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REGINO vs. Pangasinan College of Science andTechnology

Upon enrolment, students and their schoolenter upon a reciprocal contract. The studentsagree to abide by the standards of academicperformance and codes of conduct, issuedusually in the form of manuals that are

distributed to the enrollees at the start of theschool term. Further, the school informs themof the itemized fees they are expected topay. Consequently, it cannot, after theenrolment of a student, vary the terms of thecontract. It cannot require fees other thanthose it specified upon enrolment.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Reviewunder Rule 45 ,[1] seeking to nullify the July 12,2002 [2] and the November 22, 2002 [3] Orders ofthe Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City,Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541. The decretal portion of the first assailedOrder reads:

“WHEREFORE, theCourt GRANTS the instantmotion to dismiss for lack ofcause of action. ”[4]

The second challenged Order deniedpetitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was afirst year computer science student atRespondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science andTechnology (PCST). Reared in a poor family,Regino went to college mainly through thefinancial support of her relatives. During thesecond semester of school year 2001-2002, sheenrolled in logic and statistics subjects underRespondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and ElissaBaladad, respectively, as teachers.

In February 2002, PCST held a fund raisingcampaign dubbed the “Rave Party and DanceRevolution,” the proceeds of which were to goto the construction of the school’s tennis and

volleyball courts. Each student was required topay for two tickets at the price of P100 each.The project was allegedly implemented byrecompensing students who purchased ticketswith additional points in their test scores; thosewho refused to pay were denied theopportunity to take the final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by herreligion from attending dance parties andcelebrations, Regino refused to pay for thetickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, thescheduled dates of the final examinations inlogic and statistics, her teachers -- RespondentsRachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad --allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sitout her logic class while her classmates weretaking their examinations. The next day,Baladad, after announcing to the entire class

that she was not permitting petitioner andanother student to take their statisticsexaminations for failing to pay for their tickets,allegedly ejected them from the classroom.Petitioner’s pleas ostensibly went unhee ded byGamurot and Baladad, who unrelentinglydefended their positions as compliance withPCST’s policy.

On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as apauper litigant, a Complain t [5] for damagesagainst PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her

Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominaldamages;P500,000 as moral damages; atleast P1,000,000 as exemplarydamages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus thecosts of litigation and attorney’s fees.

On May 30, 2002, respondents filed aMotion to Dismis s[6] on the ground ofpetitioner’s failure to exhaust administrativeremedies. According to respondents, thequestion raised involved the determination ofthe wisdom of an administrative policy of thePCST; hence, the case should have beeninitiated before the proper administrative body,the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).

In her C omment to respondents’ Motion,petitioner argued that prior exhaustion ofadministrative remedies was unnecessary,because her action was not administrative innature, but one purely for damages arising fromrespondents’ breach of the laws on human

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relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with thecourts.

On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed theComplaint for lack of cause of action.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In granting respondents’ Motion toDismiss, the trial court noted that the instantcontroversy involved a higher institution oflearning, two of its faculty members and one ofits students. It added that Section 54 of theEducation Act of 1982 vested in the Commissionon Higher Education (CHED) the supervision andregulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruledthat the CHED, not the courts, had jurisdictionover the controversy .[7]

In its dispositive portion, the assailed Orderdismissed the Complaint for “lack of cause ofaction” without, however, explaining thisground.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the presentPetition on pure questions of law .[8]

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner raises thefollowing issues for our consideration:

“Whether or not the principle of exhaustion ofadministrative remedies applies in a civil actionexclusively for damages based on violation ofthe human relation provisions of the Civil Code,filed by a student against her former school.

“Whether or not there is a need for priordeclaration of invalidity of a certain school

administrative policy by the Commission onHigher Education (CHED) before a formerstudent can successfully maintain an actionexclusively for damages in regular courts.

“Whether or not the Commission on HigherEducation (CHED) has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for damages basedupon violation of the Civil Code provisions onhuman relations filed by a student against theschool. ”[9]

All of the foregoing point to one issue --whether the doctrine of exhaustion ofadministrative remedies is applicable. TheCourt, however, sees a second issue which,though not expressly raised by petitioner, wasimpliedly contained in her Petition: whether theComplaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Respondents anchored their Motion to

Dismiss on petitioner’s alleged failure toexhaust administrative remedies beforeresorting to the RTC. According to them, thedetermination of the controversy hinge on thevalidity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCST’sacademic policy. Thus, the Complaint shouldhave been lodged in the CHED, theadministrative body tasked under Republic ActNo. 7722 to implement the state policy to“protect, foster and promote the right of allcitizens to affordable quality education at alllevels and to take appropriate steps to ensurethat education is accessible to all. ”[10]

Petitioner counters that the doctrine findsno relevance to the present case since she ispraying for damages, a remedy beyond thedomain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the courts .[11]

Petitioner is correct. First , the doctrine ofexhaustion of administrative remedies has nobearing on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v.CA,[12] the Court had occasion to elucidate onthe rationale behind this doctrine:

“The doctrine ofexhaustion of administrativeremedies is basic. Courts, forreasons of law, comity, andconvenience, should notentertain suits unless theavailable administrativeremedies have first beenresorted to and the proper



























authorities have been given theappropriate opportunity to actand correct their alleged errors,if any, committed in theadministrative forum. x x x .[13]”

Petitioner is not asking for the reversal ofthe policies of PCST. Neither is she demandingit to allow her to take her final examinations;she was already enrolled in another educationalinstitution. A reversal of the acts complained ofwould not adequately redress her grievances;under the circumstances, the consequences ofrespondents’ acts could no longer be undone orrectified.

Second , exhaustion of administrativeremedies is applicable when there iscompetence on the part of the administrativebody to act upon the matter complainedof .[14] Administrative agencies are not courts;they are neither part of the judicial system, norare they deemed judicialtribunals .[15] Specifically, the CHED does nothave the power to award damages .[16] Hence,petitioner could not have commenced her casebefore the Commission.

Third , the exhaustion doctrine admits ofexceptions, one of which arises when the issueis purely legal and well within the jurisdiction ofthe trial court .[17] Petitioner’s action for

damages inevitably calls for the application andthe interpretation of the Civil Code, a functionthat falls within the jurisdiction of the courts .[18]

Second Issue:Cause of Action

Sufficient Causes of Action Stated in the Allegations in the Complaint

As a rule, every complaint must sufficientlyallege a cause of action; failure to do sowarrants its dismissal .[19] A complaint is said toassert a sufficient cause of action if, admittingwhat appears solely on its face to be correct,the plaintiff would be entitled to the reliefprayed for. Assuming the facts that are allegedto be true, the court should be able to render a

valid judgment in accordance with the prayer inthe complaint .[20]

A motion to dismiss based on lack of causeof action hypothetically admits the truth of thealleged facts. In their Motion to Dismiss,respondents did not dispute any of petitioner’sallegations, and they admitted that “x x x thecrux of plaintiff’s cause of action is thedetermination of whether or not theassessment of P100 per ticket is excessive oroppressive. ”[21] They thereby premised theirprayer for dismissal on the Complaint’s allegedfailure to state a cause of action. Thus, areexamination of the Complaint is in order.

The Complaint contains the followingfactual allegations:

“10. In the second week ofFebruary 2002, defendant

Rachelle A. Gamurot, inconnivance with PCST,forced plaintiff and herclassmates to buy or taketwo tickets each, x x x;

“11. Plaintiff and many of herclassmates objected to theforced distribution andselling of tickets to thembut the said defendantwarned them that if theyrefused [to] take or paythe price of the two ticketsthey would not be allowedat all to take the finalexaminations;

“12. As if to add insult to injury,defendant Rachelle A.Gamurot bribed studentswith additional fifty pointsor so in their test score inher subject just to unjustlyinfluence and compel theminto taking the tickets;

“13. Despite the students’refusal, they were forcedto take the tickets because[of] defendant Rachelle A.Gamurot’s coercion andact of intimidation, but stillmany of them includingthe plaintiff did not attend







































the dance party imposedupon them by defendantsPCST and Rachelle A.Gamurot;

“14. Plaintiff was not able to paythe price of her own twotickets because aside formthe fact that she could notafford to pay them it is alsoagainst her religiouspractice as a member of acertain religiouscongregation to beattending dance partiesand celebrations;

“15. On March 14, 2002, beforedefendant Rachelle A.Gamurot gave her class itsfinal examination in thesubject ‘Logic’ she warnedthat students who had notpaid the tickets would notbe allowed to participatein the examination, forwhich threat andintimidation manystudents were eventuallyforced to make payments:

“16. Because plaintiff could not

afford to pay, defendantRachelle A. Gamurotinhumanly made plaintiffsit out the class but thedefendant did not allowher to take her finalexamination in ‘Logic;’

“17. On March 15, 2002 justbefore the giving of thefinal examination in thesubject ‘Statistics,’

defendant Elissa Baladad,in connivance withdefendants Rachelle A.Gamurot and PCST,announced in theclassroom that she was notallowing plaintiff andanother student to takethe examination for theirfailure and refusal to paythe price of the tickets,

and thenceforth sheejected plaintiff and theother student from theclassroom;

“18. Plaintiff pleaded for achance to take theexamination but alldefendants could say wasthat the prohibition to givethe examinations to non-paying students was anadministrative decision;

“19. Plaintiff has already paidher tuition fees and otherobligations in the school;

“20. That the above-citedincident was not a firstsince PCST also did another

forced distribution oftickets to its students inthe first semester of schoolyear 2001- 2002; x x x ” [22]

The foregoing allegations show two causesof action; first , breach of contract; and second liability for tort.

Reciprocity of the School-Student Contract

In Alcuaz v. PSBA ,[23] the Courtcharacterized the relationship between theschool and the student as a contract, in which“a student, once admitted by the school isconsidere d enrolled for one semester. ”[24] Twoyears later, in Non v. Dames II ,[25] the Courtmodified the “termination of contract theory”in Alcuaz by holding that the contractualrelationship between the school and thestudent is not only semestral in duration,but for the entire period the latter areexpected to complete it .”[26] Except for thevariance in the period during which thecontractual relationship is considered to subsist,both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous incharacterizing the school-student relationshipas contractual in nature.

The school-student relationship is alsoreciprocal. Thus, it has consequences























appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts ofsuch kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocalrights and obligations. The school undertakes toprovide students with education sufficient toenable them to pursue higher education or aprofession. On the other hand, the studentsagree to abide by the academic requirements ofthe school and to observe its rules and

regulations .[27]

The terms of the school-student contract

are defined at the moment of its inception --upon enrolment of the student. Standards ofacademic performance and the code ofbehavior and discipline are usually set forth inmanuals distributed to new students at thestart of every school year. Further, schoolsinform prospective enrollees the amount offees and the terms of payment.

In practice, students are normally requiredto make a down payment upon enrollment,with the balance to be paid before everypreliminary, midterm and final examination.Their failure to pay their financial obligation isregarded as a valid ground for the school todeny them the opportunity to take theseexaminations.

The foregoing practice does not merelyensure compliance with financial obligations; italso underlines the importance of major

examinations. Failure to take a majorexamination is usually fatal to the students’promotion to the next grade or to graduation.Examination results form a significant basis fortheir final grades. These tests are usually aprimary and an indispensable requisite to theirelevation to the next educational level and,ultimately, to their completion of a course.

Education is not a measurable commodity.It is not possible to determine who is “bettereducated” than another. Nevertheless, a

student’s grades are an accepted approximationof what would otherwise be an intangibleproduct of countless hours of study. Theimportance of grades cannot be discounted in asetting where education is generally the gatepass to employment opportunities and betterlife; such grades are often the means by which aprospective employer measures whether a jobapplicant has acquired the necessary tools orskills for a particular profession or trade.

Thus, students expect that upon theirpayment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the setacademic standards, completion of academicrequirements and observance of school rulesand regulations, the school would reward themby recognizing their “completion” of the courseenrolled in.

The obligation on the part of the schoolhas been established in Magtibay v.Garcia ,[28] Licup v. University of SanCarlo s[29] and Ateneo de Manila University v.Garcia ,[30] in which the Court held that, barringany violation of the rules on the part of thestudents, an institution of higher learning hasa contractual obligation to afford its studentsa fair opportunity to complete the course theyseek to pursue.

We recognize the need of a school to fundits facilities and to meet astronomical operatingcosts; this is a reality in running it. Crystal v.Cebu International Schoo l [31] upheld theimposition by respondent s chool of a “landpurchase deposit” in the amount of P50,000 perstudent to be used for the “purchase of a pieceof land and for the construction of newbuildings and other facilities x x x which theschool would transfer [to] and occupy after theexpiration of its lease contract over its presentsite.”

The amount was refundable after thestudent graduated or left the school. Afternoting that the imposition of the fee was madeonly after prior consultation and approval bythe parents of the students, the Court held thatthe school committed no actionable wrong inrefusing to admit the children of the petitionerstherein for their failure to pay the “landpurchase deposit” and the 2.5 percent monthlysurcharge thereon.

In the present case, PCST imposed the

assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, inthe middle of the semester. It exacted thedance party fee as a condition for the students’taking the final examinations, and ultimately forits recognition of their ability to finish a course.The fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of theschool year. Hence, it could not be unilaterallyimposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.













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Such contract is by no means an ordinaryone. In Non , we stressed that the school-student contract “is imbued with publicinterest, considering the high priority given bythe Constitution to education and the grant tothe State of supervisory and regulatory powersover all educational institutions. ”[32] Sections 5(1) and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987

Constitution provide:“The State shall

protect and promote the rightof all citizens to qualityeducation at all levels andshall take appropriate steps tomake such declarationaccessible to all.

“Every student has aright to select a profession orcourse of study, subject tofair, reasonable and equitableadmission and academicrequirements.”

The same state policy resonates in Section9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as theEducation Act of 1982:

“Section 9. Rights ofStudents in School . – Inaddition to other rights, andsubject to the limitationsprescribed by law andregulations, students andpupils in all schools shall enjoythe following rights:

x x x x xx x x x

(2) The right tofreely choose theirfield of study subject

to existing curriculaand to continue theircourse therein up tograduation, except incases of academicdeficiency, orviolation ofdisciplinaryregulations.”

Liability for Tort

In her Complaint, petitioner also chargedthat private respondents “inhumanly punishstudents x x x by reason only of their poverty,religious practice or lowly station in life, whichinculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings ofguilt, disgrace and unworthiness; ”[33] as a resultof such punishment, she was allegedly unableto finish any of her subjects for the secondsemester of that school year and had to lagbehind in her studies by a full year. The acts ofrespondents supposedly caused her extremehumiliation, mental agony and “demoralizationof unimaginable proportions” in violation ofArticles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. Theseprovisions of the law state thus:

“Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise

of his rights and in the performance of hisduties, act with justice, give everyone his due,and observe honesty and good faith.”

“Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes lossor injury to another in a manner that is contraryto morals, good customs or public policy shallcompensate the latter for the damage.”

“Article 26. Every person shall respect thedignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind

of his neighbors and other persons. Thefollowing and similar acts, though they may notconstitute a criminal offense, shall produce acause of action for damages, prevention andother relief:

(1) Prying into the privacyof another’s residence;

(2) Meddling with ordisturbing the privatelife or family relations ofanother;

(3) Intriguing to causeanother to be alienatedfrom his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliatinganother on account ofhis beliefs, lowly stationin life, place of birth,physical defect, or otherpersonal condition.”











Generally, liability for tort arises onlybetween parties not otherwise bound by acontract. An academic institution, however,may be held liable for tort even if it has anexisting contract with its students, since the actthat violated the contract may also be a tort.We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,[34] from which wequote:

“x x x A perusal of Article 2176 *of theCivil Code] shows that obligationsarising from quasi-delicts or tort, alsoknown as extra-contractual obligations,arise only between parties nototherwise bound by contract, whetherexpress or implied. However, thisimpression has not prevented this Courtfrom determining the existence of atort even when there obtains acontract. In Air France v.Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the privaterespondent was awarded damages forhis unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline.It is noted, however, that the Courtreferred to the petitioner- airline’sliability as one arising from tort, not onearising form a contract of carriage. Ineffect, Air France is authority for theview that liability from tort may existeven if there is a contract, for the act

that breaks the contract may be also atort. x x x This view was not all thatrevolutionary, for even as early as 1918,this Court was already of a similar mind.In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil.780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidatedthus: ‘x x x. When such a contractualrelation exists the obligor may breakthe contract under such conditionsthat the same act which constitutes abreach of the contract would have

constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contractexisted between the parties .’

“Immediately what comes to mind isthe chapter of the Civil Code on HumanRelations, particularly Article 21 x xx.”[35]

Academic Freedom

In their Memorandum, respondents harpon their right to “academic freedom.” We arenot impressed. According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompassesthe independence of an academic institution todetermine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) whatmay be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4)who may be admitted to study .[36] In Garcia v.

the Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola Schoolof Theology ,[37] the Court upheld therespondent therein when it denied a femalestudent’s admission to theological studies in aseminary for prospective priests. The Courtdefined the freedom of an academic institutionthus: “to deci de for itself aims and objectivesand how best to attain them x x x free fromoutside coercion or interference save possiblywhen overriding public welfare calls for somerestraint. ”[38]

In Tangonan v. Paño ,[39]

the Court upheld,in the name of academic freedom, the right ofthe school to refuse readmission of a nursingstudent who had been enrolled on probation,and who had failed her nursing subjects. Theseinstances notwithstanding, the Court hasemphasized that once a school has, in the nameof academic freedom, set its standards, theseshould be meticulously observed and shouldnot be used to discriminate against certainstudents .[40] After accepting them uponenrollment, the school cannot renege on itscontractual obligation on grounds other thanthose made known to, and accepted by,students at the start of the school year.

In sum, the Court holds that the Complaintalleges sufficient causes of action againstrespondents, and that it should not have beensummarily dismissed. Needless to say, theCourt is not holding respondents liable for theacts complained of. That will have to be ruledupon in due course by the court a quo .

WHEREFORE, the Petition is herebyGRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED.The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate theComplaint and, with all deliberate speed, tocontinue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.

SPOUSES GUANIO vs. Makati Shangrila-HotelResort Inc.































For their wedding reception on July 28,2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and AnnaHernandez-Guanio (petitioners) booked at theShangri-la Hotel Makati (the hotel).

Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-LaHotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled aninitial food tasting. Petitioners claim that they

requested the hotel to prepare for sevenpersons ─ the two of them, their respectiveparents, and the wedding coordinator. At thescheduled food tasting, however, respondentprepared for only six.

Petitioners initially chose a set menuwhich included black cod, king prawns andangel hair pasta with wild mushroom sauce forthe main course which cost P1,000.00 perperson. They were, however, given an option inwhich salmon, instead of king prawns, would bein the menu at P950.00 per person. They in factpartook of the salmon.

Three days before the event, a final foodtasting took place. Petitioners aver that thesalmon served was half the size of what theywere served during the initial food tasting; andwhen queried about it, the hotel quoted a muchhigher price (P1,200.00) for the size that wasinitially served to them. The parties eventuallyagreed on a final price ─ P1,150 per person.

A day before the event or on July 27,2001, the parties finalized and forged theircontract .[1]

Petitioners claim that during thereception, respondent’s representatives,Catering Director Bea Marquez and SalesManager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despitetheir assurance that they would; their guestscomplained of the delay in the service of the

dinner; certain items listed in the publishedmenu were unavailable; the hotel’s waiterswere rude and unapologetic when confrontedabout the delay; and despite Alvarez’s promisethat there would be no charge for the extensionof the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, theywere billed and paid P8,000 per hour for thethree-hour extension of the event up to 4:00A.M. the next day.

Petitioners further claim that they broughtwine and liquor in accordance with their openbar arrangement, but these were not served tothe guests who were forced to pay for theirdrinks.

Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint tothe Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc.

(respondent) and received an apologetic replyfrom Krister Svensson, the hotel’s ExecutiveAssistant Manager in charge of Food andBeverage. They nevertheless filed acomplaint for breach of contract anddamages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)ofMakati City.

In its Answer, respondent claimed thatpetitioners requested a combination of kingprawns and salmon, hence, the price wasincreased to P1,200.00 per person, butdiscounted at P1,150.00; that contrary topetit ioners’ claim, Marquez and Alvarez werepresent during the event, albeit they were notpermanently stationed thereat as there werethree other hotel functions; that while therewas a delay in the service of the meals, thesame was occasioned by the sudden increase ofguests to 470 from the guaranteed expectedminimum number of guests of 350 to amaximum of 380, as stated in the BanquetEvent Order (BEO) ;[2] and that Isaac Albacea,

Banquet Service Director, in fact relayed thedelay in the service of the meals to petitionerLuigi’s father, Gil Guanio.

Respecting the belated service of meals tosome guests, respondent attributed it to theinsistence of petitioners’ wedding coordinatorthat certain guests be served first.

