remlaw - compiled case digest

8/9/2019 REMLAW - Compiled Case Digest

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Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case DigestsJurisdiction to Rule 9

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu 1

ERISTINGCOL vs COURT OF APPEALS - Jurisdiction

Doctrine:It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined bythe allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theoriesset up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdictionwould become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

Facts:

Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village (or village),Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 208586. On theother hand, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre were the former president andchairman of the board of governors, construction committee chairman andvillage manager of Urdaneta Village Association Inc. UVAI, respectively. UVAIis an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.

Eristingcols action against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre is founded onthe allegations that in compliance with the National Building Code and afterUVAIs approval of her building plans and acceptance of the constructionbond and architects fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house on her lotwith concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway; that for

alleged violation of its Construction Rules and Regulations (or CRR) on SetBack Line vis-a-vis the canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty ofP400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering thevillage and working on her property; that the CRR, particularly on Set BackLine, is contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.

The RTCratiocinated that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre may not assailits jurisdiction after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefstherein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking todesist from prohibiting Eristingcols workers from entering the village. In soruling, it applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

The CA issued the herein assailed Decision reversing the RTC Order anddismissing Eristingcols complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcolscomplaint.

Ruling:

Apparently, Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration ofnullity, falls within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, we have, on morethan one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinativeof the nature of the action.

Scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint reveals thatthe nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delvesinto the validity of UVAIs Construction Rules. The complaint actually goesinto the proper interpretation and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically

its construction rules.

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined bythe allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or thetheories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss.Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon thewhims of the defendant.

In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case iswell-established. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract

between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable, despite the latters deft phraseologyof its primary cause of action as a declaration of nullity of UVAIs ConstructionRules. In short, the crux of Eristingcols complaint is UVAIs supposedarbitrary implementation of its construction rules against Eristingcol, amember thereof.

In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint, it is theHLURB, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case.

GABRIEL L. DUERO,vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A.ERADELTOPIC: JURISDICTION

DOCTRINE:Lack of Jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by theparties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of theproceedings and even on appeal.

FACTS: In 1988, private respondent Bemardo Eradel entered and occupiedpetitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao delSur. The land had an assessed value of P5,240. Duero politely informed privaterespondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land, privaterespondent refused, but instead threatened him. Despite repeated demands, privaterespondent refused to leave the land.Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint forRecovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees againstprivate respondent and two others. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to

file their Answer and was given until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the,Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for apartial judgment. The agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and boundthemselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte. Judgment was rendered in his favor, andrespondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the land to petitioner.Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the landas a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over thecomplaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter hada better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it.However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.


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Respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating thesame allegation in his Motion for New Trial. Josephine, Ana Soledad and VirginiaLaurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed aMotion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.

TC:The trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. Ina Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent allegedthat the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the landwas only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of themunicipal trial court. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted. Respondent filed hispetition for certiorari before the CA.

CA:Respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motionfor Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment.

ISSUE:(1) Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held

that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and (2) that private respondent was notestopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motionsbefore it.

HELD/RATIO: (1) No. Under the circumstances, we could not fault the Court ofAppeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estoppedfrom questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule isthat, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived bythe parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by theirexpress consent.Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the courtover the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. Theappellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declareditself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively

participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannotstill be properly invoked against him because the question of lack ofjurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question ofacquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.Also,neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barringhighly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.

(2) No. Respondent is not estopped form questioning the jurisdiction of theRTC. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, includinginvocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party byestoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction, estoppel has become anequitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successfulinvocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement.For

estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentionalbecause, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other partiesbefore the said court,. believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. Butby then, Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129 had become effective, such thatjurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to saidamendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief thatsince he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave thesummons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did notdo anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, privaterespondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the samecourt and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to beanswered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence toprove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long,continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fidetenant-lessee of the land. Buthis motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC aMotion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence hemoved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raisedfor the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that

private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was alreadyon appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, deniedhis motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his twomotions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial ofprivate respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order forentry of judgment and a writ of execution.

Gonzaga v CA (2002)

Corona, J.

DOCTRINE

Doctrine in Tijiam v Sibonghanoy still subsists. A partys active participation in allstages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority togrant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that samecourts jurisdiction.

FACTS

Petitioner spouses purchased lot 19 from respond ent. To finance the purchase, the

spouses got a loan from SSS and made the property as the security. mistakenly, the


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spouses built their house on lot 18, instead of lot 19. Aware of such fact, the plaintiffnonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot 18 on the proposal that he wouldalso buy the same. Plaintiff however failed to buy Lot 18 and likewise defaulted in thepayment of his loan with the SSS involving Lot 19. Consequently Lot 19 was foreclosedand sold at public auction.

After foreclosure, the spouses asked respondent to swap lot 19 with lot 18. When

respondent refused, the spouses filed a petition for the reformation of the contract.

Trial court: The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Thecontract was clear. It reflected the true intention of parties: the spousesintended to buy Lot 19 and not lot 18.

