rule 117 compilation

8/13/2019 Rule 117 Compilation

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PAGE 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS/ PROF. ARNO V. SANIDADFIRST SEMESTER, AY 2012-2013/ (D2015)

PART VIRULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH

VALENCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN(YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. 2004)Summary: Petitioners Rodolfo G. Valencia, Pedrito Reyes, Remedios Marasigan,Bayani Anastacio, Rumulado Bawasanta, Jose Enriquez, Nelson Gabutero, JoseGenilo, Jr., Jose Leynes and Alfonso Umali extended contract of loan (worth Php2,500,000) to Engr. Alfredo Atienza for the repair of Atienzas motor vessel whichpetitioners claim was necessary for the transportation needs of inhabitants of OrientalMindoro which had just suffered three successive typhoons. Loan was supposedlyextended by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro pursuant to theGeneral Welfare clause or Section 16 of the Local Government Code.They were then charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) ofRepublic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in an information filedin the Sandiganbayan:

That on or about January 12, 1994 or sometime prior orsubsequent thereto, in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Philippines,and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accusedRodolfo G. Valencia, then Provincial Governor of OrientalMindoro, Pedrito A. Reyes, then Vice-Governor and Presidingofficer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro,Bayani Anastacio, Romualdo J. Bawasanta, Emmanuel B.Buenaventura, Cesareo M. Cueto, Violeta D. Dakis, Jose A.Enriquez, Nelson B. Cabutero, Jose G. Genilo, Jr., Jose C.Leynes, Dante A. Manao, Remedios E. Marasigan, allmembers of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of OrientalMindoro, and Alfonso V. Umali, Jr., then ProvincialAdministrator, all of whom are public officials of the provincialgovernment of Oriental Mindoro, while in the performance oftheir official and/or administrative functions, and acting inevident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring andconfederating with private accused Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza,and mutually helping one another , did then and there willfully,unlawfully and criminally give said accused Alfredo M. Atienzaunwarranted benefit, privilege and advantage by entering intoa grossly disadvantageous contract of loan, whereby theprovincial funds of Oriental Mindoro in the sum ofP2,500,000.00 was given to Alfredo M. Atienza to finance thecost of repair, operation and maintenance of his vessel,thereby causing the provincial government of OrientalMindoro damage and undue injury.

Petitioners filed a Motion Seeking an Order to Allow Accused to File with theOmbudsman Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and to Defer Issuance ofWarrant of Arrest. This was followed by a Motion to Quash filed by petitioner Valenciaon April 14, 1997.Reinvestigation was conducted. Two reviewing prosecutors recommended thedismissal of the complaint against all accused on the ground that their liability is civil innature.In the meantime, petitioners learned that in the administrative case against whichinvolved the same subject matter as the criminal case, the Ombudsman dismissed thecomplaint against them after finding that the contract of loan was entered into inpursuance of the police power of the local chief executive.

Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion forReconsideration of the Order and/or Motion to Resolve Motion to Quash Information butthis was denied so they filed certiorari petition under Rule 65.PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:

1. Sandiganbayan erred in denying motion to quash based on thedismissal of the administrative case despite the following:a. subject matter in criminal and administrative case are one and the

sameb. degree of proof in criminal case is beyond reasonable doubt

whereas in administrative case the proof required is onlysubstantialc. that 2 prosecutors recommended dismissal of case as they foundthat contract of loan was entered into pursuant to general welfareclause of Local Government Code

2. Sandiganbayan erred in denying motion to quash considering that thefacts alleged in the information have already become moot andacademic and no longer constitute an offense.

3. No satisfactory reason was given by the respondent Ombudsman indelaying inordinately (close to three [3] years) the filing of the informationagainst the petitioners.

ISSUE: Should motion to quash be granted? NO. Facts which constitute thedefense of the accused against the charge under the information must be provedby them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute propergrounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the materialaverments do not constitute the offense

o The grounds on which a complaint or information may be quashed are:(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of theaccused;(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment forvarious offenses is prescribed by law;(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offensecharged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without hisexpress consent.

o Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in amotion to quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such motion onlysuch facts as are alleged in the information and those admitted by theprosecutor, should be taken into account in the resolution thereof.

o Matters of defense cannot be produced during the hearing of such motions,except where the rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminalliability, prescription and former jeopardy.Facts which form the defense ofthe accused do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash theinformation on the ground that the material averments do not constitutethe offense

o The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash(on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitutethe offense charged, or any offense for that matter) is whether or not thefacts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish theessential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination,

matters aliunde are not considered. However, inquiry into facts outside the


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information may be allowed where the prosecution does not object to thepresentation thereof (People vs. Navarro).

In the case at bar, petitioners are charged with violation of Section 3 (e), in relation to 3(g), of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.ELEMENTS OF SEC.3(E):1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or officialfunctions;2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusablenegligence; and3. His action has caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, orhas given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the dischargeof his functions.ELEMENTS OF SEC. 3(G):1. The offender is a public officer;2. He enters into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to thegovernment.A careful scrutiny of the Information shows that all the above elements areaverred therein. It sufficiently alleges that petitioners are public officials dischargingofficial or administrative functions who, in evident bad faith and with manifest partiality,entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government with aprivate person which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and advantage.RE: EARLIER RESOLUTION OF OMBUDSMAN WHICH RECOMMENDEDDISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST THEMSC: PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS.

o The Ombudsmans resolution must be established as their defense duri ng thetrial yet it was not even offered and admitted as evidence by theSandiganbayan. It was merely attached to petitioners SupplementalPleading in Support of Motion to Quash Information. Furthermore, theResolution does not bear the approval of the Ombudsman.

o In any event, the Ombudsman subsequently denied petitioners motion forreinvestigation. The fact that two prosecutors recommended the dismissal ofthe case against petitioners is of no moment as they themselves signed theComment filed before this Court wherein they extensively argued against theinstant petition.

o The continuing objection and opposition of the prosecution to petitionersmotion to quash the Information removes this case from the exception to theabove-cited rule that in the determination of whether the facts allegedconstitute an offense, only the allegations in the Information, whose truth andveracity are hypothetically admitted, should be considered.

o Findings of the Graft Investigation Officer are contradicted by Ombudsmanwho found probable cause for the following reasons: In the credit agreementitself, while the problem of transport system was addressed in passing underits whereas clause the same was not mentioned in the body of the saidagreement. There is no provision in the contract to obligate Engr. Atienzatowards the improvement of transport service for the people of OrientalMindoro. The loan was a private affair. It suits Atienzas personalaggrandizement.

