sales case nos. 71 to 90

8/11/2019 Sales Case Nos. 71 to 90

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CASE #71

G.R. No. L-14132 January 22, 1920

LUCIANO VITUG DIMATULAC, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.DOLORES CORONEL, defendant-appellant.

Ceferino Hilario for appellant. Aurelio Pineda for appellee.

STREET, J .:

The plaintiff in this action, Luciano Vitug Dimatulac, resident of the municipality of Lubao, in theProvince of Pampanga, seeks to redeem several parcels of land, with a dwelling-house and otherimprovements thereon, from a contract of sale with pacto de retro , whereby said property wastransferred by the plaintiff on June 30, 1911, to the defendant, Dolores Coronel. The trial judge

sustained the action and entered a judgment requiring the defendant to permit the redemption and tosurrender such of the property as is now in her possession. From this judgment the defendantappealed.

It appears in evidence that, upon June 30, 1911, the plaintiff sold the property in question to DoloresCoronel for the sum of P9,000, reserving the privilege to repurchase within the period of five years.The contract contained a provision, commonly found in contracts of this character, converting thevendor into a lessee of the vendee at an agreed rental, payable annually in the months of Januaryand February, and permitting the vendor to retain possession of the property as lessee until the timeallowed for repurchase should be past. It was also stipulated that in the event the original vendor(now lessee) should fail to pay the agreed rental for any year of the five, the right to repurchasewould be lost and the property consolidated in the vendee.

Under this contract the payment of rent should have begun in the year 1912. The vendor, however,entirely failed in the performance of this obligation and continued in arrears upon account of rent forat least three years. In view of this default Dolores Coronel, the vendee, decided to take advantageof the clause in the contract by which the consolidation of the property was accelerated; and to thisend she impleaded Dimatulac in a civil action (No. 1092 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga)to compel him to surrender the property in question and to pay the past-due rent. This action wassettled by a compromise, which was reduced to writing, approved by the Judge of the Court of FirstInstance, and entered of record in that action on April 9, 1915. By the terms of this compromiseDimatulac agreed to place at the disposition of Dolores Coronel all the property to which the actionrelated, including the crops already harvested thereon but not yet converted into money; andinasmuch as Dimatulac had already made an agreement with a third person for the sale of thegrowing cane, Dolores Coronel was authorized to arrange with the buyer as to the price, to receive

the proceeds, and to apply the same to the satisfaction of the past-due rent. In conformity with thisagreement Dimatulac surrendered to Dolores Coronel the possession of most, but not all, of theparcels in question, including the crops harvested and to be harvested thereon.

Thus the situation remained until in May of the year 1916, when Dimatulac, through his wife, offeredto redeem the entire property under the original contract of sale with pacto de retro , the five yearsnamed therein as the period during which repurchase might be effected not having as yet expired.This redemption Dolores Coronel refused to concede, on the ground that the title to the property hadbecome absolute in herself. Thereupon the present action was instituted, as already stated, tocompel her to permit redemption.

It is undeniable that the clause in the contract of sale with pacto de retro of June 30, 1911, providingfor extinction of the right of the plaintiff to repurchase in case he should default in the payment of therent for any year was lawful. The parties to a contract of this character may legitimately fix anyperiod they please, not in excess of ten years, for the redemption of the property by the vendor; andno sufficient reason occurs to us why the determination of the right of redemption may not be madeto depend upon the delinquency of the vendor now become lessee in the payment of thestipulated rent. The supreme court of Spain sustains the affirmative of this proposition (decision ofJanuary 18, 1900); and although such a provision, being of penal nature, may involve hardship tothe lessee, the consequences are not worse than such as follow from many other form of agreementto which contracting parties may lawfully attach their signatures. Nevertheless, admitting the validity


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of such a provision, it is not to be expected that any court will be reluctant to relieve from its effectswherever this can be done consistently with established principles of law.

Considering this clause in the light of a penal provision, or stipulation for the forfeiture of the right torepurchase, it is at once evident that Dolores Coronel, upon the default in the payment of any of theinstallments of annual rent, had the choice either to avail herself of the forfeiture and take

possession of the property as owner or to waive the forfeiture and claim the payment of the past-duerent as a subsisting debt. She could not claim for the rent during the whole period and at the sametime assert her ownership to the whole, the two positions being mutually inconsistent. The trial courtwas, therefore, justified in holding that when provision was made in the compromise agreement of1915 for the payment of the past-due rent and the claim therefor was recognized as a subsistingdebt, Dolores Coronel in effect waived the forfeiture which was incident to the non-payment of therent on the date due. She could not insist on the performance of the principal obligation and at thesame time exact the penalty (art. 1153, Civ. Code). Furthermore, when she assumed possession ofthe property, by taking it out of the hands of the former owner, then her lessee, his obligation forfuture rent ceased. In Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan (21 Phil. Rep., 184), it was held thatwhere the lessee was ousted before the expiration of the stipulated period, the landlord could notrecover rent from the date of such ouster, even though by the contract the rent was payable prior tothe date of the ouster and was then in arrears.

It results from the foregoing that Luciano Vitug Dimatulac, the former owner of the property inquestion and plaintiff herein, was relieved from the forfeiture resulting from his failure to pay the rentupon the date due; and his right to repurchase must be considered to have been still subsistingwhen the offer to redeem was made.

Counsel for the appellant insists that the rights of the parties with respect to the property in questionwere conclusively settled by the compromise agreement effected with the approval of the court incivil case No. 1092, it being supposed that by the agreement Dolores Coronel was recognized asabsolute owner. In this we are unable to concur. Any right which Dolores Coronel may have derivedfrom that contract is entirely consistent with the title which she had acquired under the originalcontract; and there is nothing in the compromise agreement which has the necessary effect of

extinguishing the right of redemption. Her possession under this agreement must therefore beconsidered to be of the same character, and her rights of the same extent, as if she had takenpossession at once when the original contract was executed. (Art. 1815, Civ. Code.) It must beadmitted that the provision for the lease, under which the plaintiff was permitted to retain possessionof the property, was abrogated as a result of the compromise agreement, but it would be anunnecessary and unjust inference to say that the right of redemption created by the original contracthad also been destroyed. Every intendment both of law and equity favors the preservation of thatright.

As already stated, the plaintiff Dimatulac did not surrender all of the property of Dolores Coronel ashe had agreed to do in the compromise of 1915. This circumstance can not affect the solution of thiscase, and it is immaterial whether he remained in possession of part in defiance of Dolores Coronelor retained it with her consent. Of course he might be required to account for the value of the useand occupation of the property so retained, prior to the offer to redeem, but his right to redeem withinthe period limited by the contract cannot be made to depend upon his performance in good faith ofthe compromise agreement.

What has been said effectually disposes of all the grounds of error assigned by the appellant in thisCourt. The affirmance of the judgment is therefore appropriate and it is accordingly ordered that thesame be affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

CASE #72

G.R. No. L-47822 December 22, 1988

PEDRO DE GUZMAN,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA, respondents.


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Vicente D. Millora for petitioner.

Jacinto Callanta for private respondent.

FELICIANO,J .:

Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrapmetal in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent wouldbring such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler trucks which he owned forhauling the material to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicleswith cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to differing establishments in Pangasinan. Forthat service, respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercialrates.

Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer ofGeneral Milk Company (Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for

the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, topetitioner's establishment in Urdaneta on or before 4 December 1970. Accordingly, on 1 December1970, respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise on to his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on atruck driven by respondent himself, while 600 cartons were placed on board the other truck whichwas driven by Manuel Estrada, respondent's driver and employee.

Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes never reachedpetitioner, since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthurHighway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper andthe cargo.

On 6 January 1971, petitioner commenced action against private respondent in the Court of First

Instance of Pangasinan, demanding payment of P 22,150.00, the claimed value of the lostmerchandise, plus damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner argued that private respondent, being acommon carrier, and having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of him by the law,should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods.

In his Answer, private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he couldnot be held responsible for the value of the lost goods, such loss having been due to force majeure .

On 10 December 1975, the trial court rendered a Decision 1 finding private respondent to be acommon carrier and holding him liable for the value of the undelivered goods (P 22,150.00) as well as forP 4,000.00 as damages and P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

On appeal before the Court of Appeals, respondent urged that the trial court had erred in consideringhim a common carrier; in finding that he had habitually offered trucking services to the public; in notexempting him from liability on the ground of force majeure; and in ordering him to pay damages andattorney's fees.

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that respondent had beenengaged in transporting return loads of freight "as a casualoccupation a sideline to his scrap iron business" and not as a common carrier. Petitioner came tothis Court by way of a Petition for Review assigning as errors the following conclusions of the Courtof Appeals:

1. that private respondent was not a common carrier;

2. that the hijacking of respondent's truck was force majeure ; and

3. that respondent was not liable for the value of the undelivered cargo. (Rollo, p.111)

We consider first the issue of whether or not private respondent Ernesto Cendana may, under thefacts earlier set forth, be properly characterized as a common carrier.


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The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associationsengaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, byland, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carryingof persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in localIdiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person orenterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering suchservice on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis . Neither does Article 1732 distinguishbetween a carrier offering its services to the " general public ," i.e., the general community orpopulation, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of thegeneral population. We think that Article 1733 deliberaom making such distinctions.

So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatlywith the notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, asamended) which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil

Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, "public service" includes:

... every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in thePhilippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether

permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, anycommon carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle,either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever maybe its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in thetransportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf ordock, ice plant,ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power,water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wirelesscommunications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similarpublic services. ... (Emphasis supplied)

It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier eventhough he merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, althoughsuch back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner,and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others.There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; thatfee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant here.

The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of publicconvenience, and concluded he was not a common carrier. This is palpable error. A certificate of

public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisionsgoverning common carriers. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a commoncarrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of theapplicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate ofpublic convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a commoncarrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience, would beoffensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing tocomply with applicable statutory requirements. The business of a common carrier impinges directlyand intimately upon the safety and well being and property of those members of the generalcommunity who happen to deal with such carrier. The law imposes duties and liabilities uponcommon carriers for the safety and protection of those who utilize their services and the law cannotallow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply failing toobtain the necessary permits and authorizations.

We turn then to the liability of private respondent as a common carrier.

Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy" 2 are held to avery high degree of care and diligence ("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as ofpassengers. The specific import of extraordinary diligence in the care of goods transported by a commoncarrier is, according to Article 1733, "further expressed in Articles 1734,1735 and 1745, numbers 5, 6 and7" of the Civil Code.


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Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss,destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, " unless the same is due to any of thefollowing causes only :

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster orcalamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;(4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in thecontainers; and(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

It is important to point out that the above list of causes of loss, destruction or deterioration whichexempt the common carrier for responsibility therefor, is a closed list. Causes falling outside theforegoing list, even if they appear to constitute a species of force majeure fall within the scope of

Article 1735, which provides as follows:

In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding

article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove thatthey observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. (Emphasissupplied)

Applying the above-quoted Articles 1734 and 1735, we note firstly that the specific cause alleged inthe instant case the hijacking of the carrier's truck does not fall within any of the five (5)categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking ofthe carrier's vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735, in other words, that theprivate respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have actednegligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence onthe part of private respondent.

Petitioner insists that private respondent had not observed extraordinary diligence in the care ofpetitioner's goods. Petitioner argues that in the circumstances of this case, private respondentshould have hired a security guard presumably to ride with the truck carrying the 600 cartons ofLiberty filled milk. We do not believe, however, that in the instant case, the standard of extraordinarydiligence required private respondent to retain a security guard to ride with the truck and to engagebrigands in a firelight at the risk of his own life and the lives of the driver and his helper.

The precise issue that we address here relates to the specific requirements of the duty ofextraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried in the specific context of hijacking orarmed robbery.

As noted earlier, the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods is, under Article

1733, given additional specification not only by Articles 1734 and 1735 but also by Article 1745,numbers 4, 5 and 6, Article 1745 provides in relevant part:

Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjustand contrary to public policy:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) that the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts oromissions of his or its employees;

(6) that the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves, or

of r obbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence orforce , is dispensed with or diminished; and

(7) that the common carrier shall not responsible for the loss,destruction or deterioration of goods on account of the defectivecondition of the car vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used inthe contract of carriage. (Emphasis supplied)


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Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible and will not be allowed todivest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts of strangers like thieves orrobbers, except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violenceor force." We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilanceover the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which isattended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."

In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carriedpetitioner's cargo. The record shows that an information for robbery in band was filed in the Court ofFirst Instance of Tarlac, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 198 entitled " People of the Philippines v.Felipe Boncorno, Napoleon Presno, Armando Mesina, Oscar Oria and one John Doe ." There, theaccused were charged with willfully and unlawfully taking and carrying away with them the secondtruck, driven by Manuel Estrada and loaded with the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk destined fordelivery at petitioner's store in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The decision of the trial court shows that theaccused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or force. 3 Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck and its cargo but alsokidnapped the driver and his helper, detaining them for several days and later releasing them in anotherprovince (in Zambales). The hijacked truck was subsequently found by the police in Quezon City. TheCourt of First Instance convicted all the accused of robbery, though not of robbery in band. 4

In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded asquite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It isnecessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks oftravel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseenor are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinarydiligence.

We, therefore, agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals that private respondentCendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of anevent entirely beyond private respondent's control.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the Decision of theCourt of Appeals dated 3 August 1977 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CASE #73

G.R. No. 2001 February 14, 1907

SALVADOR PANGANIBAN, plaintiff-appellee,vs.AGUSTIN CUEVAS, defendant-appellant.

Del-Pan, Ortigas, & Fisher for appellant.

Isabelo Artacho for appellee.

ARELLANO,C.J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan,wherein it was held that the land and camarin in question were the property of Salvador Panganiban,and the defendant, Agustin Cuevas, was ordered to return the said property to the plaintiff,Panganiban, and to pay the costs of proceedings, the court reserving to the said plaintiff the right to


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bring an action for damages against the defendant and holding that the deposit in the hands of theclerk, amounting to 200 pesos, Mexican currency, made by Cuevas was improperly made, whichsaid sum the court ordered refunded to the said Cuevas. This case was tried in accordance with theprovisions of the former Code of Civil Procedure, and it appears:

(1) That on the 10th of December, 1897, Salvador Panganiban was the owner of a camarin and lot,

the camarin being of bamboo nipa construction, divided into five apartments, each apartment havingtwo doors opening on the front, the whole property being more specifically described in theinstrument executed by the said Panganiban, wherein he sold and transferred the same to oneFrancisco Gonzales for the sum of 1,300 pesos, it having been stipulated therein, among otherthings: "Seventh. The vendor reserves the right to repurchase the property within six months fromdate, after complying with the obligations mentioned in article 1518 of the Civil Code, and in case ofhis failure to do so within the tome stipulated, the vendee will pay to him the additional sum of 200pesos and will become the absolute owner of the property and the vendee may dispose of the same,as long as the condition subsequent continues to exist with the limitations provided by the MortgageLaw, of the provisions of which he has been duly informed." (Record, p. 45.) This deed was recordedin the Register of Property on the 13th of August, 1900.

(2) That on the let of August, 1900, Francisco Gonzales sold the property to Agustin Cuevas for thesame price, the following statement appearing in the deed of sale: "Second. That the vendor(Panganiban) reserves to himself the right to repurchase the property thus sold within the period ofsix months from the tenth of December, 1897, for the same price, thirteen hundred pesos, and incase he fails to do so, the said Gonzales will pay to the vendor, Salvador Panganiban, the additionalsum of two hundred pesos. . . ." (Record, p. 49.) This instrument was recorded on the same date asthe instrument executed on the 13th of August, 1900.

