reframing libel scott&mullis
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‘Reframing Libel: taking (all) rights seriously and where it leads’ presented by Professor Alastair Mullis and Dr Andrew Scott at the Reframing Libel Symposium, City University London, 4th November 2010.TRANSCRIPT
Reframing Libel:taking (all) rights seriously and where it leads
Andrew Scott and Alastair Mullis
Overview
Principles underpinning the libel regime
Application to regime design
Proposals for a coherent libel regime
Principles
Centrality of freedom of speech
Respect for privacy and reputation
Access to justice
Taking free speech seriously
‘[freedom of speech is] one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment... applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness
without which there is no “democratic society”
Steel and Morris v United Kingdom ECHR 68416/01, at [87].
Taking free speech seriously
‘Freedom of expression is, of course, intrinsically important: it is valued for its own sake. But it is well recognised that it is also instrumentally
important. It serves a number of broad objectives. First, it promotes the self-fulfilment of individuals in society. Secondly, in the famous words of Holmes J… “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”… Thirdly, freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy. The free flow of information and
ideas informs political debate. It is a safety valve: people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they can in principle
seek to influence them. It acts as a brake on the abuse of power”
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department,ex parte Simms [2000] 1 AC 115, at 126
Taking free speech seriously
‘we too are concerned about the potential for misuse of libel law so as to preclude investigative journalism, to stifle scientific and medical
debate, to undermine the important work of human rights organisations and other NGOs, or to invite the strategic legal tourist from abroad. To the extent that the law allows powerful individuals or corporate entities to ‘chill’ important, warranted comment concerning themselves, their
activities, their products or their ideas, it is socially dysfunctional’
Mullis and Scott (2009) Communications Law, 14(6), 173-183, at 173
Principles
Centrality of freedom of speech
Respect for privacy and reputation
Access to justice
Taking reputation seriously
Reputation quintessentially public in nature: so how can it be protected by Article 8 ECHR ?
Social psychology: key element in one’s self-esteem (self-worth) derives from
perception of what others think perceived harm to reputation causes harm to self-
esteem / impact on psychological integrity of individual
Principles
Respect for privacy and reputation
Centrality of freedom of speech
Access to justice
Taking access seriously
Access to justice important in principle and
practice
Costs, CFAs and the ‘chilling effect’ of libel
Access to justice for claimants
Application: purposes of libel
Compensate for hurt feelings
Compensate for unquantifiable presumed harm
Compensate for special (provable) harm
Vindicate / restore reputation
Compensating Article 8 harm
Hurt felt (harm) explained by social psychology
Generally, degree of hurt relatively low reasonable to consider a damages ‘cap’
Art. 8 harm: ramifications (I)
Meaning: that (those) inferred by the claimant, subject to test of
capability / reasonableness / other claimant incentive to plead mainstream meanings no need for a ‘single meaning rule’ no need for determination by jury no need to argue defences relevant to multiple
indeterminate meanings
Art. 8 harm: ramifications (II)
Defences: emphasis on justification and fair comment no particular need for Reynolds privilege
Standing: corporations unable to recover damages for Art.8
harm
Art. 8 harm: ramifications (III)
Costs: changes on meaning and Reynolds would mean very
substantial reduction in costs
Access to justice: enhanced access to justice for claimants reduced chilling effect for defendants
Application: purposes of libel
Compensate for hurt feelings
Compensate for unquantifiable presumed harm
Compensation for special (provable) harm
Vindicate / restore reputation
Vindication & intangible loss
Damages awarded to vindicate reputation: but is a monetary award the best way to achieve this?
Preference for discursive remedies (mandated apologies, corrections, rights to reply, and possibly declarations of falsity) achieve necessary symbolism enhance public understanding (one purpose of Art 10)
Vindication: ramifications (I)
Vindication & intangible loss damages remedy to be withdrawn mitigated by availability of Art 8 damages (for
individual claimants) and impact of discursive remedy
Meaning: no reason to divert from claimant’s capable /
reasonable meaning(s) no need for ‘single meaning rule’
Vindication: ramifications (II)
Standing: corporations able to seek discursive remedy
Defences: emphasis on justification and fair comment Reynolds privilege positively inappropriate
Downside for defendant: would have to provide discursive remedy – a prima
facie infringement of Article 10 right not to speak commercially disadvantageous BUT upside of enhanced journalistic credibility
Downside for claimant: vindication not coterminous with intangible harm –
‘stain’ not entirely removed
Vindication: ramifications (III)
Downside for defendant: would have to provide discursive remedy – a prima
facie infringement of Article 10 right not to speak commercially disadvantageous BUT upside of enhanced journalistic credibility
Downside for claimant: vindication not coterminous with intangible harm –
‘stain’ not entirely removed
Application: purposes of libel
Compensate for hurt feelings
Compensate for unquantifiable presumed harm
Compensation for special (provable) harm
Vindicate / restore reputation
Special damages
No reason why special damages should not continue to be recoverable if provable note: entails shift in burden of proof of harm
Meaning issue becomes less central determination of meaning a by-product of
demonstrating how damage caused
Defences: remain as at present
Endpoint: a two stream libel regime
First stream: libel tribunal / county-court / (self-) regulatory body to decide capability of meaning; applicability of
justification / fair comment defences to award max damages £10k for Art 8 harm (soft cap
imposed by dint of choice of route); no capacity to award special damages
to determine appropriate discursive remedy
Endpoint: a two stream libel regime
Second stream: High Court to consider claims for serious Art 8 harm and special
damages only; no damages for vindication / intangible harm
reliant on claimant’s capable (reasonable) meaning and harm-causing meaning respectively
cap on Art 8 harm benchmarked to damages for physical injury; no limit on special damages
Endpoint: a two stream libel regime
Reflections majority of cases proceed through stream 1 strong incentive to settle cases quickly continuing potential for abusive use of stream 2? potential for game-playing by (media) defendants?
Reframing Libel:taking (all) rights seriously and where it leads
Andrew Scott Alastair Mullis