released under the foi act 1982 - homeaffairs.gov.au

29 January 2010 CONTINGENCY MEDIA TALKING POINTS

Background (NOT FOR MEDIA RELEASE)

Media reported on 18 January that an Afghan community leader in Australia claimed that a boat carrying 105 Afghan persons seeking to enter Australia had left Indonesia on 2 October 2009 and had not arrived. Several of the media reports carried the comment that Australian Government agencies had no knowledge of such a boat.

All media enquiries on this topic should be referred to Customs and Border Protection.

Talking Points

• People smuggling operations place vulnerable people in unsafe vessels for a long and hazardous journey to Australia.

• Working with other agencies, Border Protection Command detects reports and responds to threats in the offshore maritime area – including people smuggling.

When did you find out about the vessel? Customs and Border Protection was monitoring a number of potential vessel departures from Indonesia to Australia in late September – early October 2009. Information received on 3 October suggested that a maritime-based people smuggling vessel may have left Indonesia on 2 October and experienced some difficulties the following day. Subsequent credible information received later that day indicated that these difficulties had been resolved. What steps did you take on receiving this information? Upon receiving the reports of a vessel in distress, Customs and Border Protection provided the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) with all relevant information. AMSA is the agency responsible for coordinating search and rescue operations in Australia’s Search and Rescue Zone.

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RELEASED UNDER THE FOI ACT 1982

The Australian Government also communicated this information with the Indonesian Government as the vessel was reportedly in Indonesia’s Search and Rescue Zone. Surveillance activities that day by Border Protection Command did not detect a vessel in distress What was the result of this action? On 3 October, actions by the Indonesian authorities and Border Protection Command surveillance did not detect a vessel in distress. There has been no confirmation of the alleged vessel’s current location. What are you doing to resolve this? Customs and Border Protection will continue to seek information that may shed light on the fate of the alleged vessel and its passengers. Starting in November, Australian agencies received reports of people who may have departed Indonesia on a vessel in October 2009 and have not arrived in Australia. If pressed: Are the two incidents- missing boat and missing persons- related? The missing vessel reported in the media on 18 January and the information received and acted upon regarding a vessel in difficulty on 3 October may be related, but not with certainty. Prepared by Customs and Border Protection Communication and Media Date 29 January 2010

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Drafted Name Appointment DATE

Drafted by: Belinda Cole Media Manager 29/01/10

CLEARANCE

Drafted Name Appointment DATE

Drafted by:

Clearance Appointment DATE

Customs and Border Protection

Michael Pezzullo Chief Operating Officer 29 Jan 2010

Customs and Border Protection

Marion Grant DCEO Border Enforcement

29 Jan 2010

Border Protection Command

Andrew Hudson A/G Director Policy, Engagement and Administration

29 Jan 2010

CONSULTED AGENCIES

Clearance Name Appointment DATE

PMC

DIAC

DFAT

AFP

DEFENCE

AGs

For information: Minister’s Office for Home Affairs

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Page 1RELEASED UNDER THE FOI ACT 1982

s37(2)(b)

s37(2)(b)

s37(2)(b)

s37(2)(b)

s33(a)

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s33(a)

s33(a)

s33(a)

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s37(1)(b)

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From:Sent:To:Subject:

Importance:

rccaus@arnsa gov auSaturday, 3 October 2009 15 51Border Protection OperationsVESSEL IN DISTRESS

I ow

R 030548Z OCT 2009FM RCC AUSTRALIATO BASARNAS EX (EMAIL: BASARNAS@INDO NET ID) BASARNAS EX (FAX 0011622134832884) BASARNASEX (FAX. 001162215501513) INFO COASTWATCH (AMSOC) CANBERRA (EMAIL:[email protected] ) EXEC MANAGERS AMSA (EMAIL [email protected] AU) AUSSAR RCCCHIEFS (EMAIL AUSSARCHIEFS@MAIL AMSA GOV AU) BTSUBJ. VESSEL IN DISTRESSAUSSAR 2009/6890

MARABAHAYA

RCC AUSTRALIA HAS RECEIVED A DISTRESS MESSAGE FROM AN UNKNOWN VESSEL:

NAMECALLSIGNMMSI406 MHZ DISTRESS BEACONINMARSAT NUMBER

UNKNOWNUNKNOWNUNKNOWN

UNKNOWNUNKNOWN

IN POSITION 06 55S 104 58E AT 030210UTC (NEAR SUNDA STRAIT, 15NMS OFFSHORE JAVA)

AS THIS POSITION IS WITHIN THE INDONESIAN SEARCH AND RESCUE REGION. REQUEST BASARNASJAKARTA ASSUME COORDINATION FOR THIS INCIDENT

REQUEST HARDCOPY CONFIRMATION FROM BASARNAS JAKARTA THAT COORDINATION IS WITHBASARNAS JAKARTA. PLEASE RESPOND IN ENGLISH.

