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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ~attoiBatthatIatt Quezon City FIRST DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, - versus - CRIM. CASES NOS. SB-18-CRM-0022 to SB-18-CRM-0027 For: Violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 and Perjury under Article 183 of the RPC VISCUSO SALAZAR DE LIRA, ET AL., Present: DE LA CRUZ, J. ECONG, J. CALDONA, J. Promulgated on: MAY 2 9 2018 (Jet x-----------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION DE LA CRUZ, J.: This resolves the accused's Motion to Quash Informations, dated March 8, 2018; and the prosecution's Comment, dated March 27, 20.18, thereto. In their motion, the accused seek the quashal of the Informations on the following grounds: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) inordinate delay which deprived the accused of their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases; and (c) the officer who filed the informations had no authority to do so. The accused contend that the subject informations are defective because they do not prove the wilfulness on the part of the accused spouses to not declare their assets, specifically, the

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

~attoiBatthatIattQuezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

- versus - CRIM. CASES NOS. SB-18-CRM-0022to SB-18-CRM-0027

For: Violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 and Perjuryunder Article 183 of the RPC

VISCUSO SALAZAR DE LIRA,ET AL.,

Present:

DE LA CRUZ, J.ECONG, J.CALDONA, J.

Promulgated on:

MAY 2 9 2018 (Jetx - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

DE LA CRUZ, J.:

This resolves the accused's Motion to Quash Informations,dated March 8, 2018; and the prosecution's Comment, datedMarch 27, 20.18, thereto.

In their motion, the accused seek the quashal of theInformations on the following grounds: (a) that the facts charged donot constitute an offense; (b) inordinate delay which deprived theaccused of their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of theircases; and (c) the officer who filed the informations had noauthority to do so.

The accused contend that the subject informations aredefective because they do not prove the wilfulness on the part ofthe accused spouses to not declare their assets, specifically, the

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various licensed firearms, in their Joint Statement of Assets,Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). Considering that the accusedsubmitted the Joint SALNs containing truthful statements to thebest of their knowledge, as shown by the clause "to the best of myknowledge and information" therein, they should not be chargedwith perjury. The accused further point out that the undeclaredfirearms were duly registered and recorded in the books of theFirearms Division of the PNP, hence, it negates any intention onthe part of the accused to conceal "the same. Having no intent tocommit a wrong, the accused therefore cannot be charged with thepresent crimes and offenses.

The accused likewise argue that the Office of theOmbusdman committed gross violation against their right to aspeedy disposition of their cases. They maintain that the complaintwas filed on August 29, 2014, and on January 9, 2015, the Officeof the Ombudsman Visayas directed them to file their counter-affidavits, which they did on April 17, 2015. However, without anyjustification, the six (6) informations were filed on January 23,2018, or around three (3) years and five (5) months from the filingof the original complaint. Applying the case of Tatad v.Sandiganbayan, the length of delay in the present cases is alreadyconsidered as inordinate which cannot be deemed reasonable orjustifiable. There is also no reason for the inordinate delay giventhat the issue presented is very simple and uncomplicated whichdoes not necessitate a thorough and painstaking review andscrutiny of facts, or application of a difficult question of law. In

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addition, the complaint is politically motivated as the privatecomplainant, Randy D. Graza, was the losing candidate in theelection held in 2013 for the mayoralty post in Balangiga, EasternSamar. Thus, considering that the inordinate delay grossly violatedthe right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases, as aconsequence, the Ombudsman has lost its authority or jurisdictionto file the subject informations.

By way of comment, the prosecution disputes the contentionof the accused that intention to conceal the assets is an element of

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the crime of violation of Section 8(a), in relation to Section 11, ofRA 6713. Being a special law, the crime is consummated themoment the accused failed to declare in their SALN the actualacquisition cost of their automobile and firearms. Likewise, theelements of Perjury under Article 183 of the RPC are sufficientlyalleged in the Informations, which stated the following: (a) thename of the accused; (b) the jurisdiction of the Court; (c) the

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approximate time and place of the commission of offense: (d) thefact that accused made a declaration under oath of their assets,liabilities, net worth, business and financial interests; (e) the factthat accused, as public officials, were required to file their SALNand declare under oath their assets, liabilities, net worth, businessand financial interests; (f) the fact that the declarations in theirSALN were made before competent officers authorized toadminister oath; and (g) the manner of committing the offense byfailing to declare the actual acquisition cost of the accused'sautomobile and by intentionally failing to declare the firearmsregistered under their name.

As to inordinate delay, the prosecution maintains that a meremathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient todetermine whether the right to speedy trial has been violated, andthat several factors, including the assertion of such right, must beweighed and balanced. It narrated the following timeline of events:

1) August 11, 2014 - The Complaint was filed before theOffice of the Ombudsman.

2) March 18, 2015 - The accused requested for anextension of time to file their counter-affidavit.

3)Affidavit.

March 26, 2015 ., The accused filed their Joint Counter-I

4)Affidavit.

May 20, 2015 - The private complainant filed his Reply-

5) January 12, 2017 - A draft Resolution was prepared bythe Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas.

6) June 2, 2017 - The Ombudsman issued the Resolutionfinding probable cause against the accused.

The prosecution clarifies that the Ombudsman's function isnot merely to affix her signature on the Resolution forwarded toher for approval. The Ombudsman has to make her ownevaluation of the case, hence, she has to review the entire recordsand determine whether the matter was appropriate for approval. Inaddition, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) is duty-bound toreceive the pleadings, motions and comments filed by the partiesas they are essential parts of due process and fairness. Moreover,

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due to the critical nature of the cases filed before the OMB, itshould be afforded ample time to deliberate and resolve thesecases lest it may cause disservice to the people.

The prosecution also points out that the accused failed toassert their right to a speedy disposition of their case. Followingjurisprudence, the failure of the accused to invoke their right to aspeedy disposition is construed as a waiver of the same. Also, theTatad ruling does not apply as the delay in said case was causedby political factors that controlled the investigation, which is notavailing in the present case.

The motion is partly meritorious.

In Caballero v. Senaiqenbeven,' the Supreme Courtexplained what constitutes sufficiency of an Information, thus:

The fundamental test in considering a motion to quashanchored on Section 3(a), above, is the sufficiency of theaverments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, ifhypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements ofthe offense charged as defined by law. It is axiomatic that theinformation must state every single fact necessary to constitutethe offense charged, otherwise, a motion to quash on the groundthat the information charges no offense may be properlysustained.

In the present. case, the offenses charged against theaccused-movants are violations of Section 8 of RA 6713, andPerjury under Article 183 of the RPC. Section 8 of RA 6713provides:

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officialsand employees have an obligation to accomplish and submitdeclarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know,their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and businessinterests including those of their spouses and of unmarriedchildren under eighteen (18) years of age living in theirhouseholds.

(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and FinancialDisclosure. - All public officials and employees, except thosewho serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual ortemporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement ofAssets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business

I September 25,2007,534 SeRA 3(), 43

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Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spousesand unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living intheir households. The two documents shall contain information onthe following: (a) real property, its improvements, acquisitioncosts, assessed value and current fair market value; (b) personalproperty and acquisition cost; (c) all other assets such asinvestments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and thelike; (d) liabilities, and; (e) all business interests and financialconnections. The documents must be filed: (a) within thirty (30)days after assumption of office; (b) on or before April 30, of everyyear thereafter; and (c) within thirty (30) days after separationfrom the service. All public officials and employees required underthis section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute,within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office,the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain fromall appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau ofInternal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets,liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests andfinancial connections in previous years, including, if possible, theyear when they first assumed any office in the Government. I

Husband and wife who are both public officials oremployees may file the required statements jointly or separately.xxx

The accused contend that the Informations charging themwith violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 are defective because theydo not prove the wilfulness on their part not to declare the firearmsin their Joint SALN. The Court disagrees. To reiterate, the test indetermining the sufficiency of the information is whether the factsalleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentialelements of the offense. In the subject Informations, it was allegedthat the accused, as public officials obligated by law to declareunder oath all their assets, willfully, unlawfully and criminally failedto declare certain firearms in their Joint SALN for the years 2011 to2013. This Court finds that such allegations, if hypotheticallyadmitted, establish the essential elements of violation of Section 8of RA 6713.

