regional implications of nato withdrawal from afghanistan - what role for the eu

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AGORA ASIA-EUROPE

Regional implications of NATOwithdrawal from Afghanistan:What role for the EU?

Clare Castillejo

Te US and NAO may have a date to leave Afghanistan,but they still lack a realistic exit strategy. Tere is nocredible plan for a political and security transition within thecountry. It is difficult to believe that the weak Kabul governmentwill be able to provide security or hold the aliban at bay.Moreover, there is no meaningful strategy to embed the 2014draw-down within the complex power dynamics of the region.A sustainable solution for Afghanistan requires a negotiatedpolitical settlement that is backed by regional powers.

Although Afghanistans internal politics will be crucial,its neighbours will significantly shape the countrys futurefollowing NAOs departure. Moreover, developments inAfghanistan will have profound implications for securityin its neighbourhood. Despite this, the US and its EU allieshave so far failed effectively to situate their goal of stabilisingAfghanistan within the broader dynamics of the region. o doso requires identifying the interests of the different regionalactors in Afghanistan and the incentives that could encouragethem to support an Afghan peace deal, as well as understandinghow failure in Afghanistan may affect regional stability.

Afghanistans neighbourhood is both highly volatile and critical

for global security. It poses a number of interrelated threats,including terrorism, drug trafficking, nuclear proliferationand long standing national, ethnic and sectarian conflicts.

H i g h l i g h t s

Western actors have notengaged sufficiently with the

regional power dynamics that

will determine Afghanistans

future.

The conflicting interests ofAfghanistans neighbours need

to be resolved in order to build

a sustainable peace.

The EU must considerhow it can help promote a

regionally backed settlement

for Afghanistan.

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REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATO WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN:WHAT ROLE FOR THE EU?

Europes security is therefore at stake in theAfghanistan endgame. However, the EU sofar lacks a joined up and strategic response toAfghanistans neighbourhood. Europe needsto adopt a more nuanced regional lens onAfghanistan and consider what role it couldplay in promoting a regional solution.

CONVERGING ANDCONFLICTING INTERESTS

Given Afghanistans strategic location andpotential to undermine regional securityand prosperity, all its neighbours share acommon interest in the emergence of a stableAfghan state. However, they have varying,and in some cases profoundly conflicting,interests regarding the nature of this state.If these conflicting interests are not resolved

they could undermine the stability that allAfghanistans neighbours require.

Te country whose future is most intimatelytied to that of Afghanistan is Pakistan.Pakistans powerful military has consistentlysupported the Quetta-Shura aliban, theHaqqani network and other militants inAfghanistan, as well as sought to derail anypeace negotiations which exclude Pakistan.Pakistan has simultaneously acceptedhuge quantities of US military aid to fightmilitancy, a double handed position thatis becoming increasingly untenable as USfrustration grows.

Pakistans spoiler role in Afghanistan mustbe understood within the context of itsconflict with India and sense of regionalinsecurity, as well as the civil-militaryimbalance which allows the military to

dominate policy making. Te overall goalof Pakistans military is to ensure that pro-Pakistani militant groups gain power in post-NAO Afghanistan. Pakistan is concernedat growing Indian influence in Kabul andsees a friendly Afghanistan as necessary forits security in the region.

Beyond the India threat, there are other

Pakistani interests at stake in Afghanistan.Te Pakistani militarys support for militantsin Afghanistan has created space for militancyin Pakistans border areas, from where aninsurgency has spread across the country.

A political settlement in Afghanistan thatenables Afghan militants based in Pakistanto go home and reduces militant activityon both sides of the border would greatlyimprove Pakistans prospects of defeatingits internal insurgency. Moreover, Pakistans

economy is in bad shape and an improvedsecurity situation and stable border with

Afghanistan could facilitate trade andgrowth. Tese are compelling reasons forPakistan to support stability in Afghanistan.However, given the Pakistani militarysobsession with India, it is likely to prioritisea client Afghan state over a stable one.

India also sees Afghanistan through the lensof its conflict with Pakistan. India has histori-cally had excellent relations with Afghanistan,apart from during the rule of the aliban who

were deeply hostile to India. India has rebuiltits influence in the country since 2001. It hasgiven approximately $2 billion in aid to Ka-bul, making it the largest regional donor. InOctober 2011 India and Afghanistan devel-oped a strategic partnership agreement. Tisgives India a role in training Afghan securityforces, much to Pakistans concern. Tere are



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suggestions that New Delhi and Kabul arealso collaborating clandestinely to supportBaloch insurgents within Pakistan. Indiasmain interests are to counterbalance Pakistaniinfluence in Afghanistan and prevent the re-turn of a aliban regime that would providea haven for jihadi militants. Since 2001 tradebetween India and Afghanistan has increased

dramatically and a stable

Afghanistan could pro-vide India with trade andenergy access to Cen-tral Asia.

Chinas engagement withAfghanistan is primar-ily economic. Beijing isthe biggest foreign directinvestor in Afghanistan,with major investments

in mining and com-munications. China hasavoided any direct in-volvement in Afghani-stans security or do-mestic politics, fearing

this would make it a target for Islamist ter-rorism. However, as a close ally of Pakistan,China must be assumed to have some indi-rect influence over security in Afghanistan.Given its economic investments and con-cern about the spread of Islamic militancy,Chinas interest is overwhelming for a stableand moderate Afghanistan. However, thereis a danger that Chinas extractive form ofinvestment may work against Afghanistansdevelopment. It could instead shore up elitesand increase inequality. Chinas deep opposi-tion to permanent US bases in Afghanistanis a stumbling block to its engagement withinternational actors on Afghanistans future.

Irans influence in Afghanistan has increasedsince the fall of the aliban. Iran providespolitical support to the Karzai governmentwhile apparently also supporting elements ofthe aliban in order to undermine the USmission. Iran wants to see foreign forces leaveAfghanistan and shares Chinas concernsregarding any permanent US base. However,it does not want an unstable Afghanistan

or the return of the aliban. Irans maininterests are to control drug trafficking fromAfghanistan; increase its access to marketsin Afghanistan and Central Asia; and useAfghanistan as a route to transport energy toChina. Iran would not like Afghanistan tobe entirely controlled by Pakistan.

Moscow understands that an unstableAfghanistan will compromise its own security.Russias interests are overwhelmingly in a

secure and moderate Afghanistan that willnot destabilise Central Asia or spread Islamistextremism. However, Russia shares Chinaand Irans concerns regarding permanent USbases. Russia is seeking closer security tieswith the EU and greater influence in Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security cooperation.It sees cooperation with the west overAfghanistan as an opportunity to strengthenthese ties.

Te Central Asian states have little influenceover developments in Afghanistan. However,their security could be threatened by greaterinstability in the country, in particularthrough the spread of radicalism and drugtrafficking. Given their porous borders andsubstantial ethnic minorities in Afghanistan,ajikistan and Uzbekistan are particularlyvulnerable to negative spill-over fromconflict in Afghanistan.

There isno meaningfulstrategy toembed the 2014draw-downwithin the

complex powerdynamics ofthe region



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THE NEED FOR A REGIONALLY

SUPPORTED SETTLEMENT

It is widely accepted that conflict inAfghanistan can only be ended through anegotiated peace settlement that includesthe aliban. Both the US and the Karzaigovernment have made efforts to brokersuch a settlement, but with little progress.

he governments attempts to reach out tothe aliban were disrupted in September2011 by the killing of its chief negotiator,ex-President Rabbani, apparently onthe orders of Pakistans security serviceswho did not appreciate being excludedfrom negotiations. Both Qatar and SaudiArabia are now apparently playing a rolein reinitiating dialogue. However, it isnot clear if the aliban is interested innegotiating, with NAOs withdrawal so

closely in sight.