RCC AUSTRALIA TELAH MENERIMA (SINYAL BAHAYA (DARURAT)/PERMINTAAN UNTUK BANTUAN) DARI(KAPAUPESAWAT TERBANG) DENGAN IDENTITAS

NAMANAMA PANGGILAN (CALLSIGN)MMSI406 MHZ SINYAL (RAMBU) DARURAT (DISTRESS BEACON)INMARSAT NOMOR

UNKNOWNUNKNOWN

UNKNOWNUNKNOWN

UNKNOWN

LETAKNYA GARIS LINTANG 06 55S, GARIS BUJUR 104 58E AT PADA 030210UTC (NEAR SUNDA STRAIT,15NMS OFFSHORE JAVA)

KARENA LETAKNYA KAPAUPESAWAT TERBANG TSB ADA DI DALAM KAWASAN SRR INDONESIA KAMIMINTA SUPAYA BASARNAS JAKARTA MENGAMBIL ALIH TANGGUNG JAWAB UNTUK MENOKOORDINASIKANKEOIATAN SAR

KAMI MINTA KETERANGAN SECARA TERTULIS DARI BASARNAS JAKARTA YANG MENKONFORMASIKANBAHWA BASARNAS JAKARTA TELAH MENGAMBIL ALIH TANGGUN JAWAB.

TOLONG BALAS SURAT INI DENGAN MEMAKAI BAHASA iNGGERIS

REGARDSRCC AUSTRALIABT

If you have received this transmission in error please note that that error does not constitute waiver of anyconfidentiality. privi lege or copyright in respect of information in the e-mail or attachments and any use of this materialis prohibited. Please notify the sender by return email and delete all copies of this transmission and attachments

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; COnPC14Qt =P'.4 W. : 02174 r.732P4 lc 200:: j$ : P:

INDONESIAN SAR AGENCYRADAN SAR NASIONAL

3' FLOOR, JL MEDAPi MERDEKA T1MUR 5JAKARTA PUSAT 10110 - INDONESIA

TO : RCC AUSTRALIAATTN : DUTY OFFICERPHONE : +61 2 6230 6811FAX : +61 2 6230 6868

I FROM : BASARNASi PHONE : 62-21 34832901I FAX : 62-21 34832884

L,

NUMBER OF PAGE : 1 (ONE) J DATE: OKT 03, 2,009

SUBJECT : SMUGGLING VESSEL

NO. 2243 SAR/ 0909

MESSAGE

AAA REFERING YOUR MESSAGES DATED 03 OKT, 2009 0309 UTC,JAKARTA SAR OFFICE HAS BEEN COORDINATING WITH

INDONESIAN NAVY AND THE COASTAL RADIO STATION THEREIS NO ACCIDENT AT THAT POSITION.

BBB THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COORDINATION.

REGDS,

PUDuty Officer

TELEPHONE : 348329 0162- 21- 343328 79

EMERGENCY 62 21 352 1111

FAX : 62-21-3483 2884EMAIL : bmgirua$ indo..nctid

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C/A;s -rit) g

TELEPHON. MESSAGE

Australian GovernmentAuserellas Oreisees Service

Bonier Protection Comiread

Pc ......

TSA, tripsi-9-, .- Isl-xyziose

ri-AQA T-V2-, n1014.1:. />Log.1.6-tCA-t

Client Response Yes / No

CC Border Protection CS 0 CC EOCCC Border Protection TI Cl CC HQNORCOMCC Border Protection ON 0 CC AFMACC Border Protection BR 0

(/4.) 0)..S Svs./.131.

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Version 2 25/10/2011 Page 1 of 5

Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Key Issue 9

Missing Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel

Issues

Media reported on 18 January that an Afghan community leader in Australia claimed that a boat

carrying 105 Afghan persons seeking to enter Australia had left Indonesia on 2 October 2009 and

had not arrived. Several of the media reports carried the comment that Australian Government

agencies had no knowledge of such a boat.

Talking points

• I am aware of media reports on 18 January that an Afghan community leader in Australia

claimed that a boat carrying 105 Afghan persons seeking to enter Australia had left Indonesia

on 2 October 2009 and had not arrived.

• I note that several of the media reports carried the comment that Australian Government

agencies had no knowledge of such a boat.

• At the time of the reported incident Australian Government agencies were working with

overseas partners to monitor a number of Potential Irregular Immigrant ventures to Australia.

The information available on these ventures did not definitively indicate points of departure or

arrival for vessels, nor potential departure or arrival times.

• Nevertheless, Australian agencies acted on information received on 3 October that indicated a

boat, possibly en route to Christmas Island, was in distress. Although the location of this

vessel was unclear, it appeared to be in the Indonesian Search and Rescue Region.

• Australian agencies passed this information on to their Indonesian partners. The relevant

Indonesian authority (BASARNAS) advised on 3 October that it was unable to identify a

vessel in distress in the relevant area. Subsequent surveillance activities that day by Border

Protection Command did not detect a vessel in distress.

• Following further information that the vessel was no longer in distress late on 3 October,

Border Protection Command assets continued to monitor the Christmas Island approaches.

They did not detect a vessel fitting that description in the subsequent days and Australian

Government agencies received no further information on the vessel in October.

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• In November, Australian agencies began receiving reports of people who had allegedly

departed Indonesia in October, on a vessel that had not arrived in Australia. Checks on

Christmas Island and with international organisations overseas have failed to identify these

individuals.

• We do not know for certain the fate of the vessel that was potentially targeting Christmas

Island. We hope that it turned back to Indonesia.

• The circumstances of this case demonstrate clearly that the Government must continue its

efforts to deter, disrupt and detect maritime people smuggling ventures – ventures that often

see vulnerable people put on unsafe vessels for the long and hazardous journey to Australia.

IF NEEDED

• Once the likely location of the vessel was determined, Australian authorities requested that

the Indonesian search and rescue authorities assume responsibility for coordinating actions as

the location was in their Search and Rescue Region.

• The Indonesian authorities accepted responsibility and advised later on 3 October that no

search and rescue situation existed in the advised location.

IF ASKED (Response to community concerns)

• A framework is in place to ensure that community concerns regarding possible missing

vessels, believed to be linked to people smuggling, are dealt with responsively.

• All information received by agencies regarding possible missing vessels is communicated to a

central point within Customs and Border Protection. This in turn enables whole-of-

government consideration and informs the government's response to that information.

• Customs and Border Protection, including Border Protection Command, have long standing

arrangements with Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA). Where there is

information to suggest that a venture may possibly be in distress, such information is referred

to AMSA as the competent agency to undertake search and rescue activities as AMSA

consider appropriate.

• With regards to the possible missing vessel of 02 October 2009, I am advised the Department

of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) has interviewed community members that contacted

the agency regarding the vessel. I understand DIAC subsequently made inquiries to determine

whether their relatives were already in Australia.

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• I further understand DIAC advised the members of the community that their relatives were

not in Australia and have implemented a mechanism so, should relatives arrive in Australia,

the relatives will be advised that a community member holds concerns for their safety. I refer

you to DIAC should you seek further detail on activity undertaken by that agency.

• Customs and Border Protection has received an enquiry from a concerned community

member. In its response, Customs and Border Protection requested that if the community

member receives more information that may help us to locate the possible missing vessel or

those on board to provide it via the Customs and Border Protection Hotline as soon as

possible.

Cleared by: Jeff Buckpitt, National Director, Intelligence and Targeting Division

Action officer:

Work: 6275 6750 Work:

Home: Home:

Mobile: Mobile:

05 February 2010

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Background

At the time of the reported disappearance of the boat in October 2009, Australian agencies were

working with Indonesian partners to identify and disrupt several Potential Irregular Immigrant

ventures. This included the venture that has become known as the Merak boat – the vessel carrying

255 Sri Lankans intercepted by Indonesia authorities in early October 2009.

Intelligence reporting on potential ventures at the time came from multiple sources, but was limited

in nature, often incomplete and with little corroboration of the pieces of information available. The

reporting was not often definitive on points of departure or arrival for vessels, nor on potential

departure or arrival times.

Consequently, agencies had a quite confused picture of potential ventures being mounted from

Indonesia. It was in this context that reports were received of a vessel in distress. The nature of the

information received did not allow agencies to form a definitive view of where the distress situation

may have been. At one point there were three potential locations reported where the vessel may

have been in distress, in difficulty or had simply lost its way.

