resilience of coal transport on the three rivers waterway system
DESCRIPTION
Resilience of Coal Transport on the Three Rivers Waterway System. Ryan S. Engel, LCDR, USCG TJ Clement, MAJ, USA Naval Postgraduate School OA4202 – Network Flows and Graphs Course Project November 2011. Background - Pittsburgh. PITTSBURGH 2 nd Largest Inland Port in the U.S. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Resilience of Coal Transport on the Three Rivers Waterway System
Ryan S. Engel, LCDR, USCG
TJ Clement, MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate SchoolOA4202 – Network Flows and Graphs
Course ProjectNovember 2011
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Background - Pittsburgh
PITTSBURGH
• 2nd Largest Inland Port in the U.S.
• 20th Largest Port in the U.S.
• Produces 25% of U.S.’s steel
• $9 Billion of goods annually
• 200 River Terminals
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Commodities through Pittsburgh
• 50% of the U.S. electricity comes from Coal
• Steel Production Requires Coal Coke
• Power Plants use Coal Lignite
• 13.6 Million TONS of Coal Annually
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Multi-Modal Coal Transport
Transport Mode: National Cost: **
Barge $.005 / ton-mile
Rail $.05 / ton-mile
Truck $.10 / ton-mile
** To be visited later
5
Cargo Capacity Comparison
Source: Port of Pittsburgh website
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Study Area
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Study Area
Pittsburgh
Alleghen
y Rive
r
Monongahela River
Ohio River
Braddock Lock & Dam
Emsworth Lock & Dam
Lock & Dam 2
DemandSupply
Supply
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Supplies and Demands
Terminals: Tons of Coal / week Supply/Demand Gulf Materials (Mon) 14.0K Demand
Neville Island (Ohio) 10.7K Demand
Rivers:
Allegheny: In: 30.0K DemandOut: 0.62K Supply
Net 29.4K Demand
Monongahela In: 101.5K DemandOut: 137.4K Supply
Net: 36.90K Supply
Ohio: In: 112.9K DemandOut: 123.6K Supply
Net: 10.7 Supply
* Assumption: 1 Commodity
9
Study Area
Pittsburgh
Alleghen
y Rive
r
Monongahela River
Ohio River
Braddock Lock & Dam
Emsworth Lock & Dam
Lock & Dam 2
Demand = Supply = Lock and Damn =
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Normal Operation• Coal primarily moves by barge (least expensive)
• Movement is constrained by capacities
• River segments
• Locks and dams
• Terminal crane and lift operations
• System flow is driven by supply and demand
• Objective of System:
• Minimize overall transit cost
• Meet demand for coal
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What Can Go Wrong• Blockage on river segment
• Loss of function at Lock or dam
• Contingencies
• Move Coal by rail
• Subject to
• Offloading capacities at terminals
• Increased distances and costs
• Objective: To minimize overall cost
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How to Model• Min cost flow problem: Use a mixed integer linear program
• Quantify Costs: **
• Barge = distance x 1
• Rail = distance x 2.5
• Truck = infeasible
• Quantify Capacities **
• Terminal offload = 1 million tons a year• Railroad offload = 4.25 million tons / year• Waterway = f(distance, bridge delay, shipment size)
• Objective: To minimize overall cost given attacks on system
** To be revisited
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Original Network Diagram
EMLSD
NISI
MRIE
GTS1
CSXBO
FPB
MRHB
OCRB
WEHB
PTPT
OHIOS OHIOD
FDHB
RDHB
7SHB
9SHB
NSRB
VMB
16HB
URAB
CPB
31HB
CSXBA
40HB
62HB
AZCN
LD2
ALLD ALLS
FPHB
SSHB
PATB
LHB
10HB
BHB
HMHB
GHB
HGHB
CSXB1 CSXB2
URB
RHB
GTC
JS BCBT TURR
BRDLD BRDLD
EMLSD
LD2
MONS
MOND
SOURCE
DESTINATION
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHT
NISI
GTS1
MRIEPTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
MONT
JS
TURRGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
AZCN
BLM2
BLM1
Network Model
River RouteRailroad RouteRiver NodeLand Node
(6.2, 4536)
(12.1, 4536)
(35, 81.7)
(47.8, 81.7)
(5,81.7)
(47.8, 81.7)
(35, 81.7)
(46.3, 81.7)
(46.3, 81.7)
(5,81.7)
(5,81.7)
(7, 4536)
(1, 4536)
(0, 336)
(1, 4536)
(0, 336)
(0, 336)
(0, 1134)
(0, 1134)
(1, 4536)
(1, 4536)
(0, 19.2)
(0, 19.2)
(1, 4536)
(1, 4536)20.8
14.4
10.5
-35
-10.7
