rusi essay final

8/3/2019 RUSI Essay Final

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PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA - IS SOMALILAND PART OF THE

SOLUTION?

Somali pirates - the maritime face of the 20 year civil war and a problem as

intractable as Somalia itself.

Popular as this view might be it simply is not correct. Uncomfortably, the Somali

pirate is as much an offspring of the International Community as it is of the clans

and warlords ashore.

Richard Stephens, a former Whitehall strategist, looks at the problem of regional

piracy in the context of the Somali failed-state paradigm. He suggests how a

pragmatic solution, based on the stable Islamic democracy of Somaliland, may both

resolve the problem and create a strategic tache dhuile for broader regional

benefit.

HISTORY

1. As is common with so much of Africa, Somalia is a relatively modern fabrication.

Where there were originally 3 contiguous Somalias, in 1960 British Somalia became

independent and was recognised by 35 countries - 5 days later it merged with Italian

Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia1. After 30 years of Cold War jostling and

enduring an increasingly totalitarian regime led by Mohammed Siad Barre, 1991 saw the

Barre regime ousted and the start of the ongoing Somali civil war.


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2. Highlights of modern history have been no more uplifting. The tsunami of December

2004 devastated much of the Somali fishing fleet and, in a double whammy, washed

toxic waste up onto the beaches revealing that a programme of dumping had been

occurring. In 2005 the recorded incidents of piracy increased; there was a lull in piracy

in 2006 when the Islamic Courts Union were in power but from the Ethiopian invasion of

late 2006 onwards there has been a year on year increase in incidents. 2008 saw an

explosion in piracy with 111 attacks, prompting a call for international assistance from

Somalias beleaguered Transitional Federal Government (TFG). At the end of 2008

warships from NATO, EU and the US led CTF150 were all operational in the region. In

2009 there were more than 300 reported attacks with over 500 mariners taken hostage2.

After a quiet start to 2010 both the tempo and geographical danger template have

enlarged, with vessels being seized up to 1200 miles from Somalia. Sixteen ships and

354 sailors are being held now3.

HOW DID IT COME TO THIS?

3. Simply put: Lack of effective Government + requirement + opportunity = piracy.

4. Lack of effective Government. The lack of an effective Government has been the

root cause of todays piracy problem in Somalia. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon

has stated: Piracy is a symptom of anarchy and insecurity on the ground more

security on the ground will make less piracy on the seas4. It is hard to overplay the

extent of the problem. The 2007 installation of the TFG in part created, and in part

coincided, with conditions which resulted in the worst humanitarian crisis in the

world5. Today the TFG is a Government in name only, effectively confined to a minute

part of Mogadishu and unable even to control the food aid which it receives6.


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5. Furthermore no Government has meant no Coastguard. Primarily this coastguard

would not have been used to deter pirates; its absence actually allowed rapacious

fishing fleets from the East and West to conduct activities described as plundering

Africas longest coastline unlicensed and unchallenged7. It has been called a resource

swap: Somalis get $100m a year in ransoms, Europeans get $300m a year in fish8.

Fuelling further moral outrage and nationalistic justification in the minds of the pirates

has been the use of Somali waters by toxic waste disposal companies who negotiated

with warlords a bargain price of $2.50 a tonne to dispose of their waste, where in

Europe the going rate is $1000/tonne9; following this discovery a UN Environment

Programme (UNEP) survey discovered radiation sickness in coastal villagers10. While the

extent of the damage will probably remain unknown, and acknowledging that the pirates

are eminently capable of exploiting a story to gain the moral high-ground, a functioning

government would have denied these drivers. And be it from ransoms, the sale of

fishing licences or deals to accept pollutants a large amount of hard currency now

circulates in the country; is the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) really focused on

stopping this revenue and flushing out piracy when it barely controls its own real estate

in Mogadishu?

6. + Requirement. The Somali people face extreme poverty following 2 decades of

civil war and invasion and in 2010 Somalia is again at the top of the foreign Policy Failed

States Index11. Maslow tells us that it is a short journey from being a human at the top

self-actualisation level to one reduced to pure physiological drivers; the coastal villagers

of Somalia had a significant head start in that journey and for them there was - and is -

a very real requirement to provide for themselves and their family by whatever means

are available.


