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Derrick Frazier and Robert Stewart-Ingersollregional security complexes

Regional powers and security: A framework for understanding order within

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European Journal of International Relations

16(4) 731–753© The Author(s) 2010

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DOI: 10.1177/1354066109359847ejt.sagepub.com

Corresponding author:Derrick Frazier, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 240 Computer Applications Building, 605 E. Springfield Ave, Champaign, IL 61820, USA. Email: [email protected]

Regional powers and security: A framework for understanding order within regional security complexes

Derrick FrazierUniversity of Illinois, USA

Robert Stewart-IngersollAmerican University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

AbstractIn this article we propose a framework for understanding order within Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), focused upon the importance of regional powers. We argue that there are three factors to consider in adequately explaining regional security with respect to the influence of regional powers: structure, regional power roles, and regional power orientations. The first factor emphasizes the necessary but not sufficient attributes of power and capability for understanding regional security dynamics. The last two factors stress the importance of regional power behavior as being critical to the security process. To this end we highlight three specific roles and sets of orientations that when examined in the context of structural factors, provide a clearer picture of security orders in RSCs.

Keywordsconstructivism, neorealism, regional powers, Regional Security Complexes

IntroductionIn this article we propose a theoretical Regional Powers and Security Framework (RPSF) focusing on the importance of regional powers in the development and maintenance of security orders within Regional Security Complexes (RSCs). Security orders within RSCs, we contend, are driven to a significant degree by three explanatory variables: regional structure, regional power roles, and regional power orientations. Consistent



732 European Journal of International Relations 16(4)

with RSC definitions and neorealist literature, we infer structure to include the level and distribution of material capabilities necessary to affect security. Taking into account constructivist arguments and building from concepts such as foreign policy behavior and social identity, we define regional power roles in at least three different capacities: leadership, custodianship, and protection. Finally, we define orientation in three dimen-sions as they relate to the following regional system preferences: status quo, coopera-tion, and long-term design.

Two concerns with the current literature motivate our development of this framework. First, while significant research exists on the effects of structural (for example, Katzenstein, 2005; Stein and Lobell, 1997) and behavioral factors (for example, Neumann, 1992; Ringmar, 2002), most address these factors separately or stress one at the expense of the other. Consequently, there has been an emphasis on different sets of attributes with respect to regionalism and regional security. Neorealists, for example, find the material delinea-tion of regions and identification of security issues based on traditional security dilemmas most salient (for example, Mearsheimer, 2001; Rosecrance, 1991). Constructivists, how-ever, claim that regional formation, whether in terms of security or economics, is based on a redefinition of norms and forging of common identities through collective institutions (for example, Adler, 1997; Murphy, 1991; Väyrynen, 2003). Our first value-added contri-bution, therefore, is to provide an integrated theoretical framework that accounts for both sets of attributes, as both are necessary to understand regional security formation.

Second, there is difficulty with which past theoretical contributions have adequately provided opportunities to create systematic, testable hypotheses on how both structural and behavioral factors affect regional security orders. Our second value-added contribu-tion thus builds upon the first by providing a coherent manner through which to do so. In sum, we believe that our regional power approach can help explain the variation in regional dynamics we empirically observe in RSCs, making it a useful analytical tool for regional security scholars.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We begin with a brief discussion of RSCs and the importance of regional powers. We move next to a discussion of secu-rity orders, the outcome of dynamic interactions within an RSC. From there, the next four sections explore the heart of the proposed framework focusing on regional structure, regional power roles, and regional power orientation. Here we include a series of brief case narratives to illustrate the framework, including an application of all three compo-nents in the case of the Middle East RSC. The article concludes with a recap of the framework along with a brief examination of how it can be used to examine various research questions relevant for the study of RSCs

RSCs and regional powersWork on regionalism and regional security has spanned many decades (for example, Lebovic, 1985; Solingen, 1998; Thompson, 1973). Recently, however, there has been little thorough discussion of regionalism in IR beyond political economic concerns and area-specific security. In part, we agree with Väyrynen (2003) that this is due to the fail-ure of the dominant neorealist paradigm to give serious regard to the regional level of analysis. We also agree with Lemke’s (2002: 60) assessment that this is in large part due to a ‘failure to specify objective criteria for defining regions and sub-systems.’



Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 733

While works such as those of Lemke (2002) and Buzan and Wæver (2003) represent exceptions, their research, despite their conceptualization and operationalization of regional structures, have still inspired fewer empirical studies than they merit for under-standing regional security dynamics. More pertinent to this study, they have also not established a systematic approach from which to identify regional powers, examine their unique functions, and explain how these functions impact regional security orders.1

To do this, we take Buzan and Wæver’s identification of RSCs as our starting point. We do so because unlike simple geographically based definitions of regions, RSCs allow us to focus upon groupings of states whose actions dominate the security considerations of other member states. Buzan and Wæver (2003: 44) define a regional security complex as ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.’ Lake and Morgan (1997: 12) echo this description, emphasizing the importance of security externalities that bind members of a region together, such that ‘the members are so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any member, and significant security-related developments inside any member, have a major impact on the others.’ This high level of interdependence, the shared process of constructing security concerns and methods for dealing with them amongst member states, points toward a functioning system that can be systematically identified. The lack of such a reasonable claim about most states at the global level points toward the relevance of RSCs as a proper level of focus.

Figure 1. The Regional Powers and Security Framework (RPSF).




While our primary focus here is on regionally based dynamics, our framework does allow for a significant contribution from the global level, as illustrated in Figure 1. Most prominent are the influences that occur through the behavior of extra-regional great pow-ers. These states can impact RSC security orders in four general ways. First, they can have little or no involvement in an RSC such that security orders are driven primarily by regional power behavior and regional structure alone (for example, the current South African RSC). Second, they can influence regional structure in ways that alter the distri-bution of capabilities (for example, USSR military aid to Nasser’s Egypt in 1955–72). Third, these states can influence the behavior of regional powers in ways that could encourage, deter, or reverse their actions (for example, USSR military support to Angola versus South Africa). Fourth, extra-regional great powers can directly alter the security order itself (for example, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003).2

With the exception of the US, however, great powers have had less capability or interest in projecting power globally. Without the overwhelming context of the great power rival-ries that characterized the Cold War and colonial periods, global-level influences have been more limited, while region-specific dynamics have been allowed to develop into the primary venues within which most states securitize and de-securitize actors and issues. Consequently, global-level explanations for security dynamics are less predominant.

