Download - Risk_Ass
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HSEM 1/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk Assessmentis a powerful systematic
methodology to minimize the risk of failures (orhazards) to an acceptable target.
Chapter 4: Risk assessment
Benef its o f Risk Management:
Identify the expected failures
Minimize the risk of these failures
Facilitate better business outcomes It does this by providing insight, knowledge and
confidence for better decision-making.
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HSEM 2/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk should be considered at the earliest stages of projectplanning, and risk management activities should be continuedthroughout a project.
Risk management plans and activitiesshould be an integralpart of an organizations management processes.
Systematic identification, analysis and assessment of
riskand dealing with the results contributes significantly to the
success of projects.
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HSEM 3/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk:
Any future bad news
Risk is the chance of something happening that willhave an impact upon objectives.
Risk Analysis:
Risk estimation + Criticality analysis
Risk Control:
Proactive policy + Remedy process
Risk Assessment:Risk analysis + Risk Control
to help the decision making process.
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HSEM 4/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk Cri t ical i ty Factors :
HSE and security effect
Process effetc (production losses)
Standby availability (5/5, 4/5, 3/5, 2/5)
Costs (operation and maintenance)
Project / Site/ System / Equipment:
Item / Maintenance: (Top 5 Failures)
Mean time to/bet. failure (MTTF or MTBF)
Mean time to repair (MTTR)
Work Order Priority
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HSEM 5/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Case: Equipment Criticality Systems
System #1:
Equipment HSE Process Standby Level
Gas condensate pump Major Major Without A+
Feed crude oil pump Medium Major With B
Export Pump Major Major With A
Sump Pit Pump (vessels) Major Major With A
Fire fighting pump Major Minor With A
Water feed pump Normal Medium With D
Instrument Air Compressor Major Major With A
Stand By Generator (Diesel) Major Major Without A+
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HSEM 6/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
System #2: Safety f i rs t
Level Description Example
A Major effect on HSE F ire f ighting pump
B Major effect on Process
= H igh down time cost
Feed crude oil pump
C Normal effect on HSE
Normal effect on process
Without standby
Water feed pump
D Normal effect on HSE
Normal effect on process
With standby
Water feed pump
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7/43HSEM 7/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
System #3:
Category Criticality Consequences
HSE
1No potential for injury, pollution, fire or effect on
safety systems
2No effect on safety systems controlling process and no
potential for fatalities, moderate or large pollution or
fire in classified areas
3Potential for fatalities, moderate or large pollution and
fire in classified areas.
Production
(P)
1 No effect on production
2 Brief stop in production < 1 hour or reduced product
3 Production shutdown > 4 hours
Cost ( C )
1 Insignificant consequential cost < 1,000 USD
2 Moderate consequential cost > 1,000 < 15,000 USD
3 Substantial consequential cost > 15,000 USD
(1) Low criticality. (2) Medium criticality. (3) High criticality.
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Risk = Severity x Probability
Risk = Consequencex Frequency
Risk Level:
X
Risk :
Any future bad news (objective or subjective)
Severity : Harm or damage caused by a hazard
Probability :
Likelihood that the harm is realized
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Risk = Severity x Probability
Risk = Consequencex Frequency
Method of Criticality Based of Risk Concept:
Low Medium HighSeverity
Low
Medium
High
Probability
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10/43HSEM 10/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Consequence or Sever ityProbability
Or
Frequency
(3)
High
(2)
Medium
(1)
Low
3
M
2
L
1
L
(1) Low:
>2 y
6
H
4
M
2
L
(2)Medium:
1-2y
9
S
6
H
3
M
(3) High:
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11/43HSEM 11/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
SeverityProbability
orFrequency (3)
High
(2)
Medium
(1)
Low
3
N
2
N
1
N
(1) Low:
Y
6
C
4
N
2
N
(2) Medium:
6m-1y
9
C
6
C
3
N
(3) High:
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12/43HSEM 12/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Severity
5 4 3 2 1
>6 f/y 5 H H H M L
5-6 f/y 4 H H M M L
3-4 f/y 3 H M M L L
1-2 f/y
2M M L L L
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13/43HSEM 13/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
People Assets Environ-ment
Repu-tation
Severity
0
1
2
3
4
5
No injury
or damage
to health
Slight injury
or healtheffects
Minor injury
or health
effects
Major injury
or health
effects
Single fatality
or permanent
total disability
Multiple
fatalities
No
damage
Slightdamage
Minor
damage
Local
damage
Major
damage
Extensive
damage
No
effect
No
impact
Slighteffect
Slight
impact
Minor
effect
Minor
impact
Localised
effect
Consider-
able
impact
Major
effectNational
impact
Inter-
national
impact
Massive
effect
Never heard of
in
EP industry
A
LowLow
MediumMedium
HighHigh
Has
occurred in
EP industry
B
Has occurred in
the audited OU
C D
Happensseveral t imes a
year in the
audited OU
E
Happensseveral t imes a
year in the
audited facility
SeriousSerious
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (HSE effect)
Frequency
System #4:
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HSEM 14/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk Assessment Matrix
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-100.12.