As Rabbanis kill ing demonstrates, anysettlement that excludes regional powersor undermines their interests is doomedto fail. What is needed is a politicalsettlement between Afghanistans mainactors that is actively supported byregional powers. his requires that bothnational and regional actors play a rolein negotiations. It also requires findinga compromise between the competinginterests of Afghanistans neighbours.Given the tensions between theseneighbours, this will be an extremelydifficult task.

he Istanbul and Bonn processes wereintended to build international and regio-nal cooperation concerning Afghanistan.However, these have not resulted in any

concrete progress. his is partly becauseof differences between the approach of

western actors and regional powers, aswell as the divisions among regionalpowers themselves. he next internationalconference on Afghanistan, plannedfor 2013 in okyo, seems unlikely toovercome these problems. In addition tothese formal processes, the US and some

EU member states are engaged in intensediplomatic dialogue with Afghanistansneighbours on the future of the country.However, at the moment there is littlesign that a regionally owned solution for

Afghanistan is going to emerge in timefor the 2014 withdrawal. If NAO leaves

Afghanistan without a regionally backedsettlement in place the stability of the

whole region will be in jeopardy.

Without a regionally backed settlementthe greatest danger is of a proxy warin Afghanistan, with regional powersbacking different ethnic or sectarianfactions in pursuit of their own interests.Such a conflict would be dominated bythe struggle between India and Pakistanfor control of Afghanistan. However itis possible that Iran and Russia wouldcollaborate with India to support anti-aliban actors, while Saudi Arabia maysupport Pashtun groups in alliance withPakistan.

Such a conflict would not only bedevastating for Afghanistan, but wouldhave serious implications for regionalsecurity and prosperity. It woulddangerously heighten tensions betweenIndia and Pakistan. It could also increaseethnic and sectarian violence across



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the region, given that proxy groups inAfghanistan are defined along ethnicand sectarian identities. Moreover,such a regionally sponsored conflict in

Afghanistan would block any progresstowards regional agreement on key issuessuch as nuclear proliferation, watersharing, energy and trade.

A stable Afghanistan could provide animportant trade route for India, Pakistanand China to reach Central Asian markets,as well as for Central Asian and Iranianenergy to reach China and South Asia. hedevelopment of such trade routes couldincrease prosperity across the region andenhance regional stability. Conversely, anincrease in conflict in Afghanistan wouldhave serious economic consequences forthe region. It would block prospects for

increased trade, prevent internationalactors from providing developmentassistance and threaten China and Indiasinvestments in Afghanistan. It could alsoprecipitate another mass flow of Afghanrefugees into neighbouring countries,

with serious economic and security costs.

Of greatest concern to the internationalcommunity is that Afghanistans collapseinto civil war or return to aliban rule

would again make it a haven for jihaditerrorism. hese concerns are reflected

within the region. India is particularlyworried about the prospect of a alibanreturn, given that the last alibangovernment supported terrorist activitiesagainst India. China and Russia wouldalso be concerned at an Afghanistan thatprovides even more space for internationalterrorist networks.

EU ENGAGEMENT

Te EU has invested heavily in Afghanistan.EU civilian assistance to the country isapproximately 1 billion per year; theEUPOL mission has been in place since2007 to strengthen the Afghan policeforce and the rule of law; and EU memberstates have contributed extensively to

the NAO military mission. However,this investment (like that of the US) hasnot significantly improved Afghanistansgovernance, development or securitysituation. Tis failure is not only due toineffective western strategies or corruptionwithin the Afghan government. It is alsobecause Afghanistans neighbours haveundermined progress.

Given that the Afghanistan endgame is

controlled by Asian powers, the US willhave limited influence on the outcomeand the EU even less. Te challenge for theEU is that, while it has minimal influencewithin Afghanistans neighbourhood, thatneighbourhoods future is vitally importantfor European security. Tis means the EUmust continue to search for modest ways inwhich it can promote regional support fora viable negotiated peace in Afghanistan.Te EU must use quiet diplomacy,mediation and targeted support to keyactors within Afghanistan and the regionto help foster such agreement.