RE: DISMISSAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST PETITIONERSSC: PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS

o Basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose ofadministrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based onthe time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the otherhand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.

o Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case

against petitioners is the fact that they were reelected to office. The rationalefor this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is

presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, includinghis past misconduct. However, the re-election of a public official extinguishesonly the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him, becausea crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasanceor malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties,and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as awhole.

RE: RULING IN TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYANSC; PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS.

o Thus, the ruling in Tatad does not apply here. In that case, the 3-year delayin the preliminary investigation was exacerbated by the fact that the chargesagainst petitioner were found to be politically motivated. In the case at bar,there is no indication that the complaint against petitioners was filed to servepolitical ends. Neither is the delay vexatious, capricious or oppressive. Onthe contrary, what appears is that the prosecutors exercised extreme care inverifying, evaluating and assessing the charges against petitioners by havinginvestigations before the NBI then the Ombudsman before making a findingof probable cause.

Petition dismissed, TRO lifted.

ANTONE VS. BERONILLA (2010)Petitioner: Myrna AntoneRespondent: Leo BeronillaPerez, J.

March 21, 2007 - Antone filed a complaint against Beronilla forbigamy allegingthat her marriage with him in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when hemarried one Cecile Maguillo in 1991

Prosecution filed the information:That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a lawfulmarriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in forceand subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with oneCecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the accused has all theessential requisites for validity.

Beronilla moved toquash the information on the ground thatthe facts chargeddo not constitute an offense - He says that on April 26, 2007, RTC already declared his marriage withAntone null and void. Decision became final onMay 15. - Facts alleged do not constitute an offense because the marriage was

declared null and voidfrom the beginning. Declaration was retroactive.Thus, there was no first marriage to speak of .

Antone says:- Beronillas act has all the essential requisites of bigamy it was consummated

before the RTC declared the first marriage null and void.- Motion to quash is ahypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the

information, and facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may beraised only during the presentation of evidence

RTC: Quashed information, dismissed the case - says that because of the declaration of nullity, Antone was never married to

Beronilla. First element of bigamy is missing. CA affirmed.


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Issue: Was the information properly quashed on the ground that its facts do notconstitute bigamy?

Held: NO. Its facts constitute the offense charged. Quashal was improper.

Ratio: RTC and CA acted in excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion when it

sustained Beronillas motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to thosealleged in the information.

SC agrees with Antone that a motion to quash is ahypothetical admission of thefacts alleged in the information, and facts contrary thereto are matters ofdefense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence

Definition of motion to quash:- the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or

Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or fordefects which are apparent in the face of the Information.

- This motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in theInformation, for which reason, the court cannot consider allegations contraryto those appearing on the face of the information

TEST in considering a motion to quash based on the ground that the factsalleged do not constitute an offense: Whether the facts alleged, if hypotheticallyadmitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.

In this case:- All essential elements of bigamy underRPC 349 are alleged in the

information.(1) that the offender has been legally married;(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his

or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet bepresumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential

requisites for validity- The documents showing the declaration of nullity of the first marriage

should NOT have been considered at all because MATTERS OFDEFENSE cannot be raised in a motion to quash.

Exceptions to the rule: (1) When the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution(2) When the rules so permit (ex: because of extinction of criminal liability

and double jeopardy)(3) When facts have been established by evidence presented by both

parties which destroyed the prima facie truth of the allegations in theinformation during the hearing on a motion to quash based on theground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and it wouldbe pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and stillgive due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to beweak even to support possible conviction xxx.

- Even taking into consideration these exceptions, there is still no justifiablereason for sustaining the motion to quash. Why? Because the showing of thedocuments of the dissolution of the first marriagewill not serve to preventthe impracticability of proceeding with the trial.

- Family Code Art 40: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage maybe invoked for purposes of remarriageon the basis solely of afinal judgment declaring such marriage void.

- In essence, under FC 40, a subsequent judicial declaration of thenullity of the first marriage isimmaterial in a bigamy case because,by then, the crime had already been consummated.

-

Other issues: CA also affirmed motion to quash because

1. The information should have been filed by the Sol Gen in behalf of the Peoplesince the case was a criminal one

2. There was double jeopardy dismissal of the case by the RTC is tantamountto an acquittal

SC says:1. The case affects the interest of the State and the People, so it did not opt to

dismiss the petition on a technical ground. Instead, Sol Gen was required tocomment.

2. Elements of double jeopardy:1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient

in form and substance to sustain a conviction2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise

dismissed or terminated without his express consent- 3rd and 4th elements are NOT present

RTC and CA orders set aside. Case remanded.

RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASHEXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY

DOMINGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE (2000)DAVIDE, JR, CJ.

- Panfilo Domingo seeks to nullify the resolution of Sandiganbayan denying hismotion to quash the info against him for violation of Section 3(e) in relation toSection 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

1987 PNB filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against former President FerdinandE. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then president of the Construction and DevelopmentCorporation of the Philippines (CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former DeputyPresidential Assistant.

