respondent 2010 - d m harish memorial moot competition

8/12/2019 Respondent 2010 - d m harish memorial moot competition

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TEAM CODE

I N THE I NTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE P EACE P ALACE,

T HE H AGUE , N ETHERLANDS

GENERAL L IST NO .

Y EAR 2010

C ASE CONCERNING THE B LOCKADE ON R ONISTAN BY JOTRIA AND THE ATTACKS ON JOTRIAN I NSTITUTION BY THE UC

D.M. H ARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT L AW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL M OOT COURT

COMPETITION

(2010)

R EPUBLIC OF R ONISTAN / R EPUBLIC OF JOTRIA

T HE APPLICANT STATE T HE R ESPONDENT STATE

SUBMITTED IN THE R EGISTRY OF THE COURT

ON BEHALF OF THE R ESPONDENT STATE

-R EPUBLIC OF JOTRIA -


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TT AABBLL EE OO FF CC OO NN TT EE NNTT SS

I NDEX OF A UTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

S TATEMENT OF J URISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .XII

S YNOPSIS OF F ACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .XIII

S UMMARY OF A RGUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .XVI

B ODY OF A RGUMENTS ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-20

-C ONTENTIONS -

1. The Applicant State is Responsible for the violation of United Nations Charter as its Actions

Amounted to State Sponsored Terrorism .....1

1.1. The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as International terrorism.1

1.2. Appreciation of circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in this attack ..1

1.3. In Arguendo, the UC group aided and abetted international terrorism.....2

1.4. The Applicant state was involved in state-sponsored terrorism.2

A. The Applicant state provided State Support to the terrorist activities....3

B. The Applicant state provided State Tolerance to the terrorist activities4

1.5. State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for this act of state-sponsored terrorism4

2. The Applicant State Violated the Duty to Cooperate Assigned by the Binding Security Council

Resolution and the Doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare. ......................................................................6

2.1. The Security Council resolution being a resolution under Chapter VII was a binding resolution.......6

2.2. Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII it is yet binding...................6

2.3. The Applicant state violated the doctrine of aut dedre aut judicare...................................................7

3. The arrests during Emergency by the Applicant State was in violation of International Law ......8 3.1. The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right ..8

3.2. The emergency was declared in violation of international law and hence was not valid ..8

4. The Changes Brought into the Constitution of the Applicant State Lead to the Suppression of Civil

Liberties which is a Violation of International Law ..................10


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

1. A. Frowein, Collective Enforcement of International Obligation, (1987) 47 ZaoRv 67 6

2. A/52/653, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Sixth

Committee available at http:// www.un.org/law/cod/terroris/html

4

3. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International

Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 98 (1989)

5

4. Adam Packer, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 631,

634-39 (2000)

14

5. Admission of U.S. to U.N., Advisory Opinion, (1948) ICJ Rep. 57 10

6. Aldana-Pindell, Raquel. An emerging universality of justiciable victims rights in the

criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes, Human RightsQuarterly, Vol 26, 2004

20

7. Ambateilos Arbitration (Greece v UK), [1956] 12 RIAA 83 11

8. American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS

123

9

9. Amnesty International, The United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms 2002 15

10. Andre Beirlaen, Economic Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18 Revue beigede droit international 58, 68 (1984-85)

20

11. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L.

Rev. 1823 (2002)

9

12. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the

Charter Framework, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 735, 740 (2002) 48

1

13. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595

11

14. Award (1937) 3 UNRIAA p. 1719, at p.1751 8

15. Baade, The Soviet Impact of International Law (1965) 9

16. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co . (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33 11

17. Bassiouni, Cherif, Searching for peace and achieving justice: The need for

accountability, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol 59, No 4, 1996

20

18. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing

Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 345 (1997-98)

19

19. British Prevention of Terrorism Act , 1989 1

20. British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926): Mcneill Case (1931), Further Dec. &

Op. of Com.

1


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W RITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE R ESPONDENT

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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

21. British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):2 Case (1931),Further Dec. & Op. of

Com, 297, Commission (1922)

1

22. British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):The Sonora (Mexico) Plant and Timber

Co. Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.292

1

23. British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926):Cameroon Case (1929) Dec. & Op. of

Com.,p.33

3

24. British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926); Mexico City Bombardment Claim

(1930),Dec. & Op. of Comm., p.100

3

25. British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926: Lynch Case (1929), Dec. & Op. ofCom.,p.20

3

26. Case of Ireland against the United Kingdom, ECHR: ILR 58, 190, Judgment, 1978,

159

12

27. Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, (1962) ICJ

Rep 163

6

28. CFE Treaty, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30

I.L.M. 1 (1991), art. XIX, 2, 30 I.L.M. at 22

15

29. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted in General Assembly

resolution 1974 3281 (XXIX)

12, 13,19

30. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 6, 15 17, 20

31. Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals,

1953, p.323

3,8,10,13

32. Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 200 (2d ed.

2004)

12

33. Chorzow Factory Case (Merits) (Germany v. Poland ), (1928) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.17, at p.87

8

34. Commission on Human Security, 2003, Human Security Now, New York, p. 135 15

35. Conforti, Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Perspectives (1991),467-82

7, 12

36. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment 7

37. Convention for the Preservation of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and

Other Matter (1972), 1046 U.N.T.S. 138

18

38. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

(European Convention on Human Rights) (ECHR)

9


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

39. Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 1, 17

40. D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft 13-14 (1985) at 123 15

41. David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AJIL 817 (2002) 1642. David Schewigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the

UN Charter (2001) 66

43. Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.

No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970)

5

44. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal

Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N.

Doc. A/RES/36/103 (1981)

5, 12

45.

Declaration on the Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism General AssemblyResolution 49/60, Adopted 17 February 1995, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60.

1

46. Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 Colum. Hum.

Rts L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1997)

10

47. Doswald-Beck, Legal Validity; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention inthe Domestic Affairs of States (1965)

19

48. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,

U.N. Doc. A/56/10

18

49. E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal

Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1169 (1987) at 116614

50. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90 11

51. Elettronica Sicula SpA( E L S I ) Case (U.S. v. Italy) Case, ICJ Reports, 1989, p, 15 12

52. Emanuel Gross, Terrorism and the Law: Democracy in the War Against Terrorism--

the Israeli Experience 35 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1161,1

53. European Convention on Human Rights 12

54. Exparte Ferhut Butt116 ILR, pp. 607, 614-15 (High Court) and 619 (Court of

Appeal)

12

55. Fawcett, 31 BY (1954), 452-8 12

56. Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union on Combating Terrorism of June 2002, Official Journal of the European Committee L 164, 22 June 2002

1

57. France-Venzuela Mixed Claims Commission (1902): Burn Case, Ralstons Report, pg.5

3

58. Free Zones Case (Second Phase): Order (France v. Switzerland), (1930) P.C.I.J. 8


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

(Ser. A) No.24

59. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary v Slovakia),[1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 11310,16,18

10,16,18

60. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey j. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:

History and Current Policy 4 (1985) p. 2

14, 15

61. George Norman & Joel. P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99AJIL 541 (2005)

9

62. Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law, in United NationsSanctions and International Law 32 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001)

15

63. German Interests Case (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No.7,at p.30

8

64.

Great Britain v. Russia, Report of February 26, 1905, The Hague Court Reports 403(James Brown Scott ed. 1916) cited in international law casebooks

20

65. Great Venezuelan Railroad Case, 1903, Ven. Arb 632 13

66. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal

Analysis, 19 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 177, 180-81 (1987)

5

67. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force,

18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 144, 150 (2000)

4,18

68. Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law (1970) 9

69. Higgins, Conflict of Interest (1965) 9

70. I. A. Shearer, Starks International Law 31 (1994) 9

71. Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle Of International Criminal Jurisdiction 2(1994)

7

72. ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act,

(2001), U.N. Doc. A/56/10

4, 11, 18

73. ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare,Amnesty International Publications, 2009 7

74. Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 12

75. Interhandelcase, ICT Reports, 1959, p. 27 12

76. International Convention for the Preservation of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1963),

327 U.N.T.S 3

18

77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21

U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.

171(ICCPR)

9,19


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

78. into force on 1 July 1978 12

79. J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization:

International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in

Africa, 18 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 851, 852 (2003)

10

80. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999)

9

81. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on Customary International Law, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 191 (2001)

11

82. Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under

International Law, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 559, 582 (2002)

5

83. Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 226 (1964) 8

84. John Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism and State-

Sponsored Terrorism, 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 77, 93 (2002)

1

85. John F. Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and

Economic Dimensions, 32-33 (Westview Press) (1989)

4

86. John Galtung, On The Effects of International Economic Sanctions, in Dilemmas ofEconomic Coercion 17, 19 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983)

14

87. Joy K. Fausey, COMMENT: Does the United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions toProtect Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J.

INT'L L.193, 196(Fall 1994)

15

88. Judge Lauterpacht, Sep. Op., Norwegian at 39-41 12

89. Justin D. Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 115, pg.3 13

90. Keiver, The Pacific Salmon War: The Defense of Necessity Revisited , 21 DalhousieL.J. 408 (1998)

18

91. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, pp. 62-4, 191-2, 196-201 12

92. Kenneth W. Abbott, Coercion and Communication: Frameworks for Evaluation ofEconomic Sanctions, 19 New York University Journal of International Law andPolitics 781, 783, 789 (1987)

14

93. Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 Vand. J.

Transnat'l L. 289, 298 (1987)

2,5

94. Lagos v Baggianini, [1955] 22 ILR 533 9

95. Lauritzen et al v Government of Chile, [1956] 23 ILR 70 at 715-16, 729-30 9

96. Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued presence of South Africa in 6


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970) (Advisory Opinion), (1971) ICJ Rep 113 at 53

97. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004, paragraph

163

20

98. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226 11

99. Lotus Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10 19

100. Louis B. Sohn, Speech: The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law 9

101. Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law in

Realism in Law-Making: Essays on International Law in Honor of Willem Riphagen

231 (1986)

9

102. Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Definitional

Clarifications, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239, 240-41 (1995)

1

103. Lt. Col. James P. Terry, USMC, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-

Policy Analysis, 36 Naval L. Rev. 159, 161 (1986).

1

104. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Foreword to Treaty Enforcement and InternationalCooperation in Criminal Matters, at vii, Rodrigo Yepes- Enrquez & Lisa Tabassieds., 2002

7

105. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented

Assessment, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 83, 91 (2002), at 84.

2

106. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: ATheoretical Framework , ed., International Criminal Law 3, 5 (Ardsley, New York:Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2nd. ed. 1999)

7

107. Magalidis Case, (1928)8 T.A.M 386, at 395 8

108. Malcolm Shaw, International Law 709 (2005) 16

109. Marc Henzelin, Le Principe de lUniversalit en Droit Pnal International: Droit etObligation pour les tats de Poursuivre et Juger selon le Principe de lUniversalit,

2000

7

110. Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 Recueildes Cours 155 (1998)

9

111. Metzger & Co. Case (U.S. v Haiti), 1901 U.S.F.R 262 8

112. Mexican-United States General Claims Com 9

113. Mexican-United States General Claims Commission (1923): North American 10


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

133. Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in

Africa, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1209, 1224 (2003)

10

134. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I .C . J . Reports 1974, p. 253 10

135. Nuclear Tests(New Zealand v. France), I .C . J . Reports 1974, p. 4510 10

136. Obijio for Aginam , Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap And Global

Health Challenges At Century's Dawn, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 603

10

137. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No.10

(A/59/10)

7

138. Oppenheims International Law, 9 th Ed. 2001, pg 382,118 19

139. Optional Protocol I, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 12

140. Oscar Chinl Case (Belgium v. U.K.), (1934) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 63 8

141. Parker Case, 1926 17

142. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 839 (2002)

11

143. Pleadings, Israel v. Bulgaria,ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 531-2 12

144. PortendickCase (1843) 14

145. Portugo-German Arbitration (1919): The Cysne Case (1930), 2 UNRIAA, p.101 1

146. Prosecutor v. George Ruggio, ICTR-97-32-I. 2

147. Prosecutor v. Tadic , Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 ILM 32 (1996) 6

148. Q.Wright, US Intervention in the Labanon,53 AJIL (1959) 19

149. R. Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are bindingunder Article 25 of the Charter,(1972) 32 ICLQ 269

7

150. R.A.Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World , (1968) 19

151. Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v France), [1987] 23 ILM 1346 18

152. Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction (2nd Edn., 1961),pp. 407-48, 509-25

12

153. Ramudo, The (Soviet) Socialist Theory of International Law (1964) 9

154. Reporting Form, Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military

Expenditures, UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980

15

155. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 702 (1987) 10, 11


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

156. Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-ColdWar Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l l. 901, 918 (1995)

14

157. Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in Law and Force inthe New International Order 52 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.

1991)

18

158. Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on US": International Law and

Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. Int'l L.J. 153, 162 (1994) [ Beck &Clerk ]

1,2,3,4,14

159. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheims International Law 25 (1996) 9

160. Roda Mushkat, Fair Trial as Precondition to Rendition: An International Legal

Perspective,(Univ. of H.K. Ctr. for Comparative & Pub. Law, Occasional Paper No.5, 2002)

7

161. Rosenne, Law and Practice,vol. 11, pp. 778-82 12

162. Rules of International Court of Justice (1978) adopted on 14 April 1978 12

163. Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale

J. Int'l L. 559, 565 (1999)

4

164. S. McCaffrey, 'The Forty-First Session of the International Law Commission: 83

AJIL, 1989, p. 937 Declaration on Inadmissibility

5,12

165. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., art. 2(a), U.N. Doc.

S/RES/1373 (2001)

5

166. Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (David Cortright

and George A. Lopez eds., 1995)

14

167. Security Council Resolution 1368 of 2001, adopted at the 4370 th Meeting on 12 th

September, 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001)

18

168. Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [1998] 2 All ER 820 19

169. Singh v. Bihar , AIR 2004 SC 3317, 16 1

170. Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (1923): Claim I: Rzini (Tetuan Orchards) Case

(1924), 2 UNRIAA, p.615

1

171. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Self-defense against the use of force in international law

126 (1996) at 188-201 Christine Gray, International law and the use of force 161 (2d

ed. 2004) at 126-29

18

172. Statute of the ICJ (1945), Art. 38(1)(b) 9


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

173. Stefan Talmon, Note and Comment: The Security Council as World Legislature,99AGIL 175

6

174. Stephen M. Schwebel & J. Gillis Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local

Remedies, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 484, 500 (1966)

12

175. Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in the United Nations andInternational Law 279 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997)

14

176. T. Meron, 'The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies', 25 BYIL,

1959, p. 95. Note, in addition, the North American DredgingCo. claim, 4 RIAA, p.26 (1926) 3 AD, p. 4

12

177. Taft Case (1926), Dec. & Op., p.801 1

178. The American University Washington College of Law Edwin A Mooer Lecture, 34

Am.U.L.Rev. 271(1984)

9

179. The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] 1 All ER 719 19

180. The Italian National Re-extradition Case, [1970] 70 ILR 374 at 376-7 9

181. The Rights of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India), [1966] ICJ Rep42

9

182. The SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey), [1972] PCIJ Rep Series A No. 10. 9

183. The State (Duggan) v Tapley, [1951] 18 ILR 109 9

184. Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 1(1986)

11

185. Tomuschat Report prepared by Christian Tomuschat, at 35. 1

186. Trail Smelter Arbitration,Award 2 (1941), 1935 UNRIAA, p. 1905, at p.1963 10

187. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United

States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503art. XV, 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3446,

T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 12 on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), June 18,

1979, United States-U.S.S.R., art. XV, 18 I.L.M. 1112, 1134-35

15

188. Triska and Sussler, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties (1962) 9

189. UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980 15

190. United States Code, 22 U.S.C. 2656(d) (1) 1

191. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979) 7

192. Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: CapitalPunishment and Torture, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1369, 1369 (2000)

7


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INDEX OF AUTHORITY

193. Venezuelan Preferential Claims Case (1904) (Germany, Great Britain, Italy v.

Venezuela et al), 1 H.C.R 55

8

194. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,1969 20

195. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articulation Theories: AnEconomic Analysis, 2 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 201 (2006)

11

196. Virginia Morris and M.-Christiane Bourloyannis, Current Development: The Work

of the Sixth Committee At The Forty-Eighth Session of The UN General Assembly,

88 A.J.I.L. 343 (1994)

20

197. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 161-70 (4th ed. 1981) at 127 19

198. Walter F. Smith Case, (1929) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 46, at p.167 8

199.

William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenber, A Public Choice Analysis of thePolitical Economy of International Sanctions, in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft162 (Steven Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds. 2000)

14

200. William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on

State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 105, 107-08 (2002), at 162

5

201. Wimbeldon Case, (),()1923, PCIJ (Ser. A) No.1 at 37 13


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SSTT AATT EE MM EE NNTT OO FF JJ UURR II SSDDII CC TT II OO NN

DDMM HH AARR II SSHH MM EE MM OO RR II AALL GG OO VVEE RR NNMM EE NNTT LL AAWW CC OO LL LL EE GG EE II NNTT EE RR NNAATT IIOO NNAALL MM OO OO TT CC OO UURR TT CC OO MM PP EE TT II TT IIOO NN XII

The Republic of Ronistan on one side and The Republic of Jotria on the other, have submitted by special

agreement the differences between the states case concerning the blockade on Ronistan by Jotria and the

attacks on Jotrian institutions by the UC and transmitted a copy there of to the registrar of the court pursuant

to Article 40(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. Therefore both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ

pursuant to article 36(1) of the Statute of the court.


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SSYYNN OO PP SSII SS OO FF FF AA CC TT SS

DDMM HH AARR II SSHH MM EE MM OO RR II AALL GG OO VVEE RR NNMM EE NNTT LL AAWW CC OO LL LL EE GG EE II NNTT EE RR NNAATT IIOO NNAALL MM OO OO TT CC OO UURR TT CC OO MM PP EE TT II TT IIOO NN XIII

-I-

Ronistan and Jotria are both developing countries that share a common history and a common boundary. In

the 75 years of post colonial history, relations between the two countries have by and large been friendly and

the governments of the two nations invested considerable financial and other resources to ensure that the

historical social and economic ties continue.

-II-

Ronistan had a model of local democratic governance wherein its Constitution guaranteed its people (and

indeed, all human beings) a number of rights and civil liberties.

Jotria, on the other hand, had a centralized form of democratic governance and its Constitution also

guaranteed a number of rights and civil liberties to its citizens.

-III-

Historical ties between the two countries, provided that people regularly travelled between the two countries

and Ronistan natural resources (local communities had rights to these resources) were actively sourced by

large businesses in Jotria, in effect creating a situation where payments by Jotrian businesses were made to

local communities feeding local development in Ronistan.

-IV-

Sharian Ami, a Jotrian by birth and Ronistani by residence, created a human network to drive significant

social, economic and most importantly, cultural change and form the HOTWA Political Action Congress

(HPAC), a political party.

-V-

HPAC decided to use a provision in the Ronistan Constitution that in effect transformed Ronistan from a

country of decentralization to a centralized system. Citizens enjoyed absolute rights when it came to

enjoying their cultural and religious freedoms but civil liberties such as free speech and expression could be

suspended by the Government if they felt that it was necessary to protect the overall religious and cultural

fabric of the country. Ronistan quickly ramped up its annual military expenditure to almost 10% of GDP.


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-VI-

On the other hand, Ronistan, around 10 years ago went through a massive financial crisis. This affected the

credibility of its political class and using the groundswell of emotion in the country, the military of the

country staged a coup, temporarily suspended the Constitution for a maximum of 6 months.

-VII-

6 months later, the military rulers lifted the suspension of the Constitution and called for elections. The

military supported a number of civilian candidates in these elections; most won and formed a government.

-VIII-

The government of Jotria did not have a favourable view of the developments in Ronistan and decided to de-

focus the long term cultural ties between the nations and worked to move away from their economic

dependence on the natural resources of Ronistan which was termed as an "effective economic blockade" of

the country by Ronistan.

-IX-

Jotria merely maintained that they had the right to take decisions in their economic national interests and

believed that "the cocktail of religion, culture and a military in Ronistan" compelled them to take such a

decision.

-X-

All of this lead Sharian Ami decided to use the emergency provisions of the Constitution and arrested a

number of people in the country (including leaders of the opposition and a number of Jotrian citizens) in

order to "protect the basic structure of Ronistan, the religious and cultural freedom of its people and their

way of life".

-XI-

In August 2007, Sharian Ami retired from active politics and his successor Darsh Panikhet took over. Darsh

was famous in Ronistan for a simple political slogan: "Destroy Jotrian economic imperialism." He gave

financial support to a number of popular social, economic and cultural groups including a group popularly

known as UC. UC believed that Ronistan's success as a country was inversely proportional to the success of

Jotria.


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-XII-

After a series of violent attacks on Jotrian institutions (its Supreme Court and Parliament), UCs Leadership

Council openly announced that they had knowledge that these attacks would take place but disclaimed any

specific involvement in the actual attacks

-XIII-

Certain allegations were made against UC for the attacks by Jotria and international community. The Prime

Minister of Jotria announced that based on its investigations, it had declared UC as a terrorist group. He

called upon Ronistan to arrest and handover the UC leadership within 72 hours, the failure of which would

be considered an act of war by Ronistan to which Darsh Panikhet reacted immediately and said that he was

powerless to act in the absence of any specific evidence linking UC to these attacks and that he would be

willing to act if he was provided evidence.

-XIV-

The 72 hour deadline passed after which due to involvement of international community, the Security

Council passed a resolution asking Ronistan to cooperate with Jotria in every way possible and called upon

Jotria to exhaust all means available for a peaceful resolution.

-XV-

24 hours later, in a bizarre incident, a public rally (being held by the UC Leadership Council to protest

against the "war mongering actions of Jotria") was bombed and the half the leadership of the Council were

killed. UC immediately announced that Jotria was behind the attacks based on unconfirmed sightings of

Jotrian military personnel crossing the borders of the two nations a few hours earlier.

-XVI-

Darsh Panikhet also made an announcement that Jotria had violated the territorial integrity of Ronistan and

that the attack on the public rally amounted to an armed attack on Ronistan.

-XVII-

Fearing that war was inevitable, the Security Council passed a resolution asking the parties to resolve

matters expeditiously and in a peaceful manner. On the intervention of the Secretary General of the United

Nations, the leadership of Jotria and Ronistan decided to submit the dispute before International Court of

Justice.


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SSUUMM MM AARR YY OO FF AARR GG UUMM EE NNTT SS

DDMM HH AARR II SSHH MM EE MM OO RR II AALL GG OO VVEE RR NNMM EE NNTT LL AAWW CC OO LL LL EE GG EE II NNTT EE RR NNAATT IIOO NNAALL MM OO OO TT CC OO UURR TT CC OO MM PP EE TT II TT IIOO NN XVI

C ONTENTIONS

1. The Applicant State is responsible for the violation of United Nations Charter as its actions amounted

to State sponsored terrorism.

The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as international terrorism. Appreciation of

circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in the attack . In arguendo, the UC group

aided and abetted international terrorism. The Applicant State was involved in State-sponsored terrorism.

The Applicant State provided State support to the terrorist activities. The Applicant State provided State

tolerance to the terrorist activities. Thus State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for State-

sponsored terrorism.

2. The Applicant State has violated the duty to co-operate assigned by the binding Security Council

resolution and has also violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare.

The Security Council resolution asking is a resolution under Chapter VII. Thus it was a binding resolution.

Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII, it is yet binding. The Applicant

State has also violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare i.e. the principle which provides that the State

was under an obligation either to prosecute or extradite.

3. The arrests of citizens of the Respondent State and other citizens during emergency by the Applicant

State were in violation of international law.

The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right.The emergency was declared in violation of

international law and hence was not valid. Thus, arrests were not justified.

4. The changes brought into the Constitution of the Applicant State lead to the suppression of civil

liberties which is a violation of international law.

The Applicant State has an obligation under international law to provide for civil and political rights.The

Respondent State has a right to bring this claim.Violation of this obligation entails State responsibility.

DEFENSES

1. Applicant States claim to challenge effective economic blockade is inadmissible.

The Applicant States claim to challenge the Respondent States economic policy is inadmissible.Assuming

but not conceding that the claim is admissible, the changed economic policy is in compliance with

international law. Arguendo, effective economic blockade is justified as economic sanctions under


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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS W RITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE R ESPONDENT

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international law as Economic Sanction is a justified response to increase in military expenditure and

Economic Sanctions are justified as a countermeasure under international law.

2. Respondent State is not responsible for the attacks on UC Rally in the Applicant State.

Burden of Proof is on the Applicant State to prove that UC Rally was bombed by the Respondent State.

In Arguendo, the attack is an act of self-defence and thus in compliance with international law.

Exercise of self-defence is in response to an armed attack.The Respondent State was in a state of distress

and necessity so as to justify self-defence.

3. The government of Sovereign State is sovereign and is in compliance with international law.

The Applicant State has no locus to challenge the government of Respondent State.

In Arguendo, the Respondent States government is in compliance with international law.

4.

There is no threat of war by the Respondent State and the request was a means to peacefully settle

the situation in accordance with the well-settled principle of international law.


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C ONTENTION I

DDMM HH AARR II SSHH MM EE MM OO RR II AALL GG OO VVEE RR NNMM EE NNTT LL AAWW CC OO LL LL EE GG EE II NNTT EE RR NNAATT IIOO NNAALL MM OO OO TT CC OO UURR TT CC OO MM PP EE TT II TT IIOO NN 1

T HE APPLICANT STATE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF UNITED NATIONS C HARTER ASITS ACTIONS AMOUNTED TO STATE SPONSORED T ERRORISM .

It is the humble submission of the Respondent State before this Honble Court that the UC group was

involved in international terrorism and by supporting and tolerating its activities the Applicant State

undertook state sponsored terrorism.

1.1. The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as international terrorism.

If the core of war crimes is extended to peacetime, acts of terrorism may simply be defined as peacetime

equivalents of war crimes. 1 Keeping this in mind, along with definitions of various States 2 and UN

resolutions, 3 international terrorism incorporates four elements 4: (1) use of force or threat of force, (2) in an

attempt to cause fear, (3) to bring about a political objective, and (4) targeting of civilians. 5

1.2. Appreciation of circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in the attack.

The instant case in an apt example, where circumstantial evidence should be taken into consideration by this

Honble Court. In cases where direct evidence of fact is not available, it is a general principle of law that

proof may be administered by means of circumstantial evidence. 6 Many a times in disputes of international

character, exclusive territorial control exercised by one State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the

method of proof available to the victim State to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. It has

been held by this Honble Court that such a victim State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to

1 Singh v. Bihar , AIR 2004 SC 3317, 16.2 United States Code, 22 U.S.C. 2656(d) (1); British Prevention of Terrorism Act , 1989, at Part 20; Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union on Combating Terrorism of June 2002, Official Journal of theEuropean Committee L 164, 22 June 2002; Emanuel Gross, Terrorism and the Law: Democracy in the War AgainstTerrorism--the Israeli Experience 35 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1161, at p.11653 Declaration on the Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism General Assembly Resolution 49/60, Adopted 17February 1995, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60.4 Tomuschat Report prepared by Christian Tomuschat, at 35.5 Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on US": International Law and Forcible State Responses toTerrorism, 12 Wis. Int'l L.J. 153, 162 (1994) [ Beck & Clerk ]; John Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State's Response toTerrorism and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 77, 93 (2002); Anthony Clark Arend, International Lawand Rogue States: The Failure of the Charter Framework, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 735, 740 (2002); 48; Louis Rene Beres,The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239, 240-41(1995); Lt. Col. James P. Terry, USMC, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis, 36 Naval L.Rev. 159, 161 (1986).6 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 [ Corfu Channel Case]; British-Mexican ClaimsCommission (1926): Mcneill Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.96, at pg.100; British-Mexican ClaimsCommission (1926):The Sonora (Mexico) Plant and Timber Co. Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.292, at

pg. 296; British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):2 Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com, pg. 297, at pg. 298;Hague Commission of Inquiry: The Tubantia (1922) 2 H.C.R., p.135; Germany-U.S. Mixed Claims Commission(1922): Taft Case (1926), Dec. & Op., p.801; Portugo-German Arbitration (1919): The Cysne Case (1930), 2UNRIAA, p.1011, at p.1056; Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (1923): Claim I: Rzini (Tetuan Orchards) Case (1924),2 UNRIAA, p.615, at p.654


