Round #2: Avoiding the Quagmire of Relativism: A Brief ResponseAuthor(s): Gary MarshallSource: Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1996), pp. 73-74Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25611152 .

Accessed: 14/06/2014 23:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

M.E. Sharpe, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Administrative Theory&Praxis.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:54:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Gary Marshall I University af Nebraska ~ Omaha I

ROUND #2

AVOIDING THE QUAGMIRE OF RELATIVISM:

A BRIEF RESPONSE

Administrative Theory & Praxis, 18(1): 73-74, 1996.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to be a part of this symposium and pleased to be part of a dialogue that is not exclusively about the instrumentalities of efficient

implementation. Yet, a concern for the praxis of public administration is never far from the discussion as

evidenced in all the papers especially in Hummel's work with his depiction of the anarchy

~ or oppression, I'm not sure which ? that is sure to ensue under the

"dictatorship of sliding signifiers" (from Round #1). That we are all concerned with the everyday acts of administration and policy making validates the dialogue in which we are engaged.

The symposium papers raise many excellent points, one of which is O.C. McSwite's assertion that

epistemological and ontological scene has changed and the idea of the Authoritative Real has been seriously

problematized" (Round #1). Fox and Miller make this same argument in their discussion of absolutes, reductionist explanations, incomplete or small truths, and reifications. They subsequently delineate how the logical positivists "ran into intractable problems" (Round #1). On this point, I find little disagreement among all the authors. However, beyond this point we do have

differing views particularly with regard to the specter of relativism ? a point that is immediately raised in every discussion of postmodernism. While McSwite's essay gives thorough attention to this issue, here is how I see the debate being framed in this symposium.

Goodsell, in his discussion of passion, suggests that

everything is truly subjective and therefore relative. As a solution, he asks us to passionately embrace our

subjectivity but temper it within the Constitutionally grounded tradition of responsible public administration. This point is encapsulated by the statement that:

Administrators have the precious right of legal authority ... [and] cannot

enjoy the luxury of the activist or

agitator and stir up trouble for its own

sake; they must be passionate yet at the same time painfully conscious of the far-reaching consequences of

speaking for the community in an official capacity" (Round #1).

Another way to address the threat of relativism is to

wrestle the beast to the ground and construct a better Archimedean point from which to critique our current social experience. This is the perspective taken by both Carr and Hummel. They argue that the postmodern position (Is there such a thing?) leaves one without

adequate defenses to combat the Hobbesian-like forces who intend to make the lives of the citizenry "solitary, nasty, brutish, and short." From this perspective, contextualism, for example, denies the possibility of

making a principled stand against "inequality, deprivation, urban squalor, unemployment, massive and

increasingly differentials of wealth and power ..."

(Eagleton as cited by Carr in Round #1). Even less sensible is the strategy of deconstruction which is written off as "pure silliness" (Hummel, Round #1) or a "sport" that does precious little to illuminate a critical

"understanding of the vested interests and power dynamics that are behind the production and distribution of the text" (Carr, Round #1).

On this point, it seems to me that Fox and Miller have it right in their discussion of reality versus hyperreality.

Our social experience has become over-determined and fractured. In my judgment, the value of the deconstructive stance in a world of fractured meaning is that it meets the text on its own terms. In contrast, the

more that we close ranks by asserting either technical

expertise or moral authority or both, the more we become entrapped in an intellectual cul-de-sac.

73

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:54:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

I find myself in agreement with Calas and Smircich who suggest that "poststructuralist analyses are of

particular value in understanding the cultural limits of

knowledge at times when innovations in theory and research are expected but do not seem to be happening" (1991, p. 568).

The next question that arises is how we should

proceed in our own dialogue. In my view, the

symposium serves to recreate a valid conversation about the identity of the field of public administration. To this

end, the strongest outcome of this discussion should be an attention to the vocabulary that we create. McSwite's delineation of the Tentative Real is such a creation, as is Fox and Miller's discussion of "warrants." As both Farmer and I suggest, deconstruction also serves as a creative strategy to reexamine taken-for-granted assumptions about the essential truths of public

administration. We have all argued in different ways for a broader understanding of public administration than the exclusive discourse of rationalism and efficiency that took hold after World War II. To that end, we should not limit ourselves to naming knowledge only in terms of universal forms or transcendent values. As Rorty (1991) suggests, by avoiding the objectivist-relativist trap:

All such theoretical questions would be replaced with practical questions about whether we ought to keep our

present values, theories, and practices or try to replace them with others. Given such a replacement, there would be nothing to be responsible to except ourselves (p. 41).

74

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:54:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions