regulatory structures and market transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil...

37
The Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) ® Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation National Conference of State Legislators Presented by David Littell Principal December 8, 2015

Upload: others

Post on 06-Aug-2020

4 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

The Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP)®

Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation

National Conference of State Legislators

Presented by David LittellPrincipal

December 8, 2015

Page 2: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

RAP – the Regulatory Assistance Project

RAP is a non-profit organization providing technical and educational assistance to government officials on energy and environmental issues. RAP staff have extensive utility regulatory experience. RAP technical assistance to states is supported by US DOE, US EPA and foundations.

2

Page 3: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Overview of What’s Hot –The Good and the Bad

• Solar costs down, NEM, tax incentives, VOC

• Rate Design

• Time of Use Rates

• Higher fixed fees, standby fees, demand charges

• Distribution System Planning to Control Costs

3

Page 4: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Costs Continue to Decline

4

Page 5: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Distributed Generation is Growing

5

+ 30% per year

Since 2001

Cumulative: 11+ GW

Page 6: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Why Reassess? Why Change? Why Now?A Decentralized Grid Rising

• On site generation

– Prices to deploy are trending down

– Electricity users value choice

• To secure prices, or beat the market

• To assure zero emissions, to do their part

• To be cool

• To cooperate with neighbors

• Automation (comms, smart systems, stds.) keeps it simple while chasing value

6

Page 7: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Consumer Perspective

• Rates are Prices

• Prices represent a message to consumers

• Utility Prices signal system value

• Consumers have new choices,

– Is there alignment between customer value and grid value?

7

Page 8: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Principles for Modern Rate Design

Universal Service: A customer should be able to connect to the grid for no more than the cost of connecting to the grid.

Time-Varying: Customers should pay for grid services and power supply in proportion to how much they use and when they use it.

Fair Compensation: Customers supplying power to the grid should be compensated fairly for the value of the power they supply.

8

Page 9: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Resources

• Smart Rate Design for A Smart Future

– With appendices:

• Cost allocation

• Rate Design Primer

• Retail Competition

• Monopoly Power

9

Page 10: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

10

Page 11: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Grid Value from DER – Differentiate by

• Time

– Peaks and managing predictable solar, CHP patterns

• Location

– High marginal cost places

• Attribute

– Unbundled energy, capacity, ancillary

11

Page 12: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Cross-Subsidies…

• Subsidies are endemic in utility rates

• Averages smooth out distinctions among customers

• Rough justice coupled with some intentional bias is the norm

• Explicit, appropriate subsidies are fine

– No more (hidden or unintentional shifts)

12

Page 13: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Rate Design Segment

13

Page 14: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

A Fixed TOU Rate in Use

• On-PeakSummer: weekdays 10 a.m. - 8 p.m.

Winter: weekdays 7 a.m. - 11 a.m. and 5 p.m. - 9 p.m.• Intermediate-Peak

Summer: weekdays 7 a.m. - 10 a.m. and 8 p.m. - 11 p.m.

Winter: weekdays 11 a.m. - 5 p.m.• Off-Peak

Summer: weekdays 11 p.m. - 7 a.m., Sat., Sun., holidays

Winter: weekdays 9 p.m. - 7 a.m., Saturday, Sunday, holidays

14

Page 15: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Sample Time of Use with Critical Peak:

Rate Design for the Utility of the Future: DRAFT FOR REVIEW

13

For residential consumers, the following general rate design will serve the needs of both utilities and

consumers, providing incentives for efficiency, compensation for services received, and a pathway to a

future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate for very low-cost

utilities and very high-cost utilities. The issue of whether a critical peak pricing (CPP) form, or peak-time

rebate (PTR) is most appropriate to reflect needle-peak costs is discussed in section VI.

Table 1:

Rate Element Based On the Cost Of Illustrative Amount

Customer Charge Customer-Specific Costs Only $7.00/month

Off-Peak Energy Baseload Resources +

transmission and distribution

$.08/kWh

Mid-Peak Energy Baseload + Intermediate

Resources + T&D

$.11/kWh

On-Peak Energy Baseload, Intermediate, and

Peaking Resources + T&D

$.15/kWh

Critical Peak Energy (or PTR) Demand Response Resources $.75/kWh

In the simplest of terms, this rate design recovers customer-specific costs, such as billing and collection in

a fixed monthly charge, and combines power supply and distribution costs into a TOU rate framework.

This enables fair recovery of costs from small and large customers, and from customers whose peak

demands may occur at different times from one another, and at different times from the system peak. It

also provides reasonable compensation to DG customers who supply power to the grid at times, and

receive power from the grid at times.

2. Smart meters

a. Background Smart meters are one way utilities can manage diverse power flows. Smart meters and associated meter

data management systems provide the opportunity to achieve multiple benefits, including energy and

demand savings and operational benefits30. A list of the common elements of utility operating benefits

includes:

Table 2: Common Elements of Utility Operating Benefits of Smart Meters

Reduced manual meter reading cost Improved bill-to-pay time

Reduced problem investigations Reduced uncollectibles

Improved meter accuracy Improved accounting

Reduced meter testing Call center cost reductions

Elimination of lock rings Improved asset utilization

Reduced estimated bills Outage reporting

Reduced theft Improved outage management

Improved read-to-bill time Reduction in lost outage sales

30 “Making the Business Case for Smart Meters” Smart Grid Newsletter Webinar, October 14, 2010, Chris King’s presentation page 10.

