~-4 IYrv

DECLASIEf

SECURITY

The R.A.F. Mediterranean Review is an 0. U.O. document,and as such may be issued to Officers' Mess and Station

Reference Libraries (K.R. and A.C.I. 882. 2236 (c), 2287).

It is intended for the information of all Officers and flyingcrews under conditions of security approved by the CommandingOfficer, w ho will ensure that within these limits it has as wide

a circulation as possible.

No quotation or extract from the R.A.F. Mediterranean

Review may be made without the permission of the Deputy AirCommander, Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Unauthorised quotation constitutes an offence under the OfficialSecrets Acts, 1911 and 1920, and will be dealt wiih accordingly

(K.R. and A.C.I. 1071, 1072, 2238).

Copies not required for record purposes should be disposed of

as Secret Waste in accordance with AM 1.O. A.411/41.

DEC[AFIfl

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OCTOBER TO DECEMB

4 44

M EBITERRANEAN

-I

NO'9

HEADQUARTERS.MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR

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FQRCESf SL '

Contents

Invasion Year A Short Review of European Events in 1944... Page 5

Thke Invasion of Italy (Part V)-lst October - 31st December, 1944

I. Introductory. . ............ ....... ...... 13

II. Renewal of Enemy Resistance......... ......... 17

III. i.A.T.A.F's Increased Commitments ... .......... 25

IV. Enemy Counte'r Attacks........31

The Mediterranean Aflied -Strategic Air Force-Trends of

Activity, October to December, 1944-......... 41

F he Balkan Theatre : Greece and Yugoslavia ........... .55

Operations in the Aegean-October to December, 1944 ............ 83

R.A.F. Educational Service-Activities in M.A.A.F..... ... ... 93

:Mobilising a Nation. ................... ... 103

Jet Propulsion. ................... ................. 106

Special Operation Against, the Brenner Route. ......... 123

Mining of the Danube by No. 205 Group .... . . . .

R.A.F. Medical Branch-Malaria Control in Corsica ... ... 1... i1 ^ .

No... 4 Naval Fighter Wing in the Mediterranean-194 .1 ....... 152

Enemy Ingenuity Versus Allied Interdiction.. . ...... 160

The Magnetic Sweeper. ....... :........... ........... 163

From the 540s. ....... .......................... .167

Acknowledgment. . . . ................ 175

Map The European Battle Areas-3lst December, 1943, to

31st December, 1944 ...... ... ...... ....... . 4

Tactical Bombing Effort-October to December, 1944 ,, 14

The Italian Battle Area-30th S e p t e m b e r to

31st December, 1944......................18

Points of Interdiction by Air at 13th November, 1944 ,. 22

Points of interdiction by Air at 2nd January, 1945 . 39

Strategic Bombing Efffort-October and November, 1944 ,, 43

Strategic Bombing Effort-December, 1944 ... ..... ' 52

Greece and Yugoslavia-Battle Area ... .... 54

Greece and the Athens Area ... .. . . 57

The Dalmatian Coast .... ............. .... 62

The Aegean Sea Area.... 84

Locations of Pdwer Stations on the Verona - InnsbruckRailway.... ......... ........ . 124

The Course of the Danube ... ' ..... ........... 132

Malaria Control inl Corsica.......... ..... 44

Foreword

iThe Foreword in the preceding number

of the R.A.F. ilMediterranean Review ended oil a note of optinmism a note

indicating that. possibly the end of the European wear with Germaav 'was in

sight. With, the passing of the year 1944 that end is not yet realised,

but nevertheless it is still in sight. The events and trends of activity

-reviewed in this number show clearly, not only metiods by wchich the Hun

is being crushed and . strangled in. the air, on the grounLld, on the seq an.d

under the sea, but- also reveals [lie wider Vision airaadv, at work zWithin tle

Royal Air Force to ensure that Peace, when won, shall be retained, upheld

and enjoyed by those trained to take their place and shoulder' their respan-

sibilities in civil life as thoroughly as "they were trained to take them in war.

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I

Invasion Yea

A Short Review of European Evenis in

1944

WE HAVE REACHED the Sixth War Christmas,

and reached it through a year of accomplishment

unparalleled in History. German Industry

has been disrupted and the German Armies

defeated in the field. Our power to strike the

enemy on land and sea and in the air has been

demonstrated in its full might and to its full

purpose. We are inside the Siegfried Line.

In a recent speech to the German People,Hitler said that the fight now was no longer for

victory or defeat, but for survival orannihilation. Although not distinguished for hisintuition, who shall say that Corporal

Schickeigruber Is not right?

P nO i:i1933 Hitler comes to power. Germany withdraws

from the League of Nations.

1935 Conscription is introduced into Germany.

1938 Hitler, demanding that Sudeten Germans

be restored to the Reich, masses Armies on Czech

frontier.

Great Britain mobilizes her Navy and Mr.

Chamberlain goes to Munich.

British Government persuades Czechoslovakia to

agree to cede all. territory with more than fifty

per cent. Sudeten- Germans, and in return

guarantees with France the future boundaries of

Czechoslovakia.

German troops march u nopp oaosed Into

Czechoslovakia.

1939 Without warning and in defiance of

Munich agreement, Nazi tanks enter Prague.Czechoslovakia is overrun.

British Government gives undertaking to Poland

"... that in the event of any action which clearly

threatens Poland ... His Majesty's Government

would, feel themselves bound at once to lend the

Polish. Government all support in their power."

Announced in the House of Comnons that since

1933 Germany hao spent a sum : estimated at

£6,000,000,000 on war preparations.

Hitler invades Poland and Great.,Britain declares

war.

1940 German troops enter Norway and overrun

the country in a week.

Headed by nine arioured divisions and immense

air power, the German Army crashes through

Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg to cross the

Meuse into. France. Allied forces are split and

the enemy dries north to the Channel Ports.

South of the Somme, the French Army reinforced

by two British divisions is opposed to 120 German

divisions.

Dunkirk-250,000 British, troops abandoning armsand equipment are evacuated; 80,000 do not

return.

France capitulates.

Italy, declaring war on Great Britain, launches

an offensive in Africa which in six months carriesher troops Into Egypt, the Sudan and Kenya.The Mediterranean is closed.

Battle of Britain. In three months a handfulof R.A.F. squadrons oppose and defeat the fullweight of the Luftwaffe, destroying 2,375 Germanaircraft.

Italy invades Greece.

Eighth Army attacks the Italians in the WesternDesert and forces them to retire from Egypt inone week.

1941 Italians driven out of Cyrenalca. Eighth

Army offensive halts on the German menace to

Greece.

Expeditionary Force from Middle East despatched

to Greece.

Germans send the Afrika Korps to reinforce theItalians in Tripolitania The Eighth Army is

driven back .through Cyrenalca into Egypt.

Germany invades Yugosiavia and Greece, and the.

British Expeditionary' Force is withdrawn toCrete. Germans invade Crete by air and force

the evacuation of British troops.

Coup d'etat in Iraq threatens oil supplies. Position

restored by British intervent' mpt British.action in. Syria~, , h rance from

_~

Germany at thel zent of- her strength, unab ' c on enemy supplies,defeat the .t.A.F. and, invade Britain, decid ports and air bases, reinforced Eighth Armyeliminate the Soviet Army before returning tothe :final struggle in the West. The invasion ofRussia begins.

-German Army 500 miles into Russia on a 1,000mile front is halted at the gates of Moscow.Reinforced Eighth Army opens second offensivein Western Desert.Following Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour,America declares war on the Axis.

1942 Russians counter-attack on 500..-mile frontand push the enemy back 80 miles.

Eighth Army, having advanced to El Agheila,prepares to meet German counter-attack.

New German offensive in Russia now forward 250'miles on a 1,200 mile -front from Orel to theCaucasus.

As a result of the German counter-attack inLibya the Eighth Army is now back at Gazala.Enemy, launches abortive attack at Gazala;Eighth Army counter-attacks and is checked.Enemy opens offensive and forces Eighth Armyback to El Alamein.

Germans make three abortivedestroy the R.A.F. in Malta.

attempts to

opens offensive at El Alamein. The German routbegins.

Strong British and American Forces land inFrench North Africa.

Russians open winter offensive and regain muchof the, lost ground.

1943 Germans, surrendering 248,000 prisoners,defeated and driven from North Africa at Tunis.Mediterranean re-opened to Allied shipping.

Following abortive German attack, Russianslaunch full-scale offensive on 1,000 mile front.

Allied Forces from North Africa capture Sicily.in 38 days, inflicting 165,000 casualties on theenemy.

British and American troops land at Salerno. Italycapitulates.

Stated in Parliament that since September, 1939,the R.A.F. alone has made 1,147 attacks anddropped 283,000 tons of bombs on Germany, inaddition to an ever increasing U.S.A.A.F. effort;that Allied aircraft production is now more than-four time that of Germany; and that creditbalance of new building over shipping losses hasreached 6,000,000 tons per year.

At the Lord Mayor's Days Luncheon, 10th,November, 1942, Mr. Winston Churchill said," This is not the end. It is not even the beginningof the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of thebeginning."

The Prime Minister had been speaking of theBattle .for Egypt. Rommel, conclusively defeatedat Alamein, was on the run,: Strong Allied forceshad landed in French North .Africa and the R.A.F.was already in action there against the enemy.In the East, the German drive had been held atStalingrad and in the Caucasus, and the Russianswere ready for their counter-attack.

October, 1942, marked the Turn of the Tide.Spring, 1943, saw the Germans expelled fromTunisia, and in the summer Sicily was capturedand the Mediterranean, which had been closed toAllied shipping since March, 1941, was re-opened.On 9th September, British and American troopslanded at Salerno and Italy capitulated. Threeweeks later the Foggia airfields fell to the EighthArmy, and the Allied Air Forces stood at 500miles range from Munich.

Far-reaching in. effect, these successes werereflected in two events of outstanding importance.The first was that defeat in Africa delayed bythree months the opening of the new Germanpush in the East and permitted the Russians notonly to -check their. thrust in one week but tocounter-attack immediately on a 1,000 mile front.The second, which came late , fi vas

even greater significence. On 28th December,an official statement from London announcedthe appointment of Allied Commanders for theInvasion of Europe. It was faithfully celebratedon New Year's Eve by a full-scale raid on Berlinto bring the total of bombs unloaded on theGerman capital to a round 10,000 tons.

Stalemate in ItalyAlthough for some weeks after the Salerno

crisis the Allied Armies made good progress,they were. slowed in October through difficultiesof terrain and weather hampering air activity,and by the end of the year faced a position ofstalemate on a line south of Cassino to the Sangroriver.

This was an unsatisfactory situation. Thefull. and continuous deployment of maximumGerman forces in Italy being vital to our MasterPlan for the Invasion of France, it was essentialthat the initiative be regained forthwith and theenemy prevented from stabilizing his position.Supreme Command decided, therefore, that if theline was impregnable to frontal assault, adiversionary movement would have to beengineered from the side. Anzio was launched.

The object of this " leap-frog" was to acceleratethe capture of Rome and establish a line northof the capital; this to be accomplished byoccupation of the high ground around Colli Lazialif ' my's communications to the

i ro co . be dominated. It was a

___ __

3/ 'ii::

hazardous move, for the Germans had thirteendivisions, with a further eight in reserve, to theAllies eleven and a half committed in thefield.

Anzio did not achieve its object. The initialassault, on 22nd January, took the enemy bysurprise, but he reacted swiftly and althoughpersistent attacks failed to dislodge the invadershe succeeded in pinning them down andpreventing any breakthrough. It becamenecessary for us to think again, and think quickly.

In an effort to breach the battle line and linkup with the forward bridgehead, it was nowdecided to try an all-out air offensive against thestronghold of Cassino. On 15th March, 1,000 tonswent down and in a matter of hours the fortressbecame a heap of rubble. Instead of achievingits object-the destruction of the garrison-,excessive demolition provided numerous roadblocks and strong points and turned the scale infavour of the defenders. Again the enemy linestood firm.

The Cracking of the NutWar is ever a matter of trial and error, and

with two failures recorded the Allies droppedback on the lesson of Al'amein-that of causingweakness and attrition to the enemy by cuttingby air his lines of supply and communication,while at the same time assembling a force withwhich to hit him on the ground at a momentwhen he is unable to sustain a defensive effort.

On 19th March, the first stage of the planwent into effect, the main air offensive openingwith the land offensive on the night 11/12thMay. By 22nd June, 137,949 sorties had beenflown and 84,603 tons of bombs dropped onmarshalling yards, bridges, road transport andlines of communication. The effect was paralysing.Transport was forced from the railways to theroads where fighter-bombers made hay andcompelled the enemy to restrict movementto the hours of darkness. Vehicles had to bewithdrawn from the forward areas in order tomaintain a skeleton supply line, and inconsequence combat units were left withinsufficient transport to continue the battle. Atonce it became a vicious and entirely destructivecircle.

Before the operation had been completed thewhole front broke open and British, Canadian,American, French and Polish troops surgedforward. Rome fell on 4th June, and in six weeksthe enemy, although not yet driven back to thePisa-Rimini line, had lost 80,000 casualties andupward of 15,000 vehicles.

Allied Bombing PolicyThe essential need for the retention of the

initiative in Italy, the reason for this, and itsrelative importance to the Master Invasion Planhave been mentioned. Before and during theperiod of the operations referred to above, forcesin considerable strength were assembling inGreat Britain and, in April, 1944, as a security

measure, all Foreign Diplomats and Courierswere stopped from leaving the country. Thesetwo aspects of pre-invasion activity rested on athird. No effective land campaign could succeedagainst Germany unless the enemy's essential warpotential was rigorously restricted and unless theAllies could command the sky both during thelandings and through the period of subsequentoperations.

From the outset it was realized that the keyto modern warfare lay in oil-a fact which,naturally, had not escaped the enemy eye.Twenty-four enormous synthetic oil plants hadbeen built in Germany at the beginning of thewar, and these provided about .40 per cent. ofthe country's needs. She had also the Rumaniansupplies and several new fields on her own soil.From all sources the total annual yield was about1,250,000 tons-just enough for Germany'simmediate requirements. In: 1942, aiming toincrease supplies, she launched an offensive inthe Caucasus. Fortunately, by a hair's breadth,it failed to achieve its object.

The problem facing the Allied Bomber Forcewas therefore twofold. Firstly to restrictproduction in the German aircraft industry andreduce activity in the Luftwaffe in order thatinvasion forces in France and bomber formationsover the Reich could operate undisturbed byfighter interference, and secondly to carry out aconcentrated air offensive against the enemy'sentire oil resources.

The Assault gn the Fighter Factories

For nine months, from July, 1943, toMarch, 1944, the Eighth and Fifteenth UnitedStates Air Forces, tackling first-things first, wentfor the fighter assembly and aero-engine factories-a struggle which culminated in the last sevendays of February when almost every one of theseplants was bombed in, a single week. The resultshowed itself on D-Day. Whereas in 1942 theG.A.F. had planned to increase production to2,500/3,000 single-engined aircraft per month--.an output which would not ,only have madepossible effective protection of the Reich butwould have seriously interfered with invasion-their first-line strength on all fronts in June wasless than 1,500 aircraft, only half of which wereserviceable.

Complementary to the effort against FW.190and ME.109 output, systematic strikes weredirected at plants producing Germany's latest andmost cherished aircraft-the ME.262 jet-propelledfighter. Messerschmitt's parent factory atLeipham was smashed; the research stations atPeenemunde and Rechlin, along with numerousairfields used for experimental work, wereattacked; and repeated raids were made on thejet-fuel plants at Peenemunde andHolsriegelskreuth. In spite of the faith pinnedon this type of aircraft, the total numberoperating by the end of the year was not morethan 150.

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The offensive against oil opened in April andwas still in progress when the year closed. Itshould perhaps be called the second offensive,because in 1940 and 1941 Bomber, Commandattempted the ,task and found it beyond theirthen-available power and capability. . Two greatAmerican Air Forces, the Eighth and Fifteenth,now undertook the major share of the job, aircraftfrom Britain concentrating on the syntheticplants, principally those at Leuna, Brux andPolitz, and the Mediterranean force tacklingPloesti. Night, and later day, attacks on theRuhr fell to the R.A.F.

Figures tell the story more vividly than words.In May, 1944, a 20 per, cent. reduction had beeneffected; in September the loss to the enemy was77 per cent. and his supplies only 23 per cent. oftheir pre-attack level. By December, only thirteenbut of Germany's 24 synthetic oil plants remained-five only of these within M.A.A.F. range.

Fighters had been grounded, industry hampered,naval and U-boat activity reduced to impotence,and road transport and Panzer Divisions forcedto a policy of strict fuel economy. A recoveryprogramme had been given priority overeverything including aircraft and U-boatproduction. That was the measure of success inDecember. While the final lap of the racebetween repair and attack remains yet to bedecided, (the value of the reduction which hasbeen achieved is indisputable.

This concentration of effort against oilnecessitated a let-up on the fighter-factoryoffensive and enabled the industry, in large part,to recover. That was inevitable. Nevertheless,although by dispersal and undergroundmanufacture the G.A.F. had rebuilt their front-line single-engined fighter strength to about 2,300by December, the recovery came too late. Thefighters were needed over France to repel thelandings and check the advance through thesummer and autumn of 1944, and at that timethey were not available. Now, their usefulnessis. but a fraction of what it could have been. TheAllies have the bases and they have the aircraft.The roof over Germany is off.

Confusion to Industry

Although the offensives against fighter factoriesand oil were the main and most effective air-strikes delivered at any one class-group in theGerman war machine in 1944, wide-scale attackswere undertaken on other industrial targets andagainst whole sections of the communicationssystem.

Ball-bearing factories, ranking 'in importancenext to oil, suffered continuously and wereproducing at the end of the year only 45 per cent.of their pre-attack output. Systematic raids werealso carried out on plants manufacturing armour,motor transport and ordnance, this effortincreasing in intensity in relation to land front

operations and reaching peak through September-October. Loss of output varied in most casesfrom a few weeks to several months.

Weather naturally proved a controlling factorand on occasions it was necessary to concentrateon an industrial area rather than on a specifictarget. Berlin became a favourite centre, butmany other towns suffered recurring attacks.

Interdiction of Traffic

SWhile the offensive against communicationswas no less important than that directedat industrial targets, overall results have beenmore difficult to assess, and a full appreciationwill probably not be possible until the Allies get

,well into Germany. At the beginning of 1944 thevast rail-network, strung out from Brest to theRussian border, was, in spite of repeated attack,not overtaxed. On D-Day, 6th June, however, asa result of pre-invasion strategical and tacticalbombing, only half the normal quantity oflocomotives and cars were available in France,coal was in six-days' supply, one-fifth of repairfacilities were unserviceable, and 74. bridges andtunnels had been rendered impassable. By theattack on bridges alone, the area west of theSeine and north of. the Loire was virtuallyisolated; later, prior to the invasion of SouthernFrance, attacks on the Rhone bridges cut theGerman forces in half and at a critical time heldGerman armour on the west bank out of theimmediate battle area.

In the case of Normandy, the pre-occupation ofthe enemy's forces in land fighting coupled withthe continuous bombing and fighter straffing,allowed no recovery; he was forced to acceptthings as they were and make the best of it. InSouthern France, the position, although slightlydifferent, was 'equally hopeless; labour for repairwork was -just not available.

The effect of the traffic interdiction operationin Italy which made possible the breaching of theGustave Line, has been indicated earlier. Theseoperations go on. Some are concentrated in timeand space and produce a quick result; others arelong-term and less spectacular. All count.

Over Two Million Tons of Bombs

While complete statistics are not available, anindication of the scale of air effort in 1944 isgiven in the records of Bomber Command, theEighth U.S.A.A.F. and M.A.A.F.

During the year Bomber Command and theEighth U.S.A.A.F. dropped 1,395,000 tons ofbombs on German targets-more than twice theweight unloaded in the first four and a quarteryears of the war. In addition, M.A.A.F. dropped590,358 tons, mostly on oil installations andcommunications. Fighters and fighter-bombersfrom all three air forces, . frequently beatingtheir own recoE $ umbers of sorties per day,dest od h 'ds of enemy locomotives,

jpl . ... , . . vehicles. .. .

Opening of the Second Front

In spite of the wave of rising impatience whichcharacterised a section of the British Press inthe spring of 1944, stony silence reigned supremewithin the Cabinet and no taunt extracted the oneword needed to confirm or deny the significenceof the large-scale exercises that had being goingon for some time over the southern half ofEngland.

Evaluation of the importance of that silence-it is difficult to overpraise the skill with whichit was maintained-and the confusion which thesurprise of the Normandy Invasion caused theGerman High Command, is now possible.

On 9th June, three days after the first landings,Rommel, Commanding Army Group B, afterdirecting that Cherbourg be held at all cost,intimated to General Dollman of the SeventhArmy that he could provide no reinforcementsnor share the anxiety felt over the port, becausethe German Supreme Command fully expected abig landing to be attempted higher up the coast,and for this all available airborne forces wouldbe committed. Hle explained furthermore, in replyto a request for immediate air support, that unitsof the Luftwaffe were " changing stations " andmight not be available for several days.

Events that followed are now history. In Berlinon 20th July, an unsuccessful attempt was madeto assassinate Hitler and effect a coup d'etat.Gestapo intervention restored "order " and indue course eight Generals and a number of lesserfry paid with their lives. Evidence at the trialshowed that the 'conspirators had planned toarrest all those directing food and armamentproduction, open concentration camps, and makeimmediate contact with the Allies. Although thepurge failed, it was refreshing to find suchenlightened thinking within the Reichswehr.

Meteoric Progress in Normandy

Allied progress through July and August, afterthe situation of stalemate on the Caen-Tilly fronthad been broken by an air attack that sent down5,000 tons of bombs on the perimeter defences in49 minutes, was metedric. The pocket west ofArgentan which the Germans allowed to be drawnround three flanks while they obstinately triedto drive west to Avranches was closed on18th August by British, Dominion and Americanforces with loss to the enemy of 30,000 killed and45,000 prisoners, and four days later a Maquisuprising in Paris overran the city and paved theway for its occupation by the Americans comingeastward from Chartres and Dreux.

calamity. 'irican and French troops wereashore on-~Southern France.

Invasion of the French Riviera

The conquest of Southern France by GeneralPatch's forces and the link up of this SecondInvasion Army with General Patton's troops atSombernon and Chatillon took exactly 26 days-approximately one-half of the time scheduled. Ityielded 80,000 prisoners to swell the total to400,000 taken since the landings in Normandy.

.Systematic pre-invasion bombing had followedthe pattern of the June adventure, and securityplus a carefully engineered deception programmeeffected the necessary degree of surprise. Onlyten poor quality divisions met the landing; airopposition was virtually non-existent. Everywhereahead of the advancing army Forces of the FrenchInterior sabotaged communications and tookcommand of territory. The German Nineteenth'Army pulled back with considerable skill, and bythe Devil's luck managed to evacuate most of itsfighting troops before the Belfort Gap could beclosed. But it was touch and go.

Broadly speaking, France was clear of Nazioccupation by, the end of August. A fewstrongholds in the east, on the English Channeland the Frenie Atlantic coast had not beenovercome, but th ir value to the enemy and theireffect on the main campaign was now negligible.That which had been accomplished in less thanthree months supplied a pert answer to themessage sent by Hitler to all units in Calvados onthe /morning of 6th June-"The Fuehrer desiresthe annihilation of the Allies by the evening."

Failure of the Secret Weapons

Although Mr. Chamberlain's famous " Missed theBus " comment of 1940 proved almost immediatelyto be singularly inappropriate, no phrase couldmore fairly represent Germany's strategic positionwhen, almost exactly four years later, the longpromised retaliatory weapons, the flying bomband long-range rocket, were launched againstEngland.

The potential menace which the flying bomboffered was a real one and one that wasrecognised from the outset and not underrated.Reconnaissance had pin-pointed a considerablenumber of static ramp sites, and from this andother information a fair assessment of the dangerhad been calculated. It was far from incon-siderable-particularly in view of the forthcominginvasion.

BrI ovmv v v.i+ f o-/r l Itto a i ,y C t ,rd a4-wy r p cs e p

The position for the enemy by mid-August had bombing, during which over 100,000 tons went

become critical. All the German Commanders in down on some hundreds of launching sites and

the north had disappeared. C-in-C West, Von storage depots, and on communications, theRundstedt, had been relieved; Rommel and, quantitive plott4. t of the flying bomb wasDollman killed. The Allies, wtln arlly1000,000 :de vly reduced and its debut postponed until

troops and more than 2,500,000 tons O c pre-mvasion period had passed.

in Normandy, had already taken ovpf 0o0 r ?'? missile fell on England on 13th June,prisoners. And that was not the tMotal of the 1944--a week after the Normandy landings had

been securely lathe German fighl e to

be effective. Of -d launched over the80 days main offensive against Southern England,only one-third reached the Greater London area.An indication of the peak efficiency of thecombined defences is provided by the record of28th August. On that day, of 101 flying bombsknown to have been launched, 97 were destroyed.

Terror-weapon No. 2, the long-range. rocket,came into the picture three months after itspredecessor; since when, until the end of theyear, approximately 350 incidents occurredin England, considerably more in Belgium and afew in Northern France, Holland and Luxembourg.

The sites, widely dispersed and at much greaterrange, have been more difficult to attacksystematically, although good results are creditedin an increasing number of cases. Fortunately,the rocket is an inaccurate and strictly limitedweapon; so far it has proved its nuisance valuebut nothing more.

The Russian Steam Roller

The success which, has attended Alliedco-ordination of Eastern and Western theatreoperations through the last year offersindisputable proof of the suicidal idiocy of Hitler'sdecision to attack Russia in 1941. Winter 'of the1941-2 campaign cost the Germans in killed alonemore than the whole of the four and a quarteryears of the last war. It also probably cost themthis war, for a victory in the' Caucasus at thatcrucial time might well have proved catastrophicto the Allies.

Things, however; did not turn out that way.Over 165 Nazi Divisions were held and defeatedby the Russian 'Army and the Russian Winter,and after a short offensive in November-March,1942-3; and an abortive one-week counter-attackby the Germans in the following summer, theSoviets had the situation in complete control andwere able to launch a full-scale drive in July,1943, that by mid-May, 1944, brought the lineforward into Rumania and Poland up to Vitebskand the Estonian border.

The pattern then changed its shape. Movementceased in White. Russia, to flare up a few weekslater in the Finnish sector, where in 24 hours theRed Army breached the Mannerheim Line-a taskthat had taken them four months in 1940-andpushed on beyond the Sistra river; the thrustbeing accompanied by a complementary operationbetween Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega.

In spite of the pressure, however, Finland heldout and the Russians did not achieve the quickvictory on which they had banked. As ithappened, this was relatively unimportant becausea bigger opportunity now offered on the CentralFront where, with our second front in Normandywell launched, it was unlikely the enemy couldafford reinforcement.

' -lThe Gates of Warsaw

Russia struck, therefore, at the Vitebskpositions, and struck with such force that withina month the line moved westward 350 miles,liberating Bialystok, Brest Litovsk, Deblin,Lublin, Jaroslavl and Przemysl and bringingSoviet troops within shelling distance of Warsaw.

Here again the offensive rested to permit are-grouping and allow the supply position time tocatch up. Within Warsaw itself, the PolishPatriots had risen and there was intense fighting.Elsewhere the front became quiet-but only for amatter of hours.

On 19th August the Carpathian-Black Sea Frontbroke into life, and two days later the Russianshad stormed the Galatz Gap and were fanningout towards Bucharest. On the 24th Rumaniacapitulated and on the 26th Bulgaria asked foran armistice. September brought the Red Armyforard to Belgrade and the first week ofNovember saw most of Hungary in Russian handsand Budapest under fire. By the time the yearclosed, the line had received further indents andran from the East Prussian border to Warsaw,thence through Czechoslovakia to north-west ofBudapest, and from Lake Balaton down acrossYugoslavia to the Adriatic. It containedapproximately 150 German divisions.

Alies Reach the Siegfried Line

General Dittmar, Official Commentator of theBerlin Radio, spoke to the German People onWednesday, 6th September; 1944. He said, " Fouryears ago we were the undisputed masters; weare now beaten by the methods we forged."

The General was right. The Canadian Firstand the British Second Armies had crossed theSeine and reached Brussels and the approaches ofAntwerp, cutting off the whole of the Pas de Calaisarea in eight days. The American Third Armywas '-across the Marne and Meuse and alreadyhad reconnaissance patrols forward on to Germansoil around Saarbrucken. Troops of GeneralPatch's Seventh Army were hustling the GermanNineteenth Army in its retreat for the BelfortGap. It was clearly a matter of days before thewhole of the West Wall from Kleve to the Swissborder would be under Allied assault.

Germany at this time, it was estimated, hadprobably 49 divisions in the line and anothereighteen in reserve or re-fitting. Nineteen weredisposed in Holland and north of Dusseldorf, tenin the Cologne sector, eleven between Coblenzand Strasbourg, and nine in the southerh pocketfrom Strasbourg to the Swiss frontier. TheSiegfried Line, which had been reached by theAllies at a number of points between Kleve andTrier, and stood only a mean 40-odd miles aheadof them on the southern length Trier-Karlsruhe-Basle, was at its strongest in the Strasbourg-Trier sector and around the shorter front Aaclen-Munchen Gladbach-that is, opposite the mainindustrial centres.North of Munchen Gladbach

its strength was largely an unknown quantity.Various reports, many of them propagandist,had alleged that fortifications' existed in thisdistrict; air reconnaissance gave 'no confirmation.

Following the policy that the surest way to getthrough a strongly defended line is to go roundit, plans-were made for an airborne operation tosecure the crossing of the great water barrierof the three branches of the Rhine and thefloodings within their perimeter around Arnhem-beyond which there was barely a hill betweenthe German border and Berlin. This operation,the biggest of .its kind ever undertaken, wasentrusted to the First Airborne Army andlaunched on Sunday, 17th September.

The Glory of Arnhem

Nothing in this war will outmatch the braveryof the men of Arnhem. Six thousand five hundredof them were dropped or landed by glider atEindhoven and Tilburg behind the Escaut Line,at Arnhem on the Lek, and at Nijmegen on theWaal. Only two thousand came back.

At Escaut, resistance vanishedovernight andGeneral Dempsey's tanks shot forward to occupy

SNijmegen. Further north at Arnhem, oppositionby picked S.S. battalions was at its fiercest, andalthough the paratroops dominated the vital Lekbridge for a short time they were unable to holdout against the weight of tanks, self-propelledguns, multiple mortars and flame throwers, andafter nearly ten days and nights of almostceaseless fighting had to retire across the Lekbefore the American Second Army-who,striving desperately to push on beyond Nijmegen,found the enemy at Elst, just five miles short, ofArnhem, far stronger and better prepared thanhad been anticipated-could break through andjoin up.

The achievement at Arnhem, sadly overcast bythe shadow of the losses involved and relativelydisappointing in the immense possibilitiescomplete fulfilment offered, was, nevertheless,of considerable importance. Nijmegen and theWaal crossing were secured. It remained nowfor the Canadians to eliminate opposition onWalcheren Island and the Scheldt pocketdominating Antwerp's approaches to open theone port all-essential to any sustained offensiveagainst the 'Siegfried positions.

Breaching of the Dortmund-Ems Canal

Whatever satisfaction Germany derived fromher local triumph at Arnhem, she can have foundlittle comfort in two surprises R.A.F. BomberCommand provided in the closing months' of1944-the breaching of the Dortmund-Ems canaland the sinking of the " Tirpitz."

bombs smashed both channels of the embankedsection near Ladbergen, draining the canal foimore than seven miles and completely disruptingwater communications through the Ruhr andRhineland, and between' the industrial areas ofCentral and Eastern Germany and the North Seaports.

The fact that the iron ore of France-Luxembourg, Spain and the Scandinaviarcountries had already been cut off made this newloss catastrophic. Before the attack, pig iron andsteel outputs were down to nine and fourteei:million tons respectively. The breaching of theDortmund-Ems canal lowered the respectiveoutputs, by direct and indirect causes, to fourand eight million tons. Furthermore, it deprivedthe iron and steel works at Osnabruck, Peine andSalzgitter of coking coal from the Ruhr.

Sinking of the " Tirpitz "

Hardly less serious was the second blow whiclcame on iSunday, 12th November, when R.A.F.Lancasters attacked the battleship "Tirpitz" inTromso Fjord.

Thirty-two aircraft flew on this operation and29 made the strike. They used 12,000 pound.bombs, and in spite of intense flak securedseveral direct hits. The " Tirpitz " was set onfire, capsized, and sank in a matter of minutes.

The destruction of this battleship removed aconstant menace" to convoys carrying warmaterial through Alton Fjord to Russia,eand setfree a number of Allied capital ships for otherduty. A vessel of 45,000 tons, completed asrecently as 1941, she was the fourth of Germany's"battle wagons" to go to, the bottom-herpredecessors being the " Bismark," the" Scharnhorst " and the " Graf Spee." Only oneLancaster failed to return.

The Greek Tragedy

The legend that Luck goes in Threes held goodat this time. The Bulgarian volte face, the stridesmade by the Russians towards the west, and theconstant harassing attacks on communications byYugoslav Partisans and aircraft of B.A.F. werenow rendering Greece and the Aegean untenableto the enemy. His supply position both overlandand through the Adriatic was precarious and thestrategic value of his occupation had shrunk tonegligible proportion. In August, therefore, hebegan to pull out, leaving only a minimum ofthird-rate troops to guard the back door.' Bythe beginning of November, Greece was free.

Happily, the tragedy of Greece through the lastquarter of 1944 is now over. Possibly, with apeople possessed of such innate individualism andsubjected hitherto to a rule akin to dictatorship,

The attack on the Dortmund-Ems canal was it was inevitable. Time only will prove whether

made in September, at a time when all branches the country can establish a New Order and rebuild

of enemy transport were sthggling ( et its constitution.

urgent military and economic demaand rgao e'-g®s cupation, beginningentirely successful. Twelve-thousan h Pe nnese and the big

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in the bitter and drawn-out battle for law andorder in Athens, has been told too often to needrepeating. Subjected to criticism, the action takenhas proved its worth. The visit of Mr. Churchillon Christmas Day marked a new turn innegotiations between the Government and theguerillas which the appointment of ArchbishopDamaskinos as Regent has since stabilized.

Rundstedt's Counter Offensive

By the first week of November, as a resultof Commando landings on Walcheren Island, thebattle of the Scheldt had finished and the port ofAntwerp was free. It remained now to sweepthe approaches and clear the demolitions andsunken ships for the Allies to have available aharbour within 65 miles of the front line.

The offensive which this success presaged

opened in the middle of 'the month against the

German pocket west of the river Maas, and

followed a strong assault by American Third

Army troops on the fortress of Metz and an

attack by the First French Army east of Belfort.

Resistance in all sectors was fierce, but by thebeginning of December the British Second Armyhad eliminated the Maas bridgehead and

occupied the suburbs of Venio, the Americans

had taken Metz and crossed the German border

on the Saar front, and the French were beyondMulhouse in the Doubs Valley.

Then came a set-back. On Sunday, 16thDecember, against a lightly held 75 mile frontfrom Aachen to Trier, Rundstedt launched a full-scale counter-attack employing 150,000 infantryand paratroops supported by four Panzerdivisions and the biggest air concentrationassembled for some considerable time.

The .first thrust drove a corridor through the

American line between St. Vith and Malmedy andthe second sent the Panzer Lehr Division into

Bastogne, leaving an island of Allied troops cutoff at St. Vith. These attacks were accompaniedby determined fighter-bomber operations which in

the first 36 hours cost the enemy 194 aircraft.

A Sixty-Mile Penetration

By the end of December the break-throughhad been enlarged to include Beauring, but

the enemy had not succeeded in crossing theMeuse-one Panzer division at Celles was withinfour miles of the river-nor in outflanking Liege:

He had, however, penetrated 60 miles west of

the pre-attack front line.

The story of the elimination of the bulge and

the complete defeat of Rundstedt's Army falls

within January and February of the New Year.

It was successfully accomplished by holding on

the south, ,punching at the nose and cuttingthrough the body of the salient from the north.Just as a German victory here would have

seriously affected the speed of the WesternOffensive, so their defeat and the loss it entailed

will probably tell in favour of the Allies.

War Against the U-Boats

Although by December, 1944, improved devicesfor sub-surface battery chgrging and air changingpresaged a recrudescence of opei-sea U-boatactivity and the commencement of inshoreattacks, the year had been the most successfulof any for anti-submarine operations.

Germany began the war with approximately100 U-boats; in 1944, in spite of the fact that wewere then sinking some four U-boats a week,she had 400 in service and was in a position toput 150 to sea at any one time. That this weightof effort failed to make any decisive impressionon Allied sea-traffic was due to two factors-themagnitude of American shipping output, whichby mid-1943 had made secure the position for alltime, and the magnitude and tactics of CoastalCommand and the Royal Navy.

Through 1944, Germany was employing pre-fabrication for U-boats, enabling them to be builtin about six weeks-as against eight monthsin earlier years; she was also developing theSchnorkel sub-surface replenishment apparatuswhich has been in action since the spring. Theinitiative, at the moment with the enemy, maynot remain there for long. We have yet to bebeaten in the counter-measure race.

The Sixth Christmas

To have reached the Sixth War Christmasprovokes sobering reflections, for after theGerman rout in France many prophesied therewould be no Sixth War Christmas; that the NaziArmies, once on the run, would fail to checkthe rush or extricate themselves in sufficientstrength to provide a barrier; that weight ofnumbers and the cumulative bombing programmehad achieved their respective purposes.

Time has shown the wish father to the thought.The German Army is still,fighting resolutely andthe German People, reduced to dull apathy, isstill in the firm grip of the Gestapo. A recentstatement indicated the Nazi Party's militarypolicy for the future; it now remains to be seenwith what degree of success this can beimplemented or frustrated.

If the pointers are reliable, it would appearthat Hitler is prepared, though not without bitterstruggle, to sacrifice Germany above the southernpocket and to leave the last battle to the gatesof. Munich, where, with his flanks protected bythe Schwarzwald aid Bohmerwald and his baseby the Alps, he will, it is reported, attempt tohold siege "until an Isolationist replacesRoosevelt-presumably at the 1948 elections-andwithdraws the American Forces from Germany,leaving the British and Russian Armies ofOccupation to wage a Third World War amongstthemselves."

If true, this is the fanatical dream of adesperate gang whic g omed from the outset tofailure in every apolitical and economicaspect, f e termany nothing but

I A t -A, L:e

The Invasion of ItalyPart V-Stalemate Again

1st October to 31st December. 1944

I. INTRODUCTORYBY THE END of ,September (as narrated in the held by the Allied Supreme Commander, which

last issue of the Review) the Allied Armies in were certain sooner or later to win him the game,Italy, backed by strong air support, had breached were the superiority enjoyed by his ground forcesthe Gothic Line along its entire length, except in equipment and supplies and the ace ofin the extreme west. As had happened several overwhelming air superiority. In respect of thetimes before in the Italian campaign, however, latter, however, deteriorating weather was boundthe situation flattered io deceive. The develop- to prevent its full explgitation.ment of this break-through into the occupation So far as military strategy was concerned, theof the remaining areas of Italy still under Axis Germans appreciated that the " schwerpunkt"domination was to be the reverse of easy owing of their defensive system lay south of Bologna,to the enemy's renewed stubborn resistance. and in order to remain strong there some ground

The general policy of Army Group "C "-the would have to be yielded on the Adriatic -flankenemy forces holding northern Italy-for the by gradually withdrawing behind successiveperiod under review was believed to have been water obstacles.formulated by Hitler himself. Its purpose was The general line held by the Allies in Italy atsimple-to hold the Apennine positions to the the beginning of the period, ran, in general terms,last and prevent the Allied Armies entering the from the mouth of the Fuminico river on theagriculturally rich and industrially productive Adriatic coast, south-westwards to the Mercatoplains of Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto. To area, thence north-westwards to the area somecarry out his directive, Marshal Kesselring was 20 miles south of Bologna, thence south-westwardsapparently allowed by the German High Command to north of Pistoia and south-westwards againto retain all his troops-28 German and four to Pietrasanta on the west coast. At that timeItalian divisions (by no means at full-strength, facing the Germans, from east to west were 1however) and various security formations. The Canadian, 5 and 10 Corps of the_ Eighth Armyonly proviso appeared to be the possible later in the Adriatic sector, and the Fifth Army,necessity (which turned out to be the case) of comprising 13, 2 and 4 Corps, across the rest ofwithdrawing at least two divisions from Italy to the peninsula,' with the heaviest concentrationsmeet the Russian advance in south-east Europe. south of Bologna. The Germans at the beginning

Kesselring was not without some good cards of October had nineteen or twenty divisions inin his hand. His divisions in the line actually the battle area which were supplemented byoutnumbered those of the Allies; he still held another one or two by the middle of the month.strong mountain positions and was protected byriver barriers; and, nost important, General Allied Air Supremacy

Winter was again at hand to help. him with his Although the German Army was still a teamdefensive warfare. The Marshal's most serious to be reckoned with, the Luftwaffe could hardlydisadvantage was his tenuous supply lines, be said to be fielding even a fourth eleven. TheThere were four main railway routes entering G.A.F., which at the beginning of the ItalianItaly available to him-the Brenner Pass route campaign, after the immense losses incurred infrom Austria and the three lines entering from North Africa and Sicily, could still 'boast athe north-east. These frontier routes and the Mediterranean strength of well over 1,000more southerly network of lines in the Po valley aircraft, was now represented in Italy by awere wide-open to air attacks and it required niggardly 25 long-range and fifteen tacticalconstant labour, skill and ingenuit iF , r ~atre out 30 second-lineGermans' part to slip through sufficiel n t ', S, " t" Other formationsand equipment to their forces south oo italy is, what. M.A.A.F.enable them to maintain their effort. ' t A Jleft, of M -i , em- d some nonths since joined

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the main body of the Luftwaffe in the west tohelp with the Canute-like task of trying tostem' the tides of the Anglo-American invasionand aerial offensive. Brief, infrequent andusually inglorious appearances were also beingmade in the Italian skies by the Italian FascistAir Force, comprising a job-lot of about 50single-engined fighters and 20 torpedo-bombers.

In contrast to the enemy's Lilliputian air powerthe Mediterranean Allied Air Forces in Octobermustered a strength of over 3,900 aircraft ofoperational type (that is, excluding the powerfulforce of transport aircraft) in Italy, Corsica andSardinia and further forces were based along theNorth African seabord, in Southern France,on Malta and on Vis. It is true that theMediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force, whichaccounted for 48 per cent. of the above-mentionedstrength in Italy and the adjacent western islands,was committed primarily to attacks on objectives

beyond the Italian frontiers, but its efforts couldbe switched to help the Mediterranean campaignwhenever essential.

Offensive operations over Italy were, aspreviously, ,predominantly the MediterraneanAllied Tactical Air Force's concern. For thegreater part of the period under review, theForce was composed of the Desert Air Force,the XXII Tactical Air Command (a newformation made up of the short-live'd XII FighterCommand and further former XII T.A.C. unitsreturned from Southern France), the 57th and42nd U.S.A.A.F. medium bomber wings (thelatter Wing left the Mediterranean theatre inmid-November) and the 51st Troop Carrier Wing.

For the most part during the last quarterof 1944 D.A.F. operationally controlled threeSpitfire, wings, one Kittyhawk/Mustang (P.51)wing, one Spitfire reconnaissance wing, oneU.S. Thunderbolt (P. 47) group, two wings

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Vercelli road and railway bridge under attack on 4th iNovember, 1944.

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Ora road and railway bridge under attack on 11th November, 1944.

of light bombers, and one Marauder (B. 26)medium bomber wing. In the above formationsR.A.F. squadrons numbered 21, S.A.A.F. twelve,R.A.A.F. four, U.S.A.A.F. three and R.C.A.F. andPolish Air Force one each. The XXII T.A.C. wasmade up in general of four U.S.A.A.F.Thunderbolt groups (twelve squadrons), aS.A.A.F. wing of Spitfires and Kittyhawks (twoS.A.A.F. and two R.A.F. squadrons), a U.S.A.A.F.light bomber group (four squadrons), two R.A.F.Spitfire tactical reconnaissance squadrons, twoU.S.A.A.F. Beaufihter night-fighter squadrons, aBrazilian Air Force Thunderbolt squadron and aU.S.A.A.F. photographic squadron. The Tacticalmedium bomber force consisted for the first halfof the period of twelve squadrons of U.S.A.A.F..Mitchells (B. 25s) and the same number ofU.S.A.A.F. Marauders and later of sixteen,squadrons of Mitchells only.

In numerical strength M.A.T.A.F. exceeded the1,800 mark (excluding transport aircraft) for thegreater part of the period, but was reduced bysome 300 aircraft by the end of the year.

M.A.T.A.F's 'Commitments

The Tactical Air Force's basic commitments inItaly were (a) counter air force operations, (b)the provision of air protection over the forwardareas, (c) affording close support to the groundforces, (d) attacks on enemy lines of com-munication, (e) the destruction of enemy supplies,and (f) reconnaissance duties.

To meet the first two commitments mentionedabove-in earlier campaigns of paramountimportance-a minimum effort sufficed owing tothe Luftwaffe's impotence M.A.T.A.F's' majorefforts were absorbed by tasks (c) and (d).

As had long been the tradition, the Desert AirForce continued to give intimate aid to the EighthArmy and the XXII Tactical Air Command wasmade responsible for supporting the Fifth Army'soperations. When necessary some effort could

be orce to help in theother's the Tacticaland/or Strateti called onto help with close-

The heaviest commitme

to be the pounding of the enemy's i oe no -munication-particularly railways-in" orde torestrict his build-up in the battle area. Shortlyafter the beginning of the period under review,the Desert Air Force was allotted the area eastand north of the line Verona-Ostiglia-Bolognafor attacks on communications and the XXIITactical Air Command was responsible forattacks to the west of that area. Later in theperiod the area of the latter Command wasextended further east. The medium bomber'sfunction was to add weight to the attacks inthe Po valley and strike at vulnerable pointsfurther north. From November onwards theTactical Air Force- extended its attacks onrailways northwards, with special emphasis onthe Brenner Pass line, as it became increasinglyclear that the destruction of the bridges over thePo had not resulted in the expected Alliedstranglehold on supplies reaching the GermanArmy in the field. Less help was then requiredfrom the Strategic Air Force against the frontierroutes.

The Coastal Air Force's commitments so faras the Italian campaign was concerned includedthe protection -of the rear areas and convoys;anti-shipping activity in the Gulf of Genoa andthe northern Adriatic; supplementary attacks onroad transport and other targets, particularly innorth-west Italy; and air-sea rescue missions.

It is not purposed in this account to give detailsof the Royal Navy's achievements. But it shouldbe borne in mind that protective duties (albeitnow restricted) remained a constant commitment,offensive action was taken against enemy shippingin the Ligurian and northern Adriatic seas, andbombardments were carried out of the Genoa area.

II. RENEWAL OF ENEMY RESISTANCEFifth Army's " Minor Advances " during the first half of October. An attempted

October opened with leading troops of the Fifth break-through to Bologna, aided by the air

Army in the central sector sixteen miles south of support considered in the following section, was

Bologna-the key strong-point of the German found to be impracticable.

defence line. It was immediately evident that not On 15th October 13 Corps was held up nearonly a dogged defence but local counter-attacks Bocconi and seven miles or so north of Palazzuoola;could be expected, reminiscent of the palmiest 2 Corps, advancing along the Firenzwola-Bolognadays of the Gustav line resistance. To stiffen his axis, after heavy fighting were in possession ofdivisions in the threatened central sector, Livergnano (three Land a half miles north ofKesselring. transferred not only piecemeal Loiano); and 4 Corps troops, advancing on eitherreinforcements from his Adriatic flank but more side of Highway 64, were three miles south-eastsubstantial formations from the quiet western of Vergato, and further west in the Serchiosector and the Genoa area. The remark "' Minor valley had reached Gallicano. These limitedadvances have been made against very stiff advances-particularly in the. central sector-opposition and most difficult terrain," culled from were helped, and in some cases perhapsa despatch of this time, could, accordingly, be made rossible, by the air support mentionedapplied to the whole of y's ctvity ,i he nex tio

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Operation "Pancake"

Apart from a maximum effort on the first dayof the month, when M.A.T.A.F's sorties on allduties exceeded the 1,200 mark, reports on Alliedair activity up to 12th October usually began," Bad weather contiriued to hamper operations."This bald statement when applied to Italianoperations should conjure up a picture of landinggrounds turned into quagmires as well aslowering winter skies inimical to tactical missions.

During the first eleven days of October aircraftunder the operational control of XII FighterCommand (later in the month re-designated XXIIT.A.C.) flew most of the 2,400 sorties carriedout on battlefield operations ; even so, strongclose-support was practicable on five daysonly. U.S. Thunderbolts played the major partwith attacks on enemy's positions, buildings,troop concentrations, guns, etc., mainly in thecentral sector and U.S. Bostons helped duringthe earlier part of October by bombing bivouacareas and dumps. On the first four days of themonth, also, D.A.F. directed most of the effortof its Kittyhawks and Mustangs and a Spitbomberwing towards helping the thrust towards Bologna;in particular, four missions flown against Loianoon the 3rd (in the direct path of our troops)succeeded in virtually demolishing the northernpart of that fortified town. These operations,however, only represented ' aerial skirmishingbefore the full-scale M.A.T.A.F.-.cum-M.A.S.A.F.blitz of 12th October-the intensive phase ofOperation " Pancake."

As its code-name suggests, the operation wasdesigned to flatten enemy opposition-in thisinstance in the path of the Fifth Army troopspressing on towards Bologna. The more distanttargets in the Bologna area were allotted to theStrategic heavy bombers and Tactical mediumbombers, while the Tactical fighter-bombersranged over the battlefield proper.

On 12th October the attacking heaviesnumbered 697 (over 100 more were thwarted bybad weather from reaching their objective);effective U.S. Mitchell sorties came to 141(attacks by 72 more Mitchells were frustratedby cloud cover and the entire effort of the U.S.Marauder wing was also rendered abortive); andover 270 fighter-bombers took part. The totalbomb-load dropped in this most concentratedattack by M.A.A.F. bombers up to that dateamounted to 1,661 tons. The heavy bombersattacked seven "material" targets (vehicleworkshops, stores and ammunition depots) andtwo barracks and a bivouac area, and themediums pounded two bivouac and stores areatargets, a barracks and a fuel dump. Of. thefourteen targets attacked by the Allied bombersphotographic interpretation showed that five couldbe termed destroyed and eight damaged. Thefighter-bombers, meaniwhile, attacked 60 targetsin the usual " close-support " category. On 13thand 15th October the fighter-bombers continuedtheir close-support operations ,at maximum

pressure and on the latter day the mediumbombers put up a full-scale effort against Povalley communications to hamper the supply ofthe central sector.

Apart from the material damage caused in the" Pancake" operations, reports from militaryunits emphasised the tonic effect on the moraleof our own troops and such immediate results asthe decrease in enemy artillery fire. A reportissued by G-2, Fifth Army, concluded by sayingthat "the air support... was eminentlysuccessful.. Classified targets were attacked in atimely, accurate and most effective manner, thusaiding materially the advance of the Fifth Armyin taking: important terrain."

The Fifth Army's projected break-through toBologna did not, however, as already mentioned,materialise. The German defence had againproved a nut which could not be cracked by ashort, intensive effort-steady and prolongedArmy-Air Force pressure was again required.

Eighth Army Approaches Cesena

In the Adriatic sector, meanwhile, the EighthArmy was pushing slowly. forward. At thebeginning of October the Canadians had reachedthe line, of the Fiumicino river from the sea upto and including Savignano; on their left 5 Corpshad advanced a little beyond Tribola; and10 Corps troops had followed up the enemy'swithdrawal along the remainder of the EighthArmy's front. Our forces had as aim an advancetowards Bologna from the south-east and asimultaneous progress up the Adriatic coast. TheGermans, in accordance with their general policy,were fighting a stubborn action and yieldingground only under extreme pressure, whileexploiting terrain and weather conditions to themaximum extent.

In spite of atrocious weather which, inter alia,caused the water-logging of several easternlanding-grounds-that at lesi with its concreterunway was a striking dry exception-D.A.F.rendered as far as possible its usual yeomanservice to the Eighth Army.

SFor the first four days of the month D.A.F'smain close-support, as mentioned previously, wasgiven to the Fifth Army troops in the centralsector; at the same time, however, the airoffensive was continued against the bridgesacross the Savio river, which was clearly theenemy's next major defence line against theEighth Army. Bad weather then prevented anyappreciable close-support until the 7th when themajority of the 500 sorties flown helped Canadiantroops in the Gatteo area; in addition, aircraftunder advanced " Rover" control succeeded indispersing a threatened enemy counter-attacknear Monte-Leone. For the next eight daysintermittent bad weather interfered with D.A.F'seffort-total daily sorties on all duties varyingfrom nil to 510. Nevertheless, accurate close-support, generally under " control, wasafforded the Ar p leS Iile, particularly

around Cesena; all the Savio road bridges werecut by 15th October; and, as mentioned later, aconsiderable toll was taken of rail and canaltransport in the rear eastern areas.

By mid-October, helped and heartened byD.A.F's help, Canadian troops had crossed theFiumicino river and the Rigorsa, further west;leading elements of 5 Coips were only three milessouth of Cesena, and advanced troops of 10 Corpshad reached Ranchio.

Fifth Army's Advance Stemmed

During the third week of October Kesselringswitched further crack units from the Adriaticfront westwards to pack the approach to Bolognafrom the south-east. There were then elevenGerman divisions astride the main axis of theFifth Army as compared with seven opposingSthe Eighth Army's advance and two in the quietwestern area. In the latter sector, also, wereelements of an Italian Republican Divisionsandwiched between more reliable German troopsin the old Western Desert style.

Until 26th October the Fifth Army continuedto make a little progress, but then a deteriorationin the weather greatly aided the enemy's defence.As one of the Supreme Commander's ,reports atthis time put it: "Heavy rains have made theItalian battle area a sea of mud. All rivers wereat flood stage throughout most of the period(26th to 29th October). Bridges were washedout, many roads were flooded, and in some areassupplies could be moved only by mules ormanhandling." Thus by the end of the monththe enemy had the situation south of Bolognareasonably well in hand and, in particular, hadscreened the vital areas between Route 65 andCastel San Pietro with his three best divisions,which had previously operated in the Adriaticsector.

The unfavourable weather inevitably restrictedthe air support which could be afforded the FifthArmy. During the first half of October, asalready pointed out, XXII T.A.C. directed itsmain effort against close-support targets. Duringthe last sixteen days of October XXII T.A.C's effort-2,294 sorties on all duties-was almostequally divided between battlefield commitmentsand attacks on rear communications, as in viewof the slowing up of ground operations andbad weather over the forward areas thecommunications attacks, which are consideredlater, now paid better dividends.

the attacks by bombing storage dep6ts at CastelSan Pietro and Imola and communications in theformer area. The U.S. Bostons operated in forceonly once against troop concentrations in thecentral sector, but, in addition, in a limited armedreconnaissance effort on a few nights covered theBologna area as well as the territory westwardsto the coast.

Fall of Cesena

Further east, in the meantime, the EighthArmy's continued pressure on the weakenedGerman, forces on the Adriatic front forced themto yield more ground.

The Canadians, advancing on their Rimini -Cesena axis, crossed yet another river obstacleand by the beginning of the fourth week inOctober, having taken Cervia in their stride,were along the line of the Savio, with leadingelements across the river some two miles northof Cesena. The latter town, on the main Rimini -Bologna route, had fallen, meanwhile, to 5 Corps'right flank in conjunction with Canadian troops,and a bridgehead across the Savio to the west ofthe town had been established. To the south-west,2 Polish Corps (who had taken over from 10Corps) had made a general advance of five milesor so, capturing Galatea and Civitella di Romagna.By the end of the month 1 Canadian Corps troopsin the coastal sector were within seven miles ofRavenna and other elements had reached theRonco river east of Forli; 5 Corps had crossed theRonco and forward units were three to four milessouth of Forli; and the Poles on the left flankhad also kept pace with the general advance.

Thus the Eighth Army in its drive towardsBologna from the Rimini area had progressed athird to a half of the way and in the coastalsector well over three-quarters of the way toRavenna.

D.A.F's close support to our forces on theAdriatic front was inevitably patchy, due to theadverse weather and, particularly, the "sea ofmud" already mentioned. On five of the lastsixteen days in October sorties fell below 100,including three blank or virtually blank days;nevertheless, by taking advantage of a few spellsof good weather D.A.F's total effort topped the3,300 sorties mark.

The areas covered by the close-supportoperations (which accounted for about half of thetotal effort) reflected the course of the EighthArmy's advance changing from below Cesena to.. .. --- -- . . . . .Ii-~ - .....-- 4 - oC ... .. . .. . . