right to info, assoc, non impairement cases consti

7/25/2019 Right to Info, Assoc, Non Impairement Cases Consti

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Estrada vs. Escritor[A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006]

FACTS:Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas

City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr.,a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived withanother woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio isstill legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is nota resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should notbe allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Towerand Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with theirreligious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration ofPledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effectivewhen legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar,a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991,testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which wascompletely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by threewitnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross andimmoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. Thejurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives roomfor accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolentneutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offendcompelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranksa high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court

Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that itshould override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for thecomplainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. Theburden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is theOffice of the Solicitor General.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunityto demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondentsposition that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope offree exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the FreeExercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right toreligious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claimof religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.


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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The SolicitorGeneral is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine thesincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidenceon the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) toshow that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent'sreligious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court

Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission[G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]

FACTS:The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this

special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the CivilService Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on thecivil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department ofCebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedlyrepresented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations forsanitarians.

ISSUE:Whether/not the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil serviceeligibilities of the Health Department employees

HELD:The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does notopen every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records,papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exemptcertain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It followsthat, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed bythe nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves publicinterest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. Thethreshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or publicconcern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired

information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned anydiscretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has theburden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of publicconcern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To holdotherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in anadvantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard LawReview 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by thegovernment agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, accessmay be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimateconcern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupiedonly by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as

to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or denythe claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law whichwould limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take


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judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in barexaminations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public.Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner'srequest is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the governmentemployees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right toverify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a

sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law uponaccess to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondentCommission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the positionbecomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr.[G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]

Facts:Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished withthe list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to securea clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)of Mrs.Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnishedwith the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connectionherewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & GeneralManager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS,Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion"that a confidential relationship exists between theGSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIShas a duty to itscustomers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach thisconfidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yetreceived the reply of the GovernmentService and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy GeneralCounsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure toreceive a reply "(W)e are

now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue ourdesired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte,OswaldoCarbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing,Jun "Ninoy" Alba,Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action formandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte bedirected: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa membersbelonging to the UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately beforethe February7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos;and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing theirrespective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for thesubjectinformation.

Issue:Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records onbehest loans given by the formerFirst Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa membersbelonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

Held:The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and theadministrator of various insurance programsfor the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its fundsassume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD 1146, asamended (theRevised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay thecontributions,premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, asemployer, as well as the obligations which theRepublic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees topay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage itsresources with utmost


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prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of thereasonsthat prompted the revision of the old GSIS law(CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "topreserve at all times the actuarialsolvency of the funds administered by the Systems [SecondWhereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmontehimself admits, the GSIS "is notsupposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensurethatthese funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to

the insured governmentemployees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of thedefunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriatedfunds for the GSIS and were thereforeexpected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degreeoffidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable fundsof the GSIS and the publicoffice held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearlya matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmontemaintains that a confidential relationshipexists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentialityrestricts theindiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting theGSIS the privilegeof confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition. Hisposition is apparently based merely onconsiderations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policyissues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what thelaw should be. Under oursystem of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of thegovernment,and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power

Province of Cotabato vs. The Govt. of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain[G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

FACTS:On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the AncestralDomain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compelrespondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and toprohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They alsopray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRPfrom signing the same.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern

(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines wouldbe binding itselfa) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain inviolation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)


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RULINGS:1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the localgovernment units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from theirmandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act ofguaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by anybranch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or oftranscendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention andintervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted inDavid v. Macapagal- Arroyo.In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, thedispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x xBy the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal ofCongress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling thedispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters ofpublic concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involvingpublic interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Codeof 1991).(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. Thecomplete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementaryprovision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable

safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in thehighest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leadingto the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature orcommercial character of the agreement.E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and locallevels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PresidentialAdviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in theBJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having anassociative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that gobeyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It alsoimplies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does notcontemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it providefor a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.


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The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. Itis not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the nationalgovernment being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all butname as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, apermanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations withother states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippineterritory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJEbeing itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specificprovisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with theConstitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But evenassuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional provision justquoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existinglegal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and uponeffecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of theConstitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF theamendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserveand defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her tochange the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long asshe limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure forconstitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as anunconstitutional act.

The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, shecannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place,

nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals asrecommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain inviolation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoplesof Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoropeople as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands includingPalawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendantswhether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.


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Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not onlyMoros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao andits adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall berespected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-ADproceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is vested exclusively inthe Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD

acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cutprocedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among otherthings, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous CulturalCommunities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department orany government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mereagreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices toconduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecologyincluding those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality,is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterallyvests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively anddrastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their totalenvironment.

CONCLUSION:In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion whenhe failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic ActNo. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed

and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion ofpositive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specificprovisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisionedbetween the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that theassociated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence

Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice[G.R. NO. 132601, October 12, 1998]

Facts:The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty forthe said crime.He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionalityof Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penaltyfrom electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATINGDEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITALPUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENALCODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.


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The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under thegrounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process,a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation oflegislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power tolegislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondentDirector.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality ofthe Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust,excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane,more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit theimposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondentDirector; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to theSecretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear asAmicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. Theyalleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not passconstitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading orinhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an unduedelegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhumanpunishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carryingout lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering

said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to thedate of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, whichuncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botchedexecutions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading orinhuman punishment.Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishmentof life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethalinjection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasonsdiscussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to thecompetence and expertise of administrative officials.


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Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the timeand date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. Aspetitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court whichconvicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after itspromulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including acertified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of

execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementingrules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 whichprovides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later theneighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final andexecutory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at alltimes." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time thejudgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executiveclemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in theintravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as thechoice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degradingand inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required theexpertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered areunsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution bylethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any otherevidence whatsoever.Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that allpersonnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of suchtask. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the deathpenalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution ofdeath penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading andinhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain ordistress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that allpunishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, isto go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is crueltyinherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any methodemployed to extinguish life humanely.What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as publicopinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolvingstandards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.

2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed onlyfor the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of thecrime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried outpursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the GeneralAssembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.


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3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits,map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates thecircumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specificallyrequires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of theBureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person underthe sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution."

Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injectionto be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature alsomandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior tothe performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served byrequiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminaloffense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense,R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officialsconcerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws thatcould not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of theimplementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to beconfidential.The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. TheSecretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the executionprocedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review andapproval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Correctionscould not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior,the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparentabdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being

discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondentSecretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may besuspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amendedby section 25 of R.A. No. 7659."SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution bylethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date ofthe sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In thislatter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with theaccessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for beingan invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section

17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendmentof Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating thatthe death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) yearafter delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1)year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period followingdelivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspensionof sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is thethree-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount toa gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissiblecontravention of the applicable law.Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remainconsistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.


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Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)[G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998]

Facts:Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated theprosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public

treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled himto bring the action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime inSeptember 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assetsdeposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of acompromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split orshare these assets. Chavez, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative dutyof the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that thePresidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) make public any and all negotiations andagreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claimedthat any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramountpublic interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatlyprejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. PCGG claimed Chavezs action ispremature as he has not asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and agreements and thatthe proposed terms of the Agreements have not become effectiveand binding.

They further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to theSandiganbayan for its approval, which the Republic has opposed as it has not been ratified norsubmitted to the President for approval; and that the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with theundertakings, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. On 19 August1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a Motion for

Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in Intervention. They aver that they are "among the10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the Marcos Estate isrecognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, MaximoHilao, et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U .S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis14796, June 16, 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of December 10, 1997"; andas such, they claim to have personal and direct interest in the subject matter of the case, since adistribution or disposition of the Marcos properties may adversely affect their legitimate claims. In aminute Resolution issued on 24 August 1998, the Court granted their motion to intervene.

Issue:Whether the civil and criminal liabilities of the Marcoses may be compromised, as embodied in the

General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcoses.

Held:In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the followingmatters:(1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground forlegal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitime. And like anyother contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, goodcustoms, public policy or public order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law betweenthe parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated such as by mistake, fraud, violence,intimidation or undue influence or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are sopalpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts. Inthe absence of an express prohibition, the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Codeis applicable to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to the objectives of Executive Order (EO)


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14, particularly the just and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be used tohasten economic recovery. However, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from anoffense does not automatically terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminalliability of the malefactor. While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is nosimilar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred.The power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO 14, as amended

by EO 14-A. From the wording of the law, however, it can be easily deduced that the personreferred to is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal respondent, defendant or accused.Herein, the General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs haveserious legal flaws. First, the Agreements do not conform to the above requirements of EO 14 and14-A. Criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principaldefendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Second, under Item 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms oftaxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution.The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, inthe local legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, evenunder the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Third, the government bindsitself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before theSandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly inregard to criminal jurisdiction. Once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction,the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge, oncejurisdiction is acquired by the trial court. The PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gottenwealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcosespending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. Fourth, thegovernment also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past, present, or future, matured orinchoate, against the Marcoses. Again, this all-encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under

the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived.

The stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future claims against theMarcoses that the government thereby relinquishes. This is a palpable violation of the due processand equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyondthe reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability. It is a virtualwarrant for public officials to amass public funds illegally, since there is an open option tocompromise their liability in exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth. Fifth, theAgreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfilltheir respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of theirtotal assets. Sixth, the Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which

assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While theSupplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25% of the $356 millionSwiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only tothe said deposits. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties. Neitheris there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.Finally, the absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, and expresscondition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, even ifsuch approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.


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RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS

In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon[A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978]

FACTS:The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines.The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of therespondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing theprovisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBPBy-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension forfailure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in thesense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in goodstanding, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a

consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedpersonally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to himby the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule andof the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE:Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD:The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of asdistinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All

lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar includingpayment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compelshim to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Barintegration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not themeeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. Theonly compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court inorder to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,may require thet the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice lawbefore the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And ifthe power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed toenforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdictionover matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and theirregulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel allmembers of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals[G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]

Facts:The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unionsdemands concerning theimplementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the courtaction for damages with prayer for writ of


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preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporaryrestrainingorder pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitionersfiled a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitionerscontend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since thejurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves alabor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by

the Civil Servicelaws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by theNLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Ruling:The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guaranteeamong workers with the right to organize and conduct peacefulconcerted activities such as strikes.On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governingconcerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to anylegislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 ofthe Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicablelaws concerning strike by government employees enjoinsunder pain of administrative sanctions, allgovernment officers and employeesfrom staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outsand other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of publicservice. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees tostrike theyare prohibited from doing so.

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union

[G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974]

Facts:Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of Elizalde RopeFactory and was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Membership with the Union wasmandatory as provided for under a collective bargaining agreement: "Membership in the Unionshall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered bythis Agreement."Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic ActNo. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization torequire as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the

representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 wasenacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic ActNo. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects whichprohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor organizations, the Petitionerwrote a letter informing the Union of his resignation. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter tothe Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he wasresigning from the Union as a member.

The CFI ruled in favor of Petitioner and enjoined the company from dismissing him.

In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A. no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the ground that 1)prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits


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affiliations of their members thereto; and, consequently, deprives said members of theirconstitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill ofRights, and thus becomes obnoxious [to the] Constitution; 2) Impairs the obligation of contracts; 3)discriminates in favor of certain religious sects and affords no protection to labor unions; 4) violatesthe constitutional provision that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right; 5)violates the equal protection clause; and 6) the act violates the constitutional provision regarding the

promotion of social justice.

Issue:Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workersand to promote their welfare notwithstanding the fact that it allows some workers, by virtue of theirreligious beliefs, to opt out of Union security agreements.

Held:NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free exercise ofreligious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must,therefore, yield to the former.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious orholy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional rightto the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissedfrom work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modestmeans of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.

More so now in the [1987 and past in constitutions] [...] where it is mandated that "the State shallafford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal workopportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and

employers.

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of theconstitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of aburden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed thatburden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it sodeems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can beaccommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples ofconscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. Inthe instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption

NON IMPAIREMENT CLAUSE

Rutter vs. Esteban[G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953]

Facts:On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 ofwhich P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on orbefore August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has beenconstituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as


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well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due,the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of theproperties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligationcontracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War DamageCommission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that undersection 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the

lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails theconstitutionality of RA 342.

Issue:Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.

Held:Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through themedium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. Theeconomic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protectivepower notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative actionaffects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to alegitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.

However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to beas the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continuedoperation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, andshould not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true asregards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that saidOrders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of theenforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.

Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co.[G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979]

Facts:On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision atMandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rightsin favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations,one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This wasannotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5

directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati startedconstruction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be forresidential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contendingthat the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in MunicipalResolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrialzone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial andcommercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the LocalAutonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or


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regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipalityshould be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local government inpromoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community. This isfound in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts isconstitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimateexercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or

safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise ofpolice power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people inthe locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic,pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Lozano vs. Martinez[G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

FACTS:This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses underthe BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably toquash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statutebeing unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial court, except in one case,which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional anddismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court for remedy. Those whoquestion the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following ground:

1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

2) it impairs freedom of contract;3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated theconstitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.

ISSUE:Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant tothe constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissiblefor the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is withinthe prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical topublic welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An act may not beconsidered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that itinflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. Thestate can do this in the exercise of its police power.

The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy,the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by theimposition of penal sanctions.

right to info, assoc, non impairement cases consti

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