rationality and relativism

8/12/2019 Rationality and Relativism

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R TION LITYN

REL TIVISM


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R TION LITYN

R L TIVISM

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Martin ollisN

Steven ukes

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Introduction compllation an d editorial matterCopyright Martin Hollis an d Sreven Lukes 1982First published 1982Reprinted 1983 1985 1988 1990 1993Blackwell Publishers108 Cowley Road Oxford OX4 ]F Englandll rights reserved. No p ar t o f this publication may be reproducedstored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or y anymeans electronic mechanical photocopying recording or otherwisewithout th e prior permission of th e publisher.Except in the United States of America this book is sold subject to thecondition that it shall not by w ay o f trade or otherwise be lent} resold} hired out} or otherwise circulated without the publisher s priorconsent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it ispublished and without a similar condition including this conditionbeing imposed on th e subsequent purchaser.ritish Library ataloguing in Publication DataA l catalogue record for this book is available from th e BritishLibrary.ISBN 0--631-13126-4 Pb k

Phototypesetting by Oxford Publishing ServicesPrinted an d bound in Great Britainy Athenaeum Press Ltd. Newcastle upon TyneThis hook is printed on acid free paper.


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ONT NTSContributorsIntroductionRelativism Rationalism and the Sociology o KnowledgeBarry arnes and DavidBloorLanguage ruth and ReasonThe Social Destruction o RealityRationality harles Taylor

Ian HackingMartin Hollis

Vll

48 787

Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation Newlon Smilh

Belief Bias and Ideology Jon ElsterApparently Irrational Beliefs Dan Sperber

Tradition and Modernity RevisitedRelativism and Universals

Relativism in its PlaceBibliographyIndex

ErneslGel nerRobin Horton

Steven Lukes

62349 8

2263 63


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Relativism Rationalism nd theSociology ofKnowledgeBarryBarnesandDavidBloor

In the academic world relativism is everywhere abominated. Criticsfeel free to describe it by words such as pernicious or portray it as athreateningtide . On the political Right relativism is held to destroythe defences against Marxism an d Totalitarianism. knowledge issaid to be relative to persons and places, culture or history, then is itno t but a small step to concepts like Jewish physics ? On the Left,relativism is held to sap commitment, a nd t he strength needed tooverthrow th e defences of th e established order. How can th e dis-torted vision of bourgeois sciene< be denounced without a standpointwhich is itself special and secure?

The majority critics relativism subscribe to some version r t on l sm and portray relativism s a threat to rational scientificstandards. is however a convention academic discourse thatmight is not right. Numbers may favour th e opposite position, but weshall show that the balance of argument favours a relativist theory ofknowledge. Far from being a threat to the scientific understanding offorms of knowledge, relativism is required by it . Our claim is that E. Vivas Reiteration and second thoughts on cultural relativism in H.Schook and J. Wiggins (eds),Relan vi and the Study Man (Van Nostrand,Princeton, N.J., 1961 .2 A. Musgrave The objectivism of Popper s epistemology in P.A. Schilpp ed.),ThePhiJosophy olKarlPopper Open Coun, a Salle, Ill., 1974),ch. IS, 588.K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (Routledge Kegan Paul,London), vol. 2 1966 p. 393; H.R. Post, Against Ideologies (Inaugurallecture,ChdseaCollege, University ofLondon, 28 Nov 1974),p. 2, for Jewishphysics. iv s also invokes the im ge . S. Rose and H. Rose (eds), The Radicalisation Science (Macmillan,London, 1977 .


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22 Barry Barnes and David Bloorrelativism is essential 10 all those disciplines such as anthropology,sociology the history institutions nd ideas nd even cognitivepsychology, which account for the diversity of systems of knowledge,their distribution and the manner of their change. is those whooppose relativism, and who grant certain forms of knowledge a privileged status who pose the real threat to a scientific understanding ofknowledge and cognition.

There are many forms of relativism a nd i t is essential tomake clear theprecise form in which we advocate it. The simple starting-point ofrelativist doctrines is (i) the observation that beliefs on a certain topicvary, and (ii) th e conviction that which of these beliefs is found in agiven conlext depends on or is relative to the circumstances of theusers. Bu t there is always a third feature of relativism. requireswhatmay be called a symmetry or an equivalence postulate. For in-srance, itma y be claimed that general conceptions of the natural orderwhether the Aristotelean world view, th e cosmology of a primitivepeople, or th e cosmology of an Einstein are all alike in being false, orare all equally true. These alternative equivalence lead totwo varieties of relativism; and in general it is the nature of theequivalence postulate which defines a specific form of relativism.

The form of relativism that we shall defend employs neither of theequivalence postulates just mentioned both of which run into tech-nical difficulties. To say that all beliefs are equally true encounters theproblem of ho w to handle beliefswhich contradict one another. If onebelief denies what the other asserts, ho w can they both be true?Similarly, to say thaI all beliefs are equally false poses the problem ofthe status of the relativist s ow n claims. He would seem to be pulling) e refer to ny collectively accepted system belief s knowledge .Philosophers usually adopl a different terminological convention confiningknowledge justified true belief. The reason for our preference shouldbecome clear the course the paper. For a full account the ideas th tform the background of this paper and a description of their iroplications forthe sociology of knowledge, see B Barnes, Scimli[u KtIOWWge and Sociologi l T Ieory (Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1974 ; B Barnes IlUtruuandI1IeGrDWIh ofKtIOW/edge (Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1977 ; D. Bloor,KtIOW/edge andS0ci4/ Imagery (Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1976


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Relativism Rationalism Sociology Knowledge the rug from beneath his own feet. 6Our equivalence p ost ul at e is t ha t all beliefs are on a par with one

another with respect to the causes of their credibility. It is not that allbeliefs are equally true or equally false but that regardless of truth an dfalsity the fact of their credibility is to be seen as equally problematic.The position we shall defend is that the incidence ofall beliefs withoutexception calls for empirical investigation and must be accounted forby findiog the specific local causesof this credibility. This means thatregardless of w hether the sociologist evaluates a belief as true orrational, or as false and irrational, he must search for the causes of itscredibility. In all cases he will ask for instance if a beliefis part of theroutioe cognitive and technical competences handed down from gen-eration to generation. Is it enjoined by the authorities of the society? Isit transmitted by established institutions of socialization or supportedby accepted agencies of social control? Is it bound up with patterns ofvested ioterest? Does it have a role in furthering shared goals whether

political or technical or both What are the practical and immediateconsequences of particular judgements that are made with respect tothe belief? All of these questions can and should be answered withoutregard to the status of the belief as it is judged and evaluated by thesociologist s own standards.

