responding to crisis assessing situational crisis communication of the costa concordia crisis

Corporate Communication 2st semester exam 2012 Master of Arts in Corporate Communication

Student: Tine Grarup 286495

Supervisor:

Steen Michael Hejndorf

Responding to Crisis: Assessing Situational Crisis Communication of the Costa Concordia Crisis

Total number of characters: 32,992

A case study of the Costa Concordia Crisis January 2012

Responding to Crisis: Assessing Situational Crisis Communication of the Costa Concordia Crisis Corporate Communication 2nd semester exam 2012

Master of Arts in Corporate Communication

Table of Contents

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Problem statement ......................................................................................................................................... 2

1.1.1 Research Questions ............................................................................................................................. 2

1.2 Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................... 2

1.3 Delimitations ..................................................................................................................................................... 3

2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 4

2.1 Crisis and Crisis Management Defined .................................................................................................. 4

2.2 The Value of Reputation and Stakeholder Relationships .............................................................. 5

2.3 Crisis Response ............................................................................................................................................... 6

2.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and Reputational Threat .................. 6

2.3.2 Crisis Response Strategies ............................................................................................................... 8

3 CASE STUDY ........................................................................................................................................ 11

3.1 Costa Cruises -‐ Corporate Profile .......................................................................................................... 11

3.2 Stakeholders of Costa Cruises ................................................................................................................ 11

3.3 The Costa Concordia Crisis ..................................................................................................................... 12

3.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and Reputational Threat ............... 13

4 EMPRICAL ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................... 16

4.1 Costa Cruises’ Crisis Responses ............................................................................................................. 16

4.2 Connecting and Reflecting upon the Findings ................................................................................. 21

4.3 Effect on Corporate Reputation ............................................................................................................. 24

5 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 28

6 LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 29

6.1 Books ................................................................................................................................................................. 29

6.2 Articles in Journals ...................................................................................................................................... 30

6.3 Online Articles ............................................................................................................................................... 31

6.4 Other Online Sources .................................................................................................................................. 33

6.5 Costacruises.com/co.uk Sources ........................................................................................................... 34

6.6 Online Videos ................................................................................................................................................. 35

6.6 Other Sources ................................................................................................................................................ 35

7 APPENDIXES

7.1 Appendix 1: Crisis Management Factors ........................................................................................... 36



7.2 Appendix 2: Instructing and Adjusting Information in Crisis Response ............................. 38

7.3 Appendix 3: Coombs’ Three Crisis Clusters ...................................................................................... 39

7.4 Appendix 4: Image Restoration Strategies by Benoit .................................................................. 41

7.5 Appendix 5: Captain’s Conversation with the Italian Coastguard .......................................... 43

7.6 Appendix 6: Costa Concordia Crisis Update ..................................................................................... 44

7.7 Appendix 7: Costa Cruises Crises Responses on Twitter ............................................................ 53

7.8 Appendix 8: Costa Cruises Crises Responses on Facebook ....................................................... 56

7.9 Appendix 9: Email Correspondence, Peter Anker Jensen, owner and CEO Fri Ferie ..... 59

7.10 Appendix 10: Three CSR Communication Strategies ................................................................ 63

FIGURES

Figure 1: The crisis situation (own adaption) ............................................................................................ 7

Figure 2: Costa Cruises Vision Statement .................................................................................................. 11

Figure 3: Costa Cruises stakeholder map (own adaption) ................................................................ 12

Figure 4: Outline of the Costa Concordia Wreck .................................................................................... 13

Figure 5: Statement of human error from Costa Cruises .................................................................... 14

Figure 6: Statement of human error from Pier Luigi Foschi, CEO of Costa Cruises ............... 14

Figure 7: Crisis Response Timeline (own adaption) ........................................................................... 16

Figure 8: Extract from first statement from Costa Cruises ................................................................ 17

Figure 9: Tweet from Costa Cruises’ Twitter account .......................................................................... 17

Figure 10: Extract from second statement from Costa Cruises ....................................................... 17

Figure 11: First post on Costa Cruises’ Facebook page ....................................................................... 18

Figure 12: Extract from statement: Background of Costa’s commitment to safety ................ 19

Figure 13: Article from Lovell Communications .................................................................................... 20

Figure 14: Article from news media CP World ....................................................................................... 20

Figure 15: Costa Cruises’ rejection of discount rumors ...................................................................... 20

Figure 16: Costa Cruises statement on Facebook acknowledging stakeholder requests ..... 21

Figure 17: Great offers for Costa Cruises on Fri Ferie’s website ..................................................... 24

Figure 18: Costa bolstering tweet by Costa Cruises reminding of positive views ................... 25

Figure 19: Carnival Cruises at NY Stock Exchange the days after the crisis .............................. 25

Figure 20: Social Mentions about Costa Cruises ..................................................................................... 26

Figure 21: Captain Francesco Schettino’s conversation with the Italian coastguard ............ 43



TABLES

Table 1: Crisis response strategies by the SCCT (own adaption) ...................................................... 8

Table 2: SCCT Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection (own adaption) .............. 9-‐10

Table 3: Reputational threat, Costa’s responses & SCCT Recommendations summarized . 22

Table 4: Crisis types by clusters .................................................................................................................... 39

Table 5: Image Restoration Strategies ........................................................................................................ 41



Student: Tine Grarup -‐ 286495 Page 1 of 65

1. Introduction

Several elements and developments breed opportunities for crises, disrupting normal corporate

operations. Crisis management has always been a difficult task bringing along multiple challenges

and the demand for response. Moreover the emergence of social (global) media has complicated the

entire process, requiring practitioners to act faster and more carefully than ever. The important of

crisis management follows societal development, and as we live in a highly developed society

where “omnipresent technology means that the chance of a crisis situation arising is greater than it

has ever been”1, corporations are faced with new responsibilities towards the more and more aware

stakeholders. Even corporations who track their operations and reputation closely are often

impacted by events outside of their control. “No organization is immune to a crisis”2, and if badly

managed, a crisis can ruin hard-won reputations or even destroy companies3. Thus ongoing crisis

and reputation management is of utter importance and can help ensure corporate sustainability.

When crisis strike, effective crisis response can turn what could be a disaster into an opportunity or

at least a chance move beyond the threat4.

In January 2012 Costa Cruises faced a crisis when its cruise ship Costa Concordia ran aground and

partially sank off the coast of Italy5. At least 30 people died as a result of the incident6, making it

the largest passenger cruise ship accident since the Titanic7. Facing a crisis further means facing

reputational threats, hence Costa Cruises had to take action in the attempt to minimize potential

damage to reputational assets and corporate endurance. So crisis response strategies had to be

chosen and the goal of this report is to investigate these choices and evaluate the company’s

responses in the perspective of situational crisis communication theory.

1 Anthonissen (2007) p. 9 2 Coombs (2007). P 1 3 Tench & Yeomans (2009) p. 386 4 Ulmer (2007) p. 33 5 Sloan (2012) 6 Bergman (2012) 7 Sloan (2012




1.1 Problem Statement

The goal of this paper is to analyze and discuss Costa Cruises’ post-crisis management of the recent

Costa Concordia Crisis. The paper will examine Costa Cruises’ employment of crisis responses in

relation the normative guidelines put forth in the Situational Crisis Communication Theory by

Timothy Coombs. Further the response strategies will be discussed in relation to their impact on

corporate reputation.

1.1.1 Research Questions

RQ1: In the perspective of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory, and normative

guidelines hereof, how did Costa Cruises respond to the recent Costa Concordia Crisis on

international platforms?

RQ2: How did the crisis responses affect corporate reputation of Costa Cruises?

1.2 Methodology

The methodology operates as a basis of the paper, and scientifically it takes a socio-constructive

approach viewing knowledge as grounded in social existence, thus as society change so do ideas,

ideology and values8. An approach that in this paper will cover the central argument of the

corporate communication context, where expression is given through the product of individual and

social interaction, thus changing together with societal occurrences9. The method initiates in the

problem statement, outlining the scientific problem. In the process of testing the research questions

through a case study and empirical analysis of Costa Cruises10, the concept of crisis management

and relevant theory is accounted for11. Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory research

is chosen because of its relevance to the topic and the well developed theoretical framework it

provides, as “the model has been tested and detailed in many other types of crises and types of

response strategies”12. The analysis is characterized by the method of a directed content analysis –

an interpretative analytic approach based on existing theory13. It is carried out on the basis of Costa

Cruises’ crisis responses in relation to the theory put forth, and the data is collected through

exploration of the company’s overall external communication.

8 Berger & Luckmann (1966) 9 Hibberd (2005) p.26 10 Part 3 & 4 11 Part 2 12 Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205-206 13 Hsieh & Shannon (2005) p. 1277;1281




1.3 Delimitations

In general an organization’s actions and behavior in a crisis situation go far beyond issuing press

releases and making statements online, so to cover all aspects of responses it is recognized that one

would have to include further perspectives. However, due to limitations, the analysis will purely be

based on a selection of external publications visible to salient stakeholders14. It is known that Costa

Cruises further experienced fire on its Allegra cruise ship some months later, which in the long run

also will have an effect on corporate reputation. Yet this paper only focuses on the Concordia crisis,

and how the response hereto affected reputational assets. Moreover due to page restrictions the

analysis does not touch upon the involvement of parent company Carnival Cruises.

This part one has introduced the paper and the understanding of the structure and content. The

following part will set a basis for the case study and analysis, presenting the theoretical background.

14 Fombrun & van Riel “a reputation develops through the information stakeholders receive […]” (quoted in Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 164)




2. Theoretical Background

While the importance of crisis management and communications is widely agreed upon, the

definition of a crisis is not. In order to set the stage of how the subject is approached in this paper,

the theoretical background will be initiated with a definition of the concept. It will further elaborate

on Coombs’ situational approach to crisis communication in the clarification of crisis response

theory. This is relevant in order to conduct the analysis and hence evaluate Costa Cruises’ responses

to the Concordia crisis.

2.1 Crisis and Crisis Management Defined

Despite no agreed upon definition most scholars and corporations would most likely agree that “a

crisis is the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectations of

stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate negative

outcomes”15. This is the definition by Coombs in the attempt to capture the various perspectives and

common traits of crisis definitions. The definition very well depicts the idea of a crisis being a

fundamental disruption of corporate stability and status quo, which is the essence of most

definitions16, thus it will also be the one pursued by this paper. Coombs further stress the

importance of stakeholder perceptions stating that “[i]f stakeholders believe an organization is in

crisis […] stakeholders will react to the organization as if it is in crisis”17, meaning that crisis

management is greatly related to stakeholder relationships and the reputational outcome hereof,

which is further discussed in section 2.2. Yet crises do not have to turn into a disaster “[a] crisis is

unpredictable but not unexpected”18. Corporations are able to limit the damage by engaging in crisis

management, and the approach hereto is often what makes or break the crisis outcome19. Effective

crisis management can turn a crisis into an opportunity. Nevertheless, it is argued that simply

pulling a corporation unharmed through a crisis may not be a sufficient criterion for success. Rather

crisis management is a systematic effort designed to “avert crises or to effectively manage those

that do occur”20 meaning that effective efforts are the ones where “operations are sustained or

resumed, […] stakeholder losses are minimized, and learning occurs so that lessons are transferred

15 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 2-3 16 Seeger et. al. (2005) p. 80 17 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 3 18 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 3 19 Anthonissen (2008) p. 1 20 Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 61




to future incidents”21. Coombs divide crisis management into “four interrelated factors: (1)

prevention, (2) preparation, (3) response, and (4) revision”22, further presented in appendix 1. This

paper will solely discuss the aspect of crisis response, as focus of analysis is put on post-crisis

management, where crisis response is important to recover reputation and stakeholder relationships,

also it is argued to be too early to make a revision of the Concordia crisis.

2.2 The Value of Reputation and Stakeholder Relationships

“A reputation is an aggregate evaluation stakeholders make about an organization”23 meaning that

positive stakeholder relationships can be an indicator of favorable reputation and vise versa. As

Benoit argues a company must be concerned about reputation when expectations of salient

stakeholders are disturbed24. Reputation is widely recognized as a valuable, intangible asset, linked

to corporate opportunities25 and further directly linked to credibility which in turn is broken, if a gap

occurs between expectations and performance. Thus corporate focus is increasingly moving towards

reputation management in the effort to ensure corporate sustainability, and based on the definition

of crisis above, a “corresponding emphasis must be placed on crisis management as a means of

protecting reputational assets”26. In his research of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory

(SCCT) Coombs argue that a favorable, prior reputation will benefit a corporation during a crisis,

and when protecting or restoring reputation in the post crisis communication27. Hence a key element

in crisis management is continuous positive interactions with stakeholders, and as stated by Coombs

“first priority in any crisis is to protect stakeholders from harm, not to protect the reputation”28.