(3) That on the said 13th of August, 1900, Cuevas Asked for and was granted, in ex parte proceedings, the judicial possession of the property on the 14th of the said month, noticethereof having been given to those who occupied the various apartments, among themPanganiban's wife in the latter's absence. (Record, pp. 52-55.) Subsequently, on the 10th of August,he attempted to pay Panganiban the sum of 200 pesos, which he deposited in court, and Cuevas, in

a petition presented to the said court stated: ". . . I have succeeded to all the rights of the formerpurchaser, Francisco Gonzales, and desiring to acquire the ownership of the property irrevocably, Ideposit the additional sum of two hundred pesos which my grantor undertook to pay. . . ." (Record,p. 133.) This sum Panganiban refused to receive. (Record, p. 135.)

(4) That on the 1st of October of the same year, 1900, Cuevas brought an action for ejectmentagainst Panganiban. (Record, pp. 138141.)

(5) And that on the 12th of the same month Panganiban filed a complaint in this action for therecovery of possession, the proceedings in the action for ejectment having been suspended.(Record, pp. 27-39.)

Such are the antecedents of the present case.

The complaint contains the following allegation:

(1) That in the month of May, 1898, Panganiban attempted to effect the repurchase of the property,but the creditor, Gonzales, being absent from his place of residence on account of the war, he wasunable to do so, nor was he able to deposit the purchase price with the clerk of the court for thesame reason; and (2) that the revolution broke out that time and the land and improvements inquestion were seizes by the Filipino government from Francisco Gonzales, the property having beenredeemed by Panganiban from the Filipino government on the 12th of November, 1898. These factsthe plaintiff attempted to prove by the records of the proceedings relating to the said seizure andrepurchase, which records he attached to his complaint and made a part thereof, and further by thereceipt of the purchase price paid to the revolutionary government which had seized the land fromGonzales.

The defendant, Cuevas, objected to the introduction of evidence upon these points, admitting thefacts, and stated: "(1) That both parties were bound by the terms of the contract which is the basis ofthis action: (2) that there is no doubt that the deposit alleged to have been made by the plaintiff couldnot have been made: and (3) that the other facts alleged by the plaintiff, even though they were fullyestablished, such as the fact that Panganiban was absent from the town. . ., that Hison was then


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commissioned by the Filipino government to resell the property, and other facts of minor importance,would not change the essence of the question. . . .," (Record, p. 120.)

From the evidence of record we draw the following conclusions:

The appelle alleges, and the appellant admits, that the property in question was repurchased(properly or improperly ) by the appellee from the revolutionary government. The first, second, third,and sixth assignments of error refer to this point. The fact was established by the original documentappearing on page 180 of the record and by the testimony of the witnesses for the appelle,uncontradicted by the appellant.

It is a fact admitted by the appellant that the property of Francisco Gonzales was seized by therevolutionary government and subsequently returned to him by the latter.

Several witnesses testified, and their testimony appears uncontradicted by the appellant, that whenthe property seized from Francisco Gonzales, among the same the house and lot in question, wasreturned to him, the latter property was retained by the revolutionary government without any proteston his part, and that on November, 1898, the said house and lot was resold to Panganiban by the

revolutionary government some time before Gonzalez's property was returned to him.

It is an evident fact that from November, 1898, until the 15th of August, 1900, when Cuevas took judicial possession of the property by an ex parte proceeding, Panganiban had been in the quiet andpeaceful possession of the property. This fact was established by the testimony of the witnessesreferred to and by the judicial proceedings introduced in evidence in this case, from which it appearsthat when the occupants of the various apartments of Panganiban's house were notified of the

judicial possession given to Cuevas, Faustina Terrado, "who occupied one of the apartments of thesaid house," was else notified, as the "wife of Salvador Panganiban, who was absent when thenotice was served upon the said occupant." (Record, p. 54.)

If Panganiban had not been absent and had simply objected to the possession sought by Cuevas,the latter could not have been given possession of the premises in such an ex parte proceedings asthat instituted by him for this purpose, and it would have necessary for Cuevas to bring an ordinaryaction, everything remaining as it was prior to the institution of such ex parte proceeding.

It was sufficient to restore everything to its former condition in order to preserve the regularity andconsistency required in judicial proceedings by the old Code of Civil Procedure, which provided thatthe proper action in such cases should be a plenary action for possession.

Panganiban was in possession of the property in question from November, 1898, until the 14th of August, 1900 that is to say, for more than a year quietly and peacefully, with title in good faith.He could not therefore, be called upon to surrender the said possession, particularly in view of thefact that he had not acquired the same by forcible or unlawful means. Cuevas or Gonzalez had aright to deposit the 200 pesos in court and attempt to acquire in a separate action the ownership ofthe property in question by virtue of the stipulation contained in the deed.

In view of the fact that all these rights and actions have been discussed in these proceedings, thiscourt, by virtue of the authority and powers vested in it, will now proceed to decide all the questionsraised on this appeal.

The first question relates to the repurchase made by the appelle, as to which the appellant claimsthat the Court of First Instance erred in deciding that the sale made by the revolutionary governmentwas valid and that all the obligations incurred by Panganiban in favor of Gonzalez had beenextinguished as the result of the repurchase. (Assignments of error 1,2,3, and 6.) The appelle in hiscomplaint relied, however, for the validity and efficacy of the said sale upon article 1164 andparagraph 2, article 1163, of the Civil Code, and his brief filed in this court he relies upon the

provisions of paragraph 3, article 1203, and articles 1209, 1210,1249 and 1253 of the same code.

Article 1164 of the Civil Code provides that "a payment made in good faith to the person who is inpossession of the credit shall release the debtor," and article 1163, paragraph 2, reads as follows: "Apayment made to a third person shall also be valid in so far as it may have been beneficial to thecreditor."


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But the revolutionary government to which the payment was made not in possession of the credit; itdid nothing but seize the property of the vendor, including the house and lot in question. Seizure isnot, in itself, a confiscation. The appellee in his brief admits that there was no confiscation. Thereason why the seizure was made does not appear. A seizure or embargo is nothing but aprohibition enjoining the owner from disposing of his property. By the mere embargo of a propertythe owner does not lose his title thereto. The authorities (lawful or unlawful) who, legally or illegally,

order the seizure do not become the owners of the same. What the vendor in this case did was toattempt to reacquire the ownership of the property transferred to the vendee from a third person towhom the property had not been transferred by the said vendee in any manner whatsoever.Therefore, the vendor from a person who was not the owner of the same. This is obvious.

If the revolutionary government, by reason of the seizure or the embargo, did not acquire the title tothe property or vested in the vendee, neither could the purchaser have acquired from the latter, eventhough an embargo, the credit which the said vendee had under the right of redemption in case suchredemption should take place; the property of the vendee thus seized had included the right todemand the stipulated price for the repurchase, perhaps the payment of such price to the personrightfully entitled to it under the embargo would have been proper. But there was nothing, it isalleged, but an embargo of the real estate of the vendee including the property in question. So thatarticle 1164 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar, nor is paragraph 2 of article 1163applicable to this case, because their is nothing in the record to show that a payment made byPanganiban to the revolutionary government was for the benefit of Gonzalez. "That the creditor wasbenefited by the payment made to a third person by his debtor can not be presumed, and must,therefore, be satisfactorily established by the person interested in proving this fact." Manresa, 8 CivilCode, 257.)

Finally assuming, without deciding, that the payment of the 1,300 pesos in question to therevolutionary government was properly made, yet it does not appear that the deed of sale had beencanceled that is to say, that no other deed of repurchase canceling the said deed of sale hadbeen executed in short, the obligation the payment of which was necessary to redeem theproperty was not canceled. This is also one of the conclusions arrived at by the court below in thedecision. A credit is not extinguished against the will of creditor except by the judgment of a court or

by the expiration of the period prescribed by the statue of limitations.

