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NUREG-0847 Supplement No. 20

Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391

Tennessee Valley Authority

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Oftice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

February 1996

Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Imapes are produced from the best avaiiable origirral dOCUXSleXlL

ABSTRACT

Thi s report supplements the Safety Eva1 uati on Report (SER) , NUREG-0847 (June 1982), Supplement No. 1 (September 1982), Supplement No. 2 (January 1984): plement No. 3 (January 1985), Supplement No. 4 (March 1985), Supplement (November 1990), Supplement No. 6 (April 1991), Supplement No. 7 (Sepl 1991), Supplement No. 8 (January 1992), Supplement No. 9 (June 1992), Suppl No. 10 (October 1992), Supplement No. 11 (April 1993), Supplement No. 12 (Oc 1993), Supplement No. 13 (April 1994), Supplement No. 14 (December 3 Suppl ement No. 15 (June 1995), Supplement No. 16 (September 1995), Suppl emei 17 (October 1995), Supplement No. 18 (October 1995), and Supplement N (November 1995) issued by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of t h c Nuclear Regulatory Commi ss i on wi t h respect to the appl i cat i on f i 1 ed b Tennessee Val 1 ey Authority, as appl icant and owner, for 1 icenses t o opera1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391). f a c i l i t y i s located in Rhea County, Tennessee, near the Watts Bar Dam a Tennessee River. Thi s suppl ement provi des recent i nformati on reg; resolution of some of the issues identified in the SER.

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Watts Bar SSER 20 i i i

CONTENTS Paqe

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i

1 INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.1 I n t roduc t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.12 Approved Technical Issues f o r Incorporat ion

i n t h e License as Exemptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1.13 Imp1 ementat i o n o f Correct i ve Act ion Programs and

Special Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

3 DESIGN CRITERIA . STRUCTURES. COMPONENTS. EQUIPMENT. AND SYSTEMS . . 3-1 3.9 Mechanical Systems and Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.9.6 Inserv ice Test ing o f Pumps and Valves . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.9.6.1 Pump Test Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 8.3 Onsite E l e c t r i c Power System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

8.3.1 Onsite AC Power System Compliance With GDC 17 . . . . . 8-1 8.3.1.2 Low and/or Degraded Gr id Voltage Condit ion . 8-1

11 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 11.5 Process and E f f l u e n t Radiological Monitor ing and

Sampling System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 11.5.1 System Descr ip t ion and Review Discussion . . . . . . . 11-1 11.5.2 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2

13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 13.3 Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1

13.3.1 I n t roduc t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 13.3.2 The Emergency Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1

Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 13.3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3

13.6 Physical Secur i ty Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 3-4 13.6.9 Land Vehicle Bomb Control Program . . . . . . . . . . . . l 3-4

13.3.2.17 Evaluation o f O f f s i t e Emergency

19 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS . . . . . . . 19-1

APPENDICES

A CHRONOLOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW OF WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2. OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW

E PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS

F REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

G ERRATA TO WATTS BAR SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SUPPLEMENT 19

Watts Bar SSER 20 V

ABBREVIATIONS

AC RS ANSI ASME

CAP CFR CNPP

EPZ ERCW ETE

FEMA FSAR

GDC G L

I ST

NRC NRR

ODCM

PIG

REP RERP

SER SP SRP SSER

TAC TI TM I TVA

W BN WBNPP

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards American National Standards Inst i tute American Society of Mechanical Engineers

corrective action program Code o f Federa7 Regu7ations Corporate Nuclear Performance P1 an

emergency planning zone essenti a1 raw cool i ng water evacuation time estimate

Federal Emergency Management Agency final safety analysis report

general desi gn c r i t e r i om generi c 1 e t t e r

inservice testing

Nuclear Regul atory Commi ssi on Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Offsi t e Dose Calculation Manual

particulate iodine and gas

radi 01 ogi cal emergency pl an radi 01 ogi cal emergency response pl an

safety eval uati ion report speci a1 program standard revi ew pl an supplement to safety eval uati on report

technical assignment control temporary instruction Three Mi l e Is1 and Tennessee Val ley Authority

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Watts Bar Nuclear Performance P1 an

Watts Bar SSER 20 vi i

1 INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION

1.1 In t roduc t i on

I n June 1982, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission s t a f f (NRC s t a f f o r s t a f f ) issued a Safety Evaluat ion Report, NUREG-0847, regarding the app l i ca t i on by the Tennessee Va l ley Au tho r i t y (TVA) f o r l icenses t o operate the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Un i ts 1 and 2. The Safety Evaluat ion Report (SER) was fo l lowed by SER Supplement No. 1 (SSER 1 , September 1982) , Supplement No. 2 (SSER 2, January 1984), Supplement No. 3 (SSER 3, January 1985), Supplement No. 4 (SSER 4, March 1985), Supplement No. 5 (SSER 5, November 1990), Supplement No. 6 (SSER 6, A p r i l 1991), Supplement No. 7 (SSER 7, September 1991), Supplement No. 8 (SSER 8, January 1992), Supplement No. 9 (SSER 9, June 1992), Supplement No. 10 (SSER 10, October 1992), Supplement No. 11 (SSER 11, A p r i l 1993), Supplement No. 12 (October 1993), Supplement No. 13 (SSER 13, A p r i l 1994), Supplement No. 14 (SSER 14, December 1994), Supplement No. 15 (SSER 15, June 1995), Supplement No. 16 (SSER 16, September 1995), Supplement No. 17 (SSER 17, October 1995), Supplement No. 18 (SSER 18, October 1995), and Supplement No. 19 (SSER 19, November 1995).

The s t a f f has completed i t s review o f the appl icant 's F ina l Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) up t o Amendment 91, the f i n a l amendment. Concurrent w i th the issuance o f SSER 19 on November 9, 1995, the s t a f f a lso issued an operat ing l icense, au thor iz ing operat ion up t o 5-percent power (hence, TVA i s a lso addressed as " l icensee" i n t h i s SSER).

The requirements t h a t must be met before a p l a n t can be l icensed are def ined i n NRC regulat ions. guidance documents, such as regu la to ry guides and the Standard Review Plan (SRP, NUREG-0800) t h a t de f ine methods t h a t are acceptable t o the s t a f f f o r meeting var ious requirements i n the regulat ions. However, except f o r a few regu la to ry guides t h a t are s p e c i f i c a l l y referenced i n a regulat ion, these guidance documents are no t requirements. Spec i f i ca l l y , every regu la to ry guide contains the fo l l ow ing statement:

Over the years, the s t a f f has prepared a number o f

Regulatory guides are issued t o descr ibe and make ava i l ab le t o the p u b l i c methods acceptable t o the NRC s t a f f o f implementing s p e c i f i c p a r t s o f the Commission's regulat ions, t o de l ineate techniques used by the s t a f f i n evaluat ing s p e c i f i c problems o r postu la ted accidents, o r t o provide guidance t o appl icants. Regulatory guides are no t subs t i t u tes f o r regulat ions, and compliance w i t h them i s no t required. Methods and so lu t ions d i f f e r e n t from those se t ou t i n the guides w i l l be acceptable i f they provide a basis f o r the f i nd ings r e q u i s i t e t o the issuance o r continuance o f a permi t o r l i cense by the Commission.

S im i la r l y , every SRP sect ion contains the fo l lowing:

Standard review plans are no t subs t i tu tes f o r regu la to ry guides o r the Commission's regu la t ions and compliance w i t h them i s n o t requ i red.

Watts Bar SSER 20 1-1

In add i t i on t o NRC s t a f f guidance documents, the i ndus t r y has developed numerous documents, such as ANSI standards, some o f which describe methods f o r meeting c e r t a i n requirements contained i n the regulat ions. To varying degrees, the s t a f f has endorsed these documents as an acceptable method f o r meeting the regulat ions.

As an appl icant o r l icensee develops the design o f a system, i t may choose t o nconunitn t o one o r more o f these NRC o r indust ry reference documents. appl icant o r l icensee commits t o a guidance document, then i t must meet a l l o f the guide l ines contained i n the document, o r i t must request t h a t the NRC s t a f f author ize a deviat ion. The s t a f f must s p e c i f i c a l l y approve each dev ia t i on requested. However, an appl icant o r l icensee may choose no t t o commit t o a s p e c i f i c s t a f f guidance document, but may instead choose an a1 t e r n a t i v e approach t o meeting a regulatory requirement. When t h i s happens, the NRC must evaluate the a l t e r n a t i v e approach t o determine i f it meets the regul a t i ons.

I f an

A s t a f f reviewer w i l l o f t en use the guidel ines contained i n a regulatory guide o r i ndus t r y standard as a measure o f whether the app l i ca t i on meets the regu la to ry requirements. This does not mean t h a t the regulatory guide o r i ndus t r y standard becomes a requirement o r even a commitment, and it does not mean t h a t the app l i ca t i on must meet every gu ide l ine i n the standard t o be found acceptable.

The SER and i t s supplements were w r i t t e n t o agree w i t h the format and scope o u t l i n e d i n the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800). Issues ra i sed by the SRP review t h a t were not closed out when the SER was published were c l a s s i f i e d i n t o outstanding issues, confirmatory issues, and proposed 1 icense condi t ions. A l l issues were acceptably resolved f o r U n i t 1, as reported i n Sections 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 o f SSER 19.

I n add i t i on t o the guidance i n the SRP, the s t a f f issues generic requirements o r recommendations i n the form o f technical reports, b u l l e t i n s , and generic l e t t e r s . Each o f these documents c a r r i e s i t s own a p p l i c a b i l i t y , work scope, and acceptance c r i t e r i a ; some are appl icable t o Watts Bar. The review and implementation status o f appl icable generic issues are addressed i n Appendix EE o f SSER 16.

Each o f the fo l l ow ing sections and appendices o f t h i s supplement i s numbered the same as the sect ion o r appendix o f the SER t h a t i s being updated, and the discussions are supplementary to, and not i n l i e u o f , the discussion i n the SER, unless otherwise noted. Accordingly, Appendix A continues the chronology o f the safety review. Appendix E l i s t s p r i n c i p a l cont r ibutors t o t h i s supplement. Appendix F, o r i g i n a l l y published i n SSER 1, i s supplemented i n t h i s SSER. Appendix G, which l a s t appeared i n SSER 9, corrects some e r ro rs i n SSER 19. The other appendices are not changed by t h i s supplement.

The s t a f f concludes that , on the basis o f i t s determination t h a t Watts Bar U n i t 1 has met a l l appl icable regulat ions and guidance as s tated i n the SER and supplements, and s a t i s f a c t o r y f i nd ings from a l l appl icable inspections, an operat ing l i cense can be granted t o authorize operat ion up t o 100-percent power.


The Pro ject Manager i s Peter S. Tam, who may be contacted by c a l l i n g (301) 415-7000, o r by wr i t ing t o the fo l l ow ing address:

Mr . Peter S. Tam Mai l Stop 0-14821 U. S. Nucl ear Regul a tory Comi s s i on Washington, DC 20555-0001

1.12 ADDroved Technical Issues f o r IncorDoration i n the License as ExemDtions

The l icensee appl ied f o r exemptions from c e r t a i n provis ions o f t he regula- t i ons . These have been reviewed by the s t a f f and approved i n appropriate sec- t i o n s o f the SER and SSERs. These exemptions were granted i n the low-power operat ing l i cense and w i l l be granted i n the ful l-power operat ing l icense:

(1) A i r 1 ock seal 1 eakage t e s t instead o f f u l l -pressure tes t , schedul a r exemption (Section 6.2.6, SSERs 4 and 19) (TAC M63615)

(2) C r i t i c a l i t y monitor (Section 9.1, SSER 5) (TAC M63615)

(3) Schedule t o implement the vehic le bomb r u l e (Section 13.6.9, SSER 15) (TAC M90696)

I n add i t i on t o these, the s t a f f granted the fo l l ow ing two exemptions t o the appl icant on December 15, 1994, and October 17, 1995, respect ively:

(4) Issuance, storage, and r e t r i e v a l o f badges f o r personnel (TAC M90729)

(5) P a r t i c i p a t i o n by States within the ingest ion exposure pathway emergency planning zone i n the emergency preparedness exercise (TAC M92943)

I n SSER 14, the s t a f f reevaluated three technical issues prev ious ly approved f o r exemption from various provis ions o f Appendix G t o 10 CFR Par t 50. As a r e s u l t , Section 5.3.1.1 o f SSER 14 repor ts t h a t these exemptions are no longer needed.

1.13 ImDlementation o f Correct ive Action Proqrams and Special Proqrams

On September 17, 1985, the NRC sent a l e t t e r t o the applicant, pursuant t o T i t l e 10 o f t he Code o f Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f), requesting t h a t the appl icant submit informat ion on i t s plans f o r co r rec t i ng problems concern- i n g the o v e r a l l management o f i t s nuclear program as wel l as on i t s plans f o r co r rec t i ng p lan t - spec i f i c problems. I n response t o t h i s l e t t e r , TVA prepared a Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan (CNPP) t h a t i d e n t i f i e d and proposed cor- rec t i ons t o problems concerning the ove ra l l management o f i t s nuclear program, and a s i t e - s p e c i f i c p lan f o r Watts Bar e n t i t l e d “Watts Bar Nuclear Performance Plan” (WBNPP). safety evaluat ion reports, NUREG-1232, Vol. 1 (Ju ly 1987) and NUREG-1232, Vol . 4 (January 1990).

The s t a f f reviewed both plans and documented r e s u l t s i n two

I n a l e t t e r o f September 6, 1991, the appl icant submitted Revision 1 o f the WBNPP. I n SSER 9, the s t a f f concluded t h a t Revision 1 o f the WBNPP does not necessi tate any r e v i s i o n o f the s t a f f ’ s safety evaluat ion repor t , NUREG-1232, V O l . 4.


In NUREG-1232, Vol. 4, the staff documented its general review of the corrective action programs (CAPs) and special programs (SPs) through which the applicant would effect corrective actions at Watts Bar. When the report was published, some o f the CAPs and SPs were in their initial stages o f implementation. The staff stated that it would report its review o f the implementation of all CAPs and SPs and closeout of open issues in future supplements to the licensing SER, NUREG-0847; accordingly, the staff prepared Temporary Instructions (TIS) 2512/016-043 for the Inspection Manual and adhered to the TIS to perform inspections of the CAPs and SPs. This new section was introduced in SSER 5 to be updated in subsequent SSERs.

As reported in SSER 19, all CAPs and SPs were acceptably implemented by the licensee. SSER 19 also listed all applicable safety evaluations and inspection reports for each CAP or SP. There is no new or revised information; Sections 1.13.1 and 1.13.2 of SSER 19 are thus incorporated by reference.

Watts Bar SSER 20 .1-4

3 DESIGN CRITERIA - STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS

3.2 Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components

I n Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of SSER 3, the s t a f f found tha t the seismic cl assi f i cat i on of the emergency raw cool i ng water system (ERCWS) was acceptable pending verification that TVA made certain modifications t o i t . Section 3.2 o f SSER 5, the s t a f f referenced Inspection Report 50-390/84-37, dated July 13, 1984, where such verification was documented. Subsequently, the applicant completed implementation of the Corrective Action Program on Equipment Seismic Qualification (see Section 1.13.1 of SSER 19). Inspecti on Report 50-390/93-79 (March 4, 1994), the s t a f f re-veri f i ed the modifications and found them acceptable. This update does n o t change the s t a f f ' s conclusions in SSER 3 and SSER 5 regarding Confirmatory Issues 5 and 6.

In

In

The s t a f f tracked th i s e f fo r t by TAC M94025.

3.9 Mechani cal Systems and Components

3.9.6 Inservice Testing o f Pumps and Valves (Unit 1)

In SSER 14, the s t a f f reviewed the l icensee's pump and valve inservice tes t ing (IST) program and authorized a number o f a1 ternati ve tes t ing requirements. In SSER 18, the s t a f f supplemented i t s evaluation. 1994, the s t a f f commented on 13 issues regarding the l icensee's IST program. By l e t t e r dated November 20, 1995, the licensee responded.

By a l e t t e r dated August 25,

The s t a f f has reviewed the l icensee's response t o the 13 issues and determined tha t the licensee has addressed each in a manner t h a t complies with the s t a f f ' s position as stated in the August 25, 1994, l e t t e r . Where provisional r e l i e f was granted in SSER 14, the licensee has modified applicable r e l i e f requests t o r e f l e c t the actions taken t o address the specif ic provisions. All actions are subject t o further review th rough future inspections in accordance with the s t a f f ' s existing inspection program. discussed below.

Each of the 13 issues i s The s t a f f tracked th i s e f fo r t by TAC M90252.

Issue 1

The 1 i censee has adequately described the process for i ncl udi ng components in the IST program and for determining the applicable t e s t s . However, the scope of the IST program for pumps could be further narrowed by including only those pumps t ha t a re provided with an emergency power source as discussed in paragraph 1.1 of Ameri can Soci ety of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) /Ameri can National Standards Ins t i tu te (ANSI) Operations and Maintenance Standards Part 6 (OM-6)].

Issue 2

(1) The overpressure protection devices tha t are in the scope of OM-1 are those tha t protect a system tha t has a function t o s h u t down the reactor t o a safe-shutdown condition, maintain safe shutdown, o r mi t i ga t e the

Watts Bar SSER 20 3- 1

consequences of an accident. t h a t provide overpressure protection for systems that function t o s h u t down the reactor t o a safe-shutdown condition, maintain safe shutdown, o r mitigate the consequences of an accident, whether the valves themselves perform such functions or only provide overpressure protection. Working Group of the ASME Operations and Maintenance Committee has been worki ng t o bet ter cl a r i fy which overpressure protection devices are within the scope of OM-1. The licensee should monitor the code a c t i v i t i e s ; however, the scope o f the IST program currently being implemented must comply w i t h the requirements of the 1987 e d i t i o n of OM-1 which appears t o be a broader scope than tha t defined by the licensee. The l icensee ' s response s t a t e s tha t the IST program "includes w i t h i n i t s scope those pressure-re1 i ef devices tha t are requi red t o function dur i ng accident conditions, those required t o function t o shut down the reactor, and those require t o function t o maintain the cold shutdown condition." Therefore, the response t o this issue may no t ful ly address the correct scope. The licensee should determine i f there are pressure r e l i e f devices which protect ASME Code Class 1, 2, o r 3 (or equivalent) systems tha t function in an accident and include those devices in the IST program.

That i s , the scope of OM-1 includes valves

The

(2) The s t a f f commented that the licensee defined a "Category C Passive" for cer ta in valves l i s ted i n the IST program, b u t tha t the code does n o t specify such a category and function combination (see Table 1 o f OM-10). The licensee indicates that i t considers t h i s category applicable t o the sel f-actuati ng devices that have no function t o change obturator p o s i t i o n , bu t only t o function as a pressure boundary (i .e., t o n o t rupture). Valves tha t function in response t o a system characteristic are generally considered active unless the flow i s blocked or the valves are otherwise locked in position. The valves may respond t o a system parameter, possibly inadvertently i f they are n o t functioning or s e t properly, w i t h o u t operator awareness and thereby compromi se the func t ion of the system under a condition where the valves do n o t return t o the position required t o maintain the pressure boundary integri ty . any of the valves designated as Category C-Passi ve should be "acti vel'

valves i s subject t o future s t a f f inspection.

Whether

Issue 3

The s t a f f noted tha t the corrective actions speci f ied for valves which exhibi t an increasing stroke time (paragraph 4.2.1.9(b)) consist of two elements: (1) l imiting values o r (2) multiples o f the reference values. The combination can resu l t i n 1 imi t ing values for some valves tha t are more r e s t r i c t ive than the mu1 t i p l e s of the reference values (and vice versa). The IST program stated tha t the Technical Speci f i cations were more r e s t r i c t ive than the code, which the s t a f f pointed o u t i s a misleading statement. tha t i f the stroke time of a valve exceeds a Technical Specification l imi t , o r exceeds the acceptance c r i t e r i a and is n o t immediately retested, i t will be declared inoperable. evaluation o f the t e s t data. The 1 icensee's response references paragraph 6.2 of both OM-6 and OM-10 and i s confusing. documentation in the t e s t plans and i s unrelated t o t h i s issue. Paragraph 6.2 of OM-6 discusses a 96-hour evaluation of the t e s t data for pumps, similar t o the 96 hours specified i n paragraph 4.2.1.9(b) of OM-10. The licensee should ensure tha t i t conforms t o the requirements of paragraph 4.2.1.9 of OM-10.

The licensee must ensure

If retested, a period of 96 hours i s allowed f o r

Paragraph 6.2 of OM-10 re fers t o


The intent of the s t a f f was t o c la r i fy that the 96-hour period i s available for determining operabi 1 i ty i f the speci f i ed requi rements are otherwi se met. I f a valve stroke time exceeds a limiting value, or i f i t exceeds an acceptance cr i ter ion and i s n o t retested, i t must be declared inoperable immediately. the limiting value has n o t been exceeded, i t may be immediately retested and a period of 96 hours i s available for evaluating the t e s t resul ts t o determine operability. conservative.

I f the valve stroke time exceeds an acceptance cr i ter ion, bu t

The l icensee's response t o t h i s issue appears to be

Issue 4

This issue i s concerned with the exclusion of the emergency diesel generator pumps and valves and that even i f they are considered skid-mounted, they may be within the scope of the IST program i f they are c lassi f ied as ASME Code Class 3. The licensee revised the IST program t o indicate tha t the components are non-Code and are included in the Augmented IST Program. This action i s consistent w i t h the s t a f f ' s guidance in Section 3.4 of NUREG-1482, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing a t Nuclear Power Plants," April 1995.

Issue 5

The s t a f f noted that Category A passive valves have leakage r a t e testing requirements. leakage tes t ing i s required for Category A passive valves.

The licensee has revised the IST program t o indicate t h a t seat

Issue 6

The licensee has revised the IST program t o note that check valve disassembly and inspection may, under some circumstances, be used for verification of a check valve's capability t o close. re1 ated t o veri f i cat i on of obturator movement.

This conforms with the provisions in OM-10

Issue 7

The s t a f f noted that valves other than containment isolation valves o r pressure isolation valves, as l i s ted in the IST program, may have leakage ra te l imits tha t would need to be tested i n the IST program. responded t h a t no other such valves have been identified a t the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, b u t the applicable section o f the IST program has been revised so that i t will n o t be misleading i n the future i f modifications include such valves.