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHT
NISI
GTS1
MRIEPTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
MONT
JS
TURRGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
AZCN
BLM2
BLM1
Normal Operations
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand Node
Cost 452
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHT
NISI
GTS1
MRIEPTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
MONT
JS
TURRGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
AZCN
BLM2
BLM1
#1 Worst 1-Arc Attack
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand NodeArc Attack
Cost 1026
ALLE
JS
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand NodeArc Attack
Cost 1022
#2 Worst 1-Arc Attack
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHT
NISI
GTS1
MRIEPTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
AZCN
MONTGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
BLM2
BLM1
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Comparing 1-Arc Attacks
PTPT-->ALLT
MONT-->PTPT
LD22-->LD21
LD21-->ALLE
ALLT-->LD22
OHT-->PTPT
BLM1-->BLM2
BLA1-->BLA2
ELM1-->ELM2
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Cost
1026 1022
483 456 452452483 483 452 452
PTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
JS
AZCN
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand NodeArc Attack
Cost 1026
MONTGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
BLM2
BLM1
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHTGTS1
MRIE
NISI
#1 Worst 2-Arc Attack
PTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
JS
AZCN
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand NodeArc AttackArc Defense
Cost 1026
MONTGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
BLM2
BLM1
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHTGTS1
MRIE
NISI
#2 Worst 2-Arc Attack
PTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
JS
AZCN
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand NodeArc AttackArc Defense
Cost 1934
MONTGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
BLM2
BLM1
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHTGTS1
MRIE
NISI
#1 Worst 3-Arc Attack
PTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
JS
AZCN
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand NodeArc AttackArc Defense
Cost 1263
MONTGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
BLM2
BLM1
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHTGTS1
MRIE
NISI
#2 Worst 3-Arc Attack
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHT
NISI
GTS1
MRIEPTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
MONT
JS
TURRGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
AZCN
BLM2
BLM1
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand NodeArc AttackArc Defense
Cost 25,838
#1 Worst 4-Arc Attack
ELM1
ELM2
ELA1
ELA2
OHIO
OHT
NISI
GTS1
MRIEPTPT
LD22
LD21
ALLT
ALLE
MONT
JS
TURRGTC
BCBT
BLA2
BLA1
MON
AZCN
BLM2
BLM1
River RouteRR RouteRiver NodeLand NodeArc AttackArc Defense
Cost 2337
#2 Worst 4-Arc Attack
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Cost vs. Number Attacks
0 1 2 3 40
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
Attacks
Cost
452 1026 1026 1934
25,837
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Cost vs. Simultaneous Attacks
25,837
0 1 2 3 40
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
Undefended
Defended
Attacks
Cost
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Cost vs. Simultaneous Attacks
2340
0 1 2 3 40
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Undefended
Defended
Attacks
Cost
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Things to be RevisitedAssumptions:
• Use of net flow for the locks and dams
- Coal in and out is not distinguishable
Option: Use a multi-commodity for each river
• Timeline = 1 Week
• Other timelines may have varying delays in the arc. Attacks would need to be recalculated
• Costs: Railway 2.5 times more expensive in our model.
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SummaryNotable Results:
• 1 Attack on the waterway doubles the cost
• 4 Attacks on system has enormous economic impact
• Coast Guard defends most critical 4 arcs: The system is resilient
Future Study:
• Validate assumptions
• Implement multi-commodity flow
• Broaden study area