role of external state & non-state actors
TRANSCRIPT
Role of
EXTERNAL STATE& NON-STATE ACTORSin creating challenges to internal security
UpdatedValueAdditionMaterial2020
INTERNAL SECURITY www.visionias.in
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1.Introduction...................................................................................................................3
1.1ChallengesposedbyExternalStateActors....................................................................41.2ChallengesposedbyNon-Stateactors.............................................................................5
2. Terrorism.......................................................................................................................62.1Frameworkforde�iningTerrorism...............................................................................62.2Classi�icationofTerrorism................................................................................................72.2.1Stateterrorism.....................................................................................................................72.2.2Statesponsoredterrorism..............................................................................................82.2.3ViolentNon-StateTerrorism.........................................................................................8
2.3HistoryofTerrorisminIndia.............................................................................102.3.1Jammu&Kashmir.............................................................................................................102.3.2Punjab....................................................................................................................................102.3.3GrowthofHinterlandTerrorisminIndia...............................................................10
2.4KeyIssues.................................................................................................................112.4.1TerrorismintheAgeofTechnology..........................................................................112.4.2TerrorFinancing...............................................................................................................112.4.3UrbanTerrorism...............................................................................................................122.4.4Lone-WolfAttacks...........................................................................................................132.4.5UseofTerrorasaforeignpolicyinstrumentbyExternalStates.................142.4.6ThechallengeofISandAl-QaedainIndia.............................................................15
2.5India'sCounterTerrorismStrategy.................................................................162.5.1India'spreparednessagainstterrorism.................................................................17
2.6Stepstakenbythegovernment........................................................................182.6.1Enablingastronglegislationframework..............................................................182.6.2Institutionalframeworktotackleterrorism........................................................182.6.3CombatingTerrorFinance...........................................................................................182.6.4India'sInvolvementattheUN....................................................................................19
2.7VariousGlobalActionsforcounteringTerrorism......................................20
2.8Whatmoreneedstobedone.............................................................................212.8.1Strengtheningthetechnologyframeworktodealwithextremism............212.8.2A360-degreeapproach................................................................................................212.8.3EarlypreventionandDe-Radicalisation.................................................................222.8.4Strengtheningtheroleofthepoliceforce..............................................................22
3.VisionIASMainsPreviousYears'Questions...................................................23
4.UPSCMainsPreviousYears'Questions ..................................................................... 32
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Giventhelargepopulation,diversityofgroupsandidentitiesandshrinkingshare of resources, con�licts are bound to rise in the society. When thedemocratic institutionsand the state structure fails to fully resolve thesecon�lictsinapeacefulmanner,violenceerupts. ,Thehostileexternalforcestakingadvantageofthissituationthroughsubversivepropaganda,furtherhighlightthesecon�licts.Theygive toworsenmaterialandpoliticalsupportthissenseofgrievancetosuchanextentthatasmallminorityarewillingtobecometoolsintheirhandstounderminethestabilityandsecurityofthenation.
According to some experts, India does not face an external threat in theconventionalsense,but .onlyinternalsecuritythreatsfromexternalsourcesTheseexternalsources,consistofbothstateandnon-stateactors,combinedwith those anti-state forces within India, have made the situation moreintricate.All over theworld, few countries areplaced in anunfavourable,troubledanduncertainsecurityenvironmentasIndiais.Externalsourcesofthreats to India's internal security spring from almost all countries of itsneighbourhood.
India'sinternalsecurityproblemsareamanifestationofinternalweaknessesand external attempts at waging a proxy war. Inadequate socio-economicdevelopment,apathytowardsthegenuinegrievancesofthepeople,politicalbrinkmanship amongst other reasons, has created internal contradictions,whichhave ledtodecadesof internalstrife.Similarly,anumberof internalsecuritychallengesfacedtodayarefueledandcontrolledfromPakistan.Thepresence of hostile neighbours allows the internal con�licts to get externalsupport,which includesmoney,armsandsanctuaries.Thevested interestsexploittheseconditionstopursuetheirownschema.
1.INTRODUCTION
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Pakistan
Historically,Chinahasprovided�inancialsupport,armsandsanctuariestoNaga,MizoandMeiteiextremiststofuelinstabilityinIndia'sinternalsecurity.
China
The�loodingofthecountrywithcounterfeitsisalsoawayofweakeningtheeconomy.Therefore,thenon-stateactorsoperatingfromPakistanaretheproxiesofthestate,functioningunderaclearcharterofstatepolicy.
TheissuesinJammuandKashmirandTerrorisminthehinterlandareadirectmanifestationofPakistan'sin�luence.ItispartofPakistan'sstatepolicytobleedIndiathroughathousandcuts,givenitsobviousdisadvantagesontheconventionalwar�ightingfront.
Thereisnodoubtthatnoneofthesocallednon-stateactorslikethe couldLashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)haveoperatedwithimpunitywithouttheactivefunding,logisticalandmilitarysupportofPakistan.
ThecloselinkagesoftheISIandproxygroupsarewelldocumentedasistheirdirectinvolvementinattackslike26/11.ThesegroupsaimtonotonlycreateinstabilityinstateslikeJ&K,theyalsohavealargeraimofdestabilisingthecountry.Thisisdonethroughsporadicterroriststrikes,whichspreadsterrorandpanic.
The isessentiallytheemploymentofaproxyelement,whichgivestheuseofnon-stateactorsstateofPakistana .degreeofdeniability
1.1.ChallengesposedbyExternalStateActors
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CHALLENGESPOSEDBYEXTERNALSTATEACTORS
CHALLENGESPOSEDBYNON-STATEACTORS
DrugCartelsHumanTraf�icking
IssuesposedbyNGOsandcivilsocietyorganisations
TransnationalandMultinationalCorporations
ThreatsposedbyPakistan
ThreatsposedbyChinaandotherneighbours
LeftWingExtremism
Insurgency/EthnicGroupViolence
Terrorism
Overviewofthechallengesposedbyexternalstateandnon-stateactorsintheinternalsecurity.
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1.2ChallengesposedbyNon-Stateactors
DrugTraf�icking: GoldenTriangleProximitytothelargestproducersofheroinandhashish-theandGoldenCrescent (Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran) -hasmade India'sbordervulnerable todrugtraf�icking.Traf�ickingofdrugstakesplaceoverwhelminglythroughlandbordersfollowedbyseaandairroutes
Human traf�icking in India, although illegal under Indian law, remains aHumanTraf�icking:signi�icantproblem.Peoplearefrequentlyillegallytraf�ickedthroughIndiaforthepurposesofcommercialsexualexploitationandforced/bondedlabour.Althoughnoreliablestudyofforcedandbonded labour has been completed,NGOs estimate this problemaffects 20 to 65millionIndians.
Left-WingExtremism:Itisoneofthemajorsecuritythreatsfacedbythenation,whichpreventsdevelopmentalprocessesintheleastdevelopedregionsofthecountryandmisguidethepeoplethroughitspropaganda.
Insurgency in theNortheast: Inter-tribalcon�licts,unemployedyouth, illegalmigration fromacrosstheborderhasprovidedabreedinggroundfornon-stateactorstoruninsurgencylikeanindustryintheregion.
Terrorism:SouthAsiaTerrorismPortalhaslisted180terroristgroupsthathaveoperatedwithinIndiaoverthelast20years,manyofthemco-listedastransnationalterrornetworksoperatinginorfromtheneighboringSouth-AsiancountriessuchasBangladesh,NepalandPakistan.
CivilSocietyOrganisations:Seriouschargesofmisuseandmisappropriationoffundsreceivedasgrants-in-aidfromgovernments,foreigndonorsandtheirinvolvementinrilingupdiscontentmentin the local communities against developmental projects has raised questions on theseorganisationsworkingasforeignpolicytoolofforeigngovernments
Thetrans-borderrelocationhasbeenthecauseofsocialandeconomicinsecurityforthelocalcommunities,whichhasofteneruptedincommunalviolence.
TheissueofillegalmigrationhasbeenthesourceofcommunalandethnictensioninIndia,resultinginlargescaledemographicchangesintheNorth-Eastregion.
Whilethereisnoevidenceofdirectstateinvolvementinthiscase,itisitsinactivitytoresolvetheissuethatisconcerning.
Bangladesh
Note:The challengesassociatedwith Insurgency inNorth-East and Jammu&Kashmir, LeftWingExtremism,drugandhumantraf�ickinghavebeendiscussedindetailinseparateSecuritydocuments.ThisparticulardocumentdelvesintothedetailsofTerrorismandtheroleplayedbyStateandNon-Stateactorsinit.
ChinahasitsinterestsintheNorth-EastaswellasLeft-WingextremisminIndia,andusesitsasaleveragetobrewinternalsecuritychallengesintheIndia.
ChinahasbuiltarelationshipofconvenienceandanallianceofopportunismbetweenChinaandIndianmilitantgroups.Forexample,theMaoistmovementgotitsphilosophical,moral,�inancialandintellectualsupportfromChina.
