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HSEM 1/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007

Risk Assessmentis a powerful systematic

methodology to minimize the risk of failures (orhazards) to an acceptable target.

Chapter 4: Risk assessment

Benef its o f Risk Management:

Identify the expected failures

Minimize the risk of these failures

Facilitate better business outcomes It does this by providing insight, knowledge and

confidence for better decision-making.

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Risk should be considered at the earliest stages of projectplanning, and risk management activities should be continuedthroughout a project.

Risk management plans and activitiesshould be an integralpart of an organizations management processes.

Systematic identification, analysis and assessment of

riskand dealing with the results contributes significantly to the

success of projects.

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Risk:

Any future bad news

Risk is the chance of something happening that willhave an impact upon objectives.

Risk Analysis:

Risk estimation + Criticality analysis

Risk Control:

Proactive policy + Remedy process

Risk Assessment:Risk analysis + Risk Control

to help the decision making process.

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Risk Cri t ical i ty Factors :

HSE and security effect

Process effetc (production losses)

Standby availability (5/5, 4/5, 3/5, 2/5)

Costs (operation and maintenance)

Project / Site/ System / Equipment:

Item / Maintenance: (Top 5 Failures)

Mean time to/bet. failure (MTTF or MTBF)

Mean time to repair (MTTR)

Work Order Priority

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Case: Equipment Criticality Systems

System #1:

Equipment HSE Process Standby Level

Gas condensate pump Major Major Without A+

Feed crude oil pump Medium Major With B

Export Pump Major Major With A

Sump Pit Pump (vessels) Major Major With A

Fire fighting pump Major Minor With A

Water feed pump Normal Medium With D

Instrument Air Compressor Major Major With A

Stand By Generator (Diesel) Major Major Without A+

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System #2: Safety f i rs t

Level Description Example

A Major effect on HSE F ire f ighting pump

B Major effect on Process

= H igh down time cost

Feed crude oil pump

C Normal effect on HSE

Normal effect on process

Without standby

Water feed pump

D Normal effect on HSE

Normal effect on process

With standby

Water feed pump

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7/43HSEM 7/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007

System #3:

Category Criticality Consequences

HSE

1No potential for injury, pollution, fire or effect on

safety systems

2No effect on safety systems controlling process and no

potential for fatalities, moderate or large pollution or

fire in classified areas

3Potential for fatalities, moderate or large pollution and

fire in classified areas.

Production

(P)

1 No effect on production

2 Brief stop in production < 1 hour or reduced product

3 Production shutdown > 4 hours

Cost ( C )

1 Insignificant consequential cost < 1,000 USD

2 Moderate consequential cost > 1,000 < 15,000 USD

3 Substantial consequential cost > 15,000 USD

(1) Low criticality. (2) Medium criticality. (3) High criticality.

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Risk = Severity x Probability

Risk = Consequencex Frequency

Risk Level:

X

Risk :

Any future bad news (objective or subjective)

Severity : Harm or damage caused by a hazard

Probability :

Likelihood that the harm is realized

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Risk = Severity x Probability

Risk = Consequencex Frequency

Method of Criticality Based of Risk Concept:

Low Medium HighSeverity

Low

Medium

High

Probability

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Consequence or Sever ityProbability

Or

Frequency

(3)

High

(2)

Medium

(1)

Low

3

M

2

L

1

L

(1) Low:

>2 y

6

H

4

M

2

L

(2)Medium:

1-2y

9

S

6

H

3

M

(3) High:

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SeverityProbability

orFrequency (3)

High

(2)

Medium

(1)

Low

3

N

2

N

1

N

(1) Low:

Y

6

C

4

N

2

N

(2) Medium:

6m-1y

9

C

6

C

3

N

(3) High:

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Severity

5 4 3 2 1

>6 f/y 5 H H H M L

5-6 f/y 4 H H M M L

3-4 f/y 3 H M M L L

1-2 f/y

2M M L L L

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People Assets Environ-ment

Repu-tation

Severity

0

1

2

3

4

5

No injury

or damage

to health

Slight injury

or healtheffects

Minor injury

or health

effects

Major injury

or health

effects

Single fatality

or permanent

total disability

Multiple

fatalities

No

damage

Slightdamage

Minor

damage

Local

damage

Major

damage

Extensive

damage

No

effect

No

impact

Slighteffect

Slight

impact

Minor

effect

Minor

impact

Localised

effect

Consider-

able

impact

Major

effectNational

impact

Inter-

national

impact

Massive

effect

Never heard of

in

EP industry

A

LowLow

MediumMedium

HighHigh

Has

occurred in

EP industry

B

Has occurred in

the audited OU

C D

Happensseveral t imes a

year in the

audited OU

E

Happensseveral t imes a

year in the

audited facility

SeriousSerious

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (HSE effect)

Frequency

System #4:

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Risk Assessment Matrix

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-100.12.