On Svensson’s letter, respondent, denyingit as an admission of liability, claimed that it was

meant to maintain goodwill to its customers.

By Decision of August 17, 2006, Branch148 of the Makati RTC rendered judgment infavor of petitioners, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of theplaintiffs and against the defendant orderingthe defendants to pay the plaintiff thefollowing:

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1) The amount of P350,000.00 by way of

actual damages;2) The amount of P250,000.00 for and as

moral damages;3) The amount of P100,000.00 as

exemplary damages;4) The amount of P100,000.00 for and as

attorney’s fees.

With costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.[3]

In finding for petitioners, the trial courtrelied heavily on the letter of Svensson which ispartly quoted below:

Upon receiving your comments on ourservice rendered during your receptionhere with us, we are in fact, verydistressed. Right from minor issuespappadums served in the soup insteadof the creutons, lack of valet parkers,hard rolls being too hard till a majorone – slow service, rude and arrogantwaiters, we have disappointed you in allmeans.

Indeed, we feel as strongly as you do

that the services you receivedwere unacceptable and definitely notup to our standards. We understandthat it is our job to provide excellentservice and in this instance,we havefallen short of your expectations. Weask you please to accept our profoundapologies for causing such discomfortand annoyance. [4] (underscoringsupplied)

The trial court observed that from “thetenor of the letter . . . the defendant[-hereinrespondent] admits that the services theplaintiff[-herein petitioners] received wereunacceptable and definitely not up to theirstandards. ”[5]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, byDecision of July 27, 2009 ,[6] reversed the trial

court’s decision, it holding that the proximatecause of petitioners’ injury was an unexpectedincrease in their guests:

x x x Hence, the alleged damage orinjury brought about by the confusion,inconvenience and disarray during thewedding reception may not be

attributed to defendant-appellantShangri-la.

We find that the said proximatecause, which is entirely attributable toplaintiffs-appellants, set the chain ofevents which resulted in the allegedinconveniences, to the plaintiffs-appellants. Given the circumstancesthat obtained, only the Sps. Guanio maybear whatever consequential damagesthat they may have allegedlysuffered .[7] (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners’ motion for reconsiderationhaving been denied by Resolution of November18, 2009, the present petition for review wasfiled.

The Court finds that since petitioners’complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine ofproximate cause finds no application to it:

The doctrine of proximatecause is applicable only in actions forquasi-delicts , not in actionsinvolving breach of contract. x x x Thedoctrine is a device for imputing liabilityto a person where there is no relationbetween him and another party. In sucha case, the obligation is created by lawitself. But, where there is a pre-existingcontractual relation between theparties, it is the parties themselves whocreate the obligation, and the function

of the law is merely to regulate therelation thus created .[8] (emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

What applies in the present case isArticle 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:

Art. 1170. Those who inthe performance of theirobligations are guilty of fraud,



























negligence or delay, and thosewho in any manner contravenethe tenor thereof, are liable fordamages.

RCPI v. Verchez, et al . [9] enlightens:

In culpa contractual x x x themere proof of the existence of thecontract and the failure of itscompliance justify, prima facie , acorresponding right of relief. The law,recognizing the obligatory forceof contracts, will not permit a party tobe set free from liability for any kind ofmisperformance of the contractualundertaking or a contravention of thetenor thereof. A breach upon the

contract confers upon the injured partya valid cause for recovering that whichmay have been lost or suffered. Theremedy serves to preserve the interestsof the promissee that may includehis “expectation interest,” which is hisinterest in having the benefit of hisbargain by being put in as good aposition as he would have been in hadthe contract been performed, orhis “reliance interest,” which is his

interest in being reimbursed for losscaused by reliance on the contract bybeing put in as good a position as hewould have been in had the contractnot been made; or his “restitutioninterest ,” which is his interest in havingrestored to him any benefit that he hasconferred on the other party. Indeed,agreements can accomplish little, eitherfor their makers or for society, unlessthey are made the basis for action. Theeffect of every infraction is to create anew duty, that is, to makeRECOMPENSE to the one who has beeninjured by the failure of another toobserve his contractualobligation unless he can showextenuating circumstances, like proof ofhis exercise of due diligence x x x or ofthe attendance of fortuitous event, toexcuse him from his ensuing liability.

(emphasis and underscoring in theoriginal; capitalization supplied)

The pertinent provisions of the Banquetand Meeting Services Contract between theparties read:

4.3 The ENGAGER shall be billedin accordance with the prescribed ratefor the minimum guaranteed number ofpersons contracted for, regardless ofunder attendance or non-appearance ofthe expected number of guests, exceptwhere the ENGAGER cancels theFunction in accordance with its Letter ofConfirmation with the HOTEL. Shouldthe attendance exceed the minimumguaranteed attendance, the ENGAGER

shall also be billed at the actual rate percover in excess of the minimumguaranteed attendance.

x x x x

4.5. The ENGAGER must informthe HOTEL at least forty eight (48) hoursbefore the scheduled date and time ofthe Function of any change in theminimum guaranteed covers. In theabsence of such notice, paragraph 4.3shall apply in the event of underattendance. In case theactual number of attendees exceedthe minimum guaranteed number byten percent (10%), the HOTELshall not in any way be held liable forany damage or inconvenience whichmay be caused thereby. The ENGAGERshall also undertake to advise theguests of the situation and takepositive steps to remedy the

same .[10]

(emphasis, italics andunderscoring supplied)

Breach of contract is defined as thefailure without legal reason to comply with theterms of a contract. It is also defined as the[f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform anypromise which forms the whole or part of thecontract .[11]















The appellate court, and even the trialcourt, observed that petitioners were remiss intheir obligation to inform respondent of thechange in the expected number of guests. Theobservation is reflected in the records of thecase. Petitioners’ failure to discharge such

obligation thus excused, as the above-quotedparagraph 4.5 of the parties’ contract provide,respondent from liability for “any damage orinconveni ence” occasioned thereby.

As for petitioners’ claim thatrespondent departed from its verbal agreementwith petitioners, the same fails, given that thewritten contract which the parties entered intothe day before the event, being the lawbetween them.

Respecting the letter of Svensson onwhich the trial court heavily relied as admissionof respondent’s liability but which the appellatecourt brushed aside, the Court finds theappellate court’s stance in order. It is notuncommon in the hotel industry to receivecomments, criticisms or feedback on the serviceit delivers. It is also customary for hotelmanagement to try to smooth ruffled feathersto preserve goodwill among its clientele.

Kalalo v. Luz holds :[12]

Statements which arenot estoppels nor judicialadmissions have no quality ofconclusiveness, and anopponent whose admissionshave been offered against himmay offer any evidence whichserves as an explanation for hisformer assertion of what he

now denies as a fact.

Respondent’s Catering Director,Bea Marquez, explained the hotel’sprocedure on receiving and processingcomplaints, viz:

ATTY. CALMA:

Q You mentioned that the letter indicates anacknowledgement of the concern and thatthere was-the first letter there was anacknowledgment of the concern and anapology, not necessarily indicating that such oradmitting fault?

A Yes.

Q Is this the letter that you are referringto?

If I may, Your Honor, that was the letterdated August 4, 2001, previouslymarked as plaintiff’s exhibits, YourHonor. What is the procedure of thehotel with respect to customerconcern?

A Upon receipt of the concern from theguest or client, we acknowledge receiptof such concern, and as part of

procedure in service industryparticularly Makati Shangri-la weapologize for whatever inconveniencebut at the same time saying, that ofcourse, we would go through certaininvestigation and get back to them forthe feedback with whatever concernthey may have.

Q Your Honor, I just like at this point markthe exhibits, Your Honor, the letterdated August 4, 2001 identified by the

witness, Your Honor, to be marked asExhibit 14 and the signature of Mr.Krister Svensson be marked as Exhibit14-A.[13]

x x x x

Q In your opinion, you just mentioned thatthere is a procedure that the hotelfollows with respect to the complaint,in your opinion was this procedurefollowed in this particular concern?

A Yes, ma’am. Q What makes you say that this procedure

was followed?

A As I mentioned earlier, we proved thatwe did acknowledge the concern of theclient in this case and we did emphatizefrom the client and apologized, and atthe same time got back to them inwhatever investigation we have.











Q You said that you apologized, what didyou apologize for?

A Well, first of all it is a standard that weapologize, right? Being in the serviceindustry, it is a practice that weapologize if there is anyinconvenience, so the purpose forapologizing is mainly to show empathyand to ensure the client that we arehearing them out and that we will do abetter investigation and it is not in anyway that we are admitting anyfault .[14] (underscoring supplied)

To the Court, the foregoing explanationof the hotel’s Banquet Director overcomes anypresumption of admission of breach whichSvensson’s letter might have conveyed.

The exculpatory clausenotwithstanding, the Court notes thatrespondent could have managed the “situation”better, it being held in high esteem in the hoteland service industry. Given respondent’s vastexperience, it is safe to presume that this is notits first encounter with booked eventsexceeding the guaranteed cover. It is notaudacious to expect that certain measures havebeen placed in case this predicament crops up.

That regardless of these measures, respondentstill received complaints as in the present case,does not amuse.

Respondent admitted that three hotelfunctions coincided with petitioners’ reception.To the Court, the delay in service might havebeen avoided or minimized if respondentexercised prescience in scheduling events. Noless than quality service should be deliveredespecially in events which possibility ofrepetition is close to nil. Petitioners are notexpected to get married twice in their lifetimes.

In the present petition, underconsiderations of equity, the Court deems it justto award the amount of P50,000.00 by way ofnominal damages to petitioners, for thediscomfiture that they were subjected to duringto the event .[15] The Court recognizes that everyperson is entitled to respect of his dignity,personality, privacy and peace of

mind .[16] Respondent’s lack of prudence is anaffront to this right.

WHEREFORE, the Court of AppealsDecision dated July 27, 2009is PARTIALLY REVERSED. Respondent is, in lightof the foregoing discussion, ORDERED to paythe amount of P50,000.00 to petitioners by way

of nominal damages.

PADILLA vs. CA

On appellant Robin C. Padilla's application forbail.

In an information filed before the Regional TrialCourt of Angeles City, appellant was chargedwith violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegalpossession of firearms punishable by reclusiontemporal maximum to reclusion

perpetua . 1 Pending trial, appellant was releasedon bail. Thereafter, appellant was convicted ascharged and meted an indeterminate penalty of17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusiontemporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua . Heappealed to public respondent Court ofAppeals, but judgment was rendered affirminghis conviction. Respondent court cancelled hisbailbond and ordered his arrest forconfinement at the New Bilibid Prison.Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but

was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is nowbefore us by way of a petition for reviewon certiorari with an application for bail praying,among others, to be allowed to post bail for histemporary liberty. In his subsequentpleading, 1 appellant moved for the separateresolution of his bail application.

The threshold issue is whether or not appellantis entitled to bail.

Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion.It is a matter of right when the offense chargedis not punishable by death, reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment. 2 On the otherhand, upon conviction by the Regional TrialCourt of an offense not punishable bydeath, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,bail becomes a matter of discretion. 3 Similarly,if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonmentexceeding six (6) years but not more thantwenty (20) years then bail is a matter of















shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot beindifferent to his medical needs. And bygranting appellant's request, the Court is merelyperforming its supervisory powers overdetainees to safeguard, among others, theirproper accommodation and health pursuant toSection 25 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, asamended.

ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant'sbailbond by public respondent court isAFFIRMED and the instant application for bail isDENIED for lack of merit. Appellant's request foran X-ray and MRI examinations at St. Luke'sHospital is GRANTED which should beconducted at the first opportune time to bearranged by the Director of the New BilibidPrison with the responsible officers of thehospital, provided that appellant shall be at alltimes subject to the security conditionsimposed by the prison's director. Theresponsibility for the enforcement of thesubject request, as well as the security of theappellant, devolves upon the Director of theNew Bilibid Prison. Upon termination of themedical examinations, appellant shall berecommitted to prison without delay. As muchas possible, any unnecessary publicity should beavoided.

PNCC vs. CA

FACTS: On 18 November 1985, privaterespondents and petitioner entered into acontract of lease of a parcel of land owned bythe former. The terms and conditions of saidcontract of lease are as follows: a) the leaseshall be for a period of five (5) years whichbegins upon the issuance of permit by theMinistry of Human Settlement and renewableat the option of the lessee under the terms andconditions, b) the monthly rent is P20, 000.00which shall be increased yearly by 5% based onthe monthly rate, c) the rent shall be paid yearlyin advance, and d) the property shall be used aspremises of a rock crushing plan.

On January 7, 1986, petitioner obtained permitfrom the Ministry which was to be valid for two(2) years unless revoked by the Ministry. Later,

respondent requested the payment of the firstannual rental. But petitioner alleged that thepayment of rental should commence on thedate of the issuance of the industrial clearancenot on the date of signing of the contract. Itthen expressed its intention to terminate thecontract and decided to cancel the project dueto financial and technical difficulties. However,

petitioner refused to accede to respondent’srequest and reiterated their demand for thepayment of the first annual rental. But thepetitioner argued that it was only obligated topay P20, 000.00 as rental for one monthprompting private respondent to file an actionagainst the petitioner for specific performancewith damages before the RTC of Pasig. The trialcourt rendered decision in favor of privaterespondent. Petitioner then appealed thedecision of the trial court to the Court ofAppeals but the later affirmed the decision ofthe trial court and denied the motion forreconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can avail ofthe benefit of Article 1267 of the New CivilCode.

RULING: NO. The petitioner cannot take refugeof the said article. Article 1267 of the New CivilCode provides that when the service hasbecome so difficult as to manifestly beyond the

contemplation of the parties, the obligor mayalso be released therefrom, in whole or in part.This article, which enunciates the doctrine ofunforeseen events, is not, however an absoluteapplication of the principle of rebus sicstantibus, which would endanger the security ofcontractual relations. The parties to thecontract must be presumed to have assumedthe risks of unfavorable developments. It istherefore only in absolutely exceptionalchances of circumstances that equity demands

assistance for the debtor. The principle of rebussic stantibus neither fits in with the facts of thecase. Under this theory, the parties stipulate inthe light of certain prevailing conditions, andonce these conditions cease to exist, thecontract also ceases to exist.

In this case, petitioner averred that three (3)abrupt change in the political climate of thecountry after the EDSA Revolution and its poorfinancial condition rendered the performance of



the lease contract impractical and inimical tothe corporate survival of the petitioner.However, as held in Central Bank v. CA, merepecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement doesnot discharge a contractual obligation, nor doesit constitute a defense of an action for specificperformance.

NPC vs. Heirs of Noble Casiano

FACTS In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tensionelectrical transmission lines of 69 kilovoltstraversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon.Eventually, some lines sagged, thereby reducingtheir distance from the ground to only about 8-10 ft. This posed as a threat to passersby whowere exposed to the danger of electrocution. Asearly as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogonmade verbal and written requests for NPC toinstitute safety measures to protect trail usersfrom their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr.Banayot, NPC Area Manager, informed theItogon mayor that NPC installed 9 additionalpoles, and they identified a possible reroutingscheme to improve the distance from itsdeteriorating lines to the ground.

19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as apocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocketminer Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They

cut 2 bamboo poles, and they carried one polehorizontally on their shoulder, with Noblecarrying the shorter pole. Noble walked aheadas they passed through the trail underneath theNPC high-tension lines on their way to theirwork place. As Noble was going uphill andturning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboopole that he was carrying touched one of thedangling high-tension wires. Melchor narratedthat he heard a buzzing sound for only about asecond or two, then he saw Noble fall to the

ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook him,but Noble was already dead.A post-mortem examination by the

municipal health officer determined the causeof death to be cardiac arrest, secondary toventricular fibulation, secondary toelectrocution. There was a small burned area inthe middle right finger of Noble.

Police investigators who visited the siteconfirmed that portions of the wires above thetrail hung very low. They noted that people

usually used the trail and had to pass directlyunderneath the wires, and that the trail was theonly viable way since the other side was aprecipice. They did not see any danger warningsigns installed. After the GM of NPC wasinformed of the incident, NPC repaired thedangling lines and put up warning signs aroundthe area.

Noble’s parents filed a claim for damagesagainst NPC. NPC denied being negligent inmaintaining the safety of the lines, averring thatsigns were installed but they were stolen bychildren, and that excavations were made toincrease the clearance from the ground butsome poles sank due to pocket mining in thearea. NPC witnesses testified that the cause ofdeath could not have been electrocution sinceNoble did not suffer extensive burns. NPCargued that if Noble did die by electrocution, itwas due to his own negligence.

RTC decided in favor of Noble’s parents. RTCobserved that NPC witnesses were biasedbecause all but one were employees of NPC,and they were not actually present at the timeof the accident. RTC found NPC negligent sincethe company has not acted upon the requestsand demands made by the community leaderssince 1991. CA affirmed RTC with modification –award of moral damages was reduced from100k to 50k, and award of attorney fees wasdisallowed since the reason for the award was

not expressly stated in the decision.

ISSUE AND HOLDING WON there was contributory negligence on thepart of Noble. NO; hence, NPC is not entitled toa mitigation of its liability.

RATIO Negligence is the failure to observe, for the

protection of the interest of another, thatdegree of care, precaution, and vigilance whichthe circumstances justly demand, whereby suchother person suffers injury. Contributorynegligence is conduct on the part of the injuredparty , contributing as a legal cause to the harmhe has suffered, which falls below the standardwhich he is required to conform for his ownprotection. There is contributory negligencewhen the party’s act showed lack of ordinarycare and foresight that such act could cause



him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act oromission amounting to want of ordinarycare on the part of the personinjured which , concurring with the defendant’s negligence , is the proximate cause of the injury.

The underlying precept is that a plaintiff whois partly responsible for his own injury shouldnot be entitled to recover damages in full but

must bear the consequences of his ownnegligence . NCC 2179 provides that liability willbe mitigated in consideration of the injuredparty’s contributory negligence.

Precedents + [non-]application to the case athand In Ma-ao Sugar Central , it was held that to holda person as having contributed to his injuries, itmust be shown that he performed an act thatbrought about his injuries in disregard ofwarnings or signs on an impending danger tohealth and body. In this case , there were nowarning signs, and the trail was regularly usedby people since it was the only viable way fromDalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not befaulted for simply doing what was ordinaryroutine to other workers in the area .

NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocketmining, which is prohibited by DENR in thearea. In Añonuevo v. CA , the Court held that theviolation of a statute is not sufficient to hold

that the violation was the proximate cause ofthe injury, unless the very injury that happenedwas precisely what was intended to beprevented by the statute. The fact that pocketminers were unlicensed was not a justificationfor NPC to leave their transmission linesdangling.

Damages awarded Noble’s unearned income of 720k [ loss of

earning capacity formula : Net EarningCapacity = 2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x(gross annual income – reasonable andnecessary living expenses)]

Exemplary damages of 50k [since there isgross negligence]

Moral damages of 50k

ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CA

Sought to be reversed in this petition is theDecision * of the respondent Court of Appeals'First Division, setting aside the judgment of thethen Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte,with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment ishereby set aside and another rendered

in its stead whereby defendant ishereby sentenced to pay plaintiffsactual damages of P30,229.45;compensatory damages of P50,000.00;exemplary damages of P10,000.00;attorney's fees of P3,000.00; plus thecosts of suit in both instances. (p. 27Rollo)

Basically, this case involves a clash of evidencewhereby both patties strive for the recognitionof their respective versions of the scenario fromwhich the disputed claims originate. Therespondent Court of Appeals (CA) summarizedthe evidence of the parties as follows:

From the evidence of plaintiffs itappears that in the evening of June 28until the early morning of June 29, 1967a strong typhoon by the code name"Gening" buffeted the province ofIlocos Norte, bringing heavy rains andconsequent flooding in its wake.Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June29, 1967, after the typhoon had abatedand when the floodwaters werebeginning to recede the deceased IsabelLao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen,ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 GuerreroStreet, Laoag City, and proceedednorthward towards the direction of theFive Sisters Emporium, of which shewas the owner and proprietress, to look

after the merchandise therein thatmight have been damaged. Wading inwaist-deep flood on Guerrero, thedeceased was followed by Aida Bulong,a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery,also owned by the deceased, and byLinda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller atthe YJ Cinema, which was partly ownedby the deceased. Aida and Linda walkedside by side at a distance of between 5and 6 meters behind the deceased,



Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay"and quickly sank into the water. Thetwo girls attempted to help, but feardissuaded them from doing so becauseon the spot where the deceased sankthey saw an electric wire dangling froma post and moving in snake-like fashionin the water. Upon their shouts for

help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of thehouse of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto triedto go to the deceased, but at fourmeters away from her he turned backshouting that the water was grounded.Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seekhelp from Antonio Yabes at the YJCinema building which was four or fiveblocks away.

When Antonio Yabes was informed byErnesto that his mother-in law hadbeen electrocuted, he actedimmediately. With his wife Jane,together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros,Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoagto request the police to ask the peopleof defendant Ilocos Norte ElectricCompany or INELCO to cut off theelectric current. Then the party wadedto the house on Guerrero Street. Thefloodwater was receding and the lightsinside the house were out indicating

that the electric current had been cutoff in Guerrero. Yabes instructed hisboys to fish for the body of thedeceased. The body was recoveredabout two meters from an electric post.

In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. onthat fateful date, June 29, 1967,Engineer Antonio Juan, Power PlantEngineer of the National PowerCorporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric

Plant, noticed certain fluctuations intheir electric meter which indicatedsuch abnormalities as grounded orshort-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPCCompound on an inspection. On theway, he saw grounded anddisconnected lines. Electric lines werehanging from the posts to the ground.Since he could not see any INELCOlineman, he decided to go to the

INELCO Office at the Life Theatre onRizal Street by way of Guerrero. As heturned right at the intersection ofGuerrero and Rizal, he saw an electricwire about 30 meters long strung acrossthe street "and the other end wasseeming to play with the current of thewater." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972)

Finding the Office of the INELCO stillclosed, and seeing no lineman therein,he returned to the NPC Compound.

At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went outof the compound again on anotherinspection trip. Having learned of thedeath of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed bythe house of the deceased at the cornerof Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streetsto which the body had been taken.Using the resuscitator which was astandard equipment in his jeep andemploying the skill he acquired from anin service training on resuscitation, hetried to revive the deceased. His effortsproved futile. Rigor mortis was settingin. On the left palm of the deceased,Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound.Proceeding to the INELCO Office, hemet two linemen on the way. He toldthem about the grounded lines of theINELCO In the afternoon of the same

day, he went on a third inspection trippreparatory to the restoration ofpower. The dangling wire he saw onGuerrero early in the morning of June29, 1967 was no longer there.

Many people came to the house at thecorner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilarafter learning that the deceased hadbeen electrocuted. Among thesympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro,

Municipal Health Officer of Sarrat,Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of therelatives of the deceased, Dr. Castroexamined the body at about 8:00 A.M.on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayishor, in medical parlance, cyanotic, whichindicated death by electrocution. Onthe left palm, the doctor found an"electrically charged wound" (Exh. C-1:p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, 1972) or a firstdegree burn. About the base of the



thumb on the left hand was a burnedwound. (Exh. C-2, pp. 102-103, Ibid .)The certificate of death prepared by Dr.Castro stated the cause of' death as,'circulatory shock electrocution" (Exh.I; p. 103, Ibid. ).

In defense and exculpation, defendant

presented the testimonies of its officersand employees, namely, Conrado Asis,electric engineer; Loreto Abijero,collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero,lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO Through thetestimonies of these witnesses,defendant sought to prove that on andeven before June 29, 1967 the electricservice system of the INELCO in thewhole franchise area, including AreaNo. 9 which covered the residence ofAntonio Yabes at No. 18 GuerreroStreet, did not suffer from any defectthat might constitute a hazard to lifeand property. The service lines, devicesand other INELCO equipment in AreaNo. 9 had been newly-installed prior tothe date in question. As a public serviceoperator and in line with its business ofsupplying electric current to the public,defendant had installed safety devicesto prevent and avoid injuries to persons

and damage to property in case ofnatural calamities such as floods,typhoons, fire and others. Defendanthad 12 linesmen charged with the dutyof making a round-the-clock check-upof the areas respectively assigned tothem.

Defendant asserts that although astrong typhoon struck the province ofIlocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting

to streets of Laoag City under water,only a few known places in Laoag werereported to have suffered damagedelectric lines, namely, at the southernapproach of the Marcos Bridge whichwas washed away and where theINELCO lines and posts collapsed; in theeastern part near the residence of thelate Governor Simeon Mandac; in thefar north near the defendant's powerplant at the corner of Segundo and

Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the farnorthwest side, near the premises ofthe Ilocos Norte National High School.Fabico Abijero, testified that in the earlymorning before 6 o'clock on June 29,1967 he passed by the intersection ofRizal and Guerrero Streets to switch offthe street lights in Area No. 9. He did

not see any cut or broken wires in ornear the vicinity. What he saw weremany people fishing out the body ofIsabel Lao Juan.

A witness in the person of Dr. AntonioBriones was presented by the defenseto show that the deceased could nothave died of electrocution Substantially,the testimony of the doctor is asfollows: Without an autopsy on thecadaver of the victim, no doctor, noteven a medicolegal expert, canspeculate as to the real cause of death.Cyanosis could not have been found inthe body of the deceased three hoursafter her death, because cyanosis whichmeans lack of oxygen circulating in theblood and rendering the color of theskin purplish, appears only in a liveperson. The presence of the elongatedburn in the left palm of the deceased(Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is not sufficient to

establish her death by electrocution;since burns caused by electricity aremore or less round in shape and withpoints of entry and exit. Had thedeceased held the lethal wire for a longtime, the laceration in her palm wouldhave been bigger and the injury moremassive. (CA Decision, pp. 18-21, Rollo)

An action for damages in the aggregate amountof P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the

deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24,1968. In its Answer (Vide, Record on Appeal, p.55, Rollo), petitioner advanced the theory, as aspecial defense, that the deceased could havedied simply either by drowning or byelectrocution due to negligence attributableonly to herself and not to petitioner. In thisregard, it was pointed out that the deceased,without petitioner's knowledge, caused theinstallation of a burglar deterrent by connectinga wire from the main house to the iron gate and



fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latterwith electric current whenever the switch is on.Petitioner then conjectures that the switch tosaid burglar deterrent must have been left on,hence, causing the deceased's electrocutionwhen she tried to open her gate that earlymorning of June 29, 1967. After due trial, theCFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and

dismissed the complaint but awarded to thelatter P25,000 in moral damages and attorney'sfees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CAwhich issued the controverted decision.

In this petition for review the petitioner assignsthe following errors committed by therespondent CA:

1. The respondent Court of Appealscommitted grave abuse of discretionand error in considering the purelyhearsay alleged declarations of Ernestode la Cruz as part of the res gestae .

2. The respondent Court of Appealscommitted grave abuse of discretionand error in holding that the strongtyphoon "Gening" which struck LaoagCity and Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967and the flood and deluge it brought inits wake were not fortuitous events anddid not exonerate petitioner-companyfrom liability for the death of Isabel LaoJuan.

3. The respondent Court of Appealsgravely abused its discretion and erredin not applying the legal principle of"assumption of risk" in the present caseto bar private respondents fromcollecting damages from petitionercompany.

4. That the respondent Court of Appealsgravely erred and abused its discretionin completely reversing the findings offact of the trial court.

5. The findings of fact of the respondentCourt of Appeals are reversible underthe recognized exceptions.

6. The trial court did not err in awardingmoral damages and attorney's fees todefendant corporation, now petitionercompany.

7. Assuming arguendo that petitionercompany may be held liable from thedeath of the late Isabel Lao Juan, the

damages granted by respondent Courtof Appeals are improper andexhorbitant. (Petitioners Memorandum,p. 133, Rollo)

Basically, three main issues are apparent: (1)whether or not the deceased died ofelectrocution; (2) whether or not petitionermay be held liable for the deceased's death;and (3) whether or not the respondent CA'ssubstitution of the trial court's factual findingsfor its own was proper.

In considering the first issue, it is Our view thatthe same be resolved in the affirmative. By apreponderance of evidence, privaterespondents were able to show that thedeceased died of electrocution, a conclusionwhich can be primarily derived from thephotographed burnt wounds (Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2") on the left palm of the former. Suchwounds undoubtedly point to the fact that thedeceased had clutched a live wire of thepetitioner. This was corroborated by thetestimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who actuallyexamined the body of the deceased a few hoursafter the death and described the said burntwounds as a "first degree burn" (p. 144, TSN,December 11, 1972) and that they were"electrically charged" (p. 102, TSN, November28, 1972). Furthermore, witnesses Linda AlonzoEstavillo and Aida Bulong added that after thedeceased screamed "Ay" and sank into thewater, they tried to render some help but were

overcome with fear by the sight of an electricwire dangling from an electric post, moving inthe water in a snake-like fashion ( supra ). Theforegoing therefore justifies the respondent CAin concluding that "(t)he nature of the woundsas described by the witnesses who saw themcan lead to no other conclusion than that theywere "burns," and there was nothing else in thestreet where the victim was wading thru whichcould cause a burn except the dangling live wire



cannot agree to the proposition that the onemade by him was a mere opinion. On thecontrary, his shout was a translation of anactuality as perceived by him through his senseof touch.

Finally, We do not agree that the taking ofErnesto de la Cruz' testimony was suppressed

by the private respondents, thus, is presumedto be adverse to them pursuant to Section 5(e),Rule 131. For the application of said Rule asagainst a party to a case, it is necessary that theevidence alleged to be suppressed is availableonly to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18May 1955, 97 Phil. 953). The presumption doesnot operate if the evidence in question isequally available to both parties (StaplesHowePrinting Co. vs. Bldg. and Loan Assn., 36 Phil.421). It is clear from the records that petitionercould have called Ernesto de la Cruz to thewitness stand. This, precisely, was Linda AlonzoEstavillo's suggestion to petitioner's counselwhen she testified on cross examination:

Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how fardid he reach from the gate of thehouse?

A. Well, you can ask that matter fromhim sir because he is here. (TSN, p. 30,26 Sept. 1972)

The foregoing shows that petitioner had theopportunity to verify the declarations ofErnesto de la Cruz which, if truly adverse toprivate respondent, would have helped its case.However, due to reasons known only topetitioner, the opportunity was not taken.

Coming now to the second issue, We tip thescales in the private respondents' favor. Therespondent CA acted correctly in disposing the

argument that petitioner be exonerated fromliability since typhoons and floods are fortuitousevents. While it is true that typhoons and floodsare considered Acts of God for which no personmay be held responsible, it was not saideventuality which directly caused the victim'sdeath. It was through the intervention ofpetitioner's negligence that death took place.We subscribe to the conclusions of therespondent CA when it found:

On the issue whether or not thedefendant incurred liability for theelectrocution and consequent death ofthe late Isabel Lao Juan, defendantcalled to the witness-stand its electricalengineer, chief lineman, and lineman toshow exercise of extraordinarydiligence and to negate the charge of

negligence. The witnesses testified in ageneral way about their duties and themeasures whichdefendant usually adopts to preventhazards to life and limb. From thesetestimonies, the lower court found"that the electric lines and otherequipment of defendant corporationwere properly maintained by a well-trained team of lineman, techniciansand engineers working around the clockto insure that these equipments were inexcellent condition at all times." (P. 40,Record on Appeal) The finding of thelower court, however, was based onwhat the defendant's employees weresupposed to do, not on what theyactually did or failed to do on thedate in question, and not on theoccasion ofthe emergency situation brought aboutby the typhoon.

The lower court made a mistake inassuming that defendant's employeesworked around the clock during theoccurrence of the typhoon on the nightof June 28 and until the early morningof June 29, 1967, Engr. Antonio Juan ofthe National Power Corporationaffirmed that when he first set out onan inspection trip between 6:00 and6:30 A.M. on June 29, 1967, he sawgrounded and disconnected electric

lines of the defendant but he sawno INELCO lineman . The INELCO Officeat the Life theatre on Rizal Streetwas still closed . (pp. 63-64, TSN, Oct. 24,1972) Even the witnesses of defendantcontradict the finding of the lowercourt. Conrado Asis, defendant'selectrical engineer, testified that heconducted a general inspection of thefranchise area of the INELCO onlyon June 30, 1967 , the day following the



typhoon. The reason he gave for thedelay was that all their vehicles weresubmerged. (p. 337, TSN, July 20, 1973)According to Asis, he arrived at hisoffice at 8:00 A.M. on June 30 and afterbriefing his men on what to do theystarted out. (p. 338, lbid ) One or twodays after the typhoon, the INELCO

people heard "rumors that someonewas electrocuted" so he sent one of hismen to the place but his man reportedback that there was no damaged wire.(p. 385, Id .) Loreto Abijero, chieflineman of defendant, corroboratedEngr. Juan. He testified that at about8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 Engr. Juancame to the INELCO plant and asked theINELCO people to inspect their lines. Hewent with Engr. Juan and theirinspection lasted from 8:00 A.M. to12:00 noon. (pp. 460, 465, TSN, Jan. 28,1975) Fabico Abijero lineman ofdefendant, testified that at about 6:00on June 29, 1967 the typhoon ceased.At that time, he was at the mainbuilding of the Divine Word College ofLaoag where he had taken his family forrefuge. (pp. 510-511, Ibid. )

In times of calamities such as the onewhich occurred in Laoag City on the

night of June 28 until the early hours ofJune 29, 1967, extraordinary diligencerequires a supplier of electricity to beinconstant vigil to prevent or avoid anyprobable incident that might imperil lifeor limb. The evidence does not showthat defendant did that. On thecontrary, evidence discloses that therewere no men (linemen or otherwise)policing the area, nor even manning itsoffice. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo)

Indeed, under the circumstances of the case,petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that noharm is done to the general public"...considering that electricity is an agency, subtleand deadly, the measure of care required ofelectric companies must be commensurate withor proportionate to the danger. The duty ofexercising this high degree of diligence and careextends to every place where persons have aright to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55

Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner havingbeen shown, it may not now absolve itself fromliability by arguing that the victim's death wassolely due to a fortuitous event. "When an actof God combines or concurs with the negligenceof the defendant to produce an injury, thedefendant is liable if the injury would not haveresulted but for his own negligent conduct or

omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).

Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria"relied upon by petitioner finds no application inthe case at bar. It is imperative to note thesurrounding circumstances which impelled thedeceased to leave the comforts of a roof andbrave the subsiding typhoon. As testified byLinda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept.1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept.1972), the deceased, accompanied by theformer two, were on their way to the latter'sgrocery store "to see to it that the goods werenot flooded." As such, shall We punish her forexercising her right to protect her propertyfrom the floods by imputing upon her theunfavorable presumption that she assumed therisk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it hasbeen held that a person is excused from theforce of the rule, that when he voluntarilyassents to a known danger he must abide bythe consequences, if an emergency is found toexist or if the life or property of another is in

peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. 301), orwhen he seeks to rescue his endangeredproperty (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts."Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167).Clearly, an emergency was at hand as thedeceased's property, a source of her livelihood,was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore,the deceased, at the time the fatal incidentoccurred, was at a place where she had a rightto be without regard to petitioner's consent asshe was on her way to protect her merchandise.

Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may notbe barred from recovering damages as a resultof the death caused by petitioner's negligence(ibid ., p. 1165, 1166).

But petitioner assails the CA for having abusedits discretion in completely reversing the trialcourt's findings of fact, pointing to thetestimonies of three of its employees itselectrical engineer, collector-inspector,lineman, and president-manager to the effect



that it had exercised the degree of diligencerequired of it in keeping its electric lines freefrom defects that may imperil life and limb.Likewise, the said employees of petitionercategorically disowned the fatal wires as theyappear in two photographs taken on theafternoon of June 29, 1967 (Exhs. "D" and "E"),suggesting that said wires were just hooked to

the electric post (petitioner's Memorandum, p.170, Rollo). However, as the CA properly held,"(t)he finding of the lower court ... was basedon what the defendant's employees weresupposed to do, not on what they actually didor failed to do on the date in question, and noton the occasion of the emergencysituation brought about by the typhoon" (CADecision, p. 25, Rollo). And as found by the CA,which We have already reiterated above,petitioner was in fact negligent. In a likemanner, petitioner's denial of ownership of theseveral wires cannot stand the logicalconclusion reached by the CA when it held that"(t)he nature of the wounds as described by thewitnesses who saw them can lead to no otherconclusion than that they were 'burns', andthere was nothing else in the street where thevictim was wading thru which could cause aburn except the dangling live wire of defendantcompany" ( supra ).

"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate

the wires, due care requires prompt efforts todiscover and repair broken lines" (Cooley onTorts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is thatwhen Engineer Antonio Juan of the NationalPower Corporation set out in the early morningof June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he sawgrounded and disconnected lines hanging fromposts to the ground but did not see any INELCOlineman either in the streets or at the INELCOoffice (vide, CA Decision, supra ). The foregoingshows that petitioner's duty to exercise

extraordinary diligence under the circumstancewas not observed, confirming the negligence ofpetitioner. To aggravate matters, the CA found:

. . .even before June 28 the people in Laoagwere already alerted about the impendingtyphoon, through radio announcements. Eventhe fire department of the city announced thecoming of the big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN,March 13, 1975) At the INELCO irregularities inthe flow of electric current were noted because

"amperes of the switch volts were moving". Andyet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had towait for Engr. Juan to request that defendant'sswitch be cut off but the harm was done. Askedwhy the delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he"was not the machine tender of the electricplant to switch off the current." (pp. 467-468, Ibid .) How very characteristic of gross

inefficiency! (CA Decision, p. 26, Rollo)

From the preceding, We find that the CA did notabuse its discretion in reversing the trial court'sfindings but tediously considered the factualcircumstances at hand pursuant to its power toreview questions of fact raised from thedecision of the Regional Trial Court, formerlythe Court of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129).

In considering the liability of petitioner, therespondent CA awarded the following in privaterespondent's favor: P30,229.45 in actualdamages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's deathand P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000in compensatory damages, computed inaccordance with the formula set in the Villa-ReyTransit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base ofP15,000 as average annual income of thedeceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages;P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Exceptfor the award of P12,000 as compensation forthe victim's death, We affirm the respondent

CA's award for damages and attorney's fees.Pusuant to recent jurisprudence (People vs.Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147SCRA 381), We increase the said award ofP12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the totalactual damages to P48,229.45.

The exclusion of moral damages and attorney'sfees awarded by the lower court was properlymade by the respondent CA, the charge ofmalice and bad faith on the part of respondents

in instituting his case being a mere product ofwishful thinking and speculation. Award ofdamages and attorney's fees is unwarrantedwhere the action was filed in good faith; thereshould be no penalty on the right to litigate(Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage resultsfrom a person's exercising his legal rights, itis damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA,59 SCRA 110).



WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of therespondent, except for the slight modificationthat actual damages be increased to P48,229.45is hereby AFFIRMED.

Sanitary Steam Laundry Inc. vs. CA

This case involves a collision between a Mercedes

Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundryand a Cimarron which caused the death of threepersons and the injuries of several others. The accidenttook place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite onAugust 31, 1980. All the victims were riding in theCimarron. One of those who died was the driver. TheRegional Trial Court of Makati found petitio ner’s driverto be responsible for the vehicular accident andaccordingly held petitioner liable to private respondentsfor P 472,262.30 in damages and attorney’s fees. Itsdecision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Itis here for a review of the appellate court’s decision.

The passengers of the Cimarron were mostlyemployees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc.(PMCI). They had just visited the construction site of acompany project at Lian, Batangas. The otherpassengers were family members and friends whomthey invited to an excursion to the beach after the visitto the construction site. The group stayed at Lian beachuntil 5:30 p.m., when they decided to go back toManila.

The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-4J, was owned bySalvador Salenga, father of one of the employees ofPMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. Itappears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was travelingalong Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way backto Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion bypetitioner’s panel truck, bearing Plate No. 581 XM,which was traveling in the opposite direction. Thepanel truck was on its way to petitioner’s plant inDasmariñas, Cavite after delivering some linen to theMakati Medical Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez,claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly

stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoidhitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle toswerve to the left and encroach on a portion of theopposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided withthe Cimarron on the north-bound lane.

The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez,and two of his passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe andDalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the otherpassengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken tovarious hospitals.

On December 4, 1980, private respondents filedthis civil case for damages before the then Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, against petitioner.