While many scholars have shifted focus to the regional level, our attention to the salience of regional powers for understanding regional security dynamics provides our significant contribution to this literature. This emphasis on regional powers is motivated by two factors. First, similar to neorealist arguments regarding major powers, these states are the most likely candidates to have both the interest and the capability to involve themselves extensively in the development of a security order in their particular region. Second, similar to constructivist arguments, we are convinced that capability alone does not determine security orders. As the most influential and strongest states, what regional powers do with their capability will have substantive implications for their security envi-ronment. Thus, focusing on their behavior provides a clearer picture of how a security order is shaped in the context of structure, not simply because of it. Therefore, we con-sider both structure and behavior to clarify regional security interactions and resultant security orders. We describe these orders as our outcome variable below.

Regional security ordersBuzan and Wæver (2003) describe the security dynamics of an RSC as ranging along a continuum of enmity and amity and falling into the three categories of conflict forma-tion, security regime, and security community. These classifications are determined essentially by the degree to which member states anticipate violent conflicts, and the extent to which mutually agreed-upon rules of conduct restrain the use of violence when disputes arise. They acknowledge that these classifications generally correspond to Wendt’s (1999) socially constructed Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of anar-chy, which focus upon the manner in which system members view each other: as enemy, rival, or friend. We also consider the degree to which regional cultures have been social-ized toward more conflictual or cooperative orientations as an ultimate outcome of RSC interactions, largely influenced by regional powers.




Morgan’s (1997: 33) classification of the regional security order, however, focuses more upon ‘patterns of management that can provide a modicum of security’ than upon dimensions of friendship or difference. He asserts that one should ‘set aside other dimen-sions of difference and start instead with a conception of management options open to RSCs, using this as a basis for comparative analysis.’ Using this typology as the outcome variable, the analyst is able to make use of the amity–enmity continuum as well as other process-related descriptions in two important ways. First, these regional dynamics may influence the selection of particular types of security orders. Such patterns shape both the roles that regional powers play as well as their orientations in doing so. Second, these dynamics may illuminate degrees of success or failure in creating regional security such that certain security orders are more conducive to conflict or cooperation.

We find Morgan’s use of management classifications a useful tool in understanding the influence that regional powers have upon RSC security dynamics, whether coopera-tive or conflictual. Morgan designates security orders in the following hierarchy: power restraining power, great power concert, collective security, pluralistic security commu-nity, and integration. We borrow Morgan’s term regional security order to identify the outcome that RSC power distribution, regional power roles, and orientations create, but differ in two important respects.

First, we find no objective reason to ‘treat these security orders as rungs on a ladder up which regional security complexes may climb as they pursue security management’ (Morgan, 1997: 33). Such categorization would be appropriate for the classification schemes of Buzan and Wæver (2003) or Wendt (1999) as they imply levels of security attainment. Such a classification would also be appropriate for those who view regional security as a latter stage of the process of regionalism in general (for example, Attina, 2004; Fawcett, 1995; Hettne, 2000). As stated above though, the success of different security orders in achieving higher levels of accommodation and de-securitization is an empirical question. It is also one likely to be influenced by the orientations that regional powers demonstrate. Thus we simply provide a framework from which to understand the part that regional powers play in determining security orders, leaving judgments on their efficacy for subsequent analyses.

Second, while we are influenced by Morgan’s typology, we do find some classifica-tions difficult to distinguish. For instance, the distinction between collective security, pluralistic security community, and integration seem to be marginal. Moreover, the sec-ond two classifications tilt toward focusing upon levels of cooperation and amity, rather than management techniques. We therefore modify this typology to five possible desig-nations of security orders in an RSC: hegemonic, collective security, power restraining power, concert, and unstructured. Each of these is distinct from the others in form, and depending upon the manner in which they are influenced by interactions of their member states (particularly regional powers), they will have varying influences on securitization and de-securitization.

The classification of an RSC as a hegemonic security order implies that one state has such a preponderance of structural strength that it is capable of creating and maintaining ‘essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of the international system’ (Volgy and Bailin, 2003: 41). Chase-Dunn et al. (1994: 365) point out that this sort of structural leadership implies that hegemony is the ‘capability




of a state to lead the system of states itself in a desired direction.’ Distinct from unipo-larity, hegemony moves beyond the concentration of power in a single state (Wilkinson, 1997). It implies a relationship between hegemon and system based upon a certain dominating behavior. Neorealists explain such domination as structurally induced. As Mearsheimer (2001) argues, it is what every state strives to do in its region. For con-structivists, this domination is based on identity and recognition. A state strives to be a hegemon because it views itself and others recognize it as such (Ringmar, 2002). Given the implications for our emphasis on regional powers, this difference is an important point to which we will return.

A collective security designation for an RSC implies that ‘states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression’ (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995: 398). This security order involves all RSC members in a mutual agreement that forswears aggression against one another, with violations of this agreement representing an attack on all. Many constructivist scholars view such an arrangement as the outcome of a progression to a common identity, one in which regional members identify security as external threats to the group in comparison to each other (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Väyrynen, 2000). Neorealist interpretations, however, suggest collective security arrangements, rather than being the outcome of a commonly forged identity, result largely from structural conditions conducive to institu-tional development (Grieco, 1999). Taking both perspectives into account, this type of security order will likely be part of a broader institutional framework that promotes cooperation, provides conditions for increased security, and manages conflict.

In an RSC that is designated as power restraining power, ‘states pursue security pri-marily via establishment and maintenance of what they consider a “suitable” or “stable” distribution of power’ (Morgan, 1997: 33). In bipolar or multipolar RSCs, this order implies a traditional neorealist balance of power. Self-interested states will build up con-ventional strength through arms and/or coalition building such that no state has sufficient strength to make aggression rationally feasible. As Mearsheimer (1990: 18) explains, imbalances in such a power distribution ‘invite war by increasing the potential for suc-cessful aggression.’ However, it may be different from balance of power in that a power restraining power order could be unipolar, where a single state has a sufficient prepon-derance of power to deter aggression by other members, but lacks the structural or rec-ognized influence implied by the hegemonic classification. It is the primary reliance upon conventional methods of deterrence for the maintenance of a particular distribution of power that distinguishes this type of order.

A concert system is one in which the most powerful states in a region band together to maintain stability. These states meet regularly and cooperatively determine how to address security threats. Morgan (1997: 34–35) explains that these powerful states derive their legitimacy by providing security for RSC members while maintaining a competi-tive posture toward one another. However, they temper the self-help dynamic in an effort to maintain a degree of system stability, distinguishing this order from a balance of power dynamic. Kupchan and Kupchan (1995) contend that concerts fit within the scope of col-lective security. While correspondence with system norms and the preponderant deter-rence against destabilization make the two similar, we contend that it is important to distinguish between the universal quality of collective security and the exclusive role that large powers play in a concert.




The final security order designates an RSC as unstructured, defined by the lack of a consistent means for managing regional security. Buzan and Wæver (2003) use this term to describe a region in which either of two conditions is present:

First, where local states have such low capability that their power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries; and, second, where geographical insulation makes interaction difficult (for example, islands separated by large expanses of ocean). (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 62)

They do not actually designate such areas as security complexes because the lack of interaction within such regions is insufficient for security interdependence. While this may be true for the latter point, we do not necessarily agree for the former. It may be that internal instability within a regional member state creates negative security externalities for other members (Lake, 1997). This could be true even if these member states are inca-pable of effectively projecting conventional power beyond their borders. While Buzan and Wæver’s description of their lack of power projection capacity negates the ability even to restrain power with power, this does not imply that security interdependence is non-existent or that members do not view themselves as being a part of a regional secu-rity system. Therefore, we consider such an area an RSC that lacks any effective means of creating and maintaining order.

While the unique position of regional powers is explicit in some orders, we assert that they will have a significant impact on the determination, durability, and effectiveness in all types. It is to the influence of the number and relative strength of the regional powers within an RSC that we now turn.

Regional structureRegional powers can serve a unique set of functions ranging from the development and maintenance of their RSCs to the relationship of their RSCs with the global system. These states possess a higher degree of relative power than others within their RSCs, but also behave differently. Although we stress the behavioral attributes of regional powers in understanding security orders, the relative power of states within an RSC is critically important to uncovering the identities and orientations of regional powers. Thus while we heed the call by many constructivists and critical theorists to reduce the importance of material capability, it is an essential step in understanding RSC dynamics.

Buzan and Wæver (2003: 53) argue that RSC structure is defined by four variables: its boundary, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction. While we do not spec-ify the first two variables here, the designation of the geographical make-up of an RSC provides us with the definition of its borders, and each one’s multi-state membership satisfies the anarchic structure criteria. To determine RSC polarity we identify the num-ber of power centers within the complex. Neorealists contend that the identity and behav-ior of great powers are determined by the distribution of material capability at the global system level. A straightforward translation to the regional level would indicate that the identity and behavior of regional powers should be determined by the regional distribu-tion of these capabilities. Such an approach is usually assumed when scholars allude to a commonly accepted list of so-called regional powers.




The level of material capabilities that a state possesses relative to others is important in determining whether or not it qualifies as a regional power. It is also important in defining the complex’s polarity.3 We consider the surpassing of a certain threshold of proportional power within one’s RSC to be a necessary condition for qualifying as a regional power. It is not any state that is capable of consistently playing regional power roles across a range of security issues. Effective provision of leadership, custodianship, or protection requires certain capabilities.4

Primary among these are military and economic strength. While the use of military power may vary according to RSC dynamics, military strength continues to be a founda-tional source of a state’s influence. So is the size of its economy, in terms of its provision of latent military capacity and its direct use as a means of leverage. Thus, attainment of rela-tively high levels on conventional indicators of state strength enables states to behave and be treated in a manner that distinguishes them from other system members. Focusing on five indicators of conventional state strength, we can generate a list of regional powers for each of the 11 currently existing RSCs designated by Buzan and Wæver (2003).5

Several regions demonstrate consistency in strength across multiple indicators and over time. The resulting polarity and regional powers are shown in Table 1. Unsurprisingly, the clearest leader across every indicator is the US in the North American RSC. In the post-Soviet and South Asian regions, the leading regional powers (Russia and India, respectively) show a commanding lead in almost every indicator. In the Southern African region, South Africa stands out, while in Western Africa Nigeria does. Finally, across most indicators, Brazil emerges as the clear regional power in South America. Each of these regions would be classified as unipolar by conventional standards.

In three regions, there are multiple states that stand apart from the rest. The Middle East, for instance, demonstrates a multipolar structure among four states. Europe demon-strates multipolarity as well. Finally, there is a clear separation by China and Japan in the East Asian region illustrating bipolarity, though it is interesting to note that each pos-sesses a clear lead over the other on different indicators.

In Central Africa and the Horn of Africa the lack of clarity in high values perhaps explains why Buzan and Wæver (2003) do not classify them as RSCs. As stated above, we

Table 1. Conventional RSC structures with regional power designations

Region Polarity Regional powers

North America Unipolar USASouth America Unipolar BrazilEurope Multipolar Germany, UK, France, and ItalyWestern Africa Unipolar NigeriaCentral Africa No regional power NAHorn of Africa No regional power NASouthern Africa Unipolar South AfricaMiddle East Multipolar Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and IsraelPost-Soviet Union Unipolar RussiaSouth Asia Unipolar IndiaEast Asia Bipolar China and Japan




consider them RSCs with unstructured security orders. Nevertheless, each lacks an obvious regional power in terms of relative capabilities and thus any discernible polarity.

In contrast to a neorealist perspective, accounting for the distribution of power alone does not effectively complete our task. The possession of such capabilities is not a suf-ficient condition for determining if a state will behave as a regional power; nor is the state that does so necessarily the one with the largest capabilities. While standard mea-sures of capability can be employed to assess a state’s relative strength, they fall short of uncovering the more complex nature of influences that regional powers exert upon RSC members. In particular, power may be utilized through military and economic strength as well as within the context of other varieties of political and social relationships that con-stitute RSC dynamics.

Booth and Vale (1995), for example, explain that non-traditional security concerns have become paramount in Southern Africa in the post-Cold War period. Further, it is not apparent that the regional leader along conventional measures of power (South Africa) has consistently acted as a regional power when called upon to manage such securitized concerns. Rather, Botswana has been the target of South African Development Community (SADC) requests for leadership on at least one regional security issue: food security.

The South American RSC provides another example. In this case Argentina’s eco-nomic power creates some ambiguity with respect to regional power identity. In defusing the threat of a possible military coup in Paraguay in 1996, for instance, it was the joint leadership of Brazil and Argentina through the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), not Brazil acting alone, that led to pressure on the military and averted a potential crisis (Shaw, 2003).

These brief examples are not meant to demonstrate unequivocally that these regions are bipolar but to point out that other states which do not rise to regional power status along conventional measures may in certain cases behave as regional powers. Determining whether or not they do so consistently would provide a basis for potentially designating such states as regional powers. In other words, defining the structure of an RSC is simply a first step in identifying and understanding regional powers. One must also pay particu-lar attention to the process within an RSC. This process describes the way in which regional members actually interact and pays particular attention to the functions that potential regional powers play.

Roles of regional powersIn identifying the roles of regional powers, we start with an overview of the foreign policy roles of states in general. What stands out in the literature is the relationship of roles to power. Lahneman (2003), for example, claims that power is the method by which states declare their roles or have them ascribed, with declared roles based on a state’s own evaluation of its power and ascribed roles based on the reputation and beliefs held by other states. Doran (1991) identifies roles (informal responsibilities) as a function of position in a system. Roles determine the difference between leaders and followers and those that provide security from those that are dependent upon others for it.

In discussing roles, however, one is compelled to point out the impact of realist theory in predicting state behavior and subsequent roles. From this perspective, the behavior of




states is based on power relations and relative power differences (Handel, 1990). In his seminal work on foreign policy roles, Holsti (1970: 234) highlights three types of states and their roles in the classical balance of power approach: aggressors, defenders, and balancers. He summarizes this categorization with the apt conclusion that imbalances among these roles lead to instability, conflict, and an opportunity for system transforma-tion. Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001) make similar conclusions in their assess-ments of systemic effects on states.

Constructivist interpretations, however, have led us to reconsider the types of roles that states play, their motivations for doing so, and the importance of capabilities in driv-ing such decisions. More specifically, constructivism calls us to evaluate the role of state identity as influencing its foreign policy behavior (Ringmar, 2002; Wendt, 1992). Unlike realist claims that the security dilemma leads to states maximizing power and increasing capabilities, constructivists posit that socialization, interaction, and learning among states influence identity formation and subsequent behavior. This identity formation is based on the two dimensions referred to earlier: how the state views itself and how other states view it. From the constructivist viewpoint, the inclusion of identity formation beyond the realist billiard ball model of politics provides a more robust way of interpret-ing the true behavior of states (Ringmar, 2002). In other words, it identifies why some states conform to the roles proposed by realists and why other states ‘break the mold,’ performing other roles or multiple roles simultaneously.

This range of state identity is based on the process of interaction between states and is a part of the structure of states’ environment. This structure, however, is different from the material one posited by neorealists. As Wendt (1987) contends, it is a social one in which states share knowledge, understandings of material resources, and consistent prac-tices. Thus, identity can change as the social structure and interactions change over time. In linking this approach to RSCs, the social structure provides the context in which states’ identities and roles are constructed. An observation across both regions and times illustrates this point. In some cases, states interact in a Hobbesian environment, forcing them to take on egoistic identities that force them to either be aggressive, defensive, or balancing in nature. The states of the Middle East historically have interacted in this manner. We can contrast these identities and behaviors with today’s Europe, in which states do not view their environment as hostile and interact with each other as coopera-tive members of a security community in the Kantian sense. Indeed, many constructivist scholars argue for a concept of regional security in which regional identity is defined not by conflict but by progression toward such a community (Fawcett, 1995; Hettne, 2000).

If one moves away from traditional measures of power as a direct causal mechanism for determining roles, there are larger patterns revealed among regional powers. Doran (1991), for example, does not equate traditional power with role determination. Also important is the tradition of international political involvement, the historical use of power, and how other states respond to a country because of its power and/or prestige. Following Holsti’s (1970) research on national role conceptions and taking into account constructivist arguments, we identify three prominent roles regional powers have played across time and regions: regional leader, regional protector, and regional custodian. All are linked to some measure of traditional power in that there is a threshold required for states to successfully fulfill these roles. Success or failure to perform, however, cannot




be determined by power alone. This is important because similar to Holsti we believe that failure to perform these roles will lead to instability and/or a transformation of the regional order.

Regional powers that are leaders act to strongly influence RSC members to move in specific security policy directions. They are responsible for initiating agreements on policy, shifting the courses of other states, and leading the region toward preferences more compat-ible with their own. When states are presented with a security problem that requires a solu-tion beyond a unilateral approach, it is regional power leadership that is critical in pushing states to adopt a coordinated set of policies to effectively deal with the issue.

How do regional powers become leaders? One can think of leadership in two capaci-ties. The first is in terms of a mutual recognition of leadership based on amicable interac-tions. Thus, consistent with Lahneman’s (2003) notion, some regional powers have maintained friendly relations with their neighbors, reducing the effect of the security dilemma, which in turn has provided legitimacy for their leadership. In lieu of legiti-macy, a second capacity can be viewed solely in terms of recognition based on over-whelming material capability and the willingness to use that capability to influence member states. In the latter case, the regional power employs its capability to push states in certain policy directions and does so in its own national interest. Regional powers using this type of leadership make it difficult for states to resist their preferences through potential coercion or fear of retaliation for resistance.

A key point to make about the leadership role is that it is often difficult to achieve success. There is sometimes a middle ground, where states are on friendly terms yet still suspicious of one state’s attempt to become a leader (Acharya, 2001). Regardless of suc-cess or failure, however, the leadership actions of regional powers directly affect the security order. In the Middle East RSC, for example, Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel failed to lead to a larger Arab–Israeli peace but has altered the manner in which other Arab states engage Israel. Thus, actions taken in an effort to lead an RSC can be viewed as important in understanding regional security, whether or not they are successful.

This importance cannot be more apparent than in the role of custodianship. The regional custodian role places a regional power in the position of engaging in efforts to maintain and/or stabilize the current security order. This can include powers that actively deter challenges to the order within the region or actions that provide resources for the stabilization of security concerns. Also included are specific efforts to maintain coordi-nation within the RSC to act against internal and external threats.

Regional power custodians are active in maintaining the security order that has been created, distinguishing this role from that of leadership. Without a custodian role, secu-rity issues have the opportunity to transform orders through incremental or wholesale changes to the status quo. Unchecked conflicts, for example, may be more likely to spread, intensifying security dilemmas, which in turn could lead to arms races and hostil-ity among states. Conflict management activities highlight one set of actions that custo-dians are able to employ to mitigate such changes.

Regional powers that act as custodians will likely need substantial traditional power capabilities due to the requirements for addressing significant security issues. Effec- tive custodianship may additionally require a certain degree of amity and recognition among regional member states lest interference by a regional power be interpreted as




infringement upon a state’s sovereignty. Such a perspective suggests this is possible in some RSCs but not others, which in turn plays a significant role in the type of security order established.

Effectiveness in custodianship also requires one to consider the impact of norms in the RSC. If norms are present and restrictive, regional powers that attempt to play custo-dian will be limited in the range and scope of their behavior. Custodial activities in an RSC with a norm of non-intervention, for instance, may be reduced to non-binding dip-lomatic actions such as mediation. Activities may be slow and late in responding as regional states signal a willingness to resist any attempts perceived as intervention. Regional powers thus may become reluctant to perform their custodial role. Conversely, norms of conflict management and multilateral diplomacy could open the range and scope of behavior for custodians. Activities in an RSC with such norms could include strong maintenance functions such as arbitration and peacekeeping. In either environ-ment, custodians will also be tasked with fostering and maintaining the norms that will make the role easier to perform in the future.

Leadership and custodianship have been portrayed largely as involving internal con-cerns, which begs the question: what about external factors? Securitized issues need not arise solely from within, leaving states with the need to prepare for challenges originat-ing from outside of their RSC. Regional powers thus are often tasked with the role of protection. Regional protector implies that a regional power assumes the burden of defending the area from external security threats. This defensive role can include such activities as deflecting a power away from a region in an active capacity or traditional deterrence that is focused on prevention. One other possibility in terms of this role is acting as an intermediary between regions (Bernstein and Weldon, 1968). It is clear that the protector role will be determined in large part by the identification of security issues from which member states need safeguarding.

A protector role, then, must include two components: the identification of threat and overall concerns regarding defense. In order to fulfill this role, a regional power must have something against which to protect the RSC. The challenge to identifying a threat is in achieving some degree of consensus about it. Often, the approach taken is broad preparation that focuses on possibilities in lieu of specified threats. In some cases, how-ever, as in Cold War Europe, the identification is straightforward. General concerns regarding defense come out through regional power efforts to create some form of defen-sive establishment. We are reluctant to state such establishments as ‘defense communi-ties’ as most regional attempts are not institutionalized enough. Nonetheless, many RSC members seek collaborative military arrangements with their regional powers via train-ing, exercises, and intelligence sharing.

Similar to the leadership and custodianship roles, protection from external threats is one that states take on for certain advantages. Three are worth mentioning specifically. First, preparing for external threats helps shift focus away from the potential threat of the regional power itself. This is likely to be particularly important in multipolar systems where one state is gaining in capabilities relative to others.6 Second, it allows an oppor-tunity for the regional power to gain greater influence over member states in security policy. This in turn may make it easier to fulfill both the leadership and custodianship roles. Third, regional powers defray some of the costs of preparing for threats that are




more likely to be problematic for the regional power itself than for other RSC members. This is particularly the case if the regional power is successful in achieving a consensus on the identity of the threat consistent with its own assessment.

All three roles identify a set of behaviors crucial to the development and maintenance of regional security orders. There are two final points, however, to consider. First, while discussed separately here, these roles are not mutually exclusive. In fact, success in one is likely to lead to success in the others. A regional power that is a strong leader, for example, is more likely to provide greater protection than one that has failed in this role. Strong leaders can convince other states to take seriously their concerns about defense and identification of threats. Weak leaders will find this task more challenging. Second, we are not making claims that regional powers perform these roles altruistically. Regional security has direct implications for their national interests. To the extent they perform these roles they do so in ways consistent with these interests. As it pertains to security, however, we believe that many of their interests are compatible with these roles and are likely to be protected by executing them, leading regional powers to carry out some combination of roles with varying degrees of success.

The Caucasus and Central Asia in the post-Soviet RSC provides a good illustration of the impact of roles and the need to explain security orders through a framework that moves beyond relative capabilities.7 Two points stand out in particular. First, despite a clear concentration of power within a single member state, Russia has been unable to create a hegemonic security order as might be expected. Rather, there exists a unipolar structure with an order that operates along principles of power restraining power. This is due partly to insufficient capabilities in addition to a lack of hegemonic recognition by RSC members. Second, despite its superiority in material capabilities, Russia’s inconsis-tency in performing regional power roles has led to a degradation of its influence.

In the years following the Soviet Union’s collapse, for example, Russia began to take on roles that suggested an attempt to move toward a hegemonic order. Indeed the early post-Soviet RSC is often viewed as such (Roeder, 1997). Examples of the performance of regional power roles during this period include leadership in the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), custodianship in the management of con-flicts (for example, Russian peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, Georgia, and Moldova), and protection from the penetration of outside forces into the RSC. In spite (or perhaps because) of these efforts, however, resistance to Russian power and influence developed, subsequently weakening the CIS and Russia’s ability to perform these roles. This is most evident in the creation of two institutions: The GUUAM Group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

GUUAM, a loose cooperative endeavor on the part of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, is predominantly viewed as an attempt to reduce Russian dominance in the region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The weakening of Russian power is perhaps most indicative in the desire/need to take part in the creation of the SCO. Made up of Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, emphasis on the ordering of the region through institutional structures has veered from a Russian focus on the CIS to the SCO since 2001 (Buszynski, 2003; Portyakov, 2007).

While Russia has played a leadership role in the creation and development of the SCO, it has done so in a way that recognizes China as a peer. While both states consider




the arrangement to be a counterweight to US presence within the region, China and Russia also have a number of issues over which they strategically diverge (Blank, 2006). Not only does the introduction of China as a major player within this institution provide a counterbalance to Russian domination, it also introduces opportunities for other Central Asian states to follow ‘a multivectored foreign policy of good relations with … immedi-ate neighbors, such as Turkey and China, and with more distant powers, including the United States, Germany, and South Korea’ (Ziegler, 2006: 118). In other words, the degrees of freedom within which these states act have increased as a result.

US presence in the region serves as another example of the lack of a dominant Russia. While Vladimir Putin’s administration prioritized the issue of terrorism within Central Asia and the Caucasus, providing a central motivation for the SCO, it also led him to welcome US military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and to tolerate US and NATO military bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This physical presence on the southern flanks of Russia and the Central Asian borders of China has become ‘a subject of serious concern’ for both states (Shaikhutdinov, 2007: 47–48). It has led to the balanc-ing of US power through the SCO and the maneuvering of Central Asian states within the context of these three powers, providing another indicator of Russia’s inability to per-form the role of protector over its traditional sphere of influence. Such a protector role, executed by a regionally hegemonic state, would disallow other military powers from acting freely and building bases within the region.

Russia therefore, despite its relative power and interest in holding a dominant position within the region, has performed its regional power roles such that the security dynamics have moved away from any sort of hegemonic order. It has been the combination of the level of relative capabilities and the role-related behaviors of Russia that have led to a power restraining power-based regional security order in the post-Soviet RSC.

Regional power orientationWhile the identification and assessment of regional power roles provides a good deal of explanatory power with respect to security order dynamics, it is also important to consider a state’s foreign policy orientation. We define orientation as the inclination, disposition, or preferences of a state with respect to the development and maintenance of the security order. The orientation of the regional powers in an RSC is a significant factor in determin-ing how roles are likely to be expressed in attempts to achieve a state’s preferences for a particular type of security order.8 We assess orientation along three different axes.

The first axis accounts for a regional power’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the RSC’s status quo order. Regional powers may be protective or revisionist regarding the status quo. Here, we borrow from power transition theory (PTT) (for example, Organski, 1958; Kugler and Organski, 1989), particularly Lemke’s multiple hierarchy model, which translates PTT to the regional level (Lemke, 2002). By status quo, PTT refers to an order created by a dominant state that imposes rules of conduct, regularizes patterns of interac-tions, and determines how goods are distributed at the international level. According to PTT, states may or may not be satisfied with the manner of such distribution (Kugler and Organski, 1989). States dissatisfied with the status quo that have achieved power parity with the dominant state create conditions that are conducive for war.




Our focus is somewhat different from power transition in that we are not concerned primarily with predicting wars between the top two powers within an RSC. Instead, we seek to determine whether the states that are playing the roles of regional power are doing so in a way that supports or seeks to revise the regional status quo. While war may be one option for seeking to achieve these goals, there are alternative options that states may also employ. Both the leadership and custodianship roles discussed above imply that regional powers may actively seek to develop and maintain a status quo order within their RSC. Whether or not they are acting on behalf of the existing status quo will have a distinct effect on RSC dynamics.

An in-depth analysis of the various status quo orders and orientations of regional powers in various RSCs is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we point to the necessity of such analyses for understanding how it is that regional powers influence their RSC’s dynamics. Such orientations will necessarily encourage or inhibit changes in the order around which an RSC functions. The manner in which the regional power seeks to do this and its level of success will have a significant effect on its system. Nor do we make any claim at this point about the positive or negative effects of the presence of a revisionist power upon regional security. For instance, it seems logical that the presence of both relatively equal status quo-oriented and revisionist regional powers is likely to create ripe conditions for conflict. However, it may also be the case that the presence of a revisionist power may encourage development of a more secure region where the status quo has been an ineffective or non-existent security order. We leave this empirical question for later studies.

The second axis along which we analyze the orientations of regional powers is their tendency toward unilateralism or multilateralism. Many of the actions taken by regional powers will involve and influence multiple states within the RSC. However, as Ruggie (1992: 567) points out, ‘what is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states … but that it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among these states.’ It is these prin-ciples of conduct that are generalized to a group of states that make actions multilateral-ist. Martin (1992) summarizes these principles as indivisibility, non-discrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. As such, multilateralism coordinates policies based upon the idea that states within the relevant grouping treat each other as if their relevant interests are indi-visible, they do so equally and without the need for immediate quid pro quo. Thus, mul-tilateralism implies a certain acceptance of policy and behavioral limitations among powerful states that simple cooperation does not.

These sorts of principles are translatable to regional powers in terms of their efforts to develop and maintain security orders. A multilateralist orientation implies that the regional power views security issues of RSC members as interconnected. As such, it seeks to develop rules and patterns of interaction among member states oriented toward expecta-tions of long-term cooperation, rather than immediate reciprocation. This is distinct from a more unilateralist orientation, demonstrated through actions reflecting an individualist sense of security, concerns with relative gains, proclivity toward issue- and state-specific bilateral agreements, and cooperation only when it is in the short-term national interest.

Such a distinction will translate into different styles of role-playing and should be expected to have a substantial bearing upon the nature of the security order. Again, it is not our purpose here to venture expectations about the positive or negative influences




that such orientations will have. Unilateralist orientations may result in high levels of regional security. However, it is reasonable to anticipate that security orders built upon multilateralist principles will enjoy greater legitimacy and therefore greater longevity.

The third orientation axis evaluates whether the impetus for which regional powers play their roles is proactive or reactive. The distinction between these two orientations may be less clear than the previous two. After all, the motivation to provide leadership, custodian-ship, or protection will always be in response to something — making it by definition reactive. However, we are concerned with the specificity and immediacy of this motiva-tion. Some actions that fit within the functions of the regional power will be directed at changes in the security context of an RSC that are diffuse and long-term-oriented. Others will be responses to specific and immediate actions or events. A tendency toward the for-mer would imply a proactive regional power, while a tendency toward the latter would imply a reactive one.

The first factor that determines whether a regional power is proactive or reactive is its targeted time horizon. Long-term planning for prevention and management of regional security threats implies a different type of leadership than policies addressing security threats as they arise. The second factor is the specificity of the security threats that a regional power tends to address. While it is inevitable that regional powers will be called upon to address specific security issues, our concern is whether they do so within the framework of a more broad and coherent approach to regional security.