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7. + Opportunity. Faced with the the requirement to provide Maslows basic human

needs, it turned out that there were some significant opportunities available to those

bold or desperate enough to grasp them. With no government interference ashore or

afloat, a broad base of popular support, ingrained military expertise, long sandy

beaches, a population in dire need, a bedrock of nautical proficiency, being denied the

traditional income stream of fishing, feeling justifiably aggrieved about having radiation

sickness visited on them and one of the most important international strategic choke

points just off the coast12, it is perhaps no surprise that we have the pirate issue that

we have today.

8. = Piracy. Article 101 of 1982 UNCLOS defines piracy in international law; a useful

paraphrasing of it is provided by Bjorn Moller who suggests that piracy can be defined as

armed robbery at sea by private actors acting for selfish purposes, especially economic

gain13. What we witness in Somalia falls into that definition but Somali pirates display

some unique traits.

9. The modus operandi of the Somali pirate has been mapped with some detail1415 -

they are very good at what they do. Elsewhere in the world attacks are generally

against ships at anchor and the use of firearms is not pervasive; attacking ships

underway, the use of mother ships, the prevalence of sophisticated weaponry yet the

restraint in its use are unique to this area. This professionalism of the piracy is the

reason that the business model is functioning so well; shipping companies are broadly

happy to pay ransoms, prosaically viewing them as a nuisance tax as they are less than

the cost of the vessel and her cargo, are incurred only very infrequently and once paid

crew are returned unharmed. This is a micro-economic engine which engages hundreds

of people16, is acceptable to its prey, is small enough that it does not attract the big

international criminal syndicates and non-lethal enough that it allows governments the


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do little option, yet is sufficiently lucrative that it makes a huge difference to the

local economy. There are no political demands and ships are not being reflagged; the

Somali pirates are indeed well adapted parasites on global shipping17. In addition to

the refined MO and prudent professionalism on display the other characteristic of the

Somali pirate is their self-branding as nationalist freedom fighters or, in Hobsbawns

term, social bandits1819.

10. The link between Somali pirate and Islamic terrorist is one which engages some

commentators but is difficult to establish. They are certainly not Al Shabaabs Sea

Tigers; indeed there are reports of angry Islamists trying to find and release the Saudi

Arabian MV SYRIUS STAR when it was hijacked in November 2008 and that piracy would

be eradicates under Sharia law. But it is true that the two orbits do overlap - reducing

piracy may not stop the war but it would reduce the amount of cash available for arms

procurement20.

SO WHAT HAS BEEN DONE?

11. 2008 was the year of Somali piracy and the International Community responded in

some depth. In addition to a raft of UN Security Council Resolutions navies answered

the clarion call with NATO, EU, USA, Russia, India, China, Malaysia, Iran and many other

nations becoming involved to protect their trade also.

12. The UN has launched a number of initiatives. In addition to the diplomatically

focused Contact Group on Piracy off Somalia the International Maritime Organisation

(IMO) is running an anti-piracy programme, seeking to replicate the success that was

achieved in the Malacca Straits21 As of April 2010 the UN has funded 5 local projects to

mentor prosecutors and police, build and renovate prisons, review domestic laws on

piracy, increase the capacity of local courts and to develop local media and these are


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happening in Somaliland, Puntland and the Seychelles22. Furthermore the UN Office of

Drugs and Criminality (UNODC) has sponsored facilities in Mombasa to deal with the

problem. The court at Shimo la Tewa23 is starting with the 100+ pirate suspects already

being held in Kenya although it is not an international court and Kenya has said that it

will not accept any more prisoners. This is not an enduring solution but a workable stop-

gap.

13. The private sector has taken an interest but has been broadly unsuccessful to date.

From the unfulfilled Secopex contract to Topcat (blocked by the US Department of

State) to SOMCAN (employees jailed for piracy) to Hart Security (authorities unable to

honour the contract), history shows that Private MIlitary Contractors (PMC) will need a

deft touch to be successful.

TOO MUCH LAW, NOT ENOUGH JUSTICE ...

14. International law is unequivocal in describing pirates, naming them hostis humani

generis or common enemies of mankind24. But what is the relevant international law?

15. Maritime law is based on customary international law and the most widely applied

regime is that of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). This confers on all

states a duty for the apprehension of pirates in a criminal context, rather than a military

one. Under UNCLOS only warships or other vessels clearly marked and identifiable as

being on Government service are allowed to intervene. UNCLOS III also delineates

territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZ).

16. Where the UN security council feels that additional provision is necessary for

maintaining international peace and security it issues a Security Council Resolution

(UNSCR). A UNSCR confers legitimacy and, following a plea for help from the TFG in

2008 there are 4 UNSCRs which relate to the situation in Somalia (1816, 1838, 1846 and


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1851, all of 2008) and UNSCR 1918 of 2010 which seeks to criminalise piracy in national

law (and suggests the formation of a regional or international tribunal to prosecute

suspected pirates).

17. This all appears to be not only clear but a potent blend of comprehensive,

internationally endorsed powers. But of course nothing is that simple. The application

of law in respect to piracy is complex, national laws complicate further, adding intricacy

is the nationality of the crew, the flag of the ship in question, the flag of the intervening

ship and where the incident takes place relative to international or territorial waters.

18. Some of the confusion stems from the UNSCRs themselves and has been

compounded by the tardiness of Western nations to amend their relevant legislation25.

When pirates are captured and delivered to the courts for justice a new raft of issues

arise, for example under Kenyan law all parties must be present in person for a trial - a

huge logistic exercise and an expensive one if ships masters are to be present26. If the

trial is in Europe there is the likelihood that suspects will be granted asylum, if not in

Europe delivering nations must be assured that receiving facilities match international

human rights norms.

19. The net result is confusion and an emasculated and ineffective system.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

20. Piracy can be addressed through discouraging it in the first place (by skewing the

risk:gain equation), by deterring it in the course of its execution, by defeating those

pirates still willing to undertake their missions and by then delivering the prisoners

through the criminal justice system.


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21. Shipping companies favour the do nothing approach due to the slim odds of having

to pay out but this is unacceptable for most governments, especially given the risks of

disruption of trade, increase in oil prices or environmental catastrophe. Refusing to pay

ransoms is similarly unacceptable for fear of crews being murdered and ships sold as

ghost hulls. Convoys (and use of the Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden)

only work if they are escorted and run frequently enough to make commercial sense, but

having a larger naval presence would be prohibitively expensive and frankly overkill for

the threat27. Pirates could be paid off with a transit tax - businesslike but unsavoury28 -

and there has been talk of a UN/AU funded coastguard which would be of terrific use if

trained and based securely.

SOMALILAND - THE STRATEGIC TACHE DHUILE

22. ...that with the pacification there flowed forward, like a pool of oil, a great belt

of civilization29. Perhaps it is time to pursue an alternative approach to that which has

been unsuccessful for 20 years. Perhaps it is time to invest in Somaliland as the regional

focus for an anti-piracy strategy and, in so doing, expand and capitalise on a country

with a history of success within a tortured region.

23. Any future strategy must have a firm base, somewhere which can actually facilitate

the discourage, deter, defeat and deliver functions. Somalia is out and Puntland too

permeated by the pirates themselves. Somaliland stands out as the location of choice,

not just due to its stability but because it provides a working model of how bottom-up

approaches and harnessing traditional codes such as Xeer30 can actually be made to

work.

24. Some of the regional history now requires fleshing out. At the fall of the Barre

regime and the onset of civil war in 1991 Somaliland declared independence. A


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referendum of 2001 approved a constitution and reaffirmed the sentiment, first raised

40 years earlier, of independence from the Republic of Somalia. Fair democratic

elections were held in 2003 and again in 2010. Here then is a stable, democratic Moslem

country in the midst of chaos, building free market institutions, protective of womens

rights and willing to engage with the West yet it remains unrecognised by any other

nation. Somalilands international status needs to be addressed and options are to grant

full recognition as an independent country or to facilitate a devolved status as an

interim measure.

25. Recognition. So why has Somalia not been recognised31? The principal fear is of

establishing a precedent on the continent and of contravening to the AU Charter. It is

largely for this reason of precedence that no-one wants to be the first to recognise

Somaliland - what then, the argument goes, of Transnistria? Of Palestine? Few of the

large international actors want to recognise breakaway states. There is a fear that

recognising Somaliland would somehow destabilise Somalia further (rather than

removing a third of the problem?), it is cited that Somaliland is poor and therefore not

viable, and that the clan flavoured democracy in the North is not representative. The

TFG does not have the capacity to engage in the process, is another argument, as is the

failure by Somaliland to take an active role to ameliorate the problems in the south. It

has a meagre annual budget of $30m which compares poorly to the further $213m that

donors pledged to the TFG in 200932.

