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International Security and Terrorism: Group Report

International Security and Terrorism:

Group Report

Terrorism as a subjective threat: did the United States overreact to 9/11?

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Contents

Part One: Framing the Question……………………………………………………………………………………………..….pp.2-4

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..p.2

What is Terrorism……………………………………………………………………………………………………….pp.2-3

Measuring Risk……………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….pp.3-4

Part Two: An Objective Threat……………………………………………………………………………………………..…….pp.4-6

Risk and Reaction……………………………………………………………………………………………………….pp.4-5

The Precautionary Principle……………………………………………………………………………………….pp.5-6

Part Three: A Subjective Threat…………………………………………………………………………………………….…….pp.6-8

Psychological Terrorism……………………………………………………………………………………………..pp.6-7

Encouraging Fear………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….p.8

Part Four: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….p.9

List of Figures and Illustrations

Fig. 0,Cover Photo, (New York City Police Aviation Unit, 2001).

Fig. 1, Lifetime chance of death by cause, US 2008 (National Safety Council, 2012)………………………p.4

Fig. 2, Dread risk and unknown risk (Marshall et al. 2007:308)………………………………………………………p.7

Fig. 3, George W. Bush is told about 9/11 (Agence France-Presse, 2001)…………………………….………....p.8

Fig. 4, Cover of the New York Times on 12/09/2001 (NYT, 2001:1)………………………..……………………….p.9

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Part One: Framing the Question

Introduction

The 9/11 terrorist attacks induced change within the United States, terrorism became the priority of policymakers and

the homeland security department was formed, leading to the ‘war on terror’ and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The date marks the beginning of an ‘age of terror’.1 In this report we argue that the United States has overreacted to

9/11 due to the extent of the subjective threat of terrorism; this is the concept that terrorism, by creating fear and

uncertainty, leads to excessive and disproportionate reactions. After considering complications in measuring risk, we

conceptualize the terrorist threat posed by 9/11 and compare this to the US reaction. We then consider why the US

may have overreacted to 9/11 by evaluating how the subjective threat of terrorism has affected the public through the

creation of psychological terror, which is encouraged by politicians and the media. We acknowledge alternative

motives for the US overreaction, such as to achieve other political motives or to maintain a strong international image

in the wake of their arguably declining hegemony, however these reasons are not the focus of this report which

concentrates on classifying the terrorist threat. Evaluating the US response to terrorism is important because it

influences power, money and even threatens lives in the case of a military response (Jackson et at., 2011:125) and the

fear created by the response to terrorism may also have a psychological effect on populations (Friedland & Merari,

1986:234).

What is Terrorism?

A broad and encompassing definition is that terrorism is the use or threat of violence with political aims and motives,

with a target which is bigger than the immediate victims of violence (Lutz & Lutz, 2008:9). There is a terminological

difficulty in creating a more concise definition of terrorism due to wide variation in the use of the term (Schmid,

2011:39). Therefore, instead of deliberating the possibilities for a universal definition, we will create a more specific

and relevant concept of terrorism by considering the key features of our case study. In literal terms, the 9/11 attack

was perpetrated by the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda and suffered by the United States. It caused the deaths of

1 Some interpret this rhetoric as an extreme exaggeration (Mueller, 2005:478).

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Security, ‘in the subjective objective sense,

measures the absence of threats to previously

acquired values, in a subjective sense, the

absence of fear that such values will be attacked’

(Wolfers, 1952:485)

2,977 people and the collapse of the World Trade Centre (CNN, 2013). Based on these facts, 9/11 was an act of

violence by a sub-state group, the perpetrator had a wider aim, the target was a national landmark and the act caused

many fatalities. An important counterpart of these features in relation to this report is the dramatic nature of the attack;

the magnitude and high profile of the attack created shock and therefore became the focus of mass media attention.

This is a common feature of terrorist acts; even before 9/11, Diana Taylor argued that terrorist attacks were purposely

theatrical because they have symbolic aims (1990:165). The wider aim or ‘symbolic’ aim of a terrorist group means

that attacks have the object of gaining as much attention as possible,

A further clarification of our interpretation of terrorism is

the distinction we make between objective and subjective

terrorism. This idea is grounded in Arnold Wolfers’ original

definition of national security, which distinguishes between

real ‘objective’ threats and imagined ‘subjective’ threats. In

the objective sense, terrorism may be a threat because of the actual use of violence, and in the subjective sense,

terrorism may be perceived as a threat because it creates fear that violence will be used.

