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Go!

The case of General "Jack" Lavelle, the

suits double-crossed him

March 23, 2007

The USAF's RF-4C and 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

(TRW)

RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft over Vietnam, 11th TRS, 432nd TRW, UdornRAFB, Thailand, 1968. Presented by Gary Avey at flickr. This is an actualcombat reconnaissance mission flown by Capt. Raymond I. Lennon, the pilot,and Major Donald B. Avey, the navigator/photo systems officer (PSO), in USAFparlance at the time, the front-seater and the back-seater. Both were assigned tothe 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS), 432nd TacticalReconnaissance Wing (TRW), Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). Asan aside, Major Avey flew his last RF-4C Vietnam mission in early afternoonthrough the Mu Gia pass, arguably one of the most dangerous zones over whichto fly, and he and his pilot did it in broad daylight. Thanks to Gary Avey, MajorAvrey's son for use of the photo and the background. Consent is not given toredistribute, reprint, sell or use the image in any way.

We are going to introduce you to and focus on the RF-4C and the

432nd Tactical TRW because much of the brew-ha-ha overGeneral Lavelle revolved around how RF-4C reconnaissance

missions were being flown over North Vietnam by this wing.

Furthermore, the RF-4C photo reconnaissance aircraft was the

mainstay of theater tactical photography throughout Southeast

Asia. It handled most of southern North Vietnam and Route Pack

6 to the north, and Laos.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The organizational mess: thecardinal military rule, unityof command, demolished.

The "Rules of Engagement"story in the Vietnam-LaosWars

The year 1968, a pivotal oneto this story; a reminder ofthe significant events

Reconnaissance over NorthVietnam:the RF-4CPhantom II and the 432ndTactical ReconnaissanceWing (TRW)

Events leading to thedouble-cross,a sad episodein civilian control of the

military

We honor service andsacrifice. Please click the"Donate" button andcontribute $20 or more tohelp keep this station alive.Thanks.

The case of General "Jack" Lavelle file:///Users/edmarek/Documents/Talking%20Proud/Histo

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Two RF-4C squadrons from the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance

Wing (TRW) at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand flew more than 80

percent of all reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam.

The air bases in Thailand. Presented by American Forces Thailand Networkunofficial web site.

Udorn grew to be a very large base, in part because it was

strategically located and could accommodate the size of air

forces positioned there, which not only included the USAF, but

also the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), the Royal Laotian Air

Force (RLAF), and CIA's Air America. As an aside, to help

explain the complexities of this air base, the men working on the

flightline had a rack filled with aircraft insignia plates, US, Thai,

Lao and, we understand, others, that slipped into a mounting on

the fuselage of T-28 fighters located there.


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Udorn RAFB, 1969. Presented by rascott.com

It is important to understand the 432nd Wing. It is easy to be

misled by the nomenclature, "tactical reconnaissance wing." It

most certainly was that, but it was much more. At the time

General Lavelle took charge of 7th AF, the 432nd had two

squadrons of RF-4Cs and two of F-4Ds, the former for

reconnaissance, the latter for attack and air superiority.

This is a F-4D of the 555th TFS, Udorn RTAFB, 432nd Tactical ReconnaissanceWing (TRW). Presented by 5057 Phantoms.

This made the 432nd TRW an unusual wing at the time in the

USAF. It had a dual reconnaissance and fighter mission, the

former unarmed, the latter fully armed, the former to find

lucrative targets, the latter to destroy them and protect the


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reconnaissance force.

The first US military people to arrive at Udorn RTAFB got there

in 1961, the result of a secret agreement between the US and

Thailand that would also include sending Thai troops into Laos

and Vietnam. The Royal Thai government was very sensitive to

publicity about the American deployments on the one hand, but

was very supportive of them on the other.

The problem for Thailand was that the Laotian civil war was

spreading into Thailand. The Thais feared being overwhelmed by

Laotian refugees, and even feared the Pathet Lao and their North

Vietnamese partners might extend their war into Thailand.

Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen of China meeting with the visiting GeneralSecretary of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) Prasong Wongwiwat(second from right in the front) in April 1961. Presented by China'sInternational Department Central Committee of CPC.

Indeed a communist movement did

grow in north and northeastern

Thailand, two areas traditionally

neglected by Bangkok. This photo,

courtesy of D.K.Wyatt, presented

by the University of Hawaii Press,

shows female communist guerrillas

in Thailand in the 1970s.