26. Factors supporting an independent Somaliland are more compelling. An AU fact-

finding mission itself declared that Somalilands status was unique and self-justified in

African political history and that the case should not be linked to the nation of opening

a Pandoras box33. And in reality the international community is happy to recognise

states if their is sufficient motivation - Taiwan, with its burgeoning economy, is a case in


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point. The Somalilanders would say that the Somali state is itself an invention of 1960

and they have consistently sought to remove themselves from it for the last 39 years.

They can cite a number of other countries who have resolved similar situations - the

Baltic states and independent countries within the former Yugoslavia, for example.

Economic viability is not a pre-requisite of independence (see neighbouring Djibouti) and

whatever the nuances of the democracy that Somaliland enjoys, it has proven to be

durable and effective34. Also in anti-piracy terms, Moslem leaderships in the Somali

peninsular actually have a good track record.

27. Legal. Once recognised, Somaliland can adjust its legal system to one which

facilitates proceedings without compromising legality35 and would present the ideal

solution to trying and incarcerating pirates at source. If Somaliland were able to amend

its criminal code to enable it to prosecute under universal jurisdiction that would be an

enormous stride forward, as would efficient courts. The UNODC is already engaged in

reviewing regional legislation and judicial capacity and any future initiatives to creat

the the international tribunal suggested in UNSCR 1918 should be based in Somaliland.

As a recognised country Somaliland would be able to ratify UNCLOS and the SUA in its

own right and claim an EEZ, fundamental to generating an income stream and offering

alternative employment opportunities - fishermen off Kenya are currently enjoying

record catches and staggeringly earning 50 times the daily average wages a result of

pirates deterring the industrial fishing fleets36.

28. A functioning coastguard able to protect an EEZ and the Somali fishing grounds are

therefore an essential part of the solution. A sufficiently large coastguard would also be

able to act as legitimate convoy guards, facilitating convoys as frequently as demand

dictated and this is where the UN/AU funded coastguard aspiration could be

appropriate. Perhaps more realistically (and effectively?) there is also a proposal from


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insurance firms to fund the worlds first private navy to deal with the problem and this

too is worthy of deep consideration37. Somalilands geographical location makes it

ideally placed to host multi-agency, civil/military, commercial/3rd sector command,

control and coordination functions, preferably without replicating those which exist in

Northwood UK or in Djibouti. This node could have a broader focus than piracy alone

and could contribute to maritime domain awareness of those vessels entering or leaving

the Red Sea38.

29. From an enhanced coastguard to a smoothly functioning court and penal system to

waterfront logistics to command centres and large airheads, this model requires a great

deal of infrastructure and creating this infrastructure could bring wholesale employment

and a knowledge/skills dividend to Somaliland. Lightly funded UNODC projects ($2.1m

currently) are addressing some of these areas already39. And having built the various

facilities they will require guarding and manning and maintaining and expanding - yet

more employment and investment. How to fund it all? If only a small proportion of the

monies which are currently poured into Somalia were diverted to Somaliland the

difference would be significant - spending money is Somalia at current rates is

acceptable only as there is no alternative. Those with a vested interest in safe passage

may even be inclined to consider a short term investment in the form of the transit tax

mentioned above, which could be simply a peace dividend coming from reduced

insurance premiums.

30. Following the seizure of the Egyptian BLUE STAR in 2009 and the MV SYRIUS STAR

the Arab League has taken an interest in the situation and a regional and culturally

attuned response is eminently sensible and could very well be a central part of a future

solution. There is also an extensive role for PMCs and other expert contractors in

training and mentoring the range of skills and capabilities which will be required40. Well


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placed PMCs have current knowledge and expert ground truth also, and should be used

for this. The IMO does not sanction armed guards onboard merchant vessels and using

private gunboats similarly presents problems as they could themselves be viewed as

pirates. However accredited companies, working within some form of respected

international oversight mechanism, could very well take the strain from top end naval

capabilities and this is an area which could prove to be immensely beneficial to any

nascent anti-piracy capability.

CONCLUSION

31. Something has to be done to address piracy off the Horn of Africa and reinforcing

failure in Somalia is patently not the answer; the international community simply cannot

afford it any longer, either fiscally or morally. A targeted effort in a stable part of the

troubled territory will be more effective than a dilute effort across a wider region,

consequently it is time for Somaliland to be recognised, if not as fully independent then

as a devolved government. With that recognition development effort and anti-piracy

strategies can be driven forward. It is wholly credible to picture Somaliland as a

successful and energetic nation-state, bustling with industry and enjoying its strategic

position at the entrance to the Red Sea. It is down to the international community to

allow it to happen.


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1 Namely British Somalia (now Somaliland), French Somalia (now Djibouti) and Italian Somalia (nowSomalia).

2 That is attacks which were reported as many are not. There is a widespread under-reporting of incidentsdue to costs incurred in investigating the report and the low probability of a result. DIIS Report Piracy,

Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy, Bjorn Moller 2009-02.

3Insurance firms plan private navy to take on Somali pirates, Independent World, 28 September 2010.

4 UNSG Ban Ki Moon to the UN Security Council, December 2008.

5 At the end of August/early September 2010, 250 were killed and 400 injured in Mogadishu and 66 000 havefled the capital in 2010. AllAfrica.com 9 September 2009, Somalia: Civilian Deaths at Alarming Levels.

6 A UN report observes that half of the food aid which reaches Somalia is nefariously misappropriated beforereaching those who need it. AllAfrica.com 8 October 2010, East Africa: Grabbing the Bull by the Tail -Mauritius and Piracy.

7 BBC Our World - The Pirates of Somalia, part 1 , July 29 2010.

8 $168-180m+ since 2008. Quote from Peter Lehr, University of St Andrews.

9 The European Green party found evidence of the Italian Swiss Achair Partners and the italian wastebroker Progresso dealing with the warlords in power to accept 10m tonnes of toxic waste for $80m. Thepirates responsible for the hijacking of the MV FAINA stated that the monies obtained would go towardscleaning up the toxic waste in their home waters. Wikipedia, Piracy in Somalia.

10Somalia's secret dumps of toxic waste washed ashore by tsunami, Jonathan Clayton, The Times 4 March2005.

11 In perspective the overall Somali budget is less than what nearby Uganda spends on its primary school

teachers alone and the cost of operating the warships to deter pirates is 6 times more than that budget and10 times more than the annual ransoms that the pirates harvest. AllAfrica.com 8 October 2010, East Africa:Grabbing the Bull by the Tail - Mauritius and Piracy.

12 Shipping through the region accounts for half the worlds container volume and approximately 30% ofEuropes oil and 7% of the worlds oil. Annually there are up to 30 000 ship movements through the Gulf ofAden and Bab Al Mandab straits, which is a lane of true strategic importance carrying 8% of the worldstrade. Over 80% of the trade through the region is with Europe.

13 DIIS Report Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy, Bjorn Moller 2009-02.

14 UN Dispatch The Somali Pirates Business Model, Mark Leon Goldberg dated March 17 2010.

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There are investors and suppliers, seaborne pirates and shore-based militia guards. A mother ship isoccasionally used to increase range and duration and, through preference, attacks happen at night andagainst underway targets. A typical pirate is 20-35 and hails from Puntland. He may be a professionalseaman by trade and will therefore be a trainer, he may be an ex-militia gun for hire or he may be a specialisttechnical expert operating GPS or radios. He will be a member of 1 of 5 pirate gangs and part of an industrywith 1000 employees on the front line. And his motivation will be stark - poverty and hunger ashore, or ashare of the ransom personally worth around 3m (in comparison of GDP between UK and Somalia) or, ifcaptured and imprisoned, the likelihood of being able to apply for asylum. The chances of being killed on ahijack are relatively remote, and gaining asylum almost anywhere is an attractive option. ReferencesChatham House Briefing Paper Piracy in Somalia dated October 2008, BBC Chasing the Somali PiracyMoney Trail dated 24 May 2009, Wikipedia, Piracy in Somalia, DIIS Brief Piracy off the Coast of Somaliadated January 2009, DIIS Report Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy, Bjorn Moller 2009-02.,Somalia - What Went Wrong by Ken Menkhaus, RUSI Journal August 2009.

16 BBC Chasing the Somali Piracy Money Trail dated 24 May 2009.

17Somalia - What Went Wrong by Ken Menkhaus, RUSI Journal August 2009.


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18 : The point about social bandits is that they are peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard ascriminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, aschampions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to beadmired, helped and supported. Bandits, E J Hobsbawm, Pelican 1972. Revised ed, Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 2001.

