rise and fall of the luftwaffe a.k.a. the end of herman

8/14/2019 Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe a.k.a. the End of Herman

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Military Intelligence ServiceAPO 696,US ArmyXVJiiae 1945

A.P.W.I.D* (Ninth Air Force Adv)-65/l-945373.2\u25a0'SUBJECT.: Enemy Intelligence Summaries ??,. -^ \u0084-.. p. '-/I\ u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 X0U UsU s

TO See Distribution

H.ERMANN G 0 B R IH\

PREAMBLE,The following report is the restalt of a lengthy interrogation of HERMANN G-OERING toy officers of the Air-'p/w., Interroga- ;tion Detachment / Questionnaires prepared by USS TAP and Air MinistrSwere covered by this interrogation. . . ]The interrogation dealt also with information of a general and historical .nature which .often led to liberal discussions

on basic issues. It will readily be seen that "by this means ..considerable light \?vas shed on the events which took place behindthe scenes of the play enacted by the leading characters" of theNazi hierarchy. It was apparent that the totalitarian regime hadnot run as smoothly as its leaders would have made it seem, and, \ : "surprisingly enough, one of the chief causes was HITUiR'S constant trespassing on G-OERING !S private operational premises.How much constant interference affected. the overallpolicy of the Luftwaffe eaid accelerated its doom is shown in thereflections of the P/W who, by his very nature, pretended to beunaware of the disastrous part that he himself had played in this

.regard. The report shows how HITLER concerned himself continuous^ly with the .smallest technical decisions. During the last twoyears when G-OERING-'S star to use; his own words , was descending,this interference assumed proportions which caused G-OERING- to-exclaim: "You had a great -ally in your aerial warfare theEiihreor. ." r sINTRODUCTIONPART I.; ;. ALLIED AIR'POWER AND- THE WAR._ ' -PART 11. . . \ u 25 a0 .. THE G.A.P. 'PART 111. JET AIRCRAFT.PART IV . .ALLIED .STRATEGIC BOMBINGPART V . . . THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN.HE BATTLE OF BRITAIN.

\u25a0 \PART Yl.. : ..THE -RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE RUSSIAN AIRFORCE.PART VII. THE JAPANESE.PART VIII. OTHER CAMPAIGNS AND OPIRATIONS. .

\u 2 5 a 0CONCLUSION. .

6 M 1945 0 jo a /i^ r


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/.< MIINTRODUCTION

.1 . Reichsmarech^Ll a^EEMAM QDESOGjReich-sKi.ii^^t^:. fpr ir,1. Reichsmarech^Ll a^EEMAM QDESOGjReich-sKi.ii^^t^:. fpr ir,Supreme Commander of the GAP, Prime fflCTjsr of PRUSSLff, Pre&idenupreme Commander of the GAP, Prime fflCTjsr of PRUSSLff, Pre&idenof the State Council, President of Eeichs&asto 'Srf the State Council, President of Eeichs&asto 'Sr-Forestry and G-ame, President of the 9i^^cJ^s^feS^^|ftr-ph Councilorestry and G-ame, President of the 9i^^cJ^s^feS^^|ftr-ph Councila series -eries -of titles and offices,f titles and offices, which hehich he i^c^^^^ halfi^c^^^^ *half *proudly enumerated himself was a willing; fel^p^^' M^Mf^tosroudly enumerated himself was a willing; fel^p^^' M^Mf^tos2. P/W. stated his readiness to tell everything u&*jfimjj. P/W. stated his readiness to tell everything u&*jfimjj*

u 2 5 a 0DOintins- out.Ointins- v/asJrut. v/asJrconfined to those of a more organizational nature, in accordancewith the office he laeld. Technical details were dealt with by,his various staff experts. . He made particular mention of his aide,Oberst YON: BRAUCHITSCH, : who was later separately interrogated and'his information, when cross-checked against GOERING- 1 S statements ,was incorporated^ into this report.

