republic of the philippines ~u:noibu:nhu:1ju:nsb.judiciary.gov.ph/resolutions/2017/e_crim_sb-16...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

~u:noiBu:nhU:1Ju:nQuezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILlPINES,Plaintiff,

- versus - CRIM. CASE NO. S8-16-CRM-1227For: Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019

AGNES VST DEVANADERA,Accused.

Present:

DE LA CRUZ, J., ChairpersonECONG, J.,FERNANDEZ*, JJ.

Promulgated on:

MAY 1 6 2017 rt)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~- - - - - - - - - - -)(

RESOLUTION

DE LA CRUZ, J.

This resolves accused Agnes VST Devanadera's UrgentMotion, dated April 18, 2017, and the prosecution'sComment/Opposition [To Urgent Motion dated April 18, 2017J,dated April 26, 2017, thereto.

In her motion, accused Devanadera contends that thedismissal by this Court, through its Resolution, dated April 7, 2017,of the cases filed against the other accused.' particularly the casesinvolving members of the Second PNCC Board, on the ground ofviolation of their rights to a speedy disposition of their cases,should also apply to her, considering that her case is intertwinedwith and closely related to the said cases. As she is similarlycharged with the other accused, involving the same set of facts and

1 Criminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-1209, SB-16-CRM-1210, SB-16-CRM-1215, SB-16-CRM-1216, SB-16-CRM-1218, SB-16-CRM-1219, SB-16-CRM-1220, SB-16-CRM-1221, SB-16-CRM-1222, SB-16-CRM-1223, SB-16-CRM-1225 and SB·16·CRM·1226

*Sitting as Special Member of the First Division as per Administrative Order No. 009-2017, dated January 11, 2017.Ai o/)f

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Agnes VST DevanaderaCrim. Case No. SB-16-CRM-1227

of 12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

evidence, it would be a denial of the qual protection clause of theConstitution if the present case will n It be dismissed.

As proof that her right to a seedy disposition of her casewas violated, she narrates the followi g timeline:

1. On October 12, 2010, uis Sison filed a complaintagainst the accused, together with the other accused, for plunderand violation of Section 3(e) of RA 30~9.

2. On June 26, 2013, the mbudsman issued an Orderdirecting the accused to file her count r-affidavit.

3. On July 31, 2013, the accused filed her Counter-Affidavit.

4. On December 12, 2014, the Ombudsman issued aResolution finding probable cause fo violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA3019.

5. On February 13, 2015, th accused filed a Motion forReconsideration which was denied on November 27, 2015.

6. On November 25, 2016 an Information was filedagainst the accused.

The accused contends that the period of more than six (6)years that it took the Office of the mbudsman to complete thepreliminary investigation is unjustified oppressive and vexatious,and in clear violation of her const tutional right to a speedydisposition of her case. Citing Angch ngco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 2

the accused maintains that inordinate elay in resolving a criminalcomplaint warrants the dismissal of the case. Likewise, in People v.Sandiganbayan,3 the Supreme Court dismissed the case as theOmbudsman took five (5) years and ive (5) months to completethe preliminary investigation.

By way of comment/opposition, he prosecution argues thatthe Resolution, dated April 7, 2017, has yet to attain its finality.Moreover, the controlling principle in la is that the right to speedydisposition of the case must be asserte by the accused. Thus, the

2 February 13,1997,268 SeRA 3013 December 11,2013, 712 SeRA 359


of12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

ruling in Coscollue/a v. Sandiganbayan4 and Almeda v. Office ofthe Ombudsmen", both of which were decided by the SecondDivision of the Supreme Court, and were the basis of this Court indismissing the cases against the other accused, are not in accordwith the principles laid down by the Supreme Court en banc incases such as Gonza/es v. Sandiganbayan,6 Alvizo v.Sandiganbayan,7 De/a Petie v. Sandiganbayan,8 Guiani v.Senoiqenbeveri" and Gaas v. Mitmug.10 In said cases, the HighCourt held that the assertion or non-assertion of the accused of hisright, is considered in determining whether a defendant has beendenied his right to a speedy trial. Hence, the accused's inaction, bynot taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of thematter, implies acquiescence in the delay. Such silence may beinterpreted as a waiver of the right to a speedy disposition of one'scase.