When Trial court issued a writ of execution, spouses filed an urgentmotion to recall writ of execution alleging that the court a quo hadno jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing andLand Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Spouses filed a new complaint with HLURB and a petitionto annul judgment of RTC before CA on the ground that RTCdoes not have jurisdiction to try the case.

CA: CA denied the petition on the ground of estoppel as ruled in tijam vsibonghanoy.

Spouses filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of

the CA claiming that CA erred in dismissing the petition by applying the doctrine ofestoppel. Petitioners claim that SC in their recent decisions had already abandoned thedoctrine laid down in Tijiam v Sibonghanoy.

ISSUE

Whether petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC

HELD:Yes, the court has not abandoned tijam v sibonghanoy.

Tijiam v Sibonghanoy states:

Party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different waysand for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel bydeed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

x xx

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court tosecure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failingto obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x[T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matterof the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because theparty is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of thecourt is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that sucha practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

A partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trialcourt, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmativerelief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that samecourts jurisdiction.

Petitioners were the ones who instituted the petition for reformation of contract.they vigorously asserted their cause of action.

Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction duringthe entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial courtrendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 didpetitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because saiddecision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right toquestion the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.

Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act.They cannot be allowedto profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent.This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case fordecision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lackof jurisdiction if not.


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ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION vs.DOTCG.R. No. 169914 April 18, 2008

TOPIC: JURISDICTION- Res Judicata

DOCTRINE:The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are asfollows:

1. the former judgment or order must be final;2.

it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after aconsideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at thetrial of the case;

3. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and the parties; and

4.

there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, ofsubject matter and of cause of action.

FACTS: This case tackled three SC decisions, namely:-Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.-Republic v. Gingoyon-Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation andCommunications and Manila International Airport Authority (G.R. No. 169914)

These cases are about the awarding of the Ninoy Aquino International AirportInternational Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) Project to the PhilippineInternational Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).

Banking on this SCs declaration inAganthat the award of the NAIA IPTIII Project to PIATCO is null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation(AEDC) filed before this Court the present Petition forMandamusand Prohibition. Atthe crux of the Petition of AEDC is its claim that, being the recognized and

unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it has theexclusive, clear, and vested statutory right to the award thereof.

However, there having been two prior cases rendered by the SC (Agan & Gingoyon)regarding the matter, a strong argument against the AEDC's Petition is that it isalready barred by res judicata.

ISSUE:Whether or not the case is barred by reason of res judicata, seeing that therewere prior rulings regarding the matter.

HELD:YES

RATIO:

The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment,are as follows:

5.

the former judgment or order must be final;6. it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was

rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulationssubmitted by the parties at the trial of the case;

7. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the

subject matter and the parties; and8.

there must be, between the first and second actions, identity ofparties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

All of the elements are present herein so as to bar the presentPetition.

First,the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was issuedon 30 April 1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise

agreement, once approved by the court is immediately executory and not

appealable.47

Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213 pursuant

to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgmenton the merits.

The Joint Motion to Dismiss stated that the parties were willing to settle the caseamicably and, consequently, moved for the dismissal thereof. It also contained aprovision in which the parties the AEDC, on one hand, and the DOTC Secretary andPBAC, on the other released and forever discharged each other from any and allliabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising in connection with the case. It isundisputable that the parties entered into a compromise agreement, defined as "acontract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation orput an end to one already commenced.48"Essentially, it is a contract perfected bymere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and theacceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. Once anagreement is stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere contract

binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as itsdetermination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any otherjudgment.49Article 2037 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that acompromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.

Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there wasaccordingly a judicial settlement of the controversy, and the Order, of theRTC of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled onlyupon the ground of extrinsic fraud

Third,there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pas ig City over thesubject matter and parties. The RTC can exercise original jurisdiction overcases involving the issuance of writs of certiorari,prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand injunction.
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Lastly,there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and thePetition now pending before this Court, an identity of parties, of subjectmatter, and of causes of action.

There is an identity of parties. In both petitions, the AEDC is the

petitioner. The respondents in Civil Case No. 66213 are the DOTC Secretary and the

PBAC Chairman and members. The respondents in the instant Petition are the DOTC,the DOTC Secretary, and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA).

There is an identity of subject matter because the two Petitions involve

none other than the award and implementation of the NAIA IPT IIIProject.

There is an identity of cause of action because, in both Petitions, AEDC isasserting the violation of its right to the award of the NAIA IPT III Projectas the original proponent in the absence of any other qualified bidders.

AGAN v PIATCO

Jurisdiction: hierarchy of Courts

Doctrine:The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtainedin the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justifyavailment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primaryjurisdiction.

Facts:In August 1989 the DOTC had a study conducted to determine whether or not

the present Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) can cope with trafficdevelopment up to the year 2010. A draft final report was submitted to the DOTC inDecember 1989. Four years later, in 1993, six Filipino-Chinese business leaders metwith then President Fidel Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in theconstruction and operation of a new international airport terminal. The six later formedthe Asias Emerging Dragon Corp (AEDC) which submitted an unsolicited proposal forthe development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III more than a year after

the first meeting with Ramos, in October 1994. In March 1995, the DOTC endorsed theAEDC proposal to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). InJanuary 1996, NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT IIIproject. In June 1996, the DOTC published an invitation for competitive bidding in twodaily newspapers, as required by law (sec 4-A of RA6957). The alternative bidders hadto submit three envelopes. The first contains the prequalification documents, thesecond the technical proposal, and the third the financial proposal of the proponent.The bidding was scheduled on September 20, 1996. The bid documents issued by thePrequalification Bids and Awards Committee said the proponent must have adequatecapability to sustain the financing requirement for the engineering, design,construction, operation, and maintenance phases of the project. The proponent musthave an equity that is at least 30% of the project cost, and be able to secure externalfinancing for the project. Government was also guaranteed a five percent share in thegross revenue of the project for the first five years; 7.5% in the next 10 years, and 10%

in the next 10 years. This would be in addition to a fixed annual guaranteed payment tothe government. The basis for the prequalification shall be the proponents compliancewith the minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the bid documentsand the IRR of the BOT (build operate and transfer) Law. The bid documents allowedamendments to the draft concession agreement, but said that these should cover onlyitems that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponents proposal.

In August 1996, during the second pre-bid conference, the PBAC made several

clarifications, upon the request of Peoples Air Cargo & Warehousing Co. Inc(PAIRCARGO), which wanted to challenge the AEDC bid.The PBAC said the list of revenue sources mentioned in the bid documents weremerely indicative. The project proponent may add other revenue sources, subject toapproval by the DOTC/MIAA. Also, only fees and charges denominated as publicutility fees would be subject to regulation, and these could still be revised, because thePBAC has a pending query with the justice department. In September 1996, PBACissued a bid bulletin in which it said that since PAIRCARGO could not meet therequired minimum equity prescribed in the bid documents, it would accept instead anaudited financial statement of the financial capability of all member companies of theconsortium.

In September 1996, PAIRCARGO submitted their competitive proposal to thePBAC. The first envelope, containing the prequalification documents, was opened onSeptember 23, 1996, and PBAC prequalified the PAIRCARGO consortium the followingday. On September 26, AEDC filed with PBAC its reservations regarding PAIRCARGo,noting the lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAIRCARGO. Forone, PAIRCARGO included in the computation of its financial capability the total networth of Security Bank, when the Banking Law limits to 15% the total investment thata bank may make on one project. It also questioned the appointment of Lufthansa asfacility operator, because Philippine laws limit to Filipinos the operation of a publicutility.The PBAC, however, said on October 2, 1996 that based on the documents submittedand the prequalification criteria, PAIRCARGO was prequalified. The DOTC secretaryapproved PBACs findings. The AEDC reiterated its objections two more times. OnOctober 16, the third envelope containing the financial proposals were opened, and

PAIRCARGO had offered to pay the government higher. Both PAIRCARGO and AEDCoffered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 million at no cost tothe government and to pay the government a 5% share in gross revenues for the firstfive years of operation; a 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next 10 years of operation;and a 10% share in gross revenues for the last 10 years of operation. In addition to this,AEDC offered to pay the government P135 million as guaranteed payment for 27 years.Paircargo Consortium offered a total of P17.75 billion for the same period. PBACinformed AEDC it had accepted Paircagos price proposal, and given AEDC 30 workingdays to match the bid. When AEDC failed to do so, the DOTC issued a notice onDecember 11 1996 regarding AEDCs failure to match the proposal.

In February 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into PhilippineInternational Airport Terminals Co Inc (PIATCO). AEDC protested the alleged unduepreference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections regarding the prequalificationof PIATCO. In April 1997, it filed before the Pasig RTC a petition for declaration of


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nullity of the proceedings, mandamus and injunction against the DOTC secretary, thePBAC chair and its voting members, and the chair of the PBAC technical committee.On April 17, the NEDA ICC conducted an ad referendum to facilitate the approval of theBOT agreement between the DOTC and PIATCO. Because there were only four insteadof the required six signatures, the NEDA merely noted the agreement.

On July 9, 1997, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project toPIATCO. The Concession Agreement was signed on July 12, 1997, granting PIATCO the

franchise to operate and maintain the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for 25 years, withan option to renew for a period not exceeding 25 years. PIATCO was allowed to collectfees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules in the 1997Concession Agreement. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO will transfer theairport to MIAA.In November 1998, the government and PIATCO signed an Amended and RestatedConcession Agreement (ARCA). The ARCA amended provisions on the specialobligations of the government, the exclusivity of the franchise given to PIATCO, theproceeds of the insurance, the taxes, duties and other charges that may be leviedPIATCO, and the provisions on the termination of the contract. Three moresupplements to the ARCA were signed afterwards: in August 1999, in September 2000,and in June 2001.The first redefined revenues, required government to construct an access roadconnecting NAIA II and III, and added to the special obligations of government. Thesecond supplement required government to clear structures at the construction site andto pay PIATCO for these. The third provided for PIATCOs obligations regarding theconstruction of the surface road connecting Terminals II and III.In September 2002, workers of the international airline service providers filed beforethe Supreme Court a petition for prohibition enjoining the enforcement of theagreements. They said the transfer to NAIA III could cost them their jobs, since underthe agreements, PIATCO is not required to honor MIAAs existing concession contractswith various service providers for international airline airport services.