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The titledUNGeneralAssemblyResolution49/60 "MeasurestoEliminateInternationalTerrorism,"containsaprovisiondescribingterrorismas:“Criminalactsintendedorcalculatedtoprovokeastateofterrorinthegeneralpublic,agroupofpersonsorparticularpersonsforpoliticalpurposesareinanycircumstanceunjusti�iable,whatevertheconsiderationsofapolitical,philosophical,ideological,racial,ethnic,religiousoranyothernaturethatmaybeinvokedtojustifythem.”
Althoughthereisnocurrentagreementregardingauniversallegalde�initionoftheterm,therehasbeensomedebateaboutthepossibleexistenceofan,atleastpartial,customaryde�initionofterrorism.Alongwithterrorandintimidation,therearemanyfactorsoftenconsideredcrucialtodelineatingwhenactionstakenbyagrouporanindividualconstituteterrorismornot.These includebutarenotfactorslimitedtoviolence,harm,andthreats;randomnessorindiscriminateviolence;politicalmotivation;thetargetingofcivilians,non-combatantsandso-calledinnocents;anddeliberateattemptstopublicizetheactsofterror.
Thedif�icultyinde�ining“terrorism”isinagreeingonabasisfordeterminingwhentheuseofviolence(directedatwhom,bywhom,forwhatends)islegitimate;therefore,themodernde�initionofterrorismisinherentlycontroversial.Theuseofviolencefortheachievementofpoliticalendsiscommontostateand non-state groups. The majority of de�initions in use has been written by agencies directlyassociatedwithgovernment,andissystematicallybiasedtoexcludegovernmentsfromthede�inition.
Criticsaccuse theUnitedStatesof terrorismforbackingnotonly the Israelioccupation,butotherrepressiveregimeswillingtoterrorizetheirowncitizenstomaintainpower.PalestinianmilitantscallIsrael terrorist,KurdishmilitantscallTurkeyterroristandthenation-statescall themilitantswhoopposetheirregimes“terrorists”.Like“beauty”,“terrorism”isintheeyeofthebeholder.Oneman'sfreedom�ighterisanotherman'sterrorist.Hence,thedif�icultyinde�iningTerrorism.
2.1Frameworkforde�iningTerrorismWhile the consensus on a universal de�inition of terrorism is dif�icult to bring about, there is anagreementonsomeofitsfeatures.Terrorismisaviolentphenomenon:
Eventuallyseekstoacquireunchallenged andcapture byimposingasocialcontrol politicalpowerdiscretegovernanceorder.
Whichiscomposedof setofexpressionsandbehaviors:(i)emotional(anger,hatred,heterogeneousfear), (ii)culturalandmoral(revenge,self-righteousness),(iii) instrumentalpolitics(coercion,power projection, competition, exclusion of unfriendly section of the society and elites), (iv)religious (exclusiveness, exclusion through apostatization and othering), (v) ideological(revolutionaryjihad,deviance,de�iance),(vi)criminal(organizedcrime);
Whichbyfollowingaprotean entailingcivilians,lawenforcementpersonneltargetingphilosophyandcombatantsalike,thatoperationalizesinaperformativemannerthroughvariablemeansormethods;
Whichatitsrootisessentiallya thattransitionsintoanoffensivetacticreactivecommunicativeactwhenequippedwithanevolveddoctrine;
That develops incrementally deriving from , i.e. exogenous and endogenouscontextual factorsstimuliaswellasreactionsbythestateandsociety.Thesestimuliandreactionsbyvarioussourcesproducecontextswhichprovidethemotivationandrationaljusti�icationforitsperpetuation.
2.TERRORISM
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2.2Classi�icationofTerrorism
TerroractivitiesinvolveeitherIndianorforeigncitizens.Infact,mostofthedomesticterrorismtodayhaslinkageswithforeignagencies.TransnationalJihadisTerrorism,sponsoredbyexternalagenciesandothercountriestoachievetheirgeo-strategicobjectives,currentlyposesthemajorthreattothecountry.
TerrorisminIndia,accordingtotheHomeMinistry,posesasigni�icantthreattothestate.TerrorisminIndiaareofbasicallytwotypesi.e.sponsoredby .Externalexternalagenciesanddomestic(internal)terrorism emerge from neighboring countries and Internal terrorism emulates from religious orcommunalviolenceandNaxalites–Maoistinsurgency.
“State terrorism” is as controversial a concept as that of terrorism itself. Terrorism is often,thoughnotalways,de�inedintermsoffourcharacteristics:(1)thethreatoruseofviolence;(2)apolitical objective; the desire to change the status quo; (3) the intention to spread fear bycommittingspectacularpublicacts;(4)theintentionaltargetingofcivilians.Thislastelement--targetinginnocentcivilians—isproblematicwhenonetriestodistinguishstateterrorismfromotherformsofstateviolence.
De�inedasactsofterrorismconductedbygovernmentsorterrorismcarriedoutdirectlyby,orencouragedandfundedby,anestablishedgovernmentofastate(country)orterrorismpracticedby a government against its ownpeople or in support of international terrorism. ExamplesincludetherecentkillingofSaudijournalistJamalKhashoggiintheSaudiconsulateinIstanbulallegedlybySaudigovernmentagents;anex-RussianspyandhisdaughterpoisonedwithanerveagentinSalisbury,apparentlybyRussianintelligenceagents,etc.
2.2.1Stateterrorism
MOTIVATION REVENGE, ANGER, JIHAD, SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS,EXCLUSIVENESS
INTENT AND PLANNING RATIONALITY, FLEXIBILITY
POLITICSCOERCION, POWER PURSUITS, COMPETITION, EX-
CLUSION, CRIMINALIZED VIOLENCE, DIFFERENTIATEDVICTIMIZATION, CHALLENGE/DEVIANCE
TARGETS & TACTICS/METHODSINSTRUMENTALITY, EXCLUSION, HATRED, SOCIAL
CONTROL, VICTIM & LARGETING VARIABILITY, FEAR,INTIMIDATION
PUBLIC STATEMENTS PROPAGANDA, JUSTIFICATION & BRANDING
ANALYTIC VARIABLE THEMES OR OPERATIONAL EXPRESSION
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2.2.2Statesponsoredterrorism:
Intimidatedgovernments
Ideologicallysupportiveregimes
Generallyfacilitativesupporters
DirectSupportinincidentsbygovernments
Of�icialParticipation
Inthistypeofterrorism,thegovernmentsupportsarmywhichisengagedinviolenceactivities.Basedonthegeneral towardsterrorists,theycanbecategoriseddegreeofgovernmentsupportandattitudeinto:
Inthecontemporaryperiod,thestatesthatsupportterrorismandinsurgentgroupsarenowprimarilymotivatedbygeopoliticsratherthanideology,ethnicaf�inityorreligioussentiment.
Pakistan appears to be in the general facilitativestage. It usually involves governments permittingterroriststoestablishsafehousesandtrainontheirsoil, general government training of umbrellaguerilla bands which have terrorist appendages,large �inancial contributions to these bands, andarmsprovisiontoorlaxsupervisionofthirdpartyarmstransfertothesegroups
2.2.3ViolentNon-StateTerrorism
Itiscarriedoutbynon-statearmedactorsornon-statearmedgroups(NSAGs),thatarewhollyorpartlyindependentofstategovernmentsandwhichthreatenoruseviolencetoachievetheirgoals.
ViolentNon-StateActors(VNSAs)varywidelyintheirgoals,size,andmethods.Theymayincludenarcotics cartels, popular liberation movements, religious and ideological organizations,corporations (e.g. private military contractors), self-defence militia, and paramilitary groupsestablishedbystategovernmentstofurthertheirinterests.
WhilesomeVNSAsopposegovernments,othersarealliedtothem.SomeVNSAsareorganizedasparamilitarygroups,adoptingmethodsandstructuresimilartothoseofstatearmedforces.Othersmaybeinformallystructuredanduseviolenceinotherways,suchaskidnapping,usingimprovisedexplosivedevices,orhackingintocomputersystems.
Basedonthedifferent usedbytheterroristtoachievetheirgoals, terrorismcanalsobestrategiesclassi�iedintothefollowingtypes:
Where terrorist organizations act asconvenientinstrumentstospreadtheideologyoftheState
-MILITARYSUPPORT
-FINANCIALSUPPORTTooperateandgrowintheirterritory.For instance, in the case of Iran andPakistan.
Typesofsupportprovidedbyastatetoterroristgroups:
The state supplies the terroristorganizationwithweapons,providesmilitary training, organizes coursesforthem,etc.
-IDEOLOGICALSUPPORT
Unlawfulattacksandthreatsofattacksagainstcomputers,networks,andtheinformationstoredthereinwhendonetointimidateorcoerceagovernmentoritspeopleinfurtheranceofpoliticalorsocialobjectives.Itisanunconventionalmethodofterrorism
Incyberterrorism,byusinginformationtechnologywouldradicallyinterrupttheserviceswhichareconnectedwithinternet.Forexample,cyberterroristscanhackintonetworkshousingforgettingcritical�inancialinformationordisablenetworkedemergencysystems.