Measuring Risk

A key barrier in knowing whether the US has overreacted to the threat posed by 9/11 is the difficulty in identifying the

level of threat. The global policy think tank RAND suggests that a difficulty for security policy in general is that

threats are often located in the future and are therefore inherently hypothetical (Jackson & Frelinger, 2009:ix). The

post-9/11 threat to the US has been defined as anything from unlimited to non-existent; columnists such as Charles

Krauthammer suggest that terrorism threatens ‘civilization itself’ (2004:A19) whilst academics such as John Mueller

suggest that the terrorist threat has been exaggerated and that now almost no threat exists in the US (2006:2). Jackson

et al. identify three methods used to measure the terrorist threat: statistically, statistically with psychological analysis

and by using the precautionary principle (Jackson et al., 2011:128). This report uses a combination of these three

methods; it draws upon statistical research but also considers how this numerical information has been analysed and

interpreted in order to understand both the level of threat posed by 9/11 and whether the reaction from the US was

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appropriate. The precautionary principle is suggested within our analysis when we consider whether the terrorist threat

may be bigger than statistics imply.

Part Two: An Objective Threat

In this section, we classify the extent of the ‘actual’ or objective terrorist threat and compare this to the US’s reaction.

Firstly we measure both the threat and the reaction statistically, using the number of fatalities and financial cost as

indicators. Then, using the precautionary principle, we consider any reasons for which the US may believe that the

objective threat is bigger than these numbers suggest.

Risk and Reaction

The magnitude of the 9/11 attacks created an

unprecedented level of fear; US President Barack

Obama described 9/11 as the ‘worst attack on the

American people in history’ (2011). Given that 2,977

people died as a direct result of the attacks (CNN,

2013), we may contextualize the extent of the threat by

considering comparative death tolls. Fig. 1 shows that

there are many more threatening risks than terrorism in

the US, where you are more likely to die from being

stung by a bee, or because of a fireworks discharge.

Other studies show that even in 2001 the risk of death

from causes such as homicide and even by accidental

choking were higher than those of dying in a terrorist

attack (Marshall et al., 2007:310). With the exception of 2001, the risk of death from a terrorist attack in the US has

been virtually non-existent, in almost all years fewer than ten Americans die worldwide at the hands of terrorists (US

State Department, 1997). On the other hand, Jackson et al. argue that terrorist attacks usually target property as

opposed to people and may therefore have a higher financial harm cost (2011:130). The New York Times used

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research from a range of national and international institutions to find the cost of 9/11, and claims that the economic

impact of 9/11 was $123 billion (Carter & Cox, 2011).

The US responded to 9/11 with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the creation of the Homeland Security

department. Paul Rogers classified the response as ‘vigorous and extended’ with an ‘overwhelming use of firepower’

(Rogers, 2013:221). The ‘war on terror’ has so far killed 5,281 American soldiers (Griffis, 2014) and 186,000 Iraqis

(Iraq Body count, 2014). In terms of financing the war on terror, a recent study from Harvard suggests that the war has

cost somewhere between $4 and $6 trillion (Blimes, 2013:1). This suggests even more loss of life when considering

that this money could have been spent, for example, on health care or on tackling gun crime. Even if we disregard

these possibilities as well as the detrimental impact the war on terror has had on Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s

response to 9/11 has cost 2,304 more American lives and around $4 trillion more American dollars than 9/11 did.

These statistics alone suggest that the US has overreacted at an extortionate level.

The Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle suggests that states should

actively try to prevent a threat even before there is any

evidence of that threat (Jackson et al., 2011:128). The

unpredictability associated with terrorism means that future

threat is unknown and therefore states have to make a decision between taking precautionary action or running the risk

of being attacked; this is the security dilemma (Herz, 1962:232). John Mueller argues that al-Qaeda is unlikely to

disappear (2005:491), the persistence and uncertainly surrounding terrorist groups creates the possibility that a

terrorist attack could happen at any time, which may explain why a states response to terrorism is often more extreme

than the act itself.2 This sentiment is echoed by the US; homeland security released statements shortly after 9/11

claiming that another terrorist attack could happen at any moment. Additionally, as the events which would have

occurred if the US had ‘done nothing’ are unknown, there is a possibility that terrorist attacks would have occurred,

and therefore supporters of the regime argue that the terrorist threat has been significantly reduced because of the

2 Mueller references other times in history in which states have ‘overreacted’ to a terrorist threat, such as the Russian reaction to

Chechen terrorism in 1999 and the US attack on Sudan after terrorist attacks towards American embassies in Africa in 1998

(Mueller, 2005:491).

‘Today’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any

time, and with virtually any weapon’

(Homeland Security, 2002:8).

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government reaction (Jackson et al., 2011:131). Other argue that the Iraq conflict has actually increased the spread of

the ‘al-Qaeda ideological virus’. One study, drawing upon data from an MIPT-RAND terrorism database, found that

the rate of terrorist attacks around the world by jihadist groups and the rate of fatalities in those attacks more than

doubled after the invasion of Iraq (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007:1). Therefore, evidence suggests that the US has not

slowed down the rate of terrorist attacks, although it would be impossible to tell whether there would have been even

more attacks if the US had ‘done nothing’ in response to 9/11. Considering the number of fatalities and the financial

cost does suggest that the US did overreact to 9/11. However, 9/11 represents the threat of terrorism which is now a

possibility for the future, and therefore some argue that the impulsive reaction of the US was necessary in order to

prevent further terrorism.

