remedial law digests up to june 2001 copy

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R E M E D I A L L A WD I G E S T S

A T E N E O C E N T R A L B A R O P E R A T I O N S 2 0 0 2

Table of ContentsJurisdiction 1 - 3Summary Procedure 3 - 4Criminal Procedure 4 - 12Civil Procedure 12 - 29Evidence 30 - 40Special Procedure 40 - 42

JURISDICTION

BARANGAY CONCILIATION

Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA01 Feb 2001

Facts: P filed an action against D for recovery of ownership of a parcel of land. Dquestioned P’s failure to submit the issue to barangay conciliation.

Issue: Is there a need to submit to barangay conciliation?

Held: No. The action for recovery was filed in 1991. The Local Government Coderequiring conciliation took effect only in 1992. Besides, P and D are not even residents of the same province. No lupon has jurisdiction over cases where the parties are not actualresidents of the same city or municipality.

SANDIGANBAYAN

ABBOT V. MAPAYO335 SCRA 265 (July 2000)

Facts: A was charged before the Sandiganbayan. The case was transferred to RTC byvirtue of R.A. 7975. The RTC denied A’s omnibus motion so he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The Solicitor General opined that the Sandiganbayan had

jurisdiction over the petition and not the CA.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari.

Held: Yes. In § 4 (c) of RA 7975, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expandedto include petitions for issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas

corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

SOLLER V. SANDIGANBAYAN9 May 2001

Facts: A complaint was filed against A, a municipal mayor, with the Office of theOmbudsman charging him of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsyreport to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of theoffender. The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an information withthe Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case?

Held: For an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offensemust have been committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) “in relation totheir office,” i.e. it should be intimately connected with the office of the offender, andshould have been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his officialfunctions. Moreover, these requisites must be alleged in the information. In this case,

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there was no allegation that the offense charged was done in the performance of officialfunction.

JURISDICTION OVER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

PEOPLE V. REPIROGA17 May 2001

Facts: A was a member of the Philippine Army. A complaint was filed before the Officeof the Provincial Prosecutor charging A with murder. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor conducted a preliminary investigation and later recommended the filing of aninformation.

Issues: Should the preliminary investigation be conducted by an authorized military officer before any information could be filed against AFP members? Does the authorityto file charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman?

Held: No. There is nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests the authority on amilitary officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving members of theAFP. It simply mentions an “investigating officer” who shall examine available witnessesrequested by the accused, without reference to his being a military officer.

Given the foregoing, the contention of A that the authority to file charges againsthim lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman cannot be upheld. Under AO 8, the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation over a militarycase may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his assistantssince all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. It is only in theprosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan where the Ombudsman enjoysexclusive control and supervision.

RTC JURISDICTION

VILLEGAS V. CA1 Feb. 2001

Facts: In a case for the reconstitution of an original TCT, the posting of the notice of thepetition in the provincial or municipal building of the city or municipality where the subjectproperty is located was not proven.

Issue: Did the court have jurisdiction over the petition?

Held: No. The proceeding being in rem, the court acquires jurisdiction to hear and

decide the petition for the reconstitution of the owner’s title upon compliance with therequired posting of notices and publication in the Official Gazette. These requirementsand procedure are mandatory and must be strictly complied with, otherwise, theproceedings are utterly void, which is why the petitioner is required to submit proof of thepublication and posting of the notice.

TALUSAN V. TAYAG04 Apr. 2001

Facts: The RTC, acting as a land registration court, ruled on the validity of the auctionsale of the subject parcel of land. X believes the RTC has no jurisdiction to resolve thisissue and instituted a separate action to annul the auction sale.

Issue: Does the RTC, acting as a land registration court, have jurisdiction to resolve thesaid issue?

Held: Yes. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide evencontroversial and contentious cases, as well as those invoking substantial issues. Thecourt now has the authority to act not only on applications for original registration, butalso on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Coupled with this authority

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is the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.

PEOPLE V. OBINA20 Apr. 2001

Facts: A was charged in the RTC of Las Pinas for rape. The evidence introduced by theprosecution, however, points to Nasugbu, Batangas as being the scene of the offense.

Issue: Should the RTC of Las Pinas dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction?

Held: Yes. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike civil cases, is jurisdictional. The filing of a criminal case with the wrong court can oust the court fromtrying the case. For lack of jurisdiction, the case should have been dismissed by thecourt a quo.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

BARATA V. ABALOS, et. al.6 June 2001

Facts: X filed an administrative disciplinary case against A before the Office of theOmbudsman. The Ombudsman absolved A of the charge. X filed a petition for reviewwith the SC.

Issue: Which court has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Ombudsman inadministrative cases?

Held: The Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The last paragraph of Section 27 which

provides that in all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC was rendered invalid and of no effect in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto which laid down the rule that said Section27 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of theOmbudsman in administrative disciplinary cases without violating the proscription inSection 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate

jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence. Thus, appeals fromdecisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should bebrought to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43. (The only provision affected by theFabian ruling is the designation of the CA as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of theRules of Court as the proper mode of appeal; all other matters included in said Section27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand)

SUMMARY PROCEDURE

CATUNGAL V. HAO22 March 2001

Facts: D was the lessee of X. Later, P bought the property from X. P filed an action for ejectment against D. TC ordered D to vacate. Because P disagreed with the TC’s rulingas to the rent, P sought reconsideration of the order while D filed a notice of appeal.Instead of resolving the Motion for Reconsideration, the TC issued an order elevating thecase to the RTC which in turn modified the decision in favor of C. CA ruled in D’s favor.According to the CA, the motion filed by P before the TC was a prohibited pleadingunder the Rules of Summary Procedure. In short, such motion did not produce any legaleffect.

Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to dispose of the issue of Motion for Reconsideration?

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Held: Yes. A reading of the order issued by the TC will show that the said courtelevated the issue on the amount of rentals raised by P to the RTC because the appealof respondent had already been perfected. D could have opposed such irregularity in theproceeding but D failed to do so. Even if the motion for reconsideration is a prohibitedpleading, D is precluded by estoppel from questioning it. The argument of D that theproceeding was a summary one is incorrect. Considering the amount of rentals anddamages claimed by P, said case was not governed by the Summary Rules as theunpaid rentals exceed P20, 000. Thus the filing of Motion for Reconsideration is allowed.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

SERVICE OF ORDERS & RESOLUTIONS IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

TAM WING TAK V. MAKASIAR350 SCRA 475 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P filed an affidavit-complaint with the prosecutor’s office charging D with violationof BP 22. The prosecutor dismissed the affidavit-complaint and a copy of the resolutionwas sent by registered mail to P himself. P received it on April 9. P’s counsel received acopy on June 27 so counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on July 7. Motion wasdenied for being filed out of time because the prosecutor counted the 15-day period fromApril 9. P argued that following Rule 13 § 2, if a party appears by counsel, then servicecan only be validly made upon counsel and service upon the party himself becomesinvalid and without effect.

Issue: Whether the period should be counted from P’s receipt of the prosecutor’sresolution

Held: Yes. The Rules were meant to govern court procedures and pleadings. Apreliminary investigation is not a court proceeding. The rule on service provided for inthe Rules of Court cannot be made to apply to the service of resolutions by publicprosecutors especially as the agency concerned (in this case, the Department of Justice)has its own procedural rules governing said service. DOJ Order 223 § 2 provides that inpreliminary investigations, service of resolutions of public prosecutors could be madeupon either the party or his counsel.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

MANANTAN V. CA

350 SCRA 387 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. A was acquitted.Complainant appealed the civil aspect of the judgment. CA found A civilly liable. Acontended that this amounted to double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether A was placed in double jeopardy.

Held: No. For double jeopardy to exist, the ff. elements must be established: (a) a 1st

jeopardy must have attached prior to the 2nd; (2) the 1st jeopardy must have terminated;and (3) the 2nd jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In this case, what waselevated to the CA was the civil aspect of the criminal case. A was not charged anewwith a 2nd offense identical to the 1st. There was no 2nd jeopardy to speak of; A’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

TIME OF COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE

PEOPLE V. ELPEDES350 SCRA 716 (Jan. 2001)

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Facts: A was found guilty of rape. A argued that he cannot be convicted of rapecommitted on Feb. 11 ’97 because the victim testified that she was raped on Aug. 11’97. He pointed out that the victim never testified that she was raped on the date allegedin the information.

Issue: Whether A should be acquitted since the evidence showed that rape wascommitted on a date other than indicated in the information.

Held: No. The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commissionof the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars (Rule 116 §10). A did not ask for a bill of particulars. The failure to move or specification or thequashal of the information on any of the grounds provided for in the Rules deprives theaccused of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced andadmitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficientlycharges the accused with a definite crime. Besides, the exact date of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the crime.

INFORMATION

PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO03 Apr. 2001

Facts: An information was filed, charging A with the twin killings of 2 brothers. A failed toquestion the duplicitous complaint. He was later convicted for the offense charged in theInformation

Issue: On appeal, can A question the defectively crafted information?

Held: No. True, an indictment of multiple offenses in a single complaint or information

transgresses Rule 110, § 13. A, however, has failed to timely question the above defectand he may thus be deemed to have waived this objection.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN THE INFORMATION

PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ349 SCRA 124 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was found guilty of murder. W testified that he saw A shoot the victim. Aargued that W’s name was not mentioned during the preliminary investigation so Wshould not have been presented as a witness.

Issue: Whether the prosecution was precluded from presenting W as a witness duringthe trial.

Held: No. The non-inclusion of some of the names of the eyewitnesses in theinformation does not preclude the prosecutor from presenting them during trial. There isthus no basis for the allegation that this fact indicated that W’s presentation as aneyewitness was a mere “afterthought.”

AMENDMENTS TO THE INFORMATION

GABIONZA V. CA30 March 2001

Facts: G was charged of violating RA 1161 (SSS Law). He pleaded not guilty to theoffense charged. About 4 years after he was arraigned, the public prosecutor filed amotion for leave of court to amend the information in order to change the dates therein.The TC granted the motion.

Issue: Was the grant proper?

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Held: Yes. After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the information may beallowed as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of theaccused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendmentis when a defense under the complaint or information would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would beinapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.

Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as:a. it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescriptionb. it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally chargedc. it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so asto require the accused to undergo any material charge or modification in hisdefensed. it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penaltye. it does not cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity tomeet the new averment.

In this case, the questioned amendment is one of form only. The allegation of time

when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense.

PLEA OF GUILTY

PEOPLE V. GALAS20 March 2001

Facts: A was charged with 3 counts of rape of his 15-year old daughter. A pleaded notguilty when arraigned. Later, A manifested through counsel his desire to change his pleato guilty. During the searching inquiry, the TC judge asked A whether he is aware that hemay be convicted of reclusion perpetua to death. A said yes, and was therefore

sentenced to death. He now cries improvident plea of guilty.

Issue: Was the plea of guilty improvidently made?

Held: Yes. Nowhere in the proceedings was it explained to the accused that thepenalty imposable is death even if he pleads guilty. It is not enough to inquire as to thevoluntariness of the plea. The court must explain fully to the accused that onceconvicted, he could be meted out the death penalty. One cannot dispel the possibilitythat the accused may have been led to believe that due to his voluntary plea of guilty, hemay be imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not death.

PEOPLE V. ALBORIDA25 June 2001

Facts: A raped his minor daughter. At trial, A withdrew an earlier plea of not guilty andsubstituted the same with a plea of guilty. The prosecution presented evidence andthereafter A was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to suffer thepenalty of death.

Issue: Whether the trial court followed the proper procedure.

Held: No. The trial court failed to abide by the strict safeguards intended to guaranteea provident plea of guilt. Rule 116 § 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Proceduremandates 3 things upon the trial court in cases where a positive plea is entered by

accused: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and theaccused’s comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution toprove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) ask theaccused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if hedesires. The questions propounded by the trial court do not constitute a “searchinginquiry” within the contemplation of the rule.

PEOPLE V. LATUPAN

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28 June 2001

Facts: A pleaded guilty to the single offense of multiple murder with multiple frustratedmurder. The trial court found A guilty of the complex offense of Double Murder andphysical injuries.

Issue: Whether the court erred in convicting A.

Held: No. Although SC has set aside convictions based on plea of guilty in capitaloffenses because of improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of thecondemnatory judgment, the circumstances of this case merit a different result. “Wherethe trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused erredin admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on theevidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged."

SEPARATE TRIALS

PEOPLE V. ELLASOS and OBILLO6 June 2001

Facts: A and B were accused of killing V. The judge ordered the separate trial of thecase against the 2 and transferred the trial of B to Muntinlupa RTC. Still, the judgeconvicted both A and B.

Issue: Whether the judge correctly convicted the 2 accused.

Held: No. The trial judge gravely erred in rendering a judgment of conviction againstboth accused. Since the trial of B did not take place, the trial court should have rendered

a decision only against A.

WHEN APPEAL OF ONE BENEFITS ALL

PEOPLE V. ESCAÑO349 SCRA 674 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A, B, and C were convicted. All of them appealed but A later withdrew his appeal.B and C were acquitted on appeal. A prayed that he should also be acquitted sine theappeal interposed by his co-accused is applicable and favorable to him.

Issue: Whether A should also be acquitted.

Held: Yes. This is in accordance with § 11 (a) Rule 122 of the New Rules of CriminalProcedure. The acquittal of the 2 other accused based on reasonable doubt shouldbenefit A notwithstanding the fact that he withdrew his appeal.

JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE OFFENSES

PEOPLE V. YPARRAGUIRE335 SCRA 69 (July 2000)

Facts: A was convicted of rape. A contended that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of

police and not by the complainant.

Issue: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Yes. The complaint required in Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code is but acondition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecutethe guilty parties. The complaint simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does notconfer jurisdiction in the court to try the case. Art. 344 is not determinative of the

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jurisdiction of courts over private offenses because the same is governed by theJudiciary Law and not the Revised Penal Code.

SEARCH WARRANT

GARAYGAY V. PEOPLE335 SCRA 272 (July 2000)

Facts: Manila RTC issued a search warrant authorizing the search of A’s house locatedin Lapu-Lapu City. The raid was conducted and prohibited paraphernalia wereconfiscated. An information charging A was filed Before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. Afiled a motion to quash the search warrant with the Lapu-Lapu City RTC.

Issue: Which court should resolve the motion to quash the search warrant?

Held: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based onthe results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, a motion to quash

the warrant/to retrieve things thereunder seized may be filed for the first time in either the issuing court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy isalternative, not cumulative. Thus, the motion to quash the warrant was properly filed withthe RTC of Lapu-Lapu City.

PEOPLE V. KO19 Apr. 2001

Facts: A search warrant was issued to search D’s premises for “undetermined quantityof Shabu and Drug Paraphernalia” in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. D contendsthat the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use of Shabu and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different

provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue: Was the warrant issued for more than one specific offense and hence invalid?

Held: No. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically withdangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs anddefines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belongto the same class or species. Accordingly, one search warrant may thus be validlyissued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS

LACSON V. SEC. PEREZ10 May 2001

Facts: After the anti-Arroyo crowd in Mendiola had been dispersed, President Arroyodeclared a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila. Pursuant to the proclamation, several keyleaders (Enrile, Maceda) of the opposition were ordered arrested without warrants. Thewarrantless arrests were justified on the theory that a person committing rebellion, whichis a continuing crime, may be arrested without a warrant at any time so long as therebellion persists.

Issue: Were the arrests made legal?

Held: No. To justify a warrantless arrest, there must be a showing that the personarrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting tocommit the offense of rebellion. In other words, there must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. This requirement was notcomplied with in the arrests of Enrile, Maceda et al. A declaration of a state of rebelliondoes not relieve the State of its burden of proving probable cause. The declaration doesnot constitute a substitute for proof.

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ALLEGATION OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION

PEOPLE V. BANIGUID340 SCRA 92 (Sept. 2000)

Facts: A was accused of rape. It was stated in the information that he had carnalknowledge of hi “minor daughter.”

Issue: May death penalty be imposed on the accused?

Held: No. Death penalty is imposed for the crime of rape if the “victim is under 18years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim.” For this purpose, the specialqualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship with the offender must be alleged and proved. The information must state the exact age of the victim atthe time of the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE V. DE VILLAFeb. 1, 2001

Facts: A was charged with raping V who was at the time 12 years and 10 months old. Awas V’s uncle but such fact was not alleged in the information. He was found guilty andsentenced to death pursuant to RA 7659.

Issue: Can the death sentence be sustained?

Held: No. Under the amendatory provisions of RA 7659 § 11, the attendance of factsthat would mandate the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death are in thenature of qualifying circumstances which should be alleged in the information andproved at the trial. The New Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on Dec. 1,

2000, now specifically require that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances to bealleged in the information. In the case at bar, the prosecution alleged only the minority of V; it failed to allege that A is her relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civildegree of relationship. Hence, A cannot be convicted of qualified rape.

ARRAIGNMENT

PEOPLE V. ASOYJune 29, 2001

Facts: RTC convicted A for rape and imposed upon him the death penalty. TheCertificate of Arraignment of A dated March 4, 1997 states:

"That in open court and in the presence of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor X, theaccused A, assisted by his PUBLIC ATTORNEY P, of Cariaga, Leyte, was called andhaving been informed of the nature of the charge against him by reading theINFORMATION and in answer of the question of the Court, he pleaded, GUILTY of thecrime charged."

Issue: Whether the court properly complied with Rule 116 §§ 1 and 3.

Held: No. The mandatory and stringent procedural requirements concerning thearraignment and plea of an accused are set by §§ 1 and 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. As shown in the Certificate of Arraignment, theappellant was "informed of the nature of the charge against him" by merely "reading the

Information". The Information is written in the English language of which A, a probinsiyano, is obviously unfamiliar with. The trial court, during the arraignment of theappellant, failed to comply with the requirements of § 1 (a) of Rule 116 when it did notfurnish the accused with a copy of the Information and read the same in the language or dialect known to him. And, after A entered a plea of guilty to the capital offense charged,the trial court also violated § 3 of Rule 116 by not conducting a searching inquiry into thevoluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.

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BAIL

YAP V. CA and the PEOPLEJune 6, 2001

Facts: A was found guilty of estafa and was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years. Aappealed and applied for bail pending appeal. CA allowed bail for “humanitarianreasons.” However, because of the perceived high risk of flight (A admitted that he leftthe country several times during the pendency of the case) the CA deemed it necessaryto peg the amount of bail at P5.5 M. A argued that the bail required was excessive.

Issue: Whether the bail imposed was excessive.

Held: Yes. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in theConstitution. The obvious rationale is that imposing bail in an excessive amount couldrender meaningless the right to bail. The court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from

installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bailbond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the courtand to make an accounting of his movements. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the SC found that the setting of theamount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of A’sright to bail.

The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure thepresence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated tofulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which A ischarged (in this case, P5.5M) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail isan exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this cannot be allowed

because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability whichshould necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

YAP V. CA and the PEOPLEJune 6, 2001

Facts: The SC found that the bail amounting to P5.5 M recommended by the appellatecourt was excessive. A, the accused, argued that bail should be set at P40T based onthe 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000,maintains recommended bail at P40T for estafa where the amount of fraud is P142T or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal ).

Issue: Whether the Bail Bond Guide is controlling at all times.

Held: No. True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of theDepartment of Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically notbinding upon the courts, “merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of theExecutive Branch, through the DOJ, in the enforcement of criminal laws.” Thus, courtsare advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail BondGuide due to its significance in the administration of criminal justice. Thisnotwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in A’s case an amount higher than P40T (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriateincrease is dictated by the circumstances.

PEOPLE V. SINGH, et. al.June 29, 2001

Facts: A was charged with a non-bailable offense. A filed an application for admission tobail.

Issue: Who has the burden of proof in hearings for bail application?

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Held: In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that theevidence of guilt is strong pursuant to § 8 Rule 114. In bail proceedings, the prosecutionmust be given ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. While theproceeding is conducted as a regular trial, it must be limited to the determination of thebailability of the accused. It should be brief and speedy, lest the purpose for which it isavailable is rendered nugatory.

AUTOMATIC REVIEW

PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO15 Mar. 2001

Facts: A was charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness by his 11-year old daughter.The TC found the accused guilty of both crimes.

Issue: Whether the automatic review of the death sentence includes the automaticappeal of his conviction for the less serious crime of acts of lasciviousness.

Held: No. In the case of People v. Panganiban, we ruled that an automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the TC was deemed to include an appeal of the lessserious crime not so punished by death, “but arising out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more seriousoffense.” In the instant case, however, it cannot be said that the acts of lasciviousnessarose out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion.The two cases involve distinct offenses committed at an interval of 2 months in point of time. In both cases, A was animated by separate criminal intent. Moreover, theevidence presented by the prosecution in the rape case was not the same evidence theyoffered to prove the acts of lasciviousness case.

PEOPLE V. BARCUMA07 May 2001

Facts: A was charged with murder. A escaped from jail and since then has been atlarge. The court rendered a decision finding A guilty and sentencing him to death.

Issue: May the automatic review of the RTC’s decision proceed despite the absence of the accused?

Held: Yes. There is no good reason to withhold judgment pending the re-arrest of accused-appellant after reviewing the decision of the trail court. Rule 122 § 10 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure in fact provides for automatic review and judgment.

OMBUDSMAN’S PROSECUTORY FUNCTION

UY V. SANDIGANBAYAN20 March 2001

Facts: A motion for further clarification was filed by Ombudsman Desierto to the SC’sruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizableby the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute casesfalling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

Issue: Can the Ombudsman prosecute only cases falling within the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan?

Held: No. We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminaryinvestigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees,not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the

jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. § 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)does not make any distinction. “Any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broadenough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. Such grant of

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primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not necessarilyimply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employeescognizable by the other courts.

ROXAS V. VASQUEZ19 June 2001

Facts: A and B were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.The Ombudsman approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the complaintsagainst A and B. Upon reinvestigation however, without notice to or participation of Aand B, the two were indicted. They argue that there has been a procedural infirmitybecause the Rules of Procedure require that a motion for reconsideration or areinvestigation must be filed within 15 days from notice of an approved resolution. Thiswas not done here.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman erred.

Held: No. In criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, like an appeal, renders the entirecase open for review, regardless of whether a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation was sought. The Ombudsman should not be limited in its review. It isclear from R. A. 6770 that the Ombudsman may motu propio conduct a reinvestigation.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

CAUSE OF ACTION

CHU V. BENELDA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT01 Mar. 2001

Facts: P and D entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage involvingseveral parcels of land. The agreement was for D to mortgage the property after thepurchase to pay the remaining balance. She failed to comply and instead sold the 2 lotsto X. P instituted a complaint for annulment of title. The defense filed a motion to dismisson the ground of lack of cause of action as P failed to allege that the purchaser wasaware of the defect in the title (i.e., that X was not an innocent purchaser for value).Issue: Should the complaint be dismissed?

Held: Yes. In a case for annulment of title, the complaint must allege that thepurchaser was aware of the defect in the title so that the cause of action against him willbe sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is fatal for the reason that the courtcannot render a valid judgment against the purchaser who is presumed to be in goodfaith in acquiring the property. Therefore, the tile of respondent, being that of an innocentpurchaser for value, remains valid.

PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

BARITUA V. MERCADER350 SCRA 86 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P filed a complaint against D in 1984. D contended that since P did not pay thecorrect amounts of docket and other lawful fees, then the trial court did not acquire

jurisdiction over the case, following the ruling in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA.

Issue: Whether the Manchester ruling applies.

Held: No. The statute in force at the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of a court. Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it cannot be oustedtherefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would haveprevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The Manchester ruling, which

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became final in 1987, has no retroactive application and cannot be invoked in thesubject complaint filed in 1984.

COUNTERCLAIMS

Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA01 Feb. 2001

Facts: P filed a forcible entry case against D. D filed an answer/counterclaim, arguingthat P’s certificate of title is invalid since the land is a “swamp land” and D had aFisheries Leases Agreement over that land.

Issue: Can the validity of the certificate of title be assailed in a counterclaim?

Held: No. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief,the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. D raised the issue of invalidity as a defense in an answer/counterclaim to P’s action for recovery of ownership.

This partakes of the nature of a collateral attack and is an indirect challenge to the final judgment and decree of registration which resulted in the issuance of the titles. TheProperty Registration Decree requires no less than a direct action for reconveyance dulyfiled within the period provided by law; a collateral attack is not allowed. Plus, there isalso a presumption that the lots could be registered and that titles were regularly issuedand valid since they were issued as a result of a decision rendered by a competent landregistration court.

COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS

FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION V. FORBES PARK338 SCRA 346 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: P filed an injunction suit to stop D from suspending all permit’s of entry for P’spersonnel in the construction site. D filed a motion to dismiss. The case was eventuallydismissed with finality. D subsequently filed a complaint for damages against P for alleged violation of certain deed restrictions.

Issue: Whether D’s separate suit should be given due course.

Held: No. D should have set it up as a compulsory counterclaim in the first case. Theprior case and the instant case arose from the same occurrence and the issues of factand law in both cases are identical. Since D filed a motion to dismiss in the previouscase, his compulsory counterclaim that should have been filed at that time is now

barred. The filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaimare incompatible remedies. If the dismissal of the main action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismissthe complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim.

ALDAY V. FGU INSURANCE350 SCRA 113 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P filed a case against insurance agent D. D filed an answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right to be paid commission and prayed for damages. Pmoved to dismiss D’s counterclaim for being merely permissive in nature and D failed topay the required docket fees.

Issue: Whether D’s counterclaim is merely permissive in nature.

Held: Yes. The criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether acounterclaim is permissive or compulsory is as follows:

1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largelythe same?

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2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent thecompulsory counterclaim rule?

3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as wellas defendant’s counterclaim?

4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counter claim?Another test is the “compelling test of compulsoriness,” which requires a “logicalrelationship between the claim and the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separatetrials of the parties’ respective claims would entail a substantial duplication of effort andtime by the parties and the court.”

Tested against these standards, D’s counterclaim is merely permissive. Only her claims for damages allegedly suffered as a result of P’s filing of the complaint arecompulsory. In order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissivecounterclaim, D is bound to pay the prescribed docket fee.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN CASES OF COMPLAINTS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OR TRO

GONZALES V. STATE PROPERTIES350 SCRA 311 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P filed a case against D for recovery of property against D and his brothers andsisters. P’s complaint was accompanied by an application for preliminary injunctionand/or TRO. The case was raffled but D requested that another raffle be held becausethe other defendants did not receive notice of the raffle. Summons was served bypublication on all defendants (except D) because their residences could not beascertained despite diligent inquiry. Again, D opposed the holding of a raffle on theground that the other defendants were not duly notified.

Issue: Whether the notice requirement prior to raffle was properly complied with.

Held: Yes. § 4 (c) Rule 58 states that the prerequisites for conducting a raffle whenthere is a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction/TRO are (1) notice to and (2)presence of the adverse party or person to be enjoined. This rule also provides that thenotice shall be preceded or accompanied by a service of summons to the adverseparty/person to be enjoined. The 2nd paragraph of the rule states that the required prior or contemporaneous service of summons in the ff. instances: (a) when summons cannotbe served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts (b) when theadverse party is a resident of the Phils. temporarily absent therefrom, or (c) when suchparty is a nonresident. In such event, the notice of raffle and the presence of the adverseparty must also be dispensed with. In this case, the situation in par. (a) applies so theraffle may therefore proceed even without notice to and the presence of the parties.

SERVICE OF PROCESSES

TCL SALES V. TENG349 SCRA 35 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: D received a copy of the decision of the SEC en banc on June 14. D filed amotion for reconsideration on June 23 (13 th day). D received the order denying thismotion on Aug. 6. D filed a petition for review with the CA on Sept. 25. CA held that Dshould have filed the petition not later that Aug. 21 or 15 days after Aug. 6.

Issue: Whether the period should be counted from D’s receipt of the order.

Held: No. Where a party is represented by counsel, service of process must be madeon counsel and not on the party. This rule applies to proceedings before the SEC as theRules of Court apply suppletorily thereto.

FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

MC ENGINEERING, INC. & HANIL DEVELOPMENT V. NLRC28 June 2001

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Facts: A copy of the pleading was not personally served to P and there was noexplanation given as to why personal service was not made.

Issue: What is the effect if service of pleadings is not done personally and noexplanation is given therefor?

Held: Service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, bedone personally. If they are made through other modes, the party concerned mustprovide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. Tounderscore the mandatory nature of this rule requiring personal service whenever practicable, § 11 of Rule 13 gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no writtenexplanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place.

SPECIFIC DENIAL

UNITED AIRLINES V. CA20 Apr. 2001

Facts: P filed a case against D. In the Complaint, P alleged that, at 9:45 a.m., Pchecked in at D’s designated counter. In his Answer, D denies that P checked in at 9:45a.m., for “lack of knowledge or information at this point in time as to the truth thereof.”

Issue: Is such denial contained in the Answer allowed by the Rules?

Held: No. The rule authorizing an answer that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving suchanswer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of

knowledge is asserted is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledgethat his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue. Whether or not P checked in atD’s designated counter at 9:45 a.m. must necessarily be within P’s knowledge.

PRE-TRIAL

DE GUIA V. DE GUIA04 Apr. 2001

Facts: A notice of pre-trial was served only on the counsel, without expressly directingthe counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrialconference.

Issue: What is the effect of the absence of such notice?

Held: The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void and the judgmentrendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

DE JESUS V. OBNAMIA340 SCRA 1 (Sept. 2000)

Facts: P won an ejectment suit against D. The decision became final and executory and

the judge issued the writ of execution. It appeared that the CA modified the order of execution. Because D refused to vacate, P filed a motion for an alias writ of execution.The motion was set for hearing on April 6 but D’s counsel only received a copy of themotion on that date so D was not represented during the hearing of the motion. The aliaswrit of execution was granted.

Issue: Whether the 3-day notice rule for motions must be followed.

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Held: Yes. Generally, no notice or even prior hearing of such motion for execution isrequired before a writ of execution is issued when a decision has become final.However, there are circumstances in this case which make a hearing and the requisite3-day notice of the same to the adverse party necessary. The execution of the decisionis a contentious matter as there was an issue concerning the modification of the writ.

BUSTOS V. CA350 SCRA 155 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P won in an unlawful detainer case against D. The trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but these were stayed when D filed a petition for certiorari andinjunction. D subsequently became the owner of the land. In another case for accionreivindicatoria, the CA affirmed D’s ownership over the land.

Issue: Whether D could be ejected from what is now his own land.

Held: No. Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory.

However the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions: as in special and exceptional cases where it becomesimperative in the higher degree of justice to direct suspension of its execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts andcircumstances transpired after the judgment became final that would render theexecution of the judgment unjust.

In this case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that D is now the legalowner of the land. Allowing the execution of judgment would result to grave injustice andthe issue of possession was already rendered moot when the court adjudicatedownership to D.

SANTOS V. SILVA349 SCRA 426 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: Writs of execution and demolition were issued in favor of P. The structures weredemolished pursuant to the writ. D complained that the clerk of court illegally expandedthe coverage of the demolition order.

Issue: Whether the clerk of court could validly amend the writ on his own initiative.

Held: No. By expanding the coverage of the writ, the clerk of court illegally arrogatedunto himself the exercise of judicial discretion. Before he or she can amend the writ, thecourt’s order granting the issuance should first be amended. Indeed, the preparation of awrit of execution is the duty of the clerk of court. But the performance of such duty is

under the supervision and control of the judge and the clerk of court cannot amend thewrit on his own initiative.

RES JUDICATA

Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA01 Feb. 2001

Facts: P bought 2 parcels of land from X but no decree of registration had yet beenissued. P filed a forcible entry case against D. 3 months later, a decree of registrationwas issued in favor of P. D claimed that the land was “swamp land” and that he had aFisheries Lease Agreement. The trial court dismissed the complaint. P filed another

action to assert ownership over the property.

Issue: Is the present action barred by res judicata?

Held: No. The earlier action filed by P was for forcible entry which involved only theissue of physical possession and not ownership. Meanwhile, the instant case is anaccion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an elementof ownership. A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action

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between the same parties respecting title or ownership because there is no identity of causes of action.

MOTIONS

FAJARDO V. CA20 Mar. 2001

Facts: B sued F for collection of attorney’s fees. After the presentation of evidence, theTC rendered a decision in favor of B. F, alleging that she received a copy of the decisionon Jan. 19, filed a notice of appeal on Feb. 3. On the same day, the TC denied thenotice of appeal for being premature as there was a pending motion for correction of

judgment. After granting the motion for correction, the TC granted the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. Issue: Whether the court erred in issuing a writ of execution.

Held: Yes. The motion for correction was defective, as it did not have a proper noticeof hearing. Such defect reduced the motion to a mere scrap of paper which may not betaken cognizance of by the court. This is required under §§ 4 and 5 of Rule 15. Therationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing,the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to themotion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ABRAHAM V. NLRC6 Mar 2001

Facts: P filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against D. Labor Arbiter rendered adecision in favor of P. NLRC at first upheld the decision but reversed later upon motionfor reconsideration by D. P immediately went to CA via Rule 65 certiorari. CA dismissedthe petition on the ground that she failed to file a motion for reconsideration (MFR).

Issue: Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition?

Held: No. Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correctits imputed errors. However, this is subject to exceptions, among which are: where thequestions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon bythe lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

and, where the MFR would be useless. In the present case, NLRC was clearly given theopportunity to review its ruling and correct itself when D filed its MFR. In fact, it grantedthe MFR filed by the D. Thus, the NLRC had more than one opportunity to resolve theissues of the case and in fact reversed itself upon reconsideration. It is highly improbablethat the NLRC would reverse itself again.

APPEAL

FAJARDO V. CA20 Mar 2001

Facts: F lost in the case filed against him. F received the copy of the decision on Dec.

15. F’s counsel received a copy only on Jan. 19. F filed a notice of appeal on Feb. 3.

Issue: Whether the appeal was timely filed.

Held: Yes. While the copy was received by F on Dec. 15, the copy of the decision wasreceived by F’s counsel only on Jan. 19. The 15-day period for filing the appeal shouldbe counted from the date when petitioner’s counsel received a copy of said judgment.

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When a party is represented by counsel, service of process must be made on counsel,not on the party. (§ 2, Rule 13)

METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA17 Apr. 2001

Facts: D was declared in default. The RTC rendered a Decision ordering him to pay P asum of money. The Decision became final and executory. After executing on the variousproperties owned by D, the RTC directed the sheriff to sell at a public auction the ClubFilipino share owned by D. A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of P as purchaser of that share. P then filed a Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate. TheRTC issued an Order denying the Motion. P then filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwhich was denied.

Issue: Can D appeal from the denial of the Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale and to declare the sale void?

Held: Yes. As provided in § 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, one who hasbeen declared in default may appeal, without need of an order lifting the default. Thedenial of the Motion being final in character, and not merely interlocutory, he is allowedby the Rules to appeal therefrom. The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutoryor final is: “Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the meritsof the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final.

APPEAL—UNASSIGNED ERRORS

LUDO AND LUYM V. CA01 Feb 2001

Facts: P sued D because D’s ship allegedly rammed and destroyed P’s fender pileclusters used for docking at the wharf. The trial court ruled in favor of P and ordered D topay damages. The CA reversed. P argued that D did not assign as an error theeyewitness’ incompetence to testify on the negligence of the ship’s officers and crew sothat matter should not have been disturbed by the CA.

Issue: Did the CA go beyond the issues raised?

Held: No. The SC noted that while the witness’ incompetence was not one of theassigned errors in D’s brief, the latter raised it in connection with the issue of their negligence. The CA, therefore, did not err in addressing the matter because an appellatecourt can consider an unassigned error on which depends the determination of thequestion in the properly assigned error. The issue of negligence of the ship’s officers andcrew depends significantly on the determination of whether the witness is competent totestify on the maneuvering of a docking vessel.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

DBP V. CA et. al.06 June 2001

Facts: P, a government financial institution, lost in a case against D. P filed a notice of appeal and requested for an extension to file appellant’s brief. The appellate courtgranted a number of extensions. P failed to filed its appellant’s brief within the lastextended period accorded to it by the appellate court

Issue: What is the difference between the failure to file a notice of appeal within thereglementary period and the failure to file a brief within the period granted by theappellate court?

Held: Failure to file a notice of appeal results in the failure of the appellate court toacquire jurisdiction over the appealed decision, resulting in its becoming final and

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executory upon failure of the appellant to move for reconsideration. Failure to file a brief within the period granted simply results in the abandonment of the appeal which couldlead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its reconsideration, in which case theappealed decision would also become final and executory, but prior thereto, theappellate court shall have obtained jurisdiction of the appealed decision. There is moreleeway to exempt a case from the strictures of procedural rules when the appellate courthas already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case.

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PLEADINGS

DBP V. CA et. al.06 June 2001

Facts: P appealed to the CA. P filed a motion for extension to file the appellant’s brief.

Issue: When may extensions to file pleadings be granted?

Held: An extension will only be granted if there is good and sufficient cause, and if themotion asking for the same is filed before the expiration of the time sought to beextended. The granting of an extension, including the duration thereof, lies within thesound discretion of the court, to be exercised in accordance with the attendantcircumstances of each case. However, the movant is not justified in assuming that theextension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time sought.Thus, it is the duty of the movant for extension to exercise due diligence and informhimself as soon as possible of the appellate court’s action on his motion.

CERTIORARI

ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ V. PHIL. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE349 SCRA 240 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: PEZA received the unfavorable order of the trial court on Aug. 11. It filed amotion for reconsideration on the 15th day. PEZA received the order denying the motionon Nov. 23. On Nov. 27, PEZA filed a petition for certiorari. D argued that the petition for certiorari filed by PEZA was actually a substitute for lost appeal that should not beentertained. According to D, the rule that a petition for certiorari can be availed of despitethe fact that the proper remedy is an appeal only applies in cases where the petition isfiled within the reglementary period for appeal (as in the cases of Aguilar v. Tan andBautista v. Sarmiento).

Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari should be allowed to prosper.

Held: Yes. There was grave abuse of discretion in this case and appeal was not aplain, speedy and adequate remedy so the petition for certiorari was proper. The SCfound D’s interpretation to be too restrictive. The said cases do not set as a conditionsine qua non the filing of a petition for certiorari within the 15-day period to appeal inorder for the said petition to be entertained by the court. To espouse D’s contentionwould render inutile the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

PCGG V. DESIERTO349 SCRA 767 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The PCGG received a copy of the assailed resolution on 8 April. It filed a motion

for reconsideration on 12 April. On 6 August, it received a copy of the order denying itsmotion. PCGG filed a petition for certiorari on 5 October.

Issue: Whether the petition was timely filed.

Held: Yes. Indeed, pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thepetition should have been filed on 2 October so the petition should have been dismissedfor late filing. However, during the pendency of the case, SC promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-

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03-SC (effective 1 Sept. 2000) which provided: “In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period shallbe counted from notice of the denial of said motion.” In view of the retroactive applicationof procedural laws, the petition should be considered timely filed.

UNITY FISHING V. CA02 Feb. 2001

Facts: The NLRC-Resolution denying P’s motion for reconsideration was received by Pon Oct. 6. P filed a petition for certiorari on Dec. 6.

Issue: Was the petition for certiorari filed within the reglementary period?

Held: Yes. Under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, amending § 4, Rule 65, the 60-day period tofile a petition for certiorari is reckoned from the receipt of the resolution denying themotion for reconsideration. Applying the amendment, the last day for filing the petition for certiorari should have been Dec. 5. Dec. 5 being a Sunday, the time shall not run until

the next working day pursuant to Rule 22.

INDIANA V. CHED04 Apr. 2001

Facts: The Indiana Aerospace University filed a complaint for damages against theCommission on Higher Education (“CHED”) before the RTC. The RTC denied CHED’smotion to dismiss. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, CHED filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.

Issue: Does CHED’s Petition for Certiorari require a prior resort to a motion for reconsideration?

Held: No. The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity tocorrect itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. This rule,however, is subject to certain exceptions such as: (1) the issues raised are purely legalin nature; (2) public interest is involved; (3) extreme urgency is obvious; or (4) specialcircumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. It is patently clear that theregulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, isinvested with public interest. Thus CHED’s Petition for Certiorari did not require prior resort to a motion for reconsideration.

DEPOSITIONS

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN30 May 2001

Facts: Before the defendants have filed their answers, the prosecution moved to takethe deposition of X. The prosecution alleges that X, who has been out of the country,would give vital testimony but would not return to the country because he fears for hissafety.

Issue: Is there a valid reason for the court to allow the taking of X’s deposition?

Held: None. The general rule is that a plaintiff may not be permitted to takedepositions before answer is served. However, deposition is allowed to be taken before

service of answer where conditions point to the necessity of presenting a strong case for allowance of the motion. In this case, no proof, much less any allegation, has beenpresented to show there exists a real threat to X’s life once he returns to the Philippinesand that adequate security cannot be provided for such a vital witness.

ATTACHMENT

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CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN349 SCRA 745 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The government filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against severalindividuals, including D, for restitution of ill-gotten wealth. The government asked for theissuance of a writ of attachment and this was granted. D assailed the propriety of theissuance of the writ.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the writ was proper.

Held: Yes. In order to quash a writ of attachment, a party may file a counterbond (Rule57 § 12) or to quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidentlyissued (Rule 57 § 13). The grounds cited by D have nothing to do with the issuance of the writ. His grounds were facts that took place after the writ had already beenimplemented. Supervening events, which may or may not justify the discharge of thewrit, are not within the purview of Rule 57 § 13.

LITIS PENDENTIA

SHANGRI-LA INTERNATIONAL HOTEL V. CA21 June 2001

Facts: A case for the cancellation of a mark with the Bureau of Legal Affairs, IntellectualProperty Office was filed by P. D filed a subsequent action for infringement against Pwith the regular courts in connection with the same registered mark.

Issue: Whether the administrative case for cancellation barred the filing of aninfringement case with the court.

Held: No. The earlier case for cancellation of a mark cannot effectively bar thesubsequent filing of an infringement case by the registrant of such mark. The certificateof registration still subsists and is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration,as such a corresponding infringement suit may be filed against the party who infringeson the rights of the registrant.

BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT BANK V. CA29 June 2001

Facts: There was an existing case involving P and D. D sought the dismissal of thepresent case on the ground of litis pendentia.

Issue: What are the requisites of litis pendentia?

Held: Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to a situationwherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It must conformto the following requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who representthe same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, therelief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with respect to the two (2)preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may berendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount tores judicata in the other case.

RULE 45

PENGSON V. OCAMPO, et. al.29 June 2001

Facts: P filed an ejectment case against D before the MTC. D averred that she is a co-owner of such land being a compulsory heir of its original owners. MTC ruled in favor of D, holding that she is a legitimate daughter of the original owners. RTC affirmed. CA

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reversed. Hence, this certiorari proceeding under Rule 45.

Issue: Whether a petition for review under Rule 45 is proper.

Held: No. The jurisdiction of SC in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 islimited to reviewing errors or questions of law. It is the burden of the party seekingreview of a decision of the CA or other lower tribunals to distinctly set forth in his petitionfor review, not only the existence of questions of law fairly and logically arisingtherefrom, but also questions substantial enough to merit consideration, or show thatthere are special and important reasons warranting the review that he seeks. If these arenot shown prima facie in the petition, the Court will be justified in summarily spurning thepetition as lacking in merit.

APPEAL /PETITION FOR REVIEW /CERTIORARI—DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE ATTACHED

CUSI-HERNANDEZ V. DIAZ336 SCRA 113 (July 2000)

Facts: P filed a case of accion publiciana against D. They had a contract to sell but Prescinded this because D failed to fulfill his obligation. D refused to vacate the premises.The MTC ruled in favor of P but RTC reversed. The CA denied due course to P’s appealbecause of her failure to attach a certified true copy of the contract to sell.

Issue: Whether there was a need to attach the contract to sell.

Held: No. Attached to the petition for review were original duplicate copies of the RTCand MTC decisions. The SC found that the MTC decision reproduced verbatim thecontract to sell, which is central to the dispute. There was substantial compliance with §2 Rule 42. In Caydona v. CA, it was held that “we do not construe § 2 (d) of Rule 42 as

imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition shouldbe certified as true copies.”

ATILLO V. BOMBAY07 Feb. 2001

Facts: D entered into a Lease Agreement with P, alleged owner of Alto CommercialBuilding. D failed to pay her rentals so P filed an action for ejectment which the MTCdismissed. RTC reversed; CA dismissed on D’s failure to attach pleadings and other material portions of the record of the case in violation of Rule 42 § 2(d).

Issue: Is § 2(d) of Rule 42 mandatory, or merely directory?

Held: Mandatory, and therefore non-compliance with the § 2(d) is a ground for thedismissal of a petition based on § 3 of the same rule. The phrase “of the pleadings andother material portions of the record” in § 2(d) is followed by the phrase “as wouldsupport the allegations of the petition.” This contemplates the exercise of discretion onthe part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant tothe petition. However, while it is true that it is petitioner who initially exercises thediscretion in selecting the relevant supporting documents that will be appended to thepetition, it is the CA that will ultimately determine if the supporting documents aresufficient to even make out a prima facie case.

PARAS V. BALDADO08 Mar. 2001

Facts: In an estate proceeding, petitioners moved to inhibit the respondent judge on theground of bias. The judge refused to do so. Certiorari with CA. CA dismissed on theground of failure to attach a certified true copy of impugned order as required by § 1 of Rule 65 as what was attached was a mere plain xerox copy of the order.

Issue: Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition?

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Held: No. The filing of original actions for certiorari in the CA is governed by § 3, Rule46 which mandates a certified true copy of the impugned order as a jurisdictionalrequirement. In this case, the CA was correct in disregarding the copies of the RTCorders even if these were certified by a notary public. However, the records reveal thatduplicate original copies were in fact attached to one of the seven copies of the petitionfiled with the CA, moreover, copies of the same orders, this time accomplished by theclerk of court, were submitted by petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus,the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the requirement and the CAshould have given the petition due course.

VERIFICATION

UY V. LANDBANK336 SCRA 419 (July 2000)

Facts: P filed an unlawful detainer case against D. It reached the SC. D filed a petition

for review with the SC. On 15 Feb. the SC denied the petition for (1) lack of certificationagainst forum shopping and (2) lack of verification. Before D’s counsel received theResolution denying the petition, he filed a Motion for Admission of Verification andCertification against Forum Shopping on 4 March.

Issue: Whether the (1) lack of verification and (2) certification against forum shoppingmay be cured by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.

Held: (1) Yes. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, thenon-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the

pleading are true and correct and not the product of imagination or speculation, and thatthe pleading is filed in good faith.

(2) Generally, no. Rule 45 § 5 provides that failure of petitioner to submit therequired documents that should accompany the petition, including the certificationagainst forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. But the SCmay find special circumstances or compelling reasons for the reinstatement of thepetition as what occurred in this case.

CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

LOQUIAS V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN338 SCRA 62 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: A sworn complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman charging A, B, C,and D with the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsmanfound probable cause and recommended the filing of the information. The accused fileda petition for certiorari. The Ombudsman argued that the petition did not comply withRule 7 § 5 because the verification against forum shopping was signed only by B andnot by all petitioners.

Issue: Whether there was substantial compliance with § 5 Rule 7.

Held: No. The petition is defective. There was no showing that B was authorized by hisco-petitioners to represent them and to sign the certification. It cannot be presumed that

B knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.

DAR V. ALONZO-LEGASTO339 SCRA 306 (Aug. 2000)

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Facts: Spouses X and Y in an unlawful detainer case filed by P. They were sued as “Mr.and Mrs.” They filed a petition for review with the C. This petition was dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping since it wassigned by X only.

Issue: Whether there was substantial compliance with the Rule on Certification againstForum Shopping.

Held: Yes. With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader mayprepare, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. While the rule requiresthat it be strictly complied with, it merely underscores its mandatory nature in that itcannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded but itdoes not prevent substantial compliance on the aspect of its provisions under justifiablecircumstances. In this case, it should be noted that X and Y were sued jointly asspouses over a property in which they have a common interest. The signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule.

SOLLER V. COMELEC339 SCRA 685 (Sept. 2000)

Facts: P filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of the proclamation of D asmayor. He also filed with the RTC an election protest against D. D moved to dismiss theprotest on the ground of forum shopping. P argued that he did not need to disclose in hiselection protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of proclamation because hedeemed the COMELEC petition abandoned upon the filing of the protest.

Issue: Whether P should comply with the certification of non-forum shopping.

Held: Yes. Before the COMELEC dismissed P’s petition for annulment of

proclamation, this was legally still pending resolution and he should have disclosed theexistence of such action in his election protest. The fact that P’s protest was not basedon the same cause of action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for notcomplying with the rule. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping ismandatory. The rule applies to any complaint, petition, application, or other initiatorypleading, regardless of whether the party filing it has actually committed forum shopping.

DOCENA V. LAPESURA28 March 2001

Facts: P filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,spouses H and W. TC ruled in favor of P. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that

only one of the petitioners signed the certification of non-forum shopping.

Issue: Was the dismissal correct?

Held: No. It has been the Court’s previous ruling that all the petitioners should sign thecertificate of non-forum shopping or plaintiffs in a case and that the signing by only oneof them is insufficient. In the case at bar, however, we hold that there is substantialcompliance. There are only 2 petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife.The certification was signed stating that “he and his wife…” The property subject of theoriginal action for recovery is conjugal. Under the Family Code, management or administration belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However, each spouse mayvalidly exercise full power of management alone, subject only to the intervention of the

Court. Thus, such omission is not a fatal defect.

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

UY V. SANTIAGO336 SCRA 680 (July 2000)

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Facts: MTC ruled in favor of P in an ejectment case. D appealed to the RTC. The RTCaffirmed the MTC ruling in toto. P filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution pendingappeal to which D filed his opposition. Meanwhile, D filed a petition for review with theCA assailing the RTC decision in the ejectment case. RTC judge denied executionpending appeal because D perfected his appeal, filed a supersedeas bond and gaveperiodic deposits of the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.

Issue: Whether the decision of the RTC in the appealed ejectment case is immediatelyexecutory pending appeal.

Held: Yes. It is only execution of the MTC judgment pending appeal with the RTC,which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites, provided in Rule 79 § 19. Onthe other hand, once the RTC has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, suchdecision shall under Rule 70 § 21, be immediately executory, without prejudice to anappeal via a petition for review with the CA and/or SC.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

BASCO V. CA337 SCRA 472 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: A was convicted of illegal possession of firearm. On the last day of filing anappeal, A’s counsel submitted a motion fro reconsideration without the required notice of hearing. 8 days later, counsel submitted a notification and manifestation in an attempt torectify the error. RTC denied both the motion for reconsideration and the notification andmanifestation. A filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 38, which wasalso denied for lack of merit. A then appealed the order of denial to the CA.

Issue: Whether an order denying a petition for relief is appealable.

Held: No. Under the old Rules of Court, a judgment or order denying relief under Rule38 is final and appealable. However, under the 1997 Amended Rules of Procedure, anorder denying a petition for relief is no longer subject to appeal. The aggrieved party’srecourse is to file the appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

DAP MINING ASSOCIATION V. CA, et. al.6 June 2001

Facts: P failed to file an appeal of the decision of the Director of Mines within the 5-dayreglementary period prescribed by Sec. 50 of P.D. 463. P filed a petition for relief from

judgment but it was not accompanied by affidavits of merit.

Issue: Whether the petition for relief should be allowed to prosper.

Held: No. A petition for relief is a special remedy designed to give a party a lastchance to defend his right or protect his interest. It is a relief that can only be availed of in exceptional cases. Being an act of grace, so designed as it were to give the aggrievedparty a second opportunity, the extraordinary period fixed therefor must be considerednon-extendible and not subject to condition or contingency. In this case, the petition for relief failed to be accompanied by affidavits of merit, showing the fraud, accident,mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense. These affidavits of merit would serve as theindispensable basis for a court to be called upon to entertain a petition for relief.

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT

TRINIDAD V. CA6 June 2001

Facts: P sought to annul the final judgment rendered against his interest.

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Issue: Whether the petition to annul judgment was timely filed.

Held: No. The petition to annul the judgment of the trial court was filed more than 6months after the judgment had become final and executory. The action to annul thecompromise judgment should even be deemed barred under Rule 38 § 3 providing thatthe judgment could only be set aside if the action were brought within 60 days after petitioners’ knowledge of the judgment but in no case later than six months after itsentry.