Cyber-Terrorism
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TheyfocuseitheronthecreationofaseparateStateorontheelevationofthestatusofoneethnicgroupoverothers.TamilNationalistgroupsinSriLankaandinsurgentgroupsinNorthEastIndiaareexamples
Ethno-NationalistTerrorism
Aterroristassaultonanuclearresearchcentreornuclearpowerplantcanbecauseofthereleaseofnuclearmaterial.Theconsequencesofanattackonanuclearresearchcentreornuclearpowerplantcouldequalorexceedtheeffectsofthe1986ChernobyldisasterinUSSR
Nuclearterrorismmeansdifferenttypeofuseofnuclearmaterialbytheterrorists.Itincludesattackingnuclearfacilities,preparingnuclearweaponsorpurchasingnuclearweapons,or�indingwaystoscatterradioactivematerials.
NuclearTerrorism
IdeologyOrientedTerrorism(RightandLeftWingTerrorism)
Left-wingextremists,universallyknownasMaoistsandNaxalites,wanttoremovethecapitalistgovernmentandtoestablishcommunistorsocialistbasedgovernment.Theywanttoattacktheestablishedsysteminordertoremoveclassdistinction
TheaimofRightwingterroriststooverthrowgovernmentandtoestablishanationalistorfascistgovernment.Thepersonsincludeinthistypeofterrorismarefascistskinheads,hooligans,youthsympathizersandintellectualswhodeemthatthegovernmentmustsendforeigners,outofcountry,forprotectingitsoriginalcitizens.
Theattemptbynarcoticstraf�ickerstoin�luencethepoliciesoftheGovernmentbysystematicthreatorusebyviolence
Narco-Terrorism
Bio-Terrorism
Anthrax
Biologicaltoxinsareusedtohurtandfrighteninnocentcitizens,inthenameofapoliticalorothercause.TheU.S.CenterforDiseaseControlhascategorizedtheviruses,bacteriaandtoxinsthatcouldbeusedinanattackTheyare:
SmallpoxThePlagueBotulism
Tularemia
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TherootsofinsurgencyinJammu&Kashmircanbetracedtothelaterpartofthe1940swhenPakistanattacked Indiawith a view to capture Jammu&Kashmir. Ever since therehas been a sectionofpopulationwhichbelievesinsecessionfromIndia.Thesegroupsaidedandabettedfromacrosstheborderhaveoftenindulgedinterroristactivities.The andemergenceriseofIslamistfundamentalismofAl-QaedahasaddedanotherdimensiontotheinsurgencyinJammu&Kashmir.
2.3.1Jammu&Kashmir
Thequestfora manifesteditself,afterPartition,intheirdemandforaseparateseparateSikhidentityStateinIndia.EvenaftertheformationofaseparateStateofPunjab,somerelatedissuesremainedunresolvedsuchasdemand forChandigarhas theState capital, sharingof riverwatersetc.Thesituation was further aggravated when terrorist elements demanded secession in the form of'Khalistan'.
2.3.2Punjab
2.3.3GrowthofHinterlandTerrorisminIndia
Afterfailingintwoconventionalwars,Pakistanadoptedthepathofsub-conventional/proxywarwiththemottoof'bleedingIndiawithathousandcuts'.
1970-80
TheseedsofpresentterrorismweresownintheKhalistanmovementinthe1980s,whichaimedatcreatingabuffersovereignstatebetweenIndiaandJammu&Kashmir.
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) was formed with the motive to liberate IndianMuslimsfromtheWesternin�luenceandmakethemfollowthepathofIslam.TheyadoptedaveryradicalpostureandweresubsequentlybannedunderUnlawfulActivitiesPreventionActin2001.
AfterPunjab,PakistantargetedKashmirinthelate1980s,bytappingintotheanti-IndiasentientoftheseparatistsectionsoftheKashmiripopulation.TerrorisminKashmirisbasicallyoperatedbyPoKbasedterroristorganisationscreated,trained,inspiredanddirectedbytheISI.
1980-90
AftertheAyodhyaincidentin1992,therewasasubsequentriseinreactionaryactivitiesalloverthecountry,providingaripeopportunityfortheISItofurtheritsobjectiveofspreadingterrorismandcommunalisminIndia.
1990-2000
IndianMujahideenwas formed to project to theworld that terrorism in India is purely anindigenousdevelopment,borneoutoftheill-treatmentmetedouttotheMuslims.ThiswastorefuteIndia'spositionthatterrorisminIndiasponsoredfromacrosstheborder.
TherehavebeenconstanteffortsbytheISItoexploitthecommunalfaultlinesinoursocietyandensure that the Muslim community remains vulnerable to mobilisation, recruitment andradicalisation.
RiseinthereactionaryrightwingextremistactivitiesintheformofbombblastsinMalegaon,AjmerSharifDargah,Samjhautaexpressetc.andthesubsequentallegedimplicationofinnocentMuslimyouthgaveanotherboosttotheradicalisationofMuslimyouthbytheterrorout�its.
2000onwards
2.3HistoryofTerrorisminIndia
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2.4.1TerrorismintheAgeofTechnologyThemodernterrorismisinstantaneousandunpredictable, a global threat that hit itstargets, but at same time hits a wideaudience due to use of technology.Terrorists have been using cyberspace to�indresources,makepropagandaactivitiesandfromwhichitispossibletolaunchtheattacksagainstenemieseverywhereintheworld.
Social media is an essential element ofmodern terrorism; these powerfulplatformsallowterroriststocommunicate,to make propaganda and recruit newsympathizersatthesametimemaintaininganonymitytotheuser.
Howtechnologyisbeingusedinpropagatingextremism?
Execution:Internetcommunicationsmayalsobeusedasameanstocoordinatetheexecutionofphysicalactsofterrorism.
Planning: Technology also facilitates the preparation of terror activities thoroughcommunication channels, both within and between the terror out�its located in differentgeographies.
Financing:Onlinepaymentfacilitiesofferedthroughdedicatedwebsitesorcommunicationsplatformsmake it easy to transfer funds electronically between parties. Financial supportprovidedtoseeminglylegitimateorganizations,suchascharities,mayalsobedivertedforillicitpurposes.
Training:Instructionalmaterialarebeingmadeavailablewithuseoftechnologywhichimpartstrainingandfacilitateonlinecounter-intelligenceandhackingactivities.
Cyber-attacks: These attacks are typically intended to disrupt the proper functioning oftargets,suchascomputersystems,serversorunderlyinginfrastructure.
Propaganda:Itgenerallytakestheformofmultimediacommunicationsprovidingideologicalorpractical instruction,explanations, justi�icationsorpromotionof terroristactivities. It isbeingusedforpromotionofviolence,recruitment,incitementandradicalization.
2.4.2TerrorFinancingTerroristactivitiesinmostcasesrequiresubstantial�inancialsupport.Infact,Terrorism�inance(TF) lifebloodofterrorism,canbetermedasthe oneofthemostimportantfactorssustainingitscontinuingthreat,bothfromwithinandwithout.Theyusethefollowingmethodstoraisefundingforterrorists'activities:
SendingaMessage
Themediabroadcastingthenewsaboutthe
terroract
Thekeyaudiences
discussingthenewsabouttheterroract
Thekeyaudiencespressuringonthe
authorities
Theauthoritiesconcessiontoterrorists
Terroristscommittingaterroract
irclC e n Oo fi t Ta ec ri rn ou rism mmo
C
BroadcastingtheMessage
DecodingtheMessage
TransmittingtheMessage
GettingtheMessageand
GivingFeedback
2.4KeyIssues
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Terroristorganizationsalsotakerecoursetobulkcashsmugglinganduseofinformalchannelsoftransferofmoney(likehawala).
Defrauding�inancialinstitutionsandthepublicatlarge.
Fundingcouldalsobesourcedevenfromtheproceedsoflawfulactivities.Supportersofamilitantideology couldwellmake �inancial contributions to terroristorganizations from theirknownsources of income. Such contributions could also be made to some non-pro�it or charitableinstitutionsactingasafrontforterroristorganizations,knowinglyorun-knowingly.
Byresortingtoorworkinginconcertwithcartelsinvolvedindrugtraf�icking,narcoticstradeetc.–withouthavingtoresorttomoney-launderingperse.
Fundingcouldalsoinvolvecounterfeitingofcurrency,currencysmugglingetc.
Terroristsgetsfundsbyinvolvinginillegaloperations
Internationalorganizedcrimemakesuseofawiderangeofmethodsandnetworkingtotransferfundswithaviewtolaundertheproceedsofcrime.
