eighteenth international maritime law arbitration moot … · i eighteenth international maritime...
TRANSCRIPT
i
EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW ARBITRATION MOOT
2017
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT
\
UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA
TEAM 18
FURNACE TRADING PTE LTD INFERNO RESOURCES SDN BHD
(Claimant) (Respondent)
V.
TEAM 18
ANGGRAENI KESUMA N. SAMPURNA
CRISTIAN
REGINE WIRANATA
SHOFY SUMA NISRINA
TAMARA MEILIANA SISWANTO
WALIDA AHSANA HAQUE
ii
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... ii
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................ v
LIST OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................... vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................... 1
I. THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE
CARGO ON BOARD THE TARDY TESSA PENDENTE LITE ..................................... 3
A. THIS TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT DISPUTE ........ 3
(i) This Tribunal has jurisdiction over the Parties to the dispute ...................................... 3
(ii) This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to determine issues arising out of the Voyage
Charterparty ......................................................................................................................... 3
(iii) This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to apply the International Arbitration Act (Cap
143A) .................................................................................................................................... 4
B. THIS TRIBUNAL HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER PENDENTE LITE SALE
OF THE CARGO ................................................................................................................... 4
(i) The cargo belongs to a third party to the Voyage Charterparty .................................... 4
(ii) The Voyage Charterparty is not incorporated into the Bill of Lading ........................ 5
II. RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO CLAIMANT FOR DETENTION AND
OTHER DAMAGES UNDER THE VOYAGE CHARTERPARTY ................................ 7
A. RESPONDENT HAS NOT BREACHED ITS OBLIGATION TO NOMINATE A
SAFE PORT ........................................................................................................................... 7
(i) Respondent’s delay in nominating a Chinese port is justified ...................................... 7
iii
(ii) Respondent has the right to nominate Busan as a discharge port earlier................... 9
B. RESPONDENT’S DELAY IN REMITTING FREIGHT IS NOT A
REPUDIATORY BREACH OF THE VOYAGE CHARTERPARTY ............................. 9
(i) Respondent’s obligation to pay freight is not a condition ............................................. 9
(ii) Claimant’s request to remit freight on discharge is not a fundamental breach ....... 10
C. HENCE, CLAIMANT HAS WRONGFULLY REPUDIATED THE VOYAGE
CHARTERPARTY .............................................................................................................. 11
(i) Claimant’s termination of the Voyage Charterparty is wrongful ............................... 11
(i) Consequently, Claimant has deprived itself from its rights thereunder ..................... 12
III. CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXERCISE ANY LIEN OVER THE
CARGO ................................................................................................................................. 12
A. CLAIMANT HAS NO RIGHT TO EXERCISE LIEN OVER THE CARGO PER SE
................................................................................................................................................ 12
(i) Claimant has no common law lien over the cargo ...................................................... 12
(ii) Claimant has no contractual right to lien ................................................................... 14
B. IMLAM HAS NO RIGHT TO EXERCISE LIEN ON BEHALF OF CLAIMANT . 15
C. IN ANY EVENT, CLAIMANT CANNOT EXERCISE LIEN ON THE CARGO
TALIS QUALIS ..................................................................................................................... 17
IV. IT IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR JUST FOR THE CARGO ON BOARD THE
TARDY TESSA TO BE SOLD PENDENTE LITE .......................................................... 17
A. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE CARGO TO BE SOLD PENDENTE LITE ... 17
(i) Sale of the cargo fails to preserve its value .................................................................. 17
(ii) There exist alternatives to the sale of the cargo ......................................................... 18
iv
B. IT IS NOT JUST FOR THE CARGO TO BE SOLD PENDENTE LITE ................. 18
(i) Pendente lite sale of the cargo causes disproportionate harm to Respondent ........... 19
(ii) The harm suffered by Claimant is adequately reparable by an award of damages .. 19
REQUEST FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................... 21
v
ABBREVIATIONS
Voyage Charterer
Inferno
Time Charterer Furnance
M/V Merchant Vessel
Master Tan Xiao Ming
SCMA Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration
SPSB Safe Port Safe Berth
Parties Claimant and Respondent
Vessel M/V Tardy Tessa
Port Discharge Port
IAA International Arbitration Act
Tribunal Present Arbitral Tribunal
vi
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
LEGISLATION
International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A) 2002...............................................................4,5,6
Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China 1992......................................................17
Merchant Shipping Act (Chapter 179) 1996........................................................................18
Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration Rules 2015 (SCMA Rules).....................3,4
CASES and ARBITRAL AWARDS
Aegean Sea Traders Corporation v Repsol Petroleo SA
and Another [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 39....................................................................................8
Attorney-General of the Republic of Ghana v. Texaco
Overseas Tankships (The Texaco Melbourne) [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 4731.........................19
Astrata (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Tridex Technologies Pte Ltd
and another and other matters [2010] SGHC 250........................................................ 18,19
Australian Wheat Board v Reardon Smith Line Ltd
(The Houston City) [1954] HCA 27....................................................................................8,9
Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation v Henry
Stephens Shipping Co Ltd and Tex-Dilan Shipping Co Ltd
(The SLS Everest) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 389........................................................................6
Bovis Lend Lease Pte Ltd v Jay-Tech Marine Projects Pte Ltd
and Another Application [2005] SGHC 91............................................................................3
Canadian Pacific (Bermuda) Ltd v. Lagon Maritime Overseas
(The Fort Kipp) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 168.........................................................................10
Cascade Shipping Inc v Eka Jaya Agencies (Pte) Ltd [1993] 1 SLR 980.....................13,14
Castleton Commodities Shipping Co Pte Ltd v Silver Rock Investments
(The “Clipper Monarch”) [2015] EWHC 2584.................................................................17
Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 618.................................................17
Challenger Technologies Limited v Courts (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015]
SGHC 218................................................................................................................18,19,20
vii
Cho Yang Shipping Co. Ltd. v Coral (UK) Ltd. [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 641......................16