pointing out, however, that his knowledge of GAP mattersowever,owever, that his knowledge of GAP mattershat his knowledge of GAP matters was

, . 3. GOERING- tried hard to make a - case for himself , and, despite rumors to the contrary, .is far from being mentally deranged.In fact he must be considered a very, "shrewd customer", a greatactor and professional liar who most likely made some 'mentalreservations, trying to keep what he might consider a few acesup his. sleeve in order to have some bargaining power if andwhen the need arises. It may be added 'that &OERING-- still considershimself the legal successor to ADOLF HITLER, stating however:"This is no longer of importance but it may be quite interestingfor 'you". ':."\u25a0 ; ' . ' \u25a0A* GQERING spoke with pathos and drama about the eventsleading to his arrest by the SS, his liberation by a LuftwaffeUnit, and then his final capture by US troops on 6 May 1945. Hestated that at 0300 on 21 April he left BERLIN for Southern GER- " \u25a0MANY.. . '\u25a0.5. During the night of 22 April ,. Generaloberst KOLLERfollowed GOERING to BERCHTESGADEN and reported to him" that HITLERhad decided to stay and die; in .BERLIN. Thereupon, GOERING senta telegram to. HITLER informing him that-, in view of- HITLER'S for-mer appointment of GOERING as his' successor, he would assume- fullcontrol of the German Reich unless he received orders to the'

1contrary by. 2200 hours. He^was encouraged in his actions -by a1aremark which HITLER is supposed to -have made when reminded, thatit was high time to start negotiations witlv the Allies. "1 shallnever do that", .HITLER 4.s supposed to have said, "GOEEIWG can\u25a0\u25a0* ''u25a0do it much better" t . .

6. The telegram was sent a t 1500 :hours on 23 April,, and at2200 hours, GOERII\TG was arrested l)j SS ' troops, A. telegram signedby^, HITLER , then arrived asking him to resign all his offices.According to GOERING'S interpretation this referred only to theoffices he was holding a t that time and did not include" his appoint"\u25a0ment as HITLER'S successor. A sec ond tele gram signed'. Fii.hrerwhich GOERING said 'was a fake sine e '. it was. sent after HITLER f Sdeath by BORMAM,i?he secretary of the NSDAP, sentenced him and hisfamily to death.

7. V/hile he was standing there 'surrounded by 'SS men, membersof th e 12 LN.Regt (Air Signal Regt) passed by. Upon seeing him,. .they ran forward to greet arid cheer their beloved commander. GOERING-., . swiftly weighing up the \u25a0situation and finding that the Luftwaffe men: outnumbered the SS,' ordered them to , charge the SS,whereupon' the SS -Commander rather willingly as GOERING claimedlet him go.

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8. aOBRING-'S comment on his liberation is characteristic.of his pompous vanity up to the end. "It was i.one of the most.,beautiful moments of my life to stand there again in froiltof my :"troops, and see them present arms for their Commander-in-Ohi ex.This liberation, G-OERING- continued, gave him back his freedom ofaction. It was shortlived, however, as the Americans were eventhen closing in on him. \u0084 .9. Further reference "wil lbe' made in the course of thisreport to the differences which existed .among the leaders of .aSHMAIY- par ticularly^between (xOSRTNG and HITLER. Some light'wil lbe : thrown on the entire complex of events preceding thefinal collapse of the Third Reich. GOERING f S statements willbe quoted verbatim, whenever practicable, in order" to preservethe genuine character of his reaction to certain questions andproblems under discussion. .

'10. It must be borne in mind that throughout the entireinterrogation G-OERING- made partly subtle, partly obvious effortsto clear himself. Hot only did he render HITLER responsiblefor almost all mistakes made by the German High Command 1 in general and by the Luftv/affe in ,particular , but he also took greatpains to show that he himself was not such a bad fellow afterall., "Next to being a German, 1 favor the. West; J... am a Europeanlike you", "If you know^my speeches, you wil ladmit that In noneof them whether delivered in peace or wartime have Iattacked1a foreign statesman personally", "I never held an office in the.

Nazi party".'

"I was the most outspoken exponent of the 'Stateauthority versus the authority of the party". These quotationsu 2 5 a 0\u25a0\ u25a0, \u25a0-


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**&iK fa..a -J *Without the Allied Air Porce^ \GOERING-G- ollaimed, it would have "been

possible to bring, up German ground .reinforcements- ;inf\^ fn- 4 W 'MM I


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* was an expert in Teapons of the Aimy and MV^;iT to -^r'vise him.OKL, OKW and. Navy

21. two liaison officers the OW:ICD- had ' Major, BtJCHS-u 2 5 a 0 \u 2 5 a 0\u25a0.and Oberstlt. BOHM IEiDTELBiiCH.. . '

22. There -was no l iaison officer of the OEW.with the OKL.\u25a0 \u25a0The.. Puhrer took care 'o f that himself ;' . \ /..\u25a0"' \u25a 0/\u25a 0 \u25a 0

23. Haval-Aviation to all intents ->^nd purposes did not exist\u25a0in GERMANY.' ;. ' . . \u25a0.-..' '; . / /Disposition- of Units

-... 24-. Unless interfered with by .HITLER, '\u25a0 GOERING- decided thedisplacing of units from one front to another* Employment of ; .units in the West was -the problem of Luftwaff enkoimnahd.o West(mc l 2' Jagdkorps) while Jagdkorps I;and "later . Jagdkorps handled' ; ' 9\u 2 5 a 0the Question, in G-ERMAHY. . : .\,

A/0 Procurement- 25/ In June/July 1944 procurement was transferred fromMIL.CE. to SPEERv . This resulted in an increase in a/c production ;although the average quality of the a/c suffered somewhat. . (The ;.number of good a/c, however:, still surpassed the former production

\u25a0figures. ' -'; ; . ' '. . ' '../: :... \u25a 0\u25a 0\u25a 0 v " :\u25a0 , \u25a0.'\u25a0. .. \u25a0-\u25a0 ' .\u25a0'.\ u25a 026.* m line wilgh his growing distrust -of G-OERING-' , HITLEKordered the production of jet a/c be turned over to SS G-ruppen

\u25a0fiihrer KAMiuLER. \u25a0- . . . ' ...Personnel

\u25a0. 27. \u25a0GOERIHG-'S private secretary was a Fraulein LI.MBEHOSB of .BERCHTSSG-ADEN to whom,, he said, he very s-eldona. dictated any .ordersand who could, therefore, not be considered as a valuable source.of 'information-.. In line with his normal . procedure, G^ERIKG wouldgive oral orders to his Duty Adjutant, vvho, in .' turn, passed .them-"',

\u25a0on to the. Chief . .,..\u25a0". ..'\u25a0\u25a0.'28. Responsibility for the . drafting of orders was delegatedby G-OERING- to the. appropriate .department. G-OERIIG- himself dictatedonly proclamations. ;u 2 5 a 0

: 29. - Oberst WODARG- was in charge of Intelligence {I.) mattersconcerning foreign countries-. His aides Included: \u25a0'Oberstlt. KIEMTZ (WEST)Major OWE (EAST)u25a0. -The office of the Ie was last located at a. cs'tle formerly, be-u25a0longing to the DAE' - near VIASSERBURG/IKN. : ' .