INJUNCTION

CANSON V. HIDALGO337 SCRA 293 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: CAPCOM Regional Director ordered the re-assignment of P, a police officer.Instead of complying with the directive, P filed a petition for prohibition with preliminaryinjunction with the RTC to enjoin the enforcement of the directive. RTC granted

preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether the court may enjoin the assignment/re-assignment of a police officer.

Held: No. The court has no supervisory power over the officers and men of thenational police, unless the acts of the latter are plainly done in grave abuse of discretionor beyond the competence of the functions or jurisdiction of their office. In this case,there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CAPCOM RegionalDirector. Courts cannot by injunction review, overrule or otherwise interfere with the validacts of police officials.

IDOLOR V. CA07 Feb. 2001

Facts: X, whose mortgaged property was foreclosed and sold in a public auction, failedto exercise her right of redemption within the proper period. X then filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff’s sale against the buyers with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Should the writ of preliminary injunction be issued?

Held: No. X failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to beprotected as her right of redemption had already expired two days before the filing of thecomplaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has

insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought.

URBANES V. CA28 March 2001

Facts: X agency participated in a public bidding to secure a contract providing securityservices to the SSS. However, the contract was awarded to Y. Claiming thatirregularities and anomalies attended the public bidding, X filed an action for injunction toprevent the awarding of the contract to Y. X asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as well. TC issued the writ. CA set it aside and also dismissed themain action.

Issue: Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion?

Held: Yes. The CA overstepped its boundaries when it dismissed the main action.The issue to be resolved was only in respect to the writ of preliminary injunction. Themain action of injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinctfrom the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

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SPOUSES CRYSTAL V. CEBU INT’L SCHOOL04 Apr. 2001

Facts: X was not able to pay the required school fees on time. Thus, X was not enrolledin Y school. X filed a complaint against Y school, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.

Issue: Should the writ be issued?

Held: No. X failed to show that he has a clear and unmistakable right that has beenviolated. The right to enroll in a private school is not absolute; it is subject to “fair,reasonable and equitable requirements.” X has no right or standing to pray for theissuance of an injunctive writ, because he failed to pay the required school fees on time.Moreover, X has not shown any urgent and permanent necessity for it, considering thatX is already enrolled in another school.

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT

VIRGILIO V. PATRICIA340 SCRA 525 (Sept. 2000)

Facts: P won in an unlawful detainer case against D. On appeal, RTC reversed andruled in favor of D. P filed a motion for clarificatory judgment. Without waiting for theresolution of the motion, P filed a petition for review with the CA. D argued that thepetition for review was premature. For D, because of the pendency of P’s motion, therewas no final judgment or decision that could be the subject of a petition for review.

Issue: Was the petition for review premature because of the pendency of the motion for clarificatory judgment?

Held: No. A motion for clarificatory judgment, not being in the character of a motion for reconsideration, does not toll the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. Itsfiling will not bar the judgment from attaining finality, nor will its resolution amen thedecision to be reviewed.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

SPS. MIRASOL V. CA01 Feb. 2001

Facts: Spouses H and W entered into a crop loaning financing scheme with PNB. PNB

was empowered as the spouses attorney-in-fact and could sell their sugar in order toapply the proceeds to the payment of obligation. The spouses wanted an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar but PNB ignored their requests. Come timeto settle their obligations, it was found that H and W owed PNB around 15.9 millionpesos. The spouses claimed that had PNB made the accounting, it would have foundout that the proceeds were enough to cover the obligation. They then filed a suit for accounting, specific performance and damages against the latter.

Issue: Should the Sol Gen be notified in respect to actions for declaratory relief?

Held: Yes. Rule 63 § 3 of the Rules of Court require notice to the Solicitor General.The mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions for declaratory relief but in

fact extends to “any action” contrary to the spouses’ contention that said rule appliesonly to actions for declaratory relief and not to the present action which is only for accounting, specific performance and damages.

SPOUSES LIM V. CRUZ04 Apr. 2001

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Facts: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by P against D. P caused the annotationof a notice of lis pendens at the back of the TCT covering the said subject land. A motionto cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by D, on the ground that a notice of lis pendenscannot be granted on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale.

Issue: Can a notice of lis pendens be granted, even on the basis of an unregistereddeed of sale?

Held: Yes. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in therules which requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him.In fact, there is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the noticemust prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. Hence, evenon the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotatedon the title.

SPOUSES LIM V. CRUZ04 Apr. 2001

Facts: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by P against D. P caused the annotationof a notice of lis pendens at the back of the TCT covering the said subject land. A motionto cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by D. The judge issued an order canceling thenotice of lis pendens annotated at the back of a party’s TCT upon D’s posting of anindemnity bond.

Issue: Can the court allow D to file a bond in substitution of the notice of lis pendens?

Held: No. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy andnecessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or

decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would be rendered meaningless if D isallowed to file a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of the notice.

OMNIBUS MOTION

MEDISERV V. CHINA BANKING17 Apr. 2001

Facts: D was declared in default. D filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to lift Order of Default;and (b) dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice. The Omnibus Motion was not under oath,and the Affidavit of Merit failed to aver any fact which constitutes movant’s good andsubstantial defense nor allege circumstances constituting D’s mistake or excusable

negligence.

Issue: Should the Omnibus Motion be granted?

Held: No. The Omnibus Motion was not under oath as required in Rule 9, Sec. 3 (b),and the Affidavit of Merit is defective for failing to aver any fact which constitutesmovant’s good and substantial defense nor allege circumstances constituting D’smistake or excusable negligence.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EVADEL V. SPOUSES SORIANO20 Apr. 2001

Facts: P filed against D an action to recover ownership over real property. P seeks torecover a certain portion of land with a total area of 2,450 square meters from D whichportion was allegedly in excess of the total area of the property actually sold by them tothe latter. In his Answer, D admitted the existence and due execution of the Contract tosell which contained the specific description of the property it bought from P.

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Issue: Is there a genuine issue as to any material fact?

Held: No. There is no genuine issue of fact as to ownership of the subject propertybecause the admissions made by D in its Answer are tantamount to an admission that Powned the property in question. Thus, the court may summarily resolve the issue of ownership of the subject property.

PERSONS BOUND BY JUDGMENT IN AN EJECTMENT SUIT

EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. KU26 March 2001

Facts: P mortgaged property to D. However, due to default in the payment of the loan, Dinstituted extrajudicial foreclosure and was issued a new certificate of title in his name.D then filed an action for ejectment against P’s father. The order directing the father tovacate became final. P appealed claiming that she was deprived of due process, as shewas not made a party to the ejectment suit.

Issue: Should P have been impleaded in the ejectment suit?

Held: No. Generally, no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is astranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.Nevertheless, a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants inthe suit but also those not made parties if they are trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; guests or other occupants with defendant’s permission; transferees pendente lite; sub-lessees; co-lessees; members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant. P, being thedaughter, is bound.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

GARCIA V. CA et. al.6 June 2001

Facts: An administrative case was filed against A before the PCA. A filed a case withthe CA arguing that there was violation of administrative due process. The CA refused totake cognizance of the case for A’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies.

Held: Yes. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse

through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies wouldhave first been exhausted. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of action, and it istoo significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts. This traditional attitude of thecourts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of theparty litigants and respect for a coequal office in the government. If a remedy is availablewithin the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can bemade to (the) courts. Even comity dictates that unless the available administrativeremedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to actand correct the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must beheld to be inappropriate and impermissible.

A argued that his case should have been viewed as an exception from theprinciple of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A cannot deny that he has been able

to effectively, if not deliberately, delayed the resolution of the administrative case againsthim due to his repeated requests for extension of time to file answer and hisinexcusable refusal to attend the scheduled hearings thereon despite due notice .A's invocation that his failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be EXCEPTEDby the fact that irreparable damage would ensue upon his overdue suspension andillegal ouster from office cannot be countenanced.

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EVIDENCE

IMPEACHMENT BY BIAS

PEOPLE V. PERALTA350 SCRA 198 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was found guilty of murder. A attempted to impeach the credibility of 3prosecution witnesses, especially witness W. A pointed out that W testified that as thevictim’s fraternity brother, he would do “anything and everything” for the victim.

Issue: Whether A was able to properly impeach the witnesses on account of bias.

Held: No. A witness may be said to biased when his relation to the cause or to theparties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color or pervert thetruth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness, the counsel must lay the

proper foundation of the bias by asking the witness facts constituting the bias. In thiscase, there was no proper impeachment by bias of the 3 prosecution witnesses. W’stestimony that he would do anything for his fellow brothers was too broad and general soas to constitute a motive to lie before the court.

PEOPLE V. MACANDOG et. al.6 June 2001

Facts: A was accused of the murder of V. E, a witness of the prosecution, testified thatA was among those present at the crime scene. A argued that E’s testimony should nothave been given credence because she was biased, as she was the sister of thedeceased.

Issue: Whether E is a biased witness.

Held: No. The fact that E is the sister of deceased does not per se make her a biasedwitness. Mere relationship of the victim to a witness does not automatically impair her credibility and render her testimony less worthy of credence where no improper motivecan be ascribed. Such relationship lends more credence to the testimony consideringher natural interest to see the guilty punished. It would be unnatural for a relative who isinterested in vindicating the crime to accuse anyone other than the real culprit.

CHILD WITNESS

PEOPLE V. RAMA350 SCRA 266 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was found guilty of kidnapping a baby. W, the 5-year old cousin of the victim,identified A as the one who took the victim. A contended that W’s testimony, comingfrom the mouth of a 5-year old, does not deserve credit because she could not answer many questions and appeared to have been coached by her grandmother.

Issue: Whether W is disqualified as a witness.

Held: No. The requirements of a child’s competency as a witness are the: (a) capacityof observation, (b) capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of communication. Professor Wigmore said that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity. In thiscase, while the 5-year old witness was not able to answer some questions, she wasstraightforward in identifying A as the culprit. This is in accord with the Rule onExamination of a Child Witness (became effective Dec. 15, 2000), which provides in § 6(a) that the age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competencyexamination.

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PROOF OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION

PEOPLE V. FELWA20 Apr. 2001

Facts: A was charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. In the course of thetrial, the prosecution attempted to bring out A’s former conviction of another crime.

Issue: Can the proof of A’s past conviction be used to prove his guilt of the crimecharged?

Held: No. A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may onlyprove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to provethat the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case.