In October 2002, the service providers filed a motion for intervention and apetition in intervention, joining the cause of the petitioning workers. Threecongressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino Jaraula filed asimilar petition shortly after. In November 2002, several MIAA employees also filed apetition questioning the legality of the agreements. In December 2002, another group

of congressmen Jacinto Paras, Rafael Nantes, Eduardo Zialcita, Willie Villarama,Prospero Nograles, Prospero Pichay Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and BenasingMacarambon filed their comment in intervention defending the validity of theagreements and praying for the dismissal of the petitions. On December 10, 2002, thecourt heard the case on oral argument, the required the parties to file their respectivememoranda, and to explore the possibility of arbitration as provided in the challengedcontracts.

In their consolidated memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General and theOffice of the Government Corporate Counsel prayed that the petitions be given duecourse and that the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the supplements bedeclared void for being contrary to the Constitution, the BOT Law and its implementingrules and regulations. In March 2003, PIATCO commenced arbitration proceedingsbefore the International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration.

Issue:Whether or not there was violation of hierarchy of courts

Held:No

Ratio:

Respondent PIATCO further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction toreview the instant cases as factual issues are involved which this Court is ill-equippedto resolve. Moreover, PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this Courtat the first instance is a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. They contend thattrial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court with respect to a special civilaction for prohibition and hence, following the rule on hierarchy of courts, resort mustfirst be had before the trial courts.

After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues involved, this Court isof the view that the crux of the instant controversy involves significant legal questions.The facts necessary to resolve these legal questions are well established and, hence,need not be determined by a trial court.

The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assumingjurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desiredcannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compellingcircumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of thisCourts primary jurisdiction.

It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar thatcall for the relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that thesecases are oftranscendental importance as they involve the construction and operationof the countrys premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submittedfor resolution are of first impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation ofkey provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules andRegulations. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court,procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant

cases.

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V. ATIENZAGR NO. 154599, JANUARY 21, 2004

DOCTRINES:


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Rule on Hierarchy of Courts: The concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, tobe taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrainedfreedom of choice of the court to which the application therefore will be directed. Thereis after all a hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,and also serves as the general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions forextraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainlyindicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first lever

(inferior) courts should be filed with RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. adirects invocation of the SCs original jurisdiction to issue the writs should be allowedonly when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically setout in the petition. This is an established policy. It is policy necessary to preventinordinate demands upon the courts time and attention which are better devoted tothose matters within the exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding ofthe courts docket.

Requisites for filing a Writ of Certiorari:Writ of certiorari to issue, the followingrequisites must concur:

1. It must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or

quasi-judicial functions;2.

The tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess ofjurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction; and

3.

There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law.

Forum Shopping; Exist if elements of Litis Pendentia are present: Forumshopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a finaljudgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia toexist, the following requisites must be present:

1.

Identity of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interestin both actions;

2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded onthe same facts;

3.

Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, suchthat any judgment that may be rendered in the preceding case regardless ofwhich party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Short Facts: The Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in thePhilippines. It was made by the Local Government Code. The LGU provided for electionof officers of the Liga. Sometime before the elections of LGU officers, the Manila CityCouncil enacted an ordinance inconsistent with the election law provided in the LGU

code and the Ligas constitution. This circular was later approved by the City Mayor,

Atienza. The Liga then filed a case of certiorari under rule 65 with the Supreme Courtaverring that the Manila City Council acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisction when it enacted the said ordinance.

Issue:WON certiorari under rule 65 is the proper recourse.

Held: Please refer to the doctrines.

-

City Manila council was not acting in a quasi-judicial function when it enactedthe law, but under its legislative powers;

- Not rule 65, but should be petition for declaratory relief in assailingconstitutionality or validity of a law;

-

Not with the SC, because jurisdiction is concurrent with RTC and CA-

Must follow the hierarchy of courts

Serrana vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 162059

Topic: Jurisdiction

Doctrine: Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of anon-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer ascontemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan. It is well established that compensation is not an essential element ofpublic office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.

Sandiganbayan: denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.

SC:petition is DENIEDfor lack of merit.

Facts:

Hannah Eunice D. Serrana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu (UP). She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999

as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and endingon December 31, 2000.

Petitioner received 15 million from President Estrada for the renovation of the VinzonsHall Annex. However such renovation failed to materialized. Hence, ombudsman fileda charge of estafa to the sandiganbayan.

Issue:

Can petitioner be charged of estafa in the Sand iganbayan? Can petitioner be consideredas public officer?

Ruling:


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Petitioner can be charged of estafa as provided in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. TheSandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials inrelation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as oneof the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of thoseother felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) theoffense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) ofP.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their

office.

As to the issue of whether or not petitioner is a public officer. It was held in Laurel vsDesierto, that public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred bylaw, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of thecreating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functionsof the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual soinvested is a public officer.

Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stockcorporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplatedby P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is wellestablished that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it ismerely incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by expressmandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

AMBIL JR. VS SANDIGANBAYANTOPIC: JurisdictionFACTS:

- Atty. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the IBP, wrote a letterto the office of the Ombudsman praying for an investigation into the allegedtransfer of the Mayor Adalim, an accused for murder, from the provincial jail

of Easter Samar to the residence of the petitioner.- NBI recommended the filing of criminal charges against the petitioner for

violation of Sec 3(e) of RA No. 3019 otherwise known as Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act

- Petitioners contended that Adalims transfer was justified considering theimminent threats upon his person and the danger posed by his detention atthe provincial jail.

- According to petitioner, it was upon the advice of his lawyers that he bedirected the transfer of Adalim to his residence

- Sandiganbayan, first division, found petitioner guilty of Anti-Graft andCorruption. Petitioner have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits inthe form of more comfortable quarters.

- Petitioner said that the said rule does not apply to his case because theprovision contemplates only transactions of pecuniary nature. Since the law

punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a privateperson, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor toMayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custodyof the mayor pursuant to his duty as a Provincial Jailer undertheAdministrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himselfentitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exerciseof duty.

ISSUE:Whether or not Section 3(e) RA No. 3019, as amended, applies to petitioners casebefore the Sandiganbayan?

RULING:- The Office of the Special Prosecutor said that it is enough to show that in

performer their functions, petitioners have accorded undue preference toAdalim for liability to attach under the provision

- the OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes ofapplying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the unwarranted benefitredounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his person as a detentionprisoner accused of murder

- petitioners were motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal to turnover Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero

- OSP also reiterates petitioners lack of authority to take custody of a detentionprisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are notentitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.

- there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging officialfunctions and that jurisdiction over them lay with theSandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officerscharged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 ofPresidential Decree No. 1606,[27] as amended by R.A. No. 8249.[28] Thepertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:

o SEC. 4.Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayanshall exerciseexclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as

amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, andChapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of theRevised Penal Code, where one or more of theaccused are officials occupying the followingpositions in the government, whether in apermanent, acting or interim capacity, at the timeof the commission of the offense:

o (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positionsof regional director and higher, otherwise classified asGrade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and PositionClassification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.6758), specifically including:
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o (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members ofthe sangguniang panlalawiganand provincial treasurers,assessors, engineers and other provincial departmentheads[;]

- In cases where none of the accused are occupyingpositions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribedin the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers

mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall bevested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trialcourt, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, asthe case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as providedinBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

- the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyondquestion. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, aCertification] from the Provincial Government Department Head of theHRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as SalaryGrade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupyingpositions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusivejurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. wascharged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position theSandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointlywith said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive originaljurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan.

Clarita Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction

Doctrine: It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter tobe bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever modeauthorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquiresjurisdiction over a person.

Facts: Petitioner claims that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject

matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the

plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, thefiling of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automaticforfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division ofits jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion ofthe forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, toobviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding casedispositions.

Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse ofdiscretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions todismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with theplunder case on the foregoing ground.

In addition, petitioner argues that the SBdid not acquire jurisdiction over herperson and that of her children due to a defective substituted service ofsummons. The substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II

were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNPDetention Center. However, such substituted services of summons wereinvalid for being irregular and defective.

Issue:

1.

Whether or not the forfeiture cases and the plunder case have separate causesof action.

2. Whether SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of herchildren via substituted service of summons and by their voluntaryappearance.

Ruling:

1.

a. Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed bythe plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB ofjurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holdingit together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are thecorresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. Ascorrectly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from thecommission of a criminal offense, thus: Such liability is based on astatute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfullyacquired properties.

b. It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from aplunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plundercharged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In aprosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is thecommission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition ofill-gotten wealth.

2.

a.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for thelatter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service ofsummons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under theRules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over aperson. In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons forForfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. CarlosFlores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, whoacknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is alsoundisputed that substituted service of summons for both ForfeituresI and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen.Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substitutedservices of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.

b. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, provides for the requirements to be:
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i.

(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the partyrelying on substituted service or the sheriff must show thatdefendant cannot be served promptly or there isimpossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time.Reasonable time being "so much time as is necessary underthe circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligentman to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires

that should be done, having a regard for the rights andpossibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." Moreover,we indicated therein that the sheriff must show severalattempts for personal service of at least three (3) times onat least two (2) different dates.

ii.

(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff mustdescribe in the Return of Summons the facts andcircumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.

iii. (3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable ageand discretion residing at defendants house or residence;or on a competent person in charge of defendants officeorregular place of business.

c. From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substitutedservice of summons was made on petitioner and her children, as theservice made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the firsttwo (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted serviceof summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictlycomplied with as the substituted service was made not at petitionershouse or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen.Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion.Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.

3. A defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of thecourt over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is notdeemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule onvoluntary appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans isthat the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is withoutqualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of

jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

Remedial Law ReviewPLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. JOSEM. PANLILIO, respondent.TOPIC: JURISDICTION

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise ofjurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or thedecision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over theperson and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questionsarising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction.