EExtremely high risk HHigh risk
MMedium risk LLow risk
Severity
Probability
Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
Catastrophic E E H H M
Critical E H H M L
Marginal H M M L L
Negligible
M L L L L
System #5:
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HSEM 15/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Major Processes of Risk assessment
(3)
QualitativeRisk Analysis
(4)
QuantitativeRisk Analysis
(2)
Risk
Identification
(5)Risk
Response
Planning
Risk Planning RiskControlling
(6)Risk
Monitoring
& Control
(1)
Risk
Management
Planning
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HSEM 16/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk Planning
Risk
Plan
Risk I denti fy
Risk Evaluate
Risk M itigate
Store
Risk assessment Process :
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HSEM 17/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk Assessment
Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation
Risk I dentif ication Risk Estimation
Risk Sources
=
Find
List
Elements
Risk Probability
+
Risk Impact
or
Severity
Risk M itigate
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HSEM 18/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk Estimation
Risk Impact (Severity) Risk Probability (Frequency)
Quantitative Qualitative
Tools:Forecasting limits
Decision tree analysis
Tools:Failure priority system
FMEA
Fault tree analysis
Risk radar
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HSEM 19/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk Response Strategies
2) Mitigation
(Correct ive act ion )
1) Avoidance
(Prevention)4) Acceptance
(Ac cept con sequences)
3) Transference
(Shif t Respons ibi l i ty)
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HSEM 20/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Risk Assessment Steps:
1. Select the team and team leader
2. List of job steps (break down the main activities)3. Define the potential hazards (description and type)
4. Decide who might be harmed and how
5. Evaluate the risks (Severity & Probability)
6. Define the risk level (risk matrix)
7. Propose the proactive policy (hazard control policy) Engineering controls.
Management controls.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
8. Plan your remedy (Overall planning)
Note:
Your Risk Matrixmust be customize according to
your working conditions and system criticality
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HSEM 21/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
The project r isk management process
ROOT CAUSES ANALYSIS
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HSEM 22/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
ROOT CAUSES ANALYSIS
1. Accident (or Incident or Near-Miss or Failure) classification
(short description and hazard type)
1. Contact (area visit, interview)
2. Causes3. Root cause
4. System defaults (root root cause):
Incomplete information,
Insufficient maintenance,
Bad design, Limited resources for process or HSE targets
Awareness / culture / support, .. etc.
5. Responsibility (Supervisor or/and management)
6. Severity level (A, B, or C)
7. Remedy
For (A and B ):
1. Set action plan and risk assessment for critical items
2. Measure actual performance
3. Evaluate your Performance .
4. KPI for critical items
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HSEM 23/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Root Cause Analysis
Entire chain of events is evaluated to find "Root Causes" as well as
the immediate cause
Promoted by National Safety Council, etc.
"Root causesare safety system inadequacies
Personal factors
Physical or mental condition, skills, knowledge, etc. Job factors
Equipment, workplace conditions
Recommendations may include:
Policies
Equipment Training
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HSEM 24/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Accident
Weed
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HSEM 25/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Job Safety Analysis
1. Select the team and team leader
2. List of job steps (break down the main activities)3. Define the potential hazards (description and type)
4. Evaluate the risks (Severity & Probability)
5. Define the risk level (risk matrix)
6. Toolbox Talk
7. Propose the proactive policy (hazard control policy)
Engineering controls.
Management controls.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
8. Plan your policy (Overall planning)
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HSEM 26/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Job Safety Analysis (JSA) technique
Already a part of many existing accident prevention programs
JSA breaks the job into basic steps
Identifies hazard of each step
Prescribes controls for each hazard
Review JSA if one has been conducted before the accident
Perform JSA if one is not available to determine the events and conditions that
led to the accident
The process to ensure a pre-task safety talk is carried out with all workers
1. Give safety talk to workers at start of tasks: review and identify allrisks
2. Check they understand3. Fill in form
4. All workers sign
5. Attach start form near work location
J b S f t A l i
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HSEM 27/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Identify Task scope
State study Objectives
Break down Task to basic steps
For each step
Identify Hazards
&Threats
Assess Risk Define Controls
& Recovery measures
Record results
Summarise for each step,
Assign actions & action parties
....... for the working environment
Job Safety Analysis
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HSEM 28/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
RCA= What Happened? Analysis = Reactive analysis
FMEA= What IF? Analysis = Proactive analysis
FMEA:Tool to evaluate potential failure modes and their causes
Prioritize according to risk
Actions to eliminate or reduce Probability of Occurrence
RCAis a Process for identifying the contributing causalfactors that underlie variations in performance.