Paragraph 3 of article 1203 provides that "obligations may be modified by subrogating a third personto the rights of the creditor." Article 1209 provides that "the subrogation of a third person to the rightsof a creditor can not be presumed except in the cases expressly mentioned in the code, it beingnecessary in other cases to prove such subrogation clearly in order that it may be effective."Paragraph 3 of article 1210 provides that "when the person who is interested in the fulfillment of theobligation pays, subrogation shall be presumed." Article 1249 provides that "presumptions are notadmissible, except when the fact from which they are to be deduced is fully proved." And article1253 provides that "in order that presumptions, not established by law, may be admitted as means ofevidence, it is indispensable that between the fact demonstrated and the one it is desired to deducethere should exist a precise and direct connection according to the rules of human judgment." Allthese provisions of law are relied upon by the appellee in his brief in support of the followingproposition: "All the facts above set out, and particularly those relating to the embargo and thedeposit of the property of Gonzalez and the return of the same after redemption, established thepresumption of the existence of an obligation on the part of Gonzalez in favor of the so calledPhilippine government either for war taxes or some other indebtedness. . . ." (Brief, p. 9.)

But no other fact except the embargo of Gonzalez's property and the return of the same toPanganiban having been proved, the contention of the appellee is absolutely contrary to theprovision of article 1209 of the Civil Code above quoted.

In conclusion, we hold that the court below committed the errors pointed out by the appellant underthe first, second, third, and sixth assignments.

The payment made by Panganiban to the revolutionary government of the 1,300 pesos which heshould have paid to Francisco Gonzalez in order to redeem the property, could not haveextinguished the obligation incurred by him in favor of the latter. The supreme court of Spain, in a

judgment rendered on the 28th of February, 1896, said: "The payment of the debt in order toextinguish the obligation must be made to the person or persons in whose favor it was incurred or tohis or their duly authorized agent. It follows, therefore, that the payment made to a third person, eventhrough error and in good faith, shall not release the debtor of the obligation to pay and will notdeprive the creditor of his right to demand payment. If it becomes impossible to recover what was


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unduly paid, any loss resulting therefrom shall be borne by the deceived debtor, who is the only oneresponsible for his own acts unless there is a stipulation to the contrary or unless the creditor himselfis responsible for the wrongful payment."

The fourth and fifth assignments of error relate to the second question, in so far as the appellantclaims that the court below erred in holding that neither Gonzalez nor Cuevas ever had a title to the

property in question, they not having paid as stipulated in the contract the additional 200 pesos, andin holding that the irrevocability of the sale depended upon the payment of the said additional sum of200 pesos. The question arises whether there were one or two conditions stipulated in the contractwhich should be complied with in order to make the conditional sale irrevocable. The appellantcontends that there was only one condition stipulated, to wit, the lapse of a period of six months,whereas the appellee claims that there were two conditions, viz, the lapse of the period of sixmonths and the payment of 200 pesos in addition to the purchase price.

This question may be decided as a matter of fact by reference to appellant's own statement as setout in the third paragraph of this decision, wherein he is quoted as saying: "Desiring to acquire theownership of the property irrevocably, I deposit the additional sum of two hundred pesos. . . ." Sothat prior to that deposit he had the conviction of he had not as yet acquired the ownership of theproperty irrevocably. And as a matter of law, first, by the terms of the agreement itself, according towhich, after setting forth the true conditions, to wit, the lapse of the time provided therein and theadditional payment of 200 pesos, the appellant, referring to the acquisition of the ownership in anirrevocable manner, stipulated as follows: "Shall pay the sum of two hundred pesos in addition to thesum already stated, the vendee acquiring the ownership of the property irrevocably;" and, second,because the agreement to pay an additional sum of 200 pesos presupposes that the first conditionalsale was made in consideration of the sum of 1.300 pesos, but the consideration for the irrevocableand definite sale was 1,500 pesos; and it is well known that where property is sold, the considerationtherefor being paid at the time of the sale, title does not pass to the vendee unless the property isactually delivered and the purchase price actually received.

There can be no question, therefore, that up to the 10th of August, 1900, when Cuevas depositedthe 200 pesos in court for the purpose, as stated, of acquiring the ownership irrevocably, the

property could have been redeemed.

The third question is whether after the deposit of the 200 pesos on August 10, 1900, the vendor losthis right to repurchase the property.

The provisions of the Civil Code relating to this subject are as follows:

"Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of the judicial authoritiesbefore whom the tender shall be proved in a proper case and the notice of the consignation in othercases." (Art. 1178.) There is nothing in the record to show that Cuevas tendered the payment of the200 pesos in question to Panganiban or that he gave notice of his intention to deposit the said sumin court in case said tender was refused by Panganiban. According to article 1176, "If the creditor to

whom the tender of payment has been made should refuse to accept it, without reason, the debtorshall remain released from all liability by the consignation of the thing due," and, further, that "thesame effect shall be produced by the consignation alone when made in the absence of the creditor,or when the latter shall be incapacitated to accept the payment when it is due, and when severalpersons claim to have a right to collect it, or when the instrument mentioning the obligation has beenmislaid." There being no evidence of anything except the consignation and the plaintiff Panganibannot being either absent or incapacitated so that the consignation alone could have produced theeffect of releasing the debtor, it follows that the consignation made by Cuevas did not produce theeffect which it would have produced had it been made as provided in the code. It is therefore evidentthat Cuevas never complied with the condition stipulated in the contract in order to acquire theownership irrevocably.

It appears, therefore, from the facts as established in this case:

(1) That Salvador Panganiban did not comply with the condition stipulated in the contract in order toreacquire the ownership of the property sold by him on condition of redemption, for the reason thathe did not pay the price agreed upon to the creditor or to his duly authorized agent or to the personentitled to receive the same for the creditor.

(2) That Agustin Cuevas did not comply with the other condition imposed upon him (or uponGonzalez) by the terms of the contract in order to acquire the ownership of the property irrevocably,


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as he did not make the additional payment agreed upon for the definite sale of the property in such amanner as would have relieved him of this liability under the law.

So that even after the 10th of August, 1900, and up to the present date, the redemption of theproperty could have been effected and the parties could have enforced their respective rights asthough nothing had been done, for nothing was done in the manner prescribed by law so as to have

sufficient force to create a juridical status or become res adjudicata .

The judgment of the court below is accordingly reversed without special provision as to costs. Andbeing of the opinion that this action was brought for the purpose of securing the repurchase of theproperty, and for this purpose we shall consider the complaint amended so as to make it conform tothe facts established by the evidence, we hold that Salvador Panganiban may repurchase theproperty if he so desires; and the court below is accordingly directed to require the said Panganibanto comply with the provisions of article 1518 of the Civil Code, and in case he complies therewith tothe satisfaction of the court, to enter judgment authorizing the repurchase and requiring AgustinCuevas to execute the deed of resale, cancelling the former deed of sale and the entry thereof madein the Registry of Property, or otherwise to dismiss the action. After the expiration of twenty days let

judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter the case be remanded to thecourt below for execution. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.Carson, J., concurs in the result.

CASE #75

G.R. No. L-33158 October 17, 1985

VALENTINA G. VILLANUEVA, assisted by her husband SEVERINO FERI, ANTONIO G.VILLANUEVA, ANGEL G. VILLANUEVA and OLIMPIA G. VILLANUEVA, assisted by herhusband F. DAGUIMOL, petitioners,vs.HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, Judge of the CFI of Cagayan, Second Branch, ERLINDA V.VALLANGCA, CONCEPCION G. VILLANUEVA and MACARIO K. VILLANUEVA,respondents.

CUEVAS, J .:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 dated July 14, 1970 of the then Court of First Instanceof Cagayan Branch II, in Civil Case No. 1486-A, entitled "Valentina G. Villanueva, et al., plaintiffs, versus

Erlinda V. Vallangca, et al., defendants", the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment

1. Ordering the reformation and amendment of Exhibit "3" by deleting the phraselocated at the western side of the lot which is five and one half (5-) meters in widthand fifteen (15) meters long';

2. Declaring Erlinda Vallangca, married to Concepcion Villanueva absolute owners ofan Ideal and undivided share of one-half () of the land described in paragraph 2 ofthe complaint, which was conveyed to them by Exhibit;

3. Ordering the partition of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint amongthe heirs of Basilia Garcia;

4. Ordering the dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim; and

5. Ordering the Clerk of Court to return to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,000.00deposited by them with costs de oficio.