The Soviets were in the thick of

supporting the communist Pathet

Lao forces against the feeble Royal

Laotian government.

Furthermore, Thailand had signed the Manila Pact and had a


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history of being pro-western; Thai forces served in Korea, for

example.

The Royal Thai Air Force RTAF flew reconnaissance over Laos

as early as 1960. PACAF analysts were sent over to help

interpret the imagery.

The net result was that much of what occurred from these basesin Thailand was a secret for a very long time. We hesitate saying

when the USAF arrived at Udorn because of the secrecy

involved. Our understanding is the first USAF unit to arrive was

the 333rd Air Base Squadron in October 1964, made up mostly

of people on temporary duty from Don Muang. The 333rd

reported to the 13th AF in the Philippines and to the 6234th TFW

at Korat RTAFB. At that time, the 6234th was the only USAF

tactical fighter wing in Thailand. From 1965 through 1967,

F-104 Starfighters operated from here, rotating in and out on

temporary duty status, providing escort service to Royal Thai Air

Force (RTAF) T-28s, and USAF F-4 and F-105 fighter bombers

flying against targets in Laos, the USAF flying into NorthVietnam as well.

The 432nd TRW "Hunters"

organized in September 1966 with

two reconnaissance squadrons, the

11th Tactical Reconnaissance

Squadron (TRS) equipped with

RF-4Cs, and the 20th TRS equipped

with RF-101s. In October 1967, the

20th was deactivated and replaced

by the 14th TRS, another RF-4C

squadron. So, for our purposes, the

wing had two reconnaissance

squadrons, the 11th and 14th.

Recalling earlier discussions about the organizational mess used

to fight the war in Vietnam-Laos, the 432nd Wing was

administratively a 13th AF wing and reported to the Deputy

Commander, 7th/13th AF, also known as Det 1, 7th AF, Udorn.

But, while in the air on their way for missions in North Vietnam,

its pilots and aircraft were under the operational control of the

7th AF. Missions to North Vietnam fell under PACAF and

Laotian missions fell under CINCPAC through PACAF with the

ambassador in there somewhere.


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F-4D-28-MC Phantom 65-0683 of the 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Jan 20,1972. Presented by answers.com

Also in 1967, the 432nd TRW received a tactical fighter

squadron (TFS), the 13th TFS "Panther Pack" with the F-4D

fighter-bomber, and in 1968 the 555th TFS "Triple Nickel," also

with F-4Ds. The design was for these aircraft to destroy targets,

on the ground and in the air, in Laos, the RVN and North

Vietnam. Other fighter squadrons were to be assigned to Udorn

later, after the period we are examining affecting General

Lavelle. The base has a fascinating history.

Most people know what an F-4D fighter bomber aircraft can do.

We want to talk more about the RF-4C. As an aside, RF-4C

crews often endured some verbal harassment from their "fighter

jock" brothers in the F-4Ds, often called "recce pukes," mostly in

good fun, sometimes the cause of a bar-room brawl.

You will soon see that the RF-4C aircraft carried very high

technology imagery systems and demanded considerable courage

and airmanship from its crews. Furthermore, the film they

brought back to base was virtually the only tactically useable

imagery available to our field commanders during the war. Thesecrews served and sacrificed the same as did any others.

RF-4C from the 14th TRS, 432nd TRW, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. Note nomissiles on the rails. He's unarmed. The belly tank is for fuel. Presented bywikipedia

The RF-4C was distinguishable mainly as the result of its more

pointed, elongated nose, which was about four feet longer than


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that of the F-4. This nose was designed to house three camera

stations, a mapping radar, infrared imaging systems, and a small

terrain avoidance-terrain following radar. We'll talk about these

more in a moment.

The RF-4C, a variant of the F-4 Phantom II fighter, had a range

of about 1,632 miles, cruise speed 575 mph, max speed 1,384

mph, and could fly to altitudes up to 55,200 feet. RF-4Cs wereunarmed. Their only defense was avoidance through evasive

maneuvers and high speed. There were many reasons why the

RF-4C was unarmed. We believe the dominant reason was that

the USAF leadership wanted RF-4C crews to concentrate on

good reconnaissance instead of trying to chase MiGs or attack

ground targets.

