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Responding to Domestic Violence in Disaster: Guidelines for Women’s Services and Disaster Practitioners

Elaine Enarson, Visiting ScholarDisaster Preparedness Resources Centre

University of British ColumbiaNovember, 1997

Beatrice Lavelle and her daughters came to the battered women’s shelter in south Dade

County after Hurricane Andrew, when conflicts with her brother-in-law in their crowded trailer

escalated out of control and other housing was unavailable. 1 For Diana Sanchez, the violence

started after six long months in a tent on the outskirts of the city where she and her boyfriend

lived after migrating to Miami for construction work. When Hurricane Andrew destroyed their

apartment, belongings, car, and workplaces, Lois Richards’ husband “just went berserk: “He

really went crazy. Before, I would get beat up maybe once a month if I was lucky. Afterward, it

was like every other day…I ran across a lot of women suffering, too, with their children—

husbands beating them up and leaving them. It was pretty bad.”

Hurricane Andrew hit many people hard, but especially low-income women, single

mothers, and recent immigrants. Long after city workers cleaned up the visible destruction,

displaced families still camped out in half-repaired homes and overcrowded trailers. Residents

discovered how little disaster grants and vouchers could replace and how fragile the spirit of

shared struggle during crisis was. Women like Beatrice, Diana, and Lois were less safe than ever

from violence in their own homes when Betty Hearn Morrow and I met them six months later

while documenting the social impacts of the hurricane “through women’s eyes.2 This US and

Canadian survey of women surviving violence and disaster was inspired by their experiences.

Violence Against Women in Disaster: What are the Issues?

Disasters are not only powerful physical events but complex social experiences for

individuals, households, and communities. Once considered the great “leveler” impacting poor

and rich alike, we now know that floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, chemical spills, and other

environmental and technological disasters hit some social groups more than others. 3 The poor,

subordinated racial or ethnic groups, refugees and migrants, seniors, the disabled, and women are

especially vulnerable to disaster losses and often recover from disaster more slowly.

This work was generously supported by grants from the BC Institute Against Family Violence and the Feminist Research, Education, Development & Action Centre. My thanks to Jill Hightower, Andrea Kowaz, Yasmin Jiwani, Greeta Smith, Victoria Constance, Sue Meuschke, Ruth Harding, and Tracy Porteous for their ideas and support, and to Maryvon Delano for her skillful French translation and interviewing. I am greatly indebted to the many women who shared their experiences and ideas, especially Bonnie Palecek and member programs of the North Dakota Council on Abused Women’s Services.

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But which women are more vulnerable to disaster and why? Class and racial privilege

protect some women more than others, when money in the bank means disposable income for

hurricane shutters, extra food supplies, or home repairs. On balance, women in dual-income

families are less vulnerable to the economic impacts of flood or tornado than single mothers and

able-bodied women more able to prepare for and cope with disaster than women living with

disabilities. Women and girls also die disproportionately because the daily routines of domestic

work and caregiving keep them inside hazard-prone buildings. In some societies, daughters are

too poorly fed to survive food shortages and epidemics and secluded women may not be able to

access public shelters or public relief lines.4

Women living with the “daily disaster” of domestic violence are also highly vulnerable

when disasters transform geographies, institutions, and relationships.5 In the vicious dynamic of

power and control, battered women live in a world of increasingly narrow social networks, often

isolated, unable to take or keep paid work, lacking transportation, and financially dependent.

Like their physical and emotional health, their sense of self-worth and efficacy diminishes in the

face of continued violence. As one shelter worker noted, fragile support systems can make

battered women even more vulnerable after disaster:

So many victims of battery have been isolated from the normal networks of support—

family, job, things like that…Now here’s this person that’s holding on, just barely

holding on—the disaster hits. It’s not just them, but everybody around them, they scatter.

The little bit of support that’s been helping that victim hold it together is gone, and in

fact, they may be forced into a situationwhich we saw hereof ending up in the home of

the family of the abuser and actually having more to deal with less support than they’ve

ever had before. I mean, it just mushroomsthe stress level of that victim.

Disasters have no single impact on women or women at risk of violence. Paradoxically, a

family home destroyed by fire may loosen the ties binding women to violent partners; disaster

relief money can buy a bus ticket out of town for women ready to leave; and responding to

catastrophe may reduce abuse temporarily. More than simply “victims,” battered women develop

survival skills to protect themselves and their children which may serve them well during

disaster.

Notwithstanding these coping mechanisms, the daily realities of living with violence make

attending to the threat of disaster unlikely and stabilizing life in a disaster-stricken neighborhood

and community very difficult. Already in emotional crisis, battered women in shelter are focused

on the relationship they have just left; as one shelter worker observed, they often lack “a strong

awareness of what’s going on around them.” Severe weather events like mudslide or blizzard

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isolate women at home in unsafe environments without working telephones or accessible roads;

contact with crisis counselors may be cut off and court-ordered protection unavailable when

major disasters disrupt or destroy lifeline services, including law enforcement agencies.

Relationship stress factors increase when families struggle to replace lost possessions,

housing, jobs, and peace of mind; a counselor working with men after the Loma Prieta

earthquake noted also that “many men used the quake as a way to get themselves back into an old

relationship.” 6 Men emotionally invested in the role of family provider and protector will

struggle with uncertainty and feelings of inadequacy:

The whole issue of not being able to protect his family, not being able to provide for his

family, was devastating for him, just devastating. He does not like to ask for help…He

said, ‘You know, I’ve been taking care of myself since I was 12 years old…I don’t know

what it’s going to be like when I get back there. I don’t know what kind of work is going

to be there.’ He was overdrawn on his checking account by $2,000 because he’d just

finished a house and was supposed to get paid and that house got washed away. Went to

the Red Cross and they said ‘No, we can’t give you any financial support.’ He got $7. He

doesn’t want to take money from us.

For women and children housed in shelter, mandatory evacuation following an industrial

accident or in advance of wild fire is a second-order evacuation. Designated evacuation centers

may not protect their privacy or be safe space for battered women. The advocate quoted below

works in a rural area where abusers can easily locate their partners, but she raises a broader issue:

And the Red Cross shelters, those type of shelters, are not safe for them…[The abusers]

are just going to put two and two together and say OK, well where is she going to go?

And so I think this really shows that we need to have a plan of action ahead of time…[I]f

something happens and our shelter’s unavailable, is there another shelter, across the

state even, where we could transfer her? Because they’re there for a reason. It’s

specifically because they’re in danger.