19 Viewed locally by some as an informal Coastguard collecting taxes from foreign interlopers, one of the

pirate groups in fact calls itself the National Volunteer Coast Guard and there have been reports that pirateshave been found carrying manuals of good conduct, a possible throwback to the Coastguard training whichwas undertaken in the region in the late 90s. References Chatham House Briefing Paper Piracy in Somaliadated October 2008, BBC Africa News, Q&A: Somali Piracy dated 18 June 2010.

20 There are reports of as much as 50% of ransoms being paid to Islamist groups in the areas that theycontrol and the close links to Yemen may facilitate arms movement Wikipedia, Piracy in Somalia, BBCChasing the Somali Piracy Money Trail dated 24 May 2009, Chatham House Briefing Paper Piracy inSomalia dated October 2008.

21 Under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery programme(RECAAP).

22UN trust fund backs projects in fight against piracy off Somali coast, UN News Centre, 23 April 2010.

23 This facility is also backed by EU, Australia and Canada. References Navies struggle with swarmingpirates, BBC News dated 1 April 2010, Q&A: What to do with a captured pirate, BBC News dated 24 June2010, Pirates and how to deal with them, Chatham House dated 22 April 2009.

24 Joining slavers and torturers in a select group.

25 The UK Home Office issued direction to the Royal Navy that pirates are not to be arrested as they may beable to claim asylum in the UK under British Human Rights legislation.

26Pirates and how to deal with them, Chatham House dated 22 April 2009.

27

Naval presence costs around $1bn pa: fleet of 30-60 ships with individual operating costs of $5m-$50m paeach.

28 Of course there would be real concerns regarding establishing precedence and dealing with criminals, butthe world is not a perfect place.

29 Hubert Lyautey, Marshal of France, 17 November 1854 to 21 July 1934.# # # #

30Xeer, pronounced [er], is the polycentric legal system of Somalia. Under this system, elders serve asjudges and help mediate cases using precedents. It is a good example of how customary law works within astateless society and is a fair approximation of what is thought of as natural law. Several scholars have notedthat even though Xeer may be centuries old, it has the potential to serve as the legal system of a modern,well-functioning economy. Xeer, Wikipedia.

31 There are 2 doctrines which define when a sovereign state should be recognised by the internationalcommunity. First is the declarative doctrine in which the state does not need recognition by others if it is adefined territory, has a permanent population, has a government and the capacity to enter into relations withother states. The other route to recognition is the constitutive which merely requires recognition by anotherinternational state to confer state recognition. By most definitions, Somaliland is a nation state so it merelyawaits the first to recognise it. Wikipedia List of Staes with Limited Recognition.

32 It is estimated that up to $500m reaches Somaliland from its diaspora annually and there are furtherearnings from its role as Ethiopias major export port. Somaliland, Wikipedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Customary_lawhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_lawhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_lawhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateless_societyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateless_societyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Customary_lawhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Customary_lawhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elder_(administrative_title)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elder_(administrative_title)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somaliahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somaliahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_systemhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_systemhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polycentric_lawhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polycentric_lawhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:IPAhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:IPA


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33 The Brussels based International Crisis Group similarly supported its case (New York Times The signssay Somaliland but the world says Somalia dated June 5 2006) and in a Prime Ministers question time, theUK PM stated that Somaliland is an example of genuine democracy in an area of the world not noted for itconfirming that the UK government would continue to engage with the new Government. (July 8 2010).Recognition seems to be tantalisingly close: in addition to the Prime Minister of UKs comments above, in 06the Welsh assembly invited the Government of Somaliland to the Senedd in Cardiff; in 2007 Somalilandhosted visits from the EU and AU and also in 2007 Ethiopia recognised Somaliland as a sovereign state.

34 It has pursued a reconciliation process with the clans since 1991 and clan dominance is highly forbidden inSomaliland. Another Successful ELection in Somaliland, Chatham House briefing note dated 26 July 2010.

35Pirates and how to deal with them, Chatham House dated 22 April 2009.

36 Wikipedia, Piracy in Somalia.

37Insurance firms plan private navy to take on Somali pirates, Independent World, 28 September 2010.

38Building Global Maritime Security through Global Cooperation, RUSI Defence Systems dated February2010.

39Tackling scourge of piracy requires broader approach, UN official says, UN News Centre, 10 September2009.

40 Triton International, for example, is a strategic partner of the Somaliland Coastguard and an exemplar ofthe healthy PMC/Government relationship which should be pursued in future.

rusi essay final

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