FACTS: Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum ofmoney with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its presidentNelida G. Galvez. Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATCbought from it..RTC OF MAKATI: Rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and orderedPATC and Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03with legal interest, P 50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit. A writ of execution was

issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club ProprietaryMembership Certificate, in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon and sold forP479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.RTC:1995 - private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene.Panlilioclaimed that Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over hershares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan andthat Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5million.Denied Panlilios motion for intervention.RTC:1996 - Declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in theconduct. Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ ofpreliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares. In the meantime,Panlilio again attempted to intervene, this time by incorporating in his complaint amotion to consolidate the case. Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted themotion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, whowas trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno later issuedan order, dated July 23, 1996, allowing the consolidation of the two cases and settingfor hearing Panlilios application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Platinum, asplaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the July 23, 1996 order of JudgeDiokno but its motion was denied.1997- Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals assailing, the orderof Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No.94-1634.1998CA annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether toreturn Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docketand decide it as a separate case.Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA, prayingthat Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC

Branch of Makati.CA: Motion for partial Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:Whether Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 fallswithin the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62.

HELD: Yes. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it doesnot depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on thecorrectness of its decisions.

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case d ocketed as Civil CaseNo. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact thatthe Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the


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consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect thejurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.

Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdictionrefers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein.Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subjectmatter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from thecase is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court maycommit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgmentwhich does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest thecourt of the jurisdiction over the case.

We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to JudgeDiokno of Branch 62 the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 toBranch 146 or to decide the same as a separate case in his own sala. Moreover, we findthe instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until JudgeDiokno decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have beenspared the trouble and the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turnwould have had one petition less in its docket.

Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation v Eddy Ng Kok Wei (2003)

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Re: Jurisdiction

DOCTRINE

complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyeragainst the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitionersactive participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it.

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trialcourt and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratifiedthe trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel andcan no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.

FACTS

Respondent Eddy Ng Kok Wei, a Singaporean businessman, expressed in a letteraddressed to Petitioner Manila Bankers his intention to purchase a condominium unitat Valle Verde Terraces. Respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000 forthe purchase of a 46-square condominium unit. After over a month, respondent paid90% of the purchase price.

Petitioner executed a contract to sell in favor of respondent. The contract expresslystates that the unit shall substantially be completed and deliveredto respondent on 8may 1990. 1% of the total amount shall be charged against petitioner in case of delay inthe delivery of the unit.

The final turn over of the unit was pushed to a later date (21 May 1990). Respondentreturned to the Philippines a couple of times, and for those times he found his unit stillunlivable. Exasperated, respondent sent petitioner a letter demanding payment fordamages he sustained. Petitioner however ignored the demand. Respondent then fileda complaint before RTC against respondent for specific performance and damages.

During pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit andeventually occupied it on 12 April 1991. Respondents cause of action has been limitedto claim for damages.

Trial Court: Manila Bankers is liable for payment of damages due to thedelay in the performance of its obligation to Eddy.

CA:affirmed Trial Courts decision.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court hasno jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirmingthe trial courts finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery ofthe condominium unit to respondent.

ISSUE

Whether RTC has jurisdiction over Manila Bankers case.


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HELD: Yes

On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case,Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1.In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade

and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential DecreeNo. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land UseRegulatory Board (HLURB)] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear anddecide cases of the following nature:

xxx

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutoryobligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units againstthe owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

x x x.

Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over theinstant case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific

performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer againstthe owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the

HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitionersactive participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. Wehave held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedingsand submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,

and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trialcourt and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratifiedthe trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppeland can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.

GSIS vs Santiago

Doctrine: The CA is not a trier of facts. This doctrine has exceptions which were notdiscussed in this case, merely cited. This is even more so when the CA affirms theappreciation of factual evidence by the trial court.

Facts:

Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans fromdefendant GSIS for (the) period September, 1956 to October, 1957 in the total amountof P3,117,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land covered byTCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50365. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendantGSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages dated September 25, 1956,

March 6, 1957, April 4, 1957 and October 15, 1957.

On March 6, 1980, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to YorkstownDevelopment Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the Presidentof the Philippines. The sold properties were returned to defendant GSIS.

On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by Eduardo M. Santiago, filedwith the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, a complaint forreconveyance of real estate against the GSIS. Spouses Alfeo and Nenita Escasa, ManuelIII and Sylvia G. Urbano, and Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of Mamerto Gonzalesmoved to be included as intervenors and filed their respective answers inintervention. Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answeralleging inter aliathat the action was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches

and that the complaint stated no cause of action. Subsequently, Zulueta wassubstituted by Santiago as the plaintiff in the complaint a quo. Upon the deathof Santiago on March 6, 1996, he was substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda.de Santiago, as the plaintiff.

After due trial, the RTC rendered judgment against the petitionerordering it to reconvey to the respondent, Rosario Enriquez Vda. deSantiago, in substitution of her deceased husband Eduardo, the seventy-eight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale.