On November 23, 1990, the Regional Trial Court ofMakati, to which the case was transferred following thereorganization of the judiciary, rendered judgment forprivate respondents. The dispositive portion of itsdecision reads:

It is for the reasons stated above that the court ispersuaded to award the damages incurred by theplaintiffs as proved in the trial as follows:

Actual or compensatory expenses:

a. Charito Estolano P35,813.87 (Exh. J)

b. Nicanor Bernabe III 20,024.94

& Josefina C. Bernabe

c. Julieta, Ailyn & 45,830.45 (Exh. QQ)

Josefina Enriquez

and Josefina Valeiro

d. Leonor Macaspac 2,740.00

e. Victor Rey Ignacio 14,820.64 (Exh. EEE)

f. Rene Tablante 10,032.40 (Exh. QQQ)

g. Nenita Salonoy, widow; 20,000.00

and Manilyn, children

Moral damages should also be awarded as follows:

For the injuries sustained by:

a. Charito Estolano P10,000.00 (Exh. F)

b. Julieta P. Enriquez 15,000.00 (Exh. MM)

c. Ailyn C. Enriquez 8,000.00 (Exh. NN)

d. Josefina R. Enriquez 10,000.00 (Exh. OO)

e. Josefina P. Valerio 2,000.00 (Exh. PP)



f. Nenita Salonoy 20,000.00 (Exh. DD)

g. Nicanor Bernabe III 8,000.00 (Exh. Q)

h. Josephine Bernabe 2,000.00 (Exh. R)

i. John Joseph Bernabe 10,000.00

j. Manilyn G. Salonoy 10,000.00 (Exh. EE)

k. Jack Salonoy 10,000.00 (Exh. JJ)

l. Leonor C. Macaspac 2,000.00 (Exh. AAA)

m. Victor Ignacio 8,000.00 (Exh. DDD)

n. Rene Tablanta 8,000.00 (Exh. FFF)

and finally the heirs of Jason Bernabe should be

awarded the sum of P50,000.0 0 for the latter’sdeath. The heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should be giventhe sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages andunearned income.

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered in favorof plaintiffs ordering defendant to pay the amountsaforecited and to pay the further sum of P50,000.00 forattorney’s fees and the costs.

SO ORDERED.

As already stated, the Court of Appeals, to whichthe decision of the trial court was appealed, affirmedthe decision on January 26, 1995. Hence, this appeal.

First. Petitioner contends that the driver of theCimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and,therefore, its liability should be mitigated, if not totallyextinguished. It claims that the driver of the Cimarronwas guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations atthe time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art.2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed to be

negligent.According to petitioner, the negligence consisted

of the following:

1. The Cimarron was overloaded becausethere were from 20 to 25 passengers inside whenthe passenger capacity of the vehicle was only 17.

2. The front seat of the Cimarron wasoccupied by four adults, including the driver.

3. The Cimarron had only one headlight on(its right headlight) as its left headlight was notfunctioning.

Petitioner cites Art. III, §2 of R.A. No. 4136, knownas the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, whichprovides that “No person operating any vehicle shallallow more passengers or more freight or cargo in hisvehicle than its regist ered carry capacity” and Art. IV,§3(e) which states that “Every motor vehicle of morethan one meter of projected width, while in use on anypublic highway shall bear two headlights... which notlater than one-half hour after sunset and until at leastone-half hour before sunrise and whenever weatherconditions so require, shall both be lighted.”

Petitioner asserts that the fact that its panel truckencroached on a portion of the lane of the Cimarrondoes not show that its driver was negligent. Petitionercites the case of Bayasen v. Court of Appeals ,[1] whichallegedly held that the sudden swerving of a vehiclecaused by its driver stepping on the brakes is notnegligence per se. Petitioner further claims that even ifpetitioner’s swerving to the lane of respondents wereconsidered proof of negligence, this fact would notnegate the presumption of negligence on the part ofthe other driver arising from his violations of trafficrules and regulations.

Petitioner likewise invokes the ruling in Mckee v.Intermediate Appellate Court ,[2] in which a driver whoinvaded the opposite lane and caused a collision

between his car and a truck coming from the oppositelane, was exonerated based on the doctrine of last clearchance, which states that a person who has the lastclear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, issolely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

Petitioner contends that the ruling in that caseshould be applied to the present case. According topetitioner, although the driver of the panel truck wasinitially negligent, the driver of the Cimarron had thelast opportunity to avoid the accident. However,

because of his negligence ( i.e., the aforementionedviolations of traffic rules and regulations such as the useof only one headlight at night and the overcrowding atthe front seat of the vehicle), he was not able to avoid acollision with the panel truck.

We find the foregoing contention to be withoutmerit.

First of all, it has not been shown how the allegednegligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to thecollision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/dec1998/119092.htm#_edn1










the burden of showing a causal connection between theinjury received and the violation of the LandTransportation and Traffic Code. He must show that theviolation of the statute was the proximate or legal causeof the injury or that it substantially contributedthereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, ofviolation of law, like any other negligence, is withoutlegal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of

the injury .[3]

Petitioner says that “driving an overloadedvehicle with only one functioning headlight duringnighttime certainly increases the risk ofaccid ent, ”[4] that because the Cimarron had only oneheadlight, there was “decreased visibility,” and that thefact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seatovercrowded “decreased *its+maneuverability. ”[5] However, mere allegations such asthese are not sufficient to discharge its burden ofproving clearly that such alleged negligence was thecontributing cause of the injury.

Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case,there was no way either driver could have avoided thecollision. The panel truck driver testified :[6]

Q. You stated you were following a jeepney alongthe highway in Imus, Cavite, what happenedafterwards, if any?

A. The passenger jeepney I was following made asudden stop so I stepped on the brakes.

Q. Upon stepping on your brakes, what happenedif any?

A. The Mercedes Benz (panel) suddenly swerved tothe left, sir.

Q. How big was the swerving to the left?

A. The distance which my vehicle swerved beyondthe middle line or center line to the left wasabout this distance, sir (witness demonstratingby using both hands the distance).

ATTY. ALILING:

Can we stipulate that it is 1 foot, Your Honor.

ATTY. GONZALES:

A little more, 1 1/2 feet.

ATTY. ALILING:

1 1/4 feet.

ATTY. GONZALES:

Between 1 1/4 and 1 1/2 feet.

The panel truck driver’s testimony is consistentwith the testimonies of private respondents that thepanel truck went out of control and simply smashedinto the Cimarron in which they were riding. Thus,Nicanor Bernabe III testified :[7]

Q: And did you see how the accident happened?

A: I just saw a glare of light. That is all and then the

impact.Q: Where did you see that glare of light?

A: Coming in front ahead of us.

Q: When you say ahead of you, was it . . . ?

A: Towards us.

. . . .

Q: And from what did those glare of light comefrom?

A: Based on information I received, the light camefrom the headlights of a certain panel owned bySanitary Steam Laundry, Inc.

. . . .

Q: You said that the lights were going towardsyou. Now, at what pace did these lights cometoward you?

A: Fast pac e.”

Charito Estolano, another passenger who was

seated in front of the Cimarron, similarly testified thatthey just saw the panel truck hurtling toward them. Shesaid :[8]

Q Now, you said earlier that you were involved inan accident. What was that accident?

A An approaching vehicle hit us.

Q Now, why do you know that there was theapproaching vehicle?

A There was a light which glared us and I knew

that it came from a vehicle. We were blinded.Q Where was this vehicle headed for?

A Headed for Cavite.

Q Coming from?

A Coming from Manila, I think.

Q So that, actually, in relation to your vehicle, itwas coming from the opposite direction?



























A Yes, sir.

Q Now, you said that the light headed towardsyour vehicle. On which side of the highway wasyour Tamaraw vehicle travelling at that time?

A We were on the right lane.

Q Did you actually see this light from the vehiclecoming from the opposite direction headingtowards your vehicle?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what happened after that?

A After that, there was an impact.

Q All right. Will you tell the Court which bumpedwhich?

A We were bumped by the vehicle which wascoming from the opposite direction.

The foregoing testimonies show that the driver ofthe panel truck lost control of his vehicle and bumpedthe Cimarron. Hence, even if both headlights of theCimarron were lighted, it would have been bumped justthe same because the driver of the panel truck couldnot stop despite the fact that he applied thebrakes. Petitioner’s contention that because of“decreased visibility,” caused by the fact that theCimarron allegedly had only one headlight on, its driverfailed to see the Cimarron is without any basis infact. Only its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only

one headlight on. The police investigator did not statein his report or in his testimony that the Cimarron hadonly one headlight on.

Nor is there any basis in fact for petitioner’scontention that because of overcrowding in the frontseat of the Cimarron there was “decreasedmaneuverability” which prevented the Cimarron driverfrom avoiding the panel truck. There is absolutely nobasis for this claim. There is nothing in the testimoniesof the passengers of the Cimarron, particularly CharitoEstolano, who was seated in front, which suggest that

the driver had no elbow room for maneuvering thevehicle. To the contrary, from the testimony of some ofthe witnesses ,[9] it appears that the driver of theCimarron tried to avoid the collision but because of theemergency created by the speeding panel truck comingfrom the opposite direction he was not able to fullymove his Cimarron away from the path of the oncomingvehicle. We are convinced that no “maneuvering”which the Cimarron driver could have done would haveavoided a collision with the panel truck, given the

suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding inthe front seat was immaterial.

All these point to the fact that the proximate causeof the accident was the negligence of petitioner’sdriver. As the trial court noted, the swerving ofpetitioner’s panel truck to the opposite lane could meannot only that petitioner’s driver was running the vehicleat a very high speed but that he was tailgating thepassenger jeepney ahead of it as well.

Petitioner’s driver claimed that the dis tancebetween the panel truck and the passenger jeepney infront was about 12 meters .[10] If this was so, he wouldhave had no difficulty bringing his panel truck to astop. It is very probable that the driver did not reallyapply his brakes (which is why there were no skidmarks) but that finding the jeepney in front of him to bein close proximity, he tried to avoid hitting it byswerving his vehicle to the left. In the process,however, he invaded a portion of the opposite lane andconsequently hit the Cimarron. Indeed, the panel truckdriver testified that his vehicle was running at the speedof 60 miles per hour .[11] He tried to correct himself whenasked by petitioner’s counsel whether the panel truckspeedometer indicated miles or kilometers by sayingthat the speedometer measured kilometers and notmiles, but on cross examination his testimony gotmuddled .[12]

Be that as it may, whether the driver meant 60miles per hour (which could be 96.77 kilometers per

hour) or 60 kilometers per hour, the fact remains thatthe panel truck was overspeeding because themaximum allowable speed for trucks and buses on opencountry roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus,Cavite, is only 50 kilometers per hour .[13]

The case of Bayasen , which petitioner invokes,cannot apply to this case. There was no swerving of thevehicle in that case but skidding, and it was causedby the fact that the road was wet and slippery. In thiscase, the road was dry and safe. There was no reasonfor the vehicle to swerve because of road

condition. The only explanation for this occurrence washuman error.

Petitioner’s reliance on the McKee case is alsomisplaced. In that case, the driver of the vehicle atfault, a truck, had an opportunity to avoid the collisionbut he ignored the signals from the other vehicle, a car,to slow down and allow it to safely pass the bridge. Inthis case, there was no such opportunity given theCimarron on the night of the mishap. Everythinghappened so quickly that before the passengers of the























Cimarron knew it, the vehicle had been bumped by thetruck.

Second . On its liability as employer of thenegligent driver, petitioner contends that the non-submission of the NBI clearance and police clearance ofits driver does not mean that it failed to exercise thediligence of a good father of the family in the selectionand supervision of its employees. It argues that there isno law requiring employees to submit NBI and policeclearance prior to their employment. Hence,petitioner’s failure to require submission of thesedocuments does not mean that it did not exercise duediligence in the selection and supervision of itsemployees. On the other hand, it asserts that itsemployment of Herman Hernandez as a driver meansthat he had passed the screening tests of the company,including submission of the aforementioneddocuments. Petitioner maintains that the presumptionis that the said driver submitted NBI and police

clearance.Petitioner likewise contends that the Court of

Appeal’s position that it failed to exercise due diligencein the selection and supervision of its employees by notrequiring its prospective employees to undergopsychological and physical tests before employment hasno basis in law because there is no law requiring suchtests prior to hiring employees.

The petitioner’s contention has no merit. TheCourt of Appeals did not say that petitioner’s failure to

submit NBI and police clearances of its driver was proofthat petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in theselection of its employees. What the Court of Appealssaid was that petitioner’s policy of requiring prospectiveemployees to submit NBI and police clearance and tohave at least two (2) years experience as driver prior toemployment was not enough to prove the exercise ofdue diligence and that even this policy petitioner failedto prove by its failure to present the driver’s NBI an dpolice records during the trial.

With respect to the requirement of passing

psychological and physical tests prior to hisemployment, although no law requires it, suchcircumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator ofthe exercise of due diligence. As the trial court said :[14]

. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental andemotional, were conducted on their would-beemployees. No on-the-job training and seminarsreminding employees, especially drivers, of roadcourtesies and road rules and regulations weredone. There were no instructions given to defendant’s

drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency norwhat to do after an emergency occurs. There was evenfailure on the part of defendant to present itsconcerned employee’s 204 file. All these could onlymean failure on the part of defendant to exercise thediligence required of it of a good father of a family inthe selection and supervision of its employees.

Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on thesenses .[15] Accordingly, it behooves employers to exertextra care in the selection and supervision of theiremployees. They must go beyond the minimumrequirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista,the office manager of petitioner in its Dasmariñas plant,said that petitioner has a policy of requiring jobapplicants to submit clearances from the police and theNBI. In the case of applicants for the position of driverthey are required to have at least two (2) years drivingexperience and to be holders of a professional driver’slicense for at least two years. But the supposedcompany policies on employment were not inwriting. Nor did Bautista show in what manner hesupervised the drivers to ensure that they drove theirvehicles in a safe way.

Third . With respect to the question of damages,we find no reversible error committed in the award ofactual damages to private respondents. To justify anaward of actual damages, there must be competentproof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can begiven only to claims which are duly supported by

receipts .[16]

Here, the actual damages claimed by privaterespondents were duly supported by receipts andappear to have been really incurred.

As to the moral damages awarded, we find them tobe reasonable and necessary in view of thecircumstances of this case. Moral damages areawarded to allow the victims to obtain means,diversion, or amusement to alleviate the moralsuffering they had undergone due to the defendant’sculpable action .[17] In this case, private respondentsdoubtless suffered some ordeal because some of them

lost their loved ones, while others lost theirfuture. Within the meaning of Art. 2217 of the CivilCode, they suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish,serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. An award ofmoral damages in their favor is thus justified.

The award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of JasonBernabe as death indemnity is likewise in accordancewith law .[18] However, the award of P100,000 to theheirs of Dalmacio Salunoy, denominated in the decisionof the trial court as “moral damages and unearned























income” cannot be upheld. The heirs were alreadyincluded among those awarded moraldamages. Marilyn Salunoy was ordered to bepaid P10,000, Jack Salunoy, P10,000, and their motherNenita Salunoy, P20,000, as moral damages. Theamount of P100,000 was presumably awarded primarilyfor loss of earning capacity but even then the amountmust be modified. In accordance with our case s[19] on

this question, the formula for determining the lifeexpectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be determined byapplying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus theage of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46 years of ageat the time of his death, as stated in his deathcertificate, then his life expectancy was 22.6 years, orup to 68 years old.

Next, his net earnings must be computed. At thetime of his death, Dalmacio Salunoy was earning morethan P900.00 a month as bookkeeper at the PMCI sothat his annual gross earnings was

about P11,000.00. From this amount, about 50% shouldbe deducted as reasonable and necessary livingexpenses because it seems his wife occasionally findswork and thus helps in the household expenses.

Based on the foregoing, his net earning capacitywas P124,300.00 computed as follows :[20]

net earning lifecapacity (x) = expectancy x [Gross annualincome less reasonable & necessary living

expenses]

x = [2 (80-46)] x [P11,000 - P5,500]3

= 22.6 x 5,500

= P124,300.00

In addition, the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy shouldbe paid P50,000.00 as death indemnity.

Finally, the award of attorney’s fees should bedisallowed as the trial court did not giveany justification for granting it in its decision. It is nowsettled that awards of attorney’s fees must be based onfindings of fact and law, stated in the decision of thetrial court .[21]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appealsis MODIFIED in the sense that the award of P100,000.00denominated “for moral damages and unearnedincome” is deleted, and in lieu thereof the amount

ofP124,300.00 for loss of earning capacity and thefurther amount of P50,000.00 for death indemnity areawarded to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy and theaward of P 50,000.00 for attorney’s fees isdisallowed. In all other respects the appealed decisionis AFFIRMED.

TISON AND JABON vs. SPOUSES POMASINTwo vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a

jitney ,[1] figured in a vehicular mishap along MaharlikaHighway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while thetractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), wastraversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City .[2]

The opposing parties gave two differentversions of the incident.

Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni’s father,was on board the jitney and seated on the passenger ’sside. He testified that while the jitney was passingthrough a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction andencroaching on the jitney’s lane. The jitney was hit bythe tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causingdeath and injuries to its passengers .[3]

On the other hand, Jabon recounted that whilehe was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on

the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of theroad. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag mannerand heading towards the direction of the truck. Toavoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacksof palay . Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the leftfender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a fewmeters away. The tractor-trailer was likewisedamaged .[4]

Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.

Gregorio was injured and brought to the AlbayProvincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter, AndreaPomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales andAbraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His otherdaughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and granddaughterAnnie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at thehospital. His wife, Consorcia Pomasin, anothergranddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce,Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista,










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be offset with the P200,000.00 receivedby plaintiff-appellant Cynthia Pomasin;

b) Civil indemnity of P50,000.00for the death of each victim, to beoffset with the balance of P64,000.00from the aforementioned P200,000.00of civil indemnity received by plaintiff-

appellant Cynthia Pomasin. Hence, thenet amount is computed at P37,200.00each, as follows:

NarcisaPomasin P37,200.00

LaarniPomasin P37,200.00

Andrea P.

Pagunsan P37,200.00

DionisioPerol P37,200.00

Annie Jane P.Pagunsan P37,200.00

c) Moral damagesof P50,000.00 to each of the victims;and

d) Attorney’s fees of 10% of the total award .[10]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,which was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals ina Resolution [11] dated 19 July 2006.

The petition for review raises mixed questions of factand law which lead back to the very issue litigated bythe trial court: Who is the negligent party or the partyat fault?

The issue of negligence is factual in nature .[12] Andthe rule, and the exceptions, is that factual findings ofthe Court of Appeals are generally conclusive but maybe reviewed when: (1) the factual findings of the Courtof Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) thefindings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmisesor conjectures; (3) the inference made by the Court ofAppeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken,absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse ofdiscretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate

court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues ofthe case and such findings are contrary to theadmissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on amisapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals failsto notice certain relevant facts which, if properlyconsidered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8)the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary

to those of the trial court or are mere conclusionswithout citation of specific evidence, or where the factsset forth by the petitioner are not disputed byrespondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court ofAppeals are premised on the absence of evidence butare contradicted by the evidence on record .[13]

The exceptions to the rule underscore thesubstance and weight of the findings of the trialcourt. They render inconclusive contrary findings by theappellate court. The reason is now a fundamentalprinciple:

[A]ppellate courts do not disturb thefindings of the trial courts with regardto the assessment of the credibility ofwitnesses. The reason for this is thattrial courts have the ‘uniqueopportunity to observe the witnesesfirst hand and note their demeanor,conduct and attitude under grillingexamination.

The exceptions to this rule are when the trialcourt’s findings of facts and conclusions ar e notsupported by the evidence on record, or when certainfacts of substance and value, likely to change theoutcome of the case, have been overlooked by the trialcourt, or when the assailed decision is based on amisapprehension of facts .[14]

This interplay of rules and exceptions is more

pronounced in this case of quasi-delict in which,according to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever byact or omission causes damage to another, there beingfault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damagedone. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict , thefollowing requisites must concur: (a) damage sufferedby the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault ornegligence of defendant and the damage incurred bythe plaintiff .[15] These requisites must be proved by apreponderance of evidence .[16] The claimants,






























respondents in this case, must, therefore, establishtheir claim or cause of action by preponderance ofevidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or moreconvincing than that which is offered in opposition toit.[17]

The trial court found that the jitney driver wasnegligent. We give weight to this finding greater than

the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate courtthat the driver of the tractor-trailer caused thevehicular collision.

