resources and infrastructure babcock marine clyde

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Resources and Infrastructure Babcock Marine Clyde

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Resources and InfrastructureResources and Infrastructure

Babcock Marine Clyde

Introduction to Babcock Marine (Clyde)Introduction to Babcock Marine (Clyde)

Introduction to Clyde

1963 – 3rd Submarine Squadron - Dreadnought arrival

1967 – 10th Submarine Squadron – Resolution Class

1986 – New nuclear facilities construction

1992 – 1st Submarine Squadron – Vanguard & Swiftsure

1995 – Surface Ships Arrival

1999 – Nuclear Authorisation

2009 – Valiant Jetty Arrival, Astute Arrival

2009 – Explosives Handling Jetty mid-life update

2009 – Clyde confirmed as future Base Port for all submarines

2067 – Projected life of “Successor” submarine

HMNB Clyde - Faslane

HMNB Clyde - Coulport

HMS Vanguard – 4 in class

HMS Astute – 7 in class

HMS Trafalgar – up to 4 (interim)

Successor – up to 2067

MoD PoliceMoD Police

Northern Diving Group & Bomb Disposal

Northern Diving Group & Bomb Disposal

Flag Officer Sea

Training (FOST)

Flag Officer Sea

Training (FOST)

Faslane FlotillaFaslane Flotilla

Fleet Protection Group

Royal Marines

Fleet Protection Group

Royal Marines

Lodger Units

What is it Babcock do at HMNB Clyde?

Submarines

WaterfrontSupport

NuclearOperations

SWS

BusinessMgt

Estates

Logistics

Hotel

ShipsDesign and

Safety

Resources and InfrastructureResources and Infrastructure

Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5

• Section 4.1

‘Senior management shall determine the amount of resources necessary and shall provide the resources to carry out the activities of the organisation and to establish, assess and continually improve the management system’

Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5

• Section 4.1

‘Senior management shall determine the amount of resources necessary and shall provide the resources to carry out the activities of the organisation and to establish, assess and continually improve the management system’

• Human resources• Infrastructure and the working environment

HMNB Clyde Site Safety Case

The maintenance of nuclear and radiation safety standards requires that there shall be:

•A structured and adequately manned organisation with clearly defined responsibilities for nuclear safety •Suitably trained and qualified personnel to carry out tasks having nuclear safety implications•Services and facilities essential to nuclear safety, properly designed, constructed, maintained and available when required

Reflects principles of IAEA GS-G3.5

19/04/23 1616

Human Resources provided by suppliers & partnersHuman Resources provided by suppliers & partners

Partnering at Clyde

MoD Intelligent Customer• Babcock commercial partner• Principles include the maintenance of a sound safety culture • Babcock responsible to NBC(C) for service delivery to the required standards of

safety, performance quality and cost • Service provision reflects competency• Shared management & information systems• Joint management boards

Anomalies • Budget is set by customer• Budget is controlled by customer• Significant Capital projects are out-with the contract including setting of initial

requirements• Investment is constantly pressurised• Budgets are on an annualised footing• Little opportunity/scope for company investment/return

Human ResourcesHuman Resources

Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5

• Section 4.15

‘Senior management shall determine the competence requirements for individuals at all levels and shall provide training…’

‘….shall ensure individuals are competent to perform their assigned work and that they understand the consequences for safety of their activities….’

‘Individuals shall have received appropriate education and training…..to ensure their competence.’

Human Resources

SQEP, SqEP, SQeP, SqeP

OR EVEN JUST sqeP!

Maintaining & developing a competent workforce in a changing environment

Human Resources

1980s – mid 1990s • Nuclear SQEP prescribed • General SQEP requirements less formal

Late 1990s – mid 2000s• Nuclear SQEP guidance (minimum requirements)• NSQEP Allowances• Line Managers’ influence prevalent • Inconsistent definition of SQEP, over focus on Nuclear

2008 – • Capability Clyde – qualifications based approach• Succession Planning – addressing the “E” in SQEP

Human Resources – How Many?Human Resources – How Many?

Job Families and Norms

Past Performance – sick, leave, training

Master Schedule

Fleet Maintenance

B5

B6

B7

B8

A9

A10

A16

A20

A21

A22

A23

A24

A25

A26

Surface Ships

Bangor

Ramsey - Aintree

Blyth - Aintree

Walney

Penzance

Pembroke

Grimsby

Shoreham

Fleet MaintenanceB5 BMP 08 B5 BMP 14 B5 BMP 15 B5 BMP 16B6 BMP 07 B6 BMP 08 B6 BMP 09B7 Pre LOP[R] B7 LOP[R] B7 BMP 01 B7 BMP 02DRP B8 BMP 26 (ext) B8 LOP(R)A20 RAMP 1 A20 AMP 2 A20 AMP 3CST/DRP A21 BMP 1B6 BMP 01

B5B5 BMP 08 B5 BMP 14 B5 BMP 15 B5 BMP 16

B6 B6 BMP 07 B6 BMP 08 B6 BMP 09B6 BMP 01

B7B7 Pre LOP[R] B7 LOP[R] B7 BMP 01 B7 BMP 02

B8DRP B8 BMP 26 (ext) B8 LOP(R)

A20 A20 RAMP 1 A20 AMP 2 A20 AMP 3

A21 CST/DRP A21 BMP 1

Forward Plan Aggregate

Production Aggregate - By Month

0

50

100

150

200

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300

350

400

200807

200808

200809

200810

200811

200812

200901

200902

200903

200904

200905

200906

200907

200908

200909

200910

200911

200912

201001

201002

201003

Head

co

un

t

NPF

S,L,T

Load

Capacity

Forward Plan by Section

Fleet Maintenance Support - Metallurgist

0

1

1

2

2

3

3

4

4

5

2008

08

2008

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2008

10

2008

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2008

12

2009

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2009

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2009

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2009

10

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2009

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2010

01

2010

02

2010

03

Hea

dcou

nt

NPF

S,L,T

Load

Capacity

Fleet Maintenance Support - NDE Officer

0

5

10

15

20

25

2008

08

2008

09

2008

10

2008

11

2008

12

2009

01

2009

02

2009

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2009

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Hea

dcou

nt

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S,L,T

Load

Capacity

Fleet Maintenance Support - Surveyor

0

1

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2008

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2008

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2009

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01

2010

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dcou

nt

NPF

S,L,T

Load

Capacity

Fleet Maintenance Support - Chemist

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

2008

08

2008

09

2008

10

2008

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2008

12

2009

01

2009

02

2009

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2009

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01

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03

Hea

dcou

nt

NPF

S,L,T

Load

Capacity

Human Resources - Plugging Skill Gaps at ClydeHuman Resources - Plugging Skill Gaps at Clyde

How the capability Clyde project drives upskilling

Introduction

1. Identifying required competence by role

2. Identifying competence of current role holder

3. Identifying competence gap

4. Prioritising competence gap

5. Filling competence gap

6. Evolving competence database

Capability Clyde Project

PDR/Training Planning

Clyde Academy

Job Evaluation

Capability Clyde

• Skills mapping project kicked around in various iterations for 2 years prior to January 2009

• Major NC resulting from LRQA surveillance audit April 2008– NC downgraded IN October 2008 on basis of initial

work done to identify– Scope of issue– Plan to address

• Project passed to HR in January 2009 to inject ‘second wind’ ahead of April 2009 audit

Why was this project important?

• Fundamental to maintaining right to operate

– Non-compliant with AC10 (training)

– Risk of Regulator suspending operations

– ‘Failure to address and resolve these issues will result in LRQA implementing its approval suspension procedures’

– LRQA approve ISO9001 certification

– ISO9001 = essential for operating WSMi contract

– Threat to SWS Alliance bid

– Certainly not helpful in 2013

• Fundamental building block for future capability

NB Not just about

compliance

Scope

• To ensure compliance with AC/regulatory requirements

• To address and resolve the outstanding issues from the 2008 LRQA surveillance visits such that;

– Minor NC remains a minor or is closed at April ’09 visit– Work completed by end June to close NC at next visit (October ’09)

• To build a skill/competency map for BM (C) (roles not people/not just nuclear) that will support Resource Based Management

• Areas to address;– Datum Organisation– NTRP– BMC-wide capability– Induction– PDR/Training Planning

Deliverables

• Datum Organisation– Clarify what’s in and what’s not– Bring current DO up-to-date– Accurately reflect actual and remit– Process that guarantees integrity and

compliance with AC36

• NTRP– Clarify what’s in and what’s not– Bring current up-to-date accordingly– Clarify relationship with DO– Create BMC equivalent in IFS – Process that guarantees integrity and

compliance including capture of new starts

• BMC-wide Capability– As NTRP but for whole organisation– Create ‘footprint’ for the skills, competency,

qualifications and experience of BMC– Construct to facilitate RBM– Devise common language capability v planning

to enable ‘automated’ RBM

• Assessment methodology– Standardised assessment/verification

methodology– Training for on-site assessors

• Induction– Develop and implement ‘gateway’ induction

programme– Include; site/department roles and

responsibilities, policy, objectives, CMS, management systems, safety, site tour

– Identify responsibility for maintaining ‘proof’/records of inductions

• PDR– Re-engineered process that delivers high

quality cascaded objectives that can be measured and monitored

– Identification of NTRP requirements by role to facilitate focused discussion

– Collation of training needs into consolidated training plan

– Booking methodology

©2007 Babcock International Group PLC Slide 34

How?

• Identify all roles (prioritise Datum/nuclear/other); bundle where possible

• Define Capability Framework; skill, competency, experience, qualification

• Determine what we want to assess– Capture role profiles– Capture ‘capability profile’ - SCEQ required per role (review existing info)– Create a behavioural competency framework

• How do we assess capability? – Migrate non-industrial records from legacy systems + test results against ‘known’ capability of individuals– Improve PDR process for non-industrials – Create a standardised skills assessment process for industrials prior to PDR roll out in 2011

• Develop robust process to maintain integrity of capability & supporting data

• So far– 1396 people evaluated vs 925 positions under Capability Clyde Project– Job Evaluation completed for non-industrials (500 people), in train for remaining population– Revised PDR process entering 3rd year of evolution– 2 years of new training planning process completed

Plugging competence gaps

• NB not all gaps plugged by training

• Graduate scheme covers 2 year programme of learning to grow future talent

• Apprentice scheme recruits annually for 4-year programme; numbers based on attrition + workload

• RN secondments provide – Competence ‘on tap’ for Company– Competence/experience development for RN

IDENTIFY SKILL NEED

SET SKILL DELIVERY

AS PRIORITY

CONDUCT PDRs

SEARCH DATABASE FOR

GAPS

AGREE TRAINING

PLAN

DESIGN TRAINING

INTERVENTION

DELIVER TRAINING

INTERVENTION

Training planning/prioritisation

Competence requirement

Current Competence

Competence gap

Competence surplus

Babcock (Clyde) has visibility of the whole competence picture and can set priorities accordingly

Integrated competence delivery model

JOB EVALUATION PDR

TRAINING PLANNING

CAPABILITY CLYDE

CLYDE ACADEMY

COMPETENCE DELIVERY MECHANISM

Human Resources

Scenario for CQI NucSIG consideration:

• Marine & Nuclear Engineering Company • 2 most senior Quality posts vacant at 2 locations

– A – Chartered Engineer, no quality background– B – ACQI minimum, no engineering background

Which one, if any, is correct?

Infrastructure and the Working EnvironmentInfrastructure and the Working Environment

Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5

• Section 4.18 ‘Senior management shall determine, provide, maintain and

re-evaluate the infrastructure and the working environment necessary for work to be carried out in a safe manner and for requirements to be met’

Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5

• Section 4.18 ‘Senior management shall determine, provide, maintain and

re-evaluate the infrastructure and the working environment necessary for work to be carried out in a safe manner and for requirements to be met’

• Registers of significant material assets• Appropriate inventories of consumables and spares• Consideration of damage or theft• Specific threats from certain assets (chemicals/gases etc)

Register of Material Assets

Company ERP System now hosts the Asset Register• Asset Register central to Asset Management

– Asset Management Plan

– EMIT Programme

– EMIT & Trend Information

• Nuclear Safety Implicated, non Nuclear Safety Implicated assets• Safety Case derived nuclear asset management plans• Facility Life Plans (nuclear only)• Periodic Review of Safety also used to inform plans

Asset Management

Facilities, Systems and Equipment• Old (pre-date safety cases)

– operating restrictions

– obsolete spares

• Extended Life • Mid Life Upgrades & Stage Improvement Programmes • New & Commissioning

Unregistered assets

• Several “light touch” procurement routes• Significant inventory built up over time• Action taken to contain and recover situation

Inventory Management

• Currently historical spares levels have set themselves– High profile spares and consumables are managed according to

lead times, historical data in terms of useage and failure rates (e.g Shiplift wire ropes).

• Obsolescence issues are captured and understood but lack rigour and timely investment/action.

• Generally spares kitting process for maintenance activities have improved under the maintenance management system - further advances in stock management can be made in terms of auto replenishment.

• Cost savings versus material spend – good in parts but isolated Management naivety exists – HPAC Event.

Safety/Security of assets

Safety/Security of assets

Specific Materials Management

Significant risk elements• Radioactive materials – controlled areas, operations etc.• Industrial gases – controlled storage & distribution• Bulk fuel oils – COMAH (MACR) site

• Explosives (conventional) – controlled areas & quantities

Risk management• Risk Assessment primary mechanism used• HAZOP/HAZID Analysis and FMEA reflected in Safety Cases• Environmental Aspects & Impacts Assessment• Authorised Persons in place for each significant entity

Questions/debateQuestions/debate