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SO ORDERED.

Petitioners and respondent Concepcion Villanueva are the children of spouses Macario Villanueva(one of the respondents) and Basilia Garcia. Said spouses owned a small parcel of land with an areaof 165 square meters situated along Pres. Quezon St., in the Poblacion of Aparri, Cagayan.Sometime in 1944, Basilia Garcia died intestate, leaving her husband, Macario Villanueva and

children (herein petitioners) as her sole and only legitimate heirs.

On May 13, 1964, the surviving spouse, Macario, without the subject lot having been partitioned,sold in favor of Erlinda Vallangca, the wife of respondent Concepcion Villanueva, one-half or 82.5square meters of the aforementioned lot, particularly the western portion thereof, measuring 15-meters by 15 meters, for P1,100.00, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit "3". 2 Havingbeen informed of the sale, petitioners signified their intention to redeem the lot in question but respondentvendee refused to allow such redemption contending that she is the wife of one of the legal heirs andtherefore redemption will not lie against her because she is not the "third party" or "stranger"contemplated in the law.

Petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of sale and legal redemption of the portion sold toVallangca. The trial court, on July 14, 1970, rendered a decision ordering among other things, thereformation of the Deed of Sale and declaring the vendee the absolute owner of the subject lot.

Petitioners now submit 3 that the lower court erred

(1) in holding that the property sold to Erlinda Vallangca, married to Concepcion Villanueva, is aconjugal partnership property of the spouses, and therefore, the right of legal redemption will not lieagainst Erlinda Vallangca and Concepcion Villanueva, instead of holding that Erlinda V. Vallangca,being a "third person" or .stranger the right of legal redemption contemplated under Art. 1620 and, or1088 (NCC) can be exercised as against the vendee in the sale;

(2) inordering for the formation and amendment Exh. 3 by deletion of the phrase "located at thewestern side of the lot which is five and one-half meters in width and 15 meters long" instead ofannulling and rescinding the sale as called for under the circumstances; and

(3) in ordering the partition of the property described in par. 2 of the complaint among the heirs ofBasilia Garcia, where partition is not warranted considering that there is still pending before thesame court a separate action for partition of the same property filed by Concepcion Villanuevaagainst plaintiff-petitioners.

Art. 1620 of the New Civil Code provides:

A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of allthe other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of thealienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they mayonly do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing ownedin common.

It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court disallowed redemption because itconsidered the vendee, Erlinda Vallangca, a co-heir, being married to Concepcion Villanueva, andthe conveyance was held valid since it was in favor of the conjugal partnership of the spouses in theabsence of any statement that it is paraphernal in character. Within the meaning of Art. 1620, theterm "third person" or "stranger" refers to all persons who are not heirs in succession, and by heirsare meant only those who are called either by will or the law to succeed the deceased and whoactually succeeds. In short, a third person is any one who is not a co-owner. 4The vendee is related

by affinity to the deceased by reason of her marriage to one of the heirs and being married to Concepciondoes not entitle the vendee to inherit or succeed in her own right. She is not an heir of Basilia Garcia norincluded in the "family relations" of spouses Macario and Basilia as envisioned in Art. 217 of the CivilCode.

Art. 217. Family relations shall in lude those:


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(1) Between Husband and wife;(2) Between parent and child;(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;(4) Among brothers and sisters.

The co-owners should therefore be allowed to exercise their right to redeem the property sold to

Erlinda Vallangca. To deny petitioners the right of redemption recognized in Art. 1620 of the CivilCode is to defeat the purpose of minimizing co-ownership and to contravene the public policy in thisregard. Moreover, it would result in disallowing the petitioners a way out of what, in the words ofManresa, "might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which they have beenthrust." 5 Respondent seller Macario, as co-owner and before partition, has the right to freely sell anddispose of his undivided interest or his Ideal share but not a divided part and one with boundaries as whatwas done in the case at bar. It is an inherent and peculiar feature of co-ownership that although the co-owners may have unequal shares in the common property quantitatively speaking, each co-owner hasthe same right in a qualitative sense as any one of the other co-owners. In other words, every co-owner isthe owner of the whole and over the whole, he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same timethe owner of a portion which is truly abstract because until division is effected, such portion is notcorrectly determined. 6

It appearing that a separate action for partition of the subject lot is still pending before the CFI ofCagayan, the trial court's order of partition is, therefore, uncalled for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision dated July 14, 1970 of the thenCFI of Cagayan, Br. II, is accordingly REVERSED. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO,J., dissenting:

This is an intra-family litigation over 82.5 square meters of land. The spouses Macario K. Villanuevaand Basilia Garcia owned a lot with an area of 165 square meters located on President QuezonStreet, Aparri, Cagayan. Basilia died in 1944 survived by Macario and their five children namedValentina, Olimpia, Angel, Antonio and Concepcion (a male person), the husband of Erlinda V.Villangca.

The five children each owned a 1/10 share of that same lot while Macario owned thereof as hisconjugal share or 82,5 square meters. Note that north of the lot is the lot of Severino Feri,Valentina's husband. On 3/4 of the lot stands a house of strong materials occupied by Valentina.

Macario claims that he is the owner of the house because after liberation he bought a house forP500 and transferred to the lot (6 tsn Jan. 16, 1970). On the other hand, the trial court found that it isowned by Valentina (p. 64, Rollo). Macario admits in his letter, Exhibit D.

On May 13, 1964 Macario (he is an insurance under-writer and was 79 in 1970 when he testified)sold for P1,1 00 to Erlinda, the wife of his son Concepcion, his conjugal share in said lot but hemade the mistake of selling "the western side of the lot". He should have sold only his Idealproindiviso share. He had to sell because he had to pay one Timbang the mortgage debt securedby the lot (4 tsn Jan. 16, 1970; p. 35, Rollo).

Four years after the sale, or on October 17, 1968, the four children sued their father brother andsister-in-law for rescision of the sale and for redemption. The alleged that there was no written noticeto them of the sale, that they learned of it only in September 1968 and that the house on the lot wasvalued at P7,000. They consigned the redemption price of P1,100.


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Macario answered the complaint without Counsel's assistance. He stated therein that to avoidtrouble and quarelling among the members of his family he would like to cancel the sale sinceErlinda could not buy Valentina's house, to sell his share to Valentina and to return the P1,100 toErlinda (Exh. C. pp. 32-33, Rollo).

That answer should have terminated the case. But later a motion to dismiss and an answer were

filed by Erlinda, Concepcion and Macario. They insisted on the validity of the sale to Erlinda.Valentina filed another case, Civil Case No. 1501-A, for partition.

When the trial judge categorically asked Macario what was his proposition about the case, he saidthat it was his desire that his son Concepcion should stay on the disputed lot because he had no loton which to build his house (9-10 tsn Jan. 16, 1970).

Judge Florendo in his decision dated July 14, 1970 declared Erlinda the owner of the portionbought by her after ordering the reformation of the deed of sale to make it appear that an Ideal share was bought by her and ordering the return of the P1,100 to Valentina. Judge Florendo alsoordered partition of the lot. Valentina and her brothers and sister appealed to this Court underRepublic Act No. 5440.

Macario created in this case a big legal problem for a small property. That problem would not havearisen had he been properly legally advised. Instead of selling his proindiviso ) share or 82.5square meters to his son Concepcion, a co-owner to the extent of 1/06 or 16.5 square meters, hechose to sell it to his daughter-in-law, Erlinda, thus provoking the issue of whether Erlinda is a third-

person with respect to the co-owners.

Had he sold his 11/2 share to his son Concepcion, a co-owner, there would be no question about thesale to a "third person". The right of redemption does not exist with respect to the vendee-co-owner.The Civil Code provides:

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case theshares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. ...(1522a)

ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a (stranger) before thepartition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaserby reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period ofone month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.(1067a)

Note that the "third person" in article 1620 is extrano (stranger) in the Spanish original of article1522, not "tercero" which is the Spanish for "third person".

Manresa, commenting on article 1067, now article 1088, observes, that "el marido de una heredera"is a stranger (7 Codigo Civil Espanol, 7th Ed., 1955, p. 812).

I am of the opinion that no right of redemption exists in favor of Erlinda's sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law because the sale was made to the ( conjugal partnership of Erlinda and Concepcion ), a co-owner. The sale made Concepcion and Erlinda the co-owners of 6/10 or 3/5 of the 165-square-meter lot. We have to be realistic and pragmatic in this case.

Even now, Macario could himself revoke or rectify the sale and resell his share to Concepcion.

Castan Tobenas says that an "extrano" is a person who is not a co-owner. Literally, Erlinda is not aco-owner but the unblinkable fact is that she is married to a co-owner and the portion sold becameher conjugal property and that of her husband. They in turn are co-owners of that conjugal 1/2portion.

The view that Erlinda is not a third person with respect to the co-ownership is supported by the rulingin Saclolo and Pascual vs. Madlangsakay and Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 1038. It washeld in that case:

Under legal principles, by the contract of marriage, a man and woman enter a jointlife, acting, living, and working as one, whether under the common law or under the


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civil upon marriage the husband and the wife become one single, moral, spritual andsocial being, not only for purposes of procreation for the purpose of mutual help andprotection, physically, morally and materially. There is between them a full andcomplete community existence.

Castan Tobenas says that "el matrimonio es el acto solemne por medio del cual el hombre y la

mujer constituyen entre si una union legal para la plena y perpetua comunidad de existencia".

Justice Labrador says that "if there is unity and community of existence between husband and wife,then the husband may not be considered as a being distinct and different from the wife."

Hence, in the Saclolo case it was ruled that for purposes of the Agricultural Tenancy Law, Republic Act No. 1199, where the wife sought to eject a tenant from her paraphernal land on the ground thather husband, who was jobless, would work on the land, the tenant may be ejected although the lawprovides that the landowner may eject the tenant only when he will personally cultivate his land.

The unity of husband and wife is patent in this case. Plaintiffs Valentina and Olimpia had to bring thiscase with the assistance of their husbands against Erlinda and her husband, Concepcion.

The majority opinion relies on Basa vs. Aguilar, 117 SCRA 128 where one-half of a parcel of land,with an area of 32,383 square meters, was owned proindiviso by Olimpia, Arsenio, Nemesio,Ricardo, Atanacia Juliana and Feliciano, surnamed Basa, and the other half was owned proindivisoby the spouses Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina.

The Puyat's sold their undivided share to their son-in-law, Primo Tiongson, who was married totheir daughter Macaria It was held that the Basas had the right to redeem the share sold toTiongson who was considered a third person with respect to the co-ownership inspite of the fact thathe was a son-in-law of the two co-owners.

The instant case is different from the Basa case because the vendee herein is the wife of a co-owner

Concepcion, who owns a 1/10 (proindiviso) share of the disputed lot.

What is the just solution of this case? To a fair-minded person, the judicious solution is to award thelot to Valentina whose house is built on 3/4 of the lot. The P1,100 deposited by her in payment of the (proindiviso) share of her father should be paid to Erlinda. This is in accordance with the originalanswer of Macario (Exh. C) which should be regarded as binding on him.

The second case filed by Valentina, Civil Case No. 1501-A, should be consolidated with the instantcase. In the two cases the trial judge should determine what amount at current prices should be paidby Valentina for the 1/10 share of Concepcion and the 1/10 share of each of the other children. Thissolution should establish peace among the five children.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO,J., dissenting:

This is an intra-family litigation over 82.5 square meters of land. The spouses Macario K. Villanuevaand Basilia Garcia owned a lot with an area of 165 square meters located on President QuezonStreet, Aparri, Cagayan. Basilia died in 1944 survived by Macario and their five children namedValentina, Olimpia, Angel, Antonio and Concepcion (a male person), the husband of Erlinda V.Villangca.

The five children each owned a 1/10 share of that same lot while Macario owned thereof as hisconjugal share or 82,5 square meters. Note that north of the lot is the lot of Severino Feri,Valentina's husband. On 3/4 of the lot stands a house of strong materials occupied by Valentina.

Macario claims that he is the owner of the house because after liberation he bought a house forP500 and transferred to the lot (6 tsn Jan. 16, 1970). On the other hand, the trial court found that it isowned by Valentina (p. 64, Rollo). Macario admits in his letter, Exhibit D.


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On May 13, 1964 Macario (he is an insurance under-writer and was 79 in 1970 when he testified)sold for P1,1 00 to Erlinda, the wife of his son Concepcion, his conjugal share in said lot but hemade the mistake of selling "the western side of the lot". He should have sold only his Idealproindiviso share. He had to sell because he had to pay one Timbang the mortgage debt securedby the lot (4 tsn Jan. 16, 1970; p. 35, Rollo).

Four years after the sale, or on October 17, 1968, the four children sued their father brother andsister-in-law for rescision of the sale and for redemption. The alleged that there was no written noticeto them of the sale, that they learned of it only in September 1968 and that the house on the lot wasvalued at P7,000. They consigned the redemption price of P1,100.

Macario answered the complaint without Counsel's assistance. He stated therein that to avoidtrouble and quarelling among the members of his family he would like to cancel the sale sinceErlinda could not buy Valentina's house, to sell his share to Valentina and to return the P1,100 toErlinda (Exh. C. pp. 32-33, Rollo).

That answer should have terminated the case. But later a motion to dismiss and an answer werefiled by Erlinda, Concepcion and Macario. They insisted on the validity of the sale to Erlinda.

Valentina filed another case, Civil Case No. 1501-A, for partition.

When the trial judge categorically asked Macario what was his proposition about the case, he saidthat it was his desire that his son Concepcion should stay on the disputed lot because he had no loton which to build his house (9-10 tsn Jan. 16, 1970).

Judge Florendo in his decision dated July 14, 1970 declared Erlinda the owner of the portionbought by her after ordering the reformation of the deed of sale to make it appear that an Ideal share was bought by her and ordering the return of the P1,100 to Valentina. Judge Florendo alsoordered partition of the lot. Valentina and her brothers and sister appealed to this Court underRepublic Act No. 5440.

Macario created in this case a big legal problem for a small property. That problem would not havearisen had he been properly legally advised. Instead of selling his proindiviso ) share or 82.5square meters to his son Concepcion, a co-owner to the extent of 1/06 or 16.5 square meters, hechose to sell it to his daughter-in-law, Erlinda, thus provoking the issue of whether Erlinda is a third-

person with respect to the co-owners.

Had he sold his 11/2 share to his son Concepcion, a co-owner, there would be no question about thesale to a "third person". The right of redemption does not exist with respect to the vendee-co-owner.The Civil Code provides:

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case theshares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. ...(1522a)

ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a (stranger) before thepartition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaserby reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period ofone month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.(1067a)

Note that the "third person" in article 1620 is extrano (stranger) in the Spanish original of article1522, not "tercero" which is the Spanish for "third person".

Manresa, commenting on article 1067, now article 1088, observes, that "el marido de una heredera"is a stranger (7 Codigo Civil Espanol, 7th Ed., 1955, p. 812).

I am of the opinion that no right of redemption exists in favor of Erlinda's sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law because the sale was made to the ( conjugal partnership of Erlinda and Concepcion ), a co-owner. The sale made Concepcion and Erlinda the co-owners of 6/10 or 3/5 of the 165-square-meter lot. We have to be realistic and pragmatic in this case.

Even now, Macario could himself revoke or rectify the sale and resell his share to Concepcion.


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Castan Tobenas says that an "extrano" is a person who is not a co-owner. Literally, Erlinda is not aco-owner but the unblinkable fact is that she is married to a co-owner and the portion sold becameher conjugal property and that of her husband. They in turn are co-owners of that conjugal 1/2portion.