One reason why the trial court found crediblethe version of Jabon was because his concentration asdriver is more focused than that of a merepassenger. The trial court expounded, thus:

In the appreciation of thetestimony of eye-witnesses, oneoverriding consideration is theiropportunity for observation in gettingto know or actually seeing or observingthe matter they testify to. This mostparticularly holds true in vehicularcollision or accident cases whichoftentimes happen merely momentarilyor in the split of a second. In the caseof a running or travelling vehicle,especially in highway travel whichdoubtless involves faster speed than inordinary roads, the driver isconcentrated on his drivingcontinuously from moment to momenteven in long trips. While in the case ofa mere passenger, he does not have todirect his attention to the safe conductof the travelling vehicle, as in fact hemay converse with other passengersand pay no attention to the driving orsafe conduct of the travelling vehicle, ashe may even doze off to sleep if hewants to, rendering his opportunity for

observation on the precise cause of theaccident or collision or immediatelypreceding thereto not as much as thatof the driver whose attention iscontinuously focused on his driving. Sothat as between the respective versionsof the plaintiffs thru their passengerand that of the defendants thru theirdriver as to the cause or antecedentcauses that led to the vehicular collisionin this case, the version of the driver of

defendant should ordinarily be morereliable than the version of a merepassenger of Plaintiffs’ vehicle, simplybecause the attention of the passengeris not as much concentrated on thedriving as that of the driver,consequently the capacity forobservation of the latter of the latter on

the matter testified to which is theprecise point of inquiry --- theproximate cause of the accident --- ismore reasonably reliable. Moreover,the passenger’s vision is not as good asthat of the driver from the vantagepoint of the driver’s seat especially innighttime, thus rendering a passenger’sopportunity for observation on theantecedent causes of the collision lesserthan that of the driver. This being so,this Court is more inclined to believethe story of defendant’s driver ClaudioJabon that the jitney driven by LaarniPomasin fell off the shoulder of thecurved road causing it to run thereafterin a zigzag manner and in the processthe two vehicles approaching eachother from opposite directions athighway speed came in contact witheach other, the zigzagging jeep hittingthe left fender of the truck all the wayto the fuel tank, the violent impact

resulting in the lighter vehicle, the jitney, being thrown away due to thedisparate size of the truck .[18]

The appellate court labelled the trial court’srationalization as a “sweeping conjecture ”[19] andcountered that Gregorio was actually occupying thefront seat of the jitney and had actually a clear view ofthe incident despite the fact that he was not driving.

While it is logical that a driver’s attention to the

road travelled is keener than that of a mere passenger,it should also be considered that the logic will hold onlyif the two are similarly circumstanced, and only as ageneral rule, so that, it does not necessarily follow thatbetween the opposing testimonies of a driver and apassenger, the former is more credible. The factualsetting of the event testified on must certainly beconsidered.

The trial court did just that in the instantcase. Contrary to the observation of the Court of















Appeals, the relative positions of a driver and apassenger in a vehicle was not the only basis of analysisof the trial court. Notably, aside from Jabon’s allegedvantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trialcourt also took into consideration Gregorio’s admissionthat prior to the accident, the jitney was running on the“curving and downward” portion of the highway. Theappellate court, however, took into account the other

and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was their jitney that was going uphill and when it was about toreach a curve, he saw the incoming truck running veryfast and encroaching the jitney’s lane.

We perused the transcript of stenographicnotes and found that the truck was actually ascendingthe highway when it collided with the descending jitney.

During the direct examination, Jabon narratedthat the tractor-trailer was ascending at a speed of 35to 40 kilometers per hour when he saw the jitney on theopposite lane running in a zigzag manner, thus:

Q: Now, when you passed by themunicipality of Polangui, Albay at about5:00 of August 12, 1994, could you tellthe Court if there was any untowardincident that happened?

A: There was sir.

Q: Could you please tell the Court?

A: While on my way to Liborocoming from Sorsogon, I met onmy way a vehicle going on azigzag direction and it even fellon the shoulder and proceededgoing on its way on a zigzagdirection.

Q: Could you describe to the Courtwhat was the kind of vehicle you sawrunning in zigzag direction?

A: A Toyota-jitney loaded withpassengers with top-load.

Q: You said that the top[-]load ofthe jeep is loaded?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Could you please tell the Courtwhat was your speed at thetime when you saw that jeepney with top[-]load runningon a zigzag manner?

A: I was running 35 to 40 kilometersper hour because Iwas ascending plain . (Emphasissupplied) .[20]

In that same direct examination, Jabon confirmedthat he was ascending, viz:

Q: Could you please describe thecondition in the area at thetime of the incident, was it dark

or day time?

A: It was still bright.

COURT: But it was not approachingsunset?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there any rain at that time?

A: None sir.

Q: So the road was dry?

A: Yes sir.

Q: You said you were ascendingtowards the direction of Liboro,Camarines Sur, is that correct at thetime the incident happened ?

A: Yes sir .[21] (Emphasis supplied).

Upon the other hand, Gregorio, during hisdirect examination described the road condition wherethe collision took place as “curving and downward,”thus:

Q: Could you please describe theplace where the incident happened inso far as the road condition isconcerned?











A: The road was curving anddownward.

Q: And the road was of course clearfrom traffic, is that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And practically, your jitney wasthe only car running at that time?

A: Yes sir .[22] (Emphasissupplied)

Significantly, this is a confirmation of thetestimony of Jabon.

However, on rebuttal, Gregorio turned aroundand stated that the jitney was going uphill when he saw

the tractor-trailer running down very fact andencroaching on their lane, to wit:

Q: Mr. Claudio Jabon, the driver of thetrailer truck that collided with yourowner jeepney that you were ridingtestified in open Court on July 24, 1997which I quote, ‘while on my way toLiboro coming to Sorsogon I met avehicle going on a zig-zag direction andit even fell on the shoulder andproceeded going on its way on zig-zagdirection’, what can you say about thisstatement of this witness?

A: We were no[t] zigzagging but because wewere going uphill and about to reach a curved (sic) wesaw the on-coming vehicle going down very fast andencroaching on our lane so our driver swerved ourvehicle to the right but still we were hit by the on-coming vehicle .[23] (Emphasis supplied).

The declaration of Jabon with respect to the

road condition was straightforward and consistent. Therecollection of Gregorio veered from “curving anddownward” to uphill .[24] On this point, Jabon and histestimony is more credible.

The fact that the jitney easily fell into the roadshoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial court’sconclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhillwhich, it may be repeated, was the original testimony ofGregorio that the road was “curving and

downward. ”[25] It is this conclusion, prodded by theinconsistency of Gre gorio’s testimony, that givescredence to the further testimony of Jabon that theherein respondent’s jitney, “loaded with passengerswith top- load” “was running in a zigzag manner. ”[26]

Going downward, the jitney had the tendencyto accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can

result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explainswhy it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit thetractor-trailer.

There was no showing that the tractor-trailerwas speeding. There is a preponderance of evidencethat the tractor-trailer was in factascending. Considering its size and the weight of thetractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that ofa fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in azigzagging manner.

Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. Inhindsight, it can be argued that Jabon should haveswerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzaggingbefore it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents,though, happen in an instant, and, understandably inthis case, leaving the driver without sufficient time andspace to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-traileruphill and away from collision with the jitney oncomingdownhill.

Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio’s daughter,Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident.

We did not lose sight of the fact that at the timeof the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving thetruck due to the restriction impos ed on his driver’slicense, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact,Jabon even asked the Land Transportation Office toreinstate his articulated license containing restrictioncode 8 which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom thatJabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of

the collision.

Driving without a proper license is a violation oftraffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code,the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the timeof the mishap, a person was violating any trafficregulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.Court of Appeals ,[27] we held that a causal connectionmust exist between the injury received and theviolation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven



























cause to indict Rodel, the driver of the FordExpedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resultingin Damage to Property. In the meantime,petitioner demanded from respondentreimbursement for the expenses incurred in therepair of its car and the hospitalization of Estelain the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. Thedemand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L.

Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages basedon quasi-delict before the Metropolitan TrialCourt of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City,docketed as Civil Case No. 33277, andsubsequently raffled to Branch 42.

As could well be expected, (Ramos)denied liability for damages insisting that it wasthe negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s)driver, which was the proximate cause of theaccident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedancar crossed Katipunan Avenue from RajahMatanda Street despite the concrete barriersplaced thereon prohibiting vehicles to passthrough the intersection.

(Ramos) further claimed that hewas not in the vehicle when the mishapoccurred. He asserted that he exercisedthe diligence of a good father of afamily in the selection and supervisionof his driver, Rodel.

Weighing the respective evidence of theparties, the MeTC rendered the Decision dated1 March 2006 exculpating (Ramos) fromliability, thus:

“WHEREFORE, the instant caseis DISMISSED for lack of merit. TheCounterclaims of the defendant arelikewise DISMISSED for lack of sufficientfactual and legal basis.

SO ORDERED.”

The aforesaid judgment did notsit well with (C.O.L. Realty) so that he(sic) appealed the same before the RTCof Quezon City, raffled to Branch 215,which rendered the assailed Decisiondated 5 September 2006, affirming theMeTC’s Decision. (C.O.L. Realty’s)Motion for Reconsideration met the

same fate as it was denied by the RTC inits Order dated 5 June 2007.

C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appealswhich affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent incrossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah MatandaStreet since, as per Certification of the MetropolitanManila Development Authority (MMDA) dated

November 30, 2004, such act is specificallyprohibited. Thus:

This is to certify that as per records found andavailable in this office the crossing of vehiclesat Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street toBlue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon Cityhas (sic) notallowed since January 2004 up to the present in viewof the ongoing road construction at thearea .[2] (Emphasis supplied)

Barricades were precisely placed along theintersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah MatandaStreet in order to prevent motorists fromcrossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless, Aquilinocrossed Katipunan Avenue through certain portions ofthe barricade which were broken, thus violating theMMDA rule .[3]

However, the Court of Appeals likewise notedthat at the time of the collision, Ramos’ vehicle wasmoving at high speed in a busy area that was then thesubject of an ongoing construction (the KatipunanAvenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashedinto the rear door and fender of the passe nger’s side ofAquilino’s car, sending it spinning in a 180 -degreeturn .[4] It therefore found the driver Rodel guilty ofcontributory negligence for driving the Ford Expeditionat high speed along a busy intersection.

Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate courtrendered the assailed Decision ,[5] the dispositive portionof which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decisiondated 5 September 2006 of theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City,Branch 215 is hereby MODIFIED in thatrespondent Lambert Ramos is heldsolidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo topay petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporationthe amount of P51,994.80 as actualdamages. Petitioner C.O.L. RealtyCorporation’s claim for exemplary



















created a presumption of negligence onthe part of his employer, (Ramos). Forthe employer to avoid the solidaryliability for a tort committed by hisemployee, an employer must rebut thepresumption by presenting adequateand convincing proof that in theselection and supervision of his

employee, he or she exercises the careand diligence of a good father of afamily. Employers must submit concreteproof, including documentary evidence,that they complied with everything thatwas incumbent on them.

(Ramos) feebly attempts toescape vicarious liability by averringthat Rodel was highly recommendedwhen he applied for the position offamily driver by the Social ServiceCommittee of his parish. A certainRamon Gomez, a member of thechurch’s livelihood program , testifiedthat a background investigation wouldhave to be made before an applicant isrecommended to the parishioners foremployment. (Ramos) supposedlytested Rodel’s driving skills beforeaccepting him for the job. Rodel hasbeen his driver since 2001, and exceptfor the mishap in 2004, he has not been

involved in any road accident.

Regrettably, (Ramos’) evidencewhich consisted mainly of testimonialevidence remained unsubstantiatedand are thus, barren of significantweight. There is nothing on the recordswhich would support (Ramos’) bareallegation of Rodel’s 10 -yearunblemished driving record. He failed topresent convincing proof that he went

to the extent of verifying Rodel’squalifications, safety record, and drivinghistory.

So too, (Ramos) did not botherto refute (C.O.L. Realty’s) stance that hisdriver was texting with his cellphonewhile running at a high speed and thatthe latter did not slow down albeit heknew that Katipunan Avenue was thenundergoing repairs and that the road

was barricaded with barriers. Thepresumption juris tantum that therewas negligence in the selection of driverremains unrebutted. As the employer ofRodel, (Ramos) is solidarily liable for thequasi-delict committed by the former.

Certainly, in the selection of

prospective employees, employers arerequired to examine them as to theirqualifications, experience and servicerecords. In the supervision ofemployees, the employer mustformulate standard operatingprocedures, monitor theirimplementation and impose disciplinarymeasures for the breach thereof. These,(Ramos) failed to do .[8]

Petitioner disagrees, arguing that sinceAquilino’s willful disregard of the MMDA prohib itionwas the sole proximate cause of the accident, thenrespondent alone should suffer the consequences ofthe accident and the damages it incurred. He argues:

20. It becomes apparenttherefore that the only time a plaintiff,the respondent herein, can recoverdamages is if its negligence was onlycontributory, and such contributorynegligence was the proximate cause ofthe accident. It has been clearlyestablished in this case, however, thatrespondent’s negligence was notmerely contributory, but the sole

proximate cause of the accident.

x x x x

22. As culled from the foregoing,respondent was the sole proximatecause of the accident. Respondent’s

vehicle should not have been in thatposition since crossing the saidintersection was prohibited. Were itnot for the obvious negligence ofrespondent’s driver in crossing theintersection that was prohibited, theaccident would not have happened.The crossing of respondent’s vehicle ina prohibited intersectionunquestionably produced the injury,and without which the accident would







not have occurred. On the other hand,petitioner’s driver had the right to bewhere he was at the time of themishap. As correctly concluded by theRTC, the petitioner’s driver could notbe expected to slacken his speed whiletravelling along said intersection sincenobody, in his right mind, would do

the same. Assuming, however, thatpetitioner’s driver was indeed guilty ofany contributory negligence, such wasnot the proximate cause of theaccident considering that again, ifrespondent’s driver did not cross theprohibited intersection, no accidentwould have happened. No imputationof any lack of care on Ilustrisimo’scould thus be concluded. It is obviousthen that petitioner’s driver was notguilty of any negligence that wouldmake petitioner vicariously liable fordamages.

23. As the sole proximate cause of theaccident was respondent’s own driver, respondentcannot claim damages from petitioner .[9]

On the other hand, respondent in its Commentmerely reiterated the appellate court’s findings andpronouncements, conceding that petitioner is guilty ofmere contributory negligence, and insisted on his

vicarious liability as Rodel’s employer under Article2184 of the Civil Code.

Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code onquasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:

Article 2179. When theplaintiff’s own negligence was theimmediate and proximate cause of hisinjury, he cannot recover damages. Butif his negligence was only contributory,

the immediate and proximate cause ofthe injury being the defendant’s lack ofdue care, the plaintiff may recoverdamages, but the courts shall mitigatethe damages to be awarded.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to thecontrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motorvehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,he was violating any traffic regulation.

If the master is injured by the negligence of athird person and by the concurring contributorynegligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’snegligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat thesuperior’s action against the third person, assuming ofcourse that the contributory negligence was the

proximate cause of the injury of which complaint ismade .[10]

Applying the foregoing principles of law to theinstant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing KatipunanAvenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligencebecause it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was theproximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes anyrecovery for any damages suffered by respondent fromthe accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which,in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by anyefficient intervening cause, produces the injury, andwithout which the result would not have occurred. Andmore comprehensively, the proximate legal cause isthat acting first and producing the injury, eitherimmediately or by setting other events in motion, allconstituting a natural and continuous chain of events,each having a close causal connection with itsimmediate predecessor, the final event in the chainimmediately effecting the injury as a natural andprobable result of the cause which first acted, undersuch circumstances that the person responsible for thefirst event should, as an ordinary prudent and

intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect atthe moment of his act or default that an injury to someperson might probably result therefrom .[11]

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibitionagainst crossing Katipunan Avenue from RajahMatanda, the accident would not have happened. Thisspecific untoward event is exactly what the MMDAprohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent andintelligent person who resides within the vicinity wherethe accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground

to expect that the accident would be a natural andprobable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue sincesuch crossing is considered dangerous on account of thebusy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoingconstruction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenueunderpass. It was manifest error for the Court ofAppeals to have overlooked the principle embodied inArticle 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’sown negligence was the immediate and proximatecause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.















Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into theissue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannotovercome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is theimmediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’scontributory negligence has relevance only in the eventthat Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whateverdamages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; itwill have the effect of mitigating the award of damages

in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributorynegligence in this case would benefit only thepetitioner; it could not eliminate respondent’s liabilityfor Aquilino’s negligence which is the proximate resultof the accident.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. TheDecision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2008 inCA-G.R. SP No. 99614 and its Resolution of October 13,2008 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TheDecision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,Branch 215 dated September 5, 2006 dismissing for lackof merit respondent’s complaint for damages i shereby REINSTATED.

ACHEVARA vs. RAMOS

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of theDecision dated April 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV No. 67027, and its Resolution dated October23, 2006, denying petitioners' motion forreconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed withmodification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, dated February 14, 2000,holding petitioners solidarily liable to respondents fordamages incurred due to a vehicular accident, whichresulted in the death of Arnulfo Ramos.

The facts are as follows:

On June 27, 1995, respondents Elvira Ramos and hertwo minor children, namely, John Arnel Ramos andKhristine Camille Ramos, filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sura Complain t 2f or damages under Article 2176 3 of the Civil

Code against petitioners Cresencia Achevara, AlfredoAchevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of ArnulfoRamos, husband of Elvira Ramos and father of her twochildren, in a vehicular accident that happened on April22, 1995 at the national highwayalong Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. CrescenciaAchevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep with Plate No. DKK-995, which was involved in thevehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was impleaded asthe husband of the operator and as the administrator of

the conjugal partnership properties of the SpousesAchevara.

In their Complaint ,4 respondents alleged that in themorning of April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving apassenger jeep heading north on the national highwayin Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless,careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a

motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach onthe opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicledriven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained byArnulfo Ramos caused his death, notwithstandingprompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged thatCrescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence inthe selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez asdriver of the passenger jeep. Respondents sought torecover actual damages for medical expenses in thesum of P33,513.00 and funeral expenses in the sumof P30,000.00, as well as moral and exemplarydamages, lost earnings, attorney's fees and litigationexpenses.

In their Answer ,5 petitioners denied respondents'allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycleand bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. Theyalleged that on April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez wasdriving southward at a moderate speed when he saw anowner-type jeep coming from the south and headingnorth, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching onthe west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdezdrove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the

road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeepcontinued to move toward the western lane andbumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitionersalleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless andnegligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very wellknew had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents hadno cause of action against petitioners.

During trial on the merits, respondents presented threewitnesses: Alfredo Gamera, Dr. Emilio Joven and ElviraRamos.

Alfredo Gamera testified that at about 10:00 a.m. ofApril 22, 1995, he and his wife were seated at thewaiting shed along the national highway in Tablac,Candon, Ilocos Sur, waiting for a ride to the town properof Candon. He saw a motorcycle, driven by PoliceOfficer 3 (PO3) Baltazar de Peralta, coming from theinterior part of Tablac and proceeding south toward thetown proper. He also saw a southbound passenger jeep,driven by Benigno Valdez, that wanted to overtake themotorcycle of PO3 De Peralta. As it tried to overtake the

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motorcycle, the passenger jeep encroached on the laneof the northbound owner-type jeep driven by ArnulfoRamos, which resulted in the collision. Gamera statedthat the point of impact was on the lane of the vehicleof Arnulfo Ramos. Thereafter, the passenger jeepscreeched to a halt at the fence of the Funtanilla family.The owner-type jeep was destroyed and the windshieldwas broken .6

Gamera testified that he was about 100 meters fromthe place where the vehicular accident occurred. Thespeed of the passenger jeep was about 70 kilometersper hour, while that of the owner-type jeep was about30 kilometers per hour .7

On cross-examination, it was found that Gamera wentto the Police Station in Candon, Ilocos Sur to execute hissworn statement only on May 30, 1992, one monthafter the incident and after respondent Elvira Ramostalked to him. Moreover, at the preliminaryinvestigation, Gamera did not mention in his swornstatement that his wife was present during the incident,which fact was admitted by respondent's counsel.Further, at that time, Gamera was working asa jueteng collector at the same joint where thedeceased Arnulfo Ramos was also employed, and hehad known Ramos for five years .8

Dr. Emilio Joven, a surgeon of the Lorma MedicalCenter, San Fernando, La Union, testified that ArnulfoRamos was admitted at the Lorma Hospital at about12:50 p.m. on April 22, 1995. The latter sustainedexternal injuries, mostly on the left side of the body,which could have been caused by a vehicular accident.The CT scan result of Arnulfo Ramos showed blood clotsinside the brain, scattered small hemorrhagiccontusions, and swelling and blood clots on the base ofthe brain, which internal injuries caused his death .9 Theimmediate cause of death was "acute cranio-cerebralinjury. "10

Respondent Elvira Ramos testified on the damages she

incurred due to the vehicular accident, which resultedin the death of her husband. She spent P33,513.00 forhospitalization and P30,000.00 for the funeral. Sheprayed for the award of lost earnings, moral damages,exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance feesand other costs of litigation .11

She also testified that the owner-type jeep wasregistered in the name of Matilde Taca d12 of Sto.Domingo, Ilocos Sur .13 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Petitioners presented six witnesses, namely, PO3Baltazar de Peralta, Special Police Officer 2 (SPO2)Marvin Valdez, Herminigildo Pagaduan, Benigno Valdez,Emilia Achevara and Alfredo Achevara.

PO3 Baltazar de Peralta stated that he was assigned toSantiago, Ilocos Sur. He testified that at about 9:00 a.m.of April 22, 1995, he was on board his motorcycle at the

waiting shed erected on the eastern side of the nationalhighway in Tablac, Ilocos Sur. He was about to gosouthward, but waited a while to let a southboundpassenger jeep pass by. Then he followed behind thepassenger jeep.