When the dust clears or the waters recede, women coping with physical and/or emotional

abuse must access bureaucratic disaster relief systems and compete with other impacted residents

for housing, child care, employment, education, transportation, and health services. Private and

public relief funds are rarely sufficient to meet all costs of repairing homes and replacing

possessions; relief funds may be more available to the abuser at home than to women living in

shelter. Arguably the most vital lifeline for battered women, affordable housing stocks are likely

to decline after disaster, when cheap housing on hazard-prone land is damaged or destroyed by

flood water, earthquake, or tornado.

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Before, during, and after disaster, the emotional, economic, and housing insecurity of

women living with violence exposes them to greater risk and hence imposes new demands on

shelter staff and advocates. How well prepared are they to meet the challenge? How do

communities plan for battered women’s needs during disaster?

Study Design and Sample

This report summarizes the findings of a study investigating disaster impacts,

preparedness and response in US and Canadian domestic violence programs.7 Mail and/or

telephone surveys were completed between April and November, 1997, by 77 domestic violence

shelters, transition houses, and state or provincial coalition offices, including among them 35

surveys completed by members of the British Columbia/Yukon Society of Transition Houses.

Most respondents reported no or relatively minor disaster events (e.g., minor flooding, localized

toxic spill); however, the survey also included 13 programs severely impacted in the l990s by

major flooding in the US Midwest, Quebec, and the Red River Valley, a southern California

earthquake, and Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki. A case study of the April 1997 Red River Valley

flood was developed through participant observation with the North Dakota Council on Abused

Women’s Services and telephone interviews in Manitoba. This event flooded Grand Forks, North

Dakota and East Grand Forks, Minnesota as well as two rural communities south of Winnipeg,

and put the provincial capital on evacuation alert for several weeks.

As a pilot study for future research, the survey provides baseline data and identifies

emergent issues. The survey results cannot be generalized to all shelters in either the US or

Canada; however, they do raise significant questions about the degree of protection afforded

battered women when communities prepare for and respond to disaster.8 Survey findings are

incorporated into action guidelines for shelter managers, coalition staff, and local emergency

practitioners (see Appendices A and B).

Getting on the Agenda: Awareness and Preparedness in Battered Women’s Programs

“What we give them is all that they have,” one worker said of her shelter. It will not

surprise battered women’s advocates to learn that pets, tourists, and cultural artifacts receive

more attention than battered women from disaster planners. Although less visible to emergency

managers than facilities housing the frail elderly, disabled, or mentally ill, for whom emergency

preparedness guidelines are available,9 battered women’s shelters, safe houses, and transition

homes also need comprehensive disaster planning. As they are not generally recognized as

priority facilities housing and serving an especially vulnerable population, their self-reliance

through disaster preparedness is critical.

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Hazard awareness and risk assessment

As might be expected, programs with direct experience indicated a higher awareness than

non-impacted programs of local hazardous conditions or occurrences, citing risks ranging from

avalanche, gas explosions or hazardous materials transportation accidents to wild fire, flooding,

tornado and earthquake. Few reported regularly receiving any official information on disaster

preparation, depending instead upon mass media; rural programs in Canada and the US were

more likely to receive direct communication. In the Yukon Territory, for instance, the local

Dawson City program reported receiving annual flood response plans from city officials.

Few programs are represented on local, regional, or provincial disaster planning groups.

Among programs without experience of regional disasters (n=36), which may influence domestic

violence programs without resulting in direct service impacts, four participate in local emergency

networks; the great majority (31 of 36) were either not certain or reported that their facility was

not specifically included in local disaster plans (e.g. for priority evacuation assistance,

communications, or emergency power). Programs with some regional disaster experience (n=41)

were also unlikely to participate in local planning efforts (4 of 41). More disaster-experienced

programs did report being included in local response plans (13 of 41 programs, or 32%), in some

cases, developing “stronger relationships with emergency managers” through the disaster (9 of

41, or 22%).

How safe are the buildings housing battered women? Overall, most responding shelters

reported their physical facilities to be “relatively safe.” Many, however, are located in older

buildings affordable to women’s services or are centrally located in communities built up in

hazardous coastal or flood plain areas. “He just shook his head,” one shelter director in Texas

reported of a conversation about safety with their building’s architect. A number of British

Columbia programs in a known earthquake zone reported that their facility was “relatively safe”

but added “not safe in the event of earthquake.” Assessing the structural integrity of shelters

requires worst-case scenario planning, specialized knowledge, and adequate funding for analysis

and follow-up renovation.

Shelter preparedness

Disaster planning is not a priority for domestic violence programs working hard at

“securing basic needs for women and children, e.g. safety, housing, etc.” As Table l (below)

indicates, fewer than half reported taking steps internally to protect staff or shelter residents

during and immediately after a disaster. Programs with disaster experience reporting service

changes of some kind were considered “disaster impacted” and generally reported higher levels

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of preparedness, as might be expected. However, six of 25 impacted programs (24%) and 19 of

52 non-impacted programs (37%) reported having taking no action of any kind.

Preparedness measures often appeared oriented toward the routine (e.g. minor flooding)

or contained accident (e.g. house fire) rather than the catastrophic (major earthquake) though a

shelter might be at risk of both. In British Columbia and the Yukon Territory, a region at risk of

flooding, mudslide, transportation accidents, and severe weather events, with major metropolitan

areas at risk of earthquake, 80% of the 35 responding programs reported either no preparedness

steps (12 of 35) or only minimal steps (16 of 35), for example reporting stored food or

evacuation plans “in case of fire but without follow-up plans.” Among these are six programs

which each sheltered between 500-600 women and children during the last fiscal year. Of the 35

BC/Yukon programs, seven reported having taken three or more preparedness measures.

Table l Program preparedness*

Non-impacted programs Impacted programs Action taken (n=52) (n=25)

Structural protection like earthquake bracing or hurricane shutters? 8 15% 4 16%

Stockpiled emergency food, water batteries, radios? 13 25% 10 40%

Emergency drills with staff? 17 33% 5 20%

Evacuation plans for shelter resident? 23 44% 11 44%

Disaster training for staff? 6 12% 5 20%

*Includes programs with and without shelters, and coalition offices

Overall, few programs in Canada or the United States were likely to have secured their

building and equipment as recommended by local emergency specialists. Programs with

residential shelters are, by their nature, likely to store extra food, water, and first aid supplies;

like all organizations, coalition offices and non-shelter programs will also want to meet the

emergency needs of residents, staff, and volunteers on site during a disaster. Programs are most

likely to have evacuation plans and emergency drills in place, but these were often described as

simple fire drills. Evacuating battered women from shelters is complex. They may be unable to

safely utilize designated evacuation centers and need reliable transportation to alternate

evacuation sites. Like other evacuees, they will be advised to take portable radios and back-up

batteries, flashlights, and other supplies. If feasible and safe, some clients may also want to

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return to their own homes to gather critical documents or irreplaceable items when evacuation

advisories are issued.