The view that Erlinda is not a third person with respect to the co-ownership is supported by the ruling

in Saclolo and Pascual vs. Madlangsakay and Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 1038. It washeld in that case:

Under legal principles, by the contract of marriage, a man and woman enter a jointlife, acting, living, and working as one, whether under the common law or under thecivil upon marriage the husband and the wife become one single, moral, spritual andsocial being, not only for purposes of procreation for the purpose of mutual help andprotection, physically, morally and materially. There is between them a full andcomplete community existence.

Castan Tobenas says that "el matrimonio es el acto solemne por medio del cual el hombre y lamujer constituyen entre si una union legal para la plena y perpetua comunidad de existencia".

Justice Labrador says that "if there is unity and community of existence between husband and wife,then the husband may not be considered as a being distinct and different from the wife."

Hence, in the Saclolo case it was ruled that for purposes of the Agricultural Tenancy Law, Republic Act No. 1199, where the wife sought to eject a tenant from her paraphernal land on the ground thather husband, who was jobless, would work on the land, the tenant may be ejected although the lawprovides that the landowner may eject the tenant only when he will personally cultivate his land.

The unity of husband and wife is patent in this case. Plaintiffs Valentina and Olimpia had to bring thiscase with the assistance of their husbands against Erlinda and her husband, Concepcion.

The majority opinion relies on Basa vs. Aguilar, 117 SCRA 128 where one-half of a parcel of land,with an area of 32,383 square meters, was owned proindiviso by Olimpia, Arsenio, Nemesio,Ricardo, Atanacia Juliana and Feliciano, surnamed Basa, and the other half was owned proindivisoby the spouses Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina.

The Puyat's sold their undivided share to their son-in-law, Primo Tiongson, who was married totheir daughter Macaria It was held that the Basas had the right to redeem the share sold toTiongson who was considered a third person with respect to the co-ownership inspite of the fact thathe was a son-in-law of the two co-owners.

The instant case is different from the Basa case because the vendee herein is the wife of a co-ownerConcepcion, who owns a 1/10 (proindiviso) share of the disputed lot.

What is the just solution of this case? To a fair-minded person, the judicious solution is to award thelot to Valentina whose house is built on 3/4 of the lot. The P1,100 deposited by her in payment of the (proindiviso) share of her father should be paid to Erlinda. This is in accordance with the originalanswer of Macario (Exh. C) which should be regarded as binding on him.

The second case filed by Valentina, Civil Case No. 1501-A, should be consolidated with the instantcase. In the two cases the trial judge should determine what amount at current prices should be paidby Valentina for the 1/10 share of Concepcion and the 1/10 share of each of the other children. Thissolution should establish peace among the five children.

CASE #77

November 4, 1916


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G.R. No. 10432JULIAN H. DEL PILAR, plaintiff-appellant,vs.MANUEL CATINDIG, defendant-appellee.Santos and Tomacruz for appellant.

No appearance for appellee. ARAULLO, J.: The plaintiff in these proceedings, relying upon the right of legal redemption byadjacent owners, provided for in article 1523 of the Civil Code, brought suit againstthe defendant in the justice of the peace court of the municipality of Bulacan, of the

province of the same name, and prayed for judgment in his favor and against the

defendant, declaring him to be surrogated in place of the latter in the ownership of a parcel of land which the defendant had recently acquired from a woman named MariaCornelio, in exchange for one of his own. After a hearing in the justice of the peacecourt judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, from which judgment thedefendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. There the plaintifffiled a new complaint in which, after describing both the land acquired by thedefendant in exchange for that of the said Maria Cornelio and the sum of P21, and hisown land abutting in that of the defendant so acquired by the latter, prayed the court to

render judgment by declaring him, the plaintiff, to be entitled to the legal redemptionof the property described in the complaint and acquired by the defendant from MariaCornelio as aforestated; and that the court order the defendant to deliver this propertyto the plaintiff, on payment of the sum of P21, the value of the property or, at most,the sum of P57, the value of the defendant's land that was exchanged with MariaCornelio.

The defendant in his answer denied each and all of the facts contained in the

complaint and in special defense alleged that the plaintiff's lands that adjoined his ownwere larger than the defendant's and that the land in question afforded the only meansof ingress through which work animals could reach the defendant's land, if the

plaintiff's lands were excluded. The defendant therefore prayed the court to absolvehim from the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff.

The parties stipulated in writing to submit the case to the Court of First Instance asthough it had been originally filed before the same, in view of the fact that, according

to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court, the justice of the peace court of Bulacanwhich first took cognizance thereof had no jurisdiction in the matter. After trial andthe introduction of evidence in the said Court of First Instance, judgment wasrendered on August 6, 1914, dismissing the complaint with the costs against the

plaintiff. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed, with the right to have the


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evidence reviewed, and forwarded to this Supreme Court the proper bill of exceptionsin which he alleged for the purpose of his appeal that the lower court erred:

First. In holding that the appellant had not proven his right to acquire the landin question, but that his sole purpose appeared to be to molest the appellee.Second. In holding that the appellee acquired the land in question in order thatit might serve as a passage way for his stock to his other land that wassurrounded by those of the appellant, and in considering this fact as the basis ofthe judgment. Third. In not holding the right of legal redemption of adjacentowners to lie in the appellant, and in not recognizing the latter's right ofsubrogation in place of the appellee with regard to the land in question, by

payment of either of the sums mentioned in the complaint.

Article 1521 of the Civil Code provides:

Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, with the same conditionsstipulated in the contract, in the place of the person who acquires a thing by

purchase or in payment of a debt.

An article 1523 of the same Code prescribes:

The owners of the adjacent lands shall also have the right of redemption whenthe sale of a rural estate is involved the area of which does not exceed onehectare.

The right referred to in the preceding paragraph is not applicable to adjacentlands which are divided by brooks, drains, ravines, roads, and other apparenteasements for the benefit of other estates.

If two or more adjacent owners should make use of the redemption at the sametime, the one who is owner of the adjacent land of lesser area shall be preferred;and, should both be equal in area, the person who first requested it.

Manresa, in his noted work Commentaries on the Civil Code, in treating of the saidarticle 1523 (vol. 10, p. 358, 2 d ed.) says as follows:

This right being limited in scope to rural lands not exceeding one hectare inextent, it is seen that the intention of the Code in this respect is solely to favorthe development of the ownership of land and agricultural interests .An estateof not more than a hectare in area does not, as a general rule, produce enough tokeep one family; its cultivation can not be accomplished economically, as theagricultural implements used have to be brought in across lands belonging to


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other owners, and the same may be said with regard to the gathering andtransportation of the produce .All these difficulties disappear if, on the sale ofthe estate, it is purchased by one of the adjacent owners, whereby the publicinterests is favored, because the production increases, the private interests ofthe redemptioner are respected and no ostensible harm is occasioned either thevendor or the purchaser.

x x x x x x x x x

The purpose of this article, as stated by the Code Commission in the revisededition of the Civil Code, was to furnish with the course of time some remedyfor the excessive subdivision of real estate which offers an insuperable obstacleto the development of wealth.

As may be seen, the object of the lawmaker in allowing the redemption by adjacentowners is to prevent a rural estate, adjacent to that belonging to another owner orother owners and the area of which does not exceed one hectare, from passing into thehands of a person other than some one of the adjacent owners so that the property ofthese latter would be divide without benefit to the public weal and perhaps to the

prejudice of the adjacent owners themselves who are interested in preserving theintegrity of their respective properties and in using the alienated estate for theimprovement and development of their own lands.

The right of redemption by adjacent owners cannot be exercised by any of these latteramong themselves, but only by them against a stranger who acquires from any one ofthem, by purchase or gift, in payment, or by any other title for value, a rural estate ofthe area fixed by law. The purpose of the right of action granted in such a case to theredemptioner (in connection with the right provided for in the articles 1521 and 1523of the Civil Code, above transcribed, to subrogate himself, under the same conditionsstipulated in the contract, in place of the person who acquired the property by any ofthe means mentioned) is to give preference to any of the owners of the adjacent landsas against the purchaser (that is, against the third person who, not being an adjacentowner, acquired the property) in order that he may have and hold the land under thesame conditions as those stipulated in the respective contract.

The supreme court of Spain made an explicit declaration in that sense, in its decisionsof November 26, 1895, December 4, 1896, and March 8, 1901.

This last decision was rendered in a case in which the plaintiff, exercising the right oflegal redemption, alleged that he was the owner of one celemin of land which on thenorth adjoined a piece of land of an approximate area of one fanega , less than one


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hectare, which had belonged to a woman named Juana Pea Romero, and which had been sold to one Zacarias Cuerda. The plaintiff prayed the court to hold that he wasentitled to redeem the said land and to order Cuerda to execute a deed of conveyanceof all his rights in the property to the plaintiff. Cuerda opposed the plaintiff's petition,alleging that it was evident that the right of legal redemption could be availed of only

by the adjacent owners, when the sale thereof had been made to a person who had no property adjoining the land so alienated, and that he was the owner of a piece of landwhich on the north was coterminous with the property sought to be redeemed. Thecivil branch of the Audiencia of Caceres rendered judgment affirming that of thelower court and allowing the redemption prayed for in the complaint; whereupon the

plaintiff filed an appeal in cessation before the supreme court and alleged that article

1523 of the Civil Code had been violated, as well as the rule laid down in the two firstcited decisions of the same court pursuant to which a right of action for legalredemption lies only against strangers who buy the property sought to be redeemed,

but not against another adjacent owner who has the same interest as the plaintiff in theconsolidation of the scattered holdings and in the disappearance of the small parcelsof property. In deciding that case the supreme court said:

Legal redemption can only be enforced against a stranger who buys the property sought to be redeemed and not against another adjacent owner who

has the same interest.

As the defendant in the case at bar is the owner of the land abutting upon that soughtto be redeemed by the plaintiff and is also one of the adjacent owners of this sameland, it is evident that the plaintiff has no right whatever in the said property and thatthe action brought by him against the defendant is improper.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of dismissal, appealed from, with

the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

CASE #78

G.R. No. L-21677 June 29, 1972

ANTONIO G. DE SANTOS, petitioner-appellant, vs. CITY OFMANILA and ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC., Respondents-

Appellees.

De Santos & Delfino for petitioner-appellant.


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E. Voltaire Garcia for respondents-appellees.

MAKASIAR, J. :

Petitioner-appellant seeks the review by certiorari of a decisiondated July 11, 1963 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. 29354-R, which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Manila inCivil Case No. 39730. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallaw library

The facts as found by the appellate court are as follows:

On October 1, 1958, a contract of exchange was made and enteredinto by and between the City of Manila and the Arellano University,Inc., in accordance with, and by virtue of, Resolution No. 442 of the

Municipal Board of Manila, adopted on August 15, 1958, andapproved by the City Mayor on August 22, 1958, whereby fiveparcels of land of the City of Manila (Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Psu-167195) containing an aggregate area of 2458.3 square meters,more or less, were exchanged for three parcels of land of theArellano University, Inc. (Lots 4-A, 9-A, and 10-A, Psd-53347)containing an aggregate area of 2171.4 square meters, more orless, which were needed for the construction of the Azcarraga (nowClaro M. Recto) Extension. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallaw library

On account of said contract of exchange, (the present) action wasbrought on March 25, 1959, by Antonio G. de Santos, plaintiff,against the City of Manila and the Arellano University, Inc.,defendants, (1) to declare the said contract of exchange null andvoid insofar as Lot No. 1 of Psu-167195 is concerned; (2) in theevent that the validity of said contract is sustained, to declare Lot 1subject to plaintiff's right of redemption within 30 days from thewritten notice of such exchange; and (3) in the event that said Lot 1be declared not to belong to the City of Manila, to enjoin the said

City, "in the event that it finally acquires the aforesaid property, torespect plaintiff's right of preemption." chanroblesvirtuallaw library

Defendant University filed answer with counterclaim for P5,000.00"for services of counsel to protect its interests and defend this suitagainst the unfounded complaint of plaintiff." chanroblesvirtuallaw library

Defendant City also filed answer, alleging that it is the owner of thelot in question, Lot No. 1 of Psu-167195, and that plaintiff has nopreferential or better right than defendant Arellano University toacquire said lot by preemption, legal redemption, sale, exchange orother form of acquisition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallaw library

The lot under controversy - Lot No. 1 Psu-167195 - contains 221.50square meters. It was a part of the partially dried bed of the Esterode San Miguel or Sampaloc, and is situated south of Lot No. 4, Block


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2646, Manila Cadastre, which contains an area of 1460 squaremeters and which was acquired by plaintiff on January 31, 1958from Enrique C. Lopez (Exh. F). It also adjoins the propertiesbelonging to the Arellano University, Inc. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallaw library

By letter of May 14, 1957, the City of Manila advised the ArellanoUniversity, Inc., that about 2,400 square meters of its site onLegarda Street were needed by the City for the construction ofAzcarraga extension. This letter was answered on May 21, 1957,with the proposition that in exchange for said 2,400 square meters,the City cede to the University the esteros adjoining the Arellanosite, on the basis of 2 square meters of estero (filled) for everysquare meter of the Arellano land, or in case of unfilled esteros , onthe basis of 3 to 1 (Exh. 2). The negotiations culminated in thepassage of the aforementioned Resolution No. 442 followed by theexecution of the contract of exchange sought to be annulled. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallaw library

Upon the other hand, Enrique C. Lopez, predecessor-in- interest ofplaintiff Antonio G. de Santos, having been advised that hisproperty, Lot 4, Block 2646, would be affected by the widening ofLegarda St., Sampaloc, and that the necessary area (56 sq. m.)would be expropriated, wrote the City Engineer under date ofAugust 8, 1957, proposing that the required area "be exchanged

with the City property back of my same Lot 4, Bloc 2646 ... The Cityproperty at the back of my lot, I am referring to, is at present a partof the Estero de San Miguel" (Exh. E). This letter of Mr. Lopez wascoursed through official channels, and the City Appraisal Committeestated that the exchange of the lot of Mr. Enrique C. Lopez affectedby the widening of Legarda St., with the lot (around 190 sq. m.)formerly a part of the abandoned estero bed "may be made on thebasis of meter for meter, the excess area in favor of the City to bepaid for at the rate of P45.00 per square meter" (Exh. E-3). Thepapers were then forwarded to the City Mayor by the City Engineerper indorsement of April 15, 1958 (Exh. E-6). Meanwhile, onJanuary 31, 1958, the aforesaid Lot 4, Block 2646, Manila Cadastre,was exchanged by Mr. Enrique C. Lopez for 6 parcels of landsituated in Jose Abad Santos belonging to the herein plaintiff, acopy of the deed of exchange being Exhibit F. By letter datedFebruary 25, 1959 (Exh. J-1), the City Mayor informed plaintiff, ineffect, that his Office approved an indorsement of the Officer incharge of the Department of Engineering and Public Works of theCity (Exb. J-2) wherein it was recommended that "action on theclaim of Dr. Antonio Santos as successor-in-interest of Mr. Lopez beheld in abeyance," for the reasons stated therein, to wit:

"Azcarraga Extension was planned long before the war. It isconsidered as a major thoroughfare to bypass Legarda. After thewar, with the creation of the National Planning Commission,


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Azcarraga Extension was again incorporated in their plans so thatthe opening of Azcarraga Extension from Mendiola to the Rotonda isbeing given great importance. Azcarraga Extension passes thru theproperty of the Arellano University and the San Beda College on

which we have an expropriation proceedings against the College.The expropriation case is now in court and the chances are greatthat we will win the case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallaw library

"There were plans before to widen Legarda to relieve traffic on thisstreet, but in view of the tremendous cost of expropriation involvedand in view of the proposed opening of the Azcarraga Extension,negotiations for the widening of Legarda Street even on a piece-meal basis were suspended temporarily. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallaw library

"In view of the above, any exchange now involving the widening ofLegarda Street with any property that the City has, should be heldin abeyance. On the other hand, efforts should be concentrated onthe acquisition of properties along Azcarraga Extension because ofits prime importance for lessening traffic on Legar

sales case nos. 71 to 90

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