Concordia Agritrading Pte Ltd v Cornelder Hoogewerft (Singapore) Pte Ltd
[1999] 3 SLR(R) 618...........................................................................................................6
Dalwood Marine Co v Nordana Line A/S (The “Elbrus”) [2009]
EWHC 3394 (Comm).........................................................................................................12
Elder Dempster v. Paterson, Zochonis [1924] A.C. 552 (H.L.).....................................6,15
Emilia Shipping Inc v State Enterprises for Pulp and Paper Industries
[1991] 2 MLJ 379.........................................................................................................17,18
ENE Kos Ltd v Petroleo Brasileiro SA (The “Kos”) [2010]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 87; [2010] EWCA CIV 713; [2012] UKSC 17...........................................10
Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 311..........12,13,15,17,18
Harrison v. Huddersfield Steamship [1903] 19 T.L.R. 386..............................................15
Hongkong Fir Shipping Company v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Limited,
[1961] EWCA Civ 7..................................................................................................8,10,11
Hutton v Bragg [1974] 7 Taunt. 14 S.C. 2. Marsh. 339...................................................13
Italian State Railways v Mavrogordatos and Another [1919] 2 KB 305
(The “Antonios M Mavrogordatos”)................................................................................10
Jiang Haiying v Tan Lim Hui and Another Suit [2009] 4 SLR(R) 460..............................5
Jurong Engineering Ltd v Black & Veatch Singapore Pte Ltd
[2003] SGHC 292. P. 3.......................................................................................................3
Kirchner v Venus [1859] 12 Moore 361, 390...................................................................12
L&M Concrete Specialist Pte Ltd v United Eng Contractors Pte Ltd
[2000] 2 SLR(R) 852..........................................................................................................6
Leeds Shipping Co v Soci t Fran aise Bunge
(The Eastern City) [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127.....................................................................7
Leonis Steamship Co v. Rank (No. 2) [1908] Com. Cas. 295 (CA)....................................8
London and Northern Steamship Co Ltd v. Central Argentine Railway Ltd
[1913] 108 LT 527. .............................................................................................................8
viii
Manchester Trust v. Furness, Withy [1895] 2 Q.B. 539 (C.A.).........................................15
Miramar Maritime Corporation v Holborn Oil Trading Ltd
(The “Miramar”) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 319...............................................................13,16
Molthes Rederi Aktieselskabet v Ellerman’s Wilson Line Ltd
[1926] 36 LI.L.Rep. 259.....................................................................................................13
Morris v. Baron & Co [1918] AC 1....................................................................................10
Mottram Consultants Ltd. v. Bernard Sunley & Sons Ltd. [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 197.....15
Obestain v National Mineral Development Corp
(The Sanix Ace) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 465.........................................................................19
Samuel v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation [1906] 11 Com Cas 115.............................15
Spar Shipping A.S v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd
[2016] EWCA CIV 982...................................................................................................10,11
Star-Trans Far East Pte Ltd v Norske-Tech Ltd [1996] 2 SLR(R) 196.................................6
The “Berkshire” [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 185........................................................................14
The “Dwima 1” [1996] 2 SLR 670; [1996] SGHC 83.........................................................12
The Federal Bulker [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 103......................................................................5
The Rena K [1979] Q.B. 377..................................................................................................5
The Rewia [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325 (C.A.).......................................................................14
The “Star Quest” and others [2016] SGHC 100...................................................................6
The “Starsin” [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85..............................................................................14
Tillmanns v. Knutsford [1908] 2 K.B. 385 (C.A.), [1908] A.C. 406 (H.L.)........................14
Tradigrain SA v. King Diamond Marine Ltd
“The Spiros C” [2000] Int.Com.L.R. 07/13........................................................................16
Tudor Marine v. Tradax (The Virgo) [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 135, 143.................................5
Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC K57 (QB)......................................................................5
ix
Wegener v Smith (1854) 15 CB 285, 139 ER 432.................................................................6
Wehner & Ors v Dene Steam Shipping Co & Ors [1905] 2 KB 92...............................13,14
Wilston v. Andrew Weir [1925] 22 L.I.L.Rep. 521..............................................................14
WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v. Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 1 SLR(R)......19
Zim Israel Navigation Co Ltd v. Tradax Export SA
(The Timna) [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 409.................................................................................8
OTHER SOURCES
David Joseph & David Foxton, Singapore International Arbitration: Law and Practice
(Singapore: LexisNexis, 2014).......................................................................................4,5,18
John F. Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2010).................9
Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters (London: Informa Law, 1993)...........................16,19
Leonard A. Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Liens, Common Law,
Statutory, Equitable and Maritime (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2005)...........15
Martin Dockray, Cases and Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea,
(Psychology Press, 2004).......................................................................................................8
Richard Aikens, Richard Lord, & Michael Bools, Bills of Lading
(Oxon: Informa Law, 2016)..................................................................................................6
The Law of Contract (East Kilbride: LexisNexis, 2003)........................................................5
Voyage Charterparty.................................................1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16
Yong Hai Fa Wen Quan Zi [2011] NMC No. 1...................................................................17
Yvonne Baatz, Maritime Law (Oxon: Informa Law, 2008)..................................................15
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The vessel M/V Tardy Tessa, owned by Imlam Consignorist GmbH, was chartered on a
Time Charterparty to Furnace Trading Pte Ltd (CLAIMANT). Subsequently, it was
chartered by CLAIMANT to Inferno Resources Pte Ltd (RESPONDENT) on a Voyage
Charterparty for a shipment of Australian Anthracite dated September 1, 2016. Under the
Charterparty, freight was to be paid 5 days after the beginning of the voyage, and the
discharge port was to be a safe port and safe berth in China, to be declared by
RESPONDENT when the vessel passed Singapore for bunkering.
2. RESPONDENT in turn sub-let the vessel to Idoncare Berjaya Utama Pty Ltd, owners of the
shipped cargo. A Bill of Lading was issued, naming Idoncare as shipper and signed by the
Master of the vessel. The vessel began its voyage on December 4, 2016.
3. On October 10, 2016, CLAIMANT notified RESPONDENT that the vessel had arrived in
Singapore and demanded freight, which had been due a day earlier, and the nomination of a
port. RESPONDENT replied that it was unable to do either for the time being, as Idoncare
had neither remitted freight nor nominated a port.
4. Due to a congestion in Chinese ports, on October 16, 2016, RESPONDENT requested
CLAIMANT to redirect the vessel for a discharge at Busan, South Korea. CLAIMANT
refused on the basis of it being outside of the permitted range under the Voyage Charterparty
and Time Charterparty, and alleged that it was not a safe port due to the arrival of zombies
onboard a train. RESPONDENT’s evidence to the contrary was dismissed by CLAIMANT.
5. CLAIMANT gave an ultimatum to RESPONDENT that if RESPONDENT did not nominate
a discharge port or remit freight by October 20, 2016, CLAIMANT would terminate the
2
Voyage Charterparty and claim all losses incurred. As Idoncare had yet to remit freight or
nominate a port, RESPONDENT could not do so by the set date.
6. On October 20, 2016, CLAIMANT sent a notice of lien to RESPONDENT and Idoncare via
All’s Good over the cargo on board the vessel. The next day, RESPONDENT nominated the
discharge port of Ningbo, China, and promised to remit freight after discharge of the cargo.
In spite of this, On October 22, 2016, CLAIMANT arbitrarily the Voyage Charterparty.
7. CLAIMANT sent a notice of arbitration to RESPONDENT and Idoncare on November 25,
2016. RESPONDENT and Idoncare consented to it being dealt with by an arbitration under
the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration. Subsequently, CLAIMANT created an
urgent application for consolidation and liberty to sell the cargo, on December 1, 2016.
RESPONDENT and Idoncare agreed to the consolidation, and Idoncare declined to make
submissions at the oral hearing.
3
ARGUMENT ON JURISDICTION
I. THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE
CARGO ON BOARD THE TARDY TESSA PENDENTE LITE
A. THIS TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT DISPUTE
(i) This Tribunal has jurisdiction over the Parties to the dispute
8. The arbitration regime which governs an arbitral proceedings is to be determined by the
parties to a dispute.1 In the present case, the Parties have agreed to resolve their disputes
under the SCMA: Claimant and Respondent pursuant to Clause 29 of the Voyage
Charterparty;2 and Claimant and Idoncare pursuant to the Notice of Arbitration and
Response thereto.3 The Parties have further agreed to consolidate the two aforementioned
arbitration proceedings,4 and pursuant to such consent, under Rule 33.2 of the SCMA Rules
parties may be added by this Tribunal to the arbitration proceedings.5 Consequently, this
Tribunal has the power to determine disputes between the Parties.
(ii) This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to determine issues arising out of the Voyage
Charterparty
9. Rule 20 of the SCMA Rules grants this Tribunal jurisdiction to determine all disputes arising
under or in connection with the subject of reference.6 Claimant and Respondent have agreed
that a dispute has arisen out of the Voyage Charterparty.7 As such, with regards to the
1 Jurong Engineering Ltd v Black & Veatch Singapore Pte Ltd [2003] SGHC 292; Bovis Lend Lease Pte Ltd v
Jay-Tech Marine Projects Pte Ltd and Another Application [2005] SGHC 91 2 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 26, Clause 29
3 Ibid at 72, 84
4 Ibid at 90, 93, 95
5 Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration Rules 2015 (“SCMA Rules”); Rule 33.2
6 SCMA Rules; Rule 20
7 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 76-82, 86-88
4
subject of the current dispute, this Tribunal has the jurisdiction over issues arising out of, or
in connection with, the Voyage Charterparty.
(iii) This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to apply the International Arbitration Act (Cap
143A)
1. 10. The doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz as embodied in Article 16(1) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law dictates that this Tribunal has the competence to rule on its
jurisdiction.8 Pursuant to Rule 21 of the SCMA Rules, this Tribunal shall apply the law
designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute,9 which in Clause 29.
LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION is Singapore law.10
Rule 2 of the SCMA Rules gives
a force of law to the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A).11
The present dispute is an
international arbitration under the IAA,12
two Parties, Respondent and Idoncare, have their
places of business outside of Singapore, in Malaysia and Australia respectively.13
B. THIS TRIBUNAL HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER PENDENTE LITE SALE
OF THE CARGO
(i) The cargo belongs to a third party to the Voyage Charterparty
11. Although the International Arbitration Act indeed empowers this Tribunal to grant interim
relief,14
such a relief does not exist against third parties.15
Claimant’s assertion that its right
8 International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A) 2002 (“International Arbitration Act”); Sect 3(1);
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (“UNCITRAL Model Law”); Art 16(1) 9 SCMA Rules; Rule 21
10 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 23
11 SCMA Rules; Rule 2
12 International Arbitration Act; Sect 5(2)
13 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 71, 77
14 International Arbitration Act; Sect 12(1)
15 David Joseph & David Foxton, Singapore International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Singapore:
LexisNexis, 2014)
5
to sell the cargo pursuant to its right to lien under the Voyage Charterparty is erroneous,16
as
the cargo belongs to no party named thereunder as owners and charterers,17
but instead to
Idoncare, who is a third party to the contract.18
12. Idoncare remains a third party in spite of its inclusion into the arbitration proceedings.
According to the doctrine of privity of contract, Idoncare may not be forced to arbitrate
under an arbitration agreement to which it is not a party.19
Claimant and Idoncare’s
arbitration is non-contractual for purposes of the IAA,20
as Idoncare has disagreed to
arbitrate under the Voyage Charterparty.21
Hence, it remains a third party, against whom
interim relief may not be enforced.
(ii) The Voyage Charterparty is not incorporated into the Bill of Lading
13. The right to lien, if any, exists only under the Bill of Lading under which the cargo is
shipped, which names Imlam as carrier and Idoncare as shipper.22
However, such a bill of
lading falls outside the scope of the present dispute. A bill of lading is in essence the contract
between the Parties to the bill,23
and for commercial certainty, terms outside of it may only
apply through a strict test of incorporation.24
In the present case, no such incorporation has
been made to the Voyage Charterparty.
16
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 74 17
Tudor Marine v. Tradax (The Virgo) [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 135, 143 18
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 20, 41-46, 72, 83-84 19
Jiang Haiying v Tan Lim Hui and Another Suit [2009] 4 SLR(R) 460; Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC
K57 (QB); David Joseph & David Foxton, Singapore International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Singapore:
LexisNexis, 2014); Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (East Kilbride: LexisNexis, 2003), at 302 20
International Arbitration Act; Sect 2A(1) 21
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 84 22
Ibid, at 41, 43, 45. 23
The Rena K [1979] Q.B. 377 24
The Federal Bulker [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 103
6
14. Clauses contained within a charterparty can be invoked if it is incorporated into the Bill of
Lading,25
in specific and sufficiently clear terms.26
On the contrary, the Bill of Lading states
only “freight payable as per charterparty” in the face of the Bill of Lading, and incorporates
“all terms and conditions, liberties and exceptions of the Charter Party, dated as overleaf”
in the Conditions of Carriage, with no identification of the incorporated charter party.27
15. Consequently, the provisions could be construed to refer to the sub-voyage charterparty
between Respondent and Idoncare, under which the goods are being carried.28
Shipping
practices allow the use of the term “freight payable as per charterparty” for a shipper to
protect himself against the “double jeopardy” of a claim for freight under a charter party and
a bill of lading.29
It would only be reasonable for Idoncare to infer that such a term is
intended to protect it against such a claim.
25
International Arbitration Act; Art 2A(8), Wegener v Smith (1854) 15 CB 285, 139 ER 432 26
Star-Trans Far East Pte Ltd v Norske-Tech Ltd [1996] 2 SLR(R) 196; Concordia Agritrading Pte Ltd v
Cornelder Hoogewerft (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 618; L&M Concrete Specialist Pte Ltd v United
Eng Contractors Pte Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 852 27
Ibid, at 41, 73 28
The “Star Quest” and others [2016] SGHC 100; Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation v Henry
Stephens Shipping Co Ltd and Tex-Dilan Shipping Co Ltd (The SLS Everest) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 389 at 391–
392 29
Richard Aikens, Richard Lord, & Michael Bools, Bills of Lading (Oxon: Informa Law, 2016)
7
ARGUMENTS ON MERITS
II. RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO CLAIMANT FOR DETENTION AND
OTHER DAMAGES UNDER THE VOYAGE CHARTERPARTY
A. RESPONDENT HAS NOT BREACHED ITS OBLIGATION TO NOMINATE A
SAFE PORT
(i) Respondent’s delay in nominating a Chinese port is justified
a. Respondent’s delayed nomination of a Chinese port is due to unsafe conditions thereof
16. Respondent has nominated Ningbo as the discharge port, right before the contract was
arbitrarily repudiated by the Claimant.30
Although Respondent’s initial inability to nominate
a Chinese port when the vessel passed Singapore was due to a delay from the sub-
charterers,31
however subsequent reports that there was congestion in the Chinese ports had
made it impossible for Respondent to nominate a safe port within the scope of the
Charterparty.32
17. Even though a safe port warranty clause is absent from the charterparty, the charterer would
still have an obligation to fulfill a safe port warranty.33
A port will not be safe unless, in the
relevant period of time, a particular ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the
absence of some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by
good navigation and seamanship.34
For a charterer to order a ship to a port that is unsafe
30
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 67. 31
Ibid, at 57. 32
Ibid, at 58. 33
The Aegean Sea [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 39 34 Leeds Shipping Co v Soci t Fran aise Bunge (The Eastern City) [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 at 131.