Raise Move Store SpendPLACEMENT LAYERING INTEGRATION
FundingAccess
FundingSources
LegitimateandIllicit
FundingMethodsFormalandInformal
Facilitationvs.Detection
FundingStreamsMay
Variations
$25toMillions$$$
$$ThousandstoManyThousands$$
$$HundredstoThousands$$
ToOrganization
ToOperations
ToOperatives
Figure1:Funding:Sources/Methods/Access
2.4.3UrbanTerrorismUrbanterrorismistheuseofterrorismincitiesandotherurbanareas,targetingtheurbanpopulace.UrbanterrorisminSouthAsiaisarelativelynewphenomenon.Inrecentyears,terroristsarevisiblymovingawayfromactivitiesneartheborderstothecitiesandtowns.
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2.4.4Lone-WolfAttacks
EasyTargets-Densityofbuiltenvironmentinurbanagglomerationsandurbanmasstransportinfrastructureresultinmassgatheringmakingthemeasytargetstomaximizetheimpactofterroristattacks.
ScopeforAnonymity-Unlikeinruralareas,inhabitantsincitiesandtownsaremoreheterogeneous,whichprovidesmorescopeforanonymitymakingsuicidebombingsextremelydif�iculttodetectorpreventintime.
Availabilityoffacilities-Logisticalsupportlikearms,publictransportetc.arereadilyavailableinurbanareas.
EasierRecruitment-becauseitisthecitythatnurturesdissidenceingeneral.
Attackingcredibilityofthegovernment-byattackinghighpro�ilesymbolic targets tomakeapoint that ifagovernment fails to protect high value targets, it isobviousthatitmaynotbeinapositiontoprotectthenormalones.
Protectionfromindiscriminatecounterterrorismoperations-duetovastcollateraldamage.
Lessdemandingoperations-intermsofbrutephysicalstrengthandendurancethanrequiredinmountainousorrural terrain.Andtheyalsodonotneedsophisticated long-rangeweaponstoin�lictthedesireddamage.
Easyspreadoffear-Sinceterrorismis'propagandabythedeed',theattention-seekinggoalofterroristsiswellservedintheurbanenvironmentwheretheimmediateaudienceisgreatestandwhererepresentativesoftheprintandelectronicmediaarereadilyavailableandquiteeagertoreport.Suchcoveragealsomagni�iesthefeargeneratingcapabilitiesofterroristacts.
Vulnerabilitiesduetointernet-Increasingavailabilityofpersonaldatahasmadeindividualsvulnerabletoterrorism.Suchinformationcanbeusedforthepurposeofradicalisationortargetingfortheactsofviolence.
Reasonsforincreaseinsuchattacks
A"lonewolf"isapersonwho ,outsideofanycommandpreparesandcommitsviolentactsalonestructureandwithoutmaterialassistancefromanygroup.
VolatileneighborhoodofIndiaactingasterrorhotbeds,fastgrowingpopulationespeciallyyouthwithaccesstomassmediaandsocialmedia,heavyconcentrationofpeopleinpublicareaswithlimitedsecurityandinadequatecapacitiesoflocalpoliceincreaseIndia'svulnerabilitytolonewolfattacks.
Itisanef�icientwayofspreadingterrorinhard-to-accessplacesfororganisedterroristgroups.ProminentrecentexamplesacrosstheglobeincludeBostonmarathonbombingof2013,Sydneyhostagecrisisof2014,recentattacksinNewYorkandLondonwherevehicleswereusedtorunoverandkillanumberofpeople.
RecentexamplesofUrbanTerrorinIndiaandneighboringcountries
Indiahasbeenawitnesstoseveralurbanterrorattackssuchasthe1993Bombaybombings,1998Coimbatorebombings,2000terroristattackonRedFort,2001IndianParliamentattack,2005Delhibombings,2008Bangaloreserialblastsand2008Mumbaiattacks.
InBangladesh,in2016,anunprecedentedattackonDhakaHoleyArtisanBakeryinGulshancityresultedinthedeathof29peopleincluding17foreigners.PakistanisteemingwithurbanterrorismwiththeregionsofKarachi,PeshawarandQuettabeinghottargets.
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HowevervariousotherfactorstendtoposechallengesingrowthoflonewolfattacksinIndia:
Indianshavenotdisplayedthepsychologicalwillingnesstoundertakehighriskattacks.
TheabsenceofpastexamplesoflonewolfattacksinIndiainculcatesthefearoftheunknowninthemindsofpotentialvolunteers.
Unlike in the USwhere sophisticatedweapons can be easily bought by ordinary citizens,gainingaccesstosuchweaponryinIndiaisdif�icult.
2.4.5UseofTerrorasaforeignpolicyinstrumentbyExternalStates
DeepStateisabodyofpeople,typicallyin�luentialmembersofgovernmentagenciesorthemilitary,believed to be involved in the secretmanipulation or control of government policy. Deep State inPakistanhasnurturedIslamicRadicalGroups(Mujahideens)asstrategicassetstobeusedagainstitsadversaries.
Thisstrategywas increasinglyadoptedafter thesuccessofUS-fundedMujahideens inAfghanistanagainstUSSR.Thereareprimarilythreetypesofsuchgroups
OneswhoactagainstAfghanistan-e.g.Al-QaedaandTaliban
OneswhoactagainstIndia-e.g.Lashkar-e-taiba,Jaish-e-Mohammed
ThePakistaniTaliban(Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan)-thisgrouphasbecomerogueand�ightingagainstthePakistaniestablishmentitself.
On26thFebruary,theIndianAirforcehitatrainingcampofthegroupinBalakot,Pakistan.
ThismarkedachangeinIndianresponse,asitwasa onnon-military,pre-emptive strikenon-civiliantargetto�ightterror.
On14thFebruary,2019-avehicleboundsuicideattackledtodeathof40CRPFpersonnelinPulwama,JammuandKashmir.
Itwasamaturedecisiontoachievethetarget,aswellas,preventanyescalationtowardswar
ThelinkstothisattackwereagaintracedtoPakistanbasedterrorgroupJaish-e-Mohammed.
ChangeinIndianApproachtoPakistanbasedterrorgroups
Pakistanhaslargelyremainedindenialmodeandhastakenshamactionsonterroristassetsinordertoavoidinternationalpressure.SomescholarsbelievethatthesegroupshavegrownsopowerfulnowthatthePakistaniStatelacksthecapacitytodealwiththemmilitarily.
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IssuesindealingwithPakistan'sterrorinfrastructure
The ,thatithasbecomeincurable.IfnuclearweaponscomeintheillnessofitsDeepStaterunsodeephandsofTerrorgroups,itmaybecomeadangerforinternationalpeace.
Ithasbeendif�iculttocompletelyisolatePakistanintheinternationalcommunityforlongtime,becauseithas-
TheorgansofPakistanistate,beittheExecutiveortheJudiciaryortheCivilSociety-havebeenovershadowedbyitsdeepstate.Wheneverinthepast,anyoftheotherorganstriedtostand,theyhavebeencrippledbythedeepstate.
LargepopulationNuclearCapabilitiesIslamicnationsbackingPakistan
2.4.6ThechallengeofISandAl-QaedainIndiaIslamicstatepreviouslyknownastheIslamicstateofIraqandSyria(ISIS), isaterrorgroupwhichenvisages toestablishan “IslamicstatebasedonSharia lawor IslamicCaliphate”. IS'sAmaqNewsAgencyhasannounceditsnewprovinceinIndia,thatitcalled“WilayahofHind”,butdidnotelaborateonthebranch'sgeographicalremit.
Inthepast,IShadvowedtoconvertIndiaintoKhurasanState,ahistoricnameforaregionthatcoversAfghanistan,Pakistan,partsofIndia,andothersurroundingcountries.
WhyIslamicStateisachallengeforIndia?
Involvement of other state actors- such asPakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI),whichcan provide a well-established intelligence andlogisticnetwork, inasymbioticrelationship.TheNIAreportedin2014,therecruitmentofmorethan300 Indian youths by Pakistan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban(TTP),whichhadjoinedhandswithISIS.
suchasISlosingterritorialgroundinotherareas-MiddleEasttoUS-ledforces,nowISisseekingtostrengtheningitsglobalaf�iliations.SuchastrategywashighlightedbyISISchiefAbuBakral-Baghdadiinthepast.Atthesametime,ISISviewsIndiaasapotential hotbed for radicalization due to thedemographicstructure.
Efforts of radicalization- The IS have publishedrecruitingmaterialsinHindi,Urdu,TamilandotherlanguagesspokeninIndia.In2015,itreleasedane-booktospreaditspropagandaandmakingdirectreferencetoIndianPrimeMinisteraccusinghimofspreading communal disharmony. So far( as of2019), India has had some 82 active cases ofinvestigations on individuals suspected ofengaginginpro-ISISactivities.
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AlQaedareleasedmaidenvideoonKashmir
EventhoughAlQaeda-hasbeenactiveintheIndiansubcontinent(Al-Qaeda intheIndianSubcontinent (AQIS)was foundedin2014),ithaslargelybeenunabletocarryout large-scale attacks and struggled toattractsupportoutsideofPakistan.
Reasonsforthenew-foundinterestofAlQaidainIndia:
The of Al Qaeda isaging leadershipstruggling to compete with the IS foryoungradicalizedrecruits.AsISremainmajorlyinvolvedinWestAsia,itsuitstotheAlQaeda'sstrategyto“invest”intheEast.