EExtremely high risk HHigh risk

MMedium risk LLow risk

Severity

Probability

Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely

Catastrophic E E H H M

Critical E H H M L

Marginal H M M L L

Negligible

M L L L L

System #5:

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Major Processes of Risk assessment

(3)

QualitativeRisk Analysis

(4)

QuantitativeRisk Analysis

(2)

Risk

Identification

(5)Risk

Response

Planning

Risk Planning RiskControlling

(6)Risk

Monitoring

& Control

(1)

Risk

Management

Planning

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Risk Planning

Risk

Plan

Risk I denti fy

Risk Evaluate

Risk M itigate

Store

Risk assessment Process :

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Risk Assessment

Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation

Risk I dentif ication Risk Estimation

Risk Sources

=

Find

List

Elements

Risk Probability

+

Risk Impact

or

Severity

Risk M itigate

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Risk Estimation

Risk Impact (Severity) Risk Probability (Frequency)

Quantitative Qualitative

Tools:Forecasting limits

Decision tree analysis

Tools:Failure priority system

FMEA

Fault tree analysis

Risk radar

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Risk Response Strategies

2) Mitigation

(Correct ive act ion )

1) Avoidance

(Prevention)4) Acceptance

(Ac cept con sequences)

3) Transference

(Shif t Respons ibi l i ty)

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Risk Assessment Steps:

1. Select the team and team leader

2. List of job steps (break down the main activities)3. Define the potential hazards (description and type)

4. Decide who might be harmed and how

5. Evaluate the risks (Severity & Probability)

6. Define the risk level (risk matrix)

7. Propose the proactive policy (hazard control policy) Engineering controls.

Management controls.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

8. Plan your remedy (Overall planning)

Note:

Your Risk Matrixmust be customize according to

your working conditions and system criticality

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The project r isk management process

ROOT CAUSES ANALYSIS

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ROOT CAUSES ANALYSIS

1. Accident (or Incident or Near-Miss or Failure) classification

(short description and hazard type)

1. Contact (area visit, interview)

2. Causes3. Root cause

4. System defaults (root root cause):

Incomplete information,

Insufficient maintenance,

Bad design, Limited resources for process or HSE targets

Awareness / culture / support, .. etc.

5. Responsibility (Supervisor or/and management)

6. Severity level (A, B, or C)

7. Remedy

For (A and B ):

1. Set action plan and risk assessment for critical items

2. Measure actual performance

3. Evaluate your Performance .

4. KPI for critical items

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Root Cause Analysis

Entire chain of events is evaluated to find "Root Causes" as well as

the immediate cause

Promoted by National Safety Council, etc.

"Root causesare safety system inadequacies

Personal factors

Physical or mental condition, skills, knowledge, etc. Job factors

Equipment, workplace conditions

Recommendations may include:

Policies

Equipment Training

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Accident

Weed

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Job Safety Analysis

1. Select the team and team leader

2. List of job steps (break down the main activities)3. Define the potential hazards (description and type)

4. Evaluate the risks (Severity & Probability)

5. Define the risk level (risk matrix)

6. Toolbox Talk

7. Propose the proactive policy (hazard control policy)

Engineering controls.

Management controls.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

8. Plan your policy (Overall planning)

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Job Safety Analysis (JSA) technique

Already a part of many existing accident prevention programs

JSA breaks the job into basic steps

Identifies hazard of each step

Prescribes controls for each hazard

Review JSA if one has been conducted before the accident

Perform JSA if one is not available to determine the events and conditions that

led to the accident

The process to ensure a pre-task safety talk is carried out with all workers

1. Give safety talk to workers at start of tasks: review and identify allrisks

2. Check they understand3. Fill in form

4. All workers sign

5. Attach start form near work location

J b S f t A l i

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Identify Task scope

State study Objectives

Break down Task to basic steps

For each step

Identify Hazards

&Threats

Assess Risk Define Controls

& Recovery measures

Record results

Summarise for each step,

Assign actions & action parties

....... for the working environment

Job Safety Analysis

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RCA= What Happened? Analysis = Reactive analysis

FMEA= What IF? Analysis = Proactive analysis

FMEA:Tool to evaluate potential failure modes and their causes

Prioritize according to risk

Actions to eliminate or reduce Probability of Occurrence

RCAis a Process for identifying the contributing causalfactors that underlie variations in performance.

ROOT CAUSES ANALYSIS & Failure Mode Effect Analysis

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The FMEA process is divided into the following six steps:

- For each Component:

Step 1: Funct ion s

Step 2: Func tion al Failures

Step 3: Failure modes (fai lure rate date) definit io n

Step 4: Failure cause

Step 5: Effects of failure mode descr ip t ion. Local System Plant

HSE Cost Process

Step 6: Remedy.

FMEA:

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FMEA

100%

Item Function Failure

mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

Is the part from the system or subsystem (assembly)

Is the main Task of the item

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FMEA


mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

Is the manner by which a failure is observed and is

defined as non-fulfillment of one of the equipment

functions .

Example:

valve the failure mode is open,partially open,closed

partially closed and wobble

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FMEA


mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

For each failure mode there may be several failure

causes

Select only potential failure to get root cause

By using why -why analysis you can get the root

cause for potential failure

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FMEA


mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

For each failure cause there is one or several failure

mechanisms examples of failure mechanism are

Fatigue ,corrosion and wear

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FMEA


mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

Means what is happen when each failure mode occurs

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FMEA


mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

Effect of failure is described in terms of the worst caseoutcome with respect to safety and environmental impacts

,production availability and direct economic cost and all that

in numerical measure which are defined from ranking criteria

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mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

FMEA

Safety and Environment severity degree

Impact degree on Availability of production

Impact degree on Cost

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RANK SEVERITY

LEVELDESCRIPTION

10 Catastrophic IA failure results in the major injury or death of

personnel.

79 Critical IIA failure results in minor injury to personnel, personnelexposure to harmful chemicals or radiation, a fire or a

release of chemicals in to the environment.

46 Major IIIA failure results in a low level exposure to personnel, or

activates facility alarm system.

13 Minor IV

A failure results in minor system damage but does not

cause injury to Personnel allow any kind of exposure to

operational or service personnel or allow any release of

chemicals into environment.

FMEA

HSE severity ranking criteria

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mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

FMEA

The probability that a failure will occur during the

expected life of the system can be described in potential

occurrence per unit time

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RANK DESCRIPTION

1An unlikely probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval.Unlikely is defined as asingle failure mode (FM) probability < 0.001 of theoverall probability of failure during the item operating time interval.

23

A remote probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval (i.e.once every two months). Remote is defined as asingle FM probability > 0.001

but < 0.01 of the overall probability of failure during the item operating time

interval.

46

An occasional probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval

(i.e. once a month).Occasional is defined as asingle FM probability > 0.01 but < 0.10 of the overall

probability of failure during the item operating time interval.

79A moderate probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval(i.e. once every two weeks). Probable is defined as asingle FM probability >

0.10 but < 0.20 of the overall probability of failure during the item operatingtime interval.

10

A high probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval (i.e.once a week). High probability is defined as asingle FM probability > 0.20 of

the overall probability of failure during the item operating interval.

FMEAOccurrence ranking criteria

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FMEA


mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

This section provides a ranking based on anassessment of the probability that a failure of mode

will be detected given the controls that are in place .

The probability of detection is ranked in reverse

order

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RANK DESCRIPTION

12Very high probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or

controls will almost certainly detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.

34

High probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or

controls have a good chance of detecting the existence of a deficiency or

defect.

57Moderate probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or

controls are likely to detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.

8-9Low probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or

controls not likely to detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.

10

Very low (or zero) probability that the defect will be detected. Verification

and/or controls will not or cannot detect the existence of a deficiency or

defect.

FMEA

Detection ranking criteria

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Occurrence

x Severity

x Detection

RPN = O x S x D

Risk Pr ior i ty Number


mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

FMEA

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mode

Failure

cause

Failure

mechanis

m

Failure

effects Occ Det RPN

Maintenance

task

Recomm-

ended

intervalS A C

Severity

An appropriate maintenance action may hopefully be foundby the decision logic in step 7

The identified maintenance action is performed at intervalsof fixed length.the length of the intervals is found in step 8

FMEA

risk_ass

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