G.R. No. L-27289 April 15, 1985JUAN AGUINALDO, Substituted by MARINA and PRIMITIVO AGUINALDO,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.JOSE ESTEBAN and FRANCISCA SARMIENTO,defendants-appellees.Crisostomo M. Diokno for plaintiff-appellants.Andres Franco for defendants-appellees.RELOVA,J.:In Civil Case No. 6977, the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared the contract, entitled: "Sanglaan ng Isang Lupa na Patuluyan Ipaaari," valid and binding contract of sale and dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim with costs against the plaintiff. From said judgment of the lower court, appeal was taken to this Court, "the same involving, as it does, a question of law." (p. 25, Rollo)Plaintiff Juan Aguinaldo in his complaint alleged, among others, that on June 23, 1958, defendants, through fraud, deceit and misrepresentations and exercising undue pressure, influence and advantage, procured the thumbmark of Jose Aguinaldo, father of plaintiff, to be affixed on subject contract; that defendants caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 4004, Rizal (1948) in the name of Jose Aguinaldo and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 10725-Rizal in the names of defendant spouses; that the document in question on which Jose Aguinaldo affixed his thumbmark is not true and genuine, as the thumbmark appearing thereon is a forgery; that it contains terms and conditions which partake the nature of "pacto comisario" which render same null and void; that it does not fix a period for the payment of the loan nor does it state the duration of the mortgage; that plaintiff is the sole successor-in-interest and legal heir of Jose Aguinaldo who died intestate in October 1960; that defendants having no right to win and possess the property in question are withholding the possession thereof from plaintiff and consequently deprived plaintiff of the fruits of said property; and that by reason of the willfull and malevolent acts of defendants, plaintiff suffered moral and actual damages in the amount of P4,000.00.In their answer, defendants claim absolute ownership of subject property upon the death of Jose Aguinaldo in October 1960 on the theory that the document in controversy is one of sale and not one of mortgage.The parties, through their respective counsels, agreed to submit the case for decision solely on whether the contract in question, Annex "A" of the complaint, is one of mortgage or of sale.When plaintiff Juan Aguinaldo died intestate on August 6, 1965, his heirs, namely: Marina and Primitivo, both surnamed Aguinaldo, petitioned the trial court that they be substituted as party plaintiffs in lieu of their deceased father.It is the position of plaintiffs-appellants that the document in question, Annex "A" of the complaint, is null and void because it contains stipulations which partake of the nature of "pacto comisario." On the other hand, the defendants contend that the contract is a valid sale and, as such, it passed the title to them.Hereunder is the contract in question:SANGLAAN NG ISANG LUPA-CANAVERAL NA PATULOYAN IPAAARIHAYAG SA SINO MAN MAKAKABASA:Na, ako JOSE AGUINALDO, Pilipino, balo, may karampatan gulang, tubo at naninirahan sa Bo. Bambang, Tagig, Rizal, Kapuluan Pilipinas, sa pamamagitan nito ayISINASAYSAY KO AT PINAGTITIBAY:1. Na, sarili at tunay kong pagaari dahil sa ipinagkaloob sa akin ng aking amain Martin Concepcion (patay) ang isang parcelang lupa-canaveral, at ang lupang ito ay napagkikilala at nauligiran ng mga pagaaring lupa ng mga kahangganan kagaya ng mga sumusunod:Isang parcelang lupa-canaveral na nasa pook ng Bo. Bambang, Tagig, Rizal, at siyang lupang nakatala sa Tax Declaration No. 4004-Rizal (1948), sa Tanggapan ng Tasador ng lupa sa lalawigan ng RizaL Pasig, RizaL at valor ameliarado ng P70.00 at napaloob sa mga pagaaring lupa ng mga kahangganan kagaya ng mga sumusunod: Sa Norte, Antonio Silvestre at Pedro Sarmiento; sa Este, Don-lingo Luga; sa Sur, Dionisio Dionisio at Pedro Sarmiento, at sa Weste, Tomas Cruz2. Na, alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG DAAN AT APATNAPUNG PISO (P540.00), salaping Pilipino na sa kasalukuyan ay ating ginagamit, ay natanggap ko na, sa hindi biglaan kung hindi LIMANGPUNG SENTIMOS (P0.50) lamang araw-araw magbuhat pa nuong Marzo 26, 1955, at ang kabuuang halaga ng halagang nabanggit sa itaas nito, sa oras na ito, ay kusang loob kong tinanggap sa magasawang JOSE ESTEBAN at FRANCISCA SARMIENTO, mga Pilipino, may karampatan gulang, naninirahan at may padalahan sulat sa Bo. Bambang, Tagig, Rizal, ay ISINASANGLA AT PATULOYAN IPAARI KO sa nasabing magasawa ang lupang nobanggit ko sa itaas, sa aming mga kasunduan kagaya ng mga sumusunod:NA AKO, JOSE AGUINALDO AY PAKAKANIN HABANG NABUBUHAY NG MAGASAWANG JOSE ESTEBAN AT FRANCISCA SARMIENTO, 0 NG KANILANG KAHALILI AT TAGAPAGMANA, AT BILANG KABAYARAN NAMAN SA HALAGANG LIMANG DAAN AT APATNAPUNG PISO (P540.00) AT PAGPAPAKAIN SA AKIN NG MAGASAWANG JOSE ESTEBAN AT FRANCISCA SARMIENTO, ORAS NA AKO AY MAMATAY SILA (JOSE ESTEBAN AT FRANCISCA SARMIENTO) NA ANG LUBOSAN MAGMAMAYARI NG AKING LUPANG ISINANGLANG ITO SA KANILA, SAPAGKAT ANG LAHAT NG AKING KARAPATAN SA LUPA, NGAYON PA AY IPINAGKAKALOOB KO SA KANILA SA ILALIM NG KASUNDUAN.3. Na, ang lupa-canaveral na isinasangla ko sa pamamagitan ng kasulatan ito na ipaaring patuluyan ay pinamomosiyonan ng mag-asawang Jose Esteban at Francisco Sarmiento, nuong pang Marzo 26, 1955.4. Na, ang lupang akin binabanggit sa kasulatan ito, ay hindi ko ipinagkakautang sa kanino man tao, na maliban sa magasawang Jose Esteban at Francisca Samiento.5. Na, ang lupa kong ito na siyang nakatala sa Tax Declaration No. 4004-Rizal (1948), ay hindi nakatala sa bisa ng Batas Blg. 496 o maging sa Hipotecaria Espanola, at napagkasunduan ang kasulatan ito, ay nais ipatala sa bisa ng Batas Blg. 3344, at sinusugan.SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT KONG IPINAHAYAG SA DOKUMENTONG ITO, ay inilagda ko ang aking pangalan at apelyedo dito sa Lunsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas, ngayong ika ______ ng Hunyo 1958, sa harap ng dalawang saksi.(Thumbmark)JOSE AGUINALDONagsanglaSUMASANGAYON SA MGA ALITUNTUNIN:(Sgd.) JOSE ESTEBANPinagsanglaan(Sgd.) FRANCISCA SARMIENTOPinagsanglaanMGA SAKSI:(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Eugenia S. RelonACKNOWLEDGMENT(pp. 7-1 0, Record on Appeal)There is merit in the appeal.On the issue as to whether or not the subject contract is one of sale or of mortgage, an inquiry into the surrounding facts would disclose the intention of the parties and thereby determine the truth of plaintiff-appellant's allegation that his father, Jose Aguinaldo, was misled into affixing his thumbmark on the said contract.Plaintiff-appellant, Juan Aguinaldo, is the son of Jose and it is indeed intriguing why defendants-appellees, who are not related at all to the old man, would give him fifty centavos (P0.50) everyday beginning May 26, 1955. The contract in question was executed in June 1958, or after three (3) years from the time the daffy amount of half-a-peso was given the old man. Thereafter, the defendants-appellees' saw to it that the recipient of the money would execute the contract, entitled: ."Sanglaan ng isang lupang-canaveral na Patuluyang Ipaaari. "It is significant to note that herein plaintiff-appellant was not even a witness in the document when his father who is of low intelligence, illiterate and could not even sign his name, affixed his thumbmark in the document in question. It would appear that the execution of the contract was made behind his back and/or without giving notice to him. Stated differently, if the transaction was on the level, why was not plaintiff-appellant asked to sign as a witness to the document. It may be true that the contract was read to the old man but it is doubtful if he understood the meaning of its contents. The contract was so written that anyone could believe he was only giving his property by way of mortgage, not as a sale. For instance, in paragraph 2 thereof, it reads "... ay isinasangla at patuloyan ipaaari ko sa nasabing magasawa ang lupang nabanggit ko sa itaas, ... ." In some Tagalog provinces the word "Sangla" means "Bilihan Mabibiling Muli" or "Pacto de Retro." By this contract, the vendee-a-retro takes possession of the property as owner until the same is repurchased or redeemed. On the other hand, mortgage is understood as "Prenda."In the case at bar, defendants-appellees took possession of the property on March 26, 1955 when they started giving Jose Aguinaldo the fifty centavos (P0.50) a day. It would appear then that the money which he has been receiving from the Estebans come from his own property. In effect, there was no consideration for the transfer of the property-be it sale, mortgage or Pacto Comisario.WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court, dated August 16, 1966, is REVERSED and the contract "Sanglaan ng Isang Lupa-Canaveral na Patuluyan Ipaaari" is declared null and void, and the deceased plaintiff Juan Aguinaldo is declared as the true and lawful owner of subject property.Further, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to transfer and deliver the possession of subject property to the said deceased plaintiff Juan Aguinaldo's heirs, Marina Aguinaldo and Primitive Aguinaldo, who substituted him as plaintiffs in this case and/or their respective heirs and successors; and the Provincial Assessor of Rizal is directed to cancel Tax Declaration No. 10725 (Rizal) in the name of defendants-appellees, Jose Esteban and Francisco Sarmiento, and in lieu thereof issue another in the name of the deceased plaintiff Juan Aguinaldo's heirs, Marina Aguinaldo and Primitivo Aguinaldo.SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-41847 December 12, 1986CATALINO LEABRES,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MANOTOK REALTY, INC.,respondents.Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioner.Marcelo de Guzman for respondents.PARAS,J.:Before Us is a Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which is quoted hereunder:In Civil Case No. 64434, the Court of First Instance of Manila made the following quoted decision:(1) Upon defendant's counterclaim, ordering plaintiff Catalino Leabres to vacate and/or surrender possession to defendant Manotok Realty, Inc. the parcel of land subject matter of the complaint described in paragraph 3 thereof and described in the Bill of Particulars dated March 4, 1966;(2) To pay defendant the sum of P81.00 per month from March 20, 1959, up to the time he actually vacates and/or surrenders possession of the said parcel of land to the defendant Manotok Realty, Inc., and(3) To pay attorney's fees to the defendant in the amount of P700.00 and pay the costs. (Decision, R.A., pp. 54-55).The facts of this case may be briefly stated as follows:Clara Tambunting de Legarda died testate on April 22, 1950. Among the properties left by the deceased is the "Legarda Tambunting Subdivision" located on Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila, containing an area of 80,238.90 sq. m., covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 62042; 45142; 45149; 49578; 40957 and 59585. Shortly after the death of said deceased, plaintiff Catalino Leabres bought, on a partial payment of Pl,000.00 a portion (No. VIII, Lot No. 1) of the Subdivision from surviving husband Vicente J. Legarda who acted as special administrator, the deed or receipt of said sale appearing to be dated May 2, 1950 (Annex "A"). Upon petition of Vicente L. Legarda, who later was appointed a regular administrator together with Pacifica Price and Augusto Tambunting on August 28, 1950, the Probate Court of Manila in the Special Proceedings No. 10808) over the testate estate of said Clara Tambunting, authorized through its order of November 21, 1951 the sale of the property.In the meantime, Vicente L. Legarda was relieved as a regular Administrator and the Philippine Trust Co. which took over as such administrator advertised the sale of the subdivision which includes the lot subject matter herein, in the issues of August 26 and 27, September 2 and 3, and 15 and 17, 1956 of the Manila Times and Daily Mirror. In the aforesaid Special Proceedings No. 10808, no adverse claim or interest over the subdivision or any portion thereof was ever presented by any person, and in the sale that followed, the Manotok Realty, Inc. emerged the successful bidder at the price of P840,000.00. By order of the Probate Court, the Philippine Trust Co. executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subdivision dated January 7, 1959 in favor of the Manotok Realty, Inc. which deed was judicially approved on March 20, 1959, and recorded immediately in the proper Register of Deeds which issued the corresponding Certificates of Title to the Manotok Realty, Inc., the defendant appellee herein.A complaint dated February 8, 1966, was filed by herein plaintiff, which seeks, among other things, for the quieting of title over the lot subject matter herein, for continuing possession thereof, and for damages. In the scheduled hearing of the case, plaintiff Catalino Leabres failed to appear although he was duly notified, and so the trial Court, in its order dated September 14, 1967, dismissed the complaint (Annex "E").In another order of dismissal was amended as to make the same refer only to plaintiff's complaint and the counter claim of the defendant was reinstated and as the evidence thereof was already adduced when defendant presented its evidence in three other cases pending in the same Court, said counterclaim was also considered submitted for resolution. The motion for reconsideration dated January 22, 1968 (Annex " I "), was filed by plaintiff, and an opposition thereto dated January 25, 1968, was likewise filed by defendant but the Courta quodismissed said motion in its order dated January 12, 1970 (Annex "K"), "for lack of merits" (pp. 71-72, Record on Appeal).Appealing the decision of the lower Court, plaintiff-appellant advances the following assignment of errors:ITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, DATED OCTOBER 9, 1967, THUS DEPRIVING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HIS DAY IN COURT.IITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT CATALINO LEABRES TO VACATE AND/OR SURRENDER THE POSSESSION OF THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.IIITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE THE SUM OF P 81.00 PER MONTH FROM MARCH 20, 1969, UP TO THE TIME HE ACTUALLY VACATE THE PARCEL OF LAND. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7)In the First Assigned Error, it is contended that the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9, 1967, the plaintiff-appellant was not accorded his day in Court.The rule governing dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute is provided for in Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, as follows:If the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the Court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the Court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the Court.Under the afore-cited section, it is discretionary on the part of the Court to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, and its action will not be reversed upon appeal in the absence of abuse. The burden of showing abuse of this discretion is upon the appellant since every presumption is toward the correctness of the Court's action (Smith, Bell & Co., et al vs. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., and Manila Terminal Co., No. L-5304, April 30, 1954; Adorable vs. Bonifacio, G. R. No. L-0698, April 22, 1959); Flores vs. Phil. Alien Property Administration, G.R. No. L-12741, April 27, 1960). By the doctrine laid down in these cases, and by the provisions of Section 5, Rules 131 of the Rules of Court, particularly paragraphs (m) and (o) which respectively presume the regularity of official performance and the passing upon by the Court over all issues within a case, it matters not if the Court dismissing the action for failure to prosecute assigns any special reason for its action or not. We take note of the fact that the Order declaring appellant in default was handed down on September 14, 1967. Appellant took no steps to have this Order set aside. It was only on January 22, 1968, after he was furnished a copy of the Court's decision dated December 9, 1967 or about four months later that he attached this Order and the decision of the Court. Appellant slept on his rights-if he had any. He had a chance to have his day in Court but he passed it off. Four months later he alleges that sudden illness had prevented him. We feel appellant took a long time too-long in fact-to inform the Court of his sudden illness. This sudden illness that according to him prevented him from coming to Court, and the time it took him to tell the Court about it, is familiar to the forum as an oft repeated excuse to justify indifference on the part of litigants or outright negligence of those who represent them which subserves the interests of justice. In the instant case, not only did the appellant wantonly pass off his chance to have a day in Court but he has also failed to give a convincing, just and valid reason for the new hearing he seeks. The trial court found it so; We find it so. The trial Court in refusing to give appellant a new trial does not appear to have abused his discretion as to justify our intervention.The Second and Third Assignments of Error are hereby jointly treated in our discussion since the third is but a consequence of the second.It is argued that had the trial Court reconsidered its order dated September 14, 1967 dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute, plaintiff-appellant might have proved that he owns the lot subjectmatter of the case, citing the receipt (Annex A) in his favor; that he has introduced improvements and erected a house thereon made of strong materials; that appellee's adverse interest over the property was secured in bad faith since he had prior knowledge and notice of appellant's physical possession or acquisition of the same; that due to said bad faith appellant has suffered damages, and that for all the foregoing, the judgment should be reversed and equitable relief be given in his favor.As above stated, the Legarda-Tambunting Subdivision which includes the lot subject matter of the instant case, is covered by Torrens Certificates of Title. Appellant anchors his claim on the receipt (Annex "A") dated May 2, 1950, which he claims as evidence of the sale of said lot in his favor. Admittedly, however, Catalino Leabres has not registered his supposed interest over the lot in the records of the Register of Deeds, nor did he present his claim for probate in the testate proceedings over the estate of the owner of said subdivision, in spite of the notices advertised in the papers. (Saldana vs. Phil. Trust Co., et al.; Manotok Realty, Inc.,supra).On the other hand, defendant-appellee, Manotok Realty, Inc., bought the whole subdivision which includes the subject matter herein by order and with approval of the Probate Court and upon said approval, the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of appellee was immediately registered with the proper Register of Deeds. Manotok Realty, Inc. has therefore the better right over the lot in question because in cases of lands registered under the Torrens Law, adverse interests not therein annotated which are without the previous knowledge by third parties do not bind the latter. As to the improvement which appellant claims to have introduced on the lot, purchase of registered lands for value and in good faith hold the same free from all liens and encumbrances except those noted on the titles of said land and those burdens imposed by law. (Sec. 39, Act. 496).An occupant of a land, or a purchaser thereof from a person other than the registered owner, cannot claim good faith so as to be entitled to retention of the parcels occupied by him until reimbursement of the value of the improvements he introduced thereon, because he is charged with notice of the existence of the owner's certificate of title (J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Lecardo, et al., CA-G.R. No. 25477-R, July 24, 1962; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Manuel Abundo, CA-G.R. No. 29701-R, November 18, 1968).Appellant has not convinced the trial Court that appellee acted in bad faith in the acquisition of the property due to the latter's knowledge of a previous acquisition by the former, and neither are we impressed by the claim. The purchaser of a registered land has to rely on the certificate of title thereof. The good faith of appellee coming from the knowledge that the certificate of title covering the entire subdivision contain no notation as to appellant's interest, and the fact that the records of these eases like Probate Proceedings Case No. 10808, do not show the existence of appellant's claim, strongly support the correctness of the lower Court's decisionWHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find no reason to amend or set aside the decision appealed from, as regards to plaintiff-appellant Catalino Leabres. We therefore affirm the same, with costs against appellant. (pp. 33-38, Rollo)Petitioner now comes to us with the following issues:(1) Whether or not the petitioner was denied his day in court and deprived of due process of law.(2) Whether or not the petitioner had to submit his receipt to the probate court in order that his right over the parcel of land in dispute could be recognized valid and binding and conclusive against the Manotok Realty, Inc.(3) Whether or not the petitioner could be considered as a possessor in good faith and in the concept of owner. (p. 11, Rollo)Petitioner's contention that he was denied his day in court holds no water. Petitioner does not deny the fact that he failed to appear on the date set for hearing on September 14, 1967 and as a consequence of his non-appearance, the order of dismissal was issued, as provided for by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court.Moreover, as pointed out by private respondent in its brief, the hearing on June 11, 1967 was notex parte. Petitioner was represented by his counsel on said date, and therefore, petitioner was given his day in Court.The main objection of the petition in the lower court's proceeding is the reception of respondent's evidence without declaring petitioner in default. We find that there was no necessity to declare petitioner in default since he had filed his answer to the counterclaim of respondent.Petitioner anchors his main arguments on the receipt (Exh. 1) dated May 2, 1950, as a basis of a valid sale. An examination of the receipt reveals that the same can neither be regarded as a contract of sale or a promise to sell. There was merely an acknowledgment of the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). There was no agreement as to the total purchase price of the land nor to the monthly installment to be paid by the petitioner. The requisites of a valid Contract of Sale namely 1) consent or meeting of the minds of the parties; 2) determinate subject matter; 3) price certain in money or its equivalent-are lacking in said receipt and therefore the "sale" is not valid nor enforceable. Furthermore, it is a fact that Dona Clara Tambunting died on April 22, 1950. Her estate was thereafter undercustodia legisof the Probate Court which appointed Don Vicente Legarda as Special Administrator on August 28, 1950. Don Vicente Legarda entered into said sale in his own personal-capacity and without court approval, consequently, said sale cannot bind the estate of Clara Tambunting. Petitioner should have submitted the receipt of alleged sale to the Probate Court for its approval of the transactions. Thus, the respondent Court did not err in holding that the petitioner should have submitted his receipt to the probate court in order that his right over the subject land could be recognized-assuming of course that the receipt could be regarded as sufficient proof.Anent his possession of the land, petitioner cannot be deemed a possessor in good faith in view of the registration of the ownership of the land. To consider petitioner in good faith would be to put a premium on his own gross negligence. The Court resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit and to AFFIRM the assailed judgment.Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-54070 February 28, 1983HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ZAMBALES and JOAQUINA ZAMBALES,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, NIN BAY MINING CORPORATION, ANGELA C. PREYSLER and JOAQUIN B. PREYSLER,respondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:The Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in the case entitled "Enrique Zambales and Joaquina Zambales, Plaintiffs-appellees vs. Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, Nin Bay Mining Corporation and Joaquin B. Preysler, Defendants-appellants" (CA-G.R. No. 59386-R), setting aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Palawan in Civil Case No. 678 for Annulment of a Deed of Sale with Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages", is the subject of this Petition for Review on Certiorari.Joaquin B. Preysler is now deceased and was substituted by Angela C. Preysler, his widow.Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes was originally a defendant in Civil Case No. 678 but he did not appeal from the Decision of the lower Court.The Zambales spouses (Zambaleses, for brevity) were the homestead patentees of a parcel of land with an area of 17,8474 hectares situated in the Municipality of Del Pilar, Roxas, Palawan, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. G 1193 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Palawan, issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. V-59502 dated September 6, 1955.Claiming that the Nin Bay Mining Corporation (Corporation, for short) had removed silica sand from their land and destroyed the plants and others improvements thereon, the Zambaleses instituted, on November 10, 1958, Civil Case No. 316 before the Court of First Instance of Palawan claiming damages in the total sum of P48,000.00.The Corporation denied having caused any damages and claimed that it had excavated and extracted silica sand only from its own mining claims and on which it had mining lease contracts with the Philippine Government.On October 29, 1959, the Zambaleses, duly assisted by their counsel, Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, and the Corporation, entered into a Compromise Agreement, the portions of which, pertinent to this case, read:1. DEFENDANT shall pay the PLAINTIFFS a rental of TWENTY (P20.00) PESOS per hectare per year from September 9, 1955 to September 30, 1960, or a total rental price of ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR PESOS AND SEVENTY- FOUR CENTAVOS (P1,784.74), Philippine currency, in lieu of all damages...2. The payment to the PLAINTIFFS of the above-mentioned rental price shall be considered full, absolute and final payment and indemnity for all the alleged damages to PLAINTIFFS' property and its improvements, or any other actual, moral, exemplary or other damages that PLAINTIFFS may have suffered or will suffer in connection with the mining operations of DEFENDANT on the property in question, which property, by virtue of the terms of this Agreement shall be used by DEFENDANT as occupant thereof until September 30, 1960.3. PLAINTIFFS hereby agree and bind themselves to sell, transfer and convey, and DEFENDANT or its assigns, qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain, hereby agrees to purchase and pay for, the aforesaid property of the PLAINTIFFS, containing an area of 17.8474 hectares, situated in the Municipality of Del Pilar, Roxas, Palawan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. G1193 of the Registry of Deeds of Palawan, at the fixed selling price of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS per hectare or a total purchase price of EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS and SEVENTY CENTAVOS (P8,923.70), Philippine currency. The contract to purchase and sell herein provided for, shall be reciprocally demandable and enforceable by the parties hereto on September 10, 1960. PLAINTIFFS hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint DEFENDANT, its successors and/or assigns their true and lawful attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to sell, transfer and convey on September 10, 1960 or at any time thereafter the whole or any part of PLAINTIFFS' property hereinabove mentioned to the DEFENDANT, its successors and/or assigns, or to any third party, and to execute and deliver all instruments and documents whatsoever necessary for the purpose, and all acts done and to be done by DEFENDANT, its successors and/or assigns in conformity with the powers herein granted are hereby ratified and confirmed by the PLAINTIFFS. ...4. In consideration of the payment of the amount of P1,784.74 by DEFENDANT, and of other good and valuable consideration, PLAINTIFFS, jointly and severally, hereby forever release, fully and completely, said DEFENDANT, its successors and/or assigns in interest, from any and all liabilities, whether arising from past, present or future excavation or removal of silica sand from the property in question or otherwise, and from all the other claims against the DEFENDANT contained in their Complaint in Civil Case No. 316 of the Court of First Instance of Palawan.1The Trial Court rendered judgment on October 29, 1959 based on the Compromise Agreement. The document was duly annotated an OCT No. G - 1193 (Exhibit " A ") the day after, or on October 30, 1959 (Exhibit " 10 A ").On September 10, 1960, the Corporation, as attorney-in-fact for the Zambaleses, as Vendors, sold the disputed property to Joaquin B. Preysler for the sum of P8,923.70 fixed in the Compromise Agreement (Exhibit " 11 "). Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-970 was issued in the vendee's name on December 19, 1960 (Exhibit " 2 ").The Deed of Sale to Preysler contained the following proviso:The VENDORS hereby represent and warrant that the five-year restrictive period on alienation of lands acquired under the homestead provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, has already expired, the date of issuance of the herein homestead patent to the VENDORS as aforesaid being September 6, 1955 as shown in Original Certificate of Title No. G-1193.On October 18, 1960, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved the sale to Preysler of the subject property (Exhibit "13 ").On. December 6, 1969, or ten (10) years after the Trial Court's Decision based on the Compromise Agreement, and nine (9) years after the sale to Preysler, the Zambaleses filed Civil Case No. 678 before the Court of First Instance of Palawan for "Annulment of a Deed of Sale with Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages". They contended that it was their lawyer who prevailed upon them to sign the Compromise Agreement; that they are unschooled and did not understand the contents thereof; that they were made to understand that they would receive the sum of P10,700.00, only as payment for damages sustained by the land from 1955 to 1960; that through fraud, deceit and manipulation by their lawyer and the Corporation, they were made to agree to appoint the Corporation as their attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to sell; that it was never their intention to sell the land; that in September 1969, they were surprised to learn that the land was already titled in the name of Joaquin B. Preysler; that the land was acquired and registered in the latter's name through fraud and deceit. The Zambaleses then prayed that the deed of sale and the title in Preysler's name be annulled on the ground of fraud and that the property be reconveyed to them.In their Answer, the Corporation denied all allegations that the Zambaleses had signed the Compromise Agreement without understanding the contents thereof, the truth being that it was read to them by their counsel, Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, who explained thoroughly the full implication and legal consequence of each and every provision, which was then submitted and approved by then Presiding Judge Juan L. Bocar; and that the Corporation had sold the property to Preysler as a duly constituted attorney-in-fact pursuant to the Compromise Agreement.After trial, the lower Court rendered judgment in favor of the Zambaleses, the dispositive part of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:1) That the deed of sale executed by Nin Bay Mining Corporation through its president, to Joaquin B. Preysler is hereby declared null and void;2) That the defendant Joaquin B. Preysler is hereby ordered to reconvey the land subject matter of this litigation to the plaintiffs;3) That the defendants Nin Bay Mining Corporation and Joaquin B. Preysler shall pay the plaintiffs the sum of P85,000.00 as actual damages plus the legal rate of interest from September 30, 1960 up to the time the amount is fully paid;4) That the defendants to pay the sum of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and5) The defendants to pay the costs.On appeal by the Corporation, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court, after finding that the alleged fraud or misrepresentation in the execution of the Compromise Agreement had not been substantiated by evidence.The case is now before us on review.The controversy revolves around the issue of due execution and validity of the Compromise Agreement (Exhibit "8") dated October 29; 1959, and of the subsequent Deed of Sale (Exhibit "11 "), dated 10 September 1960.IThe general rule is that whoever alleges fraud or mistake must substantiate his allegation, since the presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular. The rule admits of an exception in Article 1332 of the Civil Code which provides:When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.For the proper application of said provision, it has first to be established convincingly that the illiterate or the party at a disadvantage could not read or understand the language in which the contract was written.2The evidence discloses that the spouses Zambales are unschooled. They cannot read, speak, much less understand English or write, except to sign their names.3The Zambaleses alleged in their Complaint that the Compromise Agreement (Exhibit "8") was executed through fraud by the Corporation and by their counsel Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, whom they included as a defendant. The burden of proof, therefore, shifted to the Corporation to show that the compromise agreement had been fully explained to the plaintiffs.In refuting the allegation that plaintiffs were misled into signing the compromise agreement, their former counsel, Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, and the notary, Atty. Salomon Reyes, a lawyer for Nin Bay Mining Corporation, established that the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement were thoroughly explained and fully understood by the spouses Zambales in accordance with their proposal to sell the land at P500.00 a hectare; that before the signing of the Compromise Agreement, the notary requested Atty. de los Reyes to read and explain each and every provision to the spouses, and with the help of Ricardo Nunala, Atty. de los Reyes did so in their dialect (Cuyuno). Thereafter, the parties went to Judge Juan Bocar, who was assured that the spouses Zambales understood and signed the Compromise Agreement.4We sustain the finding of the Court of Appeals that fraud and misrepresentation did not vitiate petitioners' consent to the Agreement when it observed:Taking into account the foregoing observations, this Court is not convinced that indeed appellees were victims of a fraudulent scheme employed upon them by their former counsel by reason of their alleged illiteracy and ignorance. The evidence discloses that appellees, although unschooled, are intelligent, well-informed and intelligent people. They are not the kind of persons who could easily be fooled of their rights and interests. Even as commented by the courta quo, which had a chance to observe the demeanor of the witness, it had no observation that the witness, Joaquina Zambales, is ignorant. As correctly observed by appellants, appellees 'are political leaders and chief campaigners; they speak in the platform during political rallies; and they are widely travelled' (p. 28, Appellants' Brief). As a matter of fact they are knowledgeable of the right connections in the government. They had approached former Sen. Rogelio de la Rosa, no less, the congressman and the governor. Even the lawyers they have retained previous to their present counsel are the Padilla Law Office and the Diokno Law Office, It is common knowledge that these law offices are among the established law offices in Manila. It is far convincing that an ignorant couple would have knowledge of these law firms. All these are obvious manifestations of their being well-informed and the way they have conducted their way of living apparently is inconsistent with the plea of being illiterate and/or ignorant. They cannot capitalize on the fact that they are uneducated only because they had no formal schooling inasmuch as one's knowledge of the facts of life is not dependent on whether one had formal schooling or not and it does not necessarily follow always that if one is unschooled he is ignorant.Furthermore, when plaintiffs-appellees signed the questioned compromise agreement they were duly assisted and represented by their counsel, Atty. de los Reyes. When Atty. de los Reyes testified in court he categorically declared that it was to the best interest of his clients that they compromise Civil Case No. 316. This declaration finds support in Joaquina Zambales' testimony wherein she stated thus:ATTY. SEMBRANO:Q. Except for this present case, would you say to the Court that Atty. de los Reyes extended to you legal assistance to your satisfaction?A. Yes, sir, he is good to us.xxx xxx xxxQ. So these people never gave their services to you?A. Nobody was able to help us except Atty. de los Reyes. (Tsn., pp. 29, 31 & 32, June 19, 1974)... Thus, it having been established that appellees could not have been misled by their former counsel into signing the compromise agreement and taking into account the acts of the appellees and their children subsequent to the execution of the compromise agreement perforce the courta quoerred in not giving credence to the clear and convincing testimonies of Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes and Atty. Salomon Reyes anent the execution of the compromise agreement.5However, although we find that the Zambaleses were not misled into signing the Compromise Agreement, we hold that there has been violation of the Public Land Act. The evidence on record shows that the land in question was awarded t the Zambaleses as a homestead on September 6, 1955 (Exhibit "A"). Before us, the Zambaleses now argue that the Compromise Agreement executed on October 29, 1959 is in violation of the Public Land Act, which prohibits alienation and encumbrance of a homestead lot within five years from the issuance of the patent.6We sustain that contention. The fact that the issue