The licensee

Issue 8

The s t a f f recommended that the 1 icensee investigate the use of noni ntrusi ve methods for testing check valves. methods i s being pursued.

The licensee responded tha t the use of such

Issue 9

This issue identified incorrect references which the 1 icensee has corrected.


Issue 10

(1) The l icensee's request t o set a minimum l i m i t f o r t he v i b r a t i o n acceptance c r i t e r i a o f smooth-running pumps was approved w i t h the p rov i s ion t h a t i t be used on ly on a case-by-case bas is where i t i s determined appropriate, inc lud ing considerat ion o f any manufacturers' recommendations. The 1 icensee has rev ised Re1 i e f Request PV-01 t o inc lude such a requirement.

(2) The approval o f the a l t e r n a t i v e was a lso i n t e r i m u n t i l the ASME OM Committee has issued requirements f o r acceptance c r i t e r i a appl i cab l e t o smooth-running pumps. address the i n t e r i m requirement f o r f u t u r e changes as appl icable.

The l icensee has rev ised the r e l i e f request t o

Issue 11

The s t a f f gave i n t e r i m approval u n t i l the f i r s t r e f u e l i n g outage t o use temporary f l o w instrumentat ion f o r the b o r i c ac id t r a n s f e r pumps. The l icensee ind i ca tes t h a t the pumps w i l l be tes ted dur ing r e f u e l i n g outages using a f l ow path t h a t contains instrumentat ion meeting OM-6 requirements f o r range and accuracy. The pumps w i l l be tes ted quar te r l y using inst rumentat ion t h a t i s ava i l ab le bu t t h a t does no t meet the code range and accuracy requirements. The t e s t i n g meets o r exceeds the prov is ions o f Pos i t i on 9 o f Generic L e t t e r (GL) 89-04, "Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inserv ice Test ing Programs," f o r t e s t i n g pumps t h a t cannot be tes ted w i t h measured f l ow dur ing q u a r t e r l y tes t ing ; therefore, the rev ised r e l i e f request i s acceptable fo r long-term use i n accordance w i t h the prov is ions o f GL 89-04.

Issue 12

R e l i e f Request PV-06 was not approved i n SSER 14, and the l icensee has withdrawn the request.

Issue 13

R e l i e f Request PV-13 i s concerned w i t h the open func t ion o f a check valve; the a l t e r n a t i v e discussed v e r i f i c a t i o n o f the valve's c a p a b i l i t y t o p roper ly backseat. The r e l i e f request has been rev ised t o co r rec t the discrepancy.

3.9.6.1 Pump Test Program

The s t a f f author ized a number o f a l t e r n a t i v e t e s t i n g requirements i n SSER 14. I n i t s November 20, 1995, l e t t e r , the l icensee proposed a new a l te rna t i ve .

Re1 i e f Reauest PV-15

The request appl ies t o Code Class 3 essent ia l raw coo l ing water valves.0-FSV- 67-1221-A and 0-FSV-67-1223-B (System 67 valves) and Code Class 1 reac to r coolant system valves 1-FSV-68-396-B and 1-FSV-68-397-A (System 68 valves). The valves func t i on t o admit coo l ing water t o the jacke ts o f t he a u x i l i a r y a i r compressors and t o vent noncondensable gases and hydrogen from the reac to r vessel head fo l l ow ing accidents, respect ive ly . The 1 icensee has determined t h a t i t i s imprac t ica l t o s t roke t ime the valves using conventional methods (i .e., p o s i t i o n i nd i ca t i on ) .


The 1 icensee states:

The System 67 valves are t o t a l l y enclosed, solenoid actuated valves t h a t a re no t provided with pos i t i on ind icators . The on ly means o f cyc l i ng the valves i s by s t a r t i n g and stopping the a u x i l i a r y a i r compressors. The valves open when the compressor s t a r t s and c lose a f t e r t he compressor stops. Addi t ional ly , the valves are i n s t a l l e d i n ser ies w i t h a thermostat t h a t w i l l no t pass f l ow u n t i l t he j acke t water temperature reaches a predetermined l e v e l some t ime a f t e r s t a r t i n g o f t he a i r compressor. Therefore, t he valve cannot be timed by observing f low through the valve s ince f l ow w i l l no t begin when t h e valve opens, but when the a i r compressor water j acke t reached a preset temperature. WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear P lant ] has attempted t o detect valve operat ion v i a an accelerometer mounted on the valve, a stethoscope, and by using u l t rason ic t e s t equipment t o determine and observe valve obturator p o s i t i o n as discussed i n the paper presented by Joseph Ondish a t the Second NRC/ASME Symposium on Pump and Valve Test ing and contained i n sect ion 2A o f NUREG/CP-0123 ["Proceedings o f the Second NRC/ASME Symposium on Pump and Valve Testing," publ ished by NRC i n J u l y 19921. None o f these methods have been capable o f determining valve stroke time.

The System 68 valves are t o t a l l y enclosed, solenoid actuated Target Rock valves. The only means o f cyc l i ng these valves i s by a hand- i n d i c a t i n g c o n t r o l l e r located i n the main cont ro l room. This c o n t r o l l e r has a var iab le setpoint t h a t i s actuated by a thumbwheel. Add i t iona l l y , the valves are admin is t ra t i ve ly l i m i t e d t o a s t roke t i m e o f .not l e s s than 5 seconds t o prevent the i n t roduc t i on o f a water hammer event t o the system. Since the s t roke t ime i s t o t a l l y dependent upon the r a p i d i t y w i t h which the operator operates the thumbwheel and i s admin is t ra t i ve ly l i m i t e d t o no t l e s s than 5 seconds, the stroke time measured i s no t i n d i c a t i v e o f va lve condi t ion. t o run up the thumbwheel. Therefore, s t roke t ime t e s t i n g i s no t pract icable.

Rather it i s i n d i c a t i v e o f the t ime the operator takes

The 1 i censee proposes :

Exercise the System 67 valves through a f u l l cyc le o f t r a v e l once per quarter, and exercise the System 68 valves through a f u l l cyc le o f t r a v e l dur ing shutdowns and replace [ a l l ] the valves once every f i v e years. This a l t e r n a t i v e i s discussed i n paragraph 4.2.8 o f NUREG-1482.

The code prov is ions f o r s t roke t im ing power-operated valves a l low f o r monitor ing degrading condi t ions so t h a t valves may be repai red o r replaced before they f a i l . When st roke t im ing i s impract ica l , o ther means f o r monitor ing degrading condi t ions, o r f o r precluding degradation t o the po in t o f fa i lu re , may be acceptable a l te rna t ives . The s t a f f recommends the use o f d iagnost ic o r nonint rus ive t e s t methods where feasible, o r enhanced maintenance o r pe r iod i c replacement as a1 te rna t ives t o s t roke t ime t e s t i n g (see Section 4.2.8 o f NUREG-1482).

The subject valves are t o t a l l y enclosed solenoid valves which should have been designed w i t h p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t i o n t o enable inserv ice tes t ing ; however, the


prov is ions f o r IST had no t become p a r t o f the code o r t he NRC regu la t ions when the cons t ruc t ion permi t f o r Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, U n i t 1, was issued on January 23, 1973. Therefore, an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the code requirements may be considered because o f the impract ica l design l i m i t a t i o n s . I f t h e code requirements were imposed, the l icensee would have t o i n s t a l l p o s i t i o n i nd i ca t i on o r would have t o purchase a device t h a t would monitor the valves and measure t h e s t roke times, e i t h e r o f which would be a burden.