The prosecution also asserts that such principles wereadopted by the Supreme Court, through certain Divisions, inRepublic v. Desieno," Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,12

Valencia v. Sandiganbayan,13 Spouses Uy v. Adriano,14 andCadalin v. POEA Administretor," which cases are decided earlierthan Coscollue/a and Almeda. Considering that Coscolluela andAlmeda are not en banc decisions, they could not be considered tohave modified or reversed the principles adopted by the SupremeCourt in the above-mentioned cases, pursuant to paragraph 3,Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution. Hence, the controllingprinciple is that the right to a speedy disposition of case must beasserted by the accused; otherwise, he is deemed to have waivedsaid right.

Applying the principle to the present case, the prosecutioncontends that the case against the accused should not be

• dismissed as the accused never asserted her right to a speedydisposition of her case, except when this Court dismissed thecases against the other accused. She can no longer seek the

4 July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 1885 G.R. No. 204267, July 25,20166 July 16, 1991, 199 seRA 2987 March 17, 1993,220 SeRA 558 June 29, 2001, 360 SeRA 4789 August 6,2002, 386 SCRA 43610 April 30, 2008, 553 seRA 33511 August 16, 2004, 436 sca« 54312 October 18, 2004, 440 SeRA 42313 October 17,2005,473 SeRA 27914 October 27,2006,505 SeRA 62515December 5, 1994,238 SeRA 721


of 12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

protection of the law to benefit from the adverse effects of herfailure to raise the issue at first instance.

The prosecution likewise urges this Court to take cognizanceof the fact that the heavy caseload of the Office of the Ombudsmanaffected the speedy disposition of cases pending before it.

The motion is impressed with merit. The Office of theOmbudsman committed inordinate delay in the conduct of thepreliminary investigation.

In its Resolution, dated April 7, 2017, this Court dismissedthe cases filed against the other accused in Criminal Cases Nos.SB-16-CRM-1209 to -1226, on the ground of deprivation of theirrights to a speedy disposition of their cases because of theinordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation onthe part of the OMB. The said resolution equally applies toaccused Devanadera. The pertinent portion of the said Resolutionis quoted below.

With respect to the other accused-movants, the reckoningtime of their preliminary investigation is October 12, 2010 whenSison's 2010 Complaint-Affidavit was filed. It ended onNovember 25, 2016 when the Informations were filed in Court.Considering the surrounding circumstances, the Court isconvinced that the aggregate period of almost six (6) yearsdevoted in the preliminary investigation is unjustified, and theprotracted delay also infringed upon the other accused-movants'rights to speedy disposition of their cases.

For sure, the STRADEC Ruling must have afforded theOMB a rather less intricate start. STRADEC had alreadyprovided the main and essential groundwork for the preliminaryinvestigation as it had already made findings on the subjectCompromise Agreement, passed upon the pertinent documentsin support of such findings, and even discussed, too, on theculpability of the members of the PNCC Board members. In fact,the OMB took off from STRADEC Ruling by securing thedocuments mentioned in the cases. It will not be amiss to saythat what was left for the OMB to do then was just to review andvalidate the documents mentioned in STRADEC, and the taskcould not have been that tedious with STRADEC on hand.Verily, a perusal of the December 12, 2014 Resolution of theOMB which found probable cause against the accused willreveal that the findings of facts and the discussions therein areessentially an echo of the contents of the decision in STRADEC.This, to the Court's mind, makes feeble the justification of the


