanpredictablygarneredmixedreactions.However,mostoftheissuesthatbroughttheUS‐ledISAFtotheregionstillremainunresolved.WhereononehandOsamabinLaden’skillingisanacefortheUS,thealQaedaasanentitystillremains.Thisleavesthesecondspoiler,theAfghanTaliban,aswellastheirfaithbrothers,Tehreek‐e‐TalibanPakistan(TTP).Bothofthemhavetheadvantageofbeingsonsofthesoil.Thereisnotimelinetochase,sotheyhavetheluxurytoactasspoilers,keepthesecurityprofileturbulentinrealtimeandwaitforthe‘foreigners’toexit.ThoughtheAfghanTalibanhassufferedsignificantlosses,theirstructures,abilitytorecruit,andcountrywideoperationsremainintactwithnewtacticsandmeanstoholdground.

AfghanistantodayisnottheoneleftinthewakeoftheSovietwithdrawalandthefaultyGenevaAccords.Thisisgoodnews,asevenintheworst‐casefuturescenario,onecannotenvisiontheinternationalcommunityleavingKabulinthelurch.Howeveritcorrespondinglygivesrisetoanotherproblem:thattoomanyactorswithvestedinterestswillturnAfghanistanintotheirproxystrategicplayfield.Forthemoment,Afghansarehappywiththisinternationalfocusandseeminglypositiveattention,buttheyearstocomemaychangethishappypicture.AlargerchunkofAfghancivilsociety,whichishighlyproactiveindemocraticnation‐building,isdrawnfromtheAfghandiaspora,whodespitetheirbestintentionsmaynotbeabletowithstandapossiblesurgeinmilitancyandviolenceincaseasituationsoarises.Thelawenforcementandsecurityapparatus,ANSF,thoughmuchimprovedandstrongerthanbeforestillhasalongway

6 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 17 March 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/us-south-asia/afghanistan-and-pakistan-consequences-of-the-american-exit-4340.html

Pakistan in 2015

togoanditsperformanceposttransitionwouldatbestremainamixedbag,whichgivenAfghanistan’scomplexsecuritydynamics,isnotatallagoodnews.Thatleavesthe‘Afghan‐ownedandAfghan‐led’democraticandnation‐buildingprocess,whichlikemanyofthe‘MadeinUS’productsleavesmuchtobedesired.Inacross‐sectionofAfghannationals,thereexistsdeepskepticismaboutthe‘Afghan‐owned’componentlargelymissingfromtheframe,thusonceagainconstructingasystemthathasveryweakfoundations.

Muchdependsontheresultsoftheforthcomingelections.WithallthepresidentialcandidatesandtheiraffiliatesminusincumbentpresidentKarzaiconsentingtotheBilateralSecurityAgreement(BSA),AfghanistanrequiresastrongrepresentativegovernmentwithindigenouslegitimacyandcapacitytoextenditswritoutsideKabulwithoutexternalprops.WilltheTalibanbewillingtonegotiateandagreetosomenon‐violentpower‐sharing?Thereareseriousdoubts.WhatwouldbetheimpactofthesedevelopmentsonPakistan?ThoughthePakistanigovernmentisalreadyintalkswiththeTTP(Pakhtunfaction)andthereisatemporaryrespitefromtheUSdrones,bombingsandciviliankillingshavenotreducedandnorhastheUSannouncedacompleteterminationofitsdroneattackpolicy.InfactmostoftheTalibanhighshurahascomfortablycrossedoverintoAfghanistanandwillremainthereforaslongasitsuitsthem.ThoughtheAfghanandPakistaniTalibanarepursuingtheirindependentagenda,onemustnotforgettheirpastlinksandthestrengthandresilienceoftheirnetworks.Inaddition,thehistoryofPak‐USrelationsishighlycheckered,andevenafterelevenplusyears,PakistanisocietyremainshighlydividedaboutwhetherthishasbeenPakistan’swar.

IncasethetalkswiththeTTPfailandthereisabreachinthesecurityframeworkthatwouldresultasapartoftheagreement,wouldpost‐2014AfghanistanbeabletoprovidesecuritycooperationtoPakistan,mainlyintheshapeofborderclosure,hotpursuitinto‘friendly’territorytocapturemilitants,intelligence‐sharingandperceivablejointoperations?Withdivergentperspectivesandastrongsenseoftheothersidebeingthespoiler,thereisdoubtthatsuchacooperativesecurityregimecouldwork.However,fortheAfghanandPakistanTaliban,thepost2014timelinewouldactuallybeawelcomingnotion.SolongasthereisanAmericansecurityinterestandpresence,thereisoptimismforabettersecurityframework.BothPakistanandAfghanistancanconvenientlydumptheirbaddiplomacyontheUS.ItalsoactsasabalanceragainstastrongerIndianpresence.

ThoughPakistanidecision‐makershavereinforcedthepointthattheyhavenoreservationswithNewDelhi’s‘legitimate’interestsinAfghanistan,theywouldalwaysremainwaryofanymilitaryorstrategicroleIndiahasinAfghanistan.Realistically,everycountry,beittheUS(Monroedoctrine)orIndia(Nepal,Bhutan),hassimilarconcernswhenitcomestoitsstrategicinterests.Afghanistanofthefutureholdsincreasedeconomicandcommercialactivityandcorrespondinginvolvementoftheinternationalcommunity,aswellaspressureforincreasedtransitandtrilateral(India‐Pakistan‐Afghanistan)trade.Pakistanhastoprepareitselfforthechangingtrendsandpressures.Ironically,theenergypipelinesstillremainsomewhatelusive;aproblematicprofileforenergy‐stressedPakistanspecifically.Thecomingmonthsarefraughtwithmultiplechallengesthatneedasustainable,well‐articulatedandwellthought‐outapproach.The2014exittimelineinfactheraldsanewchapterintheregion’sstrategicrelations,whichwouldlargelyshapefuturedynamics.


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IV

PakistanandIndia

India‐PakistanRelationsin2015:ThroughaLookingGlass7

Theyearisabouttoend,andkeepingtruetotradition,itistimeforreflectionandrecollection.Howeverbadthesituationmaybecome,theendofyearholdsanoptimismthatthecomingyearwouldprovebetterthantheprevious.2014beganonapositivenotedespitethecross‐borderfirings,asIndiaheadedforelections.

AlthoughNarendraModi’selectionastheIndianprimeministerdidnotcomeasasurprise,hisgarneringofthemassivemandatewasbeyondexpectation.Ironically,theelectionwashighlyreminiscentofthe2013PakistangeneralelectionsthatbroughtformerPakistaniPrimeMinisterNawazSharifbackintopowerthroughamassivemandate.Inbothcases,theheavymandateshadalottodowithabsenceofastrongalternativeandtheanti‐incumbencysentimentmorethananythingelse.Bothelectionsalsobroughtadaringthirdoption,whereinIndia’scase,theAamAadmiPartycouldn’tdefeattheestablishedpoliticalvotebase,andinPakistan,thePakistanTehrik‐e‐Insaafhasbeenonajustice‐seekingmissionforthepastseveralmonths,withsit‐insandmarchesacrossthecountry.However,inPakistan,Modi’scampaigningandelectiontoofficewascloselywatched,andhasbeeninterpreteddifferentlybydifferentstakeholders.

Ononehand,hehasbeenallegedtobethearchitectofthe2002Gujaratriotsandasaresultofhispersonalbeliefs,views,ideologicalandpartyaffiliations,isnotviewedassomeonewhocandeliverpeace.Thisviewpointgainsfurthercredencewithhiselectionmanifestothatwasheavilyanti‐Pakistan;spokeoftherevisionofArticle370oftheIndianconstitutionpertainingtoKashmir’sspecialstatus;reviewingofIndia’snucleardoctrinewiththepossibilityoftheadoptionofnoNFUclause.

Thesecondschoolofthought,thoughcautious,wasmoreamiabletotheideaofModibeingvotedinspecificallyduetohiseconomicvisionanddevelopmentagenda–andthusinterpretedthathewouldnotdisturbtheeconomiccartbyengaginginconflict;ratherhemayactuallybeabletooffertradeandcommercialcooperation.

Apossiblethirdgroupwasthenonchalant,indifferentcategorythatseemstohavegivenuponthere‐engagementoption.TheybelieveModiisforIndiaaloneandhiscomingtopowerwillhavenoeffectontheIndia‐Pakistansituation.Finally,thereisthe‘silverlining’category,comprisingcompulsiveoptimists.Tothem,ifanyonecandeliverpeace,it'sNarendraModi,andthisisthestrategicwindowofopportunityavailabletobothsidestomakeorbreak.

Allfourarepartiallycorrect.Withoutdoubt,thisdefinitelyistherighttime,andevenifNewDelhifindsthisclichéd,incontrasttoIslamabad,theformerholdsthepotentialtocalltheshots–bothforthebetterorworse.Apeaceofferingwhichissubstantiveenoughtoaltertheconflictspectrumwillnotcomecheap,andwilldefinitelyextractaprice.Howeverincomparisonto 7 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 23 December 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-audit-and-ceasefire-monitor/india-pakistan-relations-in-2015-through-a-looking-glass-4786.html

Pakistan in 2015

Pakistan,Indiaisrelativelybetter‐positionedbothdomesticallyandotherwisetobeinthedrivingseat.Thewindowofopportunityisstrategic,givenhowbothSharifandModihaveacommoneconomicvision.

Thereisalsoastrongconstituencythatbelievesineconomicengagementandincreasedconnectivityanddoingawaywithunnecessaryredtapesvis‐à‐viscross‐borderinteraction.Modienjoysastrongmandateandisnotonlyopeningtoallcountries(exceptPakistan)butwantstocreatealegacyofhisown.CananamicablesettlementofrelativelyminordisputessuchasSiachenandSirCreekhelpcreatethatspace?

Afghanistantoois,forthemoment,enjoyingasmoothtransitionalpath,especiallyintermsofsecurity,evenifitisexternallybacked.Howlongdoesthe“unitygovernment”stayuniteddependsonhowprudentlybothAfghanPresidentAshrafGhaniandChiefExecutiveOfficerAbdullahAbdullahdecidetheirnomineesandteam.Afghanistanmaynotbethebestproxyfieldforitseasternneighborstosettlescores.Perhapsitissimplistictostate,buttheresumptionofcrossLoCfiringanditsgeographicalscopeexpandingtotheworkingboundaryshouldbeseenasasubstituteandviablealternativetoopenconventionalhostilities.

Manyarguethattheseviolationsareroutineandnothingextraordinary.Whileit’satrueestimation,ifcontextualisedundercurrentcircumstances,theyrepresentanaggressive,dismissiveandproactiveIndia,whichatthesub‐conventionallevel,issendingappropriatesignalstoIslamabad.WillIslamabadadoptanalarmistapproachtoanyandallanti‐PakistanstatementsissuedbyModiandhisteam?Shouldthe44plusformulaandtherevisionofArticle370notbedismissedasparanoia,astheUSinsists?IfthereisaconstitutionalchangeinthestatusofKashmir,canweaffordtoignorethetrigger‐happygun‐totingnon‐stateactorswhoarealwaysonalookoutforanewconflict?

DoesthisimplytheproactivedoctrineinitiatinginresponsetotheproverbialMumbai2.0?Ifthisbethecase,thenthepessimistshavewon.However,onethingiscertain,thatforthemoment,ModihasnotdevelopedapolicytoengagewithPakistan.Onecanonlyhopethatthathappenssoonerthanlater,astheoptimistsfeelthatonlythecurrentset‐up,givenitsstrengthsandcapacitytoimplementchangeenjoysthatstrategicwindowofopportunity.Otherwise,notonlywillthepeaceprocessremainstalemated,butwithpassageoftime,erodepeaceconstituencies.

Therecently‐concludedSAARCsummitdemonstratedbroadsmiles,stronghandshakesandapplausesfromtheinterestedaudience.Iftakenseriously,throughthelookingglassof2015,inthealternateuniverse,SAARCperformsinrealterms;SouthAsiaisaprosperousregion,withhighdevelopmentandgrowthrankingsinsteadofdismalgovernanceindicators.FromAfghanistantoBangladeshthereisincreasedinterconnectivity,andtogether,theleadersseekavisionofprosperity.

India‐Pakistan:WorkingBoundariesandLinesofUncontrolledFire8

Afteramuch‐deliberatedstalemate,Afghanistanfinallyhadanewdemocraticgovernmentwithapower‐sharingarrangement.ThesigningofthecontroversialBilateralSecurityAgreement 8 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 13 October 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/jammu-kashmir/india-pakistan-working-boundaries-and-lines-of-uncontrolled-fire-4696.html


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(BSA)providesafalsesenseofsecuritytomanywhofeltthattheUSmilitarymustnotpulloutcompletelyastheperceivedregionalproxieswouldturnAfghanistanintoacompleteproxybattlefield.