A large number ofexamples could be provided from recent work byhistorians sociologists and anthropologists which conform therequirements ofour equivalence postulate. For example many excel-lent historical studies of scientific knowledge and evaluation nowproceed without concern for the epistemological status of the casesbeiog addressed. They simply iovestigate the contingent determi-nants ofbeliefand reasoning without regard to whether the beliefs aretrue or the inferences rational. They exhibit the same degree and kiodof curiosity in both cases. 7 Anthropologists too are increasiogly6 These are the kinds of relativism that Popper identifies as his target onp 387and 388 his Open Society vol. The claim that relativism is self-refuting is thoroughly discussed and thoroughly demolished in Mary Hesse,The strong thesis of sociology of science , ch 2 of her Revolutions andReconstructions in Ihe hilosophy ofScience Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980).7 As a selection such work, see:A Brannigan, The reification Mendel , Social Studies ofScience 9 1979),pp 423--54; T.M. Brown, From mechanism to vitalism in eighteenthcentury English physiology Journal the History iology 7 1974 , pp.179-216. K.L. Caneva, From galvanism to electrodynamics: the transform-ation German physics and its social context , istorical Studiesin the


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24 BarryBarnes and DavidBlooraccounting for systems of commonsense knowledge and pre-literatecosmologies in the same way.

On the level of empirical investigation - and concentrating on thepractice of investigators rather than the theoretical commentary theymay provide - there is more evidence to be cited for relativism than

PhysicalSciences 9 1978), pp. 63-159; R.S. Cowan, Francis Galton s statist-ical ideas: the influence of eugenics , Isis 63 1972), pp. 509--28; A.j.Desmond, Designing the dinosaur: Richard Owen s re5JX nse RobertEdmond Grant , Isis, 70 1979), pp. 224-34; j. Farley, TM S[JonUlneousGenera ion Con roveny from Descartes 10 Oparin Baltimore, 1977); j. Farleyand G L Geison, Science, politics and spontaneous generation inFrance: the PasteurPouchet debate , ulletin the History Medicine 48 1974), pp 161-98; P. Forman, Weimar culture, causality, and quantum theory, 1918-1927: adaptation by German physicists andmathematicians to a hostile inteUectual environment Historical Studies in ekePhysical Scieru:es 3 1971), pp. i-l iS; E. Frankel, Corpuscular optics andthe wave theory of lighr: the science and politics of a revolution in physics ,Social Scudies ofScieru:e 6 1976), pp. 141-84; M.e.jacob The NewlOnia ,and he English Revolution, 1689-1720 Ithaca, 1976); j.R. jacob, Boyle satomism and the Restoration assault on pagan naturalism , Social Sludies Science 8 1978), pp. 211-33; j.R. jacob, Robert Boyle and the EnglishRevolution. A S,udy in Social and Intellectual Change New York, 1977); j.R.jacob, The ideological origins of Robert Boyle s natural philosophy ,JournalofE ,opeanSludits 2 1972), pp. 1-21; D. MacKenzie, SUltisticaltheory andsocial interests: a case srudy , SocialS,udies ofScitru:e, 8 1978), pp. 35-83; D.MacKenzie, Eugenics Britain , Social Studies of Science, 6 1976), pp.499-532; D. MacKenzie, SlfJtis,ic, in Brilain /865-1930: The SocialConslnU:lion ofScientifu: Knowledge Edinburgh University Press, 1981); D.MacKenzie, S.B. Barnes, Biometriker versus Mendelianer: Eine Kontroverse und ihre ErkHirung , Kalner ZeilSchrijl fur Soziologie special edition18 1975), pp. 16S-96; D. Ospovat, Perfect adaptation and teleologicalexplanation: approaches to the problem of the history of life in the midnineteenth century , Studies in History of Biolagy, 2 1978), pp. 33-56; W.Provine, Geneticists and the biology of race crossing , Setence 182 1973),pp 790-6; M.I.S. Rudwick, The Devonian: a system born in conflict inM.R. House e aI. OOs , The Devonian System London, 1979); S. Shapin,The politics of observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests Edinburgh phrenology disputes in R. Wallis 00.), On MMarginsofScilmce:The Social ConslnU:lion of RejeCled Sociological Review Mono-graphs 27, Keele, 1979), pp. 139-78; R.S. Turner The growth of professo-rial research in Prussia, 1818-1848: causesand contexts HislorlcalStudies intM Physi


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Relativism, Rationalism, Sociology ofK1WWledge 25against it. It is mainly on the programmatic level that the determinedopposition to relativism is to be found. Since instances of the empiricalmaterial liave been marshalled and discussed elsewhere the issuesthat will be a ddre ssed here will be of a more methodological andphilosophical character.

If th e relativist places all beliefs on a pa r with o ne a no th er for thepurposes of explanation then we ca n say th at he is advocating a formof monism He is stressing the essential identity of things that otherswould hold separate. Conversely, rationalists who reject relativismtypically do so by insisting on a form of dualism They hold on to thedistinctions between true and false, rational and irrational belief an dinsist that these cases are vitally different from on e another. They tryto give the distinction a role in th e conduct of the sociology ofknowledge or anthropology or history by saying that the explanationst o b e offered in the two cases are to beof a different kind. In particularmany of th e critics of relativism implicitly reject our equivalencepostulate by saying that rational beliefs must be explained wholly or

New Haven, )976); B. Wynne, C.G. Barkla and the JPhenomenon: a casestudy in the treatment deviance in physics , Social Studies of Scienet1976) pp. 304-47; B. Wynne, Physics and psychicsj science, symbolicaction and social control in late Victorian England in B. Barnes and S. Shapineds), Natural Order Historical Studies of Scientific ulture Sage, London,1979 ch. 7. A valuable review and discussion of this and other material is S.Shapin, History of science and its sociological reconstruction\ History Science, 20, Sep 1982 (forthcoming).8 M. Douglas> Implicit Meanings Routledge, London, 1975 ; see also herCultural Bias , Occasional Paper 34, Royal Anthropological Institule (London, 1978 ; cf. alsoM Cole ]. Gay, ]. Glick, D. Sharp, The CulluralCOnleXIolLumaing and Thinking (Basic Books, New York, 1 9) and R. Horton, andR. Finnegan (eds),Modes 01 Thoughl (Faber, London, 1973, See B Barnes, and S Shapin, (eds), Narural Order: HiSl .1 Sludie, ofScienrifu: ulMe (Sage, London, 1979 ; D. Bloor, The sociology of [scientific] knowledge in W. Bynum, E.]. Browne and R. Porter (eds), DiclionaryolcheHisloryolScience (Macmillan, London, 1981); S Shapin, Social usesofscience G.S. Rousseau and R.S. Porter (eds), mnml ofKIWWledge:Sludw Historiography 01 Eighleenlh