0'12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~- - - - - - - )(

OMB that a longer period was necessary because it had to dealwith voluminous documents and records, complex issues, andseveral respondents. What is more, the Court finds inconsistentthe prosecution's rationalization that the OMB had to carefullystudy the cases before filing them in Court to avoid injustice toboth the accused and the State and to see to it that theInformations are accurate and appropriate, to its move now towithdraw the Informations which was actually filed in Court onlyafter almost a year from the Order denying the motions forreconsideration of the finding of probable cause against theaccused. Indeed, the Informations were prepared one (1) monthshort of one (1) year from the issuance of the Order onNovember 3, 2015 denying the accused's motions forreconsideration to the Ombudsman's approval of theInformations on October 24, 2016. The filing of the motion towithdraw informations to have them amended confirms theopposite, that is, that the Informations were haphazardlyprepared despite the unreasonably long period of time spent inthe conduct of the preliminary investigation.

There is no question that the OMB had to do its owninvestigation notwithstanding the STRAOEC Ruling. What isaberrant, however, is the unreasonably long period of six (6)years in completing the preliminary investigation when all it hadto do was merely to review and validate the documentsmentioned in STRAOEC and that it merely virtually copied in itsresolution the contents of the decision in STRAOEC.

Most of the accused-movants may not have asserted theirright to speedy disposition of cases earlier, but the HonorableSupreme Court had already clarified in Coscolluela that it is notthe duty of the accused to follow-up on the prosecution of theircases. Thus:

Being the respondents in the preliminaryinvestigation proceedings, it was not the petitioner'sduty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman'sresponsibility to expedite the same within the bounds ofreasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptlyact on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced inthe case of Barker v. Wingo: 16

A defendant has no duty to bringhimself to trial; the State has that duty aswell as the duty of insuring that the trial isconsistent with due process."

16407 U.S. 514 (1972)17 CoscoJ/uela v. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 199


of 12

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

Cascalluela also illumined that prejudice occasioned bythe delay should be considered in light of the interest of theaccused that the speedy trial was designed to protect, viz:

... Prejudice should be assessed in the light ofthe interest of the defendant that the speedy trial wasdesigned to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns ofthe accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that hisdefense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious isthe last because the inability of a defendant adequatelyto prepare his case skews the fairness of the entiresystem. There is also prejudice if the defense witnessesare unable to recall accurately the events of the distantpast. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial,he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty andby living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,hostility. His financial resources may be drained, hisassociation is curtailed, and he is subjected to ·publicobliquy."

In the more recent case of Almeda v. Office ot theOmbudsman (Mindanao) ,19 the Honorable Supreme Court againemphasized that for purposes of ascertaining delay in relation tospeedy disposition of cases, objection of the accused to thedelay is not necessary as long as he takes no part in it. It islikewise immaterial that the OMB's failure or inaction is notdeliberate.

"It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedilyresolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,regardless of whether the (respondent) did not object tothe delay or that the delay was with his acquiescenceprovided that it was not due to causes directlyattributable to him." Failure or inaction may not havebeen deliberately intended, yet unjustified delaynonetheless causes just as much vexation andoppression. Indeed, delay prejudices the accused orrespondent - and the State just the same.

Considering that the finding of violation of the rights of theaccused-movants to speedy disposition of their cases willnecessarily result in the dismissal of the cases against them, andwill, therefore, render moot and academic the rest of the issuesraised as to them, it is no longer necessary to discuss thepropriety of the prosecution's motion to withdraw Informations(insofar as the accused-movants are concerned), the validity ofthe Informations, and the existence of probable cause.

18 Id., p. 20019G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016


0f12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

Primarily, the prosecution argues that in view of theaccused's failure to assert her right to a speedy disposition of hercase, the dismissal of her case is not warranted. This Court is notconvinced.

The right to a speedy disposition of a person's case isguaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution. Section 16,Article III thereof states:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedydisposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, oradministrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is notlimited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to allparties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and inall proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearinqs."

In Uy v. Office of the Ombudsmen," the Supreme Court heldthat "in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedenceover the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed againsteach other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former."

In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Supreme Court held thatinordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint, being violative ofthe constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to thespeedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminalcase. It is thus incumbent for the State to prove that the delay wasreasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it.

In the present case, it took the Office of the Ombudsmanover six (6) years to complete the preliminary investigation,reckoned from the filing of the complaint on October 12, 2010, untilthe filing of the Information before this Court on November 25,2016. To the mind of this Court, such delay is inordinate andunreasonable.

To justify the delay, the prosecution insists that the accusednever raised the issue, which is contrary to the controlling principlethat the right must be asserted by the accused. It further contendsthat Coscolluela and Almeda, which were used as basis by this

20 People v. Sandiganbayan, December 11, 2013, 712 SeRA 359, 41121 June 27,2008, 556 SeRA 73, 101; citing AI/ado v. Diokno, May 5, 1994,232 SeRA 192,21022 Supra at note 16, p. 412; citing Angchonco, Jr. v, Ombudsman, February 13, 1997,268 SeRA 301


of 12

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

Court in dismissing the other cases, did not modify the principlethat the accused must assert the right, as they were not en bancdecisions.

The Court finds the prosecution's argument misplaced.

A careful reading of the decisions in Coscollue/a and A/medawill show that the Supreme Court neither modified nor reversed therulings in the earlier cases cited by the prosecution. That theaccused asserted or did not assert his right to a speedy dispositionof his case was in fact considered by the Court in both cases. InCoscollue/a, the Supreme Court held:

Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant hasbeen denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, thefollowing factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the lengthof delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion orfailure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) theprejudice caused by the delay.

Examining the incidents in the present case, the Courtholds that petitioners' right to a speedy disposition of theircriminal case had been violated." (Emphasis supplied)

In said case, the High Court examined as to why the accusedfailed to assert their right. It found that the accused were unawarethat the investigation against them was still on-going, hence, theycould not have urged the speedy disposition of the cases.

In A/meda, the Supreme Court likewise considered as afactor the accused's assertion or non-assertion of the right. Thus:

Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determinewhether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial,or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which theconduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed,and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, thedefendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, andprejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, areconsidered." (Emphasis supplied)

Notably, the Supreme Court found that the accused inAlmeda sent a letter and filed written manifestations seeking theimmediate resolution of her case.

23 July 15, 2013, 701 sea» 188,195-19624 G.R. No. 204267, July 25,2016


0'12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

Considering that the rulings in Coscolluela and Almeda didnot modify or reverse the earlier en banc decisions of the SupremeCourt, the prosecution's argument that they should not be appliedin this case must therefore fail.

The case of Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. New IndiaAssurance Company, Ltd.25 is also instructive on the applicability ofdoctrines enunciated in Supreme Court en banc decisions. In saidcase, the petitioner assailed a decision rendered by a division ofthe Supreme Court on the ground that it violates paragraph 3,Section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution. The petitioner soughtthe reversal of the subject decision as it is allegedly inconsistentwith earlier rulings, and prayed that the case be referred instead tothe Court en banc. In denying the motion, the Court held that thereis no need for a referral to the Court en banc considering thatpetitioner's case did not modify or reverse the earlier doctrines.Furthermore, the factual findings between the instant case and theearlier cases are different, thus, precluding the application of theprinciples enunciated in the latter.

It must also be emphasized that judicial decisions applying orinterpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall formpart of the legal system of the Philippines." As a general rule, adoctrine should be recognized as good law prior to itsabandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereon shouldbe respected. 27

In De Castro v. JBC,28 the Supreme Court explained that it isnot bound by precedent. Thus:

xxx. The one highest court does not bind itself, beinginvested with the innate authority to rule according to its bestlights.

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guidedbut is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especiallywith a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly aparticular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to callfor a rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigidin a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judgesmake law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a

25 August 24, 2007, 531 scnx 13426 Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, March 8, 2016, 786 SeRA 1, 151271bid28 G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010


of 12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not alwaysstrictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlierdecision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent caseonly when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and thecourt in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification tobe applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is forthe sake of convenience and stability.