The 1 icensee discusses var ious methods attempted f o r moni tor ing the ’stroke time o f the valves, r e s u l t i n g i n discount ing a l l o f the methods. Though there are methods t h a t might provide a measure o f the s t roke time, such as d iagnost ic t e s t i n g devices now ava i lab le f o r t e s t i n g solenoid and air-operated valves, these are not y e t i n wide use f o r t e s t i n g valves such as the ,coo l ing water valves and head vent valves. I n the future, the l icensee may determine such methods are pre ferab le t o per iod ic valve replacement as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o moni tor ing t h e s t roke times. I f so, such methods may be used w i thout f u r t h e r review by the s t a f f because the methods are considered acceptable f o r meeting the requirements o f the code f o r stroke t im ing o f valves. selected a f ive-year per iod f o r per iod ic replacement, w i t h a pe r iod i c f u l l cyc le o f t he valves t o ensure there i s no binding, as recommended by the s t a f f (see NUREG-1482, Section 4.2.8, re ferenc ing NUREG-1275, Volume 6). the valves are genera l ly spec i f ied f o r a l i f e of 40 years, a f ive-year replacement frequency should be acceptable; however, i f experience ind ica tes t h a t a more frequent replacement i s needed, the l icensee must evaluate and es tab l i sh a more appropr iate per iod.

The l icensee has

Because

Because there are no prov is ions f o r pos i t i on ind ica t ion , the design o f the valves and actuat ing systems l i m i t the l icensee’s a b i l i t y t o monitor f o r degradation by per iod ic measurement o f the s t roke times. provide an acceptable means o f assuring the operat ional readiness of the valves i n considerat ion o f the i m p r a c t i c a l i t y o f meeting the code requirements. Therefore, i n accord w i th 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(6)(i), r e l i e f i s granted based on the impract ica l code requirements. The burden on the l icensee i f the code requirements were imposed has been considered i n the s t a f f ’ s eval u a t i on.

The a l t e r n a t i v e w i l l


8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

8.3 Onsite Electric Power System

8.3.1 Onsite AC Power System Compliance W i t h GDC 17

8.3.1.2 Low and/or Degraded Gri d Vol tage Condi t i on

In SSER 13, the s t a f f stated that Confirmatory Issue 28 was resolved on the basi s of a preoperational t e s t documented i n Inspecti on Report 50-390/84-90, dated February 11, 1985. However, the s t a f f stated that the resul ts obtained from tha t t e s t were no longer valid since TVA was reperforming the preoperational tests.

The preoperational t e s t was conducted by TVA and reviewed by the s ta f f i n Inspection Reports 50-390/95-22 (September 8, 1995) and 50-390/95-77 (December 6, 1995). Confirmatory Issue 28.

T h i s update does not change the s t a f f ' s conclusion regarding

The s t a f f tracked this e f for t by TAC M94025.

Watts Bar SSER 20 8- 1

11 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

The s t a f f tracked the following review by TACs M84429, M90253, and M91523.

11.5 Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling System

11.5.1 System Description and Revi ew Di scussi on

In SSER 16, Section 11.5.1, the s ta f f stated:

Additionally, the applicant has explained how the radiation monitoring program conforms with the intent o f RG [Regulatory Guide] 4.15, "Qual i ty Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal 0peration)-Effluent Steams and Environment," with respect t o quali ty assurance provisions for the system. the radiation monitoring system for Watts Bar Unit 1 meets the intent and purpose of RG 4.15, with respect t o quali ty assurance provisions for the system.

The s ta f f finds that

In SSER 16, Section 11.5.2, the s t a f f included a paraphrased version of th i s statement. Specifically, the s ta f f stated:

On the basis of i t s review, the s t a f f concludes that the process and ef f l uent radi 01 ogi cal moni tori ng and sampl i ng system for Watts Bar Unit 1 complies with 10 CFR 20.1302 and GDCs [General Design Criteria] 60, 63, and 64. The s ta f f a lso concludes that the system design conforms t o the guidelines of NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan Item II.F.l, Attachments 1 and 2 ) , RGs 1.21 and 4.15, and applicable guidelines of RG 1.97 (Rev. 2). acceptance c r i t e r i a of SRP [Standard Review Plan] Section 11.5 and i s , therefore, acceptable.

Thus , the system meets the

I t i s c lear from the f i r s t quote (above) t h a t the licensee i s n o t formally committed t o RG 4.15. Analysis Report (FSAR), the s ta f f finds that the licensee i s no t formally committed t o ANSI Standards N13.1-1969 and N13.10-1974, which are standards referenced in RG 4.15. In i t s July 21, 1995, submittal (referenced on page 11-1 of SSER 16), the licensee stated that Watts Bar i s not committed t o RG 4.15, Revi s i on 1 and tha t , however, the radiation monitoring system general ly agrees with and sa t i s f i e s the intent of the RG 4.15 except for specif ic cal i bration techniques and frequencies. The s ta f f has veri f i ed that cal i brati on frequencies are i n accordance wi t h the s ta f f I s gui dance contai ned in NUREG-1301 (see Watts Bar Offsi t e Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) , Revi si on 3). Further, the s t a f f has verified t h a t the ODCM has ident i f ied the requirements for (1) reference radi onucl i de standards used for cal i brati on and recalibration of radiation monitors, ( 2 ) periodic grab sampling and analysis for specif ic radionuclides in the samples from applicable release paths t o establ i sh peri odic correl a t i ons between moni tor readings and concentrati ons and/or release rates of radionuclides in the monitored release pa th , and (3) cal i brati on and peri odic recal i brati on of f l ow-rate measuri ng devi ces. Also, the s t a f f notes that FSAR Section 11.4.4 s ta tes that built-in check sources can be remotely actuated. The s ta f f finds these features consistent

Further, on the basis of i t s review of the Final Safety


with the corresponding guidelines of RG 4.15 and NUREG-1301 ("Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent Controls for Pressurized Water Reactors: Generic Letter 89-01," April 1991).

Regarding the licensee's calibration technique for the radiation monitors, the staff recognizes that the technique deviates from the guidance provided in ANSI Standard N13.10-1974, "Specification and Performance of On-Site Instrumentation for Continuously Monitoring Radioactivity in Effluents" referenced in RG 4.15. This is because the licensee conducted primary detector calibrations for Watts Bar effluent radiation monitors at an approved vendor's facility instead of in-place as recommended in the standard. inspectors concluded (Inspection Report 50-390, 391/95-65 dated December 8, 1995, on special preoperational inspection of radiation monitoring) that the calibration of the radiation monitors as conducted by the licensee was acceptable. The inspectors stated that:

Primary detector calibrations originally were conducted at an approved vendor's facility. From review of vendor manuals, the inspector determined that the primary calibrations for the liquid and airborne PIG [particulate, iodine and gas] detectors were conducted using either the installed or identical prototypes of detectors, sample chambers and associated electronics, thereby maintaining appropriate sample geometry and system operation characteristics .... No violations or deviations were identified.

NRC

The inspectors further determined that the guidance provided in the applicable design and technical basis documents (listed in the inspection report) generally followed the criteria documented in ANSI Standard N13.1-1969, "Guide to Sampling Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities'' and ANSI Standard N13.10-1974. For these reasons, the staff finds the licensee's calibration technique acceptable.

Additionally, in its July 21, 1995, submittal, the licensee elaborated how the radiation monitoring program meets the intent of RG 4.15. Specifically, the licensee stated that radiological monitoring is controlled in accordance with established site procedures and instructions and is implemented by personnel qualified to perform the required functions. process controls, including laboratory analysis and techniques, materials control, sampling methodology, performance monitoring and corrective actions, are implemented within program requirements. FSAR Section 11.4.4 references the ODCM for Watts Bar and maintenance instructions for information on response checks, calibration checks, and electronic calibration.

The 1 icensee further stated that

On the basis of the preceding discussion, the staff reiterates its earlier finding stated in SSER 16, Section 11.5.1, namely, that the radiation monitoring system for Watts Bar Unit 1 meets the intent and purpose of RG 4.15, with respect to quality assurance provisions for the system.

11.5.2 Conclusion

In SSER 16 the staff concluded that the process and effluent radiological monitoring and sampling system design for Watts Bar Unit 1 conforms with the guidelines of RG 4.15. 11.5.1, the staff revises the second sentence in SSER 16 to read:

On the basis of the preceding discussion in Section


1

The s t a f f a lso concludes t h a t the system design conforms t o the gu ide l ines o f NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan I I .F .1 , Attachments 1 and 2);RG 1.21, and applicable guidel ines o f RG 1.97 (Revision 2 ) . The s t a f f f u r t h e r concludes t h a t the system design meets the i n t e n t and purpose o f RG 4.15.

The s t a f f ' s o ther conclusions given i n SSER 16, Section 11.5.2, continue t o be v a l i d .


13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

13.3 Emergency Preparedness

13.3.1 In t roduc t i on

I n SSER 13, the s t a f f evaluated Watts Bar's ons i te emergency preparedness. O f f s i t e emergency preparedness was then pending eval u a t i on by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) . Emergency Plan (REP), which i s Appendix C t o the Tennessee Val ley Au tho r i t y (TVA) REP, was discussed i n Section 13.3.2 o f SSER 13 and i s discussed i n t h i s SSER. O f f s i t e plans are discussed i n Section 13.3.2.17, and inc lude the State o f Tennessee Mu1 t i - J u r i sdi c t i onal Radi o l ogi cal Emergency Response P1 an (RERP) . The f i nd ings and determination o f FEMA are a lso presented i n Section 13.3.2.17.

The Watts Bar Nuclear P1 an t Radi o l ogi ca l

The descr i p t i on o f responsi b i 1 i ti es and capabi 1 i t i e s o f the onsi t e emergency response organizat ion were evaluated i n SSER 13. The l icensee has def ined a plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) t h a t i s about 10 mi les i n radius. The actual boundaries o f the zone have been determined t o take i n t o account l o c a l condi t ions, p r i m a r i l y the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l boundaries o f those communities t h a t are w i t h i n about 10 mi les o f the Watts Bar s i t e .

The plume EPZ l i e s e n t i r e l y w i t h i n the State o f Tennessee. f o r Tennessee and the l o c a l governments (McMinn, Meigs, and Rhea counties) w i t h i n the State o f Tennessee and the plume exposure EPZ are contained i n the State o f Tennessee Mu1 t i - J u r i sdi c t i onal RERP. The i ngest i on exposure pathway EPZ i s about 50 mi les i n rad ius and includes the State o f Tennessee and po r t i ons o f the States o f Georgia and North Carolina.

Emergency plans

13.3.2 The Emergency Plan

The s t a f f has reviewed the Watts Bar Nuclear P lant ons i te REP (Appendix C t o the TVA REP), through Revision 9 (dated November 11, 1995) and the TVA REP, through Revis ion 26 (dated December 4, 1995). The r e s u l t s o f e a r l i e r s t a f f reviews o f t he adequacy o f ons i te emergency preparedness are documented i n Section 13.3 o f the SER and SSER 13.

The Watts Bar p u b l i c a l e r t and n o t i f i c a t i o n system i s described i n the Watts Bar o n s i t e REP (a d e t a i l e d desc r ip t i on o f the pub l i c a l e r t and n o t i f i c a t i o n system i s given i n the "Evaluation and Analysis o f the A l e r t and N o t i f i c a t i o n System, FEMA-REP-10 Design Report," f o r Watts Bar, which was submitted t o FEMA for review on A p r i l 26, 1993). Primary p u b l i c a l e r t i n g w i t h i n the plume exposure EPZ w i 11 be accompl i shed through the a c t i v a t i on o f po l e-mounted s i rens and tone a l e r t radios. by the s t a f f and found t o be adequate i n SSER 13. reviewed by FEMA and i s discussed i n Section 13.3.2.17 (new sect ion added i n t h i s SSER) below.

The ons i te p o r t i o n o f t h i s system was reviewed The o f f s i t e p o r t i o n was

Over the course o f t he l i c e n s i n g process, the s t a f f conducted and documented 12 inspect ions i n v o l v i n g the evaluat ion o f the onsi t e emergency preparedness, i n c l u d i n g three emergency preparedness exercise evaluations. The s t a f f ' s


assessment included a 2-week onsi te emergency preparedness apprai sal conducted March 27-April 6, 1984, with followup appraisals in September and December 1984, March 1985, March 1993, and January-March 1994. These team inspections provided an in-depth evaluation of the licensee's emergency preparedness program and form the bases for part of the staff's routine emergency preparedness inspection program following authorization for full- power operation.

The staff observed and evaluated the onsite emergency response organization during the conduct of emergency preparedness exercises on November 15, 1995, October 26, 1994, and October 6, 1993. The results of these observations are documented in inspection reports. Results of the staff's evaluation of the most recent exercise are documented in Inspection Report 50-390/95-78. In that report, the staff concluded that the licensee's performance during the exercise demonstrated the ability to implement the plan and procedures in a manner that would provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety would be protected.

On the basis of its previous conclusions (as documented in SSER 13) and its continued technical review, inspections, and exercise evaluations, the staff finds that the Watts Bar onsite REP complies with NRC requirements and is acceptable for a full-power operating license.

13.3.2.17 Evaluation o f Offsite Emergency Preparedness

The staff ' s evaluation of offsi te emergency preparedness in this supplement is based primarily on FEMA's findings of adequacy, as reported by FEMA to the NRC. FEMA provided i ts findings and determi nati ons regarding offsi te emergency preparedness for in a report dated December 15, 1995. This supplement provides the staff ' s conclusions on offsi te emergency preparedness, following the staff's review of FEMA's findings and determination in regard to State and 1 oca1 government emergency response plans and preparedness.

The licensee has submitted offsite plans for the State of Tennessee. In accordance wi th the NRC/FEMA Memorandum of Understanding (58 FR 47996), the staff gave these plans to FEMA for FEMA's review and determination about offsite emergency preparedness. offsite plans, FEMA used the evaluation criteria and standards of NUREG- 0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revi si on 1, "Cri teri a for Preparation and Eva1 uati on of Radi ol ogi cal Emergency Response P1 ans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980.

For its review and evaluation of these

The licensee submitted the "Evaluation and Analysis of the Alert and Notification System, FEMA REP-10 Report," for Watts Bar to FEMA for review on April 26, 1993. On December 15, 1995, as part of the interim findings and determi nati on, FEMA provided a report enti tl ed, "Watts Bar Nucl ear P1 ant Si te- Speci fi c Offsi te Radi 01 ogi cal Emergency Preparedness A1 ert and Noti fi cati on System Quality Assurance Verification,'' final report dated November 30, 1995, which summarizes the engi neeri ng design revi ew; i ncorporates the resul ts of the pub1 i c tel ephone survey conducted immediately fol 1 owing full acti vati on of the alert and notification system on May 5, 1994; and confirms the adequacy of the appl i cab1 e eval uati on cri teri a from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Revi si on 1, and FEMA-REP-10.


On April 22, 1993, FEMA asked the staff to analyze the evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for Watts Bar and provide FEMA with a determination on the adequacy of the ETE against the criteria contained in Appendix 4 of NUREG- 0654/FEMA-REP-l, Revision 1. On February 1, 1995 (letter, R. L . Spessard to D. H. Kwaitkowski of FEMA), the staff concluded that the revised report "Evacuation Time Estimates Within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone" (Annex H to the State of Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional RERP) for Watts Bar, dated March 3, 1994, is consistent with the guidance of NUREG- 0654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev. 1, and determined that the Watts Bar ETE is adequate.

As part o f the interim finding process, FEMA headquarters and Region IV staff, and the Regional Assistance Committee completed plan reviews on June 10-11, 1993, August 15, 1994, and June 27, 1995. The State of Tennessee Multi- Jurisdictional RERP includes plans for each of the three local governments within the Watts Bar EPZ. capability for a rapid and coordinated response to nuclear power plant emergencies in the State of Tennessee. Two qualifying exercises were also evaluated. The first exercise was conducted on October 6-7, 1993, with a remedial drill, demonstrating the correction of an identified deficiency, conducted on November 15, 1993, and findings submitted to the NRC on May 22, 1995. The second qualifying exercise was conducted on November 15, 1995. No deficiencies were noted.

This RERP is intended to provide the State with the

FEMA interim findings and determinations were submitted to the NRC on December 15, 1995. In that report, FEMA stated that there is reasonable assurance that the State of Tennessee and local radiological emergency response plans site specific to Watts Bar can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off site to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at Watts Bar.

On the basis of its review of FEMA's findings and determination as summarized above, the staff concludes that the State of Tennessee plans and preparedness provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, and the State of Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional RERP is acceptable for full -power operati on of Watts Bar.

13.3.3 Concl us ion

On the basis of its review of the Watts Bar onsite REP and the TVA REP for conformance with the criteria in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Revision 1; the results of onsite inspections; and its evaluation of the performance of the onsite emergency response organization in implementing the plans during exercises, the staff concludes the TVA REP and the Watts Bar onsite REP provide an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness and meet the requirements o f 10 CFR 50.47, including the 16 planning standards for onsite emergency plans, and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, and Appendix E thereto.

FEMA has provided its findings and determinations on the adequacy of offsite emergency planning and preparedness, based on its plan reviews, exercise observations, and analyses. On the basis of the staff's review of these findings, the staff concludes that the Watts Bar offsite emergency plans provide an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of offsite


emergency preparedness and meet the requirements o f 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E thereto.

The staff concludes that the overall state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that , pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(a) , adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event o f a radiological emergency at Watts Bar and, therefore, emergency preparedness at Watts Bar is adequate to support full-power operations. The staff bases its conclusions on its assessment of the adequacy and implementability of the onsite plan and on its review of the FEMA findings and determinations regarding the adequacy and implementability o f the State and local offsite plans. The staff’s assessment included (1) NRC and FEMA reviews of emergency plans, (2) NRC and FEMA evaluations of emergency preparedness exercises, and (3) NRC onsite inspections of the applicant’s emergency preparedness program.

The staff tracked this effort by TAC M89154.

13.6 Physical Security Plan

13.6.9 Land Vehicle Bomb Control Program

The staff has evaluated the licensee’s vehicle bomb control program in SSER 15. The staff will require implementation of 10 CFR 73.55(~)(7) and (8), the surface vehicle bomb rule, by February 17, 1996. In addition, the staff will add a license condition that during implementation of the approved power ascension phase of the initial program, TVA shall not exceed 50% power until the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(~)(7) and (8) have been fully implemented.

This review was tracked by TAC M90696.


19 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

I n SSER 1, SSER 4, and SSER 14, the s t a f f addressed the concerns r a i s e d by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) i n i t s l e t t e r r e p o r t o f August 16, 1982, which was published as Appendix F t o SSER 1. meeting o f the ACRS (November 2-4, 1995), i t r e v i s i t e d TVA's a p p l i c a t i o n f o r an operat ing l icense. On November 1, 1995, the ACRS Subcommittee on Watts Bar discussed the same subject.

During the 426th

By l e t t e r dated November 8, 1995, the ACRS t ransmi t ted t o NRC Chairman S h i r l e y Jackson i t s review r e s u l t s o f the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, U n i t 1, a p p l i c a t i o n f o r an operat ing l icense. The November 8, 1995, l e t t e r , reproduced here as Appendix F t o t h i s supplement, updates the previous ACRS l e t t e r r e p o r t dated August 16, 1982.

I n the subject l e t t e r , the ACRS s tates t h a t there i s reasonable assurance t h a t Watts Bar Nuclear P lant Unit 1 can be operated a t core power l e v e l s up t o 3411 MWt w i thout undue r i s k t o the heal th and safety o f the publ ic , subject t o r e s o l u t i o n o f two f i r e p ro tec t i on issues. These are concerned w i t h f i r e b a r r i e r penetrat ion seals and emergency l i g h t i n g i n s i d e the reac to r bu i l d ing . These two open issues were acceptably resolved and documented i n Appendix FF t o SSER 19.


APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW OF WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW

Most o f the f o l l o w i n g documents are referenced i n t h i s SSER. t h i s an exhaustive l i s t o f a l l correspondence exchanged between the s t a f f and the app l i can t dur ing t h i s period. The reader may obta in an exhaustive l i s t through the NRC document con t ro l system (NUDOCS), the Publ ic Document Room, o r the l o c a l Pub l i c Document Room.

I n no way i s

NRC L e t t e r s and Summaries

November 7, 1995

November 8, 1995

November 8, 1995

November 8, 1995

November 9, 1995

November, 9, 1995

November 28, 1995

TVA L e t t e r s

November 6, 1995

Watts Bar SSER 20

Let ter , P. S. Tam t o TVA, adv is ing t h a t t he October 23, 1995, l e t t e r regarding act ions undertaken by TVA as a r e s u l t o f Department o f Labor case 95-ERA-20 w i l l n o t be wi thheld from the p u b l i c i f TVA cannot f u r n i s h addi t i onal j u s t i f i c a t i on.

Let ter , R. P. Zimmerman t o TVA, in forming t h a t u t i l i t y act ions i n response t o admin i s t ra t i ve law judge's decis ion i s s u f f i c i e n t t o a l low the s t a f f t o proceed w i t h l icens ing.

Let ter , J. P. Jaudon t o TVA, summarizing November 6, 1995, management meeting regarding readiness o f Watts Bar, U n i t 1 f o r operat ing l icense.

Let ter , T. S. Kress (Advisory Committee f o r Reactor Safeguards, ACRS) t o NRC Chai rman Shi rl ey Jackson, f i n d i n g reasonable assurance t h a t Watts Bar U n i t 1 can be operated a t f u l l power wi thout undue r i s k t o the heal th and safety o f the pub1 i c .

Let ter , S. A. Varga t o TVA, t r a n s m i t t i n g low-power operat ing l icense NPF-20 f o r Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, U n i t 1.

Let ter , P. S. Tam t o TVA, t r a n s m i t t i n g sa fe ty eval u a t i on regarding r e v i sed core operat i ng 1 i m i t s r e p o r t f o r Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, U n i t 1.

Let ter , J. M. Taylor t o T. S. Kress (ACRS), in forming t h a t two open issues mentioned i n the ACRS's November 8, 1995, l e t t e r have been resolved i n SSER 19.

Let ter , P. P. Car ier t o NRC, n o t i f y i n g t h a t TVA decided t o use modif ied procedures t o s a t i s f y ob ject ives o f sei smi c p o r t i o n o f i ndi v i dual pl ant examination.

1 Appendix A

November 7, 1995

November 9, 1995

November 9, 1995

November 20, 1995

December 15, 1995

February 3, 1996

Watts Bar SSER 20

Letter, P. P. Carier to NRC, providing TVA response to Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1 , "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity. 'I

Letter, R. R. Baron to NRC, submitting emergency response data system implementation plan attribute list and data point library.

Letter, R. R. Baron to NRC, submitting information required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section VI, regarding emergency response data system.

Letter, R. R. Baron to NRC, submitting additional information on inservice testing of pumps and valves.

Letter, K. C. Goss of Federal Emergency Management Agency to 0. Crutchfield of NRC, stating that all open issues regarding offsite emergency preparedness are closed.

Letter, J . A. Scalice to NRC, submitting additional information on radiation monitors and the vehicle bomb control program.

2 Appendix A

APPENDIX E

P R I NC I PAL CONTR I BUTORS

NRC Watts Bar Pro jec t S t a f f

Peter S. Tam, Senior Pro jec t Manager Michael Bugg, P ro jec t Engineer ( In tern) Beverly A. Clayton, Licensing Ass is tant Ray1 eona Sanders, Technical Edi t o r

NRC Techni ca l Reviewers

P a t r i c i a Campbell, Mechanical Engineering Branch, NRR Thyagaraja Chandrasekaran, P lant Systems Branch, NRR Edwi n F. Fox, Jr., Emergency Preparedness and Radiat ion P ro tec t i on Branch, NRR Wi l l iam T. LeFave, P lan t Systems Branch, NRR

Watts Bar SSER 20 1 Appendix E

APPENDIX F*

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

* Supplement F f i r s t appeared i n SSER 1. It i s updated i n SSER 20.

Watts Bar SSER 20

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

November 8, 1995

The Honorable Shirley Ann Jackson Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jackson:

SUBJECT: APPLICATION FOR OPERATING LICENSE FOR WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1

During the 426th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, November 2-4, 1995, we reviewed the application of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a license to operate the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1. The Watts Bar Subcommittee also discussed this matter at a meeting on November 1, 1995, During the meetings, we had the benefit of discussions with representatives of the NRC staff and the TVA staff, and several members of the public. We also had the benefit of the documents referenced. Several ACRS members visited the site on October 3, 1995, The Committee previously reported on the TVA application on August 16, 1982.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 is located in eastern Tennessee. The unit employs a Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system with a rated core power level of 34x1 MWt and has an ice-condenser containment. The design is similar to that of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, which received their operating licenses in September 1980 and September 1981, respectively.

In its August 16, 1982 report, the Committee concluded that the Watts Bar units could be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public subject to the satisfactory completion of construction, staffing, and preoperational testing, as well as to the resolution of the following concerns: a serious quality assurance breakdown, flow-induced vibration in the steam generators, the integrity of the cement lining of the essential raw cooling water system piping, and the acceptability of the hydrogen control system.

There has been a long history of construction quality problems leading to a number of work stoppages at Watts Bar. With the restart of construction in December 1991, TVA's corrective actions have resulted in improvements in its quality assurance program. The staff has concluded that current performance indicates that T V A

Watts Bar SSER 20 1 Appendix F

- 2 -

has overcome significant weaknesses identified in the past and that TVA's recent performance is satisfactory. Plant construction is now essentially complete and TVA has conducted a successful hot functional test.

We discussed the status of the concerns noted above during our 415th meeting of November 3-4, 1994, and our 426th meeting of November 2-4, 1995. We believe that TVA and the staff have adequately addressed these concerns. During our discussions, the Watts Bar management expressed its commitment to operational excellence and to establishing an effective safety culture. It is our view that TVA's commitment is genuine, but that achieving and maintaining an effective safety culture will require continued senior management involvement.

The NRC staff stated, in Supplement 18 to the Watts Bar Safety Evaluation Report, that all licensing issues have been resolved with the exception of those related to fire barrier penetration seals and emergency lighting inside the reactor building. As a result of our review, we have not identified any new safety concerns.

We believe that, subject to resolution of the open issues to the satisfaction of the staff, there is reasonable assurance that Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 can be operated at core power levels up to 3411 MWt without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely,

T. S. Kress Chairman

References: 1.

2.

3 .

4.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0847, "Safety Evaluation Report Relaced to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," through Supplement 18, issued October 1995 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1528, "Reconstitution of the Manual Chapter 2512 Construction Inspection Program for Watts Bar Unit 1," issued September 1995 Letter dated August 16, 1982, from Paul Shewmon, ACRS Chairman, to Nunzio J. Palladino, NRC Chairman, Subject: ACRS Report on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Letter dated October 26, 1995, from Paul Gunter, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, to Noel Dudley, ACRS, Subject: Public Concerns With Fire Protection Issues At Watts Bar Nuclear Power Station


- 3 -

5 . Additional documents submitted to the Committee by members of the public at ACRS meetings November 1-2, 1995


APPENDIX G

ERRATA TO WATTS BAR SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SUPPLEMENT 19

Sect i on

Appendix FF

Appendix FF

Appendix FF

Page

13

Change

Paragraph a t the bottom: references t o IIA4" and "M4" should be deleted. The sentence now reads "Watts Bar penetrat ion seal d e t a i l s H1 and L1 are 3-hour f i r e - rated.. . . .I'

15

24

Paragraph a t bottom o f page: should be 1'8-foot" instead o f "8-inch". The sentence should read "The t e s t assembly consists o f a 8-foot x 13-foot x 12-inch-thick concrete s l ab w i th.. . . I' Sentence t h a t contains the word "foam" i s corrected t o "elastomer" . The sentence now reads "Since the 3-hour ra ted conf igurat ion w i t h 6 inches elastomer was s t r u c t u r a l l y stable.. . . .I'

Appendix FF 27

Watts Bar SSER 20

Several references t o ''foam" are changed t o "elastomer".

1 Appendix G

IRC FORM 335 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 . REPORT NUMBER zag) IRCM 1102. 201,3201 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

lworud bv NRC *dd VOI. b.. b.. *dbndum Nwbm. 11 m y . )

(see inStnrCTlOM on ffw -1 NUREG-0847 !. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Safety Evaluation Report Related t o the Operation o f Supplement No. 20

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 . 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED U3t'Ti' YEAR

February ' 1996 %FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

1. AUTHORIS) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

Peter S . Tam e t a l . Technical

L PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS 111 NRCplr.*d.Okyoll. O f f h ~ r R-, U.S. Nuc*r RO~LWUV &umMm~, m d ~ i l i n p . d d n r ; ~ - ~ - , ~ ~ ~ lW7Uld#7NiU!W.ddnt.J

Division o f Reactor Projects - 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 2,0555-0001

.SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS I I I N R C . ~ ~ T n r r ~ u ' : i f c o n r n c ~ r , p o r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ k ( u a r . o f f b ~ r ~ ~ , u.s ~ w l r r ~ w m ~ , ma--#-

Same as 8. above.

LE E TARYN '&fftte!! \os. 882390 and 50-391 1. ABSTRACT 1100 r ~ r d r 01 *ol

Supplement No. 20 t b the Safety Evaluation Report for the application fi led by the Tennessee Valley Authority for license t o operate Watts Bar Nuclear P l a n t , Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391, located i n Rhea County,Tennessee, has been prepared by the Off ice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation o f the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission, The purpose of this supplement i s t o update the Safety Evaluation w i t h (1) additional information submitted by the applicant since Supplement No. 19 was issued, and (2 ) matters tha t the staff had under review when Supplement No. 19 was issued.

2. KEY WORDS/DESCR!PTORS lL& wordr oronnrr clu I*lllrrhrnrrehrr khwtiw 1IynDM.i

Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Watts Bar Nucl ear P1 a n t Docket Nos. 50-390/50-391

13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Unl i m i ted

"%fI?l ass i f i ed

'?I%?& s s i f i ed

16. PRICE

I

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