When the passenger jeep was about 75 meters awayfrom him on the western lane of the national highway,PO3 De Peralta spotted an owner-type jeep comingfrom the south on the eastern lane of the road. Heobserved that the owner-type jeep was running in azigzag manner as it went over the many holes on theroad. It did not slacken speed, causing the jeep's frontwheels to wiggle, before it bumped the passenger jeepcoming from the north. The collision occurred on thelane of the passenger jeep, about two feet away fromthe center line of the road, causing the owner-type jeepto turn around and return to its former position, with itsright wheel removed; while the passenger jeep veeredto the right lane .14

After the collision, PO3 De Peralta assisted the owner-type jeep's driver, who fell to the ground, and helpedload him into a tricycle that would take him to thehospital. Then he went to the driver of the passenger jeep and asked him what happened. The driverremarked, "Even if you do not like to meet an accident,if that is what happened, you cannot do anything."Thereafter, PO3 De Peralta proceeded on his waysouthward. He reported the incident at the PoliceStation of Candon, Ilocos Sur .15

PO3 De Peralta testified that the accident happened ona straight part of the highway, but there were many

holes on the eastern lane. He stated that nothingimpeded his view of the incident .16

PO3 De Peralta also testified that he had knownrespondents' witness, Alfredo Gamera, who washis barangay mate for 20 years. He declared that henever saw Gamera at the waiting shed or at the sceneof the incident on the morning of April 22, 1995 .17



















































Investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez of the Candon PoliceStation testified that at about 11:00 a.m. of April 22,1995, he received a report of the vehicular accident thatoccurred at the national highway in Tablac, Candon,Ilocos Sur, which was three kilometers from the policestation. He proceeded to the site with somecompanions. He saw a passenger jeep positioneddiagonally on the western shoulder of the road facing

southwest, while an owner-type jeep was on the rightlane. The driver of the owner-type jeep was seriouslyinjured and was brought to the hospital .18

SPO2 Valdez testified that the owner-type jeep's righttire was detached, and its left front portion wasdamaged, while the passenger jeep's left tire wasdetached, and its left side portion was damaged .19

Herminigildo Pagaduan testified that at 7:00 a.m. ofApril 22, 1995, he was at the house of Barangay CaptainVictorino Gacusan of San Antonio, Candon, Ilocos Sur.Gacusan was then the overall monitor ofthe jueteng joint operation in Candon, Ilocos Sur.Pagaduan and Gacusan had earlier agreed to attend thewake of an army captain at Tamorong, Candon, IlocosSur that morning. While Pagaduan was waitingfor Barangay Captain Gacusan, the latter made a phonecall requesting for a vehicle to take them to Tamorong.Not long after, a yellow owner-type jeep arrived, whichwas driven by Arnulfo Ramos, an employee ofthe jueteng joint. All of them rode the jeep with PlateNo. ACG 713. Barangay Captain Gacusan was on the

driver's seat, Pagaduan sat beside Gacusan, whileArnulfo Ramos and the others sat on the rear seat .20

Pagaduan further testified that the group headed westto Tamorong via Darapidap. When they reached abridge, Baranga y Captain Gacusan tried to increase thespeed of the jeep, but it suddenly wiggled. Gacusanstopped the jeep, and they all alighted from it. Gacusantold Arnulfo Ramos to have the mechanical defectrepaired at the auto shop. Hence, they did not proceedto Tamorong, but returned to the house of Gacusan by

tricycle. The next day, he heard from Gacusan that the jeep they had used in their aborted trip to Tamorongmet an accident .21

On cross-examination, Pagaduan testified that it wasdefense counsel Atty. Tudayan who requested him totestify, because Atty. Tudayan had heard him discussthe incident with some jueteng employees .22

Petitioner Benigno Valdez testified that on April 22,1995, he was driving the passenger jeep of his aunt,

Crescencia Achevara, on the national highway in Tablac,Candon, Ilocos Sur heading south, while the owner-type jeep of Arnulfo Ramos was heading north. Valdez statedthat the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fastin a zigzag manner, when its right front wheel gotdetached and the owner-type jeep bumped the left sideof his passenger jeep. Valdez swerved the passenger jeep to the western edge of the road to avoid a

collision, but to no avail, as it bumped a post. He passedout. When he regained consciousness, he saw the driverof the owner-type jeep being rescued .23

Valdez surrendered himself to the Police Station inCandon, Ilocos Sur. He informed the police that hisvehicle was bumped by the owner-type jeep driven byArnulfo Ramos, and he showed his driver's license tothe police .24

Valdez branded as false the testimony of respondents'witness, Alfredo Gamera, that the former tried toovertake the motorcycle of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta andencroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep drivenby Arnulfo Ramos. Valdez testified that before thevehicular accident, he saw a policeman following him,but there was a tricycle between them. He denied thathe was driving fast and stated that his speed at thattime registered only 20 on the speedometer .25

Petitioner Alfredo Achevara testified that CrescenciaAchevara was his wife, while Benigno Valdez was thenephew of his wife. He and his wife owned thepassenger jeep with Plate No. DKK-995 that wasinvolved in the vehicular accident. Valdez had been thedriver of the vehicle since 1992, although he drove itonly during daytime .26

Alfredo Achevara declared that before they employedBenigno Valdez to drive the passenger jeep, the formerexercised the diligence of a good father of a family inselecting, training and supervising the latter .27 Theyrequired Valdez to show them his professional driver'slicense, and investigated his personal background and

training/experience as a driver. For his apprenticeship,they required him to drive from Metro Manila toTagaytay City, and then back to Metro Manila for a day.

Achevara stated that he knew Benigno Valdez since1988. As their driver since 1992, Valdez nevercommitted any traffic violation. On April 22, 1995, hehanded the key of the jeep to Valdez at about 7:30 a.m.at their barangay in Padaoil, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur tofetch the sound system in Santiago, Ilocos Sur for their











































fiesta. He told Valdez to avoid an accident, bring hislicense and avoid being hot-tempered .28

On February 14, 2000, the RTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur,Branch 22, rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 1431-Nin favor of respondents.

The trial court found that the testimony of respondents'

witness, Alfredo Gamera, was controverted by thetestimony of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and the finding ofpolice investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez. Gameratestified that the vehicular accident occurred becausethe passenger jeep tried to overtake the motorcycledriven by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and encroached onthe lane of the owner-type jeep driven by ArnulfoRamos. Gamera's testimony was, however, refuted byPO3 Baltazar de Peralta, who testified that thepassenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since hewas the one following behind the passenger jeep.Hence, the trial court concluded that the passenger jeepdid not encroach on the lane of the owner-type jeep onthe left side of the road to allegedly overtake themotorcycle.

Moreover, Gamera testified that the collision occurredon the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one of thewheels of the owner-type jeep was detached, so that itstayed immobile at the place of collision, about twometers east from the center line of the nationalhighway. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, whoinvestigated the incident, found both vehicles on thewestern lane of the national highway. Thus, the trialcourt stated that it was undeniable that the collisiontook place on the western lane of the national highway,which was the passenger jeep's lane.

The trial court held that, as contended by respondents,the doctrine of last clear chance was applicable to thiscase. It cited Picart v. Smith ,29 which applied the saiddoctrine, thus, where both parties are guilty ofnegligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds thatof the other by an appreciable interval of time, the

person who has the last fair chance to avoid theimpending harm and fails to do so is chargeable withthe consequences, without reference to the priornegligence of the other party.

The trial court held that the driver of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez, having seen the risk exhibited bythe wiggling of the front wheels of the owner-type jeep,causing it to run in a zigzag manner, should have parkedhis vehicle on the right shoulder of the road so that themishap could have been prevented. Since he ignored to

take this reasonable precaution, the omission and/orbreach of this duty on his part was the constitutive legalcause of the mishap .30

The trial court stated that the doctrine of last clearchance, as applied to this case, implied a contributorynegligence on the part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, whoknew of the mechanical defect of his vehicle.

Further, the trial court held that the evidence of theSpouses Achevara failed to show that they exerciseddue diligence in the selection and supervision ofBenigno Valdez as driver of their passenger jeep .31

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decisionreads:

WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in favor ofthe plaintiffs and against the defendants, the latter to

account for and to pay jointly and solidarily to theplaintiffs, because of the contributory negligence on thepart of the late Arnulfo Ramos, the reduced amountitemized as follows to wit:

1) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) - part of the totalreceipted expenses at the hospitals;

2) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) - for funeralexpenses;

3) Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) - for moraldamages;

4) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) - for exemplarydamages;

5) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) - for attorney'sfees, and

6) Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) - for actual andother costs of litigation .32

The Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez appealed thetrial court's Decision to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated April 25, 2009, the Court of Appealsaffirmed with modification the Decision of the trialcourt, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is herebyDISMISSED and the assailed February 14, 2000 Decisionof the RTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, in Civil























Ramos, aborted their trip to Tamorong, Candon, IlocosSur, using the same owner-type jeep because it waswiggling. Ramos was advised to have the mechanicaldefect repaired. Yet, later in the morning, Ramos wasdriving the owner-type jeep on the national highway inCandon. Benigno Valdez testified that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag mannerwhen its right front wheel got detached, and the owner-

type jeep suddenly bumped the passenger jeep he wasdriving, hitting the left side of the passenger jeepopposite his seat. Although Valdez swerved thepassenger jeep to the western edge of the road, it wasstill hit by the owner-type jeep.

Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. Tobe negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed toact in such a way that an ordinary reasonable manwould have realized that certain interests of certainpersons were unreasonably subjected to a general butdefinite class of risks .36

Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling andrunning fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on theopposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was madeaware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution byimmediately veering to the rightmost portion of theroad or by stopping the passenger jeep at the rightshoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeeppass before proceeding southward; hence, the collisionoccurred. The Court of Appeals correctly held that

Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence byneglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonableand prudent man would ordinarily have done under thecircumstances and which proximately caused injury toanother.

On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramosguilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving adefective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudentman would know that he would be putting himself andother vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk

for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under thecircumstances, a prudent man would have had theowner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped usingit until it was repaired. Ramos was, therefore, grosslynegligent in continuing to drive on the highway themechanically defective jeep, which later encroached onthe opposite lane and bumped the passenger jeepdriven by Benigno Valdez. Gross negligence is theabsence of care or diligence as to amount to a recklessdisregard of the safety of persons or property .37 Itevinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences

without exerting any effort to avoidthem .38 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and BenignoValdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continuedto drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despiteknowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez didnot immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road

upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos − perhapsbecause it still kept to its lane and Valdez did not knowthe extent of its mechanical defect. However, when theowner-type jeep encroached on the lane of thepassenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at hand andsteered the passenger jeep toward the westernshoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was at thispoint that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lostcontrol of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who hadthe last opportunity to avoid the collision by swervingthe passenger jeep towards the right shoulder of theroad.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situationwhere the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedentnegligence, but the defendant − who had the last fairchance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so− is made liable for all the consequences of theaccident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of theplaintiff .39 However, the doctrine does not apply wherethe party charged is required to act instantaneously,and the injury cannot be avoided by the application ofall means at hand after the peril is or should have been

discovered .40

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to thiscase, because even if it can be said that it was BenignoValdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishapwhen the owner-type jeep encroached on the westernlane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had theopportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer ofpetitioners stated that when the owner-type jeepencroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, BenignoValdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the western

shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos continued to move to thewestern lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus, petitioners assert in their Petition thatconsidering that the time the owner-type jeepencroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impactwas only a matter of seconds, he no longer had theopportunity to avoid the collision. Although the recordsare bereft of evidence showing the exact distancebetween the two vehicles when the owner-type jeepencroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must























have been near enough, because the passenger jeepdriven by Valdez was unable to avoid the collision.Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not applyto this case.

Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:

When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate

and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recoverdamages. But if his negligence was only contributory,the immediate and proximate cause of the injury beingthe defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff mayrecover damages, but the courts shall mitigate thedamages to be awarded .41

In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdezfailed to exercise reasonable care and caution that anordinarily prudent man would have taken to preventthe vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence ofArnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence ofBenigno Valdez were the proximate cause of thevehicular accident, respondents cannot recoverdamages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67027, datedApril 25, 2006, and its Resolution dated October 23,2006, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

LIBI vs. IAC

G.R. No. 70890 September 18 1992

FACTS: Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, bothminors, before he turned the firearm on himself. As aresult, the parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell'sparents to recover damages. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency ofevidence. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable forvicarious liability.

RULING: Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damagescause by their minor children is imposed by Article 2180of the New Civil Code, which covers obligations arisingfrom both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. Theparents' liability as being primary and not subsidiaryand liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that

they observe all the diligence of a good father toprevent damage.

In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligencein supervising the activities of their son. It was only atthe time of Wendell's death that they allegedlydiscovered that he was drug informant of CANU andthat the gun used in the shooting incident was missing

from the safety deposit box. Having been grosslynegligent in preventing Wendell from having access tosaid gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the naturalconsequence of the criminal act of said minor who wasliving in their company.

VALENZUELA vs. CA

These two petitions for review on certiorari underRule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from anaction to recover damages by petitioner LourdesValenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City forinjuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in theearly morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by thetrial court are succinctly summarized by the Court ofAppeals below:

This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in avehicular accident.

Plaintiff’s version of the accident is as follows: Ataround 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiffMa. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishilancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant atMarcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, AranetaAvenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with acompanion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards thedirection of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, shenoticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped ata lighted place where there were people, to verifywhether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.Having been told by the people present that her rear

right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her homein that car’s condition, she parked along the sidewalk,about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency lights,alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open thetrunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear ofher car pointing to the tools to a man who will help herfix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li andregistered in the name of defendant AlexanderCommercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff wasthrown against the windshield of the car of the







defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to theground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car.Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up to the middle of herthigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to therest of the body. She was brought tothe UERM Medical Memorial Center where she wasfound to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up todistal thigh (above knee).” She was confined in the

hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fittedwith an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospitalconfinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the artificialleg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the carinsurance.

In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages inthe amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in theamount of P100,000.00 and other medical and relatedexpenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, includingloss of expected earnings.

Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. Hewas on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; consideringthat it was raining, visibility was affected and the roadwas wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he wasdriving along the inner portion of the right lane ofAurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue,when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A.Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from theopposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with “full brightlights.” Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved tothe right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,

and bumped plaintiff’s car, which he did not seebecause it was midnight blue in color, with no parkinglights or early warning device, and the area was poorlylighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rearportion of plaintiff’s car was prot ruding as it was then“at a standstill diagonally” on the outer portion of theright lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer).He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff’s witness thatafter being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved tothe right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that

plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not alicensed driver.

The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who preparedthe vehicular accident report and the sketch of thethree cars involved in the accident, testified that theplaintiff’s car was “near the sidewalk”; this witness didnot remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiffs carwere on, and did not notice if there was an earlywarning device; there was a street light at the corner ofAurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It

was not mostly dark, i.e. “things can be seen” (p. 16,tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).

A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testifiedthat after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened thetrunk compartment, defendant’s car came approachingvery fast ten meters from the scene; the car was“zigzagging.” The rear left side of plaintiffs car was

bumped by the front right portion of defendant’s car; asa consequence, the plaintiffs car swerved to the rightand hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff wasthrown to the windshield of defendant’s car, which wasdestroyed, and landed under the car. He stated thatdefendant was under the influence of liquor as he could“smell it very well” (pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).

After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff’ssubmissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty ofgross negligence and liable for damages under Article2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise heldAlexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly andseverally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. Itordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay thefollowing amounts:

1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing themiscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of hersevered left leg;

2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealizedprofits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro LaConga restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident onJune 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealizedprofits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant,from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment; and(c) P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits inplaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until thedate of this decision;

3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;

4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages,

5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney’s fees; and

6. Costs.

As a result of the trial court’s decision, defendantsfiled an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and forReconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C.No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show thatthe point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of



glass/debris from the parties’ cars, appeared to be atthe center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trialcourt denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed anappeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In aDecision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appealsfound that there was “ample basis from the evidence ofrecord for the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff’s carwas properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk

when it was bumped by defendant’s car. ”[1] Dismissingthe defendants’ argument that the plaintiff’s car wasimproperly parked, almost at the center of the road, therespondent court noted that evidence which wassupposed to prove that the car was at or near center ofthe right lane was never presented during the trial ofthe case .[2] The respondent court furthermore observedthat:

Defendant Li’s testimony that he was driving at a safespeed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was notcorroborated. It was in fact contradicted by eyewitnessRodriguez who stated that he was outside hisbeerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A. LakeStreet, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when hisattention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring tothe plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening thetrunk compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li“approaching very fast ten (10) meters away from thescene”; defendant’s car was zigzagging, although the rewere no holes and hazards on the street, and “bumpedthe leg of the plaintiff’ who was thrown against thewindshield of defendant’s car, causing its destruction.

He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulledout from under defendant’s car and w as able to say“hurting words” to Richard Li because he noticed thatthe latter was under the influence of liquor, because he“could smell it very well” (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17,1991). He knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta.Mesa in the 197 0’s, but did not know either plaintiff ordefendant Li before the accident.

In agreeing with the trial court that the defendantLi was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff,

the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolvedthe Li’s emp loyer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from anyliability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela andreduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00.Finding justification for exemplary damages, therespondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 forthe same , in addition to costs, attorney’s fees and theother damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise,dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims .[3]

Consequently, both parties assail the respondentcourt’s decision by filing two separate petitions beforethis Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends thathe should not be held liable for damages because theproximate cause of the accident was Ma. LourdesValenzuela’s own negligence. Alternatively, he arguesthat in the event that this Court finds him negligent,such negligence ought to be mitigated by the

contributory negligence of Valenzuela.On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma.

Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respo ndent court’sdecision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial,Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven byRichard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of theactual and moral damages awarded by the trial court .[4]

As the issues are intimately related, both petitionsare hereby consolidated. It is plainly evident that thepetition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises nosubstantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attemptsto have this Court review are factual findings of the trialcourt, as sustained by the Court of Appeals findingRichard Li grossly negligent in driving the MitsubishiLancer provided by his company in the early morninghours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a generalrule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are bindingand conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normallydisturb such factual findings unless the findings of factof the said court are palpably unsupported by theevidence on record or unless the judgment itself isbased on a misapprehension of facts .[5]

In the first place, Valenzuela’s version of theincident was fully corroborated by an uninterestedwitness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of anestablishment located just across the scene of theaccident. On trial, he testified that he observed a carbeing driven at a “very fast” speed, racing toward s thegeneral direction of Araneta Avenue .[6] Rodriguezfurther added that he was standing in front of hisestablishment, just ten to twenty feet away from thescene of the accident, when he saw the car hitValenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of thedefendant’s Mitsubishi Lancer, from where sheeventually fell under the defendant’s car.Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed thestreet, noting that a man reeking with the smell ofliquor had alighted from the offending vehicle in orderto survey the incident .[7] Equally important, Rodriguezdeclared t hat he observed Valenzuela’s car parkedparallel and very near the sidewalk ,[8] contrary to Li’sallegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the centerof the rig ht lane. We agree that as between Li’s “self

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/115024.htm#_ftn1

































serving” asseverations and the observations of awitness who did not even know the accident victimpersonally and who immediately gave a statement ofthe incident similar to his testimony to the investigatorimm ediately after the incident, the latter’s testimonydeserves greater weight. As the court emphasized:

The issue is one of credibility and from Our own

examination of the transcript, We are not prepared toset aside the trial court’s reliance on the testimo ny ofRodriguez negating defendant’s assertion that he wasdriving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only amotorcycle, his perception of speed is not necessarilyimpaired. He was subjected to cross-examination andno attempt was made to question his competence orthe accuracy of his statement that defendant wasdriving “very fast.” This was the same statement hegave to the police investigator after the incident, as toldto a newspaper report (Exh. “P”). We see no compellingbasis for disregarding his testimony.

The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez’ testimony arenot borne out by an examination of the testimony.Rodriguez testified that the scene of the accident wasacross the street where his beerhouse is located aboutten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991).He did not state that the accident transpiredimmediately in front of his establishment. Theownership of the Lambingan sa Kambingan is notmaterial; the business is registered in the name of hismother, but he explained that he owns the

establishment (p. 5, tsn., June 20, 1991).

Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on hisside of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accidenttranspired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to thetestimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was a streetlight atthe corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. RomanStreet (p. 45 , tsn., Oct. 20, 1991).

With respect to the weather condition, Rodrigueztestified that there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain

and the rain has stopped and he was outside hisestablishment at the time the accident transpired (pp.64-65, tsn., June 17, 1991). This was consistent withplaintiffs testimony that it was no longer raining whenshe left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn., April 29, 1991).It was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all theway in an attempt to explain why he was travelling atonly 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn., Oct. 14, 1991). As to thetestimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrivedat the scene only in response to a telephone call afterthe accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28,

1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies inRodriguez’s testimony that woul d impair the essentialintegrity of his testimony or reflect on his honesty. Weare compelled to affirm the trial court’s acceptance ofthe testimony of said eyewitness.

Against the unassailable testimony of witnessRodriguez we note that Li’s testimony wa s peppered

with so many inconsistencies leading us to concludethat his version of the accident was merely adroitlycrafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving,which would exculpate him from any and all liability inthe incident. Against Valenzue la’s corroborated claims,his allegations were neither backed up by otherwitnesses nor by the circumstances proven in thecourse of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely ata speed of 55 kph. when “out of nowhere he saw a darkmaroon lancer right in front of him, which was (the)plaintiff’s car.” He alleged that upon seeing this sudden“apparition” he put on his brakes to no avail as the roadwas slippery .[9]

One will have to suspend disbelief in order to givecredence to Li’s disingenuous and patently self -servingasseverations. The average motorist alert to roadconditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes toa car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a lightrainfall, the visibility of the street, and the roadconditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfarelike Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time toreact to the changing conditions of the road if he were

alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions.Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.Physiological “fight or flight ”[10] mechanisms are atwork, provided such mechanisms were not dulled bydrugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc .[11] Li’failure to react in a manner which would have avoidedthe accident could therefore have been only due toeither or both of the two factors: 1) that he was drivingat a “very fast” speed as testified by Rodriquez; and 2)that he was under the influence of alcohol .[12] Eitherfactor working independently would have diminishedhis responsiveness to road conditions, since normally hewould have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’scar, rather than be in a situation forcing him tosuddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted(quoted with approval by respondent court):

Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to theSan Juan Police immediately after the incident, he saidthat while driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere hesaw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, whichwas plaintiffs car, indicating, again, thereby that,



















indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of hissurroundings and the road ahead of him, because if hewas not, then he could not have missed noticing at astill far distance the parked car of the plaintiff at theright side near the sidewalk which had its emergencylights on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at theplaintiff who was then standing at the left rear edge ofher car.

Since, according to him, in his narration to the San JuanPolice, he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiffscar in front of him, but that it failed as the road was wetand slippery, this goes to show again, that, contrary tohis claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were itotherwise, he could have easily completely stopped hiscar, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff,notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery.Verily, since, if, indeed, he was running slow, as heclaimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then,inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could haveavoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient orapplying his brakes at the proper time and distance.

It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims duringhis testimony, which is contrary to what he told thepolice immediately after the accident and is, therefore,more believable, that he did not actually step on hisbrakes, but simply swerved a little to the right when hesaw the on-coming car with glaring headlights, from theopposite direction, in order to avoid it.

For, had this been what he did, he would not havebumped the car of the plaintiff which was properlyparked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was noteven necessary for him to swerve a little to the right inorder to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car,considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenueseparated at the center by a dotted white paint, andthere is plenty of space for both cars, since her car wasrunning at the right lane going towards Manila and theon-coming car was also on its right lane going toCubao. ”[13]

Having come to the conclusion that Li wasnegligent in driving his company-issued MitsubishiLancer, the next question for us to determine iswhether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty ofcontributory negligence in parking her caralongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li pointsout, is a no parking zone.

We agree with the respondent court thatValenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part ofthe injured party, contributing as a legal cause to theharm he has suffered, which falls below the standard towhich he is required to conform for his ownprotection. [14] Based on the foregoing definition, thestandard or act to which, according to petitioner Li,Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her ownprotection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora

Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.Courts have traditionally been compelled to

recognize that an actor who is confronted with anemergency is not to be held up to the standard ofconduct normally applied to an individual who is in nosuch situation. The law takes stock of impulses ofhumanity when placed in threatening or dangeroussituations and does not require the same standard ofthoughtful and reflective care from persons confrontedby unusual and oftentimes threateningconditions .[15] Under the “emergency rule” adopted by

this Court in Gan vs Court of Appeals ,[16]

an individualwho suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger andis required to act without much time to consider thebest means that may be adopted to avoid theimpending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he failsto undertake what subsequently and upon reflectionmay appear to be a better solution, unless theemergency was brought by his own negligence .[17]

Applying this principle to a case in which thevictims in a vehicular accident swerved to the wronglane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into

the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court ,[18] that the driver therein, Jose Koh,“adopted the best means possible in the givensituation” to avoid hitting the children. Using the“emergency rule” the court concluded that Koh, in spiteof the fact that he was in the wrong lane when thecollision with an oncoming truck occurred, was notguilty of negligence .[19]

While the emergency rule applies to those cases inwhich reflective thought, or the opportunity toadequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, theconduct which is required of an individual in such casesis dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of theevent which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but bythe over-all nature of the circumstances. A womandriving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on arainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a pointwhich is both convenient for her to do so and which isnot a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected torun the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone orturn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely































find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for hernot to stop and assess the emergency (simply becausethe entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parkingzone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both athreat to her safety and to other motorists. In theinstant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portionof Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed thatshe had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other

motorists in danger, she did what was best under thesituation. As narrated by respondent court:

“She stopped at a lighted place where there werepeople, to verify whether she had a flat tire and tosolicit help if needed. Having been told by the peoplepresent that her rear right tire was flat and that shecannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk,about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car.” [20] Infact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, theinvestigator on the scene of the accident confirmed thatValenzuela’s car was parked very close to thesidewalk .[21] The sketch which he prepared after theincident showed Valenzuela’s car partly straddling thesidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance frommotorists passing the right lane ofAurora Boulevard.This fact was itself corroborated by the testimony ofwitness Rodriguez .[22]

Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela didexercise the standard reasonably dictated by theemergency and could not be considered to havecontributed to the unfortunate circumstances which

eventually led to the amputation of one of her lowerextremities. The emergency which led her to park hercar on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of herown making, and it was evident that she had taken allreasonable precautions.

Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligenceascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of theaccident. “Negligence, as it is commonly understood isconduct which creates an undue risk of harm toothers.” [23] It is the failure to observe that degree ofcare, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffersinjury .[24] We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila RailroadCompany ,[25] that negligence is the want of carerequired by the circumstances.

The circumstances established by the evidenceadduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Liwas grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. Itbears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed atabout 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settledinto a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is

ample testimonial evidence on record to show that hewas under the influence of liquor. Under theseconditions, his chances of effectively dealing withchanging conditions on the road were significantlylessened. As Prosser and Keaton emphasize:

[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of anautomobile must be prepared for the sudden

appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway,and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one whosees a child on the curb may be required to anticipateits sudden dash into the street, and his failure to actproperly when they appear may be found to amount tonegligence. [26]

Li’s obvious unpreparedness to cope with thesituation confronting him on the night of the accidentwas clearly of his own making.

We now come to the question of the liability of

Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer. In denyingliability on the part of Alexander Commercial, therespondent court held that:

There is no evidence, not even defendant Li’stestimony, that the visit was in connection with officialmatters. His functions as assistant manager sometimesrequired him to perform work outside the office as hehas to visit buyers and company clients, but headmitted that on the night of the accident he camefrom BF Homes Parañaque he did no t have ‘business

from the company’ (pp. 25 -26, tsn, Sept. 23, 1991). Theuse ofthe company car was partly required by thenature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a ‘benefit,’ apparently referring tothe fringe benefits attaching to his position.

Under the civil law, an employer is liable for thenegligence of his employees in the discharge of theirrespective duties, the basis of which liability isnot respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater

familias, which theory bases the liability of the masterultimately on his own negligence and not on that of hisservant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18).Before an employer may be held liable for thenegligence of his employee, the act or omission whichcaused damage must have occurred while an employeewas in the actual performance of his assigned tasks orduties (Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194SCRA 341). In defining an employer’s liability for theacts done within the scope of the employee ’s assignedtasks, the Supreme Court has held that this includes anyact done by an employee, in furtherance of the





























to their representatives. In other words, like a goodfather of a family, they entrust the company vehicleonly after they are satisfied that the employee to whomthe car has been given full use of the said company carfor company or private purposes will not be a threat ormenace to himself, the company or to others. When acompany gives full use and enjoyment of a company carto its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like

every good father, satisfied that its employee will usethe privilege reasonably and responsively.

In the ordinary course of business, not all companyemployees are given the privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those citedin the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilegeserves important business purposes either related tothe image of success an entity intends to present to itsclients and to the public in general, or for practical andutilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and otheremployees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients

conveniently. In most cases, providing a company carserves both purposes. Since important businesstransactions and decisions may occur at all hours in allsorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, theprovision for the unlimited use of a company cartherefore principally serves the business and goodwill ofa company and only incidentally the private purposes ofthe individual who actually uses the car, the managerialemployee or company sales agent. As such, in providingfor a company car for business use and/or for thepurpose of furthering the company’s image, a companyowes a responsibility to the public to see to it that themanagerial or other employees to whom it entrustsvirtually unlimited use of a company issued car are ableto use the company issue capably and responsibly.

In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager ofAlexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before thetrial court, he admitted that his functions as AssistantManager did not require him to scrupulously keepnormal office hours as he was required quite often toperform work outside the office, visiting prospectivebuyers and contacting and meeting with company

clients .[30]

These meetings, clearly, were not strictlyconfined to routine hours because, as a managerialemployee tasked with the job of representing hiscompany with its clients, meetings with clients wereboth social as well as work-related functions. Theservice car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc.therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation -to put up the front of a highly successful entity,increasing the latter’s goodwill before its clientele. Italso facilitated meeting between Li and its clients byproviding the former with a convenient mode of travel.

Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on theroad on the night of the accident because he wascoming from a social visit with an officemate inParañaque was a bare allegation which was nevercorroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate’splace, the same could give rise to speculation that heand his officemate had just been from a work-related

function, or they were together to discuss sales andother work related strategies.

In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has notdemonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised thecare and diligence of a good father of the family inentrusting its company car to Li. No allegations weremade as to whether or not the company took the stepsnecessary to determine or ascertain the drivingproficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full andunlimited use of a company car .[31] Not having been ableto overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should

be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car toLi, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater

familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with theformer for the injuries sustained by Ma. LourdesValenzuela during the accident.

Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amountof damages awarded by the respondent court, except asto the amount of moral damages. In the case of moraldamages, while the said damages are not intended toenrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, theaward should nonetheless be commensurate to the

suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of theopinion that the reduction in moral damages from anamount of P 1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Courtof Appeals was not justified considering the nature ofthe resulting damage and the predictable sequelae ofthe injury.

As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuelaunderwent a traumatic amputation of her left lowerextremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee.Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived ofthe full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, evenwith the use of state of the art prosthetic technology.Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which waspaid for by Li), she will be required to undergoadjustments in her prosthetic devise due to theshrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.

These adjustments entail costs, prostheticreplacements and months of physical and occupationalrehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, theprosthetic devise will have to be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb











effected by the biological changes of middle-age,menopause and aging. Assuming she reachesmenopause, for example, the prosthetic will have to beadjusted to respond to the changes in bone resultingfrom a precipitate decrease in calcium levels observedin the bones of all post-menopausal women. In otherwords, the damage done to her would not only bepermanent and lasting, it would also be permanently

changing and adjusting to the physiologic changeswhich her body would normally undergo through theyears. The replacements, changes, and adjustments willrequire corresponding adjustive physical andoccupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it hasbeen documented, are painful.

The foregoing discussion does not even scratch thesurface of the nature of the resulting damage because itwould be highly speculative to estimate the amount ofpsychological pain, damage and injury which goes withthe sudden severing of a vital portion of the human

body. A prosthetic device, however technologicallyadvanced, will only allow a reasonable amount offunctional restoration of the motor functions of thelower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. Theresultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury,mental and physical pain are inestimable.

As the amount of moral damages are subject tothis Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion that theamount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is ingreater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as

a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his MitsubishiLancer in the early morning hours of the accident.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decisionof the court of Appeals is modified with the effect ofREINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.

CAEDO vs. Yu Khe That

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiffMarcial Caedo and several members of his family wereinjured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from

the defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court ofFirst Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952),contains the following disposition:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court rendersa judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs andagainst the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and RafaelBernardo, jointly and severally, to pay toplaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum ofP1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 formoral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary

damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees,with costs against the defendants. Thecounterclaim of the defendants against theplaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed, for lackof merits.

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as toinclude an additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the

plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in theaccident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, whichcertified the case to us in view of the total amount ofthe plaintiffs' claim.

There are two principal questions posed for resolution:(1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2) if itwas defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer,defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? Onthe first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardonegligent; and on the second, held his employersolidarily liable with him.

The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning ofMarch 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los SantosAvenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcialwas driving his Mercury car on his way from his home inQuezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim wasscheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them inthe car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Comingfrom the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu KheThai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel,taking the owner from his Parañaque home to WackWack for his regular round of golf. The two cars weretraveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering thecondition of the road and the absence of traffic — theMercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and theCadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeablefrom a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in thesame direction, was a caretella owned by a certainPedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse

by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's verticalpost on the right side and held at the other end byPedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon therig when he saw it in front of him, only eight metersaway. This is the first clear indication of his negligence.The carretela was provided with two lights, one on eachside, and they should have given him sufficient warningto take the necessary precautions. And even if he didnot notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial,



the carretela should anyway have been visible to himfrom afar if he had been careful, as it must have been inthe beam of his headlights for a considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its ownlane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead ofslowing down or stopping altogether behindthe carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left

in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car'sright rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig'sleft wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as thecar skidded obliquely to the other lane, where itcollided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedohad seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened hisspeed, judged the distances in relation tothe carretela and concluded that the Cadillac wouldwait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take agamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it wouldbe in line with the carretela , or else squeeze in betweenthem in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way,and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, sincethe car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already toolate to apply the brakes when Bernardo sawthe carretela only eight meters in front of him, and sohe had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence ofthe oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, theclearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side wasinsufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caughtthe wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose.Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried

to avoid the collision at the last moment by goingfarther to the right, but was unsuccessful. Thephotographs taken at the scene show that the rightwheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of theroad at the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directlytraceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that hemust be held liable for the damages suffered by theplaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu KheThai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the

driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the CivilCode, which reads:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owneris solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,who was in the vehicle, could have, by the useof due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It isdisputably presumed that a driver wasnegligent, if he had been found guilty ofreckless driving or violating traffic regulations at

least twice within the next preceding twomonths.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factorwas the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehiclewho was present is likewise held liable if he could haveprevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the

first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed inChapman vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, wherethis Court held:

... The same rule applies where the owner ispresent, unless the negligent acts of the driverare continued for such a length of time as togive the owner a reasonable opportunity toobserve them and to direct his driver to desisttherefrom. An owner who sits in hisautomobile, or other vehicle, and permits hisdriver to continue in a violation of the law bythe performance of negligent acts, after he hashad a reasonable opportunity to observe themand to direct that the driver cease therefrom,becomes himself responsible for such acts. Theowner of an automobile who permits hischauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example,at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without anyeffort to stop him, although he has had areasonable opportunity to do so, becomeshimself responsible, both criminally and civilly,for the results produced by the acts of the

chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by asudden act of negligence, and without theowner having a reasonable opportunity toprevent the act or its continuance, injures aperson or violates the criminal law, the ownerof the automobile, although present therein atthe time the act was committed, is notresponsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.The act complained of must be continued in thepresence of the owner for such a length of timethat the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his

driver act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law isnot respondent superior but rather the relationshipof paterfamilias . The theory is that ultimately thenegligence of the servant, if known to the master andsusceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his ownnegligence if he fails to correct it in order to preventinjury or damage.



In the present case the defendants' evidence is thatRafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since1937, and before that had been employed by YutivoSons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over tenyears. During that time he had no record of violation oftraffic laws and regulations. No negligence for havingemployed him at all may be imputed to his master.Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be

sought in the immediate setting and circumstances ofthe accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driverfrom pursuing a course which not only gave him clearnotice of the danger but also sufficient time to act uponit. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.The car, as has been stated, was not running at anunreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, anddevoid of traffic that early morning. There was noreason for the car owner to be in any special state ofalert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experienceof his driver. He became aware of the presence ofthe carretela when his car was only twelve metersbehind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did notconstitute negligence, for he was not himself at thewheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, hecould not have anticipated his driver's sudden decisionto pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the factthat another car was approaching from the oppositedirection. The time element was such that there was noreasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess therisks involved and warn the driver accordingly. Thethought that entered his mind, he said, was that if hesounded a sudden warning it might only make the other

man nervous and make the situation worse. It was athought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of thatdue diligence required by law to prevent themisfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 ofthe Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarilysubjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform andinflexible standard of diligence as are professionaldrivers. In many cases they refrain from driving theirown cars and instead hire other persons to drive for

them precisely because they are not trained orendowed with sufficient discernment to know the rulesof traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed bythe different situations that are continuallyencountered on the road. What would be a negligentomission under aforesaid Article on the part of a carowner who is in the prime of age and knows how tohandle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part,say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarlyequipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess acertain measure of skill or proficiency either in themechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rulesbefore he may own a motor vehicle. The test of hisintelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is hisomission to do that which the evidence of his ownsenses tells him he should do in order to avoid theaccident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent

a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver thatappears to be fraught with danger to one passengermay appear to be entirely safe and commonplace toanother. Were the law to require a uniform standard ofperceptiveness, employment of professional drivers bycar owners who, by their very inadequacies, have realneed of drivers' services, would be effectivelyproscribed.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai,solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The nextquestion refers to the sums adjudged by the trial courtas damages. The award of P48,000 by way of moraldamages is itemized as follows:

1. Marcial Caedo

2. Juana S. Caedo

3. Ephraim Caedo

4. Eileen Caedo

5. Rose Elaine Caedo6. Merilyn Caedo

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that theCourt should have granted them also actual orcompensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for theinjuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other handmaintain that the amounts awarded as moral damagesare excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for either side. The amount of actualdamages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reasonof their injuries, other than expenses for medicaltreatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actualdamages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain andsuffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, andconstitute a proper ground for granting moral, notactual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the CivilCode.

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:



MARCIAL T. CAEDO:

A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp,frontal left; abrasions, chest wall,anterior;B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to5th inclusive. Third rib has a doublefracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma;

Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lowerlobe, secondary;C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary toprobable basal fracture, skull.

JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of

nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep,frontal;C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior,left with displacement.D. Fracture, simple, base, proximalphalanx right, big toe.E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals IIIand V right.F. Concussion, cerebral.

EPHRAIM CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal;

(3) left supraorbital

EILEEN CAEDO:

A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base,5th finger, right, lateral aspect.B. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middlefinger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3)shin, lower 1/3.

ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper andlower lids; (2) left temporal; (3)nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third,anterior.

MARILYN CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third

C. Contusion with hematoma, shin,lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (SeeExhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)

It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent

of the above-mentioned injuries, the amounts of moraldamages granted by the trial court are not excessive.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modifiedin the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu KheThai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed withrespect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costsagainst the latter.

VITARICH CORPORATION vs. LOCSIN

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rulesof Court seeking to reverse and set aside the November26, 2007 Decisio n1 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan deOro (CA-CDO), in CA G.R. CVNo.73726 ,2 which reversed the August 9, 2001 Decisionof the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General SantosCity (RTC), in Civil Case No. 6287, in favor of petitionerVitarich Corporation (Vitarich) .

THE FACTS:

Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood andcatering services business named Glamours ChickenHouse, with address at Parang Road, Cotabato City.Since 1993, Vitarich, particularly its Davao Branch, hadbeen her supplier of poultry meat .3 In 1995, however,her account was transferred to the newly openedVitarich branch in General Santos City.

In the months of July to November 1996, Losin’s ordersof dressed chicken and other meat products allegedlyamounted to P921,083.10. During this said period,Losin’s poultry meat needs for her business were

serviced by Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and AllanRosa (Rosa) , both salesmen and authorized collectors ofVitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay) , a supervisor ofsaid corporation. Unfortunately, it was also during thesame period that her account started to experienceproblems because of the fact that Directo deliveredstocks to her even without prior booking which is thecustomary process of doing business with her .4

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On August 24, 1996, D irecto’s services were terminatedby Vitarich without Losin’s knowledge. He left withoutturning over some supporting invoices covering theorders of Losin. Rosa and Baybay, on the other hand,resigned on November 30, 1996 and December 30,1996, respectively. Just like Directo, they did not alsoturn over pertinent invoices covering Losin’s account .5

On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent toLosin covering her alleged unpaid account amountingtoP921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checkedher records and discovered that she had anoverpayment to Vitarich in the amount of P500,000.00.She relayed this fact to Vitarich and further informedthe latter that checks were issued and the same werecollected by Directo .6

It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checksamounting to P288,463.30 which were dishonoredeither for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds(DAIF) or Stop Payment .7

On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum ofMoney against Losin, Directo, Rosa, and Baybay beforethe RTC.