Ikenberry (2001), for instance, reviews the creation of post-great war international orders. Given the destruction of previous orders and fundamental changes in systemic power distribution at these moments, great powers have expended considerable resources on designing and implementing new orders. These orders are broad approaches to deal-ing with security concerns that hold a high level of salience. We expect the same sort of long-term-oriented planning at the regional level as well. Such planning may also arise from the destruction of the old regional order, or it may provide for more incremental changes of the previous design. What is important is that the actions of the regional power in the creation and maintenance of this order are targeted at a broad set of security issues over an extended time period.

Bringing it all together: A test of the RPSF in the Middle East RSCPreviously we have provided examples of our Regional Powers and Security Framework as it pertains to structure and role. In this section we briefly test the framework in the Middle East RSC. Specifically, we utilize the RPSF to integrate the three components of structure, role, and orientation to explain the current security dynamics and order.

As argued earlier and illustrated in the post-Soviet case, the designation of regional powers by military capability alone limits the conclusions drawn regarding the influence of certain states in their RSC. This is the case in the Middle East, where Israel dominates militarily but has limited political leverage to perform regional power roles beyond those military in nature. In constructivist terms, other members do not recognize Israel as a regional power beyond its military role. Iran is in a similar position, although perhaps less isolated due to greater ties within the Middle East. Other states such as Egypt, Saudi




Arabia, and Iraq have at various times possessed significant relative military capabilities which have proven necessary but not sufficient to cast them as regional powers. Rather it has been their actions to serve as leaders, custodians, and protectors (supported by their capabilities) that suggest they be designated as such. Examples of these behaviors include Nasser’s efforts to create an Egypt-centered, pan-Arab state and Saudi Arabia’s peace proposals for the greater Arab–Israeli conflict. The Egyptian case in particular stands out as one in which an accumulation of material capabilities and broad recognition as a regional power qualified it as such (Lustick, 1997).

The nature of these roles is also important to understanding security orders. The RPSF emphasizes a regional power’s orientation as indicative of this nature: the identification of which helps to capture the manner in which states carry out these roles. To demonstrate this, we continue our Middle East examination, briefly assessing the RPSF in the context of nuclear proliferation, a key security issue from both within and abroad. Regional power role and orientation on the issue of proliferation interact to directly impact the security order that currently exists and the one that is likely to exist in the future.

With respect to nuclear capabilities and behaviors involving nuclear weapons, we can specify two definite regional power candidates: Israel and Iran. Israel possesses nuclear weapons while Iran is widely suspected of persistent efforts to develop them. The current foreign policy orientation of each provides a striking contrast; Israel is clearly status quo-oriented while Iran is revisionist.

While viewed by Israel as part of a comprehensive security guarantee in the context of a hostile RSC, the development of its nuclear arsenal marked a commitment to change the regional security order, making such a policy originally a revisionist one. Indeed, many assessments during this period suggested that open Israeli acknowledgment of these capabilities would alter the nature of the region to one based upon nuclear deter-rence (Irwin, 1991: 84). Such an alteration in this multipolar region would serve to create a stronger power restraining power security order. Since acquiring these capabilities, however, Israel has been a staunch supporter of the status quo; a condition that leaves Israel with a nuclear monopoly in the region.

Challenges to this monopoly demonstrate both the impact of orientation on the security order as well as the interaction with regional power roles. Perhaps the clearest example involves Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons during the late 1970s and early 1980s: efforts that were met with several preventative measures by Israel to maintain the status quo (Prelas and Peck, 2005). Highlighted by its attacks on the Osriak reactor in 1981, Israel took on the self-ascribed role of custodian of the security order (maintaining the balance of power) due to both its material capabilities and its status quo orientation. Furthermore, in terms of recognition, it should be noted that given the presence of inter-Arab rivalries dur-ing this period, Arab states were not completely dissatisfied with this effort as it limited Iraq’s own hegemonic ambitions. Most recently, Israel’s status quo orientation has contin-ued to bolster this role with respect to security order maintenance, illustrated by attacks on suspected plutonium development in Syria in 2007, and its training exercises in June 2008 targeted toward a potential preventative strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.

In contrast, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons seems to be a key component of its desire to remake the security order. It has consistently resisted international efforts to deter its nuclear program and recent displays of force along with threats toward Israel




and the US suggest it is ready to engage in war to defend its program. The possession of nuclear weapons by Iran would seemingly increase its regional power position by deter-ring Israel, the Arab states, and the US from forcefully responding to a more assertive foreign policy in the RSC (Cohen, 1995).

Thus, through the RPSF we observe the interplay between structure, role, and orienta-tion in influencing the Middle East security order. The behavior of Iran and questions regarding Israel’s ability to play a long-term custodial role with respect to nuclear prolifera-tion are the subject of much speculation on the future security order in the Middle East. While Israel’s policy of ambiguity regarding its capabilities may have decreased the moti-vation for Arab states to acquire nuclear weapons, maintaining the status quo (Evron, 1995), open acknowledgment of such capabilities by Iran, may put Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Syria in a position to become more aggressive in their efforts to pursue such arms. To date, there is increasing interest by countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in acquiring nuclear energy technol-ogy, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finding evidence of clandestine nuclear activity in Egypt as recently as 2005 (Khaitous, 2008). While such interest does not imply these states are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, it does move the region a step closer to having the option, an option that would effectively transform the security order.

ConclusionThe purpose of this article has been to establish an analytical framework through which we can better understand security dynamics in RSCs, particularly the influential func-tions that regional powers play in developing and maintaining security orders. Our pri-mary contribution centers on understanding the behavior of regional powers in this regard. Thus, we have argued for the identification of three types of regional power roles (leadership, custodianship, and protection), along with three dimensions of foreign pol-icy orientation (status quo-revisionist, unilateral–multilateral, and proactive–reactive).

It is the combination of these roles and orientations, along with the RSC’s structure and its interactions with significant external powers that drives the regional security order. It is thus imperative that analysts consider the power as well as the behavior of potential regional powers in order to determine their influence. In other words, neorealist and constructivist explanations must be integrated. While states must possess a certain base level of capabilities to act as a regional power, such power is not sufficient to be a regional power. On the contrary, states also must act and in part be recognized as such. They do so by performing regional power roles in a consistent way across a broad range of securitized issues. Furthermore, we can understand the manner in which regional powers play these roles by considering their foreign policy orientations. In this way, the three components of this framework build upon one another to complete our understand-ing of the security dynamics within an RSC.

Such a framework, however, is useless if it cannot lead to some sort of empirical vali-dation. Throughout the article we have hinted at ways in which this can be done. Building upon these allusions, we conclude with a brief discussion on the direction of future research utilizing this framework. While there are a plethora of testable questions, we include examples here of types that researchers might examine with respect to regional power behavior, the primary contribution of this framework.




First, the impact on the security order of the presence, absence, or range of securitized issues managed through the performance of regional power roles merits specific empiri-cal examination and suggests several hypotheses. For example, ceteris paribus, a lack of leadership in an RSC, and/or inconsistent leadership over time should more likely lead to unstructured and power restraining power orders. The logic here is that without a regional power to influence RSC members’ movement toward certain security policy directions there is unlikely to be any consensus, thus making a concert, security community, or hegemonic security order difficult to develop. Another hypothesis would be that RSCs lacking regular regional power custodianship should be more susceptible to changes in security orders since without custodianship, security orders have a greater potential to degrade due to unmanaged conflict and a lack of norms guiding RSC member behavior.

In terms of orientation, several additional hypotheses exist. One possibility is that RSCs with multilaterally oriented regional powers are more likely to be stable than those where regional powers are unilaterally oriented. As mentioned earlier, the rationale is that multilateral interactions are likely to create greater legitimacy and thus lead to greater adherence to the current order. Another hypothesis anticipates that RSCs with proactive regional powers will possess a higher degree of stability over the long term than those with reactive powers, since proactive powers seek to develop and implement a more comprehensive regional approach toward internal and external security threats than reactive ones. Thus, there should be a higher degree of predictability amongst mem-ber states, as well as with extra-regional states, in these types of RSCs.

Beyond these simple yet important hypotheses, there are still more complicated con-ditional effects for which one might account. Propositions concerning the combined impact of different orientations along the three dimensions, in combination with any of the roles, should lead to helpful observations about RSC dynamics. Such comprehensive analyses of RSCs require more attention than space constraints here allow, but it is for this type of empirical application that this article provides a framework, introducing a more coherent and effective way to identify and understand the influences of regional powers upon their RSCs.

While there is a growing recognition that the regional level is increasingly pertinent to an understanding of international security and that certain regional powers hold a special position atop their respective subsystems, as of yet a framework for such an exploration has not been created? We have developed such a framework here, while also proposing several examples of relevant research questions intended to move the discipline forward. Such empirical application should help to identify actual regional powers based upon both capacity and behavior, in addition to explaining how variation across each of the three variables (structure, role, and orientation) leads toward different regional security orders as well as actual processes of securitization and de-securitization.

Notes

1. Neumann’s (1992) edited volume on regional great powers stands out in this regard. Its focus on the candidacy of specific states, however, falls short in providing any overarching theoreti-cal framework from which to evaluate regional power identity.

2. We leave open the possibility that such influence could be realized through the actions of ‘middle powers.’ As Myers (1991: 6) suggests, these states could be capable of providing capabilities that could foreseeably alter the regional system. In addition, as Figure 1 suggests,




regional powers can manipulate the great powers into this type of behavior, reversing the direction of impact (Acharya, 2001; Kelly, 2007; Lemke, 2002).

3. For more detailed explanation of how these designations are made, see Buzan and Wæver (2003: 34–37).

4. Such a threshold is likely to vary across time and region. Given our emphasis on behavioral attributes, our framework allows for states with smaller capabilities to play various roles, although doing so consistently is likely to prove more difficult than for more materially capable states.

5. We use version 3.02 of the National Material Capabilities Index (CINC) along with the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006). The former is an index that includes measures of numbers of military personnel and expenditures, national energy, iron and steel production, and nominal urban and total population. For a detailed description, see Singer et al. (1972) and Singer (1987).

6. Here we agree with Walt’s (1987) assessment that states are likely to be very concerned about regional powers due not only to material capabilities but also to geographic proximity and perceived intentions. Thus, by taking on such a role, regional powers can attempt to co-opt other states in the region to direct alliance formation toward threats from the outside in lieu of one intended to balance its own power.

7. While beyond this article’s scope, we note a concern with respect to this RSC’s make-up. While Buzan and Wæver (2003) identify the RSC in terms of four subregions (Baltic, Western, Caucasus, and Central Asia), there are persuasive arguments that the Baltic states are part of the EU complex while both the Caucasus and Central Asia are separate complexes (for exam-ple, Peimani, 1998; Schulz et al., 2001). Our focus on these latter two regions takes these concerns into account, although we believe this application illustrates the difficulty with which Russia performs regional power roles across any possible RSC delineation.

8. Mouritzen and Wivel (2005) also allude to such preferences in explaining the behavior of small ‘non-pole’ power states in their interactions with ‘pole’ or regional powers. While they claim that such behavior is primarily a function of geopolitical or spatial distance from the pole, they also mention that regional or pole power preferences are important in that they influence the type of policies (sanctions) the power is likely to use in its interactions with a specific state. Here we note Mouritzen and Wivel’s important point about bilateral interac-tions but concern ourselves with a regional power’s general tendency vis-a-vis all states with respect to the security order.

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Biographical notes

Derrick Frazier is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. His research interests focus on two areas: third-party conflict man-agement and regional security. The former involves explaining the mediation process in interstate disputes, with a special emphasis on how third parties such as states and inter-national organizations are motivated to moderate and/or terminate militarized conflicts. The latter research area explores the dynamics of regional security. Specifically, Dr Frazier is investigating the behavior of regional powers and their importance in understanding regional security orders.

Robert Stewart-Ingersoll is Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of International Studies at the American University of Sharjah. His current research focuses on human and regional security. The research on human security is particularly focused upon the influences of various facets of the globalization process on human rights condi-tions in developing states, while the regional security work is concerned with under-standing the nature and determinants of regional powers’ influence on their regional security dynamics.



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