Thus efforts must be initiated by addressing the ethical responsibility of helping stakeholders to

cope with both the physical (instructing information) and psychological (adjusting information)

concerns, before focus is turned to reputation management29. The notions of instructing and

adjusting information are further described in appendix 2. In this context it is important to note that

managing reputation and responding to a crisis involves knowledge and understanding of one’s

stakeholders and their reactions30. During a crisis the media will often be the loudest and most

21 Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 60-61 22 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 5 23 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 24 24 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 264 25 Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123 26 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 8 27 Further discussed in Section 2.3.1; Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123-124 28 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165 29 Sturges (1994) p. 308; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165 30 Ulmer (2007) p. 36-37




demanding group of stakeholders, however, as the media contact often is more short term, the

company must remember “all those to whom they must communicate”31. Thus identification of

salient stakeholders is crucial, as their reactions and interpretations will gain much power when

information is shared, shaping the outcome of the crisis32. As mentioned above a crisis exists when

stakeholders perceive it to, this situational approach is clarified in the following section.

2.3 Crisis Response

Post-crisis communication is a strong area of research and is mainly identified through crisis

response strategies, being the responsive actions taken on by corporations in crisis to minimize

negative outcomes33. The SCCT is one of the most widely tested theories of crisis communication,

developed and refined by Coombs34. Taking the situational approach to crisis management it is an

attempt to map out post-crisis communication and demonstrate how crisis response strategies can be

used to protect reputational assets. The SCCT embraces three core elements; the crisis situation,

crisis response strategies, and a system of matching the two based on the statement that “[a]

strategic communicative response can best protect the reputational resource by assessing the crisis

situation and selecting a crisis response strategy that fits the crisis situation”35. These elements will

be clarified in the following sections.

2.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and the Reputational Threat

Rationally one cannot match crisis response strategies to the reputational threat of a crisis without a

link between the two. Responsibility is what provides this conceptual link as “the evaluation of the

reputational threat (the situation) is largely a function of crisis responsibility”36. Responsibility

requires accountability37, and crisis response strategies retain these answers. In his research of the

SCCT Coombs argue that three factors are used to evaluate and determine the reputational threat

presented by a crisis: the initial crisis responsibility, the crisis history and the prior relational

reputation38, a situational framing that further serves to guide the choice of crisis response

strategies.

31 Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 116 32 Lewis (2011) p. 89; Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 77 33 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 138; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 170; Coombs: Attribution (2006) p. 135 34 Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205 35 Coombs & Holladay (2012) p. 167 36 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 170 37 Weiner (1986) p. 22;70 38 Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205; Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 166; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 141




Figure 1: The crisis situation (own adaption)39

The initial crisis responsibility is defined by how much responsibility for the crisis, stakeholders

attribute to the company, the more attributed responsibility the bigger the reputational threat40. Here

Coombs proclaims “[...] three crisis clusters based upon attributions of crisis responsibility […]”41

(1) the victim cluster with very little attributions of responsibility, (2) the accidental cluster with

minimal attributions because of uncontrollability, and (3) the preventable cluster with strong

attributions and severe reputational threat, as the event is considered intentional42. Appendix 3

provides a more detailed elaboration of the crisis clusters and crisis types within. The crisis history

is “whether or not an organization had had a similar crisis in the past”43 and the prior relational

reputation is how well the organization is perceived to have treated stakeholders earlier44. This is

further related to both the Velcro effect stating that if you have a history, making the same mistakes

number of times, you are also more vulnerable in the future45, and the early adaption of stakeholder

theory by Freeman, where a descriptive approach of existing relationships is associated with the

outcomes of organizational actions46.

39 Coombs & Holiday (2012) p. 181 40 Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 168 41 Coombs Protecting (2007) p. 168 42 Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167-168 43 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 142; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167 44 Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 167 45 Coombs & Holladay (2012) p. 59; 167 46 Lewis (2011) p. 86




2.3.2 Crisis Response Strategies

When the attributions of responsibility have been identified, hence the reputational threat of a crisis,

the organization can begin to consider potential crisis response strategies. “Trying to specify the

exact number of crisis response strategies is a losing proposition”47. A theorist such as William L.

Benoit has earlier set the stage with his list of 14 “image restoration” strategies48, which is clarified

in appendix 4. To take a more productive approach Coombs has across theories identified the 10

most common strategies “built around the perceived acceptance of responsibility for a crisis

embodied in the response”49. His crisis response strategies are illustrated in table 1 below.

Primary crisis response strategies

Denial crisis response strategies

Attack the accuser Management confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong.

Denial Management asserts that there is no crisis.

Scapegoat Management blames someone outside for the crisis.

Diminish crisis response strategies

Excuse Management minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the event.

Justification Managements attempts to minimize the perceived damage caused by the crisis.

Rebuild crisis response strategies

Compensation Management offers money or other gifts to victims.

Apology Management indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.

Secondary crisis response strategies

Bolstering crisis response strategies

Reminder Telling stakeholders of the past good work of the organization.

Integration Management praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good work.

Victimage Reminding stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too.

Table 1: Crisis response strategies by the SCCT (own adaption)50

Coombs divides the primary SCCT crisis response strategies into four groups; denial, diminish,

rebuild, and bolstering. The deny responses involve, as the title says, a denial of any connection to

the crisis, either by simply denying, claiming a fault, or blaming a third party51. If accepted by

stakeholders the organization is safe for any reputational damage. Diminish response options

47 Benoit (1995) in Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139 48 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 266 49 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 170 50 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 170 51 Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 204; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140




include minimizing the perceived damage and responsibility linked to the crisis, through excuse or

justification, here reputational harm occurs if stakeholders reject the frame set by the organization52.

Rebuild strategies are about generating new reputational assets through compensation or apologies,

both being positive reputational actions, and lastly bolstering strategies function more as secondary

and a supplement, comprising efforts of goodwill from close stakeholders, reminders of past good

work, making the organization a victim etc.53.

The last core element of the SCCT is matching the response strategies with the crisis situation as

discussed in the previous section. When determining the suitable response strategy for the crisis

situation at hand it is, as mentioned, important to understand how stakeholders perceive the crisis

and the crisis outcome. The SCCT embraces this and takes a stakeholder and audience-centered

approach to crisis communication54, arguing that the larger the reputational threat the more

accommodative the response strategies should be55. Table 2 below provides a summary of the

normative guidelines and SCCT recommendations for the use of crisis response strategies.

1. Provide instructing information to all victims or potential victims in the form of warnings

and directions for protecting themselves from harm. 2. Provide adjusting information to victims by expressing concern for them and providing

corrective actions when possible.

Note: Providing instructing and adjusting information alone can be enough when crises have minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises), no history of similar crises and a neutral or positive prior relational reputation.

3. Diminish strategies should be used for crises with minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises) couples with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior relational reputation.

4. Diminish strategies should be used for crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility (accident crises), which have no history of similar crises, and a neutral or positive prior relational reputation.

5. Rebuild strategies should be used for crises with low attribution of crisis responsibility (accident crises), couples with a history of similar crises and/or unfavorable prior relational reputation.

6. Rebuild strategies should be used for crises with strong attributions of crisis responsibility (preventable crises) regardless of crisis history or prior relational reputation.

7. Denial strategies should be used in rumor crises. 8. Denial strategies should be used in challenge crisis when the challenge is unwarranted.

52 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140 53 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-141; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 172 54 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143 55 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143




9. Use corrective action (adjusting information) in challenges when other stakeholders are likely to support the challenge.

10. Bolstering strategies should be used as supplements to the other response strategies. 11. Victimage response strategy should only be used with the victim cluster. 12. To be consistent, do not mix denial strategies with either diminish or rebuild strategies. 13. Diminish and rebuild strategies can be used in combination with one another.

Table 2: SCCT Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection (own adaption)56

The above part has set a valuable basis for the forthcoming case study and empirical analysis of

Costa Cruises. The SCCT will be used in the case study accounting for the crisis situation regarding

the Concordia crisis, and in the empirical analysis evaluating Costa’s use of crisis response

strategies.

56 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 173




3. Case Study

This following section is set to paint the picture of Costa Cruises, involving company profile,

stakeholders and elaboration of the Costa Concordia crisis, including crisis situation and type

according to the SCCT, setting the basis for the analysis of crisis responses.

3.1 Costa Cruises – Company Profile

“The story behind Costa Cruises is at first glance a story of entrepreneurial success”57, starting out

as a small trader of fabrics and olive oil Costa now has more than sixty years of tradition in cruise

holidays58. Costa Cruises is the number one cruise company in Europe, and hold 7.2% of world

wide passengers59. In 2000 the company was acquired by Carnival Corporation, and is now one of

eleven more or less independent brands operated by Carnival, accounting for approximately 16% of

the revenue60. Today 65,000 Travel Agencies work with Costa Cruises all over the world and

research from 2010 shows that 98% of all passengers were satisfied clients61. Costa clarifies its

vision by the following statement:

Figure 2: Costa Cruises Vision Statement62

With a mission of having the guests being the best partners for future growth, Costa puts customer

service in focus, which also comes to show in the Costa Touch statement "We all make our Guests'

dreams come true"63.

3.2 Stakeholders of Costa Cruises

The stakeholders of Costa Cruises are many and the most predominant ones are depicted in figure 3.

In this paper focus will be on the external stakeholders, as they merely are the ones targeted in the

crisis responses of analysis and discussion in the following. As mentioned in section 2.2 it is

important to be aware of salient stakeholders in a crisis situation. In terms of external crisis

communication Costa Cruises’ most salient stakeholders are argued to be consumers and the media.

57 The Company history 58 About Costa 59 Market Share 60 Market Share 61 Company Profile 62 Our values 63 Our values




During a crisis consumer reactions are often highly emotional and uncertainty is dominating, thus

this is also what media focus will be on. Even though consumers might distrust both the company

and the media during a crisis64, their perceptions are easily influenced. Being an international

company as Costa Cruises, stakeholders will also differ across markets, and it is thus of utter

importance to align decision making and all communication, in order to keep responses consistent

and trustworthy65.

Figure 3: Costa Cruises stakeholder map (own adaption)

3.3 The Costa Concordia Crisis

On January 13, 2012 Costa Cruises gained international attention, when one of its cruise ships, the

Costa Concordia, ran aground and partially sank overnight off the coast of Italy66. At least 30

people died as a result of the incident, and two are still missing67, making it the largest passenger

cruise ship accident in 100 years, since the Titanic68.

64 Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 79 65 Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 25 66 Sloan (2012) 67 Bergman (2012) 68 Sloan (2012




The accident occurred due to a deviation

from the approved route, as depicted in

figure 4. Sailing that close to the shore

on shallow water caused the ship to hit

rocks and tore a large cut in the hull69.

Costa Cruises and prosecutors are

blaming the accident on the ship's

captain, Francesco Schettino, who they

say took the vessel off course70. The

Captain, on the other hand, blames the

collision on the charts claiming that they

did not show the rocks71. The period

after the wreck many news stories and

opinions circulated in the media about

the tragedy, and still do. Along with the

above accusations, failing to report the

accident to the coast guard in time, and

abandoning the ship before all passengers had been rescued72, directed much focus towards the

captain, who was arrested the day after the tragedy, “accused of manslaughter and abandoning his

ship before all those on board were evacuated”73. Schettino is now under house arrest while the

incident is being investigated74. The grounding of Costa Concordia was an event that shocked the

world. The following section will attempt to determine the crisis situation and reputational threat

and thus the crisis type according to the SCCT.

3.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and Reputational Threat

As mentioned in section 2.3.1 Coombs argue that three factors are used to evaluate and determine

the reputational threat (crisis situation) presented by a crisis and further guide the choice of crisis

response; the initial crisis responsibility, the crisis history and the prior relational reputation75.