Moreover, the circumstances in the Supreme Court en bancdecisions cited by the prosecution are not obtaining in the presentcase. In GonzaJes, the accused filed several motions before theOffice of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, seekingreconsideration and re-evaluation of the case and praying for thesuspension of the proceedings. In AJvizo, the Court found that thepreliminary investigation begun only in 1989, and thecorresponding information was filed in 1990. It also considered thecircumstances under which the prosecution had to operate, whichis the martial law regime. While in Deja Peiie, the Supreme Courtconsidered the transfer of the case to a new Graft InvestigationOfficer as one of the causes of the delay. Also, the accused thereinraised the issue of delay only after the case was set forarraignment. In Guiani, the Court noted that the complexity of thetransactions involved necessitated further substantiation of theallegations by requesting for the complete report from COA. Inaddition, there were forty-one respondents and most of themmoved for extensions of time to file their counter-affidavits. Finally,in Gaas, the issue of speedy disposition was raised for the firsttime after the accused lost and pursued their appeal.

In the related cases which this Court dismissed in itsResolution, dated April 7, 2017, the other accused raised the issueof speedy disposition via separate Motions to Quash, whichprocedurally may only be filed after the filing of the Information, onaccount of a Motion to Dismiss being a prohibited motion duringthe preliminary investigation. Similarly, accused Devanadera raisedthe issue after the Information has been filed and before her caseis set for arraignment. To this Court's mind, the filing of theseseparate motions by the accused right after their indictment andwell before their arraignment satisfactorily constitutes a timelyassertion of the accused's right to speedy disposition of theircases.


of 12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

Nevertheless, it bears stressing that the assertion or non-assertion of the right to a speedy disposition of one's case is justone of the factors to consider in determining whether or not theright has been violated. Corollarily, the accused's non-assertion ofhis right does not ipso facto rules out inordinate delay.

The prosecution also cites as justification for the delay theheavy caseload the Office of the Ombudsman. Again, this Court isnot persuaded. As thoroughly discussed by the Supreme Court inCoscolluela :29

To this end, the Court equally denies the S8's ratiocinationthat the delay in proceedings could be excused by the fact thatthe case had to undergo careful review and revision through thedifferent levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is finallyapproved, in addition to the steady stream of cases which it hadto resolve.

Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created underthe mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the "protector ofthe people" and as such, required to "act promptly on complaintsfiled in any form or manner against officers and employees of theGovernment, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentalitythereof, in order to promote efficient service." This greatresponsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by ineptitude.Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty notonly to carefully go through the particulars of case but also toresolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutifulperformance should not only be gauged by the quality of theassessment but also by the reasonable promptness of itsdispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, suchas the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case orany event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal workactivity - any of which have not been adequately proven by theprosecution in the case at bar - there appears to be no justifiablebasis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not haveearlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings againstthe petitioners.

Thus, the Court is constrained to decree the dismissal of thepresent case for violation of the accused's constitutional right to aspeedy disposition of her case.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, accused's UrgentMotion, dated April 18, 2017, is hereby GRANTED, and the

29 July 15, 2013, 701 seRA 188, 197


of 12

)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

Information in Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-1227 is orderedQUASHED. Accordingly, the said case is hereby DISMISSED, forviolation of accused Devanadera's constitutional right to a speedydisposition of her case.

The hold-departure order issued by this Court againstaccused Devanadera is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and thebond she posted for her provisional liberty is ordered RELEASED,subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures .

. SO ORDERED.

EFREN ~;;) LA CRUZchairpers~~~ ~!ociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ITO R. FERNANDEZAssociate Justice

~ ~JVGERALDINE FAITH~. ECONG

Associate Justice

republic of the philippines ~u:noibu:nhu:1ju:nsb.judiciary.gov.ph/resolutions/2017/e_crim_sb-16...

Documents