One piece of information on 3 October indicated a boat in distress which appeared to have

Christmas Island as its intended arrival point. The location of this vessel was unclear, however, it

appeared to be in the Indonesian Search and Rescue Region.

As the information developed, it became clear that there may have been a safety of life at sea

(SOLAS) situation. The nearest Australian Government vessel was some 360 nautical miles from

the likely location. Once the Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel’s (SIEV) location was clearer,

Border Protection Command provided advice on the situation to the Australian Maritime Safety

Authority. This occurred within four hours of the initial report of distress.

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority immediately passed the likely location information to its

Indonesian counterpart BASARNAS requesting that it assume coordination for any search and

rescue.

BASARNAS reported back the same day that it had coordinated actions in the area with the

Indonesian navy and with the Indonesian Coastal Radio Station and that there was no distress

incident in the location provided.

Concurrently with the Indonesian action to mount a search and rescue response, Border Protection

Command deployed a surveillance aircraft to monitor maritime activity along the likely track of the

vessel. Despite indications late on 3 October that the vessel was again underway, the Border

Protection Command surveillance activities (both airborne and surface) did not detect a vessel of

interest that day – nor subsequent days.

Potentially relevant information received between 5 and 10 October was again inconclusive on the

status of the venture and the intended arrival point. However, the Australian Federal Police passed

information concerning the vessel to Indonesian partners to assist with locating it.

There was no further information received on the suspect vessel targeting Christmas Island in the

month of October. Agencies continued to watch for the suspect vessel until 29 October when the

decision was taken to cease active monitoring of it, as a period of over three weeks would have

been ample time for the vessel to make its way to Christmas Island.

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Starting in November and continuing into December, the Department of Immigration and

Citizenship was approached by individuals claiming to know persons who had been on a vessel that

had departed Indonesia in early October and had not arrived in Australia. The Department

undertook checks at Christmas Island and through Posts overseas to attempt to determine whether

the named individuals were being processed on Christmas Island or were still overseas. These

checks were not able to identify the named individuals.

In addition, the Australian Federal Police received information in early December suggesting that a

vessel had not arrived. Once again, checks to identify potential passengers who might already be on

Christmas Island were inconclusive.

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IN-CONFIDENCE

IN-CONFIDENCE

QUESTION TIME BRIEF TAB ^No^

Missing Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel

Media reported on 18 January that an Afghan community leader in Australia claimed that a boat carrying

105 Afghan persons seeking to enter Australia had left Indonesia on 2 October 2009 and had not arrived.

Several of the media reports carried the comment that Australian Government agencies had no knowledge of

such a boat.

Key messages

• A vessel may have departed Indonesia on 2 October and met with difficulties en-route to Christmas Island. That vessel did not arrive in Australia, though the exact fate of the vessel remains unknown.

• At the time of the reported incident, Australian government agencies were working with overseas partners to monitor a number of Potential Irregular Immigrant ventures to Australia. The information available on these ventures did not definitively indicate points of departure or arrival for vessels, nor potential departure or arrival times.

• Nevertheless, Australian agencies acted on a credible piece of information received on 3 October that indicated a boat was in distress. This vessel appeared to have Christmas Island as its intended arrival point. The location of this vessel was unclear. However, it appeared to be in the Indonesian Search and Rescue Region.

• Australian agencies passed this information on to their Indonesian partners. The relevant Indonesian authority (BASARNAS) advised on 3 October that they were unable to identify a vessel in distress in the relevant area. Subsequent surveillance activities that day by Border Protection Command did not detect a vessel in distress.

• Following further credible information that the vessel was no longer in distress late on 3 October, Border Protection Command assets continued to monitor the Christmas Island approaches. They did not detect a vessel fitting that description in the subsequent days and Australian Government agencies received no further information on the vessel in October.

• In November Australian agencies began receiving reports of people who had allegedly departed Indonesia on a vessel in October that had not arrived in Australia. Checks on Christmas Island and with international organisations overseas have failed to identify the individuals.

• We do not know for certain the fate of this vessel that was potentially targeting Christmas Island. We hope that it turned back to Indonesia.

• The circumstances of this case demonstrate clearly that the Government must continue its efforts to deter, disrupt and detect maritime people smuggling ventures– ventures that often see vulnerable people put on unsafe vessels for the long and hazardous journey to Australia.