ThoughPakistanhastimeandagainreiterateditspolicyofnon‐interferenceandnon‐interventioninAfghaninternalaffairs,thesamecannotbesaidaboutotherregionalactors.Thatwilladdtocomplicatingthebilateralequationfurther.AnothermootpointistheDurandline,whichalwayscarriesthepotentialtoignitefieryexchangesofpassionateandpoliticallyloadedrhetoricsandonrareinstances,exchangeoffirepower.However,themorevolatileofthe“unofficial”boundarieshasbeentheLineofControl(LoC)andworkingboundaryontheeasternborder,whichhasovertheyears,successfullybecomeatestingfieldofIndia‐Pakistanrelations.Likeanyandallbilateralarrangementsbetweenthetwoneighbors,the2003ceasefireagreementregardingtheLoChasalsobeenblatantlyviolatedinthepastseveralyears.

WithbothelectedgovernmentsinPakistanandIndiabeingdrivenbyeconomics,thegeneralperceptionwasthatevenifthereisnosubstantialprogressonthebiggerproblemareas,atleastbothadministrationswilltryandmaintaincongenialrelationsandmovetowardsprogressiveengagement.Howeverthefirstsignoftroublewasthecalling‐offoftheAugus2014foreignsecretaryleveltalksafterPakistan’shighcommissionertoIndiametwiththeKashmirileadership.

Interestingly,anyonefamiliarwiththeNewDelhidiplomaticsetupandthegrandreceptionsheldwouldactuallyfindamuchgreaternumberandvarietyofKashmirileadershipinattendance,brushingshoulderswithallandsundry.

Sensitivitiesaside,ifseriouslycommittedtotheprocess,abetterapproachcouldhavebeenregisteringawell‐wordedprotestandallowingthetalkstoproceedasperschedule.However,severaltimesinthepasttoo,muchinvestmenthasbeenmadeinholdingameetingthanmakingitmeaningful.Whatifthemeetinghadproceededasperschedule?Thereislittledoubtthatnothingsubstantialwouldhaveresultedfromtheparleys.DespiteamuchclearervisionregardingwhatIndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModiwantsregardinginternalgrowthanddevelopmentandaforeignpolicytomatchwithit,therewasasomewhatvaguegesturingvis‐à‐visrelationswithIslamabad.Although,duringhiselectioncampaigningModiandhispartyhadbeenvocallyveryanti‐Pakistani,yettheverybriefperiodofpositiveoverturingsoonafterelections,gavespaceforoptimismthatperhapsthingsmightbeonthemend.

Therecentroundofcross‐LoCfireresultinginsubstantialinfrastructuraldamageaswellasheavycivilianfatalitiesoneithersidesoftheLoCandworkingboundary,hasagainbroughtoutmediahistrionicsseekingdeathtoPakistananddealingtheenemy(Islamabad)acrushingdecisiveblow.WhereononehanditmakestheModigovernment’spolicytowardsitsneighborclear,italsoretardstheprocess(whateveritmaybe)substantially.

Arecentstatementbythenew‐kid‐on‐the‐block,BilawalBhutto,regardingwrestingtheentireKashmirfromIndiagotaknee‐jerkreactionfromacrosstheborder.Interestingly,onesetofreplieswashackingofthePakistanPeople’sPartywebsitebyanIndiangroupwhichpostedpropagandastuffwithinflammatorystatements.PakistaniPrimeMinisterNawazShariftoo,muchtoNewDelhi’sdispleasurehighlightedtheplightofKashmirisattherecentlyconcludedUNGAsessioninNewYork.Immediately,conspiracytheoristshintedatasilentpledgebetweenSharifandModiregardingsilenceovertheK‐word.

Pakistan in 2015

However,whathasintentionallybeenforgotteninthisentireconflictnarrativeistheplightofflood‐affectedKashmiripopulation,whichhassufferedlossoflivesandlivelihood.

Cross‐LoCfirehasunfortunatelybecomeabarometerofIndia‐Pakistanrelations.Soonerorlaterthegunswillfallsilent,afterclaimingmanylivesbothcivilianandmilitary,withunpleasantwordsexchangedandangrygesturingatthepoliticallevel.Intheworse‐casescenario,itmayrequireahigherlevelofdeployment,butthatishighlyunlikely.Whatitwillclaiminitswakeisachunkofpeace,andawindowofopportunitytoactwiselybyeithersideanddiscusstheproblem,ratherthanindulginginblindrageandprovocativestatements.

AlthoughNewDelhidoesnotaccordthesamestatustoUNMOGIPthanPakistan,thelatter’sproposalofmakingthisofficemoreproactivemaynotbeabadidea.Apparently,stickingtobilateralismandseekingathirdparty’srolebehindthecurtainswhichresultsincrisisstabilityhasbecomeanormforthetwoneighbors.Thecurrentcrossfire,whilemayapparentlylooklikeagoodmarketingstrategy–withModiallegedlyapprovinganall‐outassault–willfurtherfracturethealreadyfragilebaseonwhich“conditional”peacestands.Ifeithersideisgenuinelyinterestedinpeace,thereisaneedforreviewingbothpoliciesandpostures.

FacesintheSand9

Givenhowtheeconomics‐savvyboysinIndiaandPakistanhaveinitiatedtheircross‐borderrelations,lookingatthenextfiveyearsskepticallywouldbeunfair.ItstartedwithPakistaniPrimeMinisterNawazShariftelephoningthethenIndianPrimeMinister‐electNarendraModi,whoimpromptuaskedhimtovisitDelhi,whichwasmorethanhappilyagreedto.Therestthatfollowedwasofficialandroutine,withthumpsonthebackstobothleadersforputtingtherightstepforward.PakistanalsoreleasedIndianfishermen–whoareusuallycollateraldamage,alongwiththeirPakistanicounterparts,intheIndia‐Pakistanconflict–asagoodwillgesture.

Skepticssuchasme,whoaftercynicallyobservingtheoft‐treadpatternofSouthAsianpolitics,takeleadindismissinganymassivebreakthroughinunresolvedconflicts,butconcedeoverminortriumphsthathelpimprovetheatmospherics.Conversely,thedetractorscompletelydismissthemeritsofdialogueorinteractionastheyconsideritassellingoutanationalideology.Wedgedbetweenthesetwonegatives,anypositiveovertureisnotonlywelcomedbutoftenmeritedbeyonditsownessence.Thishypeoftenprovescounter‐productiveasnotonlydoesthepublicpintoomuchexpectationfromtheseovertures,buttheyalsodeeplymicro‐monitortheeffortstotheextentofturningthemintoapoliticalcircusofsorts.Elsewhere,asummitlevelmeetingwillalwaysclaimmajorheadlines,butwithrealistexpectationsandconsideredmoreofanorm.HoweverinSouthAsia’scase,manyordinarynormandcodesofconductdonotapply.

OnequestionthathasoftenbeenaskedofPakistanisintherecentmonthsiswhatdowethinkaboutModiasaprimeminister?MycounterquestionisdoweasneighborsgettochoosewhoiselectedtoofficeinNewDelhiorelsewhere?No;butwhatwecandoisaimtowardssettingrealisticgoalsinsteadofdrawingrosypicturesortryingtothreadthestringfromwherethelastBharatiyaJanataGovernment(BJP)governmentleftitat:theLahore

9 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 9 June 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/india-pakistan-faces-in-the-sand-4500.html


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DeclarationorthemuchtalkedaboutChenabriverplan.NarendraModiisnotAtalBehariVajpayee,anddespitebeingelectedfromtheplatformandbeingKarSevaksoftheRashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh(RSS),thetwocouldnotbemoredifferent.Theyhaveverydifferentvisionsandorientations,andaresetalmostagenerationapart.Inveryrealisticterms,weshouldnotexpectModitoactlikehispredecessor,asVajpayeehadavision,whichwasbaptisedbythehardcorerealitiesthathehimselfwasaparticipatoryto,andwantedtoleavealegacyofpeacebetweenthetwoneighborsdespitestiffoppositionfromhispartycadresandpolicymakers.Muchhaschangedoverthelastdecade,withmoreinterestgroupsfavoringtheconstituencyofconflictthanpeace.

Atbest,whatPakistanwouldseeissomepositivemovementontheeconomicfront.Atthemicrolevel,thiswouldprovebeneficialandmayindirectlystrengthenthesomewhatvocaltradeandcommerceconstituencythathasconstantlypressedforenhancedbilateraltrade.Infact,inDecember2011,Modi,astheChiefMinisterofGujarat,wasinvitedbyavisitingdelegationoftheKarachiChamberofCommerceandIndustrytovisitthecityandshowcasethesuccessful“GujaratModel.”Butthetripdidnotmaterialiseforvariousreasons–oneamongstthembeing,Modi’sallegedroleinthe2002riotswhereseveralMuslimswerekilled.

Ifthetwoprimeministerscometogetherontheeconomicfront,therewouldbeenhancedbilateraltrade,andincreasedAfghantransittradeaswell.Thesecondbenefitcouldbeincreasedcooperationintheenergysector,asspeculationspointtowardsapotential500MWelectricitytransmissionlinefromIndiatoPakistan–thatwouldbringsomerespitetotheenergy‐stressedcountry.However,ontheeconomicfront,Pakistanalsoneedstokeepinmindthatchangingregionaldynamicsentailshiftingpolitico‐economicpriorities,andwithModibeingtoutedasSouthAsianShinzoAbe,alltheworldpowerswouldbekeentopursuebettercommercialrelationswithNewDelhi.

Regrettably,however,positivedevelopmenttowardsresolvingkeycontentiousissuesisunlikely.Thoseissueswillremainstalemated,andwhenbilateraltalkswillfinallybescheduledandrebooted,thepatternwouldbethesame:talksforthesakeofcontinuingwithtalks.However,themoreconcerningnotionisthepossibilityofNewDelhirevokingArticle370oftheIndianConstitution,whichaccordsspecialstatustotheIndian‐heldJammuandKashmir.NotonlywouldsuchanactionholddrasticconsequencesfortheoccupiedvalleyanditsrelationswithNewDelhi,butacrosstheLineofControl,itcouldtriggerasimilarmove,creatingapoliticalcompulsionforPakistantoreactinasimilarfashion.InPakistan,Kashmir’sfinallegalstatuslaypendingunderArticle257ofthePakistaniConstitution.AlthoughitwouldnotbeveryeasytorepealArticle370,mostofitsprovisionshavealreadybeenviolatedovertheyears.Lastlyandmostdangerously,itwillalsogivecredencetorightwingelementstoopposeanybilateralties,promotearmedagitationandviolencebymilitantsandindigenousKashmiriresistancegroups.

Asforotherareasofdiscord,therewouldnotbemuchbeyondoccasionalreleasesoffishermenandprisoners.IamremindedofSudarsanPattnaik’sbeautifulsandsculptureofModiandSharifatPuribeach,Odisha,withthemessagethatpeacegetsachance,yettheseremainfacesinsand,thatfacethedangerofbeingsweptawaybystrongwindsandwatercurrents.Forpeacetoreallystandachance,itshouldnotbesculptedinsandbutbuiltonsolidrealisticgroundsformutualgrowthandbenefit.

Pakistan in 2015

NuclearWeaponsandCrisisDiplomacy10

18May,2014,willmarkthe40thanniversaryofIndiagoingnuclear.‘Buddhasmiled’mightilyforthefirsttime,inthescorchingdesertofPokhran,India,inMay1974andthenagain,in1998.Inreciprocation,Pakistantooenteredthenuclearclubwithaseriesofteststhatsomewhatchangedthedestinyoftheentireregion.

Thetestswerehailedasasymbolofprestigeandhonourbydomesticactorsinbothcountries.Thoughtheprogramswereinitiatedunderdifferentcircumstancesineithernation,onecommonmotivationbothcountrieshadwasthesecuritythreatsoriginatingfromacrosstheborder–The1962Sino‐IndiawarforNewDelhi,andthebreakupofPakistanforIslamabad.Thismotivationresultedinthecreationofasecuritydilemmathathadasingularanswer:weaponisingtheirnuclearprograms.Althoughintroducedasforce‐enablersandviabledeterrentstoasuperiorthreat,theinclusionofnuclearweaponsintotheSouthAsianconflicttrajectorythustransformedthedynamicsofrelationsbetweentheneighbours.Sincethen,intentionallyornot,allformsofcrisisbetweenthetwoneighbourshavebeencolouredbythenucleardimensionalone,regardlessofwhetherthenuclearstatusisambiguousordeclared.