On the other hand, the essential elements of Perjury underArticle 183 of the RPC are:

1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed anaffidavit upon a material matter;

2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competentofficer authorized to receive and ·administer oath;

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3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willfuland deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and

4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity isrequired by law or made for a legal purpose."

In the subject Informations, the accused are being charged inconnection with their Joint SALN for the years 2011 to 2013, whichthey swore and subscribed to before Judge Federico Hunamayorand Atty. Gerian Marez Gannaban, respectively, who are bothcompetent officers authorized to administer oath. It was alsoalleged therein that the accused made a willful and deliberateassertion of falsehood when they made it appear that they do notown certain firearms, knowing the same to be false as saidfirearms were owned by or registered under the name of accusedViscuso De Lira. The Joint SALNs are sworn statements requiredto be filed under RA 3019 and RA 6713. These allegations, ifhypothetically admitted, are sufficient to establish the elements ofPerjury.

Further, the argument of the accused that they have nointention to commit a wrong is a matter of defense that is bestthreshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits.

However, with respect to the argument that the accused-movants' right to a speedy disposition of their cases is violated, theCourt is convinced that the Office of the Ombudsman indeedcommitted inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminaryinvestigation.

In the present cases, it is not disputed that from the filing ofthe Complaint on August 29, 2014, the Resolution finding probablecause was approved by the Ombudsman on June 2, 2017, and theInformations were filed only on January 23, 2018. Thus, a total of(3) years, four (4) months and twenty-five (25) days passed fromthe filing of the complaint until the Informations were filed. To themind of the Court, such delay; in view of the attendantcircumstances, is inordinate, unreasonable 'and oppressive.

2 Choa v. People a/the Philippines, March 14,2003,399 seRA 145

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The right to a speedy disposition of a person's case isguaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution. Section 16,Article III thereof states:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedydisposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, oradministrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is notlimited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to allparties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and inall proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearinqs.:'

In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan,4 the Supreme Courtexplained that the right to speedy disposition of cases should beunderstood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a meremathematical reckoning of the time involved would not besufficient. Hence, it is settled in jurisprudence that the right isdeemed violated only when the proceedings are attended byvexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustifiedpostponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or evenwithout cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowedto elapse without the party having his case tried."

In Uy v. Office of the Ombuosmen" the Supreme Court heldthat "in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedenceover the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed againsteach other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former."

In resolving a criminal complaint, inordinate delay beingviolative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process andto the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of thecriminal case. It is thus incumbent for the State to prove that thedelay was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it. 7

The prosecution argues that the motion for extension filed bythe accused, and the private complainant's reply-affidavit,contributed to the delay. However, the extension was only for eight(8) days, as the accused were able to file their Joint Counter-

3 People v. Sandiganbayan, December 11,2013,712 SeRA 359,4114 July 15,2013,701 seRA 18851bid6 June 27, 2008, 556 SeRA 73, 101: citing Allado v. Diokno, May 5, 1994,232 SeRA 192,2107 People v. Sandiganbayan, December 11, 2013, 712 SeRA 359, 412; citing Angchonco,Jr. v.Ombudsman, February 13, 1997,268 SeRA 301

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Affidavit on March 26, 2015, after requesting the extension onMarch 18, 2015. Likewise, the reply-affidavit was filed by theprivate complainant as early as May 20, 2015. Verily, the Office ofthe Ombudsman failed to provide reasonable justification as towhat transpired between May 20, 2015 up to the drafting of theResolution finding probable cause on January 12, 2017.

The right to speedy disposition of cases, as elucidated by theSupreme Court in Coscolluela, has the following purpose:

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition ofcases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurringdispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent theoppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecutionsuspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right tospeedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocentperson may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or,if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortestpossible time compatible with the presentation and considerationof whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This loomingunrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by thepassage of time should be weighed against the State and in favorof the individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, theCourt in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan (Corpuz) illumined:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and therights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approachspeedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of theinterest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed toprotect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; tominimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limitthe possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, themost serious is the last, because the inability of a defendantadequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entiresystem. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses areunable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even ifthe accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is stilldisadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under acloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financialresources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he issubjected to public obloquy.