- Also included DOMINGO, the President of PNB at the time of the questionedtransactions, it appearing from the evidence on record that he was involved inthe case

- DOMINGOs subpoena was returned unserved

Preliminary investigation persisted (this time, dropping the complaint against Marcosbecause he was out of the country and thus out of the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan)and after a finding of probable cause to implead DOMINGO in the case, SpecialProsecution Officer (SPO) III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued an order directing him tosubmit a counter-affidavit, which he did.

- Resolution was issued by prosecution officer Baldos recommending thatDOMINGO and Rodolfo M. Cuenca be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e)in relation to Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 3019;

- complaint against Marcos was recommended dismissed for being moot andacademic by reason of his death, and as against Joaquin T. Venus for lack ofmerit

THIS IS THE INFORMATION FILED:


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That on or about the month of J uly 1980, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto,in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, being then the President of thePhilippine National Bank, a government financial institution, and hence a public officer,while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to hisoffice and conspiring and confederating with then President Ferdinand E. Marcos andwith RODOLFO M. CUENCA, a private individual, being then the Chairman of the Boardof Directors of the Construction and Development Company of the Philippines (CDCP),a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines,did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest

partiality cause undue injury to the Philippine National Bank and grant unwarrantedbenef its to CDCP in the following manner: accused RODOLFO M. CUENCA,capitalizing and explo iting h is close personal association w ith the then PresidentFerd inand E. Marcos to obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP,requested the latters assistance and intervention in securing the approval by thePhilipp ine National Bank Board of Directors of th e application of the CDCP for aU.S. $40 Million Letter of Credit and in foregoing the co llateral requirements ofCDCP, as a resu lt o f w hich accused Panf ilo O. Dom ingo, acceding to the pressureexerted by President Marcos in relation to accused Cuencas requests, facilitatedand made possib le the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of BoardResolu tion No. 144 whereby the U.S.$40 Million Standby Letter of Credit appliedfor by CDCP to secure the pr incipal and in terest on its loan with the RepublicNational Bank of Dallas was approved , notwithstanding a collateral deficiency byCDCP on its previous accounts with PNB, and again subsequently recommended to thePNB Board of Directors the approval of Board Resolution No. 180 amending Board

Resolution No. 144 in order to allow CDCP to use its loan proceeds secured by theaforementioned letter of credit for its other international projects and thereafter allowedCDCP to forego its collateral requirements, which act of the accused inflicted undueinjury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to assume CDCPs ob ligation tothe Republic National Bank of Dallas after the latter had defaulted in the paymentthereof, amounting to U.S. $29 Million, and which likewise granted unwarranted benefitsto CDCP in the same amount.

1992 - DOMINGO filed a petition for reinvestigation with Sandiganbayan; this was treadas a Motion for Recon; subsequently denied by Special Prosecutor

1993 DOMINGO filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the informationagainst him on the grounds that:

(1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription,and

(2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense.- Motion was denied, hence this petition.

Upon arraignment, Domingo refused to enter a plea; hence, the Sandiganbayanordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for him

Issue: Was the denial of Domingos Motion to Quash valid? YES, IT WAS A VALIDDENIAL.

CONTENTIONS OF DOMINGO:1. ON PRESCRIPTION

a. The prescriptive period commenced to run in July 1980when thecrime was allegedly committed , and was only tolled on 6February 1992, when he was impleaded as party-respondent byProsecutor Diaz-Baldos

The filing of the complaint with the Tanodbayanon 26 May 1987 produced no legal effectand could never be deemed to have validlyinterrupted the running of the prescriptiveperiod , considering that effective 2 February1987, the Tanodbayan was divested of itsauthority to conduct preliminary investigationunless duly authorized by the Ombudsman

COURT SAYS ON THIS:- In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following

should be considered:o (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;o (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; ando (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted

WHEN PRESCRIPTION PERIOD HAS RUN:The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its ownprescriptive period. Section 11 thereof reads: "All offenses punishable under this Actshall prescribe in ten years." This was later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,approved on 16 March 1982, which increased the prescriptive period of the crime fromten years to fifteen years

- Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is aspecial law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period isSection 2 of Act No. 3326:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run f rom the day of thecomm ission of the v io lation of the law , and if the same be notknown at the time, f rom the d iscovery thereof and the insti tu tionof jud icial p roceedings for i ts investigation and punishm ent .

The prescription shall be in ter rupted when proceedings areinstitu ted against the guilty person , and shall begin to run againif the proceedings are d ismissed for reasons not constituting

jeopardy. (emphasis added)

- This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, theprescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime wascommitted. However, if the violation of the special law is not known at thetime of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discoverythereof, i.e ., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts

o IN THIS CASE: the counting of the prescriptive period wouldcommence from the date of discovery of the offense, which couldhave been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed

o Government could not have known the crime at its commission;The alleged anomalous transactions could only have beendiscovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of theoriginal respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was oustedfrom office. Prior to said date, no person would have dared toquestion the legality or propriety of those transactions

WHEN PRESCRIPTION PERIOD IS INTERRUPTED:- Second paragraph of Section 2 of Act. No. 3326, as amended, provides that it

is "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person."o Whether the running of the prescriptive period was tolled on 1

September 1987, when DOMINGO was impleaded as an accused,or on 30 July 1992, when the information against him was filed with


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the Sandiganbayan, is immaterial; for only about one or six years,respectively, has elapsed from the date of the discovery of thealleged offense.

o Thus, the prescriptive period, whether ten years as provided in R.A.No. 3019 or fifteen years as provided in the amendatory Act, hasnot yet lapsed.

o The motion to quash on the ground of prescription was, therefore,correctly denied.

CONTENTIONS OF DOMINGO:2. ON FACTS CHARGED IN THE INFO

COURT SAYS ON THIS:- The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that

the facts averred in the information do not amount to an offense iswhetherthe facts asseverated would establish the essential elements of thecrime defined in the law . In this examination, matters aliunde are notconsidered.