Te EU institutions have so far failed to takeup this challenge. While Brussels providesassistance to Kabul, it has not developedany strategic approach to promote aregional solution to the conflict. Its rolehas primarily been as an aid donor, with



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limited political engagement. However,this is beginning to change. Recognisingthe importance of Pakistans future toEuropean security, the EU increased itsaid to Pakistan by 50 per cent from 2011-2013 and in February 2012 signed a 5 yearengagement plan with the country. TeEU is strengthening political dialogue withIndia and the issue of regional cooperation

on Afghanistan featured in the February2012 India-EU summit.

At present, the EU pursues separatepolicy initiatives in different parts of theregion with limited inter-linkages. Forexample, the EUs security assistancein the region has been piecemeal andmostly has not addressed the regionalaspects of insecurity, apart from oneinitiative under the Instrument for

Stability to support increased civiliananti-terrorism cooperation betweenPakistan and Afghanistan. Likewise, whilethe EU provides support to democraticinstitutions and civil society across theregion, this support could be better joinedup. In particular the EU could help linkprogressive actors from Afghanistan,Pakistan, Iran and India in dialogue onthe future of Afghanistan and the region.In contrast, the US recently launchedits New Silk Road initiative, whichaims to strengthen regional linkagesthrough region-wide infrastructure andother projects. However, this initiativelacks funding and remains a somewhatimprecise vision.

Te EUs greatest leverage in this regionis arguably through trade. Te EU is thelargest trade partner of both India and

Pakistan and could potentially use thisposition to wield greater political influence.

Although an EU waiver on tariffs forPakistan was recently approved, Pakistanis desperate for a free trade agreement(FA). Te offer of rapid progress on aFA could perhaps provide incentivesfor improved regional cooperation byIslamabad. Trough support to regional

trade cooperation initiatives the EU couldalso possibly help strengthen economiclinks and ease tensions between India,Pakistan and Afghanistan. Of course, inthese tough economic times, Brusselstrade dialogue with India is inevitablymore focused on Europes economic needsand finalising the drawn out EU-IndiaFA negotiations than on the securitychallenges of South Asia.

PRIORITIES

Te EU must make every effort toencourage Pakistan to give up its spoilerrole in Afghanistan. Tis requires reducingPakistans sense of external insecurity andencouraging Pakistan and India bilaterallyto resolve some of the outstanding tensionsbetween them. It also means encouragingIndia to step back from more provocativeaspects of engagement with Kabul.

he EU should also encourage Pakistanand Afghanistan to work together toaddress their differences and reducesuspicion. his includes addressing theirlong running border dispute and agreeingon how the border can best be managed.It could also involve working jointlyto address the anxieties of the Pashtun



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community who make up the bulk ofAfghan and Pakistani insurgents onboth sides of the border. As a major donorto both countries the EU can supportgovernance reforms, institution buildingand development initiatives that addressthe grievances of Pashtun populations.

It is difficult to imagine that the EU

could wield any influence with theChinese government regarding its rolein Afghanistan. However, it shouldcertainly raise the issue of Afghanistanand related regional security challengesas part of its political dialogue withChina. Disappointingly it appears that

Afghanistan was not discussed duringthe latest EU-China summit on 14February 2012. he EU should providetechnical support to Afghan authorities

to help ensure that contracts with Chineseinvestors provide the best deal forAfghanistan; more transparent governancewould also temper growing Chineseunease over investment conditions in thecountry.

Te EU must seek opportunities todraw Iran into international dialogue on

Afghanistan. Irans interest in regionallevel engagement can be seen in President

Ahmadinejads participation in three waydiscussions on regional security and tradeissues with Afghan and Pakistani leadersin February 2012. Despite deterioratingrelations between the EU and Iran, thetwo share some interests in relation to

Afghanistan. Both want to avoid the returnof the aliban, would like to curb drugtrafficking and want to see the Afghaneconomy and trade routes developed. It is

important that growing tension over Iransnuclear programme does not completelyclose the door to EU engagement withIran on the future of Afghanistan even ifthis looks a remote prospect in the currentclimate.Clare Castillejo is a senior researcher at FRIDE.

e-mail: [email protected]

www.fride.org

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regional implications of nato withdrawal from afghanistan - what role for the eu

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