P erso nal 3?11e s30* . 'GrOERIN.G- claimed that all his personal files had been -destroyed. ITone of "these were in the ELM, since he very seldomwent there; instead, he used an office in the building of the

1Prussian' State Ministry. A ll the Adjutants 1 filce 'vei c supcosedlyburned at KARIMALL-. *'"" i0% m^i\


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INTELLIGENCE. jOrganisation

31. Intell igence ('ic .-\u25a0'. inform; t ion was accorded 'Strictattention"- and' was .frecruently the, "b. sia .-for -defensive 'and offensive: : joperations unless overridden.oby : the Eiihrer. Intelligence information of . general 'value and interest -was. published In Ic-publica-

\u 2 5 a0 \ u 2 5 a 0 ions, : .. \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0'. ..... ;\ u25a 0\u25a 0Sources of Intell igence

32. Important sources of In formation included foreign newspapers, ' magazines


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was under 6o;. \ ! was jnore 'extensive, the a/c wereoeing , otnerv/rse.. disposedisposed oi . Apppp-cravps-ci salvaged; , - ~ orr otherwise ~ _ ~~ of." ~.tj *_> j j L ~*.j-_,.a/6 "per'; month came, back from the repair-shops

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figure a -marked' disrupbut thisjiiXD J-.t..^.i.ij-C showedriiUViCU lIICIX decline fbllowingUX-J-UVV -L iJLgj onU X i theUU C, XVCJLL U.C '0.0. -f- iJ.C^ OliC"' " U.XOXUJJ-"'-- u 2 5 a 0\u25a0\u25a0tion of t!ie railway ' system r . > .TACTICS.'Night Pi~i v-i.Tirii \u25a0i. .1 \vi riiu25a 0 Viiii i. i. iii i..54. ITight fighting had already been practiced before the '109 !-S.!-S .i!\u25a0war' with aj. hJniciixinall force ox ne s and rr The resultsuauxow werear vvx t-a xuxuy i uiia Me ne vvert;of Hesl's xut/-o.not very satisfactory. Then, in";the summer of 1941 Korps 12-,consisting of 4 night fighter- groups, was -formed. It was underthe command of G-eneral ICAMMHUBER, -was equipped with Me 110 !s andwas entrusted with 'the defence against British 4 engine bombers.Korps 12" v;ao gradually enlarged to consist- of many more' groupsand was finally formed into Jagdkorps' l. In addition to the Me 13.0u25a0 "*"it was equipped ' .\u25a0ith.Ju 88!s and He 219* s. . L

55* Lately 5Me 262 fs were available for night fightingover BSRLIIr of which 'only 1-2 were operational at any one. time*The average claims wer-el-2 a/c shot 1 down pcr _ night by .these a/c.,56. S.-.nG- 8 engined night fighting, as it was practiced at

\u25a0 the beginning, of the summer of 1943 by 9 G-ruppen was considered. effective only if there were sufficient a/c to -allow them tostay close to a definite target as these single engined a/c werenot equipped v.lth W/T instruments. Twin engined a/c for nightfighting wore considered to be more effective. '

:' \ 2 5 a \ 2 5 a \u0084,'-. ' u25a0.u 2 5 a 0 '. r^*"57. :In the fall of 1943 night fighting was improved' by'usingv-? \u25a0\ u25a0\ u25a0 ozpcriencod. u25a0 X ."\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0.,\u25a0:\u25a0.'\u25a0..\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0 \u25a0 ., \u 2 5 a 0 pilots . Me 109 \u25a0 \u 2 5 a 0 ;nd\ 2 5 a \ 2 5 a " 2 5 a '\u25a0\u25a0,'\u25a0. **\u25a0-.. \u25a0.\u25a0,'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 Newly-r: bomber\u25a0 '.\u25a0\u25a04. ; \ u25a0\ u25a0 \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0. on .\u25a0. \u25a0 '\u25a0 TT . \u25a0v^ * s Pw 190* s. . . \ u 2 5 a0 . .trained pilots were as a rule less successful because of tiieir all too short :-iiid insufficient training due -to lack of -fuel.\u25a0- 'Q?q.il attacks. ,

58. T.'-iil ,;..t tacks on our day bombers were preferred to head-onattacks, be


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rise and fall of the luftwaffe a.k.a. the end of herman

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