- As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegationsof the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense forthat matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whosetruth and veracity are hypothetically admitted

o The information need only state the ultimate facts; the reasonstherefor could be proved during the trial

Charged against Domingo and Cuenca: violation of Section 3(e), in relation to Section4(a), of Republic Act No. 3019

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition toacts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existinglaws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any publicofficer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e). Causing any undue injury to any party, including theGovernment, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provisionshall apply to officers and employees of offices or governmentcorporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or otherconcessions.

SEC. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. -- (a) It shall beunlawful for any person having family or close personal relation withany public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of suchfamily or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requestingor receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantagefrom any other person having some business, transaction,application, request or contract with the government, in which such

public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include thespouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civildegree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close

personal relationship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assuresfree access to such public officer.

The info specifically stated:(1) That DOMINGO was a public officer, being then the president of PNB, a

government financial institution, and Rodolfo Cuenca was a private individual,then Chairman of the Board of Directors of the CDCP, who conspired andconfederated with DOMINGO, capitalizing and exploiting his close personalassociation with then President Marcos to obtain favorable loanaccommodations for CDCP;

(2) That DOMINGO committed the offense in relation to his office and while in theperformance of his official functions;

(3) That he facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB Board ofDirectors of Resolution No. 144, thereby causing undue injury and prejudiceto PNB which was unjustly forced to assume CDCPs obligation to theRepublic National Bank of Dallas after the CDCP defaulted in the payment ofthe loan amounting to US$29 Million

(4) That such undue injury was caused by his facilitation of the approval of theLetter of Credit and the waiver of the collateral deficiency, thereby grantingunwarranted benefits to CDCP in the same amount; and

(5) That he acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality

- All of these correspond to the elements of the offense charged against:o The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following:o (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged

in conspiracy with the former;o (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during

the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his orher public positions;

o (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether thegovernment or a private party;

o (4) that such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,advantage or preference to such parties; and

o (5) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evidentbad faith or gross inexcusable negligence

PEOPLE VS. VELASCO (2000)

FACTS:-The present case originated from criminal charges filed against Honorato Galves, theMayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, his bodyguard. They were charged withmurder and frustrated murder for an alleged shooting. Galvez was also charged withunauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence.

-After trial at RTC Quezon City, a consolidated decision in 1996 found Diego guiltybeyond reasonable doubt but acquitted Galvez due to insufficiency of evidence. It alsoabsolved him of the charge of illegal carrying of firearm, finding the act was not aviolation of law.-Now the government assails the acquittal of Galvez in a petition for certiorari underRule 65 and Sec. 1, Art VIII of the Constitution. It believes that the respondent judge'sacquittal of Galvez constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It claims that Velasco disregarded facts and evidence, and that theevidence should be re-examined by the court. It wants the acquittal to be nullified.-NOTE: the Court said the case was moot because Galvez was killed by allegedassassins and Velasco was dismissed from the service, but it decided to rule on theissues anyway.

ISSUE: Can the case be reviewed without violating the constitutional guarantee againstdouble jeopardy? NO.

Can the case be reviewed under a petition for certiorari under Rule 65? NO.


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RATIO:- The Court extensively went into the history of the rule on Double Jeopardy.- Jeopardy comes from the Latin jocus, meaning joke/jest/game and the French term"jeu perdre" which means a game one might lose. The concept existed in Greek,Roman, and Babylonian societies. Historically there has been much repugnanceagainst double jeopardy, but it was in England where it was formally institutionalized.- Double Jeopardy is a maxim of common law, "based on the universal principles ofresaon, justice, and conscience". Blackstone: "once a man is fairly found not guilty uponany indictment, or other prosecution before any court having competent juristiction, hemay plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime." Therule then became part of the legal system in the English colonies in America.- Despite the rule, in US vs Ball, the US SC said that the double jeopardy rule could notprevent a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction was set aside. It also held thatunder the Fifth Amendment, the verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant's

jeopardy. The government may not subsequently seek a new trial by means of appeal.- When the Philippines was ceded to the US, we adopted the custom of double jeopardyunder Gen Order 58.- In the case of Thomas E Kepner, a lawyer accused of embezzlement and acquitted,he claimed the US Govt's appeal to the Phil. SC constituted double jeopardy in the lightof US jurisprudence. As objection, the Atty Gen and SolGen of the US contended thatthe criminal system prior to the entry of the USA allowed the appeal of a judgment ofacquittal to the Supreme Court, because it was considered not as a new trial but as anextension of preliminary proceedings. The US SC rejected the government's argumentand held that the proceedings after Kepner's acquittal placed him twice in jeopardy byessentially subjecting him to a new trial. Generally, the ruling in Kepner has been held

ever since, though there have been times when the SC deviated from it.- Pronouncements by the courts on the jouble jeopardy guarantee of the FifthAmendment focused on three (3) related protections: against a second prosecution forthe same offense after acquittal; against a second prosecution for the same offenseafter conviction; and, against multiple punishments for the same offense- The interests underlying these three (3) protections are quite similar. Thus, when adefendant has been once convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles offairness and finality require that he be not subjected to the possibility of furtherpunishment by being tried or sentenced for the same offense. The policy of avoidingmultiple trials has been considered paramount so that exceptions to the rule have beenpermitted only in few instances and under rigid conditions.- In United States v. Scott the US Supreme Court synthesized two (2) venerableprinciples of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal of a judgment ofconviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support theverdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge; and second, a

judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by thecourt that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminatesthe prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal.- Under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only fromcriminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminalcharges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." This is so as long as the judgments ofdismissals do not involve determination of evidence. However, this rule does not applyto the Philippines.- The records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal upon theevidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factualresolution of the case.- The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o person shallbe twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by alaw and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar toanother prosecution for the same act." Citing the members of the Constitutional

Convention, they rejected the proposal to allow appeal from acquittal permissible evenon questions of law.