In failing to resolve the complaint with such haste andprudence as dictated by law and jurisprudence, the Office of theOmbudsman placed the accused in' a tactical disadvantage andopened the possibility that their defense will be impaired.

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Finally, as to the argument that the accused did notseasonably assert their right to a speedy disposition of the case,the Supreme Court has reiterated its ruling in Coscollue/a that adefendant has no duty to bring himself to trial. In Inocentes v.People." the High Court held:

The prosecution likewise blames Inocentes for notseasonably invoking his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Itclaims that he has no right to complain about the delay when thedelay is because he allegedly slept on his rights.

We find this argument unworthy of merit, in the same waywe did in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:

Records show that they could not have urged the speedyresolution of their case because they were unaware that theinvestigation against them was still ongoing. They were onlyinformed of the March 27, 2003 resolution and information againstthem only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when theyreceived a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19,2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that theproceedings against them have already been terminated. Thisserves as a plausible reason as to why petitioners never followedup on the case altogether. Instructive on this point is the Court's

. observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Petitioners in this case, however, could not haveurged the speedy resolution of their case because theywere completely unaware that the investigation againstthem was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case, wereiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely askedto comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is theproper procedure to follow in a preliminaryinvestigation. After giving their explanation and afterfour long years of being in the dark, petitioners,naturally, had reason to assume that the chargesagainst them had already been dismissed.

On the other hand, the OMB failed to present anyplausible, special or even novel reason which couldjustify the four-year delay in terminating itsinvestigation. Its excuse for the delay - the many layersof review that the case had to undergo and themeticulous scrutiny it had to entail - has lost its noveltyand is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in theTatad case. The incident before us does not involvecomplicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in

8 July 7, 2016, G.R. Nos. 205936-64

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view of the fact that the subject computerizationcontract had been mutually cancelled by the partiesthereto even before the Anti-Graft League filed itscomplaint.

Being the respondents in the preliminaryinvestigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to followup on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Officeof the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within thebounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate topromptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced inthe case of Barker v. Wingo:

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State hasthat duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistentwith due process.

The same pronouncement was made In Remulla v.Sendiqenbeyen." where the Court held:

Remulla argues that the assertion or non-assertion of theright to a speedy disposition of cases determines whether thecourt must dismiss the case for inordinate delay or continue theproceedings. Such argument, however, fails to persuade. It mustbe emphasized that the balancing test is a relative and flexibleconcept. The factors therein must be weighed according to thedifferent facts and circumstances of each case. The courts aregiven wide judicial discretion in analyzing the context of the case,bearing in mind the prejudice caused by the delay both to theaccused and the State.

In addition, there is no constitutional or legal provisionwhich states that it is mandatory for the accused to follow up hiscase before his right to its speedy disposition can be recognized.To rule otherwise would promote judicial legislation where theCourt would provide a compulsory requisite not specified by theconstitutional provision. It simply cannot be done, thus, the adhoc characteristic of the balancing test must be upheld.

The Court is thus constrained to decree the dismissal of thepresent cases for violation of the accused's constitutional right to aspeedy disposition of their cases.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the accused'sMotion to Quash Informations, dated March 8, 2018, is herebyGRANTED, and the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. S8-18-CRM-0022 to -0027 are ordered QUASHED. Accordingly, the said

9 April!7, 2017, G.R. No. 218040

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cases are hereby DISMISSED, for violation of the constitutionalright of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases.

The hold-departure orders issued by this Court against theaccused by reason of these cases are hereby LIFTED and SETASIDE, and the bond they posted for their provisional liberty areordered RELEASED, subject to the usual accounting and auditingprocedures.

SO ORDERED.

EFREN ~r(D~ LA CRUZChairperson/~~ssociate Justice

We Concur:.~

GER~AITH A. ~GAssociate Justice