What factors facilitate or inhibit internal preparedness in battered women’s shelters?

Shelters with very low levels of preparedness were characterized by lack of past disaster

experience, low levels of hazard awareness, lack of information about preparedness, and

organizational constraints. Asked about the primary barriers to greater disaster readiness, British

Columbia/Yukon programs reported the obvious: “Time and money. Demand for our services is

very high and no increases in funding are like funding cuts to us.” Lack of knowledge about

regional disaster response and lack of community leadership were also cited. Insensitivity to

domestic violence issues may frustrate the initiative of some programs, as in this account from an

earthquake-zone transition home: “I called earthquake readiness at city hall and we didn’t have

a big enough group to warrant a meeting. They wanted us to organize our block or neighbors. I

don’t have that time and worry about safety issues. Besides, we live in an upscale neighborhood

that doesn’t like us very much.”

Other BC/Yukon programs did report high levels of disaster readiness, including written

disaster plans, protocols for emergency transport of clients and, in one case, earthquake survival

kits for transition house residents. Overall, factors making disaster planning more salient in

responding programs, included: a subculture of preparedness, organizational and personal

experience, government mandate, coalition leadership, personal networks, and impending threat.

A “culture of prevention” may develop in hazard-prone areas which increases the

salience of hazard and vulnerability and hence fosters community and home mitigation efforts.

State-mandated disaster planning for shelters in the state of Texas, monitored by the state

domestic violence coalition, provide an example of institutionalized preparedness inspired by a

disaster subculture. Flood-prone Missouri established a state-level coordinating agency in

advance of the slowly-developing disaster along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. The state

coalition was invited by the governor to join a statewide Flood Partnership of social service

agencies, charities, emergency managers, and local government; the coalition representative

reported this did keep them “apprised of developments” and allowed their “input on needs and

effects.” It also facilitated an innovative recovery program undertaken later by the coalition

Some shelter managers were concerned about disaster vulnerability based on what they

knew about how nearby shelters had fared in past earthquakes or floods. Similarly, shelter staff

who were personally disaster-impacted or aware brought their concerns to the workplace;

however, programs cannot benefit unless or until these concerns are institutionalized in

organizational practice and policy. In several cases, rural or semirural shelters demonstrated

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preparedness and engagement with local emergency responders based on close social networks.

For example, in one rural North Dakota town the local emergency team includes both the shelter

manager and her police officer husband; in rural British Columbia, one woman was both an

Emergency Social Services volunteer and a shelter worker. A First Nations program reported

receiving disaster information from their local band which had undertaken disaster planning.

Urgent warnings clearly motivated last-minute preparedness. Acting on (inaccurately)

predicted flood levels made available to the public, the staff of the Grand Forks program moved

files and other supplies progressively higher above the floor before closing the office the day of

the major flood: “In our mind we really thought, even if we got some water it was going to be

an inch or so…We told everyone they could go do what they needed to do to save the city and

other people’s homes, so we all dispersed. We all went out sandbagging….We were trying to

save homes, not a city.” Evacuated by siren in the middle of the night when the river crested

higher than predicted, they ultimately lost both: “Monday came and the whole town was gone.”

Seventy miles up-river, the Fargo program responded proactively to flood warnings,

transporting back-up computer tapes to private homes and moving files and educational

materials, damaged once before by flooding, before turning to sandbagging. In Manitoba, the

border town of Winkler braced for flooding, too; staff there rounded up extra bedding and

supplies to house clients displaced from flooded shelters if necessary and called local emergency

managers to “remind them” they needed accurate information for their community hotline.

Downriver in Winnipeg, where emergency officials were unsure if a major dike ringing

the city would be breached and ordered the hasty construction of a secondary dike, shelter staff

prepared their facilities as best they could against sewer back up and flooding, but supplies were

scarce. Concerned about safety but lacking any official assessment of their facility from their

provincial landlord, one shelter manager contacted government officials for an emergency

inspection. In addition to reallocating shelter space to protect equipment and supplies, the two

shelters worked creatively under pressure to develop plans for rehousing evacuated shelter and

transition house clients. Capitalizing on the personal connections one director had with the

Salvation Army, they located safe space large enough to accommodate both clients and staff

should evacuation be necessary. Just before the river crested, however, their primary funding

agency overrode these plans and substituted an out-of-area evacuation plan, bringing conflicting

views of client service and autonomy into sharp relief: “They are our clients and can choose…

Who has the say?”

As the Red River Valley flood indicated, critical decisions about building safety, safe

evacuation of battered women, and work and personal priorities were made on the run, in

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communities located on a known flood plain but unprepared for protecting battered women and

their children in emergencies. Disaster planning cannot make people safe from the “flood of the

century” or other disasters, but can minimize loss and enable people and organizations to cope

more effectively with extreme conditions.

Doing More With Less: How Disasters Impact Domestic Violence Work

Hurricane Iniki swept across Hawaii not long after Hurricane Andrew devastated parts of

Miami; in both cases, the local shelter was damaged but remained open. In the Hawaiian case, all

operations were disrupted as power was lost for six weeks and the shelter had no back-up

generator; until the program director protested, abusers violating protection orders received only

citations as the jail was closed by the storm. Payroll and other services were also disrupted when

the shelter’s administrative agency was hit by the same storm.

Shelters must respond flexibly to extraordinary conditions. With no cell phone and police

unlikely to respond on the night of the hurricane, the local shelter manager recalled negotiating a

supervised visit with an abuser who demanded contact with his wife and child. In the wake of

flooding in Saguenay, Quebec, shelter staff reported: “Everything actually came to a standstill.

The police services were overworked and stretched. There were no phones, no electricity, no

water. All the energy was spent fending off the most immediate problems and responding to

essential needs. It required great flexibility on the part of the staff."

In Grand Forks, the shelter housing both domestic violence and homeless clients was

already full, and the program had placed two families in hotels; shelter staff could not track their

relocation with certainty as they, too, were forced to evacuate unexpectedly that night. With their

13 staff and 40-50 volunteers “scattered all over the countryside,” they struggled to keep the

crisis line open: “Within a few days we’d gone and got a cell phone and had our crisis line

forwarded to the cell phone until our communication center was up and running, so that we had

the beepers that we used (the pager system) up and running.”

Floodwaters left “slippery, slimy, smelly mud” for staff to clean up and destroyed the

center’s costly office equipment; with their center destroyed, 14 women shared one room and two

phones for three months in a small campus office made available by the local university. Six

months later, they had bad news about the new office space they had nearly completed

renovating for a planned move (and which the city advised them even after the flood to

continue). They are to be displaced again because, in the new “Grand New Grand Forks”

redevelopment plan, the site is now located on the wrong side of a planned dike.