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C ONTENTION I B ODY OF P LEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE R ESPONDENT


inferences of facts and circumstantial evidences. 7 It is an admitted position that it would be going too far for

an international court, in such situations, to insist on direct and visual evidence and to refuse to admit, after

reflection, a reasonable amount of human presumption with a view of reaching that state of certainty with

which a Court of Justice must be content. 8

1.3. In arguendo, the UC group aided and abetted international terrorism.

The actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance,

encouragement or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. 9 Moreover,

such assistance need not constitute an indispensable element that is a condition sine qua non, for the acts of

the principle. 10

It is not necessary for an accomplice to share the mens rea, that is knowledge of the assistance he was

providing in the commission of the actual offense11

, of the perpetrator, in the sense of a positive intention to

commit the crime. Instead, the threshold requirement is merely that the accomplice has knowledge that his

actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime. 12

1.4. The Applicant State was involved in State-sponsored terrorism.

It is contended in the present case that the Applicant State provided state support and state tolerance. Non-

state actors carry out "State-sponsored terrorism" with the support, tolerance or sponsorship of a State

government. 13 State sponsorship of terrorism can range from a State being directly behind the terrorist

attacks, to less direct State involvement such as providing training, financing or support one way or another,

to even less direct State involvement by "tolerating", while not specifically supporting or approving, a

particular terrorist group. Using a State's territory as a location from which to launch terrorist attacks is

something that, if tolerated, suggests that the State involved has, in effect, aided and abetted the terrorist

group by looking the other way. 14

7 Supra [6]8 Supra [6]9 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999) [ Furundzija];Prosecutor v. Musema, IT-96-13-A (ICTR, Jan. 27, 2000) [ Musema]; Prosecutor v. George Ruggio, ICTR-97-32-I.10 Ibid.11 Musema, Ibid., p.18112 Furundzija, Supra[9].13 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 83,91 (2002), at 84.14 Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 Vand. J.Transnat'l L. 289, 298 (1987) [ Keneth].


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A. The Applicant State provided State support to the terrorist activities.

It is humbly submitted that the Applicant State is responsible for providing State support to UC Group.

"State support" requires a less significant level of assistance than sponsorship, but includes supply of

intelligence, weapons, diplomatic assets, funds, or rhetorical endorsement. 15 Sometimes in view of its

particular nature, conclusive proof of certain fact is impossible. All that a court can reasonably require in the

way of proof in such cases, is prima facie evidence sufficient to satisfy the court, leaving it open to the

respondent State to rebut the presumptions by producing evidence to the contrary. 16 In case where proof of a

fact presents extreme difficulty, a tribunal may thus be satisfied with less conclusive proof, which is prima

facie evidence. 17 If the Judges acting as reasonable man of the world and bearing in minds the fact of human

nature, do feel convinced that a particular event occurred or state of affairs existed, they should accept such

things established.18

The absence of evidence in rebuttal is an essential consideration in the admission of

prima facie evidence. 19 The non-production of countervailing evidence may be taken into account in

weighing evidence before a court, 20 and in an appropriate case a reasonable adverse inference can be drawn

from such a non-production of evidence. 21 A claimants case should not necessarily suffer by the non-

production of evidence by respondent. 22 While it is an admitted position that it is not a function of the

respondent government to make a case for the claimant government, certain adverse inferences, could be

drawn from such a non-production of evidence, solely in the possession of the former. 23 Where counter

proof can be easily produced but its non-production is not satisfactorily explained, it may be assumed that

such evidence as could have been produced on this point would not have refuted the charge in relation

thereto. 24 It is a general principle of law that the situation, as established, by prima facie evidence, coupled

with adverse presumption arising from the non-production of available counter evidence, is sufficient to

create a moral conviction of truth of an allegation. 25 Thus, evidence produced by one party in litigation may

15 Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; at 16516 British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926: Lynch Case (1929), Dec. & Op. of Com.,p.20 [ Lynch Case]17 Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals,1953, p.323 [ Cheng]18 British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926); Mexico City Bombardment Claim (1930),Dec. & Op. of Comm., p.10019 Lynch Case, Supra [16]; British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926):Cameroon Case (1929) Dec. & Op. ofCom.,p.3320 France-Venzuela Mixed Claims Commission (1902): Burn Case, Ralstons Report, pg.521 Mexico-U.S. Special Claims Commission (1923): Namoi Russell Case (1931), Op. of Com. 1926-1931, p.44, at p.8822 Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Kling Case (1930), Op. of Com. 1931, p.36, at p.4923 Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Hatton Case, Op. of Com. 1929, p.624 Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Melczer Mining Co. Case (1929), Op. of Com. 1929, P.22825 Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923):Daniel Dillon Case (1928), Op. of Com. 1929, p.61, at p.65


24/41



be supported by legal presumptions, which arise from the non-production of information exclusively in

possession of another party. 26

In the present case there is prima facie evidence that the Applicant State provided financial aid to the UC

Group. Though there is no evidence regarding the knowledge of the Applicant State as to the activities of the

UC Group the same can established by prima facie evidence of financial aid coupled with the non-

production of countervailing evidence of lack of knowledge by the Applicant State. Thus, it is established

that the Applicant State provided State support to the terrorist activities.

B. The Applicant State provided State tolerance to the terrorist activities.

It is submitted that the complete absence of State action by the Applicant State against the UC Group, even

after the attacks in the Respondent State, makes it evident that the Applicant state provided State tolerance

to the terrorist activities. If the host government has no interest in controlling terrorists under its jurisdiction,

the failure to respond could be construed as state sponsorship. 27 "State toleration" recognizes an even weaker

level of involvement, existing when the State acquiesces to the terrorist group's presence without providing

sponsorship or support. 28 A host government also engages in State-sponsored terrorism where it merely

tolerates the use of its territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks and refuses requests to shut down those

operations when it could do so. 29 The State tolerates the terrorists operating as such within its borders by

making no effort to arrest or oust them, although it does not actively support them. By not ejecting or

arresting the terrorists, the State is enabling them to carry on their activities. 30

1.5. State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for this act of State-sponsored terrorism.

Regardless of the limitation imposed by the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Wrongful Acts, 2001, general international law principles of State responsibility provide that States assume

responsibility for all violations of international law. 31 Therefore, where States violate primary international

law, such as the U.N. Charter, they may be held responsible for sponsorship and support of terrorism under

26 Ibid 27 A/52/653, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Sixth Committee available at http://www.un.org/law/cod/terroris/htm; John F. Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, andEconomic Dimensions, 32-33 (Westview Press) (1989).28 Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; at 16529 Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 559, 565 (1999).30 Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 144, 150 (2000)[Travalio].31 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act, (2001), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [ILCArticles] Article 1


25/41



traditional principles of State responsibility. 32

Resolution 1373, 33 prohibits States from providing terrorists with financial support or protection, and

furthermore creates State accountability for acquiescence to a terrorist organization's presence within a

State's borders. 34 In Resolution 748, the U.N. Security Council recognized that State support of terrorism

presents a threat to international peace and security and stated that in accordance with the principle in UN

Charter, 35 every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in

terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the

commission of such acts. 36 Thus, the international community now recognizes accountability extending to a

State whose involvement is limited to tacit approval of terrorist activity within its borders. 37

In the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 38 applying the principle that a State's demonstration of force, in

any form of aggression,39

violates both international law and the U.N. Charter,40

and creates responsibility

under international law, 41 to terrorism, the U.N. concluded that international law imposes a duty on States to

refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing

in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts. 42 U.N. Declaration

on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States acknowledges the

duty of a State to prevent the use of its territory as a means to threaten the integrity of another State and

creates State accountability for State provision of territory to terrorist organizations. It also outlaws all State

sponsorship, support, and tolerance, for terrorism. 43 Thus, it identified State action supporting terrorism as a

violation of the U.N. Charter. 44

32 Ibid , Article 5533 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).34 William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 105, 107-08 (2002), at 162.35 Article 2(4)36S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., 3063d mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992); Kenneth Supra [14]37

Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25 Harv. J.L. &Pub. Pol'y 559, 582 (2002); at 57938 Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(1970) [ Declaration on Friendly Relations].39 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 98 (1989), at 93.40 Supra[38]41 Ibid 42 Supra[38]43 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103,U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (1981) [ Declaration on the Inadmissibility].44 Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.177, 180-81 (1987)., at 195


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C ONTENTION II


T HE APPLICANT STATE V IOLATED THE DUTY TO C OOPERATE ASSIGNED BY THE BINDINGSECURITY C OUNCIL R ESOLUTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE .

2.1. The Security Council resolution being a resolution under Chapter VII was a binding resolution.

It is humbly submitted that the measures taken by the Security Council (SC) under Chapter VII of the UN

Charter, fall under the category of binding decisions.45

Under Article 24 of U.N. Charter, SC has the primaryresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security by virtue of which it can impose on

States an explicit obligation of compliance by issuing an order or command under Chapter VII. Such

measures are binding upon all the parties and require them to cease the happening of such events. 46 The

resolutions passed under Chapter VII by SC are issued once it has determined the existence of any threat to

peace, breach of peace, or an act of aggression. 47

The concept of threat to peace and security is a political concept. The determination of threat to peace

requires more than mere normative considerations; it necessitates an analysis of political realities. 48 The

understanding of what constitutes a threat to peace is broadened considerably from the narrow concept of the

absence of the use of armed force to the wider concept of the situation that may lead to use of armed force. 49

In cases where SC does not mention the chapter under which a resolution is passed, interpretation is

required. 50 One of the sources of interpretation of SC resolution is the circumstance of its adoption. 51

2.2. Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII, it is yet binding.

Article 25 of the Charter, states that the members of the U.N. agree to accept and carry out the decisions of

the SC in accordance with the Charter. 52 It has been settled by ICJ that Article 25 of the Charter applies to

other parts besides Chapter VII of the Charter. 53 The interpretation that limits the domain of binding

decisions to those decisions taken under Chapter VII would render Article 25 superfluous. 54 Therefore, it is

necessary to look at the wordings and context of a resolution and not the chapter it is issued under, in order

45 David Schewigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (2001)[Schewigman]46 Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, (1962) ICJ Rep 16347 Article 39, UN Charter48 Prosecutor v. Tadic , Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 ILM 32 (1996)49 Stefan Talmon, Note and Comment: The Security Council as World Legislature,99 AGIL 17550 Schewigman, Supra[45] 51 Michael C. Woods, Interpretation of Security Council Resolution,Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law52 UN Charter, Article 25.53 Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), (1971) ICJ Rep 113 at 5354 Ibid .; A. Frowein, Collective Enforcement of International Obligation, (1987) 47 ZaoRv 67


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to determine whether SC intended to issue a decision or recommendation. 55 The language of the SC

resolution should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In order to

determine as to whether the power under Article 25 have in fact been exercised regard must be given to all

circumstances that led to the resolution of the SC. 56

2.3. The Applicant State violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare.

It is humbly submitted that Applicant States inaction against UC constitutes a violation of the customary

principle aut dedere aut judicare.A State must investigate any allegation that there is a person in its territory

who has committed the offence and, if the circumstances so warrant, ensure the persons presence for the

purpose of extradition or prosecution. 57 This principle of aut dedere aut judicare is a universally recognized

principle and provides an obligation on a State either to extradite or prosecute the offender. 58 Under this rule,

a State is required either to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with principles of international law for a person suspected of terrorism or to extradite the person to a State able and willing to do so. 59 The essential

principle on which this doctrine rests is that an alleged offender should not find safe haven in the territory of

any State. 60 If detaining State does not extradite, it is under an obligation without exception whatsoever and

whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its own authorities for the

purpose of prosecution. 61

This principle of aut dedere aut judicareaims to eliminate any hiding place in the territory of any of the

parties for persons accused of terrorism. 62 The requirement is not to prosecute but to submit the case to its

own authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

55 R. Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are binding under Article 25 of the Charter,(1972) 32 ICLQ 26956 Supra,[53]57 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Foreword to Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, at vii,Rodrigo Yepes- Enrquez & Lisa Tabassi eds., 200258

Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No.10 (A/59/10) para.362.59 ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare,Amnesty International Publications, 2009; Marc Henzelin, Le Principe delUniversalit en Droit Pnal International: Droit et Obligation pour les tats de Poursuivre et Juger selon le Principede lUniversalit,2000; Article 7, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment orPunishment ; M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework ,ed., International Criminal Law 3, 5 (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2nd. ed. 1999).60 Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: Capital Punishment and Torture, 23 FordhamInt'l L.J. 1369, 1369 (2000).61 Roda Mushkat, Fair Trial as Precondition to Rendition: An International Legal Perspective,(Univ. of H.K. Ctr. forComparative & Pub. Law, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2002)62 ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare,Amnesty International Publications, 2009; United States v. Columba-Colella,604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979); Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle Of International Criminal Jurisdiction 2(1994).


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C ONTENTION III


T HE ARRESTS DURING EMERGENCY BY THE APPLICANT STATE WAS IN VIOLATION OFINTERNATIONAL L AW .