OPINION RULE

PEOPLE V. DURANAN349 SCRA 180 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was found guilty of rape. The victim’s mother testified as to the mentalcondition of her daughter. The victim was considered retarded and A was sentencedaccordingly. A contended that since the victim’s mental age was not proven, he cannotbe convicted of rape of a mental retardate.

Issue: Whether the testimony of the victim’s mother was sufficient to establish themental condition of the victim.

Held: Yes. The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not apsychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she wasborn, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify onthese matters. This is in accordance with the exception to the opinion rule provided inRule 130 § 50.

HEARSAY

PEOPLE V. GARCIA335 SCRA 208 (July 2000)

Facts: A was convicted of murder. The police officer who prepared the informationtestified that he was informed by X and Y of the identity of the assailant. However, X and

Y did not actually see the assailants but merely heard the news from others.

Issue: Whether the police officer’s testimony as to the identity of the assailants isadmissible.

Held: No. The information given by X and Y to the police officer was hearsay. Thepolice officer’s testimony is even multiple hearsay, since it is based upon “third hand”information related to the witness by someone who heard it from others.

GO V. CA5 Feb. 2001

Facts: The prosecution sought to establish the fact that a certain checkbook wasdelivered personally to Mr. A by presenting the testimony of X, who testified that Y toldher that he left the checkbook on top of Mr. A’s table.

Issue: Is X’s testimony admissible?

Held: No. X’s testimony is hearsay. It does not appear that X has first-hand knowledgethat the checkbook was indeed delivered to Mr. A.

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ESTRADA V. ANIANO DESIERTO03 Apr. 2001

Facts: The Supreme Court, in a prior decision, used the Angara Diary (“AD”) toestablish Estrada’s intent to resign.

Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule against the admission of hearsayevidence?

Held: No.1. The AD is not an out of court statement. The AD is part of the pleadings in the

cases at bar. Estrada (E) cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of theAD. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said diary wasfrequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. E had all the opportunity tocontest the use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do so.

2. Even assuming arguendo that the AD was an out of court statement, still its useis not covered by the hearsay rule. The rules of exclusion do not cover admissions of a party and the AD belongs to this class. Although the AD is notthe diary of E, E is bound by it, in accordance with the doctrine of adoptiveadmission. Sec. Angara acted for and in behalf of E in the crucial days beforePres. Arroyo took her oath as President. Admissions of an agent (SecretaryAngara) are binding on the principal (E).

3. Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevantstatements. The AD contains statements of E which reflect his state of mind andare circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign.

SEVILLANA V. I.T. CORP16 Apr. 2001

Facts: In a labor case, the NLRC considered P’s complaint-affidavit as mere hearsayevidence since P was not cross-examined.

Issue: Should the complaint-affidavit be considered hearsay evidence?

Held: No. Labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the least attentionto technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process. In thislight, the NLRC, like the labor arbiter is authorized to decide cases based on the positionpapers and other documents submitted, without resorting to technical rules of evidence.

D.M. CONSUNJI V. CA20 Apr. 2001

Facts: A police officer investigated the death of P and filed a police report. P’s widowfiled in the RTC a complaint for damages against P’s employer, D. The police report wasadmitted in evidence and the police officer who prepared the same testified during trial.

Issue: Was the police report hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible?

Held: The report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of thestatements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of thetestimony of the officer who executed the report. In any case, the Court held thatportions of the report which were of the personal knowledge of the police officer suffice

to prove the cause of death of P.

CITY GOV’T V. MONTEVERDE21 May 2001

Facts: A witness gave hearsay testimony. It was not objected to.

Issue: Does the testimony have probative value?

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Held: No. Hearsay evidence has no probative value, whether objected to or not.

MOLLANEDA V. UMACOB6 June 2001

Facts: An administrative case was filed against A. Complainant sought A’s dismissal asSchools Division Superintendent. Complainant offered in evidence the testimony of witnesses who heard the complainant’s grievance against A. A contended that suchtestimony is hearsay.

Issue: Whether the testimonies of the witnesses constitute hearsay.

Held: No. The testimonies were not presented to prove the truth of complainant’saccusations against A, but only to establish the fact that complainant narrated to themwhat transpired between her and A. While it is true that the testimony of a witnessregarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the

facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purposeof placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statementwas made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it hasbeen made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may beshown. Evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for thestatement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to theexistence of such a fact.

D YING DECLARATIONS

PEOPLE V. PRECIADOS349 SCRA 1 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The prosecution called X to testify on Y’s “dying declaration.” Y, however, wasalive and later even testified in court.

Issue: Is X’s testimony admissible as dying declaration?

Held: No. One of the requisites—that the declarant dies—is missing.

PEOPLE V. MACANDOG et. al.6 June 2001

Facts: V, the victim, was able to tell E the names of his assailants before he died. A, the

accused, questioned the admissibility of V’s statement as a dying declaration.

Issue: Whether V’s statement is admissible as a dying declaration.

Held: Yes. For a dying declaration to be valid and admissible in evidence, the followingrequisites must concur:(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the

declarant’s death;(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness

of an impending death;(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case in which the declarant is the victim.

The positive declaration of the deceased as to the identity of his assailants, given theconsciousness that death is imminent is undoubtedly entitled to great weight consideringthe seriousness of his wounds and his very weak physical condition as shown by the factthat death supervened 30 minutes after his disclosure to E.

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RES GESTAE

PEOPLE V. MANSUETO336 SCRA 715 (July 2000)

Facts: A and B were accused of killing V. The prosecution presented W, the daughter of V, during trial. W identified A as the culprit. A attempted to impeach W’s credibility. Aargued that W’s failure to mention A as the driver of the getaway vehicle when shereported the shooting incident to the police immediately after it occurred should form partof the res gestae. A contended that the omission, as part of the res gestae, should havebeen afforded evidentiary weight.

Issue: Whether res gestae applies.

Held: No. Since W herself testified, there is absolutely no room for the application of the rule on res gestae. Also, subject matters not mentioned or are outside thestatements or explanations given by the declarant do not form part of the res gestae.

PEOPLE V. PALMONES336 SCRA 80 (July 2000)

Facts: A was charged with the crime of murder. Before the victim died, he was able totalk with his nephew W. He told W the names of the assailants. A contended that thedeclaration was hearsay—it was not a dying declaration or a statement constituting partof the res gestae.

Issue: Whether the declaration is admissible.

Held: No. A was correct. The following factors have generally been considered in

determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have beenmade spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement wasmade; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presenceor absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relativethereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. In this case, thedeclaration did not meet the test of spontaneity because: (a) an appreciable amount of time had elapsed before the statement was made; (b) he made the statement at thehospital and not at the scene of the crime; and (c) there was an intervening event (trip tothe hospital) that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation.

PEOPLE V. PRECIADOS349 SCRA 1 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A poisoning incident occurred. X took Y’s ante-mortem statement 39 hours after the incident.

Issue: Is Y’s statement admissible as part of the res gestae?

Held: No. The element of spontaneity is lacking in the alleged ante-mortem statement.39 hours is too long a time to be considered “subsequent immediately to the startlingoccurrence.”

TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

CARIAGA V. CA et. al.6 June 2001

Facts: Prosecution subpoenaed witness W but he failed to appear. Thus, theprosecution offered W’s testimony given out of court and this was admitted. A arguedthat his right to meet the witness against him face to face was violated.

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Issue: Was A’s constitutional right violated when the court admitted W’s out-of-courttestimony?

Held: Yes. The preconditions set forth in § 47 Rule 130 for the admission of testimonygiven by a witness out of court must be strictly complied with and there is more reason toadopt such a strict rule in the case of § 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by § 47, moreimportantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right of anaccused person “to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face” (Toledo, Jr. v.People) In Tan v. CA, it was ruled that ’unable to testify’ or for that matter ‘unavailability’,does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. Thisrule is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence, “mere sending of subpoena andfailure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise itscoercive power to arrest.” In this case, no efforts were exerted to have the witnessarrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses whoare duly subpoenaed fail to appear. The sworn statement of W should not have beenadmitted as evidence for the prosecution.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

LADIGNON V. CA336 SCRA 42 (July 2000)

Facts: P filed a complaint against D for recovery of possession of real property. Pclaimed that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged. D invoked thepresumption of regularity of public documents.

Issue: Whether P was able to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumptionof regularity of public documents.

Held: No. As a public document, the Deed of Absolute Sale had in its favor thepresumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that isclear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant; otherwise the document shouldbe upheld. P’s mere denial will not suffice to overcome the positive value of a notarizeddocument.

AUTHENTICATION

PROPLE V. BANZALES336 SCRA 64 (July 2000)

Facts: A was charged with illegal recruitment. The POEA issued a certificate stating thatA was an unlicensed illegal recruiter. A argued that the prosecution filed to establish 1element of the offense considering that no representative of the POEA was presented incourt to testify as to the authenticity of the certificate.

Issue: Whether authenticity of the certificate needs to be proved.

Held: No. A POEA certification is a public document issued by a public officer in theperformance of an official duty; hence it is prima facie evidence of the facts thereinstated (Rule 132 § 23). Public documents are entitled to a presumption of regularity;consequently, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary.

ESTRADA V. ANIANO DESIERTO03 Apr. 2001

Facts: The Court, in a previous decision, relied not upon the original but only a copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule on authentication of private writings andbest evidence?

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Held: No.1. The Supreme Court, citing Wigmore, stated that: “ Production of the original may bedispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponentdoes not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purposewill be served by requiring publication.2. Estrada had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the AD when he filed hisMemorandum, Supplemental Memorandum and Second Supplemental Memorandum,but he did not object to its admissibility. He was not therefore denied due process.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

PEOPLE V. GIVERA349 SCRA 573 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was charged with murder. The prosecution formally offered the testimony of the medico-legal officer taken in the first case involving 3 other accused for the death of

the same victim.

Issue: Whether the said testimony is admissible.

Held: No. The defense did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the medico-legalofficer so his testimony cannot be used in evidence against the accused.

FORMAL OFFER

PEOPLE V. ROBLES349 SCRA 569 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was charged with the murder of V. At the preliminary investigation stage, 1eyewitness executed an affidavit corroborating the testimony of another witness. But thisaffidavit was not offered in evidence nor was the eyewitness presented during the trial. Itwas argued that the affidavit might be treated as evidence since it formed part of therecords of the preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether the affidavit is admissible.

Held: No. It is merely hearsay. That the affidavit formed part of the record of thepreliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because therecord of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the records of the case inthe RTC. To be considered part of the records of the case, the record of the preliminary

investigation must be introduced as evidence during trial.

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION

GUTANG V. PEOPLE335 SCRA 479 (July 2000)

Facts: A, B, C, and D were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a searchwarrant. The accused argued that the Receipts of Property Seized should not have beenadmitted in evidence because these were obtained in violation of their constitutionalrights. The accused were made to sign the receipts without the assistance of a lawyer.

Issue: Whether the Receipts of Property Seized are admissible.

Held: No. The signature of the accused in the Receipts of Property Seized isinadmissible in evidence because it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. Thesignature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and atacit admission of the crime charged for the reason that, in this case, mere unexplainedpossession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures of the

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accused on the receipts are not admissible, being tantamount to an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.

PEOPLE V. RAYOS7 Feb. 2001

Facts: A was charged and convicted of the rape-slay of a 9-year old mental retardate.He executed an extrajudicial confession but claimed he was only forced to do so by thepolicemen.

Issue: When is an extrajudicial confession admissible?

Held: There are four fundamental conditions needed for admissibility of a confession:a. must be voluntaryb. must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counselc. must be expressd. must be in writing

PROVING MOTIVE

PEOPLE V. GIGANTO336 SCRA 294 (July 2000)

Facts: A, B, C, and D were convicted of murder. The accused argued that theprosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The motive for killing the victim was also not adequately shown.

Issue: Whether it was necessary to prove motive.

Held: Yes. In this case, there was no evidence of the prosecution on which a judgmentof conviction can be based. When the evidence of the prosecution is weak, it isnecessary to prove motive; otherwise, the guilt of the accused becomes open toreasonable doubt, and the accused must be acquitted.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. PEDIGERO337 SCRA 274 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: A was convicted of robbery with homicide. A claimed that the court erred inholding that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently

established his guilt.

Issue: When is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict?

Held: Rule 133 § 4 enumerates the 3 elements that should be present in order for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction. A judgment of conviction based oncircumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form anunbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, tothe exclusion of all others, as the culprit. The circumstances proved must be consistentwith each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at thesame time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.

PEOPLE V. RAYOS7 Feb. 2001

Facts: A was charged and convicted of the rape-slay of a 9-year old mental retardate.He argued that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was notsufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: When is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict?

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Held: When there are no eyewitnesses to a crime, resort to circumstantial evidencebecomes almost certainly unavoidable. In rape with homicide, the evidence against theaccused is basically circumstantial because of the nature of the crime. Thecircumstances must be consistent with each other from which the only rationalhypothesis that can be drawn therefrom would be that the accused is guilty. Thecircumstances must create a solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically believable,that pinpoints the accused, to the exclusion of others, as being the perpetrator of thecrime and thereby sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. Thecircumstantial pieces of evidence in this case, taken in their entirety, unmistakably pointto the guilt of A.

PROVING AGE

PEOPLE V. GERABAN24 May 2001

Facts: In a qualified rape case, the prosecution relied on the testimony of the rape victimand her mother to prove the minority of the victim for the purpose of imposing the deathpenalty.

Issue: May the corroborative testimony of the victim’s mother suffice to establish theminority of the victim in lieu of independent documentary evidence?

Held: Yes. The same must, however, be received with caution. In this case, the mother is quite uncertain as to her daughter’s age. As a mother, she should have personalknowledge of the ages and birth of her children. She could have stated the exact age of her daughter or the date of her birth. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove with certaintythe minority of the victim.

RECANTATION

PEOPLE V. NARDO1 Mar. 2001

Facts: A was charged with rape by his 14-year old daughter. He was convicted by theTC and sentenced to death. A raised the defense that the victim desisted in pursuingthe case against her father by showing two letters. However, these were not subscribedand sworn to by the victim.

Issue: Should the letters be admitted in order to acquit the accused?

Held: No. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable for there is always theprobability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look withdisfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses throughintimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate anearlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accuseddeserve only scant consideration. Even if sworn to, the victim’s recantation could hardlysuffice to overturn the finding of guilt by the TC which was based on her own clear andconvincing testimony given during a full-blown trial. An affidavit of recantation, beingusually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.

CREDIBILITY

PEOPLE V. BUENAFLOR27 June 2001

Facts: RTC found A guilty for raping 14-yr. old V who was asleep at the time of thecommission of the crime. During the initial reception of evidence for the prosecution, Vsaid she did not know A because it was her first time to see his face at the time theincident took place, but later on cross-examination, she admitted that what she said was

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false because actually A is their neighbor. The TC thought that considering that theoffended party is a very young girl of 15 years, it is not uncommon for the young girl toconceal the assaults because of the rapist's threats on her life.

Issue: Whether V is a credible witness.

Held: No. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the singlemost important issue. In this case, the testimony of the complainant is not crediblebecause it is replete with inconsistencies, and narrations that are contrary to commonexperience, human nature and the natural course of things.

ALIBI

PEOPLE V. ABENDAN et. al.28 June 2001

Facts: RTC found A et. al. guilty of murder. The trial court gave credence to the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that there was treachery and conspiracy in thekilling of the victim, who was asleep when he was fatally shot. A argued that the trialcourt erred in ignoring his alibi.

Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in not giving weight to A’s alibi.

Held: Yes. Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without anyshowing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, arenegative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. Alibi becomesunworthy of credit when it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relative,and not by credible persons.

MEDICAL /CHEMICAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. NUBLA19 June 2001

Facts: A was convicted for the rape of V, committed by means of force and intimidation;in particular, by inducing V to drink iced tea laced with drugs causing the latter to loseconsciousness. A denied that V was drugged and pointed to the absence of any medicalor chemical evidence to support her claim.

Issue: Whether the fact that V was drugged was sufficiently proven.

Held: Yes. While no chemical analysis was conducted on the blood of the complainantimmediately after the incident, the physical manifestations (dizziness, bodily weakness,strong desire to sleep) were proved during the trial.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

MOLLANEDA V. UMACOB6 June 2001

Facts: A, the Schools Division Superintendent, was criminally charged before the court.A was acquitted. Complainants filed an administrative case against A to dismiss him

from the service. A argued that the dismissal of the criminal case against him meant thatthe administrative case cannot prosper.

Issue: Whether A is correct.

Held: No. The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidenceagainst an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case does not foreclose theadministrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In

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dismissing the case, the court is simply saying that the prosecution was unable to provethe guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. In administrative proceedings, thequantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. A’s culpability has been provenby substantial evidence. The dismissal of the criminal case cannot bind this Court in thedisposition of the instant administrative case. There was justifiable ground for A’sdismissal from the service.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

VDA. DE MANALO V. CA349 SCRA 135 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The surviving children of Manalo filed a petition for the judicial settlement of the

estate of their deceased father. The oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the petition onthe ground that the case is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of thesame family. They argued that petitioners failed to aver that earnest efforts toward acompromise involving the members of the same family have been made prior to the filingof the petition but the same have failed (pursuant to Art. 222 of the Civil Code).

Issue: Whether the petition should be treated as an ordinary civil action.

Held: No. In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the avermentsand the character of the relief sought in the complaint/petition shall be controlling. In thiscase, the petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for settlement of estate. Indeed, the petition contained certain averments that may be typical

of an ordinary civil action and the oppositors took advantage of the said defect. Butoppositors may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of an essentially valid petition byraising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to said petition. The jurisdiction of acourt as well as the concomitant nature of the action is determined by the averments inthe complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer.

EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY V. FERNANDEZ et. al.6 June 2001

Facts: P’s co-heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate without notifying P.

The property was then expropriated by the government. Title to the property was issuedto the government in 1982. In 1996, P filed an action for reconveyance of propertyalleging that he was unlawfully deprived by his co-heirs of his participation in thesettlement of the estate.

Issue: Whether P’s action should be allowed to prosper.

Held: No. Persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement mayassert their claim only within the 2-year period after the settlement and distribution of theestate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or had no notice of the settlement . § 4, Rule 74, is not meant to be a statute of limitations.An extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte proceeding, would not affect thirdpersons who had no knowledge thereof. By its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively.

P is deemed to have been constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlementby reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot.From the time of registration, P had 2 years, within which to file their objections or todemand the appropriate settlement of the estate. The only exception is when the titleremains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of thesubject property or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocentpurchasers for value. The title to the property in the present case was no longer in the

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name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value – the government. The government is presumed to have acted in good faith in theacquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto was obtained through a CompromiseAgreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings.

JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT

HEIRS OF SANDEJAS V. LINA05 Feb. 2001

Facts: During his lifetime, D, the decedent conveyed real property to X. In theproceeding for the settlement of D’s estate, X filed a motion to approve the deed of sale.The administrator filed an opposition to the said motion.

Issue: Does the probate court have jurisdiction to approve the deed of conditional sale?

Held: Yes. Probate jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to theexercise of a probate court’s recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. In this case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent’s obligation to X; hence, that obligationclearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require X to file a separateaction will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estate of D.

RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS

HEIRS OF SANDEJAS V. LINA05 Feb. 2001

Facts: During his lifetime, D, the decedent conveyed real property to X. In theproceeding for the settlement of D’s estate, X filed a motion to approve the deed of sale.The administrator filed an opposition to the said motion.

Issue: Does X have the right to intervene?

Held: Yes. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of realproperty contracted by the decedent while still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or administrator the rightto file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before the probate courtinures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to beentitled to the avails of the suit.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE

PNB V. CA, et. al.29 June 2001

Facts: S was the special administrator of the intestate estate of X. The court authorizedS to obtain a loan from PNB to be secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. For failure to pay the loan in full, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the real estatemortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder but since there was still adeficiency, PNB filed an action with the RTC against S. RTC dismissed PNB’s complaint.CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether the mortgagee can still recover the deficiency.

Held: No. Rule 89 § 7 (f) provides that if the court grants authority to mortgageproperty of the estate, it shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceasedin his lifetime. Thus, Rule 86 § 7 also applies as to the remedies of the mortgagee. Caselaw now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee 3 distinct, independent and mutuallyexclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the

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satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the

mortgagor as an ordinary claim;(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary

claim; and(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before

it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency .The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives hisright to recover any deficiency from the estate. The 3 rd mode includes extrajudicialforeclosure sales; the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives anyfurther deficiency claim.

HABEAS CORPUS

TUNG CHIN HUI V. RODRIGUEZ02 Apr. 2001

Facts: P, a Taiwanese national, was charged and, in due course, found guilty by theBID Board of Commissioners of possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled byTaiwanese authorities. The BID Board of Commissioners issued a Summary DeportationOrder. P filed before the RTC a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Issue: Should the Writ for Habeas Corpus be issued?

Held: No. P’s confinement is in accord with § 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which reads as follows: “§ 37. (a) The following aliens shall bearrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: XXX (7) Any alien who remainsin the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admittedas a non-immigrant.”

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remedial law digests up to june 2001 copy

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