On August 9, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision 8 infavor of Vitarich, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor ofplaintiff, ordering defendant Chona Losin to pay plaintiffthe following:

1. P297,462.50 representing the three checkswhich had been stopped payment with interestat 12% per annum from the date of thisDecision until the whole amount is fully paid;

2. P101,450.20 representing the unpaid sales(Exhibits ‘L’ and ‘M’) with interest at 12% fromdate of this Decision until the whole amount isfully paid;

3. P20,000.00 in concept of attorney’s fees; a nd

4. The cost of suit.

As to the complaint against defendant Allan Rosa andArnold Baybay, the same is dismissed. The complaintagainst Rodrigo Directo still remains and is herebyordered archived until he could be served withsummons.

SO ORDERED.9

Not satisfied with the RTC decision, Losin appealed tothe CA presenting the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT

APPRECIATING THE OVERPAYMENT MADE BYDEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO VITARICHCORPORATION;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERINGTHE PAYMENT OF THE THREE (3) CHECKS WITHSTOP PAYMENT ORDERS AND WITHOUT ANYANTECEDENT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES FORTHE TWO (2) CHECKS, NAMELY: RCBC CHECKNO. CX 046324 AND RCBC CHECK NO. CX046327 ; AND

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDINGVITARICH CORPORATION NEGLIGENT IN THESELECTION OF ITS EMPLOYEES AND NEITHERFINDING THE CORPORATION LIABLE FORDAMAGES A CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE.10

On November 26, 2007, the CA rendered the assaileddecision in favor of Losin. Pertinently, the said decisionreads:

It is axiomatic that we should not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibilityof witnesses, unless there appears in the record somefact or circumstances of weight and influence which hasbeen overlooked or the significance of which has beenmisinterpreted. The reason is that the trial court is in abetter position to determine questions involvingcredibility having heard the witnesses and havingobserved their deportment and manner of testifyingduring the trial unless there is showing that the findingsof the lower court are totally devoid of support or

glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error orgrave abuse of discretion. This is such an instance.

By the contract of agency, a person binds himself torender some service or to do something inrepresentation or on behalf of another, with theconsent or authority of the latter. Thus, the elements ofagency are (i) consent, express or implied, of the partiesto establish the relationship; (ii) the object is theexecution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;


























(iii) the agent acts as a representative and not forhimself; and (iv) the agent acts within the scope of hisauthority.

The Civil Code defines a contract of agency as follows:

" Art. 1868 . By the contract of agency, a person bindshimself to render some service or to do something in

representation or on behalf of another, with theconsent or authority of the latter."

As far as Losin is concerned, Directo was a dulyauthorized agent of Vitarich Corporation. As such, it fellupon Directo to place her orders of dressed chicken andother related products to their General Santos Citybranch. All such orders were taken from the Vitarichbodega by Directo as testified by Alona Calinawan, thenbookkeeper of Vitarich from March 1995 to September199 8, who was responsible for all the customers’accounts, receivables and withdrawals of dressedchicken from their bodega.

A perusal of the records would show that Vitarichincluded in their list of collectibles from Losin severalamounts that were not supported by their Charge SalesInvoices suchas P44,987.70, P3,300.00; P28,855.40; P98,166.20;P73,806.00; and P93,888.80 and which form part oftheir total claim of P912,083.10. Furthermore, Vitarichalso submitted Charge Sales Invoices showing theamount of P70,000.00, P41,792.40, P104,137.40and P158,522.80 as part of their exhibits but whichamounts are not included in its summary statement ofcollectibles against Losin.

It is noted that the dressed chicken and other relatedproducts as manifested by the Charge Sales Invoices,were taken out of the bodega and received by Directo,who is now ‘at large.’ There was no evidence presentedby Vitarich to prove that aforesaid stocks weredelivered to Losin. Contrary to what Vitarich claimedthat Directo resigned o n August 24, 1996, exhibit ‘X’

shows that he was ‘terminated.’ The fact can not be putaside that Directo was the salesman and authorizedcollector and by law, the agent of Vitarich. Criminal actscommitted by Directo by his non-remittance of theproceeds of the checks given by Losin, is his separateaccountability with Vitarich and should not be imputedto their client, Losin. In fact, defendant Directoabsconded when plaintiff-appellee started to questionhis ‘collectibles.’ The totality of Directo’s acts clearlyindicated a deliberate attempt to escape liability.

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for thepurpose of contracting with specified persons, itsrevocation shall not prejudice the latter if they werenot given notice thereof ."

"Art. 1922. If the agent had general powers, revocation

of the agency does not prejudice third persons whoacted in good faith and without knowledge of therevocation. Notice of the revocation in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation is a sufficient warning to thirdpersons." (Emphasis Ours)

The reason for the law is obvious. Since the thirdpersons have been made to believe by the principal thatthe agent is authorized to deal with them, they have theright to presume that the representation continues toexist in the absence of notification by the principal.

Nowhere in the records can it be found that Losin wasnotified of the fact that Directo was no longerrepresenting the interest of Vitarich and that the latterhas terminated Directo’s servi ces. There is also anabsence of any proof to show that Directo’s terminationhas been published in a newspaper of generalcirculation.

It is well settled that a question of fact is to bedetermined by the evidence offered to support theparticular contention. In defendant- appellant’s‘Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich,’ preparedand signed by Losin’s bookkeeper, Imelda S. Cinco, allthe checks enumerated therein coincides with the bankstatements submitted by RCBC, thus corroboratingLosin’s claim that she has paid Vitarich. Vitarich’scontention that ‘defendant Baybay tried very hard tohide his accountabilities to the plaintiff x x x but failedto explain why the account remained unpaid,’ confirmsits belief that their own agents as such, are accountablefor transactions made with third persons. "As a SalesSupervisor, he is principally liable for the behavior of his

subordinates (Directo & Rosa) and for the enforcementof company rules" which may have gone beyond theirauthority to do such acts.

Anent the third assigned error that the lower courterred in not finding Vitarich negligent in the selection ofits employees thereby making the former liable fordamages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, We findthe same to be without basis as said article explicitlyholds that:



"‘ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 isdemandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,but also for those of persons for whom one isresponsible.

x x x x x x x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by

their employees and household helpers acting withinthe scope of their assigned tasks , even though theformer are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x x x x x x x."

Pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, that vicariousliability attaches only to an employer when the tortuousconduct of the employee relates to, or is in the courseof, his employment. The question to ask should bewhether at the time of the damage or injury, the

employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of theemployer or, independently, in that of his own? Vitarichincurred no liability when Directo’s conduct, act oromission went beyond the range of his employment.

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

"‘SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, howdetermined . - In civil cases, the party having the burdenof proof must establish his case by a preponderance ofevidence. In determining where the preponderance orsuperior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies,the court may consider all the facts and circumstancesof the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, theirintelligence, their means and opportunity of knowingthe facts to which they are testifying, the nature of thefacts to which they testify, the probability orimprobability of their testimony, their interest or wantof interest, and also their personal credibility so far asthe same may legitimately appear upon the trial. Thecourt may also consider the number of witnesses,though the preponderance is not necessarily with thegreater number."

"Preponderance of evidence’ is the weight, credit, andvalue of the aggregate evidence on either side and isusually considered to be synonymous with the term‘greater weight of the evidence’ or greater weight of the credible evidence." It is evidence which is moreconvincing to the court as worthy of belief than thatwhich is offered in opposition thereto.

x x x x x x x x x

We reviewed the factual and legal issues of this case inlight of the general rules of evidence and the burden ofproof in civil cases, as explained by the Supreme Courtin Jison v. Court of Appeals :

"xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of theissue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff ina civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However,

in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makesout a prima facie case in his favour, the duty or theburden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvertplaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdi ct must bereturned in favour of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases,the party having the burden of proof must produce apreponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiffhaving to rely on the strength of his own evidence andnot upon the weakness of the defendants. The conceptof ‘preponderance of evidence’ refers to evidencewhich is of greater weight, or more convincing, thatwhich is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it meansprobability of truth."

Hence, Vitarich who has the burden of proof mustproduce such quantum of evidence, with the formerhaving to rely on the strength of its own evidence andnot on the weakness of the defendant- appellant Losin’s.

In this light, we have meticulously perused the recordsof this case and [found] that the court a quo had erredin appreciating the evidence presented.

In deciding this appeal, the Court relies on the rule thata party who has the burden of proof in a civil case mustestablish his cause of action by a preponderance ofevidence. When the evidence of the parties is inequipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where thepreponderance of evidence lies, the party with theburden of proof fails and the petition/complaint mustthus be denied. We find that plaintiff-appellee Vitarichfailed to prove that the goods were ever delivered andreceived by Losin, said charge sales invoices beingundated and unsigned by Losin being the consignee of

the goods.

On the other hand, Losin could not also prove that shehas overpaid Vitarich. Hence, her contention that shehas overpaid Vitarich and her prayer for refund of thealleged overpaid amount, must necessarily fail.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal ishereby GRANTED and the appealed judgment is



hereby SET ASIDEand VACATED. No pronouncement asto cost.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, this petition for review alleging that---

AS THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS SQUARELY CONTRADICTS THAT OF THE TRIALCOURT, PETITIONER HUMBLY REQUESTS THE SUPREMECOURT TO INQUIRE INTO THE ERRONEOUSCONCLUSIONS OF FACTS MADE BY THE COURT OFAPPEALS.12

As a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court covers questions of law only.Questions of fact are not reviewable and passed uponby this Court in its exercise of judicial review. Thedistinction between questions of law and questions of

fact has been well defined. A question of law existswhen the doubt or difference centers on what the law ison a certain state of facts. A question of fact , on theother hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth orfalsity of the alleged facts .13

The rule, however, admits of exceptions, namely: (1)when the findings are grounded entirely onspeculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when theinference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, orimpossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse ofdiscretion; (4) when the judgment is based onmisappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of factare conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the sameare contrary to the admissions of both appellant andappellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those ofthe trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusionswithout citation of specific evidence on which they arebased; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are notdisputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findingsof fact are premised on the supposed absence ofevidence and contradicted by the evidence on record .14

The aforementioned exceptions, particularly theseventh exception, finds relevance in the case at benchsince the findings of the CA are clearly in conflict withthat of the trial court. For this reason, the Court isconstrained to reevaluate the evidence adduced byboth parties to resolve the issues which boil down towhether or not Losin is liable to Vitarich and, if so, towhat extent.

The Court resolves the issues partly in favor of Vitarich.

Initially, Vitarich claims a total of P921,083.10 fromrespondent Losin, Directo, Rosa and Baybay (defendantsin Civil Case No. 6287 for Sum of Money). According toVitarich, "[t]he successive and sudden resignations ofdefendants Directo, Baybay and Rosa and the suddenchange of mind of defendant Losin after previously

acknowledging her accounts are part of an elaborateand sinister scheme of defendants, acting singly orcollectively, in conspiracy or not, in defrauding plaintiffcorporation xxx. "15

The RTC ruled in favor of Vitarich, ordering Losin to paythe following: (1) P297,462.50 representing the three(3) checks, the payment for which was stopped, withcorresponding interest at 12% per annum from the dateof the RTC decision until fully paid; (2) P101,450.20 forthe unpaid sales also with interest at 12% per annumfrom the date of the RTC decision until fullypaid; (3) P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and (4) cost ofsuit .16 It appears that Vitarich did not challenge this partof the RTC decision anymore .17

After Losin obtained a favorable RTC decision, Vitarichnow seeks relief from this Court through this petitionfor review.

After an assessment of the evidentiary records, theCourt opines and so holds that the CA erred in reversingthe RTC decision. Losin is clearly liable to Vitarich.

Records bear out that Losin transacted with Vitarich’srepresentative Directo .18 Vitarich presented severalcharge sales invoice s19 and statement of accoun t 20 tosupport Lo sin’s accountability for the productsdelivered to her. A total of P921,083.10 was initiallycharged to her. Losin, on the other hand, presented acopy of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarichthrough its agent Directo ,21 and a Statement ofPayments Made to Vitarich 22 to support her allegationof payment.

It is worth noting that both Vitarich and Losin failed tomake a proper recording and documentation of theirtransactions making it difficult to reconcile the evidencepresented by the parties to establish their respectiveclaims.

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has theburden of proving it. In Jimenez v. NLRC ,23 the Courtruled that the burden rests on the debtor to prove






















































payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing withlegal certainty that the obligation has been dischargedby payment.

True, the law requires in civil cases that the party whoalleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1,Rule 131 of the Rules of Cour t 24 provides that the

burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truthof his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by theamount of evidence required by law. In this case,however, the burden of proof is on Losin because shealleges an affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losinfailed to discharge that burden.

After examination of the evidence presented, this Courtis of the opinion that Losin failed to present a singleofficial receipt to prove payment .25 This is contrary tothe well-settled rule that a receipt, which is a writtenand signed acknowledgment that money and goodshave been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact ofpayment although not exclusive .26 All she presentedwere copies of the list of checks allegedly issued toVitarich through its agent Directo ,27 a Statement ofPayments Made to Vitarich ,28 and apparently copies ofthe pertinent history of her checking account with RizalCommercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).At best, thesemay only serve as documentary records of her businessdealings with Vitarich to keep track of the paymentsmade but these are not enough to prove payment.

Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:

The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, orbills of exchange or other mercantile documentsshall produce the effect of payment only when theyhave been cashed , or when through the fault of thecreditor they have been impaired. [Emphasis supplied]

In the case at bar, no cash payment was proved. It wasneither confirmed that the checks issued by Losin wereactually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, the Court cannot

consider that payment, much less overpayment, madeby Losin.

Now, the Court ascertains the extent of Losin’s liability.A perusal of the records shows that Vitarich included inits list of collectibles ,29 several amounts that were notproperly supported by Charge Sales Invoice, towit, (1)P44,987.70; (2) P3,300.00; (3) P28,855.40; (4) P98,166.20; (5) P73,806.00; and (6) P93,888.80 .30 It bearsnoting that the Charge Sales Invoices presented for the

amounts listed as collectibles were undated andunsigned by Losin, the supposed consignee of the goods(except Exh. L). Of the six amounts, the Courtparticularly considered the P93,888.80 as it was theamount of one of the checks issued by Losin. Indeed,the Court cannot disregard the fact that Losin issued acorresponding check for the following amounts:(1) P93,888.96 (dated August 27,

1996) ;31

(2) P50,265.00 (dated August 30, 1996) ;32

and(3) P144,309.50 (dated August 31, 1996) .33 The Courtbelieves that Losin would not have issued those checkshad she not received the goods so delivered to her. Thefirst two (2) checks were apparently received by theVitarich but were not encashed because of Losin’sinstruction to RCBC. Thus, Losin is liable to Vitarich butnot for the total amount of the three (3) mentionedchecks but only for the amount of P93,888.96and P50,265.00 corresponding to the first two (2)checks. Losin cannot be held liable for the amount ofthe third check P144,309.50 because Vitarich didnot claim for this amount. The amount ofP144,309.50for some reason, was not among those listed in the listof collectibles of Vitarich .341avvphi1

Aside from the earlier mentioned liabilities¸the Courtalso holds Losin liable for the amount of P78,281.00which was also among those listed as collectible byVitarich. Although the Charge Sales Invoice 35 bearingthis amount was undated, it nevertheless, appears thatthe goods corresponding to this amount were actuallyreceived by Losin’s mother. This was even testified to by

Rosa 36 and confirmed by Losin herself .37 With theexception of the amounts corresponding to the two (2)checks discussed above and the amount of P18,281.00as appearing in Exh. L, the other amounts appearing onthe rest of the Charge Sales Invoice and on theStatement of Account presented by Vitarich cannot becharged on Losin for failure of Vitarich to prove thatthese amounts are chargeable to her. Vitarich evenfailed to prove that the rest of the goods as appearingon the other Charge Sales Invoices were actuallydelivered and received by her or her representative

since these Charge Sales Invoices were undated andunsigned. Thus, Losin is liable to pay Vitarich theamounts of P93,888.96 , P50,265.00 and P78,281.00 or atotal of P222,434.96 only.

Inasmuch as the case at bar involves an obligation notarising from a loan or forbearance of money, butconsists in the payment of a sum of money, the legalrate of interest is 6% per annum of the amountdemanded .38 Interest shall continue to run fromFebruary 12, 1997, the date when Vitarich demanded





























































payment of the sum amounting toP921,083.10 fromLosin (and not from the time of the filing of theComplaint) until finality of the Decision (not until fullypaid). The rate of interest shall increase to 12% perannum only from such finality until its satisfaction, theinterim period being deemed to be equivalent to aforbearance of credit .391avvphi1

Regarding the grant of attorney’s fees, the Court agreeswith the RTC that said award is justified. Losin refusedto pay Vitarich despite the latter’s repeated demands. Itwas left with no recourse but to litigate and protect itsinterest. We, however, opt to reduce the sameto P10,000.00 from P20,000.00.

The claims against Rosa and Baybay who allegedly didnot fully account for their sales transactions have notbeen substantially proven by evidence. In fact, itappears that Rosa and Baybay resigned. Resignationwould not have been possible unless accountabilitieswith Vitarich had been settled first. It was only theservices of Directo that was apparently terminated byVitarich .40 Summons, however, was not served on him,so he could not be made to account for the shortages ofcollection.

WHEREFORE, the November 26, 2007 Decision of theCourt of Appeals is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. TheAugust 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court ofGeneral Santos City, Branch 23, is REINSTATED subjectto MODIFICATIONS. Thus, the dispositive portion shouldread as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered orderingChona Losin to pay Vitarich Corporation the following:

(1) P222,434.96 representing the two checks,with Check Nos. CX 046324 dated August 27,1996 and CX 046325 dated August 30, 1996which had been stopped payment and theamount as appearing in Charge Sales Invoicemarked as Exhibit ‘L’ subject to an interest rate

of 6% per annum from February 12, 1997, thedate when Vitarich demanded payment of thesum amounting to P921,083.10 from Losin untilfinality of the Decision. The rate of interest shallincrease to 12% per annum only from suchfinality until its satisfaction, the interim periodbeing deemed to be equivalent to aforbearance of credit;

(2) P10,000.00 representing attorney’s fees; and

(3) Cost of suit.

The complaint against Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay isdismissed. The complaint against Rodrigo Directo isordered archived until he could be served withsummons.

Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation vs. De Los Santos

FACTS:On September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de losSantos, the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santoswas fetched by Wilfredo’s brother Armando, husbandof respondent Carmina Vda. de los Santos, from RizalTheater to after Teresa’s theater performance.Armando drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma, acompany car assigned to Wilfredo. Two other membersof the cast of production joined Teresa Elena in theGalant Sigma.

Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the KatipunanRoad (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with theshuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by AlfredoS. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner FilipinasSynthetic Corp. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12meters from the point of impact, across the WhitePlains Road landing near the perimeter fence of CampAguinaldo, where the Galant Sigma burst into flamesand burned to death beyond recognition all fouroccupants of the car.

A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting indamage to property with multiple homicide wasbrought against Mejia, which was decided in favor ofMejia (shuttle driver). A consolidated civil case was filedby the families of the deceased against Mejia. The RTCruled in favor of herein respondents. After the denial ofthe motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed tothe CA and the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.Hence this petition stating that the respondent courterred in finding Mejia negligent, such not beingsupported by evidence on record.

ISSUE: Whether Mejia was negligentHELD:Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that De losSantos made a turn along White Plains Road withoutexercising the necessary care which could haveprevented the accident from happening. According topetitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by thevictims should also be considered as negligence on thepart of the driver of that same vehicle, thus, mitigating,










if not absolving petitioner’s liability. However, the saidargument deserves scant consideration.

It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speedbeyond the rate of speed required by law, specificallySection 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Under theNew Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, itis presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle hasbeen negligent if at the time of the mishap, he wasviolating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in thepresent case, Mejia’s violation of the traffic rules doesnot erase the presumption that he was the onenegligent at the time of the collision. Even apart fromstatutory regulations as to speed, a motorist isnevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care anddrive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate withall the conditions encountered which will enable him tokeep the vehicle under control and, whenevernecessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid

injury to others using the highway.

A closer study of the Police Accident Report,Investigation Report and the sketch of the accidentwould reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus wastraveling at such a reckless speed that it collided withthe car bearing the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED.Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,dated August 15, 2001, is hereby AFFIRMED with

the MODIFICATION that the moral damages be reducedto P50,000.00.

case digest (cho) compiled

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