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BY JULIANA BIDADANURE + PHOTOGRAPHY COURTESY OF RITA SCAGLIA FOR THE GLOBAL JOURNAL

Rediscovering The Utopian In Europe: An Interview With

Philippe Van Parijs.

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In their interview in this magazine last year, Jürgen Habermas and Francis Fukuyama suggested the financial crisis had revealed the weaknesses of the European Union (EU). There seems to be a critical lack of trust, solidarity and cohesion – what is your diagnosis?

Solidarity is easy when it does not cost much. When a crisis hits and the amounts involved reach unprecedented levels, indignation can easily erupt on both sides. Net contributors start quibbling about whether the trouble they are being asked to relieve is self-inflicted, and try to impose conditions meant to cure the source of the trouble and prevent its repeat. Net beneficiaries, on the other hand, resent the conditionalities attached to the help they are given and eagerly believe in stories that place part of the responsibility for the trouble at the feet of net contributors.

Solidarity is also more difficult to manage when different cultures are involved. For example, having just one word [schuld] to refer to both debt and culpability – as is the case in German and Dutch – is bound to make some difference when indebted countries call for solidarity. The best predictor of a government’s stance on solidarity is not, I am told, whether it is expected to pay or receive, but rather, whether its population belongs in the main to a Protestant or Catholic tradition. In one view, those who default must be punished even if everyone is worse off

as a result. According to the other, sinners can get full absolution. This is just one illustration of why solidarity will always be trickier at the EU level than in more culturally homogeneous political communities. But being trickier does not make it impossible, nor less necessary.

Habermas rejects the appropriateness of the German and American federal model for Europe, arguing it is too ambitious and unnecessary – do you agree federalism is the wrong way forward?

What is federalism? A family of systems of government that involve at least two levels of democratic functioning with a significant set of competences entrenched at each level. The more competences are exercised at the higher level and the more difficult it is for lower-level entities to reappropriate those competences, the more one moves towards a unitary state. The more competences are exercised at the lower level and the more difficult it is for the higher-level polity to reappropriate those competences, the more one moves towards a confederation of sovereign states.

The EU is very far from being a unitary state, but it has also become quite a bit more than a confederation. The competences it exercises are substantial and entrenched enough to make the label ‘federal’ appropriate. Transferring back to member states some of these

competences – or making it easier for each national government to re-appropriate any of them – could turn the EU into a sheer confederation. But notwithstanding some facile anti-EU rhetoric, all calls for significant moves in this direction lose momentum as soon as people figure out the implications. Within the Eurozone, there is now a widespread awareness that more powers need to be transferred upward if the common currency is to be sustainable.

It does not follow, however, that the EU should try to fashion itself after either the German or American federal models. This would mean having a federal police force and federal tax collectors, abolishing the right of exit and dispensing with unanimity among member states for constitutional

Philippe Van Parijs is a central figure in the worlds of philosophy and politics alike. Described by Amartya Sen as “one of the most original and creative thinkers of our time,” he is famous for his defense of a Universal Basic Income – an unconditional monthly grant allocated to all – as the best expression of social justice and freedom.

Building on the thought-provoking exchange between Francis Fukuyama and Jürgen Habermas published in May, this special extended interview challenges us to imagine

a fairer future for the European project.

‘Within the Eurozone, there is now a widespread awareness that more powers need to be transferred upward if the common currency is to be sustainable.’

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changes. I agree with Habermas that a direct transposition of such a model is not what our multi-national, multilingual entity needs. The EU can become a stronger and more efficient federation, with two significant and entrenched levels of democratic decision making, without needing to be turned into a genuine federal state.

Habermas also argues the lack of trust and cohesion between European states is due to the incapacity of elites to transcend their own national concerns and embrace a European agenda.

Some European elites do wish to transcend national concerns. But political leaders are electorally accountable to the citizens of their respective countries. If they sacrifice national concerns to the European agenda, they run a high risk of being replaced by their rivals. The culprits, therefore, are less the main players than the rules of the game they have no option but to play. Of course, if the electorates themselves were guided by Europe’s common good rather than by national self-interest, there would be no problem. But with media and parties fragmented along national divides, there is no way this could happen. Against this background, much of the art of European governance consists in achieving good compromises between positions steered by national concerns. It requires generating sufficient trust and mutual understanding between national leaders with enough authority over political majorities and public opinion. Given the existing institutional framework, it is the capacity of political elites to manage this that represents the key to progress.

You have argued the main catalyst for European citizenship ought to be a form of European social redistribution – what do you mean, especially by the notion of a ‘euro-dividend’?

A euro-dividend, like any other form of EU-wide social redistribution, may work as a catalyst for European citizenship, just as Bismarck’s pension system was arguably a major factor in turning the people of Bavaria, Prussia or Rhineland into German citizens. But this is not my primary reason for

proposing it. The immediate reason is that some background conditions need to be satisfied sufficiently for a common currency to be sustainable, given the countries sharing that currency no longer have the option of adjusting to adverse conditions through devaluation.

The theory of optimal currency areas identified four such conditions: homogeneity, flexibility, mobility and solidarity. These conditions are, on the whole, far better satisfied by American states than by the EU’s member states. Firstly, homogeneity across member states in terms of sectoral specialization is low in both the United States (US) and the EU because of the single market. It is likely to drop even further in the EU as time allows the comparatively recent single market to produce more effects. Secondly, the downward flexibility of nominal wages and prices is not great in the US and far lower, on average, in the EU, because many member states have far stronger trade unions, a more developed welfare state and more constraining labor legislation. Thirdly, the mobility of workers across state borders is about six times lower in the EU than in the US and is unlikely to increase much, if only as a result of the EU’s linguistic fragmentation. Finally, financial solidarity across states (when one is doing worse) is estimated – depending on the index used – to be between 20 and 50 times greater in the US than in the EU.

If we want the euro to survive beyond the short term, one or more of these four background conditions must be

better satisfied. Improving the EU’s performance significantly in terms of the first three conditions is either impossible, or undesirable, or both. The best chance for the euro is therefore to satisfy far better the fourth condition: solidarity. The EU’s 27 welfare states have developed historically along quite distinct paths, reflecting different power relations and public debates. Their structures are very diverse and their generosity – along many dimensions – very unequal. Even comparatively minute reforms are highly sensitive politically. It is an illusion to believe that we shall ever have, or indeed that we should ever have, a unified EU-wide mega welfare state analogous to the US. We must think of a far simpler, rougher form of cross-border redistribution, which will not replace the existing national welfare states, but fit beneath them.

Hence, my proposal of a universal euro-dividend organized and funded at the level of the Eurozone or EU as a whole. Such a scheme could not be funded by social security contributions, which should be earmarked for social insurance benefits. Nor could it be funded by a personal income tax, if only because the definition of taxable income is again too diverse among member states and too politically sensitive. One might think of a ‘Tobin tax’ on financial transactions, or of a carbon tax on CO

2 emissions. But this could only finance, under optimistic assumptions, an EU-wide euro-dividend of about €10 or €14, respectively. More promising is a reliance on the most Europeanized of all taxes: the Value Added Tax (VAT). For instance, an EU-wide VAT of 20 percent would fund a monthly euro-dividend of €200.

If ensuring the sustainability of the euro is your immediate reason for advocating an EU-transfer system, is it the only reason?

My more fundamental reason for supporting EU-wide redistribution is that immersion in the single market hampers member states’ capacities to organize redistribution at the national level – the mobility of capital, goods, services and people generates downward tax and social competition. Redistribution on a higher scale may be politically harder to achieve, but it

‘It is an illusion to believe that we shall ever have, or indeed that we should ever have, a unified EU-wide mega welfare state analogous to the United States.’

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is less vulnerable to such competition. Moreover, it attenuates competition between its components. A member state would be less scared of losing a net contributor to its transfer system if it would continue to benefit from some of its contributions were it to move to another member state, and it would be less scared of attracting net beneficiaries if some of the net transfer to them would occur irrespective of whether or not they moved. In these two complementary ways, a simple but sturdy EU-wide transfer system would serve to protect and advance the European social model – both by lifting part of it to a higher scale and by protecting what is already being achieved at the national level.

How do you differ from Habermas on this?

In a recent speech [Drei Gründe für mehr Europa], Habermas stated his three reasons for wanting more European integration. One is specific to Germany – protection against nationalistic temptations. But the other two are closely related to what I just said. That is, making the currency union sustainable and ensuring democratic politics regain control over market forces rather than be ruled by them. Organizing a redistribution system at the level at which the single market operates, rather than at the level of smaller units subjected to competition within this market, is one crucial way in which democracy can tame the power of the market and make it work for the benefit of all.

Do you believe a strong European identity is necessary and desirable in order to move forward?

If what we mean by a ‘European identity’ is a set of values or cultural features that would be common to all or most EU citizens – while being alien to all or most non-Europeans – then I find the attempt to identify one a waste of time and the attempt to create one a misguided enterprise. But whenever the inhabitants of a particular territory — in this case a big chunk of what has traditionally been called Europe — are under the authority of the same collective decision making institution, they form a political community. It is important that enough of its members

should identify with that community. Belonging to the community — being ‘European’ in this case — is part of what they are. Such identification is important because it facilitates compliance with the decisions taken at that level, including redistribution from some members of that community to others. Similarly, it fosters political participation for the benefit of that community — from voting to petitioning, campaigning and holding office. In this sense, we need a European patriotism, a cura patriae europaeae.

Are local forms of patriotism slowing the process down?