was not raised in the Courts below is not a deterrent factor considering that the question affects the validity of the agreement between the parties. The Supreme Court has the authority to review matters even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it is found that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.7Moreover, a party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.8In the case at bar it is indisputable that Homestead Patent No. V-59502 was issued on September 6, 1955 as shown in Original Certificate of Title No. 1193 (Exhibit "A ").The sale of a homestead lot within the five-year prohibitory period is illegal and void. The law does not distinguish between executory and consummated sales.The law prohibiting any transfer or alienation of homestead land within five years from the issuance of the patent does not distinguish between executory and consummated sales; and it would hardly be in keeping with the primordial aim of this prohibition to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader the piece of land that the state had gratuitously given to them, to hold valid a homestead sale actually perfected during the period of prohibition but with the execution of the formal deed of conveyance and the delivery of possession of the land sold to the buyer deferred until after the expiration of the prohibitory period, purposely to circumvent the very law that prohibits and declares invalid such transaction to protect the homesteader and his family.9In the compromise agreement executed between the parties, (1) the Zambaleses promised to sell and the Corporation agreed to buy the disputed lot at P500.00 per hectare, the contract to be reciprocally demandable and enforceable on September 10, 1960; and as a substitute procedure, (2) an irrevocable agency was constituted in favor of the Corporation as attorney- in-fact to sell the land to any third person on September 10, 1960 or any time thereafter.Clearly, the bilateral promise to buy and sell the homestead lot at a price certain, which was reciprocally demandable10, was entered into within the five-year prohibitory period and is therefore, illegal and void. Further, the agency to sell the homestead lot to a third party was coupled with an interest inasmuch as a bilateral contract was dependent on it and was not revocable at will by any of the parties.11To all intents and purposes, therefore, there was an actual executory sale perfected during the period of prohibition except that it was reciprocally demandable thereafter and the agency to sell to any third party was deferred until after the expiration of the prohibitory period. That "rentals" were ostensibly to be paid during the five-year prohibitory period, and the agency to sell made effective only after the lapse of the said period, was merely a devise to circumvent the prohibition.To hold valid such an arrangement would be to throw the door wide open to all possible subterfuges that persons interested in homesteads may devise to defeat the legal prohibition against alienation within five years from the issuance of the patent.We hold, therefore, that the bilateral promise to buy and sell, and the agency to sell, entered into within five years from the date of the homestead patent, was in violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law, although the executed sale was deferred until after the expiration of the five-year- prohibitory period.As the contract is void from the beginning, for being expressly prohibited by law12the action for the declaration of its inexistence does not prescribe.13Being absolutely void, it is entitled to no authority or respect, the sale may be impeached in a collateral proceeding by any one with whose rights and interest it conflicts. There is no presumption of its validity.14The approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources after the lapse of five years from the date of the patent would neither legalize the sale.15The homestead in question should be returned to the Zambaleses, petitioners herein, who are, in turn, bound to restore to the Corporation the sum of P8,923.70 as the price thereof. The actual damages awarded by the Trial Court of P85,000.00 have not been adequately substantiated. Moreover, under the agreement, the total rental price of P1,784.74 was intended to be "in lieu of all damages, or any other actual, moral, exemplary or other damages.This is without prejudice to the corresponding action on the part of the State for reversion of the property and its improvements, if any, under Section 124 of the Public Land Act.16WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby REVERSED, and another one entered (1) declaring null and void a) the bilateral promise to buy and sell entered into between Enrique Zambales and Joaquina Zambales, on the one hand, and the Nin Bay Mining Corporation on the other, and b) the sale executed by Nin Bay Mining Corporation in favor of Joaquin B. Preysler; (2) ordering Angela C. Preysler to reconvey the land subject matter of this litigation to petitioners upon refund by the latter to the Nin Bay Mining Corporation of the sum of P8,923.70, all expenses for the reconveyance to be borne by private respondents; (3) ordering Nin Bay Mining Corporation to pay rentals to petitioners at the price of P20.00 per hectare per year from December 6, 1969, the date of the institution of the Complaint, till the date that possession is turned over to petitioners; and (4) ordering the Register of Deeds for the Province of Palawan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-970 of his Registry, and reissue to the Heirs of Enrique Zambales and Joaquina Zambales the title to the homestead in question.Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Solicitor General.No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132305December 4, 2001IDA C. LABAGALA,petitioner,vs.NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.QUISUMBING,J.:This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4, 1997,1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990,2of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-41515, finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3pro indivisoshare in a parcel of land.1wphi1.ntThe pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as follows:Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property.3On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said property.4Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 19795was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 1723346) in petitioner's name alone.7Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his "poor and unschooled sisters who. ..sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare."8Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale.9On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment cases against her and other occupants of the property. The first was decided in her and the other defendants' favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and resorted to the present action.Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the property as decreed by the RTC. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a title in her name alone, allegedly after respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the property from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay realty taxes thereon. She added that with a title issued in her name she could avail of a realty tax amnesty.On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, decreeing thus:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the plaintiffs [herein respondents] as being entitled to the ownership and possession each of one-third (1/3)proindivisoshare of the property originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of Jose T. Santiago and presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the name of herein defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No. 3075-A Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint, and the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No. 56226 of this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third (1/3)proindivisoshare adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T. Santiago in said case, is hereby adjudged and adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and entitled to possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge damages, attorney's fees and costs. Upon finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is ordered cancelled and a new title issued in the names of the two (2) plaintiffs and the defendant as owners in equal shares, and the Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed to effect the same upon payment of the proper fees by the parties herein.SO ORDERED.10According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter. The trial court ruled that the following evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents which stated that petitioner is Jose's daughter, and (2) Jose's income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said that respondents knew of petitioner's existence and her being the daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases they filed against petitioner. According to the court, respondents were not candid with the court in refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that she was Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is entered declaring the appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago the co-owners in equal shares of the one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose Santiago in the land and building covered by TCT No. 172334. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Manila is directed to cancel said title and issue in its place a new one reflecting this decision.SO ORDERED.Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into account the statement made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did not have any child.Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for consideration:1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that she had adduced sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago, making her his sole heir and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She points out that respondents had, before the filing of the instant case, previously "considered"11her as the daughter of Jose who, during his lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate daughter. She asserts that her identification as Jose's daughter in his ITR outweighs the "strange" answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally, citing the case ofSayson v. Court of Appeals12in which we held that "(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law."13Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of this contention.14For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of Jose, per her birth certificate that indicates her parents as Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas.15They argue that the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to the present case since this is not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership, and possession of property .The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:.Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.16Article 263 refers to an action to impugn thelegitimacyof a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.17Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.Petitioner's reliance onSaysonis likewise improper. The factual milieu present inSaysondoes not obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged by petitioners inSaysonwas (1) the validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly adopted since Doribel had already been born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the decree of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a direct proceeding.18In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother's child. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.We agree with the Court of Appeals that:The Certificate. of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)19plainly states that... Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate, then where is hers? She did not present any though it would have been the easiest thing to do considering that according to her baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such denials and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida...Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellee's parents were Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. This document can only prove the identity of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament -- nothing more.20(Citations omitted.)At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life.21Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate.22However, as we held inHeirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals:...a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to [a person's] kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized.23A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation.24More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.25We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We find petitioner's silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be adverse to her claim. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala.26The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence.During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation.Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Court of Appeals that:...This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are extractable from the following questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to donate the properties in question to Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the facade of the sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document, how could it have happened that Jose Santiago who was of course fully aware that he owned only 1/3pro indivisoof the properties covered by his title sold or donated the whole properties to Ida? c) Why in heaven's name did Jose Santiago, a college graduate, who always signed his name in documents requiring his signature (citation omitted) [affix] his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the] child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating his properties to her when she would inherit them anyway upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier married to Esperanza Cabrigas ); Ida was of legal age (for [ s ]he was then just 15 years old); and the subject properties were free from liens and encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated in the title of said properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984 after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in possession was the baptismal sponsor of Ida?27Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.28Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time.29Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract,30including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property,31which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have been made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at all - accepted the "donation" for Ida.32In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld.1wphi1.ntWHEREFORE,the petition isDENIED,and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 32817 isAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R.NO. L-36249 March 29, 1985ANIANO OBAA,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANICETO SANDOVAL,respondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:Petitioner seeks a review of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court (in CA-G.R. No. 44345-R) ordering him in an action for Replevin to return to Aniceto SANDOVAL, private respondent herein, 170 cavans of rice or to pay its value in the amount of P37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint until fully paid.SANDOVAL is the owner and manager of the "Sandoval and Sons Rice Mill" located in Rosales, Pangasinan. He is engaged in the buying and selling of palay.On November 21, 1964, SANDOVAL was approached by a certain Chan Lin who offered to purchase from him 170 cavans of clean rice (wagwag variety) at the price of P37.26 per cavan, delivery to be made the following day at petitioner's store in San Fernando, La Union, with payment to be made thereat by Chan Lin to SANDOVAL's representative. SANDOVAL accepted the offer as he knew petitioner and had had previous transactions with him.As agreed, the 170 cavans of rice were transported the following day on a truck belonging to SANDOVAL to petitioner's store in San Fernando, La Union. Chan Lin accompanied the shipment. Upon arrival thereat, the goods were unloaded but when the truck driver attempted to collect the purchase price from Chan Lin, the latter was nowhere to be found. The driver tried to collect from petitioner, but the latter refused stating that he had purchase the goods from Chan Lin at P33.00 per cavan and that the price therefore had already been paid to Chan Lin.Further demands having been met with refusal, SANDOVAL, as plaintiff, filed suit for replevin against petitioner, then the defendant, before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, which ordered petitioner-defendant to pay to SANDOVAL one-half () of the cost of the rice or P2,805.00.On appeal by petitioner-defendant to the then Court of First Instance of La Union, the parties agreed to adopt SANDOVAL's testimony before the Municipal Court. After trial de novo, judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint against petitioner-defendant.On appeal to respondent Appellate Court, SANDOVAL obtained a reversal in his favor, as follows:WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside and another one entered ordering defendant-appellee to return the one hundred and seventy cavans of rice to plaintiff- appellant or to pay its value in the amount of P 37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid and with costs against the appellee.1Before us, petitioner-defendant takes issue with the following Appellate Court findings:From the evidence presented by the parties, it is evident that this is a simple case of swindling perpetuated by Chan Lin at the expense of the plaintiff and the defendant. The act of Chan Lin in purchasing plaintiff's rice at the price of P 37.25 per cavan and thereafter offering the same goods to defendant at a much lower price is an indication that it was never his intention to comply with his obligation to plaintiff. It is clear that Chan Lin's only purpose in entering into said contract with plaintiff was to acquire the physical possession of the goods and then to pass them on to defendant on the pretext that he is the owner thereof. Premises considered, therefore, Chan Lin cannot be considered as the owner of the goods at the time the same was said to have been sold to the defendant-appellee. Considering that defendant acquired the 170 cavans of rice from a person who is not the owner thereof, it is therefore clear that he acquired no greater right than his predecessor-in-interest.Finally, on principle of equity, it is but proper that plaintiff-appellant be allowed to recover the one-hundred and seventy cavans of rice or its value. Being the undisputed owner of the above mentioned goods, the appellant cannot be deprived of its ownership without the corresponding payment.2We agree with petitioner-defendant that there was a perfected sale. Article 1475 of the Civil Code lays down the general rule that there is perfection when there is consent upon the subject matter and price, even if neither is delivered.The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.xxx xxx xxxOwnership of the rice, too, was transferred to the vendee, Chan Lin, upon its delivery to him at San Fernando, La Union, the place stipulated3and pursuant to Articles 1477 and 1496 of the same Code:Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.Art. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.At the very least, Chan Lin had a rescissible title to the goods for the non-payment of the purchase price, but which had not been rescinded at the time of the sale to petitioner.However, from petitioner-defendant's own testimony before the Court of First Instance, he admits that three days after the delivery, he was repaid the sum of P5,600.00 by Chan Lin, who was then accompanied by SANDOVAL's driver, and that he had delivered the rice back to them. On rebuttal, however, the driver denied that the rice had ever been returned.4The driver's version is the more credible, for, as SANDOVAL's counsel had manifested in open Court, if return of the rice had been effected, they would have withdrawn the complaint.5Following is the admission made by petitioner-defendant:Q After the third day ... when that request for you to hold the rice was already overdue, what happened?A This is what happened. Chan Lin and the driver with the same truck that they used to unload the rice, came to me.Q What day was that?A That was I think, Thursday, about 4:30 P.M.Q Do you know the date?A November 26, I think.Q What did they do when this driver and Mr. Chan Lin came back?A They told me that they wanted the rice back and give my money back.Q Did they give you your money back?A Yes.Q How much?A They gave me P5.600.COURT:Q They gave you that amount?A Yes, sir.ATTY. GUALBERTO:Q Did they tell you why they were getting back the rice and giving you back your money?A Yes. The complete rice, and Vallo (SANDOVAL's driver) told me, he wanted to return the rice to the ricemill, that is what Vallo and the Chinese agreed with Aniceto Sandoval.Q Did the Chinese tell you that he made agreement with Sandoval to get back the rice?A Yes.COURT:Q Did you receive the money?A Yes , sir6Having been repaid the purchases price by Chan Lin , the sale, as between them, had been voluntarily rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was thereby divested of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should return the rice to Chan Lin, but since even the latter, again from petitioner-defendant's own testimony above-quoted, was ready to return the rice to SANDOVAL, and the latter's driver denies that the rice had been returned by petitioner-defendant cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another by holding on to property no longer belonging to him.7In law and in equity, therefore, SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice, or the value theref since hewas not paid the price therefor.WHEREFORE, albeit on a different premise, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.Teehankee, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-32811 March 31, 1980FELIPE C. ROQUE,petitioner,vs.NICANOR LAPUZ and THE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.Taada, Sanchez, Taada, Taada for petitioner.N.M. Lapuz for respondent.GUERRERO,J.:Appeal bycertiorarifrom the Resolution of the respondent court1dated October 12, 1970 in CA-G.R. No. L-33998-R entitled"Felipe C. Roque, plaintiff-appellee, versus Nicanor Lapuz, defendant-appellant"amending its original decision of April 23, 1970 which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Case No. Q-4922 in favor of petitioner, and the Resolution of the respondent court denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.The facts of this case are as recited in the decision of the Trial Court which was adopted and affirmed by the Court of Appeals:Sometime in 1964, prior to the approval by the National Planning Commission of the consolidation and subdivision plan of plaintiff's property known as the Rockville Subdivision, situated in Balintawak, Quezon City, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement of sale covering Lots 1, 2 and 9, Block 1, of said property, with an aggregate area of 1,200 square meters, payable in 120 equal monthly installments at the rate of P16.00, P15.00 per square meter, respectively. In accordance with said agreement, defendant paid to plaintiff the sum of P150.00 as deposit and the further sum of P740.56 to complete the payment of four monthly installments covering the months of July, August, September, and October, 1954. (Exhs. A and B). When the document Exhibit "A" was executed on June 25, 1954, the plan covering plaintiff's property was merely tentative, and the plaintiff referred to the proposed lots appearing in the tentative plan.After the approval of the subdivision plan by the Bureau of Lands on January 24, 1955, defendant requested plaintiff that he be allowed to abandon and substitute Lots 1, 2 and 9, the subject matter of their previous agreement, with Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the approved subdivision plan, of the Rockville Subdivision, with a total area of 725 square meters, which are corner lots, to which request plaintiff graciously acceded.The evidence discloses that defendant proposed to plaintiff modification of their previous contract to sell because he found it quite difficult to pay the monthly installments on the three lots, and besides the two lots he had chosen were better lots, being corner lots. In addition, it was agreed that the purchase price of these two lots would be at the uniform rate of P17.00 per square (meter) payable in 120 equal monthly installments, with interest at 8% annually on the balance unpaid. Pursuant to this new agreement, defendant occupied and possessed Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the approved subdivision plan, and enclosed them, including the portion where his house now stands, with barbed wires and adobe walls.However, aside from the deposit of P150.00 and the amount of P740.56 which were paid under their previous agreement, defendant failed to make any further payment on account of the agreed monthly installments for the two lots in dispute, under the new contract to sell. Plaintiff demanded upon defendant not only to pay the stipulated monthly installments in arrears, but also to make up-to-date his payments, but defendant, instead of complying with the demands, kept on asking for extensions, promising at first that he would pay not only the installments in arrears but also make up-to-date his payment, but later on refused altogether to comply with plaintiff's demands.Defendant was likewise requested by the plaintiff to sign the corresponding contract to sell in accordance with his previous commitment. Again, defendant promised that he would sign the required contract to sell when he shall have made up-to-date the stipulated monthly installments on the lots in question, but subsequently backed out of his promise and refused to sign any contract in noncompliance with what he had represented on several occasions. And plaintiff relied on the good faith of defendant to make good his promise because defendant is a professional and had been rather good to him (plaintiff).On or about November 3, 1957, in a formal letter, plaintiff demanded upon defendant to vacate the lots in question and to pay the reasonable rentals thereon at the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955. (Exh. "B"). Notwithstanding the receipt of said letter, defendant did not deem it wise nor proper to answer the same.In reference to the mode of payment, the Honorable Court of Appeals found Both parties are agreed that the period within which to pay the lots in question is ten years. They however, disagree on the mode of payment. While the appellant claims that he could pay the purchase price at any time within a period of ten years with a gradual proportionate discount on the price, the appellee maintains that the appellant was bound to pay monthly installments.On this point, the trial court correctly held that It is further argued by defendant that under the agreement to sell in question, he has the right or option to pay the purchase price at anytime within a period of ten years from 1954, he being entitled, at the same time, to a graduated reduction of the price. The Court is constrained to reject this version not only because it is contradicted by the weight of evidence but also because it is not consistent with what is reasonable, plausible and credible. It is highly improbable to expect plaintiff, or any real estate subdivision owner for that matter, to agree to a sale of his land which would be payable anytime in ten years at the exclusive option of the purchaser. There is no showing that defendant is a friend, a relative, or someone to whom plaintiff had to be grateful, as would justify an assumption that he would have agreed to extend to defendant such an extra- ordinary concession. Furthermore, the context of the document, Exhibit "B", not to mention the other evidences on records is indicative that the real intention of the parties is for the payment of the purchase price of the lot in question on an equal monthly installment basis for a period of ten years (Exhibits "A", "II", "J" and "K").On January 22, 1960, petitioner Felipe C, Roque (plaintiff below) filed the complaint against defendant Nicanor Lapuz (private respondent herein) with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, for rescission and cancellation of the agreement of sale between them involving the two lots in question and prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the rescission and cancellation of the agreement of sale, the defendant to vacate the two parcels of land and remove his house therefrom and to pay to the plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60.00 a month from August 1955 until such time as he shall have vacated the premises, and to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, costs of the suit and award such other relief or remedy as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, which motion was denied by the court. Thereafter, defendant filed his Answer alleging that he bought three lots from the plaintiff containing an aggregate area of 1,200 sq. meters and previously known as Lots 1, 2 and 9 of Block 1 of Rockville Subdivision at P16.00, P15.00 and P15.00, respectively, payable at any time within ten years. Defendant admits having occupied the lots in question.As affirmative and special defenses, defendant alleges that the complaint states no cause of action; that the present action for rescission has prescribed; that no demand for payment of the balance was ever made; and that the action being based on reciprocal obligations, before one party may compel performance, he must first comply what is incumbent upon him.As counterclaim, defendant alleges that because of the acts of the plaintiff, he lost two lots containing an area of 800 sq. meters and as a consequence, he suffered moral damages in the amount of P200.000.00; that due to the filing of the present action, he suffered moral damages amounting to P100,000.00 and incurred expenses for attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00.Plaintiff filed his Answer to the Counterclaim and denied the material averments thereof.After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment in favor of plain. plaintiff and against the defendant, as follows:(a) Declaring the agreement of sale between plaintiff and defendant involving the lots in question (Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the approved subdivision plan of the Rockville Subdivision) rescinded, resolved and cancelled;(b) Ordering defendant to vacate the said lots and to remove his house therefrom and also to pay plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955 until he shall have actually vacated the premises; and(c) Condemning defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of the suit. (Record on Appeal, p. 118)(a) Declaring the agreement of sale between plaintiff and defendant involving the lots in question (Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the approved subdivision plan of the Rockville Subdivision) rescinded, resolved and cancelled;(b) Ordering defendant to vacate the said lots and to remove his house therefrom and also to pay plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955 until he shall have actually vacated premises; and(c) Condemning defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of the suit. (Record on Appeal. p. 118)Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter court, finding the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law and evidence, affirmed the same.In its decision, the appellate court, after holding that the findings of fact of the trial court are fully supported by the evidence, found and held that the real intention of the parties is for the payment of the purchase price of the lots in question on an equal monthly installment basis for the period of ten years; that there was modification of the original agreement when defendant actually occupied Lots Nos. 4 and 12 of Block 2 which were corner lots that commanded a better price instead of the original Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 9, Block I of the Rockville Subdivision; that appellant's bare assertion that the agreement is not rescindable because the appellee did not comply with his obligation to put up the requisite facilities in the subdivision was insufficient to overcome the presumption that the law has been obeyed by the appellee; that the present action has not prescribed since Article 1191 of the New Civil Code authorizing rescission in reciprocal obligations upon noncompliance by one of the obligors is the applicable provision in relation to Article 1149 of the New Civil Code; and that the present action was filed within five years from the time the right of action accrued.Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's decision on the following grounds:First Neither the pleadings nor the evidence, testimonial, documentary or circumstantial, justify the conclusion as to the existence of an alleged subsequent agreement novatory of the original contract admittedly entered into between the parties:Second There is nothing so unusual or extraordinary, as would render improbable the fixing of ten ears as the period within which payment of the stipulated price was to be payable by appellant;Third Appellee has no right, under the circumstances on the case at bar, to demand and be entitled to the rescission of the contract had with appellant;Fourth Assuming that any action for rescission is availability to appellee, the same, contrary to the findings of the decision herein, has prescribed;Fifth Assumming further that appellee's action for rescission, if any, has not yet prescribed, the same is at least barred by laches;Sixth Assuming furthermore that a cause of action for rescission exists, appellant should nevertheless be entitled to tile fixing of a period within which to comply with his obligation; andSeventh At all events, the affirmance of the judgment for the payment of rentals on the premises from August, 1955 and he taxing of attorney's fees against appellant are not warranted b the circumstances at bar. (Rollo, pp. 87-88)Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals sustained the sixth ground raised by the appellant, that assuming that a cause of action for rescission exists, he should nevertheless be entitled to the fixing of a period within which to comply with his obligation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, amended its original decision in the following wise and manner:WHEREFORE, our decision dated April 23, 1970 is hereby amended in the sense that the defendant Nicanor Lapuz is hereby granted a period of ninety (90) days from entry hereof within which to pay the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P11,434,44 with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum from August 17, 1955 until fully paid. In the event that the defendant fails to comply with his obligation as above stated within the period fixed herein, our original judgment stands.Petitioner Roque, as plaintiff-appellee below, filed a Motion for Reconsideration; the Court of Appeals denied it. He now comes and appeals to this Court on a writ of certiorari.The respondent Court of Appeals rationalizes its amending decision by considering that the house presently erected on the land subject of the contract is worth P45,000.00, which improvements introduced by defendant on the lots subject of the contract are very substantial, and thus being the case, "as a matter of justice and equity, considering that the removal of defendant's house would amount to a virtual forfeiture of the value of the house, the defendant should be granted a period within which to fulfill his obligations under the agreement." Cited as authorities are the cases ofKapisanan Banahaw vs. Dejarme and Alvero,55 Phil. 338, 344, where it is held that the discretionary power of the court to allow a period within which a person in default may be permitted to perform the stipulation upon which the claim for resolution of the contract is based should be exercised without hesitation in a case where a virtual forfeiture of valuable rights is sought to be enforced as an act of mere reprisal for a refusal of the debtor to submit to a usurious charge, and the case ofPuerto vs. Go Ye Pin,47 O.G. 264, holding that to oust the defendant from the lots without giving him a chance to recover what his father and he himself had spent may amount to a virtual forfeiture of valuable rights.As further reasons for allowing a period within which defendant could fulfill his obligation, the respondent court held that there exists good reasons therefor, having in mind that which affords greater reciprocity of rights (Ramos vs. Blas, 51 O.G. 1920); that after appellant had testified that plaintiff failed to comply with his part of the contract to put up the requisite facilities in the subdivision, plaintiff did not introduce any evidence to rebut defendant's testimony but simply relied. upon the presumption that the law has been obeyed, thus said presumption had been successfully rebutted as Exhibit "5-D" shows that the road therein shown is not paved The Court, however, concedes that plaintiff's failure to comply with his obligation to put up the necessary facilities in the subdivision will not deter him from asking fr the rescission of the agreement since this obligation is not correlative with defendant's obligation to buy the property.Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals for the following alleged errors:I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying paragraph 3, Article 1191 of the Civil Code which refers to reciprocal obligations in general and, pursuant thereto, in granting respondent Lapuz a period of ninety (90) days from entry of judgment within which to pay the balance of the purchase price.II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that Article 1592 of the same Code, which specifically covers sales of immovable property and which constitutes an exception to the third paragraph of Article 1191 of said Code, is applicable to the present case.III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that respondent Lapuz cannot avail of the provisions of Article 1191, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code aforesaid because he did not raise in his answer or in any of the pleadings he filed in the trial court the question of whether or not he is entitled, by reason of a just cause, to a fixing of a new period.IV. Assuming arguendo that the agreement entered into by an