69 Pisa (2012) 70 Sloan (2012); Sky News (2012) 71 BBC News (2012) 72 Appendix 5 73 Bozicevic (2012) 74 Pisa (2012) 75 Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 166; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 141; Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205

Figure 4: Outline of the Costa Concordia Wreck (Agar, 2012)




As noted earlier, the media will have a great power in letting other stakeholders know about the

crisis and influencing attitudes hereto, hence, “how the media frame the crisis is an important

consideration”76. The Costa Concordia crisis created much disturbance in stakeholder expectations

and could most likely have been prevented if other actions had been made, meaning that the

responsibility attributed by stakeholders is high, and the crisis is thus, according to theory, situated

in the preventable cluster pursuing strong attributions of responsibility and a severe reputational

threat77. The crisis type is argued to be a human-error accident78, as human error most likely caused

the accident. Few days after the wreck both a corporate press release and a statement from CEO

Pier Luigi Foschi reported human error, as seen in figure 5 and 6 below.

Figure 5: Statement of human error from Costa Cruises79

Figure 6: Statement of human error from Pier Luigi Foschi, CEO of Costa Cruises 80

One could also argue for the crisis type to be organizational misdeed with injuries, as stakeholders

were placed at risk and injuries occurred. However according to this crisis type the risk should be

placed by management, which is quite debatable in this situation. In both cases the company is

facing severe reputational threat, leading to a certain type of crisis response according to the SCCT.

In the days after the crisis some dialogues referred to the past safety history of the company81, and

not being the first reported accident with injuries, called Costa’s safety records into question. To

name a few, the very same Costa Concordia hit the dockside in Sicily in 2008, causing damage to

76 Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 173 77 Section 2.3.1; Appendix 3; Section 2.2 78 Appendix 3 79 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 80 Foschi: Press (2012) [2:29-2:38] 81 Foxnews.com (2012)




the port82, and more seriously, in 2010 Costa Europa crashed during docking killing three crew

members and injuring four passengers83. Incidents like these and Costs’ handling hereof will have

great influence on the attribution of responsibility in the recent Concordia crisis. Nevertheless

Costa’s positioning as the number one cruise company in Europe84 with 98% satisfied passengers85,

provides the company with a positive prior relational reputation, and will of course benefit the

company during the crisis and in the attempt to restore reputational assets86.

82 Paloti (2009); Derbyshire (2012) 83 SilverStein (2010); Bryant (2010) 84 Section 3.1 85 Section 3.1 86 Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123-124; Section 2.2




4. Empirical Analysis

Based on the crisis situation accounted for above the Concordia crisis is placed in the preventable

cluster with an existing crisis history and favorable prior reputations. Thus the situation suggests

strong attributions of crisis responsibility and possesses a severe reputational threat87. In such

instances the SCCT recommends the accommodative response strategy of rebuild, as compensation

or full apology would work to improve corporate reputation88. The following section will examine

and discuss the crisis responses used by Costa to see if they are in agreement with the SCCT

recommendations and attempt to determine the overall success of the post-crisis management.

4.1 Costa Cruise’s Crisis Responses

After the Costa Concordia wreck on January 13th Costa has engaged in different responses in order

to keep stakeholders informed and hopefully retain reputational assets.

Figure 7: Crisis Response Timeline (own adaption)89

87 Section 2.3.1; Section 3.3.1; Appendix 3 88 Section 2.3.2 89 Appendix 6, 7 & 8; Costa Concordia – Update; Costa Cruises on Twitter; Costa Cruises on Facebook




From a corporate perspective several statements were made public on the corporate websites, and

some also published as press releases90. From a more consumer perspective Costa also used the

power of social media, including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, to communicate updates and

company statements. These responses are illustrated and discussed in appendix 6, 7 and 8. The

above figure 7 illustrates the timeline of the different crisis responses.

Figure 8: Extract from first statement from Costa Cruises91

Figure 9: Tweet from Costa Cruises’ Twitter account92

The first response was a confirmation of the evacuation of Concordia, published around 4 hours

after the wreck as a corporate statement on the website and on twitter as seen in the above two

figures93. Shortly after expressions of condolences and concern was stated on the website and on

Facebook as seen in the below figure 10 and 1194. With consumers as salient stakeholders, it is

argued to be valuable to include social media in the first responses.

Figure 10: Extract from second statement from Costa Cruises95

90 Press 91 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 92 Costa Concordia on Twitter; Appendix 7 93 Appendix 6 & 7; Costa Cruises on Twitter; Costa Concordia - Update 94 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 & 8; Costa Cruises on Facebook 95 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6




Figure 11: First post on Costa Cruises’ Facebook page96

Until this point no real response strategy had been used. Costa only did what Coombs call

instructing and adjusting information to help stakeholders cope with concerns97, as the

communication was solely informative and at the same time somewhat indefinite, as not much was

known yet. In fact Costa waited more than 14 hours before providing a contact number for

assistance to friends and families98. In a time where the media is very much global and news travel

across the world in no time, it is of utter importance to initiate immediate communication with

stakeholders involved99. So despite the little knowledge, Costa’s timing was unacceptable and

indicates little or no crisis preparation100.

During this first period Costa received several comments and condolences especially on Twitter as

seen in appendix 7, to which Costa also responded contributing to the key element of stakeholder

interaction101. In these first communications Costa supported the captain in stating that “[…] still

preliminary the ship Costa Concordia under the command of the Master Francesco Schettino was

regularly sailing […]”102. However only the day after, assessments changed and indications were

now “that there may have been significant human error on the part of the ship’s Master […]”103.

Alongside reassuring that “[a]s all Costa Masters, he has been constantly trained passing all

tests”104, this statement is argued to be an attempt to minimize corporate responsibility via

96 Costa Concordia on Twitter; Appendix 8 (facebook) 97 Section 2.2; Sturges (1994) p. 308; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165 98 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 99 Section 2.2 100 Section 2.1; Appendix 1 101 Section 2.2 102 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 103 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 104 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6




justification, using the diminish response strategy105. Further this could even be argued to be an

attempt to shift blame and make the captain the scapegoat, hence touching upon denial strategy106.

In the end of this same statement background information of Costa’s commitment to safety was

further included, as seen below. This was a reminder of the company’s high obligation to and

standards of safety and personnel training, thus a use of the bolstering posture to retain

reputation107.

Figure 12: Extract from statement: Background of Costa’s commitment to safety108

The following days’ responses were merely online and through the media coverage of Costa’s press

conference on January 16 with Chairman and CEO Pier Luigi Foschi, sharing company condolences

and addressing key issues regarding the incident. In this press conference similar response strategies

as above were used109. Watching the video, it is clear that English is not the CEO’s first language110,

which affects the impression of concern and engagement required in such a situation, nevertheless it

was an in-person public statement, which until this had not been part of the responses. But it might

have come too late for the company to retain control, because at this time the world media had

already created their own perceptions and rumors were already fluctuating. The CEO was aware of

this and tried to justify his absence with the reason of being abroad “and therefore did not have a

direct and immediate knowledge of the facts occurred”111. One could argue that someone else

should then have been appointed the role of spokesperson, to make sure that stakeholders got this

in-person information earlier and also to have a spokesperson with more media training and

international plea112. However, this is another discussion which will not be taken in this paper.

105 Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140 106 Section 2.3.2; Appendix 4 107 Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 172; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-141 108 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 109 Foschi: Press (2012) 110 Foschi: Press (2012) 111 Foschi: Senate (2012) [3:19-3:28] 112 Coombs (2007) p. 128;168-169




One rumor fluctuating in the media was that Concordia victims were offered 30 percent discount on

their next cruise, being highly criticized as a tasteless compensation to victims still recovering, as

seen in the below articles.

Figure 13: Article from Lovell Communications; PR, crisis comm. and marketing comm. agency113

Figure 14: Article from news media CP World114

Figure 15: Costa Cruises’ rejection of discount rumors115

Also seen above these accusations were rejected by Costa in statements shortly after. Not until

January 27th the company itself addressed the issue of compensation and announced a compensation

package for Concordia victims and future cruise guests. Being a part of the rebuilding strategy,

compensation was an appropriate strategy to choose116, however at this point stakeholders had

already had the time to develop another opinion of the company’s response, mainly based on

113 Coleman (2012) 114 Funaro (2012) 115 Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 116 Section 2.3.2




groundless assertions in the media, thus the reputational rebuild should have been announced

immediately after the claims, to have the full effect.

After the worst media storm had abated, Costa’s communication also became less frequent and

merely focused on information about the removal of Costa Concordia, and promise of corrective

actions. Also in the social media channels things were slowly returning back to normal, as the

Facebook post by Costa below illustrate. This also shows how Costa listens to and involves

stakeholders, which is further elaborated on in Appendix 8. This integration of stakeholders is also a

part of the bolstering strategy117.

Figure 16: Costa Cruises statement on Facebook acknowledging stakeholder requests118.

4.2 Connecting and Reflecting upon the Findings

Due to strong attributions of crisis responsibility, Costa should, as earlier established119, use rebuild

response strategies “generating new reputational assets through compensation or apologies”120.

Despite the theoretical suggestion, Costa’s first reaction to the crisis was not to apologize, but rather

to minimize responsibility by use of the diminish posture of justification and excuse. In fact the

company never provided a full apology. Even though compensation was given, initiating a rebuild

response, the company’s main strategy was to make the captain the scapegoat, thus Costa displayed

itself as a victim of the captain’s mistakes and denied responsibility. Costa further tried to bolster

the corporate image by reminding stakeholders of its high obligation to safety, and integrating

stakeholders via social media.

In the first statements from Costa one can tick off some of the key elements in crisis

communication; concern for stakeholders and actions addressing the situation, but the overt attempt

117 Section 2.3.2 118 Costa Cruises on Facebook; Appendix 8 119 Section 2.3.2; 3.3.1 120 Section 2.3.2




to blame the captain could be a very risky strategy, as “it creates the impression of a business

willing to jump to conclusions before all the facts are known, rather than keeping a cool head”121.

Theory further argues that at this early stage Costa’s focus should be on the human impact and not

protecting commercial interests122. Shifting the blame and thus touching upon denial strategy123

might not be appropriate in a situation where the crisis possibly could have been prevented by the

company124, as the CEO also stated himself “this is a tragic accident which shouldn’t have occurred

and could have been avoided”125. So, even if the accusation of the captain holds true, corporate

changes will have to be made in order to fully retain reputation, as these changes will further impact

stakeholders due to the ripple effect126. As stated by Ian Mitroff, crisis management expert, “it’s

easy to put the finger on just one bad apple but you still have to ask, ‘what about the whole

system?’”127. Further Costa could stand in front of severe reputational damage if investigations later

conclude that the captain was not to blame128.

Reputational threat of crisis situation

Costa Cruises' responses SCCT recommendations

Costa Concordia wreck January '12

Strong attributions of crisis responsibility = severe reputational threat

Diminish crisis response strategy: Rebuild crisis response strategy: Justification Compensation

Excuse Apology

Denial crisis response strategy: Bolstering crisis response strategy: Scapegoat Reminder

Bolstering crisis response strategy: Integration Reminder Integration Rebuild crisis response strategy: Compensation

Table 3: Reputational threat, Costa Cruises’ responses & SCCT Recommendations summarized129.

Reviewing the summarization in table 3, Costa made use of various response strategies in its crisis

communication. The use of the rebuild strategy of compensation and the secondary bolstering

121 Hemus (2012) 122 Section 2.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165 123 Section 2.3.2; Appendix 4 124 Section 3.3.1 125 Foschi: Senate (2012) [3:07-3:14] 126 Lewis (2011) p. 8-9 127 Booton (2012) 128 Section 2.2 129 Summarized from above sections




strategies reminder and ingratiation are coherent with the SCCT recommendations130. However

neither the deny nor the diminish strategy match these recommendations, thus Costa’s overall crisis

response did not follow prescriptions. While the crisis situation classified the crisis as a severe

reputational threat, Costa mainly responded with strategies suitable for victim crises and accident

crises131. Also mixing the denial with diminish and rebuild strategies will, according to the SCCT,

create critical inconsistency132, and thus erode the effectiveness of the overall response133.

Particularly also in Costa’s case, being an international company with stakeholders across many

markets, it is of utter importance to align responses134. Nevertheless one could argue that the

complexity of crises, not being static, changing with society occurrences135, might create a need for

corporate preparedness to change response if necessary during the crisis period to protect

reputation136. Thus the SCCT’s incorporation of guidelines recommending consistency in crisis

response could be understood in different ways, and Costa might not have been as inconsistent as

first stated.

Also the lack of apology could be discussed, as one could argue that Costa gave a partial apology

through the use of regret and concern, possibly with the reasoning that it would not hold the same

liabilities. Even though full apology would have had a greater effect on the reputational rebuild,

accepting responsibility could also put Costa in a worse off position in potential lawsuits related to

the crisis137, and it might in the long run benefit Costa and its corporate image not to use full

apology. Further, by not explicitly apologizing, Costa was able to focus discussion on corrective

actions, which is further included in the normative guidelines of instructing and adjusting

information138, and would address the priority of protecting stakeholders from harm139. At the same

time this is aligned with consumer focus in Costa’s vision and mission140, but it does not change the

fact that Costa has damaged reputational credibility when creating a gap between the mission/vision

130 Section 2.3.2 131 Section 2.3.1; Appendix 3 132 Section 2.3.2; Figure x 133 Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) 173 134 Section 3.2 135 Section 1 & 1.2 136 Heath & Coombs (2006) p. 206; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 173 137 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 141 138 Section 2.3.2; Heath & Coombs (2006) p. 206; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143 139 Section 2.2 140 Section 3.1; Our values




expectations and actual performance141. This leads on to the following section determining the

reputational effect of Costa’s responses.

4.3 Effect on Corporate Reputation

According to theory, Costa Cruises should have suffered severe reputational damage. Several media

have too proclaimed that Costa might not survive, and that travelers would abandon the idea of

cruising142. However, none of this has yet occurred, as agents are largely reporting that cruise sales

are business as usual143. As stated by Peter Anker Jensen, CEO of the Danish travel agency Fri

Ferie, “I have heard comments like ‘now it must surely be the world's safest cruise line’ - and

people forget quickly”144. Peter further stated that despite the tragedy, prices is still what matters

most, “we did not sell many cruise holidays before the accident. It's scary but true, Costa sat down

prices - and then we sold very well!”145. As depicted below, Fri Ferie is now promoting great cruise

offers on their website. Thus indications show that the old notion of ‘bad press is better than no

press’ might be true in the long run.

Figure 17: Great offers for Costa Cruises on Fri Ferie’s website146

The above is further supported by statements from consumers. One even wrote an article on how

the media buzz had opened his eyes for cruise holidays, and not just any cruise – a Costa cruise, 141 Section 2.2 142 Walker (2012); MacMillan (2012) 143 Turen (2012); Appendix 9 144 Appendix 9 145 Appendix 9 146 Fri Ferie Cruise




stating that he “guessed that there's probably no safer time to travel on Costa than right now”147.

This article was also highlighted by Costa in the tweet below.

Figure 18: Costa bolstering tweet by Costa Cruises reminding of positive views148.

Also the stocks of parent company Carnival Cruises149 did not suffer as much as one might have

feared. Naturally they initially did go down, as illustrated in the figure below the stocks made a

steep drop on the opening bell on January 17150. This was only anticipated in the situation of crisis,

however, it is notable that already on the first day of trading the stock was starting to balance out,

and at the end of the third day of trading the stock was slowly ascending again.

Figure 19: Carnival Cruises at NY Stock Exchange the days after the crisis151

Using a monitoring tool to check the social mentions of Costa Cruises, one can assess the sentiment

of the company, being “the ratio of positive conversations happening online verses the amount of

negative”152. From the time around the crisis and till now, the sentiment has, as seen in the figure 20

below, gone from having one negative conversation for every one positive, to now having only one

for every eleven positive conversation. Further the strength shows that the media buzz around

company have abated, and the likelihood of Costa being discussed in social media has gone from 25

147 Serminara (2012) 148 Costa Cruises on Twitter 149 Which as well indicate the situation of Costa Cruises 150 Which was the first day of trading after the wreck, as Monday was a holiday (NYSE trading hours) 151 NYSE Carnival Corporation 152 Hayes (2012); SocialMention FAQ




to 3 percent. This support the statement above that people might quickly forget, and indicate that

Costa might not suffer as much from the crisis as first assumed.

Figure 20: Social Mentions about Costa Cruises153

So, even though Costa acted somewhat contrary to what the SCCT recommends in similar crises,

and was criticized in the media, consumer interaction and investor affairs imply that the cruise

operator will make it through the crisis. Naturally, there are limitations on the ability to explain the

exact influences of the crisis on Costa’s reputation, and the included data might say more about the

image than the long term reputation. However, the Costa image appears to be in the process of

repair as the attitude among salient stakeholders seems to be turning. Further Costa is launching

new initiatives and a new flagship liner, hoping to rebuild reputation154. This puts forth Benoit’s

view on crisis management in taking restorative actions to cope with the image threat155. Though it

is argued to be image repair and not restoration, as the image not necessarily is restored back to its

former stage, but rather repaired to a new stage for future endurance. Whether or not these actions

will result in the full repair of consumer confidence is yet to be seen, as the holiday season unfold,

and thus beyond the scope of this paper.

Concluding one could argue for crisis preparation to be of utter importance, by being better

prepared for a crisis situation, Costa would have been able to respond much faster and more

specific156. When being the center of tragedy, one must be ahead of the PR battle on every front. A

great part of PR is reputation management, which includes continuous monitoring (social) media

153 Hayes (2012); SocialMention – Costa Cruises 154 Sinha (2012) 155 Appendix 4 156 Section 2.1; Appendix 1




activity for any possible dissatisfied consumer157, as it will change along individual and social

interactions158. In time this monitoring could prevent an episode as the Concordia wreck from

developing into an image damaging incident. As stated earlier effective crisis management is

“where operations are sustained or resumed, […] stakeholder losses are minimized, and learning

occurs so that lessons are transferred to future incidents”159, making the revision factor of crisis

management important as well, learning from the crisis and using this for both the prevention of and

preparation for future crises160.

157 Baldelomar (2012) 158 Section 1.2 159Section 2.1; Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 60-61 160 Appendix 1




5. Conclusion

The paper has been built on an interest in post-crisis management theory, and its relation to the

reality of crisis management by corporations such as Costa Cruises. Based on an understanding of

the concept, a situational perspective was taken through the clarification of Coombs’ Situational

Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). With the aim of testing the normative crisis response

guidelines hereof, a case analysis of Costa’s crisis responses has been carried out. Through the

analysis it was found that Costa did not follow theoretical recommendations, as the company used a

combination of strategies from all the different crisis response postures in no specific or thought

through order. However despite Costa’s mismatch responses, certain measures indicate that Costa

might not suffer as much damage to its corporate reputation as first assumed.

Mixing different strategies and taking the position as a victim of the captain’s mistakes, Costa

places itself in the same situation as most stakeholders, creating sympathy and minimizing

responsibility. In its own form Costa engaged in situational crisis responses when choosing its

responses according to the context and media coverage at hand, and the threat that followed.

Whether or not this was intentional and a planned strategy or merely just a lucky strike for a

company that was not at all prepared for a crisis, one can only guess. Nevertheless, it can be argued

that theoretical recommendations might not be essential in all types of crisis situations. Again had

the SCCT prescriptions been followed, Costa would most likely not have been target for the many

critiques and negative discussions, and would thus be in a better reputational position going through

the crisis. In conclusion, the paper has provided a basis for the discussion of whether or not

theoretical guidelines always should be followed and questions remain of how the reputational

situation of Costa would have been, had the company followed the SCCT prescriptions.




6. List of References 6.1 Books

§ Anthonissen, Peter F. Crisis Communication – practical PR strategies for reputation

management and company survival. Kogan Page: London, 2008.

§ Barton, Laurence. Crisis in Orgnaizations II. South-Western: Ohio, 2001.

§ Benoit, William L. Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies. State University of New York Press, 1995.

§ Benoit, William L. 2004. Image restoration discourse and crisis communication. In Responding to crisis: a rhetorical approach to crisis communication, edited by Millar, D. P. and Heath, R. L.. Mahwah, NJ, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

§ Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Doubleday & Co, 1966.

§ Coombs, W. Timothy. Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA, 2007.

§ Coombs, W. Timothy & Sherry J. Holladay. The Handbook of Crisis Communication.

Wiley-Blackwell: Oxford, 2012.

§ Grunig, James E., and Todd T. Hunt. Managing Public Relations. New York: CBS College Publishing, 1984.

§ Heath, Robert L. Handbook of Public Relations. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001.

§ Heath, Robert L. & Timothy W. Coombs. Today’s Public Relations: An Introduction. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA, 2006.

§ Hibberd, Fiona J. Unfolding Sosial constructionism. Springer, 2005.

§ Lewis, Laurie K. Organizational Change: Creating Change Through Strategic Communication. Wiley-Blackwell: West Sussex, 2011

§ Morsing, Mette, and Suzanne C. Beckmann. Strategic CSR Communication. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2006.




§ Seymour, Mike & Simon Moore. Effective Crisis Management: Worldwide Principles and Practice. Cassell: London & New York, 2000.

§ Tench, Ralph & Liz Yeomans. Exploring Public Relations. Pearson Educated: Harlow, 2009.

§ Ulmer, Robert R. Effective Crisis Communication: Moving From Crisis to Opportunity. Sage Publications: California, 2007.

§ Weiner, Bernard. An Attributional Theory of Motivation and Emotion. Springer-Verlag: New York, 1986

6.2 Articles in Journals

§ Allen, M. W., & Caillout, R. H. “Legitimation endeavors: Impression management strategies used by an organization in crisis”. Communication Monographs 61 (1994): 44-62.

§ Cooley, Skye Chance & Asya Besova Cooley. “An examination of the situational crisis communication theory through the general motors bankruptcy”. Journal of Media and Communication Studies 3.6 (2011): 203-211.

§ Coombs, W. Timothy. “Attribution Theory as a guide for post-crisis communication research”. Public Relations Review 33 (2007): 135-139.

§ Coombs, W. Timothy. “Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The Development and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory”. Corporate Reputations Review 10.3 (2007): 163-176.

§ Coombs, W. Timothy & Sherry J. Holladay. "Unpacking the halo effect: reputation and

crisis management". Journal of Communication Management 10.2 (2006): 123 – 137.

§ Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah E. Shannon. “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis.” Qualitative Health Research. 15.9 (2005): 1277-1288.

§ Morsing, Mette and Majken Schultz. “Corporate social responsibility communication: stakeholder information, response and involvement strategies.” Business Ethics: A European Review. 15.4 (2006): 323-338

§ Seeger, Matthew W., Robert R. Ulmer, Julie M. Novak & Timothy Sellnow. “Post-crisis discourse and organizational change, failure and renewal” Journal of Organizational Change Management. 18.1 (2005): 78-95.




§ Sturges, David L. 1994. “Communicating through crisis: A Strategy for Organizational Survival”. Management Communication Quarterly 7.3 (1994): 297-316.