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6 Barry Barnes and DavidBloorpartly by the fact that they are rational, whilst irrational beliefs call forno more than a causal, socia-psychological or external explanation.For example, Hollis has recently insisted that true and rational beliefsn eed on e sort of explanation, false and irrational beliefs another .10Imre Lakatos was one of the most strident advocates of a structurallysimilar view. He equated rational procedures in science with those thataccord with some p ref er re d p hiloso phy of science. Exhibiting thecases which appear to conform to the preferred philosophy is callednternal history or rational reconslruclion . He then asserts that therational aspect of scientific growth is fully accounted for by one s logicof scientific discovery . All the rest, which is not fully accounted for, ishanded over to the sociologist for non-rational, causal explanation. Aversion of this t he ory is endorsed by Laudan. Even the sociologistKarl Mannheim adopted this dualist and rationalist view whe n hecontrasted the existential determination of thought by extratheoretical factors with development according to immanent lawsderived from the a ture of things of pure logical possibilities . Thisis wh y he exempted the physical sciences and mathematics from hissociology of knowledge. 3

As the first step in the examination of the rationalist case let usconsider a charge that is sometimes made against the relativist. t issaid, for example by Lukes, that the relativist has underrnined his ownright to use words like true or false . 14 Answering this charge is not adifficult task, and it will help to bring the character of relativism, andthe shortcomings of rationalism, into sharp focus.

Consider the members of two tribes, Tl and T2, whose cultures areboth primitive but otherwise very different from one another. Within M. Hollis, The social destruction of reality , this volume p. 75. I. Lakatos, History of science and its rational reconstructions in R. Buckand R Cohen eds), Boston Sludies in Philosophy ofScience, vol 8 Reidel,Dordre


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Relarivism Rationalism Sociology Knowledge each tribe some beliefs will be preferred to others and some reasonsaccepted as more cogent than others. Each tribe will have a vocabularyfor expressing these preferences. Faced with a choice between thebeliefs of s ow n tribe an d those of lhe olher each individual wouldtypically prefer those of his ow n culture. He would have available tohi m a number of locally acceptable standards to use in order to assessbeliefs and justify his preferences.

What a relativist says about himself is just what he would say aboutth e tribesman. The relativist, like everyone e1 C is under th e necessityto sort ou t beliefs, accepting some and rejecting others. He willnaturally have preferences and these will typically coincide with thoseof others in his locality. The words true an d 'false' provide th e idiomin which those evaluations are expressed, a nd t he words rational and'irrational' will have a similar function. When confronted with an alienculture he too, will probably prefer his ow n familiar and acceptedbeliefs an d his local culture will furnish n or ms a nd standards whichca n be used to justify such preferences if it becomes necessary to do so.

The crucial point is that a relativist accepts that his preferences andevaluations are as context-bound as those of th e tribes T l and T2.Similarly he accepts tha t n on e of the justifications of his preferencesca n be formulated in absolute or context-independent terms. In thelast analysis, he acknowledges that s justifications will stop at someprinciple or alleged matter of fact that only has local credibility. Theonly alternative is that justifications will b eg in to run in a circle andassume what they were meant to justify.

For th e relativist there is no sense attached to the idea that somestandards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely locallyaccepted as such. Because he think s tha t the re are no context-free orsuper-eultural norms of rationality he does no t see rationally and It may be objected that the present argument would only apply in a worldwhere peopleweredivided into relatively isolated social groups andwould failin proportion to the degree that cosmopolitan uniformity prevailed - or whenwhat Durkheim called an international life emerged. is is onc of theobjections E Gellner presses against Winch in The new idealism - cause nmeaning in the social sciences' n Lakatosand A. Musgrave(eds),Problems;ItePhilosophy o[Scie. (North Holland, Amsterdam, 1 8), pp. 377-406,esp. p 97 nfact in our argument the picture of the isolated tribes Tl and T2is merely expository and not a necessary feature of the argument. The size ofthe context and the actual presence of alternatives is entirely contingene. Thesame point would apply even if there happened to be just one homogeneousinternational community.


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28 Barry Barnes and David Bloorirrationally held beliefs as making up two distinct and qualitativelydifferent classes of thing. They do not fall into two different naturalkinds which make different sorts of appeal to th e human mind orstand in a different relationship to reality, or depend for their credibil-ity on different patterns of social organization. Hence th e relativistconclusion that they are to b e explained in th e same way.

A typical move at this point in th e argument is to try to contain an dlimit the sigrtificance of th e sociology of knowledge by declaring thatbecause it is merely the study of credibility it can have no implicationsfor validity Validity, say the critics, is a question to be settled directlyby appeal to evidence an d reason an d is quite separate from thecontingencies of actual belief. As Professor Flew has put it anaccount of the sufficiently good reasons for a b elief must be dis-tinguished from a n account of the psychological, physiological orsociological causes of inclinations to utter words expressing this beliefwhen appropriately stimulated . 6 The question of the reasons for abelief and the question of its causes are qrtite separate sorts of issue.But having separated these two issues this critic then proceeds to shuntth e sociologist an d psychologist into the sidings where they can beforgotten. The rationalist is now free to operate in th e realm of reasonand make out its function an d workings to be whatever he wishes. Thisis why we ar e told SO emphatically that th e sociologist of knowledgemust be concerned with causes of belief racher than with whateverevidencing reasons there may be for cherishing them .

Unfortunately for the rationalist the freedom which this convenientdivision of labour would give him cannot be granted: the distinctionsupon which it is based will not stand examination. The reason is that itwould be difficult to find a commodity more contingent and moresocially variable than Flew s evidencing reasons . What coun ts as anevidencing reason for a belief one context will be seen as evidencefor quite a different conclusion in another context. For example, was

A.G.N. Flew, Is the scientific enterprise self-refuting? t ro eedings o iuEighth Inrenw ional Conference on the Unil of t Serenees Los Angeks 979 New York, 1980 vol 1,pp.34-M. Ibid.


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Relativism Rationalism Sociology Knuwledge 9the fact that living malter appeared in Pouchet s laboratory prepara-tions evidence for the spontaneousgenerationoflife, or evidence theincompetence the experimenter as Pasteur maintained? s his-torians of science have shown, different scientists drew differentconclusions an d took th e evidence to point in different directions.This was possible because something is only evidence for somethingelse when set in the context of assumptions which give it meaning -assumptions for instance about what is pn r probable rimprob-able. f on religious and political grounds there is a desire to maintaina sh ar p an d symbolically useful distinction between malter and lifethen Pouchet must have blundered rather than have made a fascinat-ing discovery. Th es e were indeed the factors that conditioned thereception of his work in th e conservative France of the SecondEmpire. R Evidencing reasons , then, are a prime target forsociological enquiry and explanation. There is no question of thesociology of knowledge being confined to causes rather than evidenc-ing reasons . Its concern is precisely with causes s evidencingreasons .

V

Obviously it would be possible for the rationalist to cOUDleraltack. Hecould say that the above argument only applies to what are taken to bereasons, rather than to what r lly r reasons. Once again, the chargewould be that the sociologists had conflated validity and credibility.But if a rationalist really were to insist on a total distinction betweencredibility and validity he would simply leave the field of discoursealtogether. Validity totally detached from credibility is nothing. Thesociologist of knowledge with his relativism and his monism wouldwin by default: his theory would meet no opposition. It is because ofthe rationalist s desire t avoid this consequence that sooner or later,overtly or covertly he will fuse validity an d credibility. He too willtreat validity and credibility as o ne thing by finding a cenain class ofreasons that are alleged to carry their own credibility with them: theyw be visible because they glow by their own light.

To see how this comes about consider again the two tribes TI andT2 For a member o f T I examining what is to him a peculiar belief and Geison, Science, politics and spontane us generation


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30 arry arnes and avid lourfrom the culture ofT2 there isaclear point to the distinction betweenthe validity a nd t he credibility of a belief. He will say that just becausethe misguided members ofT2 believe something that doesn t make ittrue. It s rightness and wrongness he may add must be establishedindependently of belief. But of course what he will mean by in-dependently of belief independently of the beliefof others such asthe members ofT2. For his ow n part he h as no option but to use theaccepted methods and assumptions of his own group. In practice thisis what directly ascertaining truth or falsity comes down to.

The simple structure of the example makes it easy to see what ishappening. The distinction between validity an d credibility is soundenough in this case but its real point its scope and its focus is entirelylocal. As th e relativist would expect it is not an absolute distinction .but one whose employment depends upon a taken-for-granted back-ground. It is a move within a game and it is with regard to th ebackground knowledge assumed by the mo ve that validity andcredibility ar e tacitly brought together. Without this the distinctionitself could never be put to use or its contrast be given an application.

our imaginary tribesman was dialectically sophisticated he mightrealize that he is open to t he charge of special pleading and t hat hehad in his own case collapsed the distinction upon which he ha d beeninsisting. How could he reply to the accusation that hehad equated th evalidity an d credibility of his ow n beliefs? As a more careful statementof his position he might claim that not even th e fact that his own tribebelieves something is in irself sufficient to make it true. Bu t he wouldthen have to mend the damage of this admission by adding that it justwas a fact that what his tribe believed w s true. A kindly providenceperhaps ha d here united these two essentially different things.

For the sociologist of knowledge these refinements change nothing.They do not remove the special pleading they simply elaborate upont But th ey r emin d us that we need to locate the point at which th erationalists of our culture make the same move. We must examine therationalist case to find the point at which reasons ar e said to becomevisible by their own light an d Reason in Action transcends th eoperation of causal processes and social conditions.

vA familiar candidate to invoke for the role of Reason in Action is th eclass of beliefs which are supposed to be directly an d immediately


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Relativism Rationalism Sociology nowledge apprehended by experience. may be said that some knowledgeclaims can be sustained and can attract credibility purely in virtue oftheir correspondence with reality - a correspondence which anyreasonable agent can recognize. Some things w just know by experi-ence and no contingent factors such as their support by authority ortheir coherence with the overaJl panern culture re necessary fortheir maintenance.

Such a theory is easily recognized as a species naive empiricismand its weaknesses are well known. Nevertheless similar assumptionscan emerge in a disguised fonn. For example Flew has argued tha twhen it is a question of accounting for beliefs a bo ut maUers ofeveryday useand observation then there is nothing like so much roomfor sophisticated social and historical causes . 9The polemical force ofthis appeal to everyday use and observation may be gathered from thefollowing claim which we shall assess in some detail:

The cause ofour belief that the ferry canoe is where it is on theZaire River does not lie in the social structure ofour tribe. is tobe found instead in certain intrusive f cts thatwhen we turn oureyes towards the right bit of the river the canoecauses appropriate sensory impressions; and that those heed-lessly placing themselves in the water rather tha n the canoe areincontinently eaten by crocodiles.o

would be possible to take exception to this passage by stressing howmuch more s involved in the identification of an object as the Zaireriver ferry canoe than turning our eyes in the right direction. All thesocially sustained classifications that are involved in the process havebeen simply left out of account. But though such criticisms would becorrect and well deserved they would not fully meet the point beingmade. What s really at issue here is the status of certain skills such asour ability to navigate ourselves around our environment; avoidingfalling in rivers; and remembering the location ofmedium-scale phys-ical objects. The question is: how do these skills relate to a relativistsociology of knowledge? Do they provide any basis for criticism andhence comfort for the rationalist?The first point to notice is that the facts to be attended to are skills

that individuals share with non-linguistic animals. They are a real andimportant part of our mentality and as Flew has pointed out they arenot greatly illuminated by sociologists or historians. Indeed they are Flew s the scientific enterprise self-refuting?10 Ibid.


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34 Bany Barnes and DavidBloorthese substances. They then observed what happened, and recordedthe behaviour of various volumes of gas given off and absorbed.

Nevertheless Priestley and Lavoi si er bel ie ve d totall y differentthings: they gave sharply conflicting accounts of the nature of thesubstances they observed and their properties and behaviour. Indeedthey asserted that quite different substances were present in the eventsthey witnessed. Lavoisier denied that there was such a substance asphlogiston and postulated the existence of something called oxygen .Priestley took exactly the opposite view. He insisted on the existenceofphlogiston, identifying it with certain samplesof gas agreed by bothto be present in the experiment. Furthermore Priestley deniedLavoisier s oxygen and characterized the gas so labelled - which hehad himself discovered - by means of his own theory. Clearly theeffect of the facts is neither simple nor sufficient to explain whatneeds explaining, viz. the theoretical divergence. t is bec ause theeffect of the facts is so different that the sociology ofknowledge h as atask.

There were, indeed, some occasions when for a while theexperimenters observed different things from one another, e.g. whenone came across a phenomenon that theother had not yet heard about.Furthermore, it is clear that when either of them observed somethingnew in their apparatus it evoked a response. Thus PriestleySpolled theappearance of water when, as we would say, he heated lead oxide inhydrogen. (For Priestley this was minium in phlogiston .) Butwhat the new observation did was t prompt the elaboration of hisexisting approach. Similarly, the differential exposure to facts merelyresulted, for a while, in a slightly different degree of elaboration oftheir respective systems of thought.

The general conclusion is that reality is , after a ll , a common factor inall t he vastly dif fe re nt cognit ive r esponses that men produce to it.Being a common factor it is not a promising candidate to field as anexplanationof that variation. Certainly any differences in the samplingofexperience, and any differential exposure to reality must be allowed J.B. Conant The overthrow of phlogiston theory ) in J.B. Conant andK.K. Nash eds), Harvard Case HiS om in ExperimenUlI Scien


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Relativism Rationalism Sociology Knowledge 5for. But that is in perfect accord with our equivalence postulate whichenjoins the sociologist to investigate whatever local causes of credibil-ity operate in each case. There is nothing in any of this to give comfortto the rationalist, or trouble to the relativist.

VII

Another important line of attack directed against relativism appears ina well-known sequence of papers by Martin Hollis an d StevenLukes. 23 They hold that all cultures share a common core of truebeliefs an d rationally-justified patterns of inference. This core is madeup of statements which rational men cannot fail to believe in simpleperceptual situations and rules of coherent judgement, whichrational men cannot fail to subscribe to . 24 Elsewhere these culturaluniversals are described as material object perception beliefs an dsimple inferences relying say on the law non-contradiction . 25According to Hollis and Lukes the truth of the statements in this core,and the validity of the inferences therein, are everywhere acknow-ledged because there are universal, context-independent criteria oftruth an d rationality, which all men recognize an d are disposed toconform to. Without such universal criteria there would be nocommon core.Clearly there is indeed such a core, an d it is sustained by context-independent criteria of truth an d rationality, then relativism is con-founded. But why must we accept that it exists? Interestingly, Lukes23 M. Hollis, Thelimits of irrationality , European Journal of Sociology1967), pp. 265-71; an d Reason and r itu al , Philosophy 43 1967), pp.231-47; and also this volume. See also S. Lukes Some problems aboutrationality , European Joumal of Sociology 7 1967), pp. 247-64; On th esocial determination of truth in Horton and Finnegan Modes ThoughtRelativism cognitive and moral Supplementary Proceedings the Aristote68 1974), pp. 165-89; Rationality and the explanation of belief ,paper given at the Colloquium on .Irrationality: Explanation andUnderstanding Maison des Sciences de l Homme Paris 7-9 Jan 1980.Note: Hollis The limits of rationality and Reason and ritual and LukesSome problems about rationality have llbeen reprinted in B.R. Wilson ed.),Ralionality Blackwell, 1970), chs.9 an d II. Page references will beto t Wilson volume unless otherwise stated.24 Hollis this volume p. 74.2S Lukes Rationality and the explanation of belief p. 8.


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36 arry arms and avid loorand Hollis make no serious attempt to describe the common core or tomark its boundaries. Rather they seek to show that u t exist or atleast that its existence must be assumed a priori if the possibility ofcommunication and understanding hetween distinct cultures is ad-mitted. We are asked to consider the problems facing say an English-speaking anthropological field-worker seeking to understand an alienculture. Such an individual must grasp the meaning of the alienconcepts and beliefs and this we ar e tol d requires him to tr nsl tthem into English. hisis where the common core comes in: it servesas the rational bridgehead which makes translation possible. is thebasis upon which simple equivalences between two languages can beinitially established so that the enterprise of translation can get off theground. By assuming that in simple percepTUal situations the aliensperceive much as we do infer much as we do and say more or lesswhatwe would say we can define standard meanings for native terms .This then makes it possible to identify utterances used in moreambiguous situations lying outside the bridgehead in which super-naTUral or metaphysical or ritual beliefs are expressed. 26 The basicpoint however is that without the rational bridgehead we would becaught in a circle. eneed to translate native utterances in order toknow what beliefs they express while at t he s am e time we need toknow what is believed in order to know what is being said. Without anassumed bridgehead of shared beliefs there would be no way into thecircle for there is says Hollis no more direct attack on meaningavailable .27

Stated in abstract terms this argument has a certain plausibility.An d if it were to prove correct it would certainly bolster th e rationalistcase an d run counter to our equivalence postulate. The beliefs belong-ing to the rational bridgehead will be those whose enduring presence isexplicable simply in virTUe of the untrammelled operation of universalreason. Their credibility will be of a different sort from the diversity ofbeliefs that are peculiar to different culTUres. The credibility of thislatter class will have to be explained by special local causes whilst theformer simply are rational 2 The fact is however that the bridgheadargument fails as soon as it is measured against the realities oflanguagelearning and anthropological practice.26 Hollis The limits of irrationality pp. 215 216 and Reason and rifual

227 Hollis The limits of irrationality p. 208.

28 Lukes Some problems about rationaliry p. 208.


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Relativism Rotimtalism Sociology KntJWledge Notice how the whole argument hinges on Ihe supposed role of

translation there is no more direct attack on meaning available . Butthe fact is Ihat translation is not the most direcI attack on meaning thatis available. was not available nor did il play any part al all in Ihelirsl and major allack Ihat any of us made upon meaning when weacquired language in childhood. First language acquisition is not alranslation process and nOlhing that is absent here can be a necessaryingredient in subsequenl learning. To understand an alien culture theanthropologist can proceed in the way thaI native speakers do. Anydifficulties in achieving this stance will be pragmatie rather than pr or There is for instance no necessity for the learner to assumeshared concepts. Such an assumption would be false and would havenothing but nuisance value.

To see why Ihis is so consider whalis involved when a child learns anelementary concepl like bird . Such learning needs Ihe continuingassistance of culturally competent adults. A teacher may gesturetowards something in the sky and say bird . Given the well-knownindefiniteness of ostension a child would probably glean very littleinformation from this: is il the object or the setting that is intended?But afler a few ls of ostension to different birds in different seltingshe would begin to become competent in distinguishing birds fromnon-birds and might perhaps himself tentatively point out and labelputative birds.Suppose now that the child labels a passing aeroplane a bird . Thiswould be a perfectly reasonably thing to do given the points ofresemblance berween aeroplanes and birds. O f course there arenotieeable differences too but there are such differences betweenevery successive instance of what are properly called b ir ds . All theinstances of empirical concepts differ in detail from one another andwe can never apply such concepts on the basis of perfect identity ratherthan resemblance. What the child is doing in effect is judging theresemblances belween the aeroplane and Ihe previous instances ofbird to be more significant than the differences. The general form ofhis judgement with its balancing of similarities an d differences isidentical 10 Ihose whieh lead 10 proper or accepted usage. It is only hisknowledge of custom which is defective.

What happens in the case of the child is that he is overruled. Nothat is an aeroplane. This correction is at once an act social controlandofcultural transmission. It helps him to learn which ofthe possiblejudgements of sameness are accepted by his society as relevant to the


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38 Barry BamesandDavid Blooruse of bird . In this way the particulass of experience are ordered intoclusters and patterns specific to a culture

The significance of t s point becomes even more cleas when we seehow the things we call birds ase dealt with in other cultures. Whenth e anthropologist Bulmer visited the Karam of New Guinea he foundthat many ofthe instances of what we would call bird were referred toas yakt . He also found that instances of bats were included amongstth e yakt , while instances of cassowaries were scrupulously deniedadmittance to the taxon. Objects were clustered in different ways, andthe analogies that it is possible to discern amongst phenomena werechannelled along different paths. Nevertheless, twas not too difficultto learn yakt : the task simply involved noting what the Karampointed out as yakt until it was possible t pick them out as well as th eKaram did. Z

What these examples show is that evenempirical terms like bird dono t constitute a special core of concepts whose application dependsonly upon an unconditioned reason. Learning even the mostelementary of terms is a slow process that involves the acquisition fromth e culture of specific convemions This makes apparently simpleempirical words no different from others that are p erh ap s mo reobviously culturally influenced. There ase no privileged occasions forth e use of terms- no simple perceptualsituations - which provide th eresearcher with standard meanings uncomplicated by cultural vari-ables. In short, there is no bridgehead in Hollis sense. 30

Because there are no standard meanings there is no question ofusing them to provide a secure base from w hic h to advance towardsm or e a mb ig uo us cases whose operation is to be understood in aqualitatively different and derivative way. All concepts and all usagesstand on a par: none are intrinsically unambiguous or intrinsicallyany more than some are intrinsically literal or intrinsically metaphorical . Furthermore, there is no telling in advance R. Bulmer, Why is the cassowary not a bird? , ann s 2 1967),/,.5-25.For a fuller development of these points. see Hesse, he tructure Scienlijic Inference Macmillan, London, 1974), chs I and 2. The ir sociolog-ical signifIcance is explored B. Barnes, On the conventional character ofknowledge and cognition , Philosophy ofrhe Social Sciences l9gl), pp.303-33. D Bloor, Durkheim and Mauss revisited: classification and thesociology of knowledge , Sludies in Hisrory alld Philosophy Scietlce forth-coming) - a German version of this paper appeared in K61tIeT Zeirschrifr fUrSozialogie special issue, 3 1980), pp. 20-51.


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elativism ationalismSocwlogy Knuwledge which are the problematic cases where an alien culture will deviatefrom ours. For example Bulmer could not have predicted in advancewhat the Karam would call bats or cassowaries simply because of theinitial identity ofusage he discerned between the Karam yakt and ourbird Similarly no one could predict on the basis of past usage whatthe Karam would do with a hitherto unknown case such as say abarn-owl. Existing usage is only a precedent defmed over a fmitenumber ofparticular instances. does not f the proper handling ofnew cases in advance Diverse developmenls re possible n evenwhere cultural diversity is not present it could emerge at any momentby a revision of the existing sequence of judgements of sameness anddifference.

t might be objected none the less that the rational bridgeheadwas invoked to account for the possibility of translation and trans-lation is a possible mode ofunderstanding alien culture even if t is nota necessary mode. How is translation possible? Might not an anti-relativist argument be based simply upon the possibility of successfultranslation?The way to proceed here is to assume nothing about translation inadvance least of all that it is successfully carried out. Instead weshould ask what is implied for translation by the little empirical

knowledge we possess of the simpler aspecrs of semantics andlanguage learning. One clear implication arises from the character ofconcepts as arraysof judgements ofsameness. Every such array beingthe product of a unique sequence of judgements is itself unique. Noarray in one culture can be unproblematically set into an identity withan array from another culrure. Hence perfect translation cannot exist:there can only be translation acceptable for practical purposes asjudged by contingent local standards. And this is a conclusion whichfits well with what we know of the extremely complex procedures andactivities which constitute translation as an empirical phenomenon.Thus the rational bridgehead the alleged common core of beliefsllared by all cultures rums out to be a purely imaginary constructwith no empirical basis at all. is not difficult however to perceive itsorigins in tile received culture of epistemologists. It is an oldphilosophical dualism dressed in a new garb. The distinction betweenthe pans ofaculture that belong to tile rational core and the parts thatare specific and variable is just another version of the idea thatobservational predicates are qualitatively different from theoreticalpredicates. The bridgehead argument is a plea for a single pure


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40 arryBarnes and David loorobservation language. O fall th e dualisms ofepistemology this must bethe most discredited.31 Surely, we no w all recognize that although wemay well all share the same unverbaJized environment there are anynumber of equally reasonable ways of speaking of it .

VIIIHollis an d Lukes argument includes the claim that there are simpleforms of inference which all rational men frod compelling. Among theinstances offered here is p p implies q, therefore q . Hollis introducesthis under th e logicians name of modus ponens an d represents it byusing the usual symbol for material implication, (p. p--+q))--+q.32 isnoticeable, however, that Hollis and Lukes do not even begin to maketheir case. In particular they offer no relevant empirical evidence fortheir claim. None the less it is interesting to explore what follows me n do indeed evince some general disposition to conform to modusponens an d to other simple patterns of inference. then becomesnecessary to ask why men are disposed in favour of these forms ofinference. What might account for the existence of such allegeduniversals of reason?

According to the rationalists there are two distinct issues here andtwo ways of approaching the question. We can either search for thecauses of the phenomenon or we ca n seek to furnish reasons for it.Naturally a rationalist will want to provide th e sufficiently goodreasons that are at work and hence show that deductive intuitions areexplicable in rational terms. The aim will be to show that deductiveforms ofinferencecan be shown to be rationally justified in an absoluteand context-free sense. Unfortunately for the rationalist there littlethat he can offer by way of reasoned argument in favour of adherenceto deductive inference forms. We have reached the end-point at whichjustification goes in a circle.

The predicament is neatly captured in Lewis Carroll s story of whatthe Tortoise said to Achilles. Presented by Achilles with premises ofthe form p--+q and p the tortoise refuses to draw the conclusion quntil t he s te p has been justified. Achilles obliges by formulating th erule according to which the tortoise is to proceed. The rule makes Cf. Hesse, TMSlTllClure o Scienriju: In tTemeHollis


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Relalivism Raliq and p will you now conclude q ? he asks. Unforlunalely Ihelortoise is able 10 point out that when the justifying premise has beenadded the new inference is again dependent on a step of the type Ihathas been called into question: so he asks for yet another premise to beformulated, and so on. The a tempt at justification therefore fails, andAchilles fmds that he cannot use logic to force the tortoise to draw thedesired conclusion.The basic point is that justifications of deduction themselves pre-suppose deduction. They are circular because they appeal to the veryprinciples of inference that are in question In this respect thejustification of deduction is in Ihe same predicament as the justifica-tions of induction which tacilly make inductivemoves by appealing tothe fact that induction 'works'. Our two basic modes of reasoning arein an equally hopeless statewith regard 1 their rational justification.3S Carroll, 'What the Tortoise said to Achilles , Mind n.s., 4 (1895), pp.278-80. Carroll, of course, does not use bare ps and qs but begins with asimple proposition from Euclid.).4 t has been argued that there are technical defects n Carroll s paper andthat the tortoise shifts his ground with regard to what has to be justified atdifferent stages in the regress. J. Thomson, 'What Achilles should havesaid to the Tortoise', Rario 3 (1960), pp. 95-105. Nevertheless the basicthrust Carroll s argument is correct. Circularity emerges whenever anattempt is made to groundourmost general notions validity. SeeW. Quine,Truth by convention in his Ways aradox (Random House, New York,1966). See also J. McKinsey,lcnmoalo[SymbolicLogic 13 (1948) pp 114-15;and S. Kleenc: ibid., 173-4. These: points are fully discussed in SusanHaack, 'The justification of deduction', Mind 85 (1976), pp. 112-19. Inparticular Haack shows that appeals to the truth table definition ofmaterialimplication in order to justifymodus pcmens itselfuses that principle p. 114).35 Haack, n The justification of deduction exhibits the similarity betweenthe scandal induction and the scandal deduction. Needless to say, aninduclive justification deductive inference-Conus and conuadiction-avoiding rules is useless in the battle against relativism. these rules andforms are favoured and institutionalized only where they prove profitable indiscourse, then their incidence becomes intelligible in {CnTIS of contingentlocal determinants just as sociological relativism requires. And, conversely,ll the deviations from the rules and forms are likely to become equ vjustified in the same way. This will show 'hem to be just the same kinds ofphenomena as the rules and forms themselves. Consider all the familiarlocutions we fUld of pragmatic value in informal speech which appear to doviolence to fonnallogical rules: Yes and no , It was, and yet wasn t , The


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4 arry ames and David B/ X7rAs with induction a variety of attempts have been made toevade the

circularity of justification. 36 Perhaps the most fully developed attemptat justification has been to say that the validity of inferences derivessimply from the meaning of the formal signs o r logical words u sed inthem. For instance, the meaning of is given by truth tabledermitions or the rules or inrerence of the logical system of which it is a

part, and the validity of t he inferences in this system derives fr omthese meanings. This is the theory of analytic validity . Unfortunatelyfor the rationalist this theo ry has been completely devastated by thelogician A. N Prior

Prior develops his argument by t aki ng the case of the very simplelogical connective and Why is pan d q therefore q a valid inference?The theory of analytic validity says that it is valid because of themeaning of and What is the meaning of and ? This is given bystating the role that the term has in forming compound propositions,or conjunctions, and drawing inferences from them And is dermedby the rules that i) from any pair of statements p and q we can inferthe slatement p an d q an d ii)from any conjunctive statement p an dq we can infer either of the conjuncts. As an antidote to the seductivepower or this circular procedure Prior shows that a similar sequence ofdermitions would permit the introduction of connectives that wouldjustify the inference or any statement from an y other Consider, hesays, the new logical connective tonk :

Its meaning is completely given by the rules that i) from anys tat ement P we can i nf er any statement rormed by joining P to

whole was greater than its parts , There is some truth in that statement ,That statement is nearer to the truth than this onc , A is a better proof thanB and so on. All these locutions, indeed everything in discourse whichLukes identifies as needing elucidation by context-specific rather thanuniversal rules, become identical in character to universally-rational formsof discourse. The dualism essential to the anti-relativist position disappears.36 For instance, it may be said that justifications of deducLion are superfluous and that it is a mistake to concede that they are necessary. Critics oLewis Carroll have taken this line, e.g. W. Rees, What Achilles said to theTortoise J indn.s., 60 95I , pp. 241-6. But judgements about what is, oris not, 5Uperfluous are highly subjective. In the present typ of case we maysuspect that they will derive their credibility entirely from their conveniencefor the purposes in hand namely evading the problem that justifications arccircular.37 A.N. Prior, The runabout inference ticket , Analysts 1960), pp. 38-9.


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Relativism Rationalism Sociology Knowledge 4any statement Q by tonk which compound statement wehereafter describe as the statement P-tonk-Q , and that ii)from any contonktive statement P-tonk-Q we ca n infer th econtained statement Q. 38

Hence we can inf er any Q from anyWhat P rior s p ap er shows is that appeal to rules an d meaningsc annot by i ts elf justify our intuitions about validity, because theserules and meanings are themselves judged according to those in-tuitions, e.g. intuitions to the effect that and is defined by acceptablerules, whereas tonk is not. The theory ofanalytic validity invites us toru n to meanings to justify our intuitions of validity, but then we haveto run back again.lo our intuitions of validity to justify our selection ofmeanings. Our preference for th e right rules which define accept-able connectives reveals the circularity of the intended justification.The intuitions are basic an d the p ro blem of justification set by thetortoise is the end-point after all. Like the good relativist that he is, thetortoise awaits a reasoned justification of deduction, confident thatnone will be forthcoming. 39

IXWhat else is there to do then but to turn to causes for an answer to thequestion of th e widespread acceptance of deductive inference formsand the avoidance of inconsistency? A plausible strategy is to adopt a38 Ibid., p. 38.39 Prior s paper has been discussed by N. Belnap, Tonk, Plank and Plink ,Analysis 22 i962), pp. 130-4; J.T. Stevenson, Roundabout the runaboutinference ticket , Analysis 21 1962), pp. and Susan Haack, Phil >s p y LogU:s Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978), p. 31.

None these commentators address the main point in Prior s argument.They treat his paper as it posed the question of how we should dennelogical connectives rather than the question the source the validity of theinferences containing mem Thus their response takes the form of saying thatprop r y chosen meanings accomplish valid inferences. The point then is tolocale the source propriety for these choiCts and this reintroduces finNitions of validity again Belnap explicitly invokes these intuitions butdespite his appreciationofPrioe s paper appears not to see that he ising rather than correcting imHollis paper A Retort to the Tortoise , Mind 84 1975), pp. 61(} 16, issimply another attempt to reify meaning and impute to it the power to solvebasic problems of validity.


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44 arry ames and avid loorform of nativism: the disposilion arises from our biological constitu-tion and the way the brain is organized. Such a move, needless to say,gives no comfort to ralionalism: epistemologicallY, to invoke neuronalstructure is no better than to invoke social structure; both moves seekexplanations rather than juslifications. And for this very reason naliv-ism is perfectly compatible with relativism. At whatever point it isfound necessary, the explanation of credibility may swing from socialto biological causes. Our empirical curiosity swings from asking howour society is organized to asking how the brain is organized. ugeneral cognilive proclivilies become subject to empirical enquiry justas are the cognilive proclivilies ofother species. The empirical scien-tific investigation of human cognition its manifest structure and itsphysiological basis, is, of course, a lengthy task. At any given time ouroverall understanding of the matter and in parlicular our verbalaccounts of it will be provisional and liable to change. They aresubject to the same fluctualions and redescriplions as are found in thestudy of any other empirical phenomenon.

This consideralion reinforces an important point: no account ofourbiologically-based reasoning propensilies will justify a unique systemof logical conventions. Just as our experience of a shared materialworld does not itselfguarantee shared verbal descriplions of it so ourshared natural rationality does not guarantee a unique logical system.Hollis and Lukes make the same mistake in dealingwith logic as theydo with descriptive predicates. They fail to keep what belongs tounverbalized reality separate from what belongs to language. Just asthey conflated the two with their doctrine of a universal observalionlanguage; now they take the plausible belief that we possess deductivedisposilions and rendedt without a second thought into the abstractand highly convenlionalized notion of material implication. To com-bat this confusion we need to remember the gap between the variedsystems of logic as they are developed by logicians and the primitive,biologically based, informal intuitions upon which they all depend fortheir operation. Hollisand Lukes conflation soon takes its revenge onthem: modus ponens for material implication, which they confidentlytaketo be a rational universal, has been explicitlydeemed to fail, and isrejected, in some interesting systems of logic. 404 A.R. Anderson and Belnap Tautological entaihnents hilosophic l tudies 13 1961 , pp. 9 24 This paper develops some of the consequencesofdemanding t the entailment rclation satisfy conditions of relevance


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Relativism Rationalism Sociclogy Knowledge Logic as it is systematized in textbooks monographs or research

paper s, is a learned body of scholarly lore, growing and varying overtime. It is a mass of conventional routines decisions expedientrestrictions, dicta maxims, and ad we rules. The sheer lack ofnecessity in granring it s a ss um pt io ns or adopting it s s tra ng e andelaborate definitions is the point that should strike any candid obser-ver. Why should anyone adopt a notion of implication whereby acontradiction implies any proposition? What is compelling aboutsystems o logic which require massive and systematic deviation fromour everyday use o crucial words like if then and land ?41 As abody of conventions and esoteric traditions the compelling characterof logic, such as it is, derives from certain narrowly defined purposesand from CUStom and insti tutionalized usage. Its authority is moraland social, and as such it is admirable material for sociological investi-gation and explanation. In particular the credibility of logical con-ventions, juSt like the everyday practices which deviate from themwill e ofan entirely local character. The utility ofgranring or modify-ing a de fini tion for the sake of fonnal symmetry the expediency ofignoring the complexity ofeveryday discourse and everyday standardsof reasoning so that a certain abstract generality can e achieved: these

between premise and conclusion. This is one of the plausible intuitiverequirements that are violated by the Lewis Principle that a contradictionentails any statement: and not entailsQ regardless o whemer or notQCmmS This is what Anderson andBelnap do on grounds of relevance. The result is aperfectly consistent axiomYStem: the four-valued logic of De Morgan implication. ee Haack, Philoqphy Lcgic . pp. 200-1; D. Makinson, Topics in Modern Logic Methuen,London, 1973), ch. 2.It is ironic that logicians who expose with admirable ruthlessness howproblematic variable and difficult to ground patterns o inference are andwho freely confess bow very little is agreed upon by the totality of prac-titioners in their field are turned to again and again to provide constraintsupon the possibilities of rational thought. Just as there is always a certaindemand for iron laws o economics so there seems always to be ademand foriron laws o logic. l For acareful documentation of the relation between ordinary and technicalusage, see P. Slr1lwson, bllroduction UJ Logiall Themy Methuen, London,1952 .


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46 arry arnesand Da Didloorwill be the kinds of justification that will be offered and accepted ordisputed by specialists in the field.

The point that emerges is that if any informal, intuitive reasoningdispositions are universally compelling, they are ipso facto without anyreasoned justification. On the other hand, any parts oflogicwhich canbe justified will not be universal but purely local in their credibility.The rationalist goal of producing pieces of knowledge that are bothuniversal in their credibility and justified in context-independenttenns is unattainable.42

There is, of course, a final move that the rationalist can make. Hecan fall back into dogmatism, saying of some selected inference orconclusion or procedure: this just is what it is to be rational, f thisjust is a valid inference. 43 It is attbis point that the rationalist fmallyplucks victory out of defeat, for while the relativist can fight Reason,he is helpless against Faith. Just as Faith protects the Holy Trinity, orthe Azandeoracle, or the ancestral spiritsof the Luba, so it can protectReason. Faith has always been the traditional and most effective42 For an extension of this argument from logic to mathematics, see D. BloornowledgeandS ociallmagery Routledge Kegan Paul, 1966 . chs S-7. Herea modified empiricist theory of mathematics is defended against Frege. Seealso Bloor, Polyhedra and the abominations of Leviticus BrilishJaumal/orthe HisUJry Science, 1978), pp. 24S-72. This provides a sociologicalreading of I Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1976 . Although dogmaticassertionsare perhaps the most common ways in whichphilosophers indicate the end-points at which they revert to faith, there areocher ways. Quine for example explicitly takes for granted currendy acceptedscientific knowledge. Similarly, logicians often set out the points where theyallow intuition to decide for them which of different arguments they willaccept.Equally widespread, ifless defensible, is the decision to reject an argumentbecause of its consequences. If a series of inferences leads to solipsism, orscepticism, or relativism, it is assumed, simply by that very fact that theseries must contain an error. Thus, H. Putnam describes how one of hispapers is designed to block a perfectly good, but inconvenient, inductiveinference: [There is] a serious worry . . . that eventually the followingmeta-induction becomes overwhelmingly compelling: just as 7W term used inthe science more than 50 . . yearsago referred so i lwillcum outrhatno term wednow . . . refersIt must obviously be a desideratum for the Theory of Reference that dUsmetainduction be blocked What is realism?, Philosophical PaP


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Relativism Rationalism Sociowgy Knowledge 7defence against relativism. But ifat this point the relativist must retiredefeated, to gaze from some far hilltop on the celebratory rites of theCult of Rationalism, he can nevertheless quietly ask himself: whatlocal, contingent causes might account for the remarkable intensity ofthe Faith in Reason peculiar to the Cult

_ _of faith, which scorns any disguise. e Jarvie for example, is disarminglyfrank when he opposes relativism by suggesting: Perhaps, when we doscience, and even more so mathematics, we participate in the divine . [ t is]awe at the transcendental miracle of mathematics and science that has movedphilosophers since Ancient Greece Laudan s problematic progress and thesocial sciences , Philosophy Ihe Social Scietu es 9 1979), p. 49644 A plausible hypothesis is that relativism is disliked because so manyacademics see it as a dampener on their moralizing. A dualist idiom, with itsdemarcations, contrasts, rankings and evaluations is easily adapted thetasks of political propaganda or selfcongratulatory polemic. This is theenterprise that relativists threaten, not science. See notes 1-4 above. frelativism has any appeaJ at all, it will be to those who wish to engage thateccentric activity called disinterested research .

rationality and relativism

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