Ruined computers, damaged furniture, and refuse piles are the observable impacts of

disaster capturing media attention. Less visible but more long-lasting are the indirect losses

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sustained by women’s services and other social service agencies. Battered women’s programs

which experienced a major disaster reported in this survey that the event intensified the familiar

contradiction between rising demand and declining resources.

Rising demand

Does violence against women increase after disaster? This remains a question with no

simple answer—if not simply the wrong question. Which disasters, which women, and when?

Simple causal effects, for example on employment rates or migration patterns, are difficult to

attribute to events as complex and long-lasting as major natural or technological disasters. In the

absence of national population surveys,10 researchers rely on such indicators of violence as

requests for protection orders or crisis line calls; however, these are often inadequate in severely

disrupted areas lacking functioning telephones, courts, or responding police officers. In addition,

few domestic violence programs have record-keeping systems in place which identify disaster-

relevant calls, differentiate between new and on-going cases, or track disaster-related service

impacts over time. Nor do most researchers track indirect effects like domestic violence during

the recovery period although, as indicated below, the lag time between a disaster event and

reported increases in violence may be substantial.

Program staff reported responding to disaster-impacted women before, during, and after

disaster, including on-going clients and new cases. Forty-one of the 77 programs surveyed

reported some disaster experience, usually with contained forest fires or mudslide; disaster-

induced service impacts were reported by 25 of these (61%). In 13 cases (32%), respondents

indicated that their routine services were significantly disrupted, generally by flooding but also

by earthquake and hurricane.

Impacted programs reported a decline in service demand during the impact period, citing

barriers to contact with women (e.g., disrupted communication, transportation, and law

enforcement) as well as reduced tensions while “the family pulled together,” or was at least

distracted by the immediate crisis. For shelter programs compensated on a per diem basis, a

decline in occupancy during this period translated into a decline in shelter funding; Winnipeg

programs identified this as a concern during the flood and raised the issue with their union

representatives.

Nine of the 13 most severely impacted programs reported increased demand (e.g. crisis

calls, counseling, shelter) after the disaster; programs in Miami, Hawaii, Missouri, California and

North Dakota reported this increase from six months to a year later. Hit by flooding in late April,

the Grand Forks program reported that crisis calls rose by 21% and counseling of on-going

clients by 59% between July l996 and July l997; they processed an additional 18% more

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protection orders in August, l997 than in August l996. Staff also reported more referrals from

emergency rooms, suggesting a rise in physical assaults.

Downriver in Canada, where two small communities were flooded and Winnipeg

sandbagged against the flood threat, programs did not report any flood-induced increase in

service demand six months after the crisis. Upriver in Fargo, where the local domestic violence

program provides crisis intervention but not shelter, the director reported a 15% increase in

protection orders processed over the same period the preceding year, reflecting both the

community stress of preparing for an expected flood and their response to Grand Forks families

evacuated to the Fargo area. A second sister shelter reported an increase of 15% in domestic

violence crisis calls. Other programs cited referrals from flood hotline workers, for example an

isolated woman fearing physical confrontation with her husband as they tried to cope with

carcass removal on their hard-hit farm. In a nearby town, a staff member from another program

herself became a first-time victim of physical abuse after her husband lost his job during the

crisis period.

Impacted programs reported greatly increased case management with existing clients.

When their own support systems are disrupted or destroyed, women living with violence need the

services of a comprehensive domestic violence intervention program. Family and friends may

well relocate, and children already traumatized by violence cope with new losses; one program

reported seeing the young daughter of a former client thrown into turmoil again after a three-

week evacuation from her home. In the case below, lack of housing forced a woman back into an

unsafe situation: “One woman had gotten a protection order right before the flood and then

when the evacuation was taking place, she really didn’t have..basically, she had no family

around here, her support system was very small. And so, because of that, she contacted him…

She felt like she was forced into the situation and then things got bad and she had to get out of

that situation so it created even more problems.” Because the local shelter was destroyed, she

sought protection at a friend’s home and turned again to her local crisis intervention center for

support.

As the Saguenay program reported, their main challenge came not from new cases of

disaster-induced violence but a “great increase in crisis management, helping women who had

been relocated to find alternative housing. Some women in the shelter lost their homes, many

had indirect problems not related to family violence to be solved. Some women were not able to

see their children who were not with them. Increased stress and worries.” A second program in

the region also reported that court cases were postponed, women stayed longer in the shelter, and

women were displaced from transitional housing.

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Declining resources

Especially in communities supporting strong domestic violence services, programs

reported receiving offers of financial help from local women’s groups, media attention, donated

food, personal care supplies and other items, and increased access to government disaster-

response funds. However, while needs persist long after the immediate crisis, respondents noted

that the “sympathy factor” driving these donations is generally short-lived.

The director of the flooded Grand Forks program predicted that the private and public

disaster relief they anticipate will meet only half of their estimated $100,000 losses. In addition,

six months after the crisis, they were threatened with the loss of $60,000 in community block

development grant monies diverted to “flood relief,” prompting a staff member to protest: “We

feel we are flood relief…We’re that one piece of hope and now that’s being taken away.” This

potential loss, which threatened a struggling program with the loss of three staff positions, was

apparently averted by the director’s media appeal for different priorities in the “re-imagining” of

Grand Forks: “The first priority should be the needs of citizens—their food, shelter, and safety.

There has probably never been a more critical time for human needs—when we really need to

pull together as a community. But human needs really aren’t a priority now.”11

Indirect funding cutbacks (e.g. canceling or postponing planned fundraisers) are also

painful, particularly in the US where private fundraising is essential. Like others in their area, the

Fargo program had been advised that United Way funds would be redirected to “flood victims,”

motivating them to conduct a planned “business breakfast” less than two weeks after the flood:

“We lost 3 weeks of preparation for this event. It was an $ 11,300 gross—and I had no doubt

that had we not lost that it would have been between $15,000 and $20,000, because we had

people directly working on that who were front-line fighting the flood--who could have lost their

homes.”

Survey respondents reported the determined efforts of staff and advocates to return to a

stricken shelter and assist residents through hard times, regardless of personal losses, evacuation,

and transportation hurdles. Upriver, a key volunteer in the local program did extra duty on the

crisis line and otherwise carried on although she had “14 people coming to stay at her place

because she’s the only dry place in town.” In Winnipeg, the Red River “lake” forced the shelter

director and her two young children to evacuate as she strove to coordinate shelter response to

the impending flood and possible sewage back-up. Like other impacted staff members, she

needed and received help from colleagues ready to “listen to [her] fears.”

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Many respondents noted disruptions due to “a lot of unproductive time” and, later,

“survivor guilt,” and there was one flood-induced resignation reported. But the larger problem

was staff overload. For one shelter, the greatest need was transportation for staff able to work but

not able to travel; elsewhere, staff and volunteers needed personal time to attend to their own

homes. A program director observed: “The question is, then, who’s manning the fort?…[I]t ends

up putting other staff members in crisis, and especially when you’re talking shelter programs.

It’s fine to say ‘you need to do what you need to do,’ but you also then need to have the backup

on the hotlines…It’s really important to plan for that.” Only one program, located on the Gulf

Coast of Texas where severe weather is common, reported personnel guidelines in place

specifying leave and salary policies for disaster-impacted staff.

A major community disaster also impacts volunteers and board members, whose

contributions are substantial in many programs. Coalition members may not be able to offer

effective help to disaster-hit sister programs, either because they too were impacted or because no

plans for coordinated response were developed. Responding to the crisis of impacted shelters can

be divisive in state or provincial umbrella organizations, as members have different priorities and

often compete for resources, but it was also reported that bureaucratic networks became “real”

during disaster.

When floods, fires, or toxic contamination disrupt a large area, shelters must respond to

women without the assistance of other local shelters (e.g. referrals for overflow or for evacuated

shelter or second-stage clients) and area resources (e.g. local hotels, motels, and safe homes,

public transportation, legal advice, housing and other social services). Disrupted courts and

overburdened police officers not only put women at risk but increase demands on stressed shelter

workers; six months after the Red River crested in Grand Forks, staff reported it was still a “huge

struggle” and a long drive to a different courthouse to get protection orders signed.

Responding to disaster

Disasters mean hard work for residents, emergency responders, local governments---and

women’s advocates. Asked how their program was changed by disaster, respondents most often

cited increased hotline calls, information and referrals, liaison with other community agencies,

and fundraising. Their collaborative work with other agencies during community recovery also

appears to increase, for example around housing or child care issues.

All surveyed programs helped sister shelters to the best of their ability by providing

space, donating money to impacted staff members, resupplying office materials, and sharing

other resources. Nearby shelters took in displaced families when they could; where feasible,

sister shelters expanded their mission to include housing evacuated families and relief workers

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(e.g. nurses caring for premature infants from an evacuated hospital). New children’s support

groups and other services were developed by nearby programs to serve displaced “disaster

families.”

A British Columbian program responded with critical-incident stress debriefing, an

initiative of interest to other nearby programs; elsewhere in this region, programs threatened by

localized flooding prepared lists of counselors, and offered their services to the local emergency

response team. The small rural program in Nevada most impacted by the flooded Truckee River

was later recognized by a leading women’s service group for their extensive flood relief work,

including re-clothing clients and community members through their thrift shop. In Hawaii, the

shelter manager reported increased services after the hurricane to new cultural groups made more

aware of their resources through disaster assistance center referrals.

In the wake of Hurricane Andrew, the Florida shelter reported that “community-based

domestic violence support groups were implemented and continue today,” more than five years

later. California initiatives to the Northridge earthquake included a Whittier program which

distributed free emergency kits and flyers in conjunction with regular public education programs.

In Redondo Beach, the agency received a government grant for services to quake-impacted

residents in shelter one year after the earthquake; this 18-month project also integrated

emergency preparedness materials into “life information materials” to help stabilized residents

“get on with their lives in the future.”

State and provincial coalition offices reported action to mitigate the impacts of future

disasters. The Florida state coalition, for example, conducted emergency preparedness training

for members and disaster plans were distributed to all member programs. As noted above, the

Texas coalition monitors development of disaster plans for member programs.

In North Dakota, the coalition as well as member programs wrote press releases,

responded to media requests, and in other ways publicized the resources available to flood-

impacted women and their families outside the immediate Grand Forks area. Significantly, the

coalition failed in their efforts to be included among “primary agencies” listed in the resource

guide for those staffing the state flood hotline, reflecting and reinforcing the invisibility of

violence against women. The coalition later added disaster issues to their already full annual

agenda of goals, including identifying emergency management professionals as a target group

for domestic violence training. On a personal level, they also collected money, clothing, and

other supplies for the five Grand Forks staff members who sustained major losses in the flood.

Flood-affected programs expect that the Manitoba association will also draw on their experience

to help increase program readiness and response.

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The slowly-developing Missouri flood facilitated a coordinated response which included

coalition leaders sensitive to women’s risk of violence. Although the mechanics of flood funding

“teetered on the edge of bureaucratic disaster,” coalition leadership resulted in the modification

of an existing grant for substance abuse in disaster to include Missouri shelters responding to

women, violence, and disaster. This involved the coalition and its members in “service expansion

to meet ongoing escalation of demands for services, which included a new source of referrals

from ‘flood workers’ doing crisis intervention in previously unserved areas and very hard-hit

areas.” The state coalition took on new staff to carry out the project, which involved it in

conducting original research, grant writing and revision of funding guidelines, and substantial

technical assistance to programs receiving grant monies.

These examples of disaster response demonstrate the broad range of new “disaster work”

undertaken by domestic violence programs. Survey respondents, particularly programs with

prior experience, suggested that a more proactive role for state or provincial coalitions in this

area would be supported (12 of 25, or 48%).

Making Women Safer: An Integrated Community Response

This survey highlighted two related issues: first, the low salience of disaster in most,

though not all, US and Canadian domestic violence shelters and coalitions; and second, the

contradiction between increased demands and reduced resources as shelters respond to women,

violence, and disaster.

The programs surveyed also reported consistently high levels of interest in addressing

both concerns. Asked which steps their agency might take toward disaster readiness, 9 of 52 non-

impacted (and no impacted programs) responded “none needed,” in some cases because measures

were already in place or “in process.” Table 2 (below) summarizes responses from programs

with and without disaster experience which generated perceived service changes. Interestingly,

organizational disaster experience does not always substantially increase readiness to act,

suggesting that emergency managers should target women’s services with and without first-hand

disaster knowledge.

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Table 2 Potential program preparedness*

Non-impacted programs Impacted programs Action Considered (n=52) (n=25)

Attending area meetings on disaster preparedness 25 (48%) 16 (64%)

Ensuring that facility is included in existing evacuation and emergency response plans 33 (63%) 18 (72%)

Requesting technical evaluation of facility security 14 (27%) 7 (28%)

Providing staff training on preparedness and response 27 (52%) 17 (68%)

Establishing protocols for emergency response with other relevant agencies in our area 28 (54%) 15 (60%)

Developing an emergency plan for our organization 33 (63%) 15 (60%)

*Includes programs with and without shelters, and coalition offices

Disaster mitigation is generally most feasible during the rebuilding process, when

impacted communities are motivated to reduce the incidence and severity of future disasters.

These data suggest that disaster-impacted domestic violence programs will be especially open to

dialogue about how they are involved in area response plans, providing staff training, and

attending relevant meetings. Less interest was reported in developing formal protocols for

coordinated emergency response or having the structural integrity of facilities evaluated,

generally because of assumed costs.

Emergency managers will find this high degree of potential disaster readiness

encouraging. However, those factors constraining in-house preparedness, principally lack of

funding, competing demands, and lack of information, will also clearly constrain steps toward

comprehensive disaster readiness.

Integrating women’s services and emergency management

The survey also suggested how women’s services might be more directly involved in

coordinated community disaster response. Several managers offered or arranged for shelter staff

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to pinch-hit for overburdened hotline workers on area disaster hotlines. Organizations with staff

who are experienced at operating a shelter for displaced people in crisis, collecting and

distributing personal and household goods, advocating for crisis intervention and recovery

services, placing homeless families in shelter, and running a crisis line are an important part of

community capacity to respond to disaster. However, a frustrated shelter manager complained

that local emergency planners “don’t really think about us.”

Drawing on these data to help move the process forward, guidelines for shelter staff

undertaking organizational disaster planning are attached to this report (see Appendix A).

Designed to spark dialogue and initiate the search for information, the guidelines include

vulnerability and capacity assessment, operational and administrative planning, training and drill.

Working closely with local emergency planners and responders is an essential

component of effective disaster planning. However, just as disasters are not salient for most

women’s services, battered women’s needs during disaster and recovery are not on the radar

screen of most emergency managers. An integrated community response to women, violence, and

disaster demands a new partnership between these two professional communities.

Toward this end, the report also includes planning guidelines for shelters, coalitions, and

disaster practitioners (Appendix B). Based on the experiences and observations of respondents,

actions at every stage of the disaster cycle are identified for each of these three groups. The most

effective approach will be broad-based planning involving a wide range of disaster practitioners

(e.g., specialized experts, disaster agency professionals, government officials, volunteers ) and

women’s services (e.g., advocating for victims of violence, First Nations women and new

immigrants, low-income, senior, and disabled women, single mothers, minority-language

speakers, homeless and socially isolated women).

Speaking from a rural North Dakota setting, the director of a program actively involved

in her community’s local emergency response group argued: “It’s not up to the people in charge

who are running the disaster things, it’s really up to the programs themselves, the shelters

themselves, to say ‘Hey, I exist and don’t you dare forget me…You have to be there. You have to

tell them, ‘Hey, I’m here—I want this. I insist on this.” This model may be less effective for

programs in more complex social and political environments; articulating needs is certainly

always necessary but rarely suffices. Advocacy for battered women in disaster is essential in all

kinds of communities and no single model is appropriate.

A strong battered women’s movement articulating women’s needs and interests before,

during, and after disaster is a vital resource in disaster-resilient communities. For their part,

emergency planners charged with understanding and preparing their communities must actively

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engage in the dialogue around violence and disaster. Comprehensive community assessments

must include awareness of how different groups of women are differently at risk of violence in

disaster contexts.

Conclusions and Implications

As more than one respondent noted, disaster is “not on anybody’s agenda” in US and

Canadian domestic violence programs. The findings did indicate high levels of interest in

becoming more disaster-aware, but also suggested how rarely programs plan ahead to respond

flexibly to crisis, participate in local disaster planning, or are utilized as a community resource.

Battered women’s programs, like other women’s services, can increase their

organizational readiness and offer leadership to communities organizing to cope with the

challenges of disaster. But programs struggling to meet existing needs with limited or declining

resources cannot move toward disaster readiness. Funding priorities in emergency response

organizations as well as women’s services must reflect and support the needs of women at risk of

violence in disaster.

Structural or material steps toward disaster mitigation (e.g. dikes, zoning codes,

retrofitting) help protect individuals, households, and neighborhoods, but effective grassroots

mitigation must include initiatives supporting more highly integrated and empowered

communities. Specifically engaging those groups most vulnerable to disaster is an essential part

of the process. 12 Like other women vulnerable to disaster, women living with violence need

services but also a seat at the table when communities plan for disaster mitigation and response.

Emergency practitioners accustomed to partnering with interfaith coalitions, the Salvation Army,

and food banks need to also work with grassroots women’s organizations serving at-risk

populations. Preparedness programs designed for cohesive neighborhoods must also include

those insecurely housed in disaster-prone environments, including women and children in

battered women’s shelters. Disaster training and communications are most effective when

carefully targeted and delivered to reach those serving vulnerable populations; responders in the

field after disaster also need a good understanding of domestic violence issues. In this model of

community mitigation, stronger formal and informal networks between women’s services and

emergency managers are essential.

A sustained research agenda will help answer questions important to women and men

living through disaster.13 Qualitative case studies and national survey data which specify

conditions facilitating or hindering disaster readiness are useful for disaster planners and

women’s services. Research support is needed to investigate sexual and domestic violence

against women in disaster contexts as a matter of public health. Documenting the incidence and

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the circumstances of disaster-induced violence against women, and women’s personal and

organizational responses to it, will support better assessments of community capacity and

vulnerability. As the link between women at risk of violence and emergency planners, paid and

unpaid workers in women’s shelters and coalitions are vital partners in these research projects.

Global development patterns—both how we use our environment and how we organize

our societies—place increasing numbers of people at increasing risk of both “natural” and

technological disaster. Women’s services in affluent as well as poor societies can and should plan

now to respond to more, and more severe, disasters in the coming years. An integrated

community response will best serve women and children who must survive both violence and

disaster.

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APPENDIX A

DISASTER PLANNING FOR SHELTERS:Guidelines for Staff, Volunteers, and Boards

Disaster planning is not often a priority in battered women’s shelters or transition homes, where your work focuses on daily survival issues. But your shelter is the only home women in crisis have, and it will be directly or indirectly impacted should a major disaster hit your neighborhood.

1 All names are pseudonyms. Statements set off in italics are respondent quotations.2 This work appears as Betty Hearn Morrow and Elaine Enarson, “Hurricane Andrew Through Women’s Eyes: Issues and Recommendations,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 14 (1), 1996. 3 For further reading on this point, see Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis, and Ben Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters. London: Routledge, 1994.4 For an analysis of women’s higher injury and mortality rates, see Keiko Ikeda, “Gender Differences in Human Loss and Vulnerability in Natural Disasters: A Case Study from Bangladesh,” Indian Journal of Gender Studies 2 (2), 1995; and J.P.W. Rivers,” Women and Children Last: An Essay on Sex Discrimination in Disasters,” Disasters 6 (4), 1982. Women’s disaster vulnerability is also discussed by contributors to the forthcoming reader The Gendered Terrain of Disasters: Through Women’s Eyes, Elaine Enarson and Betty Hearn Morrow (eds.), Greenwood Publishing.5 Increasing violence against women after disaster is suggested by field reports from shelters. See “Violence Against Women in the Aftermath of the October 17, 1989 Earthquake: A Report to the Mayor and City Council of the City of Santa Cruz,” Santa Cruz Commission for the Prevention of Violence Against Women, March 1990; and Victoria Constance and Colleen Coble, Missouri Coalition Against Domestic Violence, “The Missouri Model: The Efficacy of Funding Domestic Violence Programs as Long-Term Disaster Recovery: Final Evaluation Report,” December 1995. For an analysis of organizational responses to domestic violence in three disaster-impacted communities, see Jennifer Wilson, Brenda Phillips, and David Neal, “Domestic Violence After Disaster,” forthcoming in The Gendered Terrain of Disaster.6 Glen Fitch, Executive Director of Men’s Alternatives to Violence, quoted in “Violence Against Women in the Aftermath of the October 17, 1989 Earthquake,” p. 3, op.cit.7 All state and provincial associations or coalitions in the US and Canada were mailed a 23-item survey investigating disaster planning, impacts, and response. Responding state (16 of 51) and provincial (5 of 11) associations completed the survey and provided contact information for member programs they identified as at-risk or disaster-impacted. Thirty-five of 76 (46%) members of the British Columbia/Yukon domestic violence coalition also completed the mail survey. A total of 77 mail or telephone surveys were completed, including 52 non-impacted and 25 impacted programs in the US and Canada. 8 Sample size precluded a systematic comparative analysis between disaster and domestic violence planning and response in the US and Canada; however, no obvious patterns of difference were observed.9 For example, see Kathleen Tierney, William Petak, and Harlan Hahn, Disabled Persons and Earthquake Hazards, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1988, and Responding to the Needs of People with Serious and Persistent Mental Illness in Times of Major Disaster, US Department of Health and Human Services, 1996, and Emergency Planning Manual for Special Care Facilities, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa, Canada.10 No national population surveys, to my knowledge, been conducted in any society on the incidence of domestic violence after disaster, although violence against women is recognized internationally in other emergency situations. See Working with Women in Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation Programmes, League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Field Studies Paper No. 2, 199l. 11 Quoted in the Grand Forks Herald, October 8, 1997, p.2A. 12 On these two related points, see Phillip Berke, Jack Kartez, and Dennis Wenger, “Recovery After Disaster: Achieving Sustainable Development, Mitigation and Equity,” Disasters 17 (2), 1993, and Andrew Maskrey, Disaster Mitigation: A Community Based Approach. Oxford: Oxfam, 1989.13 See Elaine Enarson, “Through Women’s Eyes: A Gendered Research Agenda for Disaster Social Science,” forthcoming in Disasters, l997.

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Working through worst-case scenarios to assess risks, vulnerabilities, and resources will help your program respond when shelter residents need you more than ever. Staff, volunteers, and board members will also benefit as potential disaster victims and as emergency responders to shelter residents and clients.

Who pays? Time and money are not the only constraints to disaster planning, but they are critical. Your board or advisory committee may be able to take this on. Preparedness and mitigation are a good investment and local funders and service groups may help meet the costs of disaster planning. Making your interest and needs known to funding agencies and local emergency management officials is always essential. Funding priorities in women’s services and emergency organizations must include disaster planning for battered women’s shelters.

No single model of disaster planning fits all. Contact your local emergency managers for more information and area-specific recommendations.

RISK ASSESSMENT: Disaster planning begins with careful consideration of hazardous conditions impacting your shelter’s ability to do its job. Assessing known risks and hazards will help you prepare and respond more effectively in crisis. Environmental or technological hazards (e.g. how likely is your shelter to be impacted by a flooded

river or tsunami? How close are storage facilities for hazardous waste, major transportation arteries, the airport or the harbor?)

Resident vulnerability: This varies depending on your clients, but consider the general nature of women you tend to shelter. Do you often serve migrant workers or women from outlying rural areas, disabled women, undocumented or minority-language speakers, or seniors? They will have different needs during and after a major disaster.

Physical facility: Relative to the risks you have identified, how safe is your shelter physically? Consider type of construction, age, condition, number and location of exits, available safe spaces, window protection, etc. Consult local specialists who can help you with this evaluation.

Community services: Consider community characteristics which will impact on the disaster recovery of battered women, e.g., housing availability, employment patterns, child care resources, minority language services, area health services, public transportation routes, etc. How can your agency work with others before a crisis to ensure coordinated services after a major disaster?

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES: Strive to be self-sufficient for 72 hours after a major disaster. Shelters will often have storage space and supplies on hand, but other programs also need to stockpile supplies. Assume your shelter is full and you are housing women and children with a range of ages and personal needs.

Store adequate supplies of flashlights, transistor radios, and spare batteries in a known place Keep fire extinguishers and first aid supplies current Have a portable generator or identify alternate power sources you can access Cycle through emergency food and water to sustain all residents and staff for 72 hours Purchase and maintain emergency communication equipment, e.g. cell phone, CB radio, pager Provide residents with evacuation kits (flashlight, transistor radio, personal care kit; if possible, help residents return home to gather personal papers or other valuables) Consult local emergency planners for area-specific recommendations regarding heavy objects, window coverings, etc. Flag all utility shut-off valves; store a wrench in a bag secured to one of the valves

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ADMINISTRATION: Supporting shelter residents involves lots of “backstage” services which are also important to protect before, during, and after disaster. Learning more about issues likely to arise will reduce possible conflicts later.

Clear lines of authority and responsibility. If key decision-makers are unavailable, who takes over? Is all your personal contact information complete and accurate? What is the role of volunteers or board members in crisis?

Personnel guidelines for the emergency period, including job responsibilities, arrangements for release time, compensation for lost time, etc.

Bureaucratic contingency planning to meet obligations to other agencies if your office is not functional; off-site storage of duplicate records; alternative workspaces and methods to provide continuous service, e.g. from coalition offices to member programs

RESOURCES. After the immediate crisis, other programs will want to help shelters that were directly impacted. How will you assess their needs? What can you realistically offer? What other resources can programs and residents access?

Coalition protocols for mutual aid. You may not be able to communicate with impacted programs but will want to help with evacuation space, child care, emergency supplies, replacement supplies or equipment, respite care for staff, etc. Establish a centralized needs assessment system, e.g. through the coalition office or an a regional basis. Advance planning will make your help timely and appropriate. Keep protocols up-to-date.