RF-4Cs mostly flew alone. Sometimes they had armed escorts,

and sometimes they flew as part of a fighter package.

You might use this photo of an actual air strike to envision the

scenario we are about to describe. This is a strike in progress.

The photo was presented by Jimmie Butler, a former forward air

controller (FAC) pilot. Jimmie believes the photo is from the

collection of Colonel Craig Elliott and was taken in 1968. Now,

to the scenario. As an aside, we've done an article on these FACs

flying the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog, "The O-1 'Bird Dog,' the

toughest dog in the fight, 'our little flivver.'"

Sometimes the RF-4Cs would marry up with a strike packageand a FAC. In such an instance, the RF-4C might go in on a

photo run of an intended target. Once he peeled off and pulled

up, a FAC would mark the target with smoke. In the above case,

a FAC marked the target with his rockets. Then the attack

fighters would come in for the kill. The larger plumes of smoke

are probably from a strike that occurred just a few minutes

earlier. There is little wind to dissipate it. The whiter plume at the


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base of the tall plume suggests something was hit besides banana

trees. Butler believes the hits in the lower center have just

occurred as the photo was taken, and were probably off-target,

intended to hit where the earlier strikes hit. The challenge in

1968 for the F-105 and F-4 pilots was rules that said pull up at

least above 4,500 feet above the terrain, which means they

literally lobbed their ordnance from about two miles away.

Precision guided munitions came later.

In any event, presume that the strikes are over. Now the RF-4C

would go back on another photo run to film the bomb damage.

He would probably have to loiter around for a while waiting for

the smoke to clear, and would no doubt do that at a higher

altitude.

This is not a combat flight, but instead a training flight that gives you a goodsense for how a mission might be flown, in this instance against a US NIKEsurface-to-air missile (SAM) site. This mission was flown by the 38th TRS, 26thTRW, Zweibrucken, Germany. Presented by 38TRS (unofficial).

You might imagine here that that NIKE site in this photo is the

target that was attacked in the previous photo, and the RF-4C is

making his second run for BDA imagery. The enemy has been hit

and is not in a good mood. He knows the RF-4C will probably

come by for his BDA run. He's already had a chance to gauge his

firing against the FAC and earlier air attacks. So he's ready. It

was this second run that could be very dangerous.

Note the that RF-4C in the image is flying straight and level.

While the RF-4C's recce systems took a lot of superb

photography, to get such good imagery required them to fly

straight and level at relatively low altitudes and at cruising

speeds; 480 knots at 1,000 feet was the official norm, though we

have seen many crews say they often went to 400-600-800 feet,

especially in poor weather and night. Low altitude flying was


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driven mostly by the need to get under the clouds; the cameras

were very good at higher altitudes, but they could not see

through the clouds. The intelligence analysts wanted

photography with reasonably constant scale, in order to know

what size things were that were being imaged. This required the

pilots to stay at about the same level above the ground

throughout the photo run. When flying that low down through

valleys, they were easy prey for guns on the surrounding hills. Itwas normal for the pilot to have to keep his aircraft straight and

level at low altitude for as much as 4-5 minutes. There could be

no banking or turning; if done, the photography would be

useless.

These are the mountains that make up much of the mountainous divide betweenLaos and both Vietnams. Photo credit: W.E. Garrett, from, "The Hmong inLaos, no place to run," published by the January 1974 edition ofNationalGeographic

Much of the region over which the 432nd flew was rough terrain,

meaning many pilots had to go up and down the hills, tough with

this big, powerful aircraft, and rough on the crew because a

sudden jerk down the hill meant negative G forces that brought

everything in the cockpit into the crews' faces, most notably the

dirt and dust.

Let's take a closer look at the high tech imagery equipment

aboard this bad-boy.


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Use this graphic to identify what kind of equipment was at each station. Adescription of camera types for each station is provided below.

This is the forward section of an RF-4C from the 22nd TRS at RAF Alconbury,Britain, shot in June 1982. Presented by Recon Rhinos.


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Getting ready to install cameras in prep for RAM 90. Picture is taken in the

summer of 1990 at Zweibrucken AB, Germany. We believe the man standing aftof Station 2 is working on Station 3. We cannot see the SLAR antenna or the IRscanner and do not know whether they are installed in this aircraft. We believethat "round-looking" double canister at bottom center of the photo is a camerasystem film magazine; this one looks like the upgraded KS-87 camera filmmagazine. Photo provided by John Hatfield, Prescott Valley, Arizona. Presentedby Aviation Enthusiast Corner.

The following text and graphic were provided by Phantom

Variants.

"The RF-4C's nose featured three camera stations that

could be configured by ground crews with different camera

fits: Station 1 could accommodate a KS-87 or KS-72

camera; Station 2" was behind station 1, and included acamera port staring downward, as well as camera ports

staring off to each side. It could accommodate various

combinations of KS-72, KS-87, or panoramic KA-56

cameras in vertical or oblique (angled to the side)

mountings; Station 3 included two vertical ports. It could

accommodate a KA-91 or KA-55A high-altitude

panoramic camera; dual KS-87s with different focal

lengths; or KC-1A, KC-1B, or T-11 mapping cameras. A

Goodyear AN/APQ-102 side looking airborne radar

(SLAR) that shot radar beams out to the sides of the

aircraft and recorded the echoes on a long film strip, giving

an all-weather view of the terrain alongside the aircraft'sflight path. The AN/APQ-102 also had a "moving target

indicator (MTI)" capability that picked out any vehicle

moving at more than 9.25 KPH (5.75 MPH or 5 knots)

perpendicular to the aircraft's flight path, highlighting the

target on the film strip. An AN/AAS-18 infrared line

scanner was mounted under the back-seat position and

stared out of the belly vertically. It recorded infrared


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imagery on a film strip to provide a thermal map of the

terrain below the aircraft's flight path."

All the imaging systems were tied to the aircraft's navigational

system to record precise locations. Film was developed at Udorn

immediately after recovery, done by highly trained photo

interpreters (PIs) in imagery exploitation trailers located near the

runway. These were called "Recce Techs," or ReconnaissanceTechnical Squadrons, RTS. The PIs prepared air target folders

(maps, charts and photo mosaics) for the aircrews, bomb damage

assessments, and intelligence analyses of "where an enemy was,

what he was doing, and what he had to do it with" (excerpt from

Asia from Above: The 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron,

Yokota AB, Japan, July 1957-March 1971).

The crews often had to fly multiple parallel lines of flight,

perhaps 5-10 miles long, back and forth over the area they were

imaging to get the required area coverage. We'll talk a little more

about this technique later.

KA-91C panoramic camera. Positioned at Station 3. We believe that RF-4Csused in Vietnam used an earlier "B" model. It provided wide-angle coverage ofthe terrain. Presented by Wright-Patterson AFB

The photographic camera systems used film and demanded

reasonably good weather; they could not see through the clouds.That said, these camera systems provided the highest resolution

photography of all the systems, superb for bomb damage

assessment (BDA) and flushing out targets hiding under cover

and concealment. The photoflash ejection systems enabled the

cameras to be used at night. These were photoflash cartridges

dropped from the aircraft to illuminate the target, something like

a flare. We have seen reports that they were 4.5 million


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candlepower flashes.

Night flying over Vietnam and Laos was dicey for everyone who

did it. The Timemagazine of July 29, 1966, "Eyes in the Sky,"

quoted then-Captain Gale Hearn, an RF-4C pilot in the RVN who

specialized in night flying, saying this:

"We're more scared of those mountains than we are of theViet Cong. You learn to trust your radar out there. When

the moon goes down, it's like flying through an ink bottle."

This is a Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) photo taken by a RF-4C on July 1,1969. A KS-72/6in. camera was used for this photo. Presented by Jimmie Butler.

A moment on BDA. This was a very important mission role for

the RF-4C. Commanders had to know what level of damage wasinflicted on a target in order to decide whether another strike

package had to go back or not. Some fighter pilots were anxious

about RF-4C BDA photography, because it provided a good

visual score card on their accuracy, perhaps contributing to their

use of that phrase, "recce puke."

Duane Webb, a Navy film developer aboard the USS Kitty Hawk

1968-69, describes the importance of BDA well:

"Reconnaissance planes have to go back and see if it's

done, or the planes that do the bombing will have to go

back and do it again."

The infrared system was all-weather, day-night. Fundamentally,

it detected heat variation. For example, along the Ho Chi Minh

trail, the enemy would learn of an incoming aircraft, drive off the

roads under the cover of thick jungle canopy. They might be able

to hide from the photo systems, but the infrared could pick up

their engine heat.


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Some aircraft were also outfitted with a side-looking arrayed

radar (SLAR) which was an all-weather, day-night imaging

system. This was pioneer technology that today is something to

behold.

We understand that the 432nd TRW might fly 40-50 sorties per

day, shooting up to a cumulative seven miles of film. Followingthe partial bombing halt of March 1968, the wing was restricted

to North Vietnam's southern panhandle (RP-1) and Laos, with

the SR-71 flying farther north. The SR-71 was good, but it

recovered in Okinawa, Japan, and took a long time for the photo

results to get back to the field. Furthermore, it was controlled by

SAC, not the 7th AF, and it was in high demand elsewhere,

Korea for example.

The RF-4C was operated by a total of nine squadrons in the

Vietnam Laos War. A total of 83 aircraft were lost, seventy-two

in combat and 38 of those over North Vietnam. No RF-4C was

lost to enemy MiG aircraft. Of the 72 lost in combat, seven were

shot down by SAMs and 65 by AAA or small arms. This

underscores the lethality of AAA systems and small arms to

aircraft flying mid-altitude and even low altitude flights.

We want to conclude this section by telling a few stories about

the men who flew these missions. It is important to understand

what they did. It is imprint to the Lavelle story as well.


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The Ho Chi Minh Trail stretched hundreds of miles through Laos and Cambodiabefore terminating in South Vietnam. Mountain passes allowed access. Graphiccredit:Zaur Eylanbekov. Presented byAir Force Magazine.

Lt. Col. Gilbert S. Palmer Capt. Thomas Wright

Palmer-Wright, 14th TRS, Udorn, Thailand: On February 27,

1968 Lt. Col. Gilbert S. Palmer, pilot, and Capt. Thomas Wright,weapons systems officer (WSO), were tasked to fly a section of

Route 137 running through the Ban Karai Pass. They were to fly

a southwest to northeast track from Laos into North Vietnam.

The Ban Karai Pass was one of two major passes through

difficult mountains between North Vietnam into Laos,

connecting to the Ho Chi Minh trail, the main supply line for the

North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. The Ban Karai was very

treacherous, high mountains with karst ridges, lined with enemy

gun emplacements on both sides, and in many places very

narrow to traverse by air. Palmer's mission was a daylight run,

some clouds with tops at 2-3,000 ft, visibility 2-3 miles, callsign

"Sumo." They approached the target area, checked in with theAirborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC),

and a FAC on-station. The area was heavily defended and

populated by enemy and/or enemy sympathizers. Palmer checked

in and reported everything normal. The crew was never heard

from again, and neither they or their aircraft were ever found.

There are many such stories --- crew checks in normal, never

heard from again, as though it simply vanished into the ether.


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Capt. Halle William "Bud" Smith

1st Lt. Charles Bilfolchi

Smith-Bilfolchi, 16th TRS, Tan Son Nhut, RVN: Capt. Halle

Smith, pilot, and 1st Lt. Charles Bilfolchi, WSO were tasked to

conduct a night time reconnaissance mission on January 8, 1968

out of Tan Son Nhut AB, Saigon, RVN. There was extreme haze,scattered clouds at 2-3,000 ft with overcast in the mountainous

areas. Their flight was monitored by radar, they were cleared into

their area in Kontum Province about 40 minutes after launch, and

then they were told their flight could no longer be followed by

friendly radar. They acknowledged, and were never heard from

again. An Army helicopter spotted a wreckage at next light. A

long-range reconnaissance team from the 4th Infantry Division

was sent in. Bad weather delayed their arrival until January 11.

They found considerable wreckage correlating to an RF-4C on

top of a ridge and in the trees. No evidence of the crew was

found. The aircraft appeared to have crashed into the side of a

mountain. Two surveys were conducted of the site in 1993 and2000. Vietnamese citizens turned over human remains they said

they had found at the site. Bolfolchi was positively identified, he

has been returned and buried at Arlington National Cemetery. To

our knowledge, Capt. Smith has not yet been found.

Setterquist-Bergiven, 14th TRS, Udorn, Thailand: On August

22, 1968, 1st Lt. Francis L. Setterquist, pilot, and 1st Lt Charles

Bergiven were assigned a low altitude night reconnaissance

mission over North Vietnam. Their target area was about 50

miles northwest of Dong Hoi in Quang Binh Province, the

southernmost North Vietnamese province, on the DMZ. They

were given clearance to proceed on their target run, and they

were never heard from again.


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Major Mark L. Stephensen1st Lt. Gary R. Sigler

Stephenson-Sigler, 11th TRS, Udorn, Thailand:On April 29,

1967, Major Mark L. Stephensen, pilot, and 1st Lt Gary R. Sigler

launched out of Udorn RTAFB headed for the Hanoi region.

Their mission, a night-time mission, was to conduct BDA of

bridges at Hanoi that were struck by F-105 Thuds that day.

About 60 miles from Hanoi, their systems indicated that SAMradar had locked on to their aircraft. Attempting to evade the

missile, the crew dove the aircraft to get as close to the deck as

they could. They began evasive maneuvers, trying to break the

radar lock, a common maneuver in this kind of situation. The

aircraft crashed against trees on a hill and then into the side of

another hill. Sigler ejected after the first impact, was captured

two days later, and served as a POW for nearly six years. He

suffered serious burns, and a broken back, but was nonetheless

severely tortured during captivity. Major Stephensen's remains

were returned by the Vietnamese in April 1988. It is not known

whether he had served any of the intervening years as a POW or

whether he died in the crash.

Capt. William R. Stroven Capt. Kenneth A. Stonebraker

Stonebraker-Stroven, 11TRS, Udorn, Thailand:On October

28, 1968 Captains William R. Stroven, pilot, and Kenneth A.


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Stonebraker, navigator, callsign "Diode," departed Udorn

RTAFB for a single-aircraft reconnaissance mission over North

Vietnam. One report has said their target was the Quang Khe

Ferry near the enemy port of Dong Hoi; another said it was an

ammunition supply dump near Hanoi. We believe the former to

have been the target. Weather was overcast cloud cover with a

2,000 ft. ceiling, 6,000 ft tops and showers. Capt. Stroven

checked in with the "Alleycat" ABCCC and requested clearanceto commence the photo run, during the 0500 hour. Following the

photo run, they checked in with the "Waterboy" Ground

Controlled Intercept (GCI) radar site on the coast at Qhuy Nhon

to ask for flight instructions, a traffic report, and current weather.

We suspect they were also interested in avoiding any offshore

naval fire that might be coming their way. Waterboy then lost

contact. Very little information is available about their loss,

except that most analysts believe they went down somewhere

west of Dong Hoi, which was over jungle covered mountains. No

wreckage was ever located. The crew was never located. These

men have not yet come home.

Phil Rowe, 12th TRS, Tan Son

Nhut AB, RVN, 1968-1969:

Rowe operates a web site, "Some

RF-4C Info & Stories,"which we

commend to you. He has over 20

short stories. We read them all,

and plucked out a few highlights

that talk directly to mission

conduct.

We mentioned area coverage

earlier. He has a simple chart, andexplains how it was done. He was

the WSO on a flight tasked to

photograph a target area about

5x15 miles, and decided seven

parallel lines would be needed to

do the job. It was a moonless,

night mission. He employed the

infrared scanner, the pilot flew

about 480 knots at 1,000 ft over

fairly level terrain.

On the first run, the crew noted

arcing light above them. Unsure

of what it was, they did their

second run and saw more high

arcing tracers, well above them.

On the third leg, they flew

between tracers coming from

both sides, but still overhead.

The pilot jacked up the speed to


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540 knots, and, determined to

finish the mission, they

completed all seven legs. They

then cranked her up to 25,000 ft

for the short trip back home. They never did find out what the

tracers were and never learned why they were tasked to

photograph that area.

While over North Vietnam, Rowe detected on his receivers that

an enemy surface-to-air missile site was getting ready to launch

against his aircraft. He told his pilot to make an evasive

maneuver, the skipper dove her to about 400 ft, leveling off

barely above the trees, and the two of them watched two missiles

passing by into the clouds above. He said they looked like

telephone poles!