-The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effectthereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The pertinent portions ofSec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide:Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has beenconvicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminatedwithout his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaintor information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain aconviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittalof the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for theoffense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for anyoffense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged inthe former complaint or information x x x x- The requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint orinformation; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) thedefendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, orconvicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without hisexpress consent. - In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal broughtbefore the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding ofmistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may applyonly when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecutionrepresenting the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. Theultimate goal is prevention of government oppression.- Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double JeopardyClause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason,

applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused onground of grave abuse of discretion.- Errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise ofjurisdictio n. One cannot file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, because while theevidence may not have been evaluated correctly, it was considered and passed upon.This consequently exempts it from the requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction.

PANGANIBAN, SEP OPINION- Petition at bar should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) the former accused is alreadydead, so this Petition has become moot and academic; (2) the petitioner has failed toshow that public respondent had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.- People v. CA & Maquiling: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtis a proper remedy to challenge an acquittal on the ground that the trial court had actedwithout jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.- It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elementsconcur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in formand substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accusedhave been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or thecase is dismissed without their consent.- Even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not beplaced in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunalhad acted without jurisdiction. A ruling issued without jurisdiction is necessarilynull and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of anacquittal.

PEOPLE VS. HON. BENJAMIN RELOVA AND MANUEL OPULENCIAMarch 6, 1987J. Feliciano

(Motion to Quash Nature and Grounds Double Jeopardy)


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FACTS: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police, together with

personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, searched and examined thepremises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned andoperated by Manuel Opulencia.

The police discoveredthat electric wiring, devices and contraptions had beeninstalled, without the necessary authority from the city government , and"architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building." Opulencia admitted thathe had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower ordecrease the readings of his electric meter .

Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas Cityan information against Manuel Opulencia forviolation of Ordinance No. 1,Series of 1974, Batangas City . A violation of this ordinance was punishable by afine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment,which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court."

That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippinesand within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without properauthorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, didthen and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorizedinstallations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease theconsumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang,Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathorized installations of electricwirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangaswas damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONETHOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February,1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in theaforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.

Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, hefileda motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime therecharged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to berecovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award .

The Batangas City CourtGRANTED the motion to dismiss on the ground ofprescription , it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony whichprescribes two months from the time of discovery, and it appearing that theinformation was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of theoffense charged in February 1975.

Fourteen days later, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Courtof First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, ANOTHER INFORMATION againstManuel Opulencia, this time fortheft of electric power under Article 308 inrelation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code .

That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21stday of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the BatangasElectric Light System, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniouslytake, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount ofFORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS(P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the saidBatangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Governmentof Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.

Before he could be arraigned,Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging thathe had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the secondinformation and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional rightagainst double jeopardy .

Judge Relova GRANTED the Motion to Quash: The first case, as it appears, wasnot simply one of illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount ofP41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprivedthe city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electricinstallations only, it could have alleged illegal connections which were done at oneinstance on a particular date between November, 1974, to February 21, 1975. Butthe information said that from November, 1974 to February 1975 it was meantto include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the citygovernment. The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to21 February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.

ARGUMENT OF PEOPLE: The unauthorized installation punished by theordinance of Batangas City isnot the same as theft of electricity.o The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection

against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for thesame offense .The petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the CityCourt of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized installationof electrical wiring and devices. Only two elements are needed toconstitute an offense under this City Ordinance: (1) that there was suchan installation; and (2) no authority therefor had been obtained from theSuperintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the DistrictEngineer.

o The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner'sargument continues, is the installing of electric wiring and deviceswithout authority from the proper officials of the city government. Toconstitute an offense under the city ordinance, it isnot essential toestablish any mens rea on the part of the offender, or an intent toappropriate and steal electric fluid .

o The elements of theft are DIFFERENT from the unlawful orunauthorized installation of wiring : (1) That personal property betaken; (2) That the personal property (taken) belongs to another; (3)That the taking be done with intent of gain; (4) That the taking be donewithout the consent of the owner; (5) That the taking be accomplishedwithout violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.Also, theft of electricity can be done even without illegal or unauthorizedinstallations.

ISSUE: WoN the second information for theft [of electricity] violated Opulencias right

against double jeopardy.

HELD: YES! The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the generalproposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is availablealthough the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from theoffense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised PenalCode, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Thiswas made clear in Yap vs. Lutero.

It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protectionagainst double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not tobe understood with absolute literalness.The identity of offenses that must beshown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may beregarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarilyincludes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense orwhere the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustrationthereof . Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all


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the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in thetechnical definition of the second offense.

In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: fromNovember 1974 to February 1975. The accused also conceded that he effected orpermitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electricpower bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that suchunauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorizedinstallation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant withoutthe corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the"taking" of electric current was INTEGRAL with the unauthorized installation ofelectric wiring and devices. The dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of theBatangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had alreadyprescribed, amounts to an ACQUITTAL of the accused of that offense. UnderArticle 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of thegrounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court,anorder sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a BAR toanother prosecution for the same offense .

RATIO: Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and anordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar toanother prosecution for the same act.

The argument of People is correct under the first sentence of Art. IV (22).However, this case must be examined under the second sentence of the section.The first sentence is the general rule; the second sentence is the exception to thegeneral rule.

In Yap v. Lutero: There are two kinds of double jeopardy: against punishment forthe same offense, and against punishment for the same act. Thus, the firstsentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereasthe second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Underthe first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same actprovided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in onecase is not included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case.The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same,owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and theother a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and thesame act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shallbar a prosecution under the other.

Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the samestatute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to theidentity ofoffenses charged . In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipalordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to theidentity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which arealleged to have given rise to the two offenses.