They may be, but they do not need to. Suppose it were true that each of us can only have one patria, namely the nation-state to which we belong and for which we must be willing to die. Then it would also be true that patriotism is incompatible not only with the sort of allegiance or loyalty I said was important for the EU, but also with an analogous commitment I believe is equally important for sub-national entities — municipalities or the states of a federal polity — if they are to function well. I cannot see, however, why

identification and commitment at these various levels should be a zero-sum affair. People can differ greatly in the extent to which they feel Glaswegian, Scottish, British or European and care for the political communities formed at these levels. But one can be a good Scot, Brit and European at the same time as, and indeed by virtue of, being a good Glaswegian. Patriotism, in other words, can and must be plural and multi-layered, from the municipality or even neighborhood all the way to the EU.

You have also written extensively on global justice – indeed it appears you are perhaps more committed to global justice than to justice amongst European states. How do you articulate these two commitments?

I agree with the view of John Rawls that justice, understood along egalitarian lines, is the first virtue of social institutions. Also, that it applies to what he calls the ‘basic structure’ – that is, the main institutions of a society that have major effects on peoples’ life chances. “Profound and present from the start,” to use his expression. But unlike him, I believe the relevant basic structure today is not that of separate nation-states, but of mankind as a whole. There is a worldwide basic structure, if only in the form of borders, which coercively structure the extremely unequal possibilities open to the inhabitants of different portions of the earth.

Today, we form a global justificatory community – a set of human beings increasingly talking to one another as persons equally worthy of respect, across all geographical, linguistic and cultural borders. We are thereby enabled to request from each other good reasons for accepting the huge inequalities shaped by those coercive institutions we are expected to comply with. For the coercively imposed global basic structure to be justifiable to all its members as free and equal persons, it will need to be dramatically reformed. Among the key reforms needed at the global level are some of those at the core of what the EU has already achieved, such as freedom of movement and a ban on discrimination based on nationality. But the radical reform I am advocating at the EU level – the development of

an interpersonal transfer system that encompasses the whole of the area to which freedom of movement applies – is also relevant.

But we cannot move to a global basic structure of this sort in one big leap. Prior experimentation is needed on a more modest, yet still very large, scale. This is where the EU comes in, with its bold, unprecedented effort to create a rich set of common institutions treating on an equal footing all members of a portion of the European continent’s population. That is a population far larger and more diverse than any empire has ever ruled. Building fair and sustainable institutions at the European level is not quite as daunting as doing it at the global level. But it is a formidable and risky task, with many obstacles. Success is not only important from the standpoint of global justice, due to the increased fairness in the distribution of opportunities it may achieve among half a billion human beings. Success also matters greatly to the pursuit of global justice because the institutions required at the EU level provide the closest

approximation in the history of the world to the sort of institutions world-level distributive justice demands.

But in creating an ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ is the the European project not fundamentally particularistic? Should this worry us from a global justice perspective?

Making the European project succeed requires some form of European patriotism. But just as municipal, regional or national patriotism does not need to be directed against other municipalities, regions or nations, European patriotism does not have to be directed against the rest of the world. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that redistribution on a national or continental scale is incompatible with open borders. This regrettable but undeniable fact is at the core of the most cruel of all dilemmas faced by Northern progressives – they cannot be as generous as they feel they have to be with their own folk while being as generous as they would like to be with those knocking at the door.

Generous redistribution within Europe does not exclude a significant level of immigration and a good use of the diasporas created. If these are well integrated in countries of destination and remain well connected to their countries of origin, they can contribute greatly to spreading trust, trade, investment and technological transfers for the benefit of the poorer parts of the world.

Given climatic conditions and the vicious circles of institutions, one should, however, be under no illusion about the prospect of enabling all parts of the world to be self-supporting within the foreseeable future. Think of the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, with a GDP per capita of less than 2 percent of the EU’s and projected population growth from 60 to 150 million by 2050. To provide a minimally decent standard of living to every household all over the world, one must recognize honestly that there are only two options: massive migration and significant permanent transfers. Given the disruptive nature of the former, both for the communities of origin and for the communities of destination, one should go for the latter. This places special importance on EU-wide experimentation of the sort I suggest. If global justice is not to require that half the African population shifts across the Mediterranean, it will call for simple and workable interpersonal, transnational transfer schemes like the euro-dividend.

Given the reluctance of national communities to provide their own citizens with unconditional cash, is a euro-dividend, let alone a global dividend, utopian?

It certainly sounds utopian to some. But so what? It is important not to be naïve and to listen carefully to all types of objections to the feasibility and desirability of what we propose. But we should never give up just because of a lack of political support. If we believe – all things considered – that there is a sensible case for a euro-dividend, then we should make that case. We should make it again and again, and be on the lookout for opportunities to move forward. Many things that we are now used to, including the EU itself, once sounded utopian to most.

‘If what we mean by a ‘European identity’ is a set of values or cultural features that would be common to all or most EU citizens then I find the attempt to identify one a waste of time and the attempt to create one a misguided enterprise.’