Cuthburt-Ruhling, 14th TRS,

Udorn, Thailand: Capt. Bradley

G. Cuthburt and his backseater,

Capt. Mark J. Ruhling (shownhere), 14th TRS, Udorn RAFB,

Thailand, launched out of Udorn on

November 23, 1968 on a

reconnaissance mission over North

Vietnam. Their target was a SAM

site in North Vietnam. Their aircraft

was shot down near Dong Hoi,

North Vietnam. Ejection procedures

were initiated. Both canopies

ejected. Ruhling's ejection seat

malfunctioned. He saw Cuthburt go out of the aircraft. Cuthburt's

ejection seat rockets burned Ruhling's helmet. Ruhlingre-initiated his ejection handle and, on the second try, it worked

and he ejected safely. After landing on the ground, Ruhling

established radio contact with other aircraft in the area and

advised his capture was imminent. He was captured, served as a

POW, and was released in 1973. Capt. Cuthburt remains listed as

MIA. Both Ruhling and other aircrew in the area saw Cuthburt's

chute deploy, but he was never heard from again and his remains

have not been found. His dog-tag was recovered and there was

hearsay evidence he was beaten to death by local wood-cutters.

This was the first USAF aircraft lost over North Vietnam

following the bombing halt of November 1968.

Before closing this section, we were fortunate to come across an

interview conducted in February 2002 with Alan Osur, a former

USAF officer and photo interpreter with the 432nd TRW at

Udorn. His entire interview is presented by The Vietnam

Archive, Oral History Project at Texas Tech University. He

arrived at Udorn in October 1966, so his memories are of

operations before the bombing halt, mostly the Rolling Thunder

bombing operation over Laos and North Vietnam. We've picked


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out some highlights that we found particularly interesting and

informative.

F-105 "Thuds" and F-4 "Phantoms" flew most of the tactical bombing runsagainst Hanoi during Rolling Thunder. The normal attack route in was to crossthe Red River, then fly over to "Thud Ridge," then turn and fly low level downThud Ridge directly to Hanoi and its near environs, or cross over Thud Ridgeand strike targets to the northeast of Thud Ridge.

Hanoi and Haiphong were known as "the barrel." When

the Frag (flight) orders came in, they had identifiers, BB, B

or nothing. BB was the double barrel; in the 432nd's case,

the flight was over Hanoi; the Navy had Haiphong. If theidentifier was a single B, the flight was to Route Pack 6,

northwestern North Vietnam, including the outskirts of

Hanoi. If there were no identifier, the mission to someplace

else, considered by some as an easier flight. The wing

might get 20 lines (flights) per day on average.

At this point in the war, the 432nd only flew

reconnaissance flights as part of Rolling Thunder. For the

most part, the 432nd flew just over North Vietnam, though

they overflew Laos to get there and back. The fighter-

bombers came out of other bases. That changed when the

two fighter squadrons came to Udorn later.

Udorn was Air America's major hub. Their pilots had to

debrief every mission, so they were a fount of intelligence.

On occasion, they would ask the RF-4C guys to take some

photos on the Q-T, on their way home from North

Vietnam, of targets of interest in Laos to CIA. Most guys

would do it.


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The number one threat to the recce birds was the SAM-2,

the SA-2; next was AAA, mostly the 57 mm and 85 mm,

which could operate at 20-30,000 ft. They were both radar

controlled. The 37 mm was a threat at lower altitudes, and

was optically controlled. The MiGs were the least

threatening.

The weather recces were usually the first to go, between

3-4 AM. It took about an hour to get up there, so they

provided early morning forecasts.

Hanoi/Bac Mai airfield BDA photo following an attack, January 6, 1973.Presented by the US Centennial of Flight Commission.

The main mission was BDA, most often for the F-4 and

F-105 bomb runs over the North. Not all, but a lot of BDA

was flown in conjunction with a strike package. BDA

missions had both good and bad news. The bad news was

that the fighter bomber missions had gotten everyone's

attention in North Vietnam, so a recce flying through got

them when they were wide awake and angry. The goodnews was the enemy would use a lot of missiles to fight off

the bombers, so oft times they were plum out of missiles

when the recce came through. The MiGs were returning or

already had returned to base, so they were of little threat.

The AAA, though, was always there and had plenty of

rounds.


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When their RF-4Cs were hit, they were almost always hit

over the North, and very seldom made it back to base. The

crews either died or were caught as POWs. Some POWs

lived; some were murdered; some would die of illness.