Part Three: A Subjective Threat

In this section we argue that terrorism is a subjective threat due to the psychological effects it produces. Terrorism is a

form of psychological warfare; it aims to paralyze the population with fear and anxiety, to intimidate and to induce

worry and concern that is disproportional to and far exceeds the actual damage it causes (Friedland & Merari, 1986;

234). Although terrorist acts injure and hurt their immediate victims, their ultimate goal is to cause a sense of fear and

anxiety, helplessness and vulnerability among the general population. As a result these acts evoke feelings of potential

victimization (Krupnick, 1980: 347, Freedman, 1983; 389-401) unrelated to the actual probability of becoming a

victim of terrorism (Friedland & Merari, 1986; 250). This could explain why the United States overreacted to the

terrorist threat after 9/11.

Psychological Terrorism

The fact that terrorist attacks are unpredictable creates a perception of uncontrollability, which affects one’s capability

of coping with the threat (Klar, Medding & Sarel,1996; 229-245). Studies conducted in the United States have

examined the psychological reaction to the events of September the 11th (Galea, Ahern & Resnick, 2002; 346). The

findings indicate post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, symptoms with consistent depression, anxiety and

a reduced sense of safety. Although the prevalence of probable PTSD symptoms was significantly higher in the New

York City metropolitan area, it was shown that psychological effects were not limited to those who experienced it

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directly (Stephenson, 2001; 286). Research shows that the effects of the events on September the 11th spread

throughout the country and that individuals continue to have substantial anxiety about future terrorist attacks. Fig. 2

represents how terrorism is seen by the American public as a ‘high signal potential event’ that could happen. This

articulates the widespread fear that the public had to the idea of terrorism which may explain the political policy focus

on counterterrorism (as opposed to a concentration on other equally dangerous threats) .

Fig. 2

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Encouraging Fear

If political leaders focus their policies on terrorism, they can

cause psychological anxiety about the threat within their

country. An example of this is the Bush Doctrine, a political

agenda which created a culture of fear (Furedi, 2005; 124).

The phrase initially justified the 2001 invasion of

Afghanistan with the argument that the United States had the

right to secure its own safety against countries that harbour

or give aid to terrorist groups. Naomi Klein, author of The Shock

Doctrine (2008), claims that the Bush administration exploited a

‘window of opportunity that opens up in a state of shock’ (Klein,

2007). George Bush’s speeches explicitly implied that the US was

under immediate threat of another attack, this caused psychological

terror and anxiety for the citizens of the United States, as they

believed that there was an immediate threat of a terrorist attack

(Glassner, 2010:234).

In a similar vein to political rhetoric, media rhetoric promotes the

fear of future terrorist attacks. The initial reaction of the media

suggests that 9/11 was a colossal threat. In the days following the attacks, newspapers were filled with images of

destruction and fear-inducing headlines; the New York Times cover, shown in Fig. 4, named 9/11 the ‘day of terror’

and ‘a creeping horror’ (New York Times, 2001:1). After the terrorist attacks of September the 11th, Schuster et al.

(2001) conducted a national survey in the United States and found a substantial increase in indicators of stress

throughout the country, suggesting that media coverage communicated the emotional impact of terrorism to distant

audiences. Similar effects have been found in other states in which media coverage of terrorist attacks induce wide-

spread fear.3 The media has the same psychological effect as political figures and institutions in adding to the

3 For example, a survey of Israelis conducted shortly after a series of deadly terrorist attacks found that exposure to coverage

including horrifying details of the attacks, was associated with the development of symptoms similar to post-traumatic stress

disorder (Keinan, Sadeh & Rosen, 2003).

‘If we were not fighting and destroying the

enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. They

would be plotting and killing Americans across

the world and within our own borders. By

fighting these terrorists in Iraq, Americans in

uniform are defeating a direct threat to the

American people’

(President George W. Bush, 2005)

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subjective threat of terrorism by increasing the level of public fear.

Part Four: Conclusion

Throughout this report, we have made two key arguments:

that the US did overreact to 9/11, and that the US did so in

response to the fear, evident in the level of psychological

anxiety, which was created by the subjective threat of

terrorism. We agree with academics such as John Mueller,

who argue that the costs of terrorism can come from fear

and reaction as opposed to the direct effects of terrorism

(2005:478). This was communicated to the public by

political rhetoric and mass media attention. These

arguments to not ignore the objective threat and harm

caused by 9/11, but simply suggest that the subjective

threat spread further and caused an over exaggeration of

the likelihood of future threat. This is an important

message for critics of policy and academics, who may

benefit from the awareness that policymakers are likely to

respond to terrorist threats disproportionately, and also to

the general public, who may benefit from the knowledge

that terrorism is unlikely to directly threaten them.

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