Area agency protocols for coordinated crisis assistance, e.g. with information and referral lines, food banks, homeless shelters, local attorney and counseling associations, grassroots advocacy groups and private disaster relief agencies. You may be able to share skilled crisis line workers, offer needed language skills, or even have shelter space available for evacuated women and children needing short-term emergency housing. Groups working with particularly vulnerable populations need formal and informal networks to plan for equitable disaster response. Keep protocols up-to-date.

Resource bank of first-responders and resources.. This information is on hand for crisis line workers but be sure it is current and reflects personnel or policy changes in emergency operations staff, law enforcement, ambulance and hospital, etc. Know in advance what assistance you can and cannot expect from first-responders in a widespread disaster. Is your shelter on anyone’s priority list for assistance? Would emergency transportation to evacuation sites be available if needed, or your power restored on a priority basis?

Keep emergency assistance information on file regarding private and public postdisaster aid. Knowing in advance about eligibility standards and application procedures will make a difference later. A board member or staff person may take this on and ensure that sample applications and basic information are available on site.

STAFF TRAINING: Emergency response is part of routine staff training and shelter orientation. Staff should also be trained to respond to worst-case scenarios of severe and widespread damage. You may want to include residents in some aspects of disaster preparedness as well. How will staff and residents work together to keep the shelter self-sufficient for 72 hours?

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Staff training should include essential emergency guidelines: utility cut-off procedures, primary medical response (e.g., CPR), knowledge of emergency communications systems, evacuation plans and back-up transportation systems, etc.

Disaster preparedness and response training covering hazards, impacts, responses, and recovery may be available locally through your emergency response office or voluntary relief organizations. It should be tailored to your circumstances and available regularly to staff and interested volunteers or board members.

USING THE DISASTER PLAN: A response plan filed under “forget it” is still helpful. The process of developing the plan is an important step. But a disaster plan shared and reviewed will help you more in a crisis.

File your shelter’s disaster plan with your local emergency manager. Be specific about your anticipated needs. Also identify resources you may be able to offer to others in the event of a major disaster.

Review and update your disaster response plan; incorporate it into staff and resident orientation.

Conduct regular drills with staff, volunteers, and board members. Disaster planning identifies vulnerabilities but also builds on strengths; it can be empowering for shelter residents.

Become acquainted with your local emergency practitioners. Know who these people are and how they work. Attend public meetings and take part in emergency drills, if possible; be certain how your program will and will not be included in local emergency response.

APPENDIX B

WOMEN, DISASTER, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:Planning Guidelines for Programs, Coalitions, and Disaster Practitioners

Disaster phases are cyclical and intersecting: effective relief helps recovery; mitigation supports preparedness. The guidelines below emphasize shelters, where the issues are most acute, but apply to non-shelter programs and to coalitions. Collaborative action by shelters, coalitions, and emergency responders throughout these phases will best support an integrated community response to women in crisis during disaster.

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A. PREPAREDNESS

Shelters: staff, volunteers, and board members

Assess local hazards and shelter vulnerability; evaluate the structural safety of physical facility Prepare space appropriately, e.g. computer bracing, heavy objects secured, shutters Rotate stored emergency food and water to sustain each person for 72 hours Identify safe evacuation sites and transportation options Designate staff responsibilities and develop personnel policies for disaster work Develop signed protocols with related agencies for mutual support Equip emergency kits for residents and staff Counsel residents on self-protection and evacuation options Provide disaster training for staff, board, volunteers; include residents as appropriate Develop, review, and practice disaster plan

Coalitions: state/provincial association staff and board members

Support program preparedness through fundraising and modeling Develop contingency plans for non-interrupted service to programs Provide or facilitate disaster planning for member programs Develop, review, and practice disaster plan for coalition office

Practitioners: emergency planners and responders in the public and private sectors

Include coalitions and member programs in disaster communication networks Link emergency communications with shelters Assist programs in identifying alternative evacuation sites

B. EMERGENCY RESPONSE


Support the choices of residents during the crisis If feasible and safe, accompany residents home to secure vital documents and possessions Transport residents to safe evacuation sites as feasible Provide continuous program services as feasible


Provide respite care for impacted staff, emergency supplies, and equipment as feasible Coordinate communication between member programs Advocate for impacted programs with emergency responders and decision-makers


If necessary, assist with resident evacuation to established or alternate sites Provide transportation assistance for critical shelter staff needed on site Establish emergency communications with shelters on a priority basis Contact shelter manager to use extra shelter space, if feasible and safe Access trained domestic violence staff as stand-by responders

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C. RECOVERY


Help residents access all forms of available disaster relief Advocate for clients through recovery process, e.g. temporary housing, insurance, medical services Assist disaster hotline workers as feasible Use shelter resources to house homeless women and children as feasible Increase children’s services and counseling for impacted residents Increase outreach to affected neighborhoods in service area Publicize program resources through disaster assistance centers and community hotlines Develop or join collaborative interagency disaster response initiatives


Facilitate critical incident stress debriefing or post-disaster trauma counseling for staff or residents Assess needs of impacted programs Coordinate coalition assistance to impacted programs Advocate for impacted programs distribution of disaster relief and recovery funds Identify non-governmental disaster recovery funding sources Redistribute coalition resources as needed to assist impacted programs


Consult shelter staff on continuing needs of impacted women through recovery Respect the anonymity of shelter residents applying for relief Include battered women in assessments of long-term recovery process Provide shelter information and resource materials in disaster relief centers

D. MITIGATION


Develop or join emergency response networks for nonprofits and social service providers Include disaster awareness in life skills materials for shelter residents Include disaster contexts in public education on domestic violence Use media outlets to publicize domestic violence resources in disaster contexts Identify shelter needs and capacities for local disaster managers Assess needs of vulnerable groups of women in shelter, e.g. undocumented women, disabled Participate in area emergency drills Cross-train staff in disaster skills through Red Cross/Emergency Social Services as feasible Recruit and retain board members, staff, and volunteers from disaster response agencies


Provide leadership and resources to member programs on disaster planning Integrate disaster crisis issues into other coalition projects Add gender and disaster materials to resource library

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Provide public education on violence in disaster Access state or provincial emergency organizations for resources Integrate disaster issues into domestic violence training materials Include disaster responders in coalition programming, as appropriate Provide domestic violence training/materials for state, provincial, and local disaster responders


Identify battered women and children as a special needs population Include local programs in communications networks, planning groups, and exercises Encourage personal and organizational networks with domestic violence programs Facilitate training of outreach mental health teams and volunteer disaster responders in violence and

disaster issues Facilitate training of domestic violence staff on disaster response Assist shelters and other women’s services developing organizational disaster plans

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