ROOT CAUSES ANALYSIS & Failure Mode Effect Analysis
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HSEM 29/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
The FMEA process is divided into the following six steps:
- For each Component:
Step 1: Funct ion s
Step 2: Func tion al Failures
Step 3: Failure modes (fai lure rate date) definit io n
Step 4: Failure cause
Step 5: Effects of failure mode descr ip t ion. Local System Plant
HSE Cost Process
Step 6: Remedy.
FMEA:
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HSEM 30/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
FMEA
100%
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
Is the part from the system or subsystem (assembly)
Is the main Task of the item
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HSEM 31/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
FMEA
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
Is the manner by which a failure is observed and is
defined as non-fulfillment of one of the equipment
functions .
Example:
valve the failure mode is open,partially open,closed
partially closed and wobble
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HSEM 32/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
FMEA
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
For each failure mode there may be several failure
causes
Select only potential failure to get root cause
By using why -why analysis you can get the root
cause for potential failure
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HSEM 33/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
FMEA
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
For each failure cause there is one or several failure
mechanisms examples of failure mechanism are
Fatigue ,corrosion and wear
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HSEM 34/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
FMEA
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
Means what is happen when each failure mode occurs
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HSEM 35/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
FMEA
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
Effect of failure is described in terms of the worst caseoutcome with respect to safety and environmental impacts
,production availability and direct economic cost and all that
in numerical measure which are defined from ranking criteria
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HSEM 36/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
FMEA
Safety and Environment severity degree
Impact degree on Availability of production
Impact degree on Cost
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HSEM 37/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
RANK SEVERITY
LEVELDESCRIPTION
10 Catastrophic IA failure results in the major injury or death of
personnel.
79 Critical IIA failure results in minor injury to personnel, personnelexposure to harmful chemicals or radiation, a fire or a
release of chemicals in to the environment.
46 Major IIIA failure results in a low level exposure to personnel, or
activates facility alarm system.
13 Minor IV
A failure results in minor system damage but does not
cause injury to Personnel allow any kind of exposure to
operational or service personnel or allow any release of
chemicals into environment.
FMEA
HSE severity ranking criteria
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HSEM 38/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
FMEA
The probability that a failure will occur during the
expected life of the system can be described in potential
occurrence per unit time
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HSEM 39/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
RANK DESCRIPTION
1An unlikely probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval.Unlikely is defined as asingle failure mode (FM) probability < 0.001 of theoverall probability of failure during the item operating time interval.
23
A remote probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval (i.e.once every two months). Remote is defined as asingle FM probability > 0.001
but < 0.01 of the overall probability of failure during the item operating time
interval.
46
An occasional probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval
(i.e. once a month).Occasional is defined as asingle FM probability > 0.01 but < 0.10 of the overall
probability of failure during the item operating time interval.
79A moderate probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval(i.e. once every two weeks). Probable is defined as asingle FM probability >
0.10 but < 0.20 of the overall probability of failure during the item operatingtime interval.
10
A high probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval (i.e.once a week). High probability is defined as asingle FM probability > 0.20 of
the overall probability of failure during the item operating interval.
FMEAOccurrence ranking criteria
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HSEM 40/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
FMEA
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
This section provides a ranking based on anassessment of the probability that a failure of mode
will be detected given the controls that are in place .
The probability of detection is ranked in reverse
order
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HSEM 41/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
RANK DESCRIPTION
12Very high probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or
controls will almost certainly detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.
34
High probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or
controls have a good chance of detecting the existence of a deficiency or
defect.
57Moderate probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or
controls are likely to detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.
8-9Low probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or
controls not likely to detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.
10
Very low (or zero) probability that the defect will be detected. Verification
and/or controls will not or cannot detect the existence of a deficiency or
defect.
FMEA
Detection ranking criteria
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HSEM 42/Ch. 4HSE management ViewPart I - Dr. Att ia Gom aa - 2007
Occurrence
x Severity
x Detection
RPN = O x S x D
Risk Pr ior i ty Number
Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
FMEA
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Item Function Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
intervalS A C
Severity
An appropriate maintenance action may hopefully be foundby the decision logic in step 7
The identified maintenance action is performed at intervalsof fixed length.the length of the intervals is found in step 8
FMEA