After some considerable debate and after flying air escorts

for the recces for a while, the decision was made that it

was safer for the recce to conduct his flight alone. Whenescorts were provided, the entire flight attracted too much

attention and they started losing escorts.

During the 1966-67 period, RF-4C flights over Laos did

not encounter a significant threat, because they were flying

at 20-30,000 ft. through that area and the enemy didn't yet

have a lot of high altitude AAA there to get at them.

Hanoi Petroleum storage site on fire, a strategic target, three miles northof Hanoi. This is a BDA photo following an USAF F-105 strike on June30, 1966 Air Force. Presented byAir & Space Power Journal.

The tough missions were Hanoi and the entire Red River

Valley area (see the photo above). That's where the targets

of interest to the USAF were. And that's where the high

concentrations of SAMs and AAA were. Most of the recce

flights up North were at high or medium level altitudes.

That was because most of their targets were strategic

targets, and those were heavily defended. As a general

rule, the 432nd did not fly RF-4Cs over the Ho Chi Minh

trail. The recce units in the RVN took care of that.

When heading over the North, the RF-4Cs would try to fly

in formation, usually in pairs. That allowed them to use

their jammers together, making them more effective

against the SAM radars. If they became separated, it was

easier for a SA-2 Fan Song radar to pick them up and fire.


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One of the RF-4C's cameras could swing from horizon to

horizon, so if his partner got hit, quite often he could get a

photo of the explosion and, hopefully, a successful

ejection.

The camera film photography was the major source of

intelligence. The infrared was useful usually only when the

bombers had struck things like power plants. Then a nightRF-4C infrared flight could ascertain whether the plant's

lights were on or off, indicating the level of damage

inflicted.

The first order of business at the post mission debriefing

was to offer the crew some whiskey. The USAF provided

some real rot-gut brandy and whiskey, so the debriefing

officers would bring in their own stuff, good stuff, to give

the crews. Many felt guilty sitting in the safety of Udorn

while the pilots went up North to do their thing, so they

brought in the real McCoy for the returning aircrews. This

allowed the crew to settle down and relax, especially ifthey had had a very tough run.

Most of the time, the recce birds knew when there was a

MiG in their area. There was an air surveillance aircraft

always on orbit over the Gulf of Tonkin, and he would call

out MiG warnings as soon as the MiGs lifted off their

runways and emerged out of the ground clutter. This was

an automatic abort criteria for a RF-4C. He had no way to

fight the MiG (by design), he could not outmaneuver a

MiG, but he could outrun him. Heavy cloud cover over the

target was also an abort item, but it was the crew's call as

to whether it would try to duck down below it and take achance.

The leadership at wing and squadron level was impressive.

The farther away the leadership was, the less impressive it

was. Getting a swinging bamboo bridge as a JCS target

approved by the president would cause a lot of mockery

and joking among the fliers. Many felt that many of the

targets were "ridiculous." Sending four F-4s to bomb a

swinging bamboo bridge with 6,750 lb bombs and then

two RF-4Cs to see if they knocked it down seemed liked

overkill.


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Getting the same ingress and egress routes, day after day,

from 7th AF drew a great deal of criticism from the

aircrews; too much predictability.

It was obvious to the men at Udorn as early as 1967 that

the US was not "winning" the war. There were too many

bombing restrictions:

"You couldn't go here, you couldn't go there, you

couldn't attack this target, you couldn't attack that

target ... Generally speaking, we all thought they

were dumb restrictions. The table talk, the consensus

was that these were dumb restrictions."

The following was perhaps Alan Osur's most damning commentdirected at the suits in Washington:

"Crap or get off the pot. We weren't doing it right. If we're

not going to do it right, then get out ... To me, the number

one lesson of Vietnam is you do it right, or you don't do it

at all ... If you're going to fight the war, you do it right, or

if you're worried about collateral damage and image and


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all that, then that's not your war, pick another one, or you

don't pick any, but you don't mess around."

Well, that's what the suits did in the Vietnam-Laos War. They

"messed around." We're finally going to get to the matter of

General Lavelle. We've presented a lot of history and background

that will be helpful to you as you contend with this next section.

Events leading to the double-cross, a sad episode in civilian

control of the military


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Documents

usafs rf

c reconnaissance aircraft

c vietnam mission

the432nd tactical trw

c squadrons

c reconnaissancemissions

southern north vietnam

reconnaissance flights