§ Pearson, Christine M. and Judith A. Clair. “Reframing Crisis Management” Academy of management review 23.1 (1998): 39-78

6.3 Online Articles

§ Agar, Michael. “Concordia: How the disaster unfold”. The Telegraph. 16 Jan. 2012. 22 Apr. 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/interactive-graphics/9018076/Concordia-How-the-disaster-unfolded.html>

§ Baldelomar, Raquel. “Costa Concordia and Brand Reputation Management”. 24 Jan. 2012. Quaintise. 15 May 2012. <http://blog.quaintise.com/costa-concordia-and-brand-reputation-management/>

§ BBC News. “Costa Concordia cruise ship captain ‘went off course’”. BBC News. 16 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16576979>

§ Bergman, Jamey. ”Concordia Update: Five Bodies Removed from Wreckage Identified”. Cruise Critic. 17 Apr. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?ID=4710#>

§ Booton, Jennifer. “Carnival Fails Crisis 101 in Costa Response”. Fox Business. 27 Jan. 2012. 07 May 2012. <http://www.foxbusiness.com/travel/2012/01/26/experts-say-carnival-should-have-learned-from-wendys-fedex-post-crisis/#ixzz1sOHF8UXr>

§ Bozicevic, Zoran. ”Striking photos as sinking cruise ship Costa Concordia lies in shallow waters”. National Post. 16 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/16/striking-photographs-of-tragedy-in-shallow-waters-as-the-costa-concordia-sinks/>

§ Bryant, Sue. ” Costa Europa Hits Pier In Egypt; Three Dead, Four Injured”. Cruise Critic. 27 Feb. 2010. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?ID=3710>

§ Coleman, Dana. “Costa to Concordia Passengers: “Ya’ll Come Back Now, You Hear!””. Lovell Communications Inc. 24 Jan. 2012. 02 May 2012. <http://lovell.com/crisis-communications/costa-concordia-passengers-%E2%80%9Cya%E2%80%99ll-now-hear%E2%80%9D/>




§ Cruise Market Watch ~ 22nd January 2012. “Costa Concordia Impact to Cruise Prices and Bookings“. Cruise Market Watch. 22 Jan. 2012. 14 May 2012. <http://www.cruisemarketwatch.com/articles/costa-concordia-impact-to-cruise-prices-and-bookings/>

§ Derbyshire, David. ”So what DID cause the Costa Concordia to hit the rocks? Human error,

electrical failure and uncharted ridge are all theories”. Daily Mail Online. 16 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2087133/Costa-Concordia-accident-So-DID-cause-cruise-ship-hit-rocks.html#ixzz1shvbwVRR>

§ Evans, Rebecca, Harris, Paul & Nick Pisa. “Captain Coward: 'I only left because I FELL

into lifeboat when ship listed suddenly as I was trying to help'”. Daily Mail Online. 19 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012.<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2087704/Costa-Concordia-Captain-Francesco-Schettino-I-left-I-FELL-lifeboat.html#ixzz1sgJgpzfk>

§ Foxnews.com. “Website reviews show slew of past safety concerns raised by Costa Concordia passengers”. Fox News. 17 Jan. 2012. 22 Apr. 2012. <http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2012/01/17/website-reviews-show-slew-past-safety-concerns-raised-by-costa-concordia/#ixzz1snkAdVgd>

§ Funaro, Vincent. “Costa Concordia Survivors 'Insulted' by 30 Percent Cruise Discount Offer”. CP World. 24 Jan. 2012. 9 May 2012. <http://www.christianpost.com/news/costa-concordia-discount-insult-survivors-offered-30-percent-off-next-cruise-67838/>

§ Hayes, Kevin. “Mom was right: It’s important people like you!” Kevin Hayes: Digital Communications & Social Media Consultant. 13 May 2012. <http://www.kevinhayes.ca/blog/mom-was-right-its-important-people-like-you/#comment-3126>

§ Hemus, Jonathan. “Costa Cruise’s blame game is dangerous crisis communication strategy”.

Insignia Talks. 16 Jan. 2012. 02 May 2012. <http://insigniatalks.com/2012/01/costa-cruises-blame-game-is-dangerous-crisis-communication-strategy/>

§ MacMillan, Davis. “Can a Name Change Save Costa Cruises?” The Daily Feed. 1 Mar. 2012. 13 May 2012. <http://www.minyanville.com/dailyfeed/2012/03/01/can-a-name-change-save/>

§ Paloti, Melissa Baldwin ”Fire Onboard Costa Romantica Impacts Cruise, Cancels Another”. Cruise Critic. 27 Feb. 2009. 22 Apr. 2012. <http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?ID=3086>




§ Pisa, Nick ”Huge Operation To Refloat Costa Concordia”. Sky News. 2 Apr. 2012. 21. Apr. 2012. <http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16200962>

§ Serminara, Dave. “Sailing with Costa, Post-Concordia: A Review of Costa’s Neo Romantica”. Gadling. 15 May 2012. 16 May 2012. <http://www.gadling.com/2012/05/15/sailing-with-costa-post-concordia-a-review-of-costas-neo-roma/>

§ Silverstein, Erica. “Update: Costa Cancels Final Europa Cruises in Wake of Tragic Dock Accident”. Cruise Critic. 5 Mar. 2010. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?id=3721>

§ Sinha, Sanskrity. Costa Hopes to Rebuild Reputation with New Cruise Ship after Deadly Concordia Disaster. International Business Times. 7 May 2012. 14 May 2012. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/338012/20120507/costa-concordia-tragedy-cruises-new-ship-fascinosa.htm>

§ Sloan, Gene. ”Italy cruise ship disaster could take toll on industry”. USA Today. 17 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/travel/story/2012-01-17/Cruise-disaster-could-take-toll-on-industry/52622068/1>

§ Sky News “Ship Was “Too Close To Shore””. Sky News. 6 Feb. 2012. 21. Apr. 2012. <http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16149523>

§ Squires, Nick. ”Cruise disaster: company say errors made by ship's captain may have caused crash”. The Telegraph. 16 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9017326/Cruise-disaster-company-say-errors-made-by-ships-captain-may-have-caused-crash.html>

§ Turen, Richard. ”Media bullies and the Concordia”. Travel Weekly. 12 Apr. 2012. 5 May

2012. <http://www.travelweekly.com/Richard-Turen/Media-bullies-and-the-Concordia/>

§ Walker, Jim. “Will the Costa Cruise Brand Survive?” Cruise Law News. 19 Feb. 2012. 13 May 2012. <http://www.cruiselawnews.com/2012/02/articles/social-media-1/will-the-costa-cruise-brand-survive/>

6.4 Other Online Sources:

§ Carnival, press room. 2012. Carnival Cruises. 05 May 2012. <http://carnival-news.com/press-room/>




§ Market Share: 2012 World Wide Market Share. 2012. Cruise Market Watch. 20 Apr. 2012. <http://www.cruisemarketwatch.com/market-share/>

§ Costa Cruises on Twitter. 2012. Twitter.com. 30 Apr. 2012.

<https://twitter.com/#!/costacruises>

§ Costa Cruises on Facebook. 2012. Facebook.com. 30 Apr. 2012. <http://www.facebook.com/costacruises.na>

§ Fri Ferie Cruise. 2012. Danskfriferie.dk. 14 May 2012.

<http://www.danskfriferie.dk/cruise>

§ NYSE Carnival Corporation. 2012. New York Stock Exchange. 14 May 2012. <http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lcddata.html?ticker=ccl&fq=D&ezd=1Y&index=5>

§ NYSE trading hours. 2012. New York Stock Exchange. 14 May 2012. <http://www.nyx.com/holidays-and-hours/nyse>

§ SocialMention FAQ. 2012. SocialMention.com. 13 May. 2012. <http://socialmention.com/faq>

§ SocialMention – Costa Cruises. 2012. SocialMention.com. 13 May 2012.

<http://www.socialmention.com/search?q=costa+cruises&t=all&btnG=Search> 6.5 Costacruises.com/co.uk Sources:

§ About Costa. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012. <http://www.costacruises.co.uk/B2C/GB/Corporate/The+company/thecompany.htm>

§ Company Profile. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012. <http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Corporate/The+company/aboutourselves/aboutourselves.htm>

§ Costa Concordia – update. 2012. Costa Cruises. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.costacruises.co.uk/B2C/GB/Info/concordia_statement.htm>

§ Our values. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012. <http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Corporate/The+company/aboutourselves/ourvalues/ourvalues.htm>

§ Press. 2012. Costa Cruises. 30 Apr. 2012. <http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Press/default.htm>




§ The Company history. Costa Cruises. 19 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.costacruises.co.uk/contents/corporate/STORIA_COMPLETA_UK_EU.pdf> 6.6 Online Videos

§ Foschi, Pier Luigi. Press Conference Costa Concordia - Introduction Speech. 16 Jan. 2012.

Costa Cruises on YouTube. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNqAq2bHtFc>

§ Foschi, Pier Luigi. Senate of the Italian Republic - VIII Permanent Commission for Public

Works - Senate of the Italian Republic - Hearing of Wednesday 25th January, 2012. 25 Jan. 2012. Costa Cruises on YouTube. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=1yvWGFcI4Sg#!>

6.7 Other Sources

§ Grarup, Tine. Gaining Sustainable Competitive Advantages through CSR Engagement and Communication. Corporate Communication 1st semester exam 2011/2012 at Master of Arts in Corporate Communication




7.1 Appendix 1: Crisis Management Factors

Coombs divide crisis management into four interrelated factors arguing that “crisis management is a

process of preventing, preparing for, responding, and revising from crises”161. The two factors of

prevention and preparation both are part of the precrisis stage involving actions before a crisis in

come across. The factors of response and revision belong to the postcrisis stage being key activities

that must take place after the crisis. For the postcrisis stage to begin the crisis need to be recognized

including information of how the incident is understood and accepted as crisis.

Prevention represents what management and the organization in general should do in order to

avoid crises. This involves detecting different warning signs and taking actions accordingly to

prevent a possible crisis situation. The news media rarely uncover crisis that did not happen.162

Preparation is the best way to avoid problems related to crisis situations that cannot be prevented,

such as harming stakeholders, damaging reputation, losing market share etc. Preparation involves

making a crisis management plan (CMP) that should help the organization select and train

spokespersons and public employees, it should help diagnose vulnerabilities and on this basis build

and improve a crisis communication system.163

Response in a crisis situation is vital for the subsequent survival of the organization/brand. Here the

components from the preparation factor above should be applied to the actual crisis situation. The

better the preparation the better outcome, as organization’s crisis response often is discussed and

critiqued in the media. Communication with stakeholders through words and action is a essential

part of this crisis management response phase.164 An element of the response is further recovery,

being “the organization’s attempt to return to normal operations”165.

Revision is all about evaluating crisis management and learning from the crisis. Ideally the

organization will learn from mistakes and be able to prepare more appropriate actions. Other

161 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 6 162 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 5 163 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 5 164 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 6 165 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 6




postcrisis actions further include follow up communication with stakeholders and continuous

corrective actions.166

As Coombs argue it is all linked in a spiral “[i]f prevention fails, preparation is required for optimal

performance. Revision is derived from performance and informs both the prevention of and

preparation for future crises. In turn, improving preparation should improve response”167. It is thus

important to remember that crisis management is an ongoing process that must be an integrated part

of the regular operations of an organization.

166 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 6 167 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 6




7.2 Appendix 2: Instructing and Adjusting Information in Crisis Response

According to Coombs and the SCCT research the first priority in a crisis is to protect stakeholders

from harm, which involves addressing the ethical responsibility of helping stakeholders to cope

with both the physical (instructing information) and psychological (adjusting information) concerns,

before focus is turned to reputation management168.

The notion of instructing information is to provide stakeholders with information about what they

can do to protect themselves from harm and threat put forth in the crisis situation169. Examples of

instructing information would be telling stakeholders how to evacuate an area, not to buy faulty

goods, how to return the goods if they have already bought it, how to get help and/or assistance and

so forth. “Instructing information can be delivered directly to stakeholders (eg, sirens) or through

the news media (e.g. recall alerts)”170. By instructing information stakeholders receive the

information needed to protect themselves and at the same time give the perception of an

organization in control.

Adjusting information is responses that help stakeholders cope with the psychological concerns in a

crisis situation where uncertainty most likely will be the dominating emotion. Adjusting

information is all about telling stakeholders what happened and what is going on.171 The uncertainty

among stakeholders can be decreased by communicating what corrective actions the organization

has initiated in order to prevent a similar crisis in the future, which will further reassure

stakeholders that they are the first priority. However, corrective actions demands sound knowledge

about the situation for it not to be just speculation, meaning that such information often will take a

long time to develop, losing some of its usefulness in situations where information is needed

straight away172.

168 Sturges (1994) p. 308; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165 169 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 133-134 170 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165 171 Coombs: Ongoing(2007) p. 135 172 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 136




7.3 Appendix 3: Coombs’ Three Crisis Clusters

Identifying the crisis type or placing an event in a crisis cluster is the initial step in assessing crisis

responsibility. SCCT research has identified three crisis clusters based upon attributions of crisis

responsibility by crisis type173, meaning that the amount of responsibility that stakeholders attribute

to the organization determines the crisis cluster and specific crisis type. The three clusters are the

victim, accidental and preventable cluster – see table 4 below.

Table 4: Crisis types by clusters174

Crises in the victim cluster have very weak attributions of crisis responsibility and the organization

is merely seen as a victim of the crisis, hence the reputational threat is mild175. Within this crisis

cluster the types of crises are natural disasters, rumor, workplace violence, and product tampering.

The accidental cluster has minimal attributions of crisis responsibility as the event is considered

173 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 168 174 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 168 175 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167




unintentional, thus the reputational threat will be moderate176. The cluster includes challenges,

technical- error accident and technical-error product harm. The crises within the preventable

cluster are crises that could have been prevented if other decisions had been made177. Here the

organization is looking at a big reputational threat. These “intentional” crises involve human-error

accident, human-error product harm and organizational misdeed.