8
itself is a breach of obligation imposed by the charter,35
and if the ship is damaged through
going there, he will be liable for the damage.36
18. Congestion in a discharge port due to strike and other hindrances may bring high risks in
damaging the cargo through delay of the discharge. Further, congestion requires extra costs,
loss of trade, and disruption of trade and transport agreements, as cargo and equipment do
not move efficiently through the terminals.37
To avoid liability for dangers posed by the
congestion, Respondent could not nominate a safe port in China until October 21, 2016.
b. The delay is not a serious breach under the Voyage Charterparty a quo
19. In itself, a failure to nominate a discharge port in sufficient time by a charterer would only
entitle a shipowner to claim detention for the delay until the charterers did give orders as to
which port to proceed to.38
Any term within a charter party can only be categorized as a
condition should it be the intention of the Parties.39
Hence, in the absence of an agreement
between the Parties to establish timely nomination as a condition,40
a delay in the nomination
of the safe port is not a condition of the Voyage Charterparty. Instead, it is an innominate
term, where the effect of non-performance will only depend on the nature or the
consequences of the breach.41
In the present case, Respondent had eventually nominated a
safe port in Ningbo, China,42
with no adverse consequences to Claimant. Hence, Claimant
has no right to treat the breach as repudiatory.
35
Australian Wheat Board v Reardon Smith Line Ltd (The Houston City) [1954] HCA 27, para 10. 36
The Houston City; Hall Bros Steamship Co, Ltd v R and W Paul, Ltd (1914) 111 LT 811 at para 81; Aegean
Sea Traders Corporation v Repsol Petroleo SA and Another [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 39. 37
Leonis Steamship Co v. Rank (No. 2) [1908] Com. Cas. 295 (CA); London and Northern Steamship Co Ltd v.
Central Argentine Railway Ltd [1913] 108 LT 527. 38
Zim Israel Navigation Co Ltd v. Tradax Export SA (The Timna) [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 409 39
Hongkong Fir Shipping Company v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Limited, [1961] EWCA Civ 7 40
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 20-23. 41
Martin Dockray, Cases and Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Psychology Press, 2004, p. 25. 42
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 67.
9
(ii) Respondent has the right to nominate Busan as a discharge port earlier
20. If a charterer considers a port of discharge unsafe, he may discharge the cargo elsewhere and
justify the course he has taken as to the unsafeness of the original port.43
In the present case,
Respondent has deemed Chinese ports unsafe, and hence nominated Busan as a discharge
port.44
However, Claimant refused such a nomination.45
21. Whereby the safety of a port is in doubt, it is the charterer who must bear the responsibility
of his choice,46
and owners should be entitled to rely on the place nominated being safe.47
Claimant’s refusal to comply by alleging that Busan was unsafe is hence not justified.
Respondent has guaranteed the safety of the port, as Korean military have secured the area
and vessels have berthed in Busan with no issues.48
Consequently, Claimant bears no risk in
accommodating Respondent’s request. Even if Busan eventually turned out to be unsafe,
Claimant could seek remedies based on the safe port warranty, but still would not be
justified in terminating the contract.49
B. RESPONDENT’S DELAY IN REMITTING FREIGHT IS NOT A
REPUDIATORY BREACH OF THE VOYAGE CHARTERPARTY
(i) Respondent’s obligation to pay freight is not a condition
22. Respondent had indeed failed to pay freight by the time stated on the charter party, due to
the not having received the same from Idoncare.50
However, a late payment is not of itself a
43
Australian Wheat Board v Reardon Smith Line Ltd (The Houston City) [1954] HCA 27, para 7. 44
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 57 45
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 58, 60 46
Australian Wheat Board v Reardon Smith Line Ltd (The Houston City) [1954] HCA 27, para 8. 47
Australian Wheat Board v Reardon Smith Line Ltd (The Houston City) [1954] HCA 27 48
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 60 49
John F. Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2010), p. 16. 50
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 56
10
repudiatory breach entitling the owners, in the absence of a withdrawal provision, to
terminate the charter.51
In the present case, such a provision is absent from the Voyage
Charterparty.52
Moreover, the shipping community does not consider the desideratum of
commercial certainty for future performance to be such as to require payment to be treated as
a condition.53
(ii) Claimant’s request to remit freight on discharge is not a fundamental breach
23. Instead, the categorization of freight as a term by default is an innominate term,54
and
Claimant can only be considered to have fundamentally breached the contract if it denies
Respondent the benefit of the contract.55
In the present case, such a benefit is the receipt of
freight by Claimant, which Respondent has agreed to fulfill through the payment of freight at
the discharge of the cargo.56
The payment of freight on completion of discharge would not
deprive Claimant of the right to guarantee freight due to it, as a shipowner would still be
entitled to exercise lien for the cargo as remained under its control.57
Although such a
method of payment indeed deviates from Clause 19. FREIGHT of the Voyage Charterparty,
Claimant and Respondent may alter such a term pursuant to an agreement.58
51
Spar Shipping A.S v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 982; Italian State
Railways v Mavrogordatos and Another (The “Antonios M Mavrogordatos”) [1919] 2 KB 305; ENE Kos Ltd v
Petroleo Brasileiro SA (The “Kos”) [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87; [2010] EWCA CIV 713; [2012] UKSC 17. 52
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 20 - 23. 53
Spar Shipping A.S v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 982, para 201. 54
Spar Shipping A.S v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 982. 55
Hongkong Fir Shipping Company v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Limited, [1961] EWCA Civ 7 56
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 69. 57
Canadian Pacific (Bermuda) Ltd v. Lagon Maritime Overseas (The Fort Kipp) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 168 58
Morris v. Baron & Co [1918] AC 1
11
C. HENCE, CLAIMANT HAS WRONGFULLY REPUDIATED THE VOYAGE
CHARTERPARTY
(i) Claimant’s termination of the Voyage Charterparty is wrongful
24. In the absence of any relevant contractual or statutory provision, the contract can be treated
as terminated by the innocent party only when a breach of a condition has occurred.59
Such
a breach goes to the root of the contract or is one that deprives the innocent party of
substantially the whole benefit of the contract.60
Upon the breach of innominate terms, the
legal consequences of the breach only depend upon the factual consequences caused by the
breach.61
If the breach of contract does not make the performance stray significantly from
the parties’ intention, the contract shall not be undermined.62
25. Hence, the Voyage Charterparty would only be terminated if Respondent has shown any
intention to not perform their obligations any longer or a refusal to perform all, or
substantially all, of its obligations under the charterparty.63
On the contrary, until right
before the Charterparty was terminated, Respondent had attempted to perform their
obligations under the charterparty and had no intentions to end the contract. 64
Thus,
Claimant has wrongfully terminated the Voyage Charterparty.
59
Spar Shipping A.S v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 982, para 96. 60
Spar Shipping A.S v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 982, Ibid;
Hongkong Fir Shipping Company v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Limited, [1961] EWCA Civ 7. 61
Hongkong Fir Shipping Company v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Limited, [1961] EWCA Civ 7. 62
Hongkong Fir Shipping Company v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Limited, [1961] EWCA Civ 7. 63
Hongkong Fir Shipping Company v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Limited, [1961] EWCA Civ 7. 64
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 58 and 61.
12
(i) Consequently, Claimant has deprived itself from its rights thereunder
Claimant has, as a consequence of its unjustified termination of the contract, wrongfully
repudiated the Voyage Charterparty. Such a declaration could become a wrongful act, if the
injured party elects to treat it as such.65
In the present case, Respondent has accepted
Claimant’s termination as a repudiatory breach under the Voyage Charterparty.66
Wrongful
repudiation, in itself, results in the loss of benefit that was intended in the making of the
contract. 67
Hence, Claimant is not entitled to claim the benefits of the Voyage Charterparty
in the form of freight and other sums due to it.
III. CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXERCISE ANY LIEN OVER THE
CARGO
A. CLAIMANT HAS NO RIGHT TO EXERCISE LIEN OVER THE CARGO PER SE
(i) Claimant has no common law lien over the cargo
29. A right to lien at common law, which is recognized by Singaporean law,68
arises
independently by implication of law for freight due under a carriage.69
Such a right is a self-
help remedy enacted in defense to an action for recovery of the goods by a person who
would otherwise be entitled to immediate possession.70
On the contrary, Claimant neither
has possession of the cargo, nor right to freight due under the carriage.
65
Hochster v. De La Tour [1853] 2 E&B 678 66
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 69 67
Dalwood Marine Co v Nordana Line A/S (The “Elbrus”) [2009] EWHC 3394 (Comm) 68
Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 311 69
Kirchner v Venus [1859] 12 Moore 361, 390 70
The “Dwima 1” [1996] 2 SLR 670; [1996] SGHC 83
13
a. Claimant has no possession of the cargo
30. A common law lien is possessory in nature.71
On the contrary, Claimant has no possession of
the cargo. Clause 26. NAVIGATION of the Time Charterparty provides that the Vessel is
not demised to Claimant, and that IMLAM remains responsible for navigation of the
Vessel.72
Consequently, Claimant has no possession of the ship as a time charterer,73
which
amounts to it not having any possession over the goods.74
Consequently, it is not entitled to
exercise any common law lien over the cargo.
b. Claimant has no freight due to it from Idoncare
31. In order for Claimant to claim lien over the cargo, Idoncare as its owner must owe its debt in
respect to Claimant which is entitled to the lien.75
On the contrary, Idoncare has no
contractual relation with Claimant over which Claimant is entitled to freight. Even if the
freight clause is incorporated into the Bill of Lading, the Voyage Charterparty only imposes
freight on Respondent.76
The incorporation of a clause into a Charterparty does not allow for
a construction as to change the identity of the party in said clause into a party in the bill of
lading.77
As Claimant is not entitled to freight from Idoncare, it has no claim over the cargo.
71
Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 311 72
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 10 73
Cascade Shipping Inc v Eka Jaya Agencies (Pte) Ltd [1993] 1 SLR 980; [1993] SGCA 7; Wehner & Ors v
Dene Steam Shipping Co & Ors [1905] 2 KB 92; Molthes Rederi Aktieselskabet v Ellerman’s Wilson Line Ltd
[1926] 36 LI.L.Rep. 259 74
Hutton v Bragg, 7 Taunt. 14 S.C. 2. Marsh. 339 75
Molthes Rederi Aktieselskabet v. Ellerman's Wilson Line Ltd [1926] 26 Ll.L.Rep. 259 76
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 22. 77
Miramar Maritime Corporation v Holborn Oil Trading Ltd (The “Miramar”) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 319
14
(ii) Claimant has no contractual right to lien
a. Claimant has no right to lien under the Bill of Lading
i. IMLAM is the carrier under the Bill of Lading
32. A bill of lading is essentially an evidence of contract between a shipowner and a shipper.78
Where a Charterparty does not amount to a demise of the ship, and possession thereof is not
given up to the charterer, the contract contained in the bill of lading is made with the
owner.79
As proven supra, Claimant is not established as the shipowner.80
Consequently, the
Bill of Lading is an evidence of contract between Idoncare as shipper and IMLAM as carrier,
and not Claimant.