3.1. The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right.

It is humbly submitted that the Applicant State has fictitiously exercised its sovereign right under the cloak

of emergency declaration. The principle of good faith is considered to be the foundation of all laws. 63 The

principle of good faith ought to govern international relations. 64 It cannot be that good faith is less obligatory

upon nations that upon individuals in carrying out agreements. 65

A State must fulfil its obligations bona fide.66 Good faith thus governs the exercise of rights. These rights

must not be exercised fictitiously so to evade such obligations or rules of law, or maliciously so as to injure

others. Violations of these requirements of the principle of good faith constitute abuse of rights, prohibited

by law. 67 The principle of good faith requires every right to be exercised honestly and loyally. Any fictitious

exercise of right for the purpose of evading a rule of law is not tolerated under international law. Such an

exercise constitutes an abuse of right, prohibited by law. 68 Ex re sed non ex nomin is a principle of good

faith. 69 This principle inter alia precludes the form of law from being used to cover the commission of what

in fact is an unlawful act. If international law prescribes certain rights to a State, which can be exercised

under certain circumstances for a specific purpose, it is not permissible for that State to exercise such a right

under the pretext of that purpose, to achieve a completely distinct unlawful purpose. 70 Such an exercise of

right would lead to invasion of law amounting to fictitious exercise of right constituting an abuse of rights

and thus violating the principle of good faith. 71

3.2. The emergency was declared in violation of international law and hence was not valid.

It is well established that there are two essential elements of custom in international law, namely, State

practice and opinio juris sevi necessitates72. For this purpose, practice must be general, and not completely

63

Magalidis Case, (1928)8 T.A.M 386, at 39564 Venezuelan Preferential Claims Case (1904) (Germany, Great Britain, Italy v. Venezuela et al), 1 H.C.R 55,at p.6065 Metzger & Co. Case (U.S. v Haiti), 1901 U.S.F.R 262, at 27166 Award (1937) 3 UNRIAA p. 1719, at p.175167 German Interests Case (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No.7, at p.30; Free Zones Case(Second Phase): Order (France v. Switzerland), (1930) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.24, at p.1268 Cheng, Supra[17] , p.12369 Chorzow Factory Case (Merits) (Germany v. Poland ), (1928) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.17, at p.87 [ Chorzow FactoryCase]70 Ibid71 Walter F. Smith Case, (1929) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 46, at p.167; Oscar Chinl Case (Belgium v. U.K.), (1934)P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 63, at p.8672 Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 226 (1964).


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universal, 73 in order to constitute an international custom. 74 Passage of time is not critical. 75 Thus, a practice

does not have to be observed as law, either tacitly or expressly, by every State. 76 Further, in order for State

practice to constitute the necessary opinio juris, the acts concerned must amount to settled practice coupled

with the evidence of the belief that it is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 77

This subjective element can be deduced from various sources including the conclusion of bilateral and

multilateral treaties. 78 The concept of "derogation", which means that States could legally suspend their

obligation to respect and enforce the rights contained in the human right convention during times of war,

was extended to other public emergency threatening the life of the nation only in 1950. 79 All the three

leading instruments i.e. ECHR , the introducer of the concept; ACHR and the ICCPR, prescribe, broadly

speaking, inter alia, two procedural restrictions, on the use of emergency powers. 80 These treaties are signed

and ratified by majority of the nations. All the nations therefore recognise these controls over State

emergency and thus these controls constitute a part of customary international law. The procedural controls

relevant in the present situation is a requirement that the details of such emergency, as well as the precise

nature of any derogations involved, must be notified to all states through a prescribed authority or atleast to

the State which will be affected by the derogation. 81

73 Nicaragua, Ibid , at 98; Restatement of Foreign Relation Laws of the United States 102 cmt. c (1987) [Restatement].74 George Norman & Joel. P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AJIL 541 (2005); MauriceMendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 Recueil des Cours 155 (1998); Robert Jennings andArthur Watts, Oppenheims International Law 25 (1996)[ Oppenheim] ; I. A. Shearer, Starks International Law 31(1994).75 Restatement, Supra [73], Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law in Realismin Law-Making: Essays on International Law in Honor of Willem Riphagen 231 (1986) ; Louis B. Sohn, Speech: The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law; The American University Washington College of Law Edwin A Moo Lecture, 34 Am.U.L.Rev. 271(1984).76 Triska and Sussler, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties (1962); Ramudo, The (Soviet) Socialist Theory ofInternational Law (1964); Higgins, Conflict of Interest (1965); Baade, The Soviet Impact of International Law (1965);Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law (1970).77 North Sea, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined. ] 6, pp. 3, 44; Nicaragua, Supra [Error! Bookmark notdefined. ], at 109; The Rights of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India), [1966] ICJ Rep 42; The SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey), [1972] PCIJ Rep Series A No. 10.78 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatamela), [1955] ICJ Rep 22 [Nottebohm]; Lagos v Baggianini, [1955] 22 ILR533 at 536-7; Lauritzen et al v Government of Chile, [1956] 23 ILR 70 at 715-16, 729-30; The State (Duggan) v Tapley,[1951] 18 ILR 109; The Italian National Re-extradition Case, [1970] 70 ILR 374 at 376-7; North Sea, Supra [Error!Bookmark not defined. ], at 25; Nicaragua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined. ].79 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on HumanRights) (ECHR); American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR);International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171(ICCPR)80 ICCPR, Article 4; ACHR, Article 27; ECHR, Article 15.81Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999) ;Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 (2002)


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C ONTENTION IV


T HE C HANGES BROUGHT INTO THE C ONSTITUTION OF THE APPLICANT STATE L EAD TO THESUPPRESSION OF C IVIL L IBERTIES WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL L AW .

It is humbly submitted that the sovereign right of the Applicant State does not give it the right to violate

international norms. The interdependence of rights and obligations applies not only to treaty obligations but

also to obligations derived from general law. Every right is subject to such limitations as are necessary to

render it compatible both with the parties contractual obligation and with their obligations under general

law. 82 In this sense, rights can no longer be regarded as absolute, 83 but are essentially related. 84 The principle

of good faith by recognising their independence harmonises rights and obligations of every person as well as

within legal order as a whole. 85

4.1. The Applicant State has an obligation under International Law to provide for civil and political rights

International obligations may be established by a customary rule of international law.86

The delineation of

civil and political rights as "first generation human rights" has become standard terminology. 87 Through

treaty and customary international law, first generation human rights are binding on all nation-states. 88 First-

generation rights are negative rights, or "immunity claims" by citizens towards the State, in the sense that

they limit the power of a government to protect peoples' rights against its power. They relate to the sanctity

of the individual and his rights within the socio-political milieu in which he is located. They imply that no

government or society should act against individuals in certain ways that would deprive them of inherent

political or personal rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, and security of person, freedom of speech,

press, assembly, and religion. 89 First generation human rights are superior to economic, social, and cultural

rights i.e. second-generation human rights. 90 Though human rights, second-generation rights are considered

82 Mexican-United States General Claims Commission (1923): North American Dredging Company of Texas Case, Op.of Com. 1927, p.21, at p.29; Trail Smelter Arbitration,Award 2 (1941), 1935 UNRIAA, p. 1905, at p.196383 Ibid , at p.29; Admission of U.S. to U.N., Advisory Opinion, (1948) ICJ Rep. 57, at 7984

Cheng, Supra[17], p.13285 Ibid86 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I .C . J . Reports 1974, p. 253; Nuclear Tests(New Zealand v. France), I .C . J . Reports 1974, p. 457 [collectively referred as Nuclear Test Cases] ; North Sea, Supra [Error! Bookmark notdefined. ] at pp. 38-39, para. 63; Nicargua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined. ].87 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary v Slovakia),[1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 113 [Gabcikovo];88 Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 Colum. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1997);Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 702 (1987)89 J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in Africa, 18 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 851, 852 (2003); Nsongurua J.Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1209, 1224 (2003).90 Obijio for Aginam , Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap And Global Health Challenges At Century'sDawn, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 603.