Atthetimeofthecreationofthesetwocountries,flawedborderdemarcationandcolonialbiasesresultedinmanyproblems.Someofthoseproblemsgotsettled,whiletheothers–suchasthesettlementofmigrantpopulation,distributionofpre‐partitionresourcesetc.–underwenttransformationoverthetime.

Overthedecades,therewereseveralincidentsthatledtoawar‐likesituationandevenwar,whichtookmutualbelligerencyupanotch.However,interestingly,externalinterventionswereemployedtomitigateallthesehostilesituations.Still,somelargerissues–suchastheKashmirissue,unsettledborderdemarcations,andwatersharing–stillremainamootpointbetweenthetwoneighbours.

Timelyinterventions,whetherthroughsilentoropensignalingbyeitherconcernedpartycanbetermedassuccessfulexamplesofcrisisdiplomacy.AccordingtoaPrincetonUniversityproject,“seeminglyindependentcrisesthatevolveinageographicallyconfinedspaceoveraperiodoftimehaveapropensityformutualinteraction,reinforcementandintensification.Inastrategicallyimportantregionalreadyinupheavalandflux,suchdevelopmentscouldclearlyinfluencetheinternationalsystemandattracttheinterventionofneighboringandoutsidepowersthatmightexploitthecrisesfortheadvantageoftheirrespectiveinterests.

Furthermore,greatpowers’interestscanhavethepotentialtoaggravatetheramificationsofsuchcrisesandtochallengeregionalandinternationalcrisismanagementcapabilitiesandefficiency.”Thissituationisfurtheraffectedbythedomesticconcernsandproblemsofthekeyactors,whichhaveanadverseimpactonbothcrisisdiplomacyandstabilizationefforts.Acombinationoftime,costs,stakesandperceptions,whichcanleadtoseveralscenariorisingoutofunintendedconsequences,wildcards,accidentsandparticularpolicyoptionscantriggerinadvertentchainreactionthatinevitablyleadsthebelligerentstoadownwardspiralingsyndrome.

10 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 12 May 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database/india-pakistan-nuclear-weapons-and-crisis-diplomacy-4432.html


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Similarly,incaseofIndiaandPakistan,noneofthecrisesthathaveeruptedfromtimetotimehaveanindependentorigin.Infact,theirrootsliedeepintheconflictwhichdatesbacktothecreationofthesetwostates,andincertainrespects,priortoit.Solongasthemainsourcesofconflictarenotproperlydealtwith,crisesandresultingdiplomaticeffortswillremainthenorm.Manyconsidermeaningfulinterventionstowardscrisismanagementbyneighbouringoroutsidepowersasahallmarkofsuccess.However,suchinterventions,atbest,onlydealwiththesymptomaticoccurrences,andinsteadofofferingapermanentorlastingsolutiontothemainproblems,freezetheissue.Thisstalemateholdsuntilthenextcrisessurfacesinanothershape,andwithmoreintensity.

Withtheinclusionofnuclearweaponry,theIndia‐Pakistanconflictequationhasbecomemorecomplicatedandmoreinterventionheavy,aseachtimebothcountriesinchclosertoaconfrontation,externalactorsremainwatchfulandwaryoftheimplicationsaninadvertentescalationcouldhold.Yet,oncethecrisisissettledthroughcooperativeorcoercivediplomacy,thefocusshiftstootherissuesinsteadofdeliberationonapermanentorlastingresolutiontotheunderlyingcauses.

Insteadofadvocatingforcomprehensivenucleardisarmament,whichisnotpossible,allconcernedactors(domesticandinternational)needviewSouthAsianconflictsandcrisesthroughawiderlensandnotthroughthenuclearprismalone.Undoubtedly,thesestrategicassetshaveachievedthepurposetheywerecreatedfor:primarilytoincreasethecostofarmedexchangeandstakesinvolvedtoalevelwheredeterrenceensuresthatwar,evenofaconventionalnature,remainsaleastfavoriteoption.However,crisesstilltakeplace,limitedconflictshavetakenplace,andthetwocountrieshave,overtime,inchedclosertomoreconfrontationalattitudesthancooperation.

Nuclearweaponsareconsideredtobeasourceofproblemsandnotforce‐multipliersandenablerswhichtheyactuallyare.Cooperativeandmeaningfuldiplomacythatbringspositivedividendsisalwaysgoodandwelcomed,butcrisisdiplomacymustnotbecomeanormand/orasubstituteforroutinediplomacyandlastingconflictresolutionmeasures.

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