ii. The Bill of Lading was not issued on behalf of Claimant
33. Claimant may no further contend that such Bill of Lading was issued pursuant to the
Voyage Charterparty. To determine whether a contract of carriage is made with a shipowner
or time charterer, the manner of the signature of the bill must be the primary consideration.81
In the present dispute, the Bill of Lading was signed by the Master of the M/V Tardy
Tessa,82
who by default is an agent of IMLAM.83
34. A Master’s signature can only bind Claimant as charterer if the wording of the bill of lading
and the surrounding circumstances unambiguously state that the Master, in signing, was
78
The “Berkshire” [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 185 79
Cascade Shipping Inc. v Eka Jaya Agencies (Pte) Ltd [1993] 1 SLR 980; [1993] SGCA 7 80
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 10. 81
The “Starsin” [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85 82
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 41, 43, 45 83
Wehner v Dene Steam Shipping Co [1905] 2 K.B. 92; Tillmanns v. Knutsford [1908] 2 K.B. 385 (C.A.),
[1908] A.C. 406 (H.L.); Wilston v. Andrew Weir [1925] 22 L.I.L.Rep. 521; The Rewia [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
325 (C.A.).
15
acting as an agent of Claimant.84
This must be done through an agreement between the
shipowner and charterer that the master had no authority to enter into a bill of lading contract
on behalf of the shipowner,85
and a clear statement on the bill of lading indicating that the
master signed as agent for charterer.86
On the contrary, there was no such indication in the
Time Charterparty between IMLAM and Claimant,87
nor on the Bill of Lading.88
b. Claimant has no right to lien under the Voyage Charterparty
35. Claimant would only be entitled to lien over third party cargo if the Voyage Charterparty
incorporated into the Bill of Lading itself contained an express contractual right to lien on
behalf of Claimant for cargo aboard the Vessel.89
On the contrary, there is no right to lien
embodied in the Voyage Charterparty in the present case.90
Such right only exists under the
STANDARD COAL-OREVOY sent to Claimant as an attachment,91
however the lien clause
was deleted in the Voyage Charterparty, thus it ceases to exist.92
Without such clause,
Claimant has no right to exercise lien for amounts due to it from Respondent.
B. IMLAM HAS NO RIGHT TO EXERCISE LIEN ON BEHALF OF CLAIMANT
36. A time charterer’s contractual right to lien may indeed entitle it to direct the shipowner to
detain a shipper’s cargo as an equitable assignee, by the means of the term “freight payable
as per charterparty”.93
However, such term only enables a shipowner to exercise lien if it has
84
Harrison v. Huddersfield Steamship [1903] 19 T.L.R. 386; Samuel v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation
[1906] 11 Com Cas 115; Elder Dempster v. Paterson, Zochonis [1924] A.C. 552 (H.L.) 85
Harrison v. Huddersfield Steamship [1903] 19 T.L.R. 386 86
Manchester Trust v. Furness, Withy [1895] 2 Q.B. 539 (C.A.). 87
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 1-19. 88
Ibid, at 41-46 89
Yvonne Baatz, Maritime Law (Oxon: Informa Law, 2008), Leonard A. Jones, A Treatise on the Law of
Liens, Common Law, Statutory, Equitable and Maritime (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2005) 90
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 20-23. 91
Ibid at 31, Clause 19 92
Mottram Consultants Ltd. v. Bernard Sunley & Sons Ltd. [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 197 93
Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 311
16
the legal right to the freight, whoever else may have equitable or beneficial rights to the
freight in its hands.94
On the contrary, no such right exists for IMLAM in the present dispute.
37. The Voyage Charterparty does not concoct an obligation for Idoncare to pay freight.
Whereby a charter party contains provisions on freight, a shipowner’s claim is limited to the
ones contained within the charterparty, and is a subject to any variations therein.95
Clause 19.
FREIGHT stipulates that freight is payable by the Charterers, which under Clause 4.
CHARTERERS is Respondent and not Idoncare.96
No construction of the contract may be
made to alter the identity of the Parties.97
Hence, Idoncare has no obligation to pay freight
under the Voyage Charterparty.
38. Furthermore, Idoncare is only contractually obliged to pay Respondent under its agreement.
A shipper does not necessarily need to agree to pay freight under a bill of lading. In the
condition where the agreement for freight is between the shipper and a third party who is not
the shipowner, there exists no agreement to pay freight between the shipper and shipowner.98
Idoncare has agreed for freight to be payable towards Respondent and not IMLAM,99
and
there exists no right for IMLAM to demand freight from Idoncare.
94
Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters (London: Informa Law, 1993) 95
Tradigrain SA v. King Diamond Marine Ltd “The Spiros C” [2000] Int.Com.L.R. 07/13 96
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 20-21. 97
Miramar Maritime Corp v. Holborn Oil Trading Ltd [1984] 1 AC 676 98
Cho Yang Shipping Co. Ltd. v Coral (UK) Ltd. [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 641 99
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 83-84.
17
C. IN ANY EVENT, CLAIMANT CANNOT EXERCISE LIEN ON THE CARGO
TALIS QUALIS
39. A lien is, essentially, the denial of possession of the cargo to someone who wants it. Under
such basis, as no party wants delivery of the cargo at the bunkering port en route to the
discharging port, at that point a shipowner is not entitled to enforce the lien. Such action
would only be justified should lien not be enforceable at the port of discharge.100
40. In the event that this Tribunal holds that a lien exists, and is validly incorporated into the Bill
of Lading, Claimant would be entitled to lien at the last nominated port of discharge in
Ningbo, China. Pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the Chinese Maritime Code, lien for cargo
in the international carriage of goods by sea is enforceable.101
In addition, The Ningbo local
court recognizes the existence of lien.102
As a consequence, as Claimant has not exercised its
lien in the appropriate location, its assertion of a right to lien is unenforceable.