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secondary in order of their importance for protection by and against the State. 91 Thus there is an

unconditional obligation on the Respondent State to provide for first-generation human rights.

4.2. The Respondent State has a right to bring this claim.

All States are entitled to invoke responsibility for breaches of obligations to the international community as

a whole.92

First generation human rights, because of its negative character, represent commitment to the

entire international community by each State because all the States have an interest in the former they are

obligations erga omnes, thus making them a proper subject for international concern and justifying sanctions

and initiation of proceedings by other States, individually and collectively, for violations thereof. 93 The ICJ

and ILC have also considered first generation human rights as peremptory norms of International Law. 94

Thus the Respondent State though not an Injured State has a right to assign responsibility.

4.3. Violation of this obligation entails State Responsibility.

There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with

what is required of it by that obligation. 95 Violation of an unequivocally recognised norm of customary

international law being a legal obligation will constitute an internationally wrongful act. 96 State

responsibility entails for such an internationally wrongful act. 97 Further the Applicant State cannot preclude

this wrongfulness because nothing precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in

conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. 98

The fact that the constitutional amendments made in the Applicant State gave them the right to usurp civil

liberties show that their actions were in violation of international law and thus entails responsibility.

91 Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1986)92 ILC Articles, Supra[31], Art. 4893 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co . (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33 [ Barcelona Traction]; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, (1990)78 California Law Review 449.94

Barcelona Traction, Ibid , at p. 32, para. 34. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90, at p. 102, para. 29; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, at p. 258, para. 83;Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections,I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595, at pp. 615-616, paras. 31-32.95 ILC Articles, Supra[31], Art. 1296 Restatement, Supra [73]; Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articulation Theories: An Economic Analysis, 2 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 201 (2006); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts onCustomary International Law, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 191 (2001); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 839 (2002).97 ILC Articles, Supra [31],, Art. 1 r/w Art. 28 r/w Art. 33; Ambateilos Arbitration (Greece v UK), [1956] 12 RIAA 83; Barcelona Traction, Supra[93] , [1970] ICJ Rep 4; Norwegian Loans Case (France v Norway), [1957] ICJ Rep 9[Norwegian].98 ILC Articles, Supra[31]1,Article 26.


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APPLICANT STATE S C LAIM TO C HALLENGE E FFECTIVE E CONOMIC B LOCKADE ISINADMISSIBLE .

1.1. The Applicant States claim to challenge the Respondent States economic policy is inadmissible.

It is submitted before this Honble Court that the Applicant States claim to challenge the effective

economic blockade imposed by the Respondent State over Applicant State should be held inadmissible on

the grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies. 99

The rule of exhaustion of local remedies is a customary principle of international law, 100 which provides that

all local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted. 101 The rule of

exhaustion of local remedies in such cases poses a question of admissibility. 102 It has been stated that matters

within the domestic jurisdiction 'as determined by' that particular State are automatically excluded from the

purview of the international tribunals. 103 Respect for State sovereignty provides a principal rationale for the

requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. 104 Matters within the competence of States under general

international law are said to be within the reserved domain, the domestic jurisdiction of the States. 105 It has

been held by this Honble Court that every State has the sovereign right to choose freely, their political,

economic, social and cultural systems and the formulation of foreign policy. 106 Thus, the matters, such as

framing of economic policy fall within the well-established internal framework of a nation. Thus any claim

with respect to it should be dealt at first by domestic courts of Respondent State.

99 Article 79, Rules of International Court of Justice (1978) adopted on 14 April 1978 and enteredinto force on 1 July 1978100 Elettronica Sicula SpA( E L S I ) Case (U.S. v. Italy) Case, ICJ Reports, 1989, p, 15; Stephen M. Schwebel & J.Gillis Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 484, 500 (1966) 101 Interhandelcase, ICT Reports, 1959, p. 27; Pleadings, Israel v. Bulgaria, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 531-2, and T.Meron, 'The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies', 25 BYIL, 1959, p. 95. Note, in addition, the North American DredgingCo. claim, 4 RIAA, p. 26 (1926); 3 AD, p. 4; Exparte Ferhut Butt116 ILR, pp. 607, 614-15(High Court) and 619 (Court of Appeal); Article 35, European Convention on Human Rights; Article 46, Inter-

American Convention on Human Rights; Article 5, Optional Protocol I, International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights; and Article 295 of the Law of the Sea Convention;102 Fawcett, 31 BY (1954), 452-8; Judge Lauterpacht, Sep. Op., Norwegian, Supra[97] at 39-41; Case of Ireland againstthe United Kingdom, ECHR: ILR 58, 190, Judgment, 1978, 159.103 Rosenne, Law and Practice,vol. 11, pp. 778-82.104 Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 200 (2d ed. 2004)105 Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction (2nd Edn., 1961),pp. 407-48, 509-25; Conforti, Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Perspectives (1991), 467-82; Kelsen, Principles of International Law, pp. 62-4,191-2, 196-201.106 Nicaragua Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined. ] at pp. 14, 108; S. McCaffrey, 'The Forty-First Session of theInternational Law Commission: 83 AJIL, 1989, p. 937; Declaration on Inadmissibility, Supra [43] , p. 1021; Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States adopted in General Assembly resolution 1974 3281 (XXIX) [Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties]


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1.2. Assuming but not conceding that the claim is admissible, the changed economic policy is in

compliance with international law.

It is humbly submitted that economic decision taken by Respondent State is targeted to protect the interest of

the nation in light of huge economic loss suffered by it. 107 It is often difficult to differentiate between the

normal economic controls that a State exercises over its economy and economic sanctions designed to

coerce a foreign State. 108 State control over its domestic economy is an accepted exercise of its

sovereignty. 109 State control over its domestic economy is an accepted exercise of its sovereignty. 110 Every

State has a duty to decide such economic goal and to take such measures which are in its best interests and

lead to the development of the nation. 111

The right of a State to adopt the course which it considers best suited to the exigencies of its security and to

the maintenance of its integrity is a very essential right.112

This right possessed by all the nations, which is

based on generally accepted usage, cannot lose its raison dtre,simply because it may in some cases be

abused. 1

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