Cleared by: Jeff Buckpitt, National Director, Intelligence and Targeting Division 28 January 2010

Work: 6275 6750 Mobile:

Action Officer:

Date Created: 27 January 2010 Date Reviewed: 28 January 2009

Equivalent MOB ref number: ^MOB reference number^

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C8ANT

Line

C8ANT

Line

IN-CONFIDENCE

IN-CONFIDENCE

Background At the time of the reported disappearance of the boat in October 2009, Australian agencies were working

with Indonesian partners to identify and disrupt several Potential Irregular Immigrant ventures. This

includes the venture that has become known as the Merak boat – the vessel carrying 255 Sri Lankans

intercepted by Indonesia authorities in early October 2009.

Intelligence reporting on potential ventures at the time came from multiple sources, but was limited in

nature, often incomplete and with little corroboration of the pieces of information available. The reporting

was not often definitive on points of departure or arrival for vessels, nor on potential departure or arrival

times.

Consequently, agencies had a quite confused picture of potential ventures being mounted from Indonesia. It

was in this context that reports were received of a vessel in distress. The nature of the information received

did not allow agencies to form a definitive view of where the distress situation may have been. At one point,

there were three potential locations reported where the vessel may have been in distress, in difficulty or had

simply lost its way

Nevertheless, Australian agencies acted on the most credible information that they received. One piece of

information on 3 October indicated a boat in distress which appeared to have Christmas Island as its

intended arrival point. The location of this vessel was unclear; however, it appeared to be in the Indonesian

Search and Rescue Region.

As the information developed, it became clear that there may have been a safety of life at sea situation. The

nearest Australian Government vessel was some 360 nautical miles from the likely location. Once the

Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel’s (SIEV) location was clearer, Border Protection Command provided

advice on the situation to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. This occurred within four hours of the

initial report of distress.

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority immediately passed the likely location information to its

Indonesian counterpart BASARNAS requesting that it assume coordination for any search and rescue.

BASARNAS reported back the same day that it had coordinated actions in the area with the Indonesian navy

and with the Indonesian Coastal Radio Station and that there was no distress incident in the location

provided.

Concurrently with the Indonesian action to mount a search and rescue response, Border Protection

Command deployed a surveillance aircraft to monitor maritime activity along the likely track of the vessel.

Despite indications late on 3 October that the vessel was again underway, the Border Protection Command

surveillance activities (both airborne and surface) did not detect a vessel of interest that day – nor subsequent

days.

Potentially relevant information received between 5 and 10 October was again inconclusive on the status of

the venture and the intended arrival point. However, the Australian Federal Police passed information

concerning the vessel to Indonesian Partners to assist with locating it.

There was no further information received on the suspect vessel targeting Christmas Island in the month of

October. Agencies continued to watch for the suspect vessel until 29 October when the decision was taken

to cease active monitoring of it, as a period of over three weeks would have been ample time for the vessel

to make its way to Christmas Island.

Starting in November and continuing into December, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship was

approached by individuals claiming to know persons who had been on a vessel that had departed Indonesia

in early October and had not arrived in Australia. The Department undertook checks at Christmas Island and

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C8ANT

Line

C8ANT

Line

IN-CONFIDENCE

IN-CONFIDENCE

through Posts overseas to attempt to determine whether the named individuals were being processed on

Christmas Island or were still overseas. These checks were not able to identify the named individuals.

In addition, the Australian Federal Police received information in early December suggesting that a vessel

had not arrived. Once again, checks to identify potential passengers who might already be on Christmas

Island were inconclusive.

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C8ANT

Line

C8ANT

Line

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s33(a)(i)

s7(2A)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i)

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s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s7(2A)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i) & s33(b)

s33(a)(i)

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s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i)

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s33(a)(i)

s47B(a)&(b)

s7(2A)

s33(a)(i)

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s7(2A)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i), s33(b) & s37(2)(b)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i), s33(b), s37(1)(b)&(c) & 37(2)(b)

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s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i), s33(b), s37(1)(b)&(c) & 37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i), s33(b), s37(1)(b)&(c) & s37(2)(b)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

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s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i), s37(1)(b)&(c) & s37(2)(b)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)

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s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s37(1)(b)&(c)

s7(2A)

s7(2A)

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s33(a)(i)

s7(2A)

s33(a)(i)

released under the foi act 1982 - homeaffairs.gov.au

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