The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered the assaileddecision affirming that of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the assaileddecision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is DISMISSED for lack ofmerit. The Decision of December 17, 1997 of Branch 71 ofthe Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED

In its petition, the petitioner maintains that it did not act in bad faith when iterroneously included in its certificate of sale, and subsequently consolidated the titlesin its name over the seventy-eight lots (subject lots) that were excluded from theforeclosure sale. There was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or malice beattributed to the petitioner when it erroneously caused the issuance of certificates oftitle over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from theforeclosure sale.

Issue: W/N issue of facts regarding bad faith can be tried in the CA.


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Held: No. but the decision of the SC still discussed it.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition forreview on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited toreviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. Case law has it that thefindings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusiveupon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said rule, we find no reason to

deviate therefrom.[6]

By assailing the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed bythe CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions of facts in itspetition.

Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved into the factual issues,we find the petition barren of merit.

That the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating ownership and causing theissuance of titles in its name over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these wereexpressly excluded from the foreclosure sale was the uniform ruling of the trial courtand appellate court. As declared by the CA:

The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the Zuluetas [therespondents predecessors-in-interest] the existence of these lots, in failing to notify

or apprise the spouses Zulueta about the excluded lots from the time it consolidatedits titles on their foreclosed properties in 1975, in failing to inform them when itentered into a contract of sale of the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown DevelopmentCorporation in 1980 as well as when the said sale was revoked by then PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos during the same year demonstrated a clear effort on its part todefraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject properties. Even iftitles over the lots had been issued in the name of the defendant-appellant, still itcould not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion over them becauseindefeasibility of title under the Torrens system d oes not attach to titles secured byfraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendant-appellant in the formof concealment of the existence of said lots and failure to return the same to the realowners after their exclusion from the foreclosure sale made defendant-appellantholders in bad faith. It is well-settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of titleis not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for

fraud.[7]

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and theCA. The petitioner is not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a government financialinstitution and, like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in itsdealings, including those involving registered land.

KATON vs PALANCAG.R. No. 151149. September 7, 2004

TOPIC: JURISDICTION

DOCTRINE: Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of

action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be

dismissed motu proprioby the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated forreview on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately endsuseless litigations.

FACTS: George Katon filed a request for the re-classification of a piece of real

property known as Sombrero Island which consists of approximately 18

hectares. Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of

the area. During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the islandbut there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted bypetitioner and respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer ofpetitioner) who went to the island from time to time to undertakedevelopment work, like planting of additional coconut trees.

The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorablyendorsed.

Petitioner contends that Sombrero Island had been classified from forestland to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon hisrequest and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then landinvestigator of the District Land Office, favorably endorsed the request of

respondents. A Survey Authority was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor

Salvador to survey 10 hectares of Sombrero Island for the respondents.

Respondents filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the subjectisland

Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and originalcertificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued infavor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained throughfraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.

The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application forhomestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for itsconversion from forest land to agricultural land.[6]

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defensesand Counterclaim in due time. They also filed a Motion to Dismiss on theground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order toamend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirsof the deceased, Respondent Gapilango.

RTC- The Motion to Dismiss was granted.

Petitioners MR was denied by the trial court for being a third and prohibitedmotion.

CA- Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse ofdiscretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while petitioner had causedthe reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he neverapplied for a homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired

title to that land.
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The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and thereversion of the property to the State were matters between the latter and thehomestead grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to annul the grant,the homesteaders right thereto stands. Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner hadthe exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already barredby laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Respondent

Palancas title had been issued.

CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. Itagreed with petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorilydismissing his Motion for Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a thirdand prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion.

Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by thechallenged Resolution of the CA Special Divisionof five members with twojustices dissenting pursuant to its residual prerogative under Section 1 of Rule 9 ofthe Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S:1. WON the CA is correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an

issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition-2.

WON the CA is correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative underSection 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving thePetition on an issue not raised in the Petition

RATIO:

First issue: No.

This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CAsruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved forreconsideration. The CA even corrected itself in its resolutionThe CAs Resolution hasrendered petitioners issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice

it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling onthe merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was infact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trialcourt in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is thedoctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errorsof jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, moreso when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trialcourt, as in this case.

Second Issue:No.

Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residualprerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motupropriodismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to

him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of itsoriginal jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. Itfollows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.

Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogativesunder Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trialcourts over cases appealed to the CA.

Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections notpleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicataand(4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the fourexcepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.

The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage inwhich the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the caseor the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon theperfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the recordson appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the recordson appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residualjurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of

indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of theappeal.

The CAsmotu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could nothave been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule

41. Undeniably, lsuch order of dismissal was not one for the protection andpreservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal.What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers ofthe courts to dismiss an action motu proprioupon the grounds mentioned in Section 1of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the samerules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it

dismissed the Complaint motu proprio on more fundamental groundsdirectly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction and forprescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction overthe subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determinedby the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

Petition DENIED.

Pecson v Comelec

Residual Jurisdiction


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Doctrine:Decisions of the courts in electoral protest cases, should at least be givensimilar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers.

(Disclaimer: mejo mahirap intindihin yung case, read at your own risk,digest not credible)

Facts:

Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position inthe Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007elections. On May 17, 2007, Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate,garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecsons 12 ,531, or a margin of 61votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soonthereafter, Pecson filed an election protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, with the RTC.

On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecsons favor. TheRTC ruled that Pecson received a total of 14,897 votes as against Cunanans 13,758 a vote margin of 1,139.

Cunanan received a copy of the Decision on November 26, 2007 and filed aNotice of Appeal the day after. The RTC issued on November 27, 2008 an Ordernoting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directingthe transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests AdjudicationDepartment (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed on November28, 2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming thatSection 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the CourtsInvolving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials[2](Rules) allows this remedy.

The RTC granted Pecsons motion for execution pending appealvia a SpecialOrder dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but suspended, pursuant to the Rules,the actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days.

Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTCgravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writof execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and subsequently granting themotion for execution pending appeal despite the issuance of an order transmitting therecords of the case.

Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application ofPreliminary Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/TemporaryRestraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. He argued in his petitionthat: (1) the RTC Decision did not c learly establish Pecsons victory or his (Cunanans)defeat a requirement of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules; among other reasons, thenumber of votes the RTC tallied and tabulated exceeded the number of those whoactually voted and the votes cast for the position of Mayor, and (2) the RTC had

constructively relinquished its jurisdiction by the issuance of the Order datedNovember 27, 2007 directing the transmittal of the records of the case.

The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-dayTRO directing: (1) the RTC to cease and desist from issuing or causing the issuance ofa writ of execution or implementing the Special Order; and (2) Cunanan to continueperforming the functions of Mayor of Magalang.

In his Answer and/or Opposition, with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO,Pecson argued that: (1) preliminary injunction cannot exist except as part or incidentof an independent action, being a mere ancillary remedy that exists only as anincident of the main proceeding; (2) the petition for application of preliminaryinjunction, as an original action, should be dismissed outright; and (3) Cunanan isguilty of forum shopping, as he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Special Ordersimultaneously with the petition filed with the COMELEC.

The COMELECs Second Division denied Cunanans petition in a Resolutiondated March 6, 2008. It ruled that: (1) the resolution of the motion for executionpending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pendingincidents; the motion was filed prior to the expiration of the period to appeal andwhile the RTC was still in possession of the original record; and (2) there is goodreason to justify the execution of the Decision pending appeal, as Pecsons victory wasclearly and manifestly established.

Pecson thus asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an Ex-Parte Motion. Despite Cunanans opposition, the RTC granted Pecsons motion.Pecson thereafter assumed the duties and functions of Mayor of Magalang.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC erred in reversing the decisions of thr trial court

Held: Yes
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/182865.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/182865.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/182865.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/182865.htm#_ftn2


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Ratio:

Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts inelection protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots andafter full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth andrecognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true whenattended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness ofthe term of the contested elective office, of the case.

In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred innullifying the RTCs Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise ofjurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked atwrong considerations and when it acted outside of the contemplation of the law innullifying the Special Order.

ALDAY v. FGU INSURANCEGR NO. 138822, JANUARY 23, 2001

DOCTRINES:

Test to determine whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory:Quintanilla v. CA, is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logicalrelationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where the conductingseparate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantialduplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.

Non-payment of docket fees does not result in automatic dismissal: InSuson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees isa jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automaticdismissal of the caseprovided the docket fees are paid within the applicable

prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has notbeen alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitionerhas attempted to evade the payment of the proper fees for her permissive counterclaim.

Facts: Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC ofMakati alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representingunliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges incurredby petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent forrespondent. Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costsof suit.

Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right for thepayment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions andcontingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated

premium reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed forattorneys fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for theallegedly unfounded action filed by respondent.

Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim AndTo Declare Defendant In Default because petitioners answer was allegedly filed out oftime. However, the trial court denied the motion and similarly rejected respondents

motion for reconsideration. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss petitionerscounterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the samebecause of the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. In response, petitioner askedthe trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees sinceit is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having failed to answersuch counterclaim.

RTC:Granted respondents motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim andconsequently denied petitioners motion. The court found petitioners counterclaim tobe merely permissive in nature and held that petitioners failure to pay docket feesprevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. It also deniedpetitioners MR.

CA: Sustained the trial court, finding petitioners own admissions, as

contained in her answer, show that her counterclaim is merely permissive.Issue:WON petitioners counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissive.

Held: Some are permissive, some are compulsory.

A compulsory counterclaimis one which, being cognizable by the regular courts ofjustice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting thesubject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its adjudicationthe presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the criteria or tests thatmay be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive,summarized as follows:

1. Are the issues of fact and lawraised by the claim and counterclaim largely thesame?

2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent thecompulsory counterclaim rule?

3. Will substantially the same evidencesupport or refute plaintiffs claim as wellas defendants counterclaim?

4. Is there any logical relationbetween the claim and the counterclaim?

Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is thecompelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical relationshipbetween the claim and counterclaim, that is, where

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