The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed byexamining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged . Thequestion of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability bothunder a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the firstinstance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the actsof the accused as set out in the two informations areso related to each other intime and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on thesame occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, ora continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be

appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penalliability simultaneously under different legal enactments.

Acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused bya common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, shouldnot be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts asthere are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprisingprosecutor can find.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED.

PEOPLE VS. DEL CARMEN (1951)Facts: An information formalicious mischief against Maria Del Carmen, et al.forremoving and destroying (actuated by feelings of hate and resentment) thebanguera and media agua of Felix Versozas house was filed at the Manila MunicipalCourt.- After the prosecution presented its evidence, the defendants moved for the dismissalof the case on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the removal ordestruction of the property had been inspired by resentment. The court granted this.- The same fiscal who filed the earlier info filed another info against defendants forcoercion before CFI Manila. The info read: by means of violence, force andintimidation prevented Felix Versoza from leaving intact the banguera and mediaagua and forcibly removed the same by means of hammers, etc.- Defendants motion to quash on the grounds of double jeopardy (DJ) and insufficiencyof allegations was sustained by the CFI. Prosecution appealed, saying there is no DJbec the second info charged am offense different from the first. The rule against DJapplies only to protect the accused not against the second punishment for the same actbut against being tried for the same offense.

SUPREME COURT:The act complained of in the 2nd info is the same one which formed the basis of the infofor malicious mischief. In the first info, the defendants were charged for having removedand destroyed the banguera. In the second one, Versoza was prevented from leavingintact his house because the defendants had removed the banguera.- While the rule against DJ prohibits the prosecution for the same offense, it iselementary that the accused should be shielded against being prosecuted forseveral offenses made out from a single act. Else, an unlawful act or omission maygive rise to several prosecutions depending on the prosecutions ability to imagine as

many offenses as can be justified by the act or omission, by simply adding orsubtracting essential elements. Under the prosecutions theory, rape may becomecoercion by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented theoffended from remaining a virgin.- This case is a reminder for prosecuting officers to be careful and comprehensive incriminal investigations by determining definitely, before filing the info, the offenses infact and law committed.

PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT OF MANILA AND FRANCISCO GAPAY1983 Relova, J.RESOLUTION style case.Facts:

1. October 17, 1971: Incident happened (accused bumped victim doesnt sayexplicit facts); the next day, an information for Serious Physical Injuries thrureckless imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck

and on that same day, the victim (de la Cruz) died;- Private respondent was arraigned two days later;


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2. October 24: an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed;- This was dismissed by City Court (upon motion by private respondent)

on November 17 on the ground of double jeopardy;3. City Court decided:

- Melo v People: where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenesfor which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character ofthe offense and, together with the facts existing at a time, constitutes anew and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second

jeopardy if indicted for the second offense;- However, the doctrine in that case does not apply because in People vs.

Buan (22 SCRA 1383): Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes thenegligent state of mind and not the resulting injury;- Once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot

again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a differentresulting injury.

Issue:W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru

reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently forhomicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the sameinjuries he had suffered. NO.Held:

GENERAL RULE: One who has been charged with an offense cannot becharged again with the same or Identical offense though the latter be lesser or greaterthan the former.

- EXCEPTION: rule of Identity does not apply when the second offense

was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution because in suchcase there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution,to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Melo v People.

- Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and afterconviction, the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against thesame accused does not put him twice in jeopardy; or stated differently,

- Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which thedefendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offenseand, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new anddistinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy ifindicted for the new offense;

Jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignmentand conviction of the accused

- As stated, the victim died the same day the information was filed andaccused was arraigned two days later or October 20; so, when the

information of homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed on October24, accused was already in double jeopardy;- In his memorandum, the Solicitor General mentioned that on October

21, the City Fiscal motioned for the abeyance of the hearing andarraignment because there is information that the victim died, and theinformation would have to be amended; be that as it may, the factremains that the victim died on October 18, a day after the accident andarrest of accused, and that on October 20, the accused was arraigned,pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly;

Affirmed.Concurring. Guttierez Jr., J.: constrained to concur because the records areinadequate to show that the arraignment, while hasty and surrounded by seeminglysuspicious circumstances, was tainted by fraud, collusion, or other form of chicanerysufficient to sustain a finding that the State was denied due process.

Knowing the volume of the case load in the City Court of Manila and the

inevitably slow pace of work even when urgency is dictated by the nature of cases withthe Fiscal or before the various salas, it is most surprising that the accused could have

been arraigned on October 20, 1972 for the charge of serious physical injuries onlythree days after the incident, two days after the filing of the information, and two daysafter the death of the victim.

The only sensible conclusion to draw from the above circumstances is thatthe accused was hastily made to plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose acharge for homicide even before it could be filed. In such a case, there would be atrifling with the processes of justice and a collusive effort amounting to fraud or deceit todeprive the State of its authority to prosecute an accused for the correct offense.

Either the assistant city fiscal was naively new to the job, or he washopelessly negligent, or he connived with the accused, in which case remedialmeasures are called for. At any rate, I concur in the affirmance of the order of dismissalin line with the many protections that the Constitution and the laws give to the accusedin criminal prosecutions.

MANANTAN VS. CAFeb 29, 2011Topic: Double Jeopardy - Rule 117, secs. 3(h), 5 and 7; Rule 120, sec. 5 FACTS:

- Sept. 25, 1982: Fisal Ambrocio invited Ruben Nicolas to catch shrimps at hisfarm. They drank beer with Manantan before they proceeded to the farmusing Manantans Toyota Starlet, where they consumed more beer.Manantan, Nicolas and some others returned to Ambrocios house with aduck; they ate and drank. They went bowling and also went to a nightclubafter, where they yes, you guessed it drank some more.

- When they decided to go home, Manantan drove the car. He was driving at a

speed of 40km/hr along Maharlika Highway in Isabela when they met apassenger jeep with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to theright. The two vehicles COLLIDED and the Toyota turned turtle.

- Ambrosio and Nicolas were both brought to the hospital. Ambrosio sufferedminor injuries. Nicolas DIED.

- DEFENSE VERSION:o basically the same as prosecutions, except that Manantan didnt

drink beer and he was driving slowly.

- TC: NOT GUILTY. Acquitted from homicide through reckless imprudencewithout a ruling on his civil liability.

- CA: Modified in that Manantan is CIVILLY LIABLE for his negligent andreckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the accident.

o at time of accident, Manantan was drunk because he consumed at

least 12 beer bottles between 9am-11pm.ISSUES:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals asto his negligence or reckless imprudence? (NO. THERES NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY. )

(2) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchesterdoctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240? (NO.)

RATIO:ISSUE # 1: CA awarding indemnity to respondents does NOT place appellant indouble jeopardy.

PETITIONER SAYS:

-

TCs finding that he was not negligent was the basis for his acquittal, notreasonable doubt.


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- In finding him liable for damages, CA placed his acquittal in suspicion and puthim in DOUBLE JEOPARDY

RESPONDENTS SAY:- TC acquitted him on reasonable doubt.- Civil liability not extinguished in crim cases if acquittal based on reasonable

doubt.

SC SAYS:- For DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO EXIST, there must be:

o a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the secondo first jeopardy must have terminated;o the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.

- IN THIS CASE:o petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal

Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge.o Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by

private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066.Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with asecond criminal offense identical to the first offense. The recordsclearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed topetitioner on appeal.

o In modifying thelower courts judgment, the appellate court did notmodify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of asecond criminal case against petitioner for the same offense.

Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of.Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy isincorrect.

ISSUE # 2:

PETITIONER SAYS:- CA erred in awarding damages since respondents did not pay corresponding filingfees. Non-payment of fees violates Manchester Doctrine where in The Court ac quires

jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees.

RESPONDENTS SAY:- Manchester doctrine inapplicable. Assuming that the Manchester ruling is appliedretroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are afirst lien on the judgment.

SC SAYS:- At the time the information was filed (1983), the implied institution of civil

actions with criminal actions was governed byRule 111, Section 1 of the1964 Rules of Court . As correctly pointed out by private respondents, undersaid rule, it was not required that the

- When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused byway of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees forsuch civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the

judgment except in an award for actual damages.- In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the

complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by theoffended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. These were theapplicable provisions when respondents appealed the CIVIL ASPECT in1989.

- Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminalaction, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case,are not included in the computation of the filing fees.

- the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations ofdamages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectivelyguarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to theinstitution of the criminal action.

- The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint orinformation. We therefore find no basis for petitioners allegations thatthe filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellatecourt acquired no jurisdiction.

DISP: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assaileddecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31,1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioners motionfor reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SALAZAR V. PEOPLE (2003)Petitioner: Anamer SalazarRespondents: People and J.Y. Brothers Marketing CorporationCallejo, Sr., J.

Facts: An information for estafa was filed against Anamer Salazar (petitioner) and

co-aacused Nena Timario with the RTC. Prosecs evidence: Salazar bought 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers andgave a check as payment drawn against Prudential Bank by one NenaTimario in the amount of P214,000. Upon presentment, the check wasdishonoured (closed account). Salazar was informed of such and shereplaced it with another check, which, however, was returned as DAUD(Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).

Salazar filed a Demurrer with Leave of Court alleging that she could not beguilty of the crime as charged.

The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crimecharged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of thecheck as payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that:

o the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence ofconspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner andthe issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, forthe purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, theprivate complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never metNena Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorserof the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the checkwas a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falselypretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d).

o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D.Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is herebyheld liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused AnamerD. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers MarketingCorporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.

Petitioner filed MR on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he beallowed to present evidence pursuant to RoC Rule 33. TC denied.

Issue: W/N Salazar was denied due process when she was not accorded her right to

adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.


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Held: Yes.

Ratio: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil

liability arising from the offense shall be deemed instituted with the criminalaction unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right toinstitute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the civil action.

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on thecivil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubtas only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declaredthat the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of theaccused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which theaccused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict isextinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal actionthat the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist orwhere the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

PROCEDURE:o If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court

renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, theprosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as itwould place the accused in double jeopardy. However, theaggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both mayappeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within theperiod therefor.

o After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has theoption either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leaveof court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waivesthe same.

o In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the natureof a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution toprove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where theaccused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, hethereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the casefor decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On theother hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer toevidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on thecriminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if hisdemurrer is denied by the court.

o If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, theaccused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of thecase unless the court also declares that the act or omission fromwhich the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial courtissues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrerto evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civilliability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgmenton the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason thatthe constitutional right of the accused to due process is therebyviolated.

o This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence,the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal andcivil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is theevidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is toissue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to

evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for

continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civilaspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduceevidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adducetheir sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

o Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of thecase on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and theaccused.

IN THIS CASE, the civil action arising from the delict was impliedly institutedsince there was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nora reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before theinstitution of the criminal action. The petitioner was granted leave of court tofile a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurreron its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil.However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case andordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainanteven before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently,therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.

PEOPLE VS. LACSON (April 2003)Resolution J Callejo Sr

This involves a previous case regarding the PNP's involvement with the KuratongBaleleng massacre/case/shootout

MfR by the sSate praying that:1. Sec 8, Rule 117 (provisional dismissal) NOT be applied in this case. And2. the Time Bar rule in Sec 8, Rule 117 should also NOT be applied in this case.

People: the requisites required for a provisional dismissal to be granted is not present.Specifically, the respondents failed to pray for a provisional dismissal. The heirs of thevictims were also not informed of a provisional dismissal.

SC:Sec. 8. Provisiona l dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except withthe express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year afterissuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses

punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shallbecome permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case havingbeen revived

SEC 8, RULE 117 IS NOT GRANTED.Requisites1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves fora provisional (sin perjuicio ) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and theaccused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;2. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;3. The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;4. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal ofthe case.Reason for requiring conformity of accused: to bar him from asserting double jeopardy

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent tosuch provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express


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consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in thenew rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without theexpress consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. Thecase may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the rightof the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that suchrevival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling ofthe Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offensenecessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminaryinvestigation.In this case: The respondents only prayed for a judicial determination of probablycause and for the warrant of arrest to be withheld. They admitted that they did not prayfor a provisional dismissal of the case.TIME BAR WILL ALSO NOT BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIEDIN THIS CASE.Generally, a procedural rule, such as Sec 8 Rule 117, will be retroactively applied. Butin this instance, it will not for if it will, the State will be prejudiced and actually have lessthan 2 years to revive the case. The resolution of the lower court judge was executedon March 31 1999. The rule became effective on Dec 1, 2000. The state will have lessthan 2 years to pursue the case.Commencement of 2 years march 31, 1999.it will end on March 31 2001, but the state would only commence an action on Dec 1,2000, because that's the only moment they would have been informed of the existenceof such rule.

PEOPLE VS. LACSONPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTORGENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTORJOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A.ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN andCITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners,vs. PANFILO M. LACSON,respondent. | CALLEJO, SR., J.| 2003

Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) OmnibusMotion;[1] (b) Motion for Reconsideration;[2] (c) Supplement to Motion forReconsideration;[3] (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments.[4]

The main issue here is the time bar against the refiling of the criminal cases againstLacson after the March 29, 1999 dismissal by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr.

SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be

provisionally dismissed except with the express consent ofthe accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable byimprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of anyamount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) yearafter issuance of the order without the case having beenrevived. With respect to offenses punishable byimprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisionaldismissal shall become permanent two (2) years afterissuance of the order without the case having beenrevived. (n)

Respondent Lacson: the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in CriminalCases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to

a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate.Prospective application of Section 8 Rule 117 would give the petitioners more than two

years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating therespondents right to due process and equal protection of the law.

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP)should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, onlyand solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforcethe constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case.

the rule should have retroactive application , absent any provision thereinthat it should be applied prospectively.

In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to

prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of thecases by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP tookeffect on December 1, 2000.

There was an inordinate delay in the revival of the cases, considering thatthe witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March 1999 are the samewitnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to refile the casesbefore the two-year bar but failed to do so because of negligence; andperhaps institutional indolence. Therevival of the cases contemplated inSection 8 refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for trial.

The operational act then is the refiling of the Informations with theRTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-yearbar.

Petitioners: assert that the prospective application of Section 8 is in keeping with

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part thatthe rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not diminish,increase or modify substantial rights.

While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should notpreclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If suchright to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said tobe a procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural ruleimpairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be givena retroactive application. T

The petitioners assert that the refiling of the cases under Section 8 shouldbe taken to mean as the filing of the criminal complaint with the appropriateoffice for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, and not theactual filing of the criminal complaint or information in court fortrial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the offended parties must begiven notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases underSection 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, if the requisitenotices to the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, thetwo-year period had not yet even commenced to run.

ISSUE: WON the time bar in sec 8 rule 117 should be applied retroactively orprospectively.Held: Prospectively.(Short Answer)It would be a denial of the States right to d ue process to apply the newrule retroactively in the present case, considering that the criminal cases wereprovisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999before the new rule tookeffect on December 1, 2000.

If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have onlyone year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revivethese criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed

under the new rule.


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if the time limit is applied prospectively, theState would have two yearsfrom December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 200 2 within which to revivethe cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixingthe time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in theadministration of justice.

Long answer:) The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it

is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule Effected year2000 was fixed by the Court for the benefit of the State and the accused;not for the accused only.

in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those ofthe accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases withminimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account thesubstantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. TheCourt believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to reviveprovisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice tothe offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respectedunless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient thatthe rule becomes a denial of justice.

In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule tobe applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Courtwere otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended,

namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisionaldismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused.

4. In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which torevive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. onMarch 29, 1999. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that thetwo-year period commenced to run on March 31,1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge

Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment ofthe new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionallydismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. on March 29,1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000.

If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have onlyone year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revivethese criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixedunder the new rule.

On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, theState wouldhave two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 200 2 withinwhich to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of thenew rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State andavoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in theadministration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999[22] should be excluded in thecomputation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effectat the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar . It cannoteven be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases againstrespondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year periodunder the new rule. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice FelixFrankfurter, inGriffin v. People , 351 US 12 (1956):

Other parts of the case:JUDICIAL ADMISSION BINDS RESPODENT: When the respondent admitted that hedid not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in hismotion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not give hisexpress consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted thatone of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.

The respondents contention that his admissions made in his pleadings andduring the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case as they weremade in the course of a different proceeding does not hold water. theproceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourseis but a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This isnot a new trial, but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trialcourt, which later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him inthe proceedings before this Court

NO NEED FOR REMAND: There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case tothe trial court to enable the respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisitenotices under Section 8 had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court hasthoroughly examined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and theRTC[50] and found no proof that the requisite notices were even served on all the heirsof the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May28, 2002 Resolution, Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the mandate underSection 8 because said rule had yet to exist. [

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING , respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons OmnibusMotion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED.The respondents Motion forReconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The ExecutiveJudge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED toCONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE thesame with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon Citydesignated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

LOS BANOS VS. PEDROTime-Bar (Rule 117, Sec. 8)April 22, 2009J. Brion

Los Banos, et. al. = private prosecutor and the PNP Boac checkpoint teamPedro = accused

FACTS:

May 13, 2001 (a day befor

rule 117 compilation

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