IV. IT IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR JUST FOR THE CARGO ON BOARD THE
TARDY TESSA TO BE SOLD PENDENTE LITE
A. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE CARGO TO BE SOLD PENDENTE LITE
(i) Sale of the cargo fails to preserve its value
41. An order to sell a cargo could be considered necessary in order to preserve the value of the
cargo, which would otherwise be lost or diminished.103
Contrary to the purpose of
preservation, the Parties’ joint expert report in valuation of the coal notes that the distressed
100
International Bulk Carriers v Evlogia Shipping (The Mihalios Xilas) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 186. 101
Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China 1992; Art. 87-88. 102
Yong Hai Fa Wen Quan Zi [2011] NMC No. 1 103
Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 311; Emilia Shipping Inc v State Enterprises
for Pulp and Paper Industries [1991] 2 MLJ 379, Castleton Commodities Shipping Co Pte Ltd v Silver Rock
Investments (The “Clipper Monarch”) [2015] EWHC 2584; Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] EWCA
Civ 618.
18
nature of the cargo would itself diminish such a value.104
Accordingly, the very purpose of
preservation would not be achieved through a sale of the cargo.
(ii) There exist alternatives to the sale of the cargo
42. Sale of distressed cargo could be held necessary in the event that no alternatives exist to
preserve the right to lien.105
On the contrary, even if this Tribunal holds that Claimant is
entitled to lien, as argued supra, Claimant has the ability to exercise lien in the discharge
port of Ningbo, without having to order the ship to remain afloat off-port outside Singapore
in deprived conditions.
43. Alternatively, in the event that this Tribunal holds that Claimant does not have the ability to
exercise lien in Ningbo, Claimant has the option of berthing in Singapore, where the Vessel
is remaining afloat off-port limits.106
Singaporean law recognizes that liened cargo remains
subject to lien when discharged to the custody of a wharfinger or warehouseman with
written notice of such.107
As such, through discharge, Claimant can prevent further
deterioration of the cargo and the crew of the vessel without reducing its value.
B. IT IS NOT JUST FOR THE CARGO TO BE SOLD PENDENTE LITE
44. To fulfill the element of justice, the pendente lite sale must fulfill the American Cyanamid
Co v Ethicon Ltd test of balance of convenience.108
Such a test stipulates that the harm
caused by a lack of enforcement substantially outweighs the harm that is likely to result to
the party against whom measure is sought, and is not adequately reparable by an award of
104
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 101-102. 105
Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 311; Castleton Commodities Shipping
Company Pte Ltd v Silver Rock Investments [2015] EWHC 2584; Emilia Shipping Inc v State Enterprise for
Pulp and Paper Industries [1991] 1 SLR(3) 411. 106
Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 97. 107
Merchant Shipping Act (Chapter 179) 1996; Art. 127 108
Astrata (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Tridex Technologies Pte Ltd and another and other matters [2010] SGHC
250; Challenger Technologies Limited v Courts (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 218;
David Joseph QC & David Foxton QC (ed.), Singapore International Arbitration: Law & Practice (Singapore:
LexisNexis, 2014).
19
damages.109
Should the balance of convenience tip in favor of Respondent’s request not to
create an interim measure, such measure may not be enforced.110
(i) Pendente lite sale of the cargo causes disproportionate harm to Respondent
45. This Tribunal must take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice in the
event that relief is granted to a party.111
Should this Tribunal make an order for sale of the
cargo, in the event that this Tribunal eventually grants an award in favor of Respondent,
substantial losses would have been suffered by Respondent and Idoncare. As argued supra,
Idoncare would have been deprived of full proceeds of the cargo. Idoncare would further
have a reason to indemnify Respondent for losses of the cargo.112
Such damages clearly
outweigh that suffered by Claimant in the event that interim sale is not granted, which is the
necessity to lay berth and lien the cargo off the ship, costs of which would be payable to
Claimant should this Tribunal hold Respondent wrongful.113
(ii) The harm suffered by Claimant is adequately reparable by an award of damages
46. The test additionally stipulates the provision of evidence adduced by both parties that if a
relief is not granted, the applicant’s legal rights would be violated in a manner that would be
incapable of being compensated.114
In contrast, in the present dispute, Claimant’s alleged
right to freight and damages would not be violated in the event that this Tribunal does not
grant the right to sale over the cargo. Claimant would still be able to seek damages arising
109
Astrata (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Tridex Technologies Pte Ltd and another and other matters [2010] SGHC
250; Challenger Technologies Limited v Courts (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 218; 110
WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v. Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 1 SLR(R). 111
Challenger Technologies Limited v Courts (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 218; 112
Attorney-General of the Republic of Ghana v. Texaco Overseas Tankships (The Texaco Melbourne) [1994]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 473; Obestain v National Mineral Development Corp (The Sanix Ace) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
465. 113
Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters (London: Informa Law, 1993). 114
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396.
20
under the alleged breaches of contract by Respondent through the decision of this
Tribunal.115
115
Challenger Technologies Limited v Courts (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 218
21
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the reasons set above, the Respondent requests the Tribunal to adjuge and declare :
1) This Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction and/or power to grant liberty to the
Claimant to sell the cargo on board the MV TARDY TESSA pendente lite.
2) The Respondent is not liable to the Claimant for detention and/or other damages
under the Voyage Charterparty.
3) The Claimant is not entitled to exercise any lien over the cargo
4) It is neither necessary nor just for the cargo on board the MV TARDY TESSA to be
sold pendente lite.