It is important to note that severity and performance history factors have a great influence on the

crisis responsibility adjustment process, as this could change the crisis cluster178. As argued by

Coombs & Holladay; “repeated or severe technical breakdown accidents should perhaps be treated

more like the preventable cluster than the accident cluster”179. The crisis clusters are developed in

order to simplify the choice of crisis response strategies. Seeing that the crises types within each

cluster will generate similar attributions of responsibility, thus one can use similar response

strategies to address all crises types within the same cluster.

176 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167 177 Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167 178 Coombs & Holladay (2012) p. 180 179 Coombs & Holladay (2012) p. 180




7.4 Appendix 4: Image Restoration Strategies by Benoit

Professor William L. Benoit has introduced a theory of image restoration strategies based on

apologia. He believes that image is essential to any organization especially when responding to

attacks, instigating a crisis180. According to Benoit an attack that instigates a corporate crisis, has

two critical components - (1) the accused is held responsible for an act; (2) the act is portrayed as

offensive - and image restoration strategies are organized accordingly181. It is important to note that

stakeholder perceptions are more important than reality and “the greater the (perceived)

offensiveness of the act and, perhaps, the greater the (apparent) responsibility of the accused for that

act, the greater the damage to the image”182. Benoit has set up five strategies for addressing issues

of responsibility and reducing the act's perceived offensiveness, which are shown in table 5 below.

Table 5: Image Restoration Strategies183

180 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 263 181 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 264 182 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 264-265 183 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 266




Denial is, as the word prescribes, response by simply denying the offensive act and rejecting

responsibility, or by shifting blame184, much similar to Coombs’ posture of same name185. Evasion

of responsibility is the attempt to reduce responsibility of the offensive act through one of four

following grounds; reasonable reaction to provocation, alleging lack of information or control,

claim action occurred by accident, or good intentions186. Similar to Coombs’ excusing in the

diminish posture187. Reducing offensiveness of the event is a general image repair strategy with the

six versions of bolstering to strengthen positive stakeholder attitudes, differentiation to seem less

offensive, transcendence to place the act in a more positive context, minimization of negative

feelings associated, attacking one’s accuser to damage credibility of the source, and compensation

to soften negative views188. All forms comparable to Coombs’ diminish, rebuild, and bolstering

strategies189. Corrective actions play down the negative effects by willingness to correct actions

and/or prevent recurrence190. Mortification is admitting responsibility and asking forgiveness191,

and parallel to Coombs’ rebuild in form of apology192.

Often it can be difficult to separate the individual strategies from each other, seeing that one

expression can serve as or be interpreted as several strategies, which Benoit also points out.

Moreover he stresses that it is possible and appropriate to combine the strategies193.

Benoit further include suggestions for effective crisis communication within an image repair

discourse, stating the importance of identification and understanding of the crisis and relevant

audiences, in order to modify the messages as a key part of persuasion194. When restoring the image

Benoit suggests that an organization should admit responsibility immediately if they are at fault, in

order to avoid litigation.

184 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 265-266 185 Section 2.3.2 186 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 266-267 187 Section 2.3.2 188 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 267-269 189 Section 2.3.2 190 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 269 191 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 269 192 Section 2.3.2 193 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 279 194 Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 273-274




7.5 Appendix 5: Captain Francesco Schettino’s Conversation with the Italian Coastguard

The below figure 20 depict a full transcript between Italian coastguard and Captain Francesco

Schettino on the night of the wreck. The transcript show the cruise captain as a coward, and support

accusations of failing to report the accident to the coast guard in time, and abandoning the ship

before all passengers had been rescued.

Figure 21: Captain Francesco Schettino’s conversation with the Italian coastguard195

195 Evans et. al. (2012)




7.6 Appendix 6: Costa Concordia Crisis Update

Below is the list of corporate statements made by Costa Cruises regarding the Costa Concordia

crisis. It is a direct copy from the corporate website, which is listen in the list of references as Costa

Concordia - Update.

Friday, February 17th 2012 Time 5.30 pm (CET) With regard to the story uncovered and reported by the Italian TV program “Striscia la Notizia”, regarding an Italian woman who allegedly suffered a miscarriage caused when the Costa Concordia ran aground, the Company has announced that it intends to file a complaint with the legal authorities and that it will take similar action in response to any similar scams or attempts at profiteering in the wake of the Concordia tragedy. The Company has confirmed that neither the woman nor her husband was on the Costa Concordia's Guest list on January 13. During the editions broadcast on February 14, 15 and 16, “Striscia la Notizia” discussed the case of a couple of self-styled survivors of the Costa Concordia shipwreck and their lawyer. They have appeared on various TV programs and their story has also received substantial coverage on websites, in newspapers and in agency press releases both in Italy and abroad. Through their lawyer the couple asked Costa Crociere 1 million euros in damages. The woman was purportedly five months' pregnant when she went on the cruise and lost her baby several days after escaping the stranded ship off the coast of the island of Giglio. “Striscia la Notizia” investigated the claims and discovered that the whole story was in fact made up: the couple were using false identities and neither of them had been on board the Concordia on the day of the shipwreck. Time 4.00 pm (CET) The Concordia Emergency Commissioner's Office and Costa Crociere have announced that the pumping of fuel from the cruise ship Costa Concordia has been continuing around the clock since 5 pm on February 12, in accordance with the plan devised by the Neri/Smit Salvage team. From the time defueling began until 7 am on February 17, a total of 952 cubic meters of fuel had been pumped out of 4 tanks located in the forward part of the ship. A total of 1,428 cubic meters of fuel is still to be removed from 13 tanks, of which 576 cubic meters in the forward part of the ship. According to the schedule drawn up by the Neri/Smit Salvage experts, if the sea and weather conditions remain favorable, all of the fuel still on board the Costa Concordia should be extracted within 3 working weeks. Since the outset Costa Crociere's priorities have been to guarantee maximum safety, the least possible environmental impact and protection of the environment of Giglio and the island's tourism industry, while carrying out defueling within a reasonable length of time. Both the defueling procedure and the other operations scheduled on Costa Concordia are being conducted jointly with full cooperation between Costa Crociere and the Concordia Emergency Commissioner's Office. Thursday, February 16th 2012 In response to the decision by the Italian consumer association Codacons to lodge a complaint against the Chairman & CEO of Costa Crociere and other Company executives, reported by the Italian Ansa news




agency on Wednesday, February 15, 2012, the Company reserves the right to take any and all steps necessary including any legal action required to protect its reputation and that of its executive officers.

Tuesday, February 14th 2012 Costa Crociere confirms the extension of the terms for the compensation proposal to March 31st 2012. Such decision has been taken in order to offer all passengers with more time to evaluate the proposal and to exercise their claims with due tranquility. While extending the date for accepting the proposal the Company confirms the simple, effective and easy to redeem compensation package as it was offered from last Jan 27th, 2012. The extension of the deadline will not have any impact on the claiming process but it is intended to meet the requests expressed by some of our guests. The compensation package applies only to guests who have returned home. The families of the victims and those guests who were wounded or permanently injured, will be covered under a separate proposal that will take into account their individual circumstances.

Monday, February 13th 2012 Time 2.30 pm (CET) This morning at 9.00 am it has been completed the pumping of the 103 m3 of fuel from the first tank of the ship. The pumping operations are now going on with the second tank. Pumping, which was started yesterday afternoon at 5 pm by Neri/ Smit Salvage engineers, is carried on at a speed of 10 m3 per hour, thanks to good weather conditions.

Costa Concordia January 13th, 2012. Never forget. One month after that terrible night, we all at Costa Crociere renew our sincere condolences to the families and friends of our Guests and crew members who lost their lives in this tragic incident. In the history of our Company, for sure these have been the saddest days of ever. We have all experienced, and with us who knows us, a dismay, a sadness, a deep pain, that we not envisioned to be possible. This tragic incident should not be happened. We will never forget those who lost their lives and those who have experienced moments of fear in front of Giglio Island. We commit to make this will not happen never again.

Thursday, February 2nd 2012 Time 7.00 pm (CET) Costa Crociere has worked from the hours immediately after the Costa Concordia accident to ensure the least possible environmental impact and to safeguard the island of Giglio’s business activities and tourism. Right from the outset, the measures drawn up by the Company have constantly been shared with and approved by the competent Italian authorities, in a spirit of full, transparent and total cooperation. After engaging leading international salvage experts Smit Salvage BV to remove the fuel contained in the Costa Concordia’s tanks, and presenting a plan to remove other materials and potential pollutants, which is ready to get under way as soon as weather conditions permit, Costa Cruises is also working with the utmost commitment and speed on the plan to remove the ship itself, fully aware that this is a priority to protect the environment on Giglio and the island’s tourism The Company has set up a technical committee, with representatives from Costa Cruises, Carnival Corporation & plc, Fincantieri, Rina and sector experts, including academics, who will work fo the best possible drawing up of the plan, on a joint basis with the competent authorities.




As anticipated in a letter sent to Costa Concordia Emergency Commissioner Franco Gabrielli, Costa Cruises has called for tenders 10 companies throughout the world to present a working plan to enterely remove the hull of the Costa Concordia. The invitation has been sent to the world’s leading operators, who have the capabilities to perform the work in the shortest time possible, while ensuring maximum safety and the least possible environmental impact: 1) Smit Salvage BV, 2) Svitzer Salvage BV, 3) Mammoet Salvage BV, 4) Titan Salvage, 5) Resolve Marine Group Inc., 6) T&T Marine Salvage Inc., 7) Donjon Marine Inc., 8) Tito Neri S.r.l., 9) Fukada Salvage & Marine Works Co. Ltd., 10) The Nippon Salvage Co Ltd. The plans must be presented to Costa Cruises by the beginning of March 2012, for joint assessment with the Civil Protection Scientific Committee, in order to allow the best one to be selected by the end of March 2012. This timeline represents the best possible outcome in a situation of this kind, although it cannot be excluded that there will be delays given the complexity of the operation.

Tuesday, January 31st 2012 Time 2.00 pm (CET) VIII Permanent Commission for Public Works Senate of the Italian Republic Hearing of Pier Luigi Foschi, Chairman and CEO Costa Crociere Listen to the Hearing

Friday, January 27th 2012 Time 4.00 pm (CET) Costa Crociere announced a compensation proposal for guests that have returned home after the tragic Costa Concordia accident on January 13.196 Costa Crociere would like to express its profound condolences to the families of the victims, our continued sympathy to the families of the missing, and our deep regret and sorrow for the damages and hardship the Costa Concordia accident caused to all its guests. This proposal is also the result of negotiations that Costa Crociere began with the consumer associations protecting guests’ interests, and with the support of multiple tourism/travel-industry associations. In Italy, the company has already reached an agreement with the National Council of Consumers and Users, a nationally representative organization. The families of the deceased and guests who were injured and required medical treatment on site will be covered under a separate proposal that will take into account their individual circumstances. The proposed compensation package for the guests who have returned home includes all of the following: • a lump sum of 11,000 Euros per person as indemnification, covering all patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including loss of baggage and personal effects, psychological distress and loss of enjoyment of the cruise vacation; • reimbursement of the value of the cruise, including harbour taxes; • reimbursement of the air and bus transfers included in the cruise package; • full reimbursement of travel expenses to reach the port of embarkation and to return home; • reimbursement of any medical expenses borne; • reimbursement of expenses onboard during the cruise. This compensation package is higher than the current indemnification limits that are provided for in international conventions and the laws currently in force. The 11,000 Euro lump-sum payment will be offered to all passengers, including non-paying children, regardless of their age. Costa has also pledged not to

196 Compensation package for Concordia victims and future cruise guests – a use of the rebuilding strategy, but maybe too late. (discussed on page 20)




deduct any amount paid by any insurance policy stipulated by the guests from this sum. In addition, the company will return all goods stored in the cabin safes, where retrieval is possible. Costa Crociere has also pledged to provide a program for psychological assistance to any guests that request it. The company has further agreed to offer customers the ability to cancel any upcoming cruise booked before January 13, on any of its routes, without penalty through February 7, 2012. Two dedicated operation units will handle the claims to ensure timely resolution. The payments will be credited by the company within seven days of receipt of the acceptance of the proposal. A dedicated e-mail address [email protected] will be provided to assist with inquiries.

Wednesday, January 25th 2012 Time 2.30 pm (CET) VIII Permanent Commission for Public Works Senate of the Italian Republic Hearing of Pier Luigi Foschi, Chairman and CEO Costa Crociere Watch the Hearing

Tuesday, January 24th 2012 Time 3.00 pm (CET) With reference to news reports on discounts and promotional offers, Costa Cruises feels bound to point out that the company has never offered any discount on future cruises to guests who were on board the Costa oncordia for the cruise of January 13th and involved in the tragic accident. The information published by a newspaper and reported in various news outlets is totally unfounded, as is confirmed by the English passenger who was quoted by the newspaper.197 Costa Cruises reiterates that after the tragic accident the company’s priority has always been to provide the maximum possible assistance and solace to the people involved. From the outset the company has been fully aware of and saddened by the suffering and hardship endured by guests and crew members and has acted with this firmly borne in mind. On a joint basis with rescue teams, the Company worked to provide evacuated passengers and crew members with all the necessary assistance to ensure they were able to return home. Subsequently it contacted guests by telephone, after they had returned home, to check on their physical and emotional wellbeing, and to confirm that they will receive a refund for the cruise and all material expenses relating to it. As already announced, the company welcomes discussion with its guests and all consumer protection associations to determine indemnity for the hardship endured, with the support of tourism sector trade associations with which it has been in contact for days. Driven by its sense of ethics and the values of fairness and responsibility which guide it, the Company has also given all customers with bookings for future Costa cruises the possibility, if feeling afraid, to cancel their cruise booking by giving notice no later than February 7th. All travel agents who work with the Company were informed of this days ago. Costa Cruises would also like to clarify that starting on the day after the accident, all advertising initiatives planned were cancelled out of respect for those affected by this tragedy. The Company was unable to stop only one postal promotion which had already been sent to some customers at the end of December. Costa Cruises is incredulous at the disgraceful and unfounded assertions made about the Company without any form of verification.

197 Rejection of accusations of 30 percent discount to Concordia victims (discussed on page 20)




Time 9.30 am (CET) Costa Cruises clarifies that the company has extremely strict systems in place to control access to ships, in addition to the port area access controls performed by the authorities before embarkation. Access on board is granted only on the basis of: - a ticket and an identity check for cruise customers; - an optically read ID card for crew members; - the entry of the person’s name on the visitor list, after approval by the Company and the Staff Captain, in addition to the presentation of a valid identity document which is retained on embarkation. The name of any person who departs with the ship is registered in on board systems. In addition, a photograph is taken of passengers on embarkation, which is then associated with an ID bar code found on the embarkation form and the Costa Card given to passengers when on board (this card acts as each passenger’s personal identification badge for entering and leaving the ship and for making use of on board services). No one on board has the power to waive security procedures. The company takes severe disciplinary action in the event of violation. Precise lists of every person embarked on the ship and who departed with it (guests, crew and any engineers) are transmitted to the Company immediately after departure. In the case of the accident involving the Costa Concordia, these precise lists have been given to the authorities in relation to operations to identify the survivors, victims and missing. Furthermore, the company categorically denies the rumour that there were “clandestine workers” on board. Costa Cruises applies the highest possible standards of security, safety and social accountability. The company is certified as regards social accountability (SA 8000) and safety (OHSAS 18001) by RINA in the framework of BEST4 certification, which also covers the environment and quality, and is subject to inspections by the certification society and the maritime authorities in Italy and in the countries visited by its ships. Monday, January 23rd 2012 Time 12.30 pm (CET) These days, we are receiving many messages of condolence for the victims and their families as well as many expressions of appreciation for the professionalism and competence of our crew. The Company shares the mourning and it is grateful to each demonstration of solidarity to men and women of Costa Crociere. Your expressions of closeness are really precious in such a delicate moment. Your demonstrations are touching, and they encourage us to do more to continue to deserve the trust you are granting us.

Wednesday, January 18th 2012 Time 9.15 pm (CET) Costa Cruises confirms that it is contacting all guests on the Costa Concordia at the time of the tragic accident to make sure they have returned home and are well, and to confirm that they will receive a refund for the cruise and all material expenses relating to it. Costa Crociere also reiterates that it is in contact with its guests and all consumer protection associations to determine indemnity for the hardship endured, with the support of the tour operator association of each country. Costa Cruises confirms both the constant commitment and care it devotes every day to safety and its dedication to relations with the guests who represent the company’s most important asset, as they have done for more than sixty years. Costa Cruises would like once again to express its great sadness over the victims and its support for their families




Time 7.45 pm (CET) For Costa Cruises protecting the environment is an integral part of its corporate mission, as it has demonstrated by obtaining the most stringent international certifications (UNIEN ISO 14001). The company therefore immediately understood the need to promptly address issues concerning the protection of the marine environment. In the hours immediately after the accident, Costa Cruises therefore commissioned worldwide leading salvage experts Smit Salvage BV to draw up a plan to recover the reserves of fuel from the Costa Concordia. Right from the outset, this plan has been shared with the competent authorities and, as a result of full cooperation with them, will be put into effect by the end of the week. Time 0.01 am (CET) We are deeply saddened to learn that additional people have been found during the search of the Concordia and extend our heartfelt sympathies to their families. We continue to cooperate with authorities to support the rescue and recovery efforts, and to help secure the vessel to ensure that there is no environmental impact. Our main priority remains the location of those passengers and crew who have not yet been accounted for. While rescue efforts continue we are reaching out to all our guests and their families to offer further assistance. Sunday, January 15th 2012 Time 8.15 pm (CET) We at Costa Cruises are deeply saddened by this tragedy, and our hearts and prayers go out to everyone affected and offer the determined victims’ families her heartfelt condolences. Over the past 48 hours, more than 1,100 Costa employees have been working tirelessly in the wake of this terrible event. We are working closely with the authorities to support ongoing search and rescue operations, and are focusing on ensuring that all guests and crewmembers return home safely. Our immediate priority is to account for all passengers and crew and to secure the vessel to ensure that there are no environmental impacts. We have engaged the services of a worldwide leader specialized salvage company to develop an action plan and help establish a protection perimeter around the ship. It should be noted that the Prosecutor in charge has seized the ship and the DVR-- so called “black box” containing all navigation data and the vessel can be accessed by Costa only with permission from the authorities. We are working with investigators to find out precisely what went wrong aboard the Costa Concordia. While the investigation is ongoing, preliminary indications are that there may have been significant human error on the part of the ship’s Master, Captain Francesco Schettino, which resulted in these grave consequences.198 199The route of the vessel appears to have been too close to the shore, and the Captain’s judgment in handling the emergency appears to have not followed standard Costa procedures. We are aware that the lead Prosecutor has leveled serious accusations against the ship’s Captain, who joined Costa Crociere in 2002 as a Safety Officer and was appointed Captain in 2006, after acting as Staff Captain as well. As all

198 An attempt to minimize corporate responsibility via justification, using the diminish response strategy, and further an attempt to shift blame and make the captain the scapegoat, hence touching upon denial strategy (discussed on page 18-19) 199 Statement of human error, placing the crisis within the preventable crisis cluster with strong attributions of responsibility and a severe reputational threat (discussed on page 14)




Costa Masters, he has been constantly trained passing all tests. In light of these accusations and the continuing investigation, it would be inappropriate for us to comment further at this time.200 As we are learning more about the event itself and the evacuation, however, it is becoming clear that the crew of the Costa Concordia acted bravely and swiftly to help evacuate more than 4,000 individuals during a very challenging situation. We are very grateful for all they have done. Costa is committed to ensuring that no such incident ever occurs again. Our number one priority is always the safety and security of our guests and crew and we comply with all safety regulations. (See background on Costa safety below). Background on Costa’s commitment to safety Costa complies very strictly with all safety regulations and our personnel are committed, first and foremost, to guest safety and security.201 All crew members hold a BST (Basic Safety Training) certificate and are trained and prepared to emergency management and to assist passengers abandoning the ship with numerous drills. Roles, responsibilities and duties are clearly assigned to all crew members. Every two weeks all crewmembers perform a ship evacuation simulation. A lifeboat and evacuation drill for all guests is conducted within 24 hours of embarking, as required by law. Costa has a computerised system which ensures all passengers undergo this drill. The skills of Costa crew are periodically tested by Coastguard authorities and an independent classification organization as per SMS (Safety Management Systems) requirements. There are lifeboats and jackets on board in excess of the number required for all passengers and crew. Lifeboats are equipped with food and water supplies, first aid kits and communication and signalling equipment. All life-saving appliances are aligned to international standards and are subject to close, regular inspection by shipboard personnel and certification authorities. All Costa ships are certified by RINA and have been built to the highest standards and technologies. Saturday, January 14th 2012 Time 5.30 pm (CET) " I want to express our deep sorrow for this terrible tragedy that devastates us “ - said Gianni Onorato President Costa Crociere- “ I am here only now because, as you will understand, I have been from the down until now on the Isola del Giglio to be close to the rescue operations. First at all, I would like to thank all the authorities, law enforcement and volunteers who made all efforts to help and assist our Guests involved in this terrible event." We are not at this time able to provide an answer to all the questions, because the competent authority are trying with our cooperative efforts to understand the reasons for this incident.

200 An attempt to minimize corporate responsibility via justification, using the diminish response strategy (discussed on page 18-19) 201 Background information of Costa’s commitment to safety - a reminder of the company’s high obligation to and standards of safety and personnel training, thus a use of the bolstering posture to retain reputation (discussed on page 19)




On the basis of the first evidences, still preliminary the ship Costa Concordia under the command of the Master Francesco Schettino was regularly sailing from Civitavecchia to Savona, when suddenly the ship struck a rock.202 The Master who was on the bridge at that time, understood the severity of the situation immediately performed a maneuver aimed to secure Guests and crew, and started the security procedures in order to prepare for an eventual ship evacuation. Unfortunately, this operation was complicated as result of a sudden tilt of the ship that has made difficult the disembarkation. Thanks to the commitment of all forces coordinated by the Coast Guard, from that moment on, rescue operations have been further strengthened. From the first time the company mobilized all its resources ashore to put in to assist our guests and crew members and prevent possible environmental impacts. Time 12.00 pm (CET) The Costa Concordia accident happened tonight it’s a tragedy that deeply shocked our company. Our first thought goes to the victims and we would like to express our deepest condolences to their families and friends. We’re close to the people who have been injured and we’re following their progress. All our efforts are now concentrated in assisting the guests and the crew who were on board, to bring them home as soon as possible. The Costa Cruises customer service has already started contacting by phone all the guests who were supposed to board today in Savona and starting from tomorrow in the scheduled ports. At the moment no changes have been planned to the schedule of the other Costa Cruises ships. People looking for assistance can contact the call centre number 08453510552.203 All the Costa Cruises people would like to thank from the deepest of their hearts the Guardia Costiera, the authorities and the citizens of the Giglio Island and of Porto Santo Stefano who helped and assisted the guests and the crew. They also thank the doctors who are assisting the injured and anyone in need of assistance. The Company is cooperating with the Authorities that are investigating on the accident. Time 5.00 am (CET) It is a tragedy that deeply affects our company. Our first thoughts go to the victims and we would like to express our condolences and our closeness to their families and friends. 204In this moment all our efforts are focused on the completion of the last emergency operations, besides providing assistance to the guests and the crew who were onboard in order to have them going back home as soon as possible. The emergency procedures started promptly to evacuate the ship. The slope, gradually taken over by the ship, made the evacuation extremely difficult. We would like to express our profound gratitude to the Coast Guard and all the forces co-ordinated by the Coast Guard, including the authorities and citizens of the island “Isola del Giglio”, who have been involved in the rescue and assistance to guests and crew members. The company will fully co-operate with the relevant Authorities in order to determine the causes of what happened. Time 1.00 am (CET) Costa Cruises confirms the evacuation of about 3,200 passengers and 1,000 crew members on board of the Costa Concordia. An incident occured near the island 'Isola del Giglio' of the coast of Italy. 205The evacuation started promptly, but the position of the ship has worsened, making it more complicated to complete the last

202 In the first communications Costa supported the captain (discussed on page 18) 203 Contact number for assistance to friends and families (instructing and adjusting information, discussed on page 18) 204 Expressions of condolences and concern (instructing and adjusting information, discussed on page 17-18) 205 First Crisis response from Costa Cruises conforming the evacuation of Costa Concordia (instructing and adjusting information, discussed on page 17)




part of the evacuation. At this moment, the cause of the incident cannot yet be confirmed. The Company is currently working with the highest commitment to provide all the needed assistance. The Costa Concordia was sailing across the Mediterranean Sea, starting from Civitavecchia with scheduled calls to Savona, Marseille, Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca, Cagliari and Palermo. About 1.000 passengers of Italian nationality were onboard, as well as more of 500 Germans, about 160 French and about 1.000 crew members. The Guests had to embark today in Savona and in subsequent ports will be contacted directly by Costa Cruises.




7.7 Appendix 7: Costa Cruises Crises Responses on Twitter

After the wreck of Costa Concordia the company behind, Costa Cruises, also responded to the crisis

on through its Twitter account. Below some of the responses are listed. First a tweet confirming the

evacuation of the cruise ship the day after the wreck and then a tweet thanking the coastguard. The

following tweets are an extract of the many responses to and conversations with people tweeting

about the accident. Hereafter the tweets were information about the press conferences, statements

and ongoing work due to the accident. It is notable that no tweets where made with condolences to

those involved and the families of the dead, except one with a link to the press conference.




Source: Costa Cruises on Twitter




7.8 Appendix 8: Costa Cruises Crises Responses on Facebook

After the wreck of Costa Concordia the company behind, Costa Cruises, also responded to the crisis

on through its Facebook account. Below these responses are listed.




The company’s facebook communication can be argued to draw parallels to Morsing and Schultz’

stakeholder response strategy and stakeholder involvement strategy206, as Costa Cruises’ customers

and other stakeholders are able to ‘like’ the facebook page and then like, comment and/or share all

the postings made by the company, thus stakeholders are able to respond. It is however, important

to note that Morsing and Schultz question and elaborate on the strategy arguing that “what aspires 206 Morsing and Schultz (2006) p. 325; Appendix 10




to be a two-way communication mechanism is really [sender oriented and] a one-way method for

supporting and reinforcing corporate actions and identity”207. Thus using this strategy, Costa

Cruises need to carefully choose their communication to engage stakeholders, as they need their

endorsement in order to rebound from the crisis. The involvement strategy comes to show in the

post from February 17th below where the company shows that it listens and thus involve

stakeholders.

Source: Costa Cruises on Facebook

Here the company is influenced by stakeholders and change accordingly, through this mutual

dialogue Costa Cruises is able to keep up with the development of stakeholder expectations and

further the company’ own ability to meet these208. It is argued that these communication strategies

by Morsing and Schultz are applicable to other communication than solely CSR communication,

thus the linking here. Using these strategies will most certainly benefit the company in the crisis

situation, as the communication then aspires goodwill and consideration, hence it can help build

reputation209. As Coombs states “[i]t is the regular, two-way communication that helps an

organization to understand the expectations of its stakeholders. […] The goal is to determine when

an expectation gap occurs”210. Both stakeholder strategies above further takes an evaluative mode,

as the feedback from stakeholders can help determine response choices and future initiatives211.

207 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 328 208 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 328; Appendix 10 209 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 8, 24 210 Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 59-60 211 Appendix 1




7.9 Appendix 9: Email Correspondence with Peter Anker Jensen, owner and CEO Fri Ferie

The following is a translation of an interview with Peter Anker Jensen, Owner and CEO of the

Danish travel agency Fri Ferie. The interview was handled via email in Danish, and the

correspondence is depicted below the transcription.

Question: How do you think that this crisis has affected the Costa Cruises' reputation?

Answer: It is evident that the reputation has been damaged - but I have heard comments like

"Now it must surely be the world's safest cruise line" - and people forget quickly.

Question: How have your clients reacted to the crisis? Have you as a travel agency seen any

insecurity and/or decline in sales of cruise traveling?

Answer: We did not sell many cruise holidays before the accident. It's scary but true, Costa sat

down prices - and then we have sold very well! - The prices are obviously the most

important. And Simon Spies’ thesis about "bad press is better than no press" has held

true in this case.

Question: How has Costa Cruises communicated the crisis and their responsibility to you as B2B

customer? Was the communication and the information provided sufficient for you?

Answer: They handled it very professionally B2B, much information, etc.

Question: How have you handled the crisis in relation to your customers?

Answer: We had very few cruse customers BEFORE the crisis - and some of them have

contacted us - but no one has canceled.

Question: How do you think that Costa Cruises has handled the crisis in general to those

involved, their customers and the media?

Answer: It is difficult to have a serious view on this - there is so much we do not know in this

case - I would rather not comment based on articles in newspapers, TV etc. I consider

the media in general as far less serious than in the company as Costa.




Question: Do you see any problems or doubts in continuing to cooperate with Costa Cruises? Do

you know how other agencies look at this?

Answer: No, I do not - and as a professional "observer" of what other agencies do - I cannot see

that anyone have “picked them off the shelf".

Email correspondence in Danish:

From: Peter Anker Jensen Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 4:34 PM To: Tine Grarup Subject: Re: Hvordan har Costa Concordia krisen påvirker Fri Ferie's salg af cruise rejser Se mine svar nedenfor. /Peter Den 17/04/2012 kl. 21.29 skrev Tine Grarup: Hej Peter, Mange tak fordi du tager dig tiden, det er en stor hjælp! Nedenfor er et par spørgsmål jeg håber du kan svare på.

• Hvordan mener du/i at denne krise har påvirket Costa Cruises’ omdømme? Det er klart at omdømmet har taget skade -‐ men jeg har hørt kommentarer som "Nu må det da være verdens sikreste krydstogtsselskab" -‐ og folk glemmer hurtigt

• Hvordan har jeres kunder reageret på krisen? Har i som rejsebureau set en utryghed og/eller nedgang i salg af cruise rejser?

Vi har ikke solgt ret meget cruise før ulykken, det er uhyggeligt men sandt, Costa satte priserne ned!! -‐ og så har vi solgt helt fantastisk!! -‐ priserne er åbenbart det vigtigste. Og Simons Spies tese om "At dårlig presse er bedre end ingen presse " har holdt i dette tilfælde

• Hvordan har Costa Cruises kommunikeret krisen og deres ansvar til jer som B2B kunde? Var kommunikationen og den givne information tilstrækkelig for jer?

De har håndteret det meget professionelt B2B, meget information m.m




• Hvordan har i håndteret krisen i forhold til jeres kunder? Vi havde kun ganske få kunder FØR krisen -‐ og nogle af dem har kontaktet os -‐ men ingen har afbestilt

• Hvordan mener du/i at Costa Cruises har håndteret krisen generelt overfor de involverede, deres kunder og i medierne?

Det er svær at have et seriøst synspunkt på det -‐ der er så meget vi ikke ved i denne sag -‐ jeg udtaler mig helst ikke på baggrund af artikler i Ekstra Bladet, TV2 m.v. Jeg betragter medier generelt som langt mindre seriøse end i selskab som Costa

• Ser i nogle problemer i eller skrupler ved fortsat at samarbejde med Costa Cruises? Ved du hvordan andre bureauer ser på dette?

Nej det ser jeg ikke -‐ og som professionel "observatør" på hvad andre bureauer gør -‐ kan jeg ikke se at der er nogen som "har pillet dem af hylden" Hvis du selv har yderligere kommentarer til emnet, så må du endelige sende dem også. Mange tak for hjælpen. Med venlig hilsen Tine From: Peter Anker Jensen Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2012 12:15 PM To: Tine Grarup Subject: Re: Hvordan har Costa Concordia krisen påvirker Fri Ferie's salg af cruise rejser Hej Tine Du må godt sende mig nogle spørgsmål -‐ men jeg har meget at lave så jeg kommer til at svare kort. /Peter Den 29/03/2012 kl. 16.36 skrev Tine Grarup: Hej Peter, Jeg har fået din mail af din kollega tidligere idag. Jeg er kandidat studerende på Handelshøjskolen i Aarhus, og er igang med at skrive semesteropgave omkring crisis managment og Costa Concordia krisen.




Jeg ved at i samarbejder med Costa Cruises i forbindelse med jeres udbud af cruise rejser, og kunne i den forbindelse godt tænke mig, at høre hvordan krisen har påvirket jeres salg af cruise rejser. Jeg vil sætte pris på hvis jeg måtte sende dig nogle spørgsmål via mail, ellers hvis jeg må ringe og få en snak om det. Ser frem til at høre fra dig. -- Med venlig hilsen / Best regards Tine Grarup Stud.cand.ling.merc Corporate Communication Aarhus University, Business and Social Sciences




7.10 Appendix 10: Three CSR Communication Strategies

Below appendix is an extraction from the Corporate Communication paper on 1st semester212.

Based on Grunig and Hunt’s characterization of public relations models (1984) being; press

agentry, public information, two way asymmetric, and two way symmetric213, Morsing and Schultz

have developed three types of stakeholder relations for the communication used by corporations

when engaging in CSR. Namely the stakeholder information strategy, the stakeholder response

strategy, and the stakeholder involvement strategy as visualized in figure 4 below214. The full table

developed by Morsing and Schultz is to be found in appendix 3, including a more thorough

explanation.

Figure: Three CSR communication strategies (own adaption)

The stakeholder information strategy is a one-way flow of information from corporation to

stakeholders, and is similar to Grunig and Hunt’s public information model. This strategy has the

purpose of distributing information, in order to inform the general public about the corporation’s

favorable CSR initiatives as objectively as possible. Focus is here on the design of the concept

message, in the attempt to ensure positive stakeholder support.215 However such an approach might

run the risk of the ‘self-promoter’s paradox’ as credibility of the communication originates from the

corporation itself216.

The stakeholder response strategy is based on Grunig and Hunt’s two-way asymmetric

communication, where communication flows to and from the external stakeholders. Being

asymmetric the corporation however still attempts to modify public attitude and behavior, and does

212 Grarup (2011) p. 12-14 213 Grunig & Hunt (1984) p. 21-25 214 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 325 215 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 327 216 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 332




not change as a result of public relations217. This strategy takes an evaluative mode, where the focus

of CSR initiatives is decided upon feedback from the public. This model is frequently used by

corporations, however in is important to note that Morsing and Schultz question and elaborate on

the model arguing that “what aspires to be a two-way communication mechanism is really [sender

oriented and] a one-way method for supporting and reinforcing corporate actions and identity”218.

Thus using this strategy, corporations need to carefully choose their communication to engage

stakeholders, as they need their endorsement.

The stakeholder involvement strategy does in contrast engage in real mutual dialogue, as persuasion

comes from both the corporation itself and its external stakeholders. This implies that corporations

might also be influenced by stakeholders and thus must change when necessary. By engaging in

these dialogues corporations explore mutually beneficial actions, and are able to keep up with the

development of stakeholder expectations and further the corporation’s own ability to meet these219.

The CSR initiative hereby depends on its ability to integrate both internal and external CSR

concerns in a continuous dialogue.

The stakeholder involvement strategy is further interlinked with the two above strategies, however

it argues that informing and evaluating is not sufficient alone. Hence, the corporations must ensure

a concurrent interaction with stakeholders in order to bring about mutual understanding and rational

agreement220.

On the basis of CSR being a continuously developing concept demanding continuously adaption,

Morsing and Schultz highlight that “stakeholder involvement becomes increasingly more important

for ensuring that a company stays in tune with concurrently changing stakeholder expectations”221.

Thus the three strategies cover the development of stakeholder relationships. While one-way

communication of CSR initiatives is necessary in giving sense to stakeholders, it can no longer

stand alone. In order to survive, stakeholders, whom corporations are depending on, need to be

engaged in long-term value creation. This interaction will generate long-term mutual relationships,

being another source of competitive advantage222. Having a positive recognition from stakeholders

217 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 327 218 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 328 219 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 328 220 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 328 221 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 336 222 Morsing & Schultz in Morsing & Beckmann (2006) p. 139




and being perceived as a legitimate corporation further cause a smaller need for loud CSR

communication223. Reputation surveys indicate that subtle CSR communication such as “annual

reports and websites are the preferred means of CSR communication by stakeholders”224. Such a

communication strategy might have little public display, yet it allows for a stronger focus on

content. Morsing and Schultz, however, also suggest that such minimal releases would very much

benefit from adding stakeholder involvement, as allowing for stakeholder expression of support

and/or thoughts about the CSR initiative, will then generate the needed visibility225.

223 Morsing & Schultz in Morsing & Beckmann (2006) p. 147 224 Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 336 225 Morsing & Schultz in Morsing & Beckmann (2006) p. 155

Comment: In practice communication with stakeholders is costly and time-‐consuming, thus the

stakeholder dialogue is likely to be located somewhere between the extremes of the

above strategies, making the complexity of the environment manageable, by focusing

maybe on a limited number of stakeholders and issues (Pedersen (2006) p. 142-‐143).

responding to crisis assessing situational crisis communication of the costa concordia crisis

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