15

Page 16: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

16

Peak Load Benefits of Different Residential Rate Designs

Page 17: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

17

Enabling Technology Improves Price Response

Page 18: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Contrasting Direct Demand Response

and Dynamic Pricing

• Dynamic pricing can result in a steady fairly reliable reduction in peak demand, thereby altering the daily load curve, but it can not impact the need to reduce demand as a result of a specific event.

• Active Load Control can be employed to respond to specific emergency events to maintain reliability.

18

Page 19: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Contrasting Direct Demand Response and

Dynamic Pricing

In determining whether to use a dynamic pricing rate design or a direct demand response program, the question is whether you want to lower the peak demand curve and shift load in which case changes are incorporated through the rate design orwhether you want to create a product that can be used to reduce demand when system peaks are getting too high.

19

Page 20: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

A Peak Time Rebate in Use

• Delaware Delmarva Power and Light (DPL) has a critical peak rebate program for residential customers.

• Customers receive a $1.25 credit for every kWh they reduce their usage below a baseline during an event.

• Customers get this credit automatically; they do not have to enroll in the program.

• DP&L: http://www.delmarva.com/Peak-Energy-Savings-Credit.aspx

20

Page 21: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

21

Page 22: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Price Elasticity at Work

22

Page 23: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Customer Specific Costs Appropriate for the Monthly Customer Charge

• Billing

• Collections

• Share of transformer and service drop

23

Page 24: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Straight Fixed /

Variable:

100% ofDistribution

System Classified as Customer-

related

24

Page 25: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Net metering growth

26

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Nu

mb

er

of

ne

t m

ete

red

cu

sto

mrs

in t

he

U.S

.

Page 26: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Maturing Solar:Changes Ahead for Net Metering?

• Compensation method suited for infant industry

– Emphasis of Simple compensation and interconnection

– Rough compensation “close enough” at smaller numbers

– When higher numbers create a financial effect on the utility, a more rigorous compensation method can be considered

27

Page 27: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

28

$0.090

$0.138 $0.135

$0.107$0.115

$0.00

$0.04

$0.08

$0.12

$0.16

Maine

Short-Run

Maine

Long-Run

Minnesota Austin Average

per-kWh

Rate

Value of Solar Studies: Market Values Only

Maine values do not include

market price response

Page 28: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Rate Design Principles for DG Users

• DG users should not experience discrimination

• Time-varying rates are appropriate in both directions

• PV user should be able to connect to the grid for no more than the cost to connect

• PV user should be able to avoid the retail rate for all on-site consumption of on-site power

• PV user should pay for T&D service at non-discriminatory rates for power received from the grid

• Recognize “value of solar” to the grid when establishing fair rates and compensation for DG users

29

Page 29: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Resources

• Designing Distributed Generation Tariffs Well

30

Page 30: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Complementary Policies

• Distribution planning to establish locational and time values

• Decoupling to remove throughput incentives and address revenue adequacy and stability– With minimum bill if PUC judges it needed

• Outcome-based regulation to promote most valuable utility activity

• Technology when business case informed by value is compelling

• Bill simplicity so customers (or their agent) can understand the value of choices

31

Page 31: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

California and New York

• California PUC has directed its utilities to open up the distribution planning process– Use DG and DR as primary resources

• NY PSC in its Reforming the Energy Vision process has set its utilities on a similar path– Anticipates avoiding significant grid costs

from typical solutions

– Potential transfer of cost from utility to customers choosing to deploy DG and DR

32

Page 32: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Trends are Clear

• More automation

• More valuable choices for individuals

– Potential for more consumer interest for services

– What happens if storage becomes more accessible to consumers?

• What will utilities and their regulators do?

33

Page 33: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Boothbay Pilot - Peak Shaving

Source: GridSolarNRRI Presentation

Radial nature of electric service and local distribution

circuits on the Boothbay peninsula defines the

electrical region for the Pilot Project – Total Peak load

– Approx. 30 MW.

13

Page 34: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Boothbay Maine NTA PilotResource Mix

35

Source: NEEP, EE as T&D

Resource (Jan. 2015), p. 38.

Page 35: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

Boothbay Maine NTA PilotCost Comparison of NTA v. Transmission

36

Source: NEEP, EE as T&D

Resource (Jan. 2015), p. 41.

Page 36: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

37

Source: Lazard, 2015

Energy Efficiency Is the Lowest Cost Resource$/M

Wh

Page 37: Regulatory Structures and Market Transformation · future that is less dependent on fossil generation. Differences will be appropriate f or very l ow-cost utilities and very high-cost

About RAP

The Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) is a global, non-profit team of experts that focuses on the long-term economic and environmental sustainability of the power sector. RAP has deep expertise in regulatory and market policies that:

Promote economic efficiency Protect the environment Ensure system reliability Allocate system benefits fairly among all consumers

Learn more about RAP at www.raponline.org

David Littell

[email protected] +1 802 498 0733