Another reason is due to the fact thatIndia has substantially increased itsengagementwithAfghanistan since thefalloftheTalibangovernment.So,India'sgrowingin�luencemaydeterAlQaeda'sreemergencetopowerinAfghanistan
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Astrategyfor�ightingterrorinIndiahastobeevolvedintheoverallcontextofanationalsecuritystrategy.Totacklethemenaceofterrorism,amulti-prongedapproachisneeded.
2.5India'sCounterTerrorismStrategy
Administrationneed tobe responsive to the legitimategrievancesofpeople so that theseareredressedpromptlyandcannotbeexploitedbyterroristgroups.
InternationalCooperationbecomescrucialasterrorismisaglobalthreatandcannotbehandledbynationsactinginsilos.Activeparticipationinbilateral,regionalandmultilateralforumsformsacrucialpartofIndia'sstrategyagainstterrorism.
Socio-economicdevelopmentisaprioritysothatvulnerablesectionsofsocietydonotfallpreytothepropagandaofterroristspromisingthemwealthandequity.
Strongmeasuresarerequiredtodealwithcriminalelementsbutwithrespectforhumanrights.
Dealingwiththemenaceofterrorismwouldrequireacomprehensivestrategywithinvolvementofdifferentstakeholders–theGovernment,politicalparties,securityagencies,civilsocietyandmedia.Thenecessaryelementsofsuchastrategyarelistedbelow:
Providingtheappropriatelegalframework:Theordinarylawsofthelandmaynotbeadequatetobookaterrorist.Thismayrequirespeciallawsandeffectiveenforcementmechanisms,butwithsuf�icientsafeguardstopreventitsmisuse.
Counteringthesubversiveactivitiesofterrorists:Governmentmustgiveprioritytodefeatingpoliticalsubversions(e.g.byterroristsandMaoists).Theemphasisshouldbeoncivilasopposedtomilitarymeasurestocounterterrorismandinsurgency.
Building capacity:The capacity building exercise should extend to the intelligence gatheringmachinery,securityagencies,civiladministrationandthesocietyatlarge.
Goodgovernanceandsocioeconomicdevelopment:Thiswouldnecessitatehighprioritybeinggiven to development work and its actual implementation on the ground for which a clean,corruption-freeandaccountableadministrationatalllevelsisanimperativenecessity.
UnionGovernmentshouldhave intensive interactionswiththeStatesandPoliticalconsensus:UnionTerritorieswhiledrawingupthenationalstrategy,thelatterwouldberequiredtodotheirpartincloseconsultationwiththenodalministryoftheGovernmentofIndia.
Respectforruleoflaw:Governmentalagenciesmustnotbeallowedtotransgresslawevenindealingwithcritical situationscausedby insurgencyor terrorism. Ifanextraordinarysituationcannotbedealtwithbytheexistinglaws,newlawsmaybeenactedsothatlawenforcementagenciesdonotresorttoextra-legalorillegalmethods.
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2.5.1India'spreparednessagainstterrorism
ThestatusofIndia'spreparednessinperformingkeyrolesincounteringterrorismactivitiesisasfollows:
Intelligencegathering
However,vitalinputsandinformationregardingvariousgovernmentdepartmentsandNGOshastobestreamlined.
Presently,thetaskisundertakenbythestatepoliceandtheCentralgovernmentagencies.
NATGRIDandMulti-AgencyCenter(MAC)havebeensetupafter26/11.
TrainingandOperations
ResourcecrunchattheleveloftheStatepoliceactsasabottleneckinupgradingtheirtrainingcapability.
Asofnow,foroperations,IBplaystheroleofthecoordinatorwiththepoliceofdifferentstates,but ifoperationsneedtobecarriedoutsimultaneouslynmanystates,thereisnouni�iedcommand.
Investigation
The remains amajor scopeof improvement in the investigating capabilities of the statepolice.
TheNIAActwasenactedintheaftermathoftheMumbaiterroristattacksof2008.Adecadelater, theActwasamendedwiththeobjectiveofspeedyinvestigationandprosecutionofcertainoffences,includingthosecommittedoutsideIndia.
Widening the ambit of the act and strengthening the role of NIAwouldmake terroristinvestigationsinthecountrymoreef�icientandwouldhelpincreatingagooddatabankofthevariousterroristnetworkoperatinginsideandoutsidethecountry.
Prosecution
The2019NIAamendmentallowedthecentralgovernmenttodesignateSessionsCourtsasSpecialCourtsforthetrialofscheduledoffencesundertheAct.
Rampantdelaysduetoproceduralaspectsinthecriminaljusticesystemactsasabottleneckonthepaceofthetrial.
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2.6Stepstakenbythegovernment
2.6.1Enablingastronglegislationframework.
NIA Act, 2019: The NIA is now empowered to investigate offences related to “(i) humantraf�icking,(ii)offencesrelatedtocounterfeitcurrencyorbanknotes,(iii)manufactureorsaleofprohibitedarms,(iv)cyber-terrorism,and(v)offencesundertheExplosiveSubstancesAct,1908”.
UAPAAct,2019:ParliamentclearedtheUnlawfulActivities(Prevention)AmendmentAct,2019todesignateindividualsasterroristsoncertaingroundsprovidedintheAct.
The Act empowers the Director General of National Investigation Agency (NIA) to grantapprovalofseizureorattachmentofpropertywhenthecaseisinvestigatedbythesaidagency.
TheActempowerstheof�icersoftheNIA,oftherankofInspectororabove,toinvestigatecasesofterrorisminadditiontothoseconductedbytheDSPorACPoraboverankof�icerinthestate.
An hasbeen issued inApril2018 toStates/UnionTerritories.advisoryon terror �inancingGuidelineshavealsobeenissuedinMarch,2019toStates/UnionTerritoriesforinvestigationofcasesofhighqualitycounterfeitIndiancurrencynotes.
StrengtheningtheprovisionsintheUnlawfulActivities(Prevention)Act,1967tocombatterror �inancing by criminalizing the production or smuggling or circulation of high qualitycounterfeitIndiancurrencyasaterroristactandenlargethescopeofproceedsofterrorismtoincludeanypropertyintendedtobeusedforterrorism.
ATerrorFundingandFakeCurrency(TFFC)CellhasbeenconstitutedinNationalInvestigationAgency(NIA)toconductfocusedinvestigationofterrorfundingandfakecurrencycases.
The MoU, signed in March, will give NATGRID access to the Crime and Criminal TrackingNetworkandSystems(CCTNS)database,aplatformthatlinksaround14,000policestations.
(NATGRID) has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the National CrimeRecordsBureau(NCRB)toaccessthecentralisedonlinedatabaseonFIRsandstolenvehicles.
2.6.2Institutionalframeworktotackleterrorism
NATGRID:Itseekstobecometheone-stopdestinationforsecurityandintelligenceagenciestoaccessdatabaserelatedtoimmigrationentryandexit,bankingandtelephonedetailsofasuspectona“securedplatform”.
NationalCyberCoordinationCentre(NCCC)hasbeenestablishedasacybersecurityande-surveillanceagencyinIndia.
2.6.3CombatingTerrorFinance
Government has taken various steps to combat terror �inancing in the country,which inter alia,include:
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2.6.4India'sInvolvementattheUNIndiahasprioritisedtheadoptionofanintergovernmentalframeworktocombatterrorism.Indiaintroducedthe in1996thatde�inedComprehensiveConventiononInternationalTerrorism(CCIT)terrorismandenhanced“normativeprocessesfortheprosecutionandextraditionofterrorists.”
Activeparticipationinseveralcounter-terrorismdiscussions,suchas
Supportingcounter-terrorismmechanismsestablishedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolutions,suchasResolution1373establishingtheCounter-TerrorismCommittee,andResolution1540addressingthenon-proliferationofWeaponsofMassDestructiontoterroristorganisations
DraftingaGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategyintheGeneralAssemblyin2006,
ServingasafoundingmembersoftheGlobalCounter-TerrorismForum(GCTF),
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TrainingprogramsareregularlyconductedfortheStatePolicepersonnelonissuesrelatingtocombatingterrorist�inancing.
FakeIndianCurrencyNotes(FICN)networkisoneofthechannelsofterror�inancinginIndia.FICNCoordination Group (FCORD) has been formed by the Ministry of Home Affairs to shareintelligence/informationamongthesecurityagenciesofthestates/centertocountertheproblemofcirculationoffakecurrencynotes.
IntelligenceandsecurityagenciesofCentreandStatesworkintandemtokeepaclosewatchontheelementsinvolvedinterrorfundingactivitiesandtakeactionasperlaw.
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EuropeanUnion'stheEUjudicialcooperationunit,EUROJUST EUROPOLandtheEU'spoliceforce,
Itoutlinescollective,ChristchurchCallToAction:voluntary commitments from governments andonline serviceproviders intended toaddress theissue of violent extremist content online and toprevent abuseof the internet,whilemaintaininginternationalhumanrightlaws.
FinancialActionTaskForce(FATF)andtheGroupof Eight (G8) Counter terrorism Action Group(CTAG)
GlobalInternetForumtoCounterTerrorism(GIFCT)isanindustryledinitiative,workinginclosepartnership with the UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) to substantiallydisruptterrorists'abilitytopromoteterrorism,disseminateviolentextremistpropaganda.
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2.7VariousGlobalActionsforcounteringTerrorism
United Nations oversees various conventions that target different aspects of terrorism, includingterrorist�inancing,hijacking,acquiringweaponsofmassdestruction,andhostagetaking,tonameafew.
UNGeneralAssemblyunanimouslyadoptedin2006theGlobalCounterterrorismStrategy(GCT).
The aims to promote better coordination amongRATS (Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure)membersoftheShanghaiCooperationOrganisation onterrorism.IndiaconsidersRATSas(SCO)animportantandeffectiveorganisationin�ightagainstterrorismasitpossessesdataon2,500suicidebombersand69terroristorganizations.
TerroristTravelInitiativewaslaunchedunderauspicesofGlobalCounterterrorismForum(GCTF).
Counter-terrorismImplementationTaskForce(CTITF)-apartnershipofbodiescreatedbyUNin2005, which now includes more than thirty UN entities plus INTERPOL, to streamline andcoordinatecounterterrorismeffortswithintheUN.oUNSCestablishedtheCounterterrorismCommittee(CTC).
TheinitiativewilladevelopsetofgoodpracticeswhichwillreinforcecountriesandorganizationstousebordersecuritytoolsprescribedinUNSCResolution2396tostopterroristtravel.
It will bring together national and localgovernments, law enforcement and borderscreening practitioners, and internationalorganizations to share expertise on how todevelop and implement effective counterterrorismwatchlistingandscreeningtools.
FATFputsPakistanonits“GreyList”
TheFATFplacedPakistanonthegreylistin2018andaskedittoimplementaplanofactiontocurbmoneylaunderingandterror�inancingbytheendof2019,butthe deadline was extended due to theCOVID-19pandemic.
TheGreylist,ontheotherhand,of�iciallyreferred to as 'Jurisdictions UnderIncreasedMonitoring,' constitute thosenationsthatpresentsigni�icantrisksofmoney laundering and terror-�inancingbut which have committed to workingcloselywiththeFATFinthedevelopmentandimplementationofactionplansthataddresstheirde�iciencies.
TheFATFmaintainstwolists–ablacklistandagreylist.Countriesonitsblacklistarethosethatthewatchdogdeemsnon-cooperative in the global effort to curbmoneylaunderingandterror-�inancing.
(Alsodiscussedinthetopicofmoneylaundering)
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Developing a well-operated online intelligence network for intelligence sharing, joint onlineoperationsanddatabaseconvergencetokeepacheckonISIS'sin�luenceontheinternet.
Crossplatformrecruitmentofspecialistsdealingwithsocialmedia,bigdataanalysis,terrorism�inanceandtechnicalintelligence.
2.8.2A360-degreeapproachItisnecessaryforIndiatoeffectchangesinitsinternalsecurityarchitectureandfurtherempoweritsintelligence and investigation agencies for enhanced preparedness, along with some diplomaticmeasurestocounterterrorisminthewholeofthesub-continent.
2.8Whatmoreneedstobedone
2.8.1Strengtheningthetechnologyframeworktodealwithextremism
EnhancingTechnology:Preventtheupload& dissemination of terrorist and violentextremist content, with a mechanism forautomatic identi�ication and immediate &permanentremoval.
Terms of Use: Updating terms of use,communitystandards,codesofconduct,andacceptableusepoliciestoexpresslyprohibitthe distribution of terrorist and violentextremistcontent.
User Reporting of Terrorist and ViolentExtremist Content: Providing easy to usemethods within online platforms andservices for users to report or � laginappropriatecontent.
Transparency Reports: Publishing on aregularbasistransparencyreportsregardingdetectionandremovalofterroristorviolentextremistcontentononlineplatform
Shared Technology Development: Sharet e chno l ogy w i t h o t he r i ndu s t r i e s ,governments,andNGOs,suchasdatasetsandopensourcecontentAIdetectiontools.
Combating Hate & Bigotry: Supportresearch and academic efforts to betterunderstand and attack root causes ofextremism and supporting capability andcapacityofNGOstopromotepluralism
Education: Collaborate with industry,governments, educational institutions, andNGOs to help educate the public aboutterroristandextremistviolentcontentonline&howtoreportit
Crisis Protocols:Creating a crisis protocolforrespondingtoemergingoractiveevents,on anurgent basis, so relevant informationcan be quickly and ef�iciently shared,processed,andacteduponbyallstakeholderswithminimaldelay
RoleofOnlineserviceproviders
RoleofGovernmentandcivilsociety
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In�luential Minority Religious leaders should be roped in to appeal to youth against radicalpropaganda,especiallythosecomingthroughsocialmediaandotherinternetplatforms.
Thegovernmentshouldworkwithsocialgroups,NGOsandstudentbodies,whichcanreachouteasilytothepopulationatlarge,ascomparedtostateinstitutions.
2.8.3EarlypreventionandDe-RadicalisationA comprehensive strategy of early prevention, targeted repression and intervention and involvesgovernmentandnon-governmentalactors.
2.8.4Strengtheningtheroleofthepoliceforce
Enhancingtheirtrainingcapabilitiesandprovidingthemwithmodernequipmentforsurveillance,investigationandoperationsistheneedofthehour
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3.VisionIASMainsPreviousYears'Questions
havenotbeende�inedundertheAct,whichmaybe'terrorism','affectingtheinterestofIndia'
prosecuteoffencesaffectingnationalsecurity,byincorporatingoffencessuchastraf�ickingof
Theexpandedjurisdictioncoversmatters(suchasoffencesundertheExplosivesAct)whichare
jurisdiction.
The ofscheduledoffencesmaybeproneto ,whichcanexpandedscope misusebygovernmentcategorizethemasactsofterrorism.Thisisespeciallydangerouswhentheterms/phraseslike
minorsforsexualexploitationetc.,which .maynotberelatedtoterrorism
However,thefollowingobjectionshavebeenraisedagainsttherecentamendments:
NIAtrialsunderSection11and22oftheNIAAct2008.
The ,whichwasenactedtonewamendmenthasdilutedthenatureandoperationoftheAct
Theamendmentenablesthecentralgovernmenttodesignatesessioncourtsasspecialcourtsfor
interpretedto .curbdissent
alsointhedomainofthestategovernmentsleadingtopossibleencroachmentontheir
1.Highlighting the key changesmadeby theNational InvestigationAgency (Amendment)Act,2019,discusstheobjectionsthathavebeenraisedagainstthese.
Approach:
GiveabriefaccountontheNIAAct.
Discusstheobjectionsthathavebeenraisedagainsttheamendments.
Concludeonthebasisoftheabovepoints.
Answer:
EnumeratetheamendmentsmadeintheAct.
The waspassedbytheParliamentamendingtheoriginalActof2008.NIA(Amendment)Bill,2019Followingaretheamendmentsmade:
It .ItcannowexpandedthetypeofoffencesthattheNIAcouldinvestigateandprosecuteinvestigateoffencesrelatedtohumantraf�icking,counterfeitcurrency,manufactureorsaleof
NationalInvestigationAgency(NIA)isacentralagencytocombatterrorisminIndia,establishedunderthe .Ithaswidepowerssuchas,totakesuomotucognisanceNationalInvestigationAct,2008ofterroractivitiesinanypartofIndiaandregisteracase,toenteranystatewithoutpermissionfromthestategovernment,andtoinvestigateandarrestpeople.
prohibitedarms,cyber-terrorism,andoffencesundertheExplosiveSubstancesAct,1908.
TheNIAwillhavethe ,subjectpowertoinvestigatescheduledoffencescommittedoutsideIndiatointernationaltreatiesanddomesticlawsofothercountries.Aspecialcourtwillpresideoversuchcases.
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The provision to designate the existing Sessions Courts as Special Courts will dilute theexclusivityoftheNIAAct.ThesesessionscourtswouldrunonsimilarlinesastheydounderotherCentral Acts, thus of this Act. Also, these courts areeroding the special character alreadyoverburdenedwithpendingcasesandthismovewillfurtherincreasetheirburden.
ThepowertoinvestigatecasesoutsideIndiawouldnotbeusefulwithoutanycooperationandextraditiontreatieswithothercountries.
TheamendmentshavebeenbroughttostrengthentheNationalInvestigationAgency.However,theaforementionedconcernsneedtobeaddressedsothatthereisacoordinatedeffortforthe�ightagainstterrorism.
2.Bringouttheimportanceofinternationalcooperationin�ightingterrorism.Inthiscontext,throwlightonUNGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategy.Approach:
Brie�lywriteanintroductionaboutterrorismasaglobalthreat.
Bringouttheimportance/needforinternationalcooperationin�ightingterrorism.
ThrowlightonUNGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategy.
Inthemodernworld,terrorismhasevolvedfromlocaltoatrulyinternationalthreat.AccordingtoGlobal Terrorism Index, 67 countries experienced at least one death from terrorism in 2017.Although,thetotalnumberofdeathsbyterrorismfellby27percentbetween2016and2017,thenumberofterrorist incidents increasedespecially inEurope.Consequently, there isaneedforinternationalcooperationaround�ightingterrorismbecauseofthefollowingfactors:
Answer:
IncapacityofIndividualstatetocontrolterroristthreats:Multilateralinitiativesbolsterstatecapacitytobuildinstitutionsandprogramsthatstrengthenarangeofactivities,frompolicingtocounterradicalizationprograms.
Enormousefforts:Giventhenumberofplayersinvolved,theenormityofthetaskandthelimitedresourcesavailable,effectivecoordinationiscrucial.
Crossborderlinkages:Terroristgroupscanoperatefromeverycorneroftheglobebytakingadvantage of porous borders and interconnected international systems—�inance,communications,andtransitaswellasusingsocialmediaandemergingtechnologies.
Effectivecriminaljusticecooperationamongstatesisnecessarytodenysafehavensandbringtojusticethosewhocommitorattempttocommitterroristcrimes.
Changingandevolvingnatureofterrorism:Itsassociatedmotivations,methodsofattackandchoiceof targetsareoftenevolving. Internationalcooperationcanensureeffectivevigilanceagainst it aswell asdenymisuseof any emerging technology such as arti�icial intelligence,dronesetc.
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Recognizing this need for international cooperation to combat terrorism, the United NationsGeneral Assembly adopted the in 2006. Its objective is toGlobal Counter-Terrorism Strategyenhancenational,regionalandinternationaleffortstocounterterrorism. TheGeneralAssemblyreviewstheStrategyeverytwoyears,accordingtomemberstates'counter-terrorismpriorities.TheGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategyiscomposedof4pillars:
Addressingtheconditionsconducivetothespreadofterrorism.
Preventingandcombatingterrorism.
Ensuringrespectforhumanrightsforallandruleoflawasthefundamentalbasisforthe�ightagainstterrorism.
Building states' capacity topreventandcombat terrorismandstrengthening the roleof theUnitedNationssysteminthisregard.
Mostrecently,aseriesofactionshavebeentakenbytheUNtoincreaseeffectivenessintacklingthechallengesofterrorismandviolentextremism,suchas:
EstablishingtheUNOf�iceofCounter-Terrorism(UNOCT),whichhasbeenamajorreformintheUNcounter-terrorismarchitecture.
UNGlobal Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compactwas signed in 2018 by 36UN entities,INTERPOL,andtheWorldCustomsOrganization.ItisaimedatensuringthattheUnitedNationssystemprovidescoordinatedcapacity-buildingsupporttoMemberStatesinimplementingtheUNGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategyandotherrelevantresolutionsattheirrequest.
However,deepdivisionsstillremainbetweenmemberstatesonissuessuchastheutilityoftheprevention approach to violent extremism, the identi�ication of the conditions and drivers toradicalization, the important role of civil society in ensuring an effective global strategy.Furthermore, concerns about failure to adequately address the human rights abuses beingcommittedandtheincreasingerosionofinternationalhumanitarianlawinthenameofcombattingterrorismneedtobeaddressedurgently.
Answer:
Internethasbroughtaboutarevolutioninthewaypeopleshareinformationandcollaborate–quickly,effectively,acrossborders,toanalmostlimitlessaudience.Internet,however,isalsobeingexploitedbytheterroristorganizationstocreateanewbrandof'internet-enabled'terrorism.
Bringoutthechallengesandopportunitiespresentedbyinternet.
Brie�lywriteabouttheuseofinternetbyterrorists.
3.Theuseof Internetcreatesbothchallengesandopportunities inthe�ightagainstterrorism.Discuss.Approach:
Concludeonthebasisoftheabovepointsonapositivenote.
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Themultivariateuseof Internet forpropagating terrorismposescorrespondingchallenges forsecurityagenciesworldwide:
Lending Anonymity: Use of internethas decentralized terrorist operations such as training,planningandexecutionofattacks(likelonewolfattacks)whichlendsanonymitytoperpetratorsandleavesbehindnotrace.
DisseminatingPropaganda:Useofinternetbyterroristorganisationstofacilitaterecruitment,promoteradicalization,andinciteviolencethroughvideos,games,andonlinechatroomshasenhancedtheirreach,whichisbecomingincreasinglydif�iculttomoderate.
TransnationalOperations:It isbeingfacilitatedbyinternetwhichhelpsthemevadenationaljurisdictionandprosecution.
IllicitFundRaising:Itisalmostgettingimpossibletoidentifythefundsreceivedthroughshellcompaniesoracomplexwebofonlinetransactions.
Cyber-Terrorism:Useofdigitalplatformsbyterroristscanthreatencriticalinfrastructureslikepower,banking,transportandcommunicationswhichcandestabilizeanentirenation.
Procuringweapons:Itisemergingasasourceofprocuringsophisticatedweaponseasilyandanonymouslyattheclickofabuttonviadarkweb,whicharedif�iculttotrace.
Theuseof internetbyterroristorganizations,alsopresentsopportunitiestogovernmentsandsecurityagenciestocounterthem:
Internetcanbehelpfultodisseminatesoundcounter-narrativestoawide-CounterPropaganda:audience(inmultiplelanguageswithease)aswellasthetargetedgroupswhoarelikelytoberadicalized.
Evidencecollection:Internetcanbeusedtogatherevidenceswhichcanbeusedforprosecution.
Intelligencegathering: Itcanhelpgovernmentsandsecurityagenciestopre-emptattacksbyanalysingtheonlinecommunicationsandactivitiesoftheterrorists.BigDataAnalyticscanalsobeemployedtoproactivelyidentifyanddetersuchattacks.
EffectiveTransnational Co-operation betweenintelligence/securityagencies inreal-timecanamplifytheglobalefforttocounterterrorism.
Theinternetisaprimeexampleofhowtechnologicaladvancementcanprovetobeadouble-edgedsword. A united, global response is the only hope for the international community to defeat'internet-enabled'terrorism.IndiarecentlyjoiningtheChristchurchCalltocounterterrorismandradicalizationonlineincludingsocialmediaisastepintherightdirection.Indiashouldlooktobuilduponsuchinitiatives.
Approach:
GiveabriefbackgroundabouttheincreasedincidenceofurbanterrorattacksinIndiaandtheirconsequence.
4.Urbanterrorismhasbeenontheriseinrecenttimes.Identifythefactorsthatmakeurbancentressusceptibletoterroristattacks.Whatlessonscanbelearntfromthepastattackstoputinplaceeffectivemeasurestocombatit?
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MentionsomeeffectivemeasuresinordertocounterthemenaceofgrowingurbanterrorisminIndia.
Exploringdifferentdimensions,accountforreasonsastowhyurbanenvironmentsofferbetterchoicetoterrorists.
Answer:
In recent times, cities such asMumbai, New York, Paris and London have faced the brunt ofterrorism. This indicates towards a trend of rise in urban terrorism. Following factors can beattributedforthisphenomenon:
Logisticalsupport likearms,medicines, food,andlodgingarereadilyavailable inanaverageurbanarea.
Urbancentreshavebecomeatargetbecausetheyarecentresandsymbolsofpolitical,economicandculturalpower.
Unlikeruralareas,urbanareasoffermorescopeforanonymitywhichenablesthe'terrorist�ishtoswiminurbanwaterseasily'.
Population is not only high in cities, but also diverse, dense and concentrated in certaingeographicalpockets.
Maneuverabilityofterroristsisguaranteedbythepresenceofpublicandprivatetransport.
Terroristgroupsgenerally�inditeasiertorecruitprospectiveterroristsinapredictablemanner.
Urban areas have administrative, economic, and political headquarters with criticalinfrastructure,wheremoredamagecanbeaf�lictedwithrelativeease.
Readyavailabilityofprintandelectronicmediawhosewidecoveragealsomagni�iesthefear-generatingcapabilitiesofterroristacts.
Terror attack on cities undermines India's booming economy and vitiating the investmentclimate.
Largeareasuffersdestructionandcontaminationwherenormallifeisparalysedforseveraldays.
Italsoweakensthefabricofsocialcohesion.
Target Hardening: Terrorists usually choose high-pro�ile soft targets like markets, railwaystationsetc.Targethardeningthroughblastwalls,attack-resistantbollardsandshatter-proofglass is one way to deal with this.Also, surveillance cameras, metal and explosive vapourdetectorsandX-rayscanningmachinesshouldbeinstalledatkeyaccesspoints.
Itisimperativetostrengthenlocalintelligenceforpro-Strengtheningactionableintelligence:activecounter-terroristmeasures.Thismustbeaccompaniedbycommunitypolicing.
Consequencesofurbanterrorism
CombatingUrbanTerrorism
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International cooperation:Governmentmust enter into extensive cooperative arrangementswith friendly countries to maximize the advantages of intelligence sharing, seek trainingassistanceandacquireexpertiseavailablewithcountrieslikeIsraelandtheUnitedStatesetc.
Counter-terroristoperations:NationalSecurityGuard(NSG)mustbeequippedwithstate-of-the-art technology and equipment to enable the commandos to enhance their operationalperformance and minimise their own casualties. Every state should have a NSG-type ofcommandoforcetocounterlethalterrorstrikes.
Trained manpower: Security personnel should be sensitised to spotting and segregatingsuspiciousobjectsthatareleftbehindbesidestrainingtheminrescueandreliefoperations.Cityplanners can also introduce strategies to undermine radicalization by strengthening socialbondsbetweendifferenturbancommunities.
pointsofterroristsandtheirhostlocations–onemayusephysicalmapofIndia
Answer:
5.InwhatwaysdoesthephysiographyofIndiaposeachallengetoitscounter-terrorismefforts?Whatcanbedonetodealwiththesechallenges?
Approach:
Relatethesegeographicalfeatureswiththevulnerabilityoftheseborderstoterrorismandhamperingofcounter-terrorismefforts
Urbanterrorismisaphenomenonthatposesgravethreatatatimewhenmoreandmorepeoplearemoving to cities. The challenge is to safeguard cities against terrorism while ensuring theircosmopolitan,diverseanddynamiccharacter.Thus,amultidimensionalapproach-involvinginter-citycooperationpolice-communityrelationsandintelligence,securityandemergencyresponseservices-istheneedofthehour.
ThephysiographyofIndiaismarkedbydiversefeatures,mostprominentbeingitslonglandandmaritimeborders.Vastcoastline, ruggedterrain,speci�ically forests,and internationalbordershaveeffectivelyaidedterroristgroupsinvariouspartsofIndia.Multiplechallengestocounter-terrorismeffortsemanatefromvariousgeographicalfeaturesandclimaticvariationsdiscussedinthetableaspermarkingsgivenon�igure:
Discussstepsthatcanbetakentoovercomethesebarriers
IdentifyfeaturesofphysiographyofIndiaalongitslandandseaborders,thatbecometheentry
1
45
3 2
Figure:FrontiersofIndia
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Borderregion
(see�igure)Physiography Challengesposedto
counter-terrorismefforts
Beyondsurveillancerange;providespacesforterroriststoingress-attack-exit
Illicitdrugs,armstradeandtraf�icking;freemovementofNEinsurgents
Thicklyforestedregion–hometomanyethniccommunities
Plains,riverinebelts,hillswithhardlyanynaturalobstacles;adverse
climaticconditionssuchas�looding
Himalayanrangeswithsteepruggedslopes
Seasonal�loodsalongGujaratborder;rivercrossingsalongPunjabborder
Shallowsandybeachesanddunes,lagoons,dissectionsbyriversandestuaries,residualhills,rocky
highlands
Patrollingrequiresspecialvehicles,boatsetc.withrelevantlytrained
personnelCoastline
Movementofdrugs,illicittradealongthegaps,shiftingsanddunesmaking
fencingineffective,terroristin�iltration
Heavilypopulatedandcultivatedarea;landacquisitionisdif�icult;repeatedsubmergenceoffencesetc.;illegal
migration/traf�icking
Fakecurrency,openborders,shiftingboundariesduetochangingcourseof
rivers
1
2
3
4
5
Fencingand�loodlighting,withperiodicmaintenance,alongIndia'salllandborders,ashasbeen
SchemesschemessuchastheBorderAreaDevelopmentProgramme,followingstepscanbetakentodealwithphysiographicalchallenges:
donealongPunjabandRajasthan'sinternationalborders.
ConstructionofstrategicborderroadsandBorderOut-postsforbetterpatrolling.
Deploymentofhi-teche-surveillanceequipmentlikeNightVisionDevices,HandheldThermal
Beside these infrastructuralmechanisms,updatingofborderagreementswithallneighbouringnations,toensuresustainablepeace,isindispensable.
Imagers,UnattendedGroundSensorsetc.asproposedunderComprehensiveIntegratedBorder
Specialtrainingsforcoastalsecurityforcesandstatepolicepersonnelinmaritimeactivities.
UAVscanaidthebordersecuritybysurveillingininaccessibleanddif�icultlocations.
ManagementSystem(CIBMS)andimplementingitalongalllandborders.
Mountainranges,riversandstreams,Passesopenevenduringwinters
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whichitseesisagainstPakistan'sinterests.
somegroupsfromUNsanctionscommitteewhichisbeingopposedbyRussia.
ThedelayinmovingaheadwithbanonthenewheadofTalibanorIndia'sLackofglobalconsensus:
Fragmentationisexplainedbythefollowing:
decidedtoremovenamesofsomeTalibanleadersfromUNSanctionscommittee.AttheBRICS
Thisdifferenceisseenineverysphere,including�ightagainstTusslebetweenUSandRussia:
thatkeptIndia'sdesirefortoughstatementson“cross-borderterrorism”fromPakistanatbay.
Fore.g.:whileIndianandAfghanistangovernmentsopposeanynegotiationwithTalibanwhile
Nonetheless,thebilateralaspectinthewholedevelopmentcannotbeignoredeither.
terrorism.
India'sattemptstodesignateindividualsinvolvedinplanningandorchestratingactsofterroronitssoil, such asMasoodAzhar, as a global terrorist underUNSCResolution 1267has been put ontechnicalholdbyChinaInthiscontext, ithasbeenobservedbymanythisrepresentsatrendofconsensusoncombatingterrorismglobally.
InatrilateralmeetinginDecember2016theyhaveEmergingaxisofPakistan-China-Russia:
Answer:
proposedConventionAgainstTerrorism.
formulateaglobalframeworkonterrorism.
governmentinAfghanistan.Thisdiluteswaragainstterrorism.EvenUSAispushingtoremove
Russia,ChinaandPakistanarereadytonegotiatewithcertainfactionsofTaliban.
TowardstheendalsoidentifyhowbilateralimpetuscannotbedeniedinexplainingtheChinese
Thus,itshowsthat,everycountryischoosingitsowntermstopursueitsownobjectives.Thisdilutesthe�ightagainstterrorism,andre�lectsthelargernarrativeoffragmentationofglobalconsensusagainstterrorism.
move.Concludebysuggestingawayforward.
Afghanistan,butoflatemanycountries(likeRussia,China,USetc.)areintalkwithittostabilizethe
Noconsensusonagloballyacceptablede�initionof“terrorism”atUNGeneralAssemblyto
Adichotomyisapparentlydevelopingasterroristswhoaregoodorbad.Goodandbadterrorists:
Though,9/11attackstartedasanoffensiveagainstTalibaninOutreachtowardsTaliban:
ChinaisbuildingCPECwithPakistan,thereforeChinaisblockinganymoveEconomicinterest:
summitinOctoberandtheHeartofAsiaconferenceinDecember,itwastheRussia-Chinacombine
6.China'smovetoblockIndia'sattemptsofdesignatingcertainindividualsasterroristattheUNisnotpurelybilateral,ratheritre�lectsalargertrendoffragmentingglobalconsensusonterrorism.Criticalyanalyse.
Approach:
Intheintroduction,brie�lyexplainIndia'sattempttodesignateindividualssuchasMasoodAzaharasterroristattheUNthrough1267committee.
IdentifyingChina'srole,delineatethefactorsthatcanbecitedastheexampleofalackofconsensusonterrorismglobally.
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ChineseinterestsinPakistananditsdifferenceswithIndiaonborderissues,SouthChinaSeaaswellasIndianOceanregionprovidesgroundforargumenttobemadeforabilateralimpetusbehindChina'sactioninthe1267committee.
Attheglobalstage,MasudAzhar'sbanisapieceinamuchlargerjigsawpuzzleofterrorism.Inthefaceofweakeningglobalconsensus,thatoncehelpeditapplypressureonPakistan,IndianeedstoconcentrateonbilaterallyengagingChinawhilesimultaneouslypushingforwardwithitsattemptatforgingaglobalconsensusonterrorismatmultilateralforumsbyrevitalizinginitiativessuchastheComprehensiveConventiononTerrorism.
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4.UPSCMainsPreviousYears'Questions
3.Terrorismisemergingasacompetitiveindustryoverthelastfewdecades.”Analysetheabovestatement.(2016)
1.Indiangovernmenthasrecentlystrengthenedtheanti-terrorismlawsbyamendingtheunlawfulactivities(Prevention)act(UAPA),1967andtheNIAAct.AnalyzethechangesinthecontextofprevailingsecurityenvironmentwhilediscussingthescopeandreasonsforopposingtheUAPAbyhumanrightsorganizations.(2019)
2.Thescourgeofterrorismisagravechallengetonationalsecurity.Whatsolutionsdoyousuggesttocurbthisgrowingmenace?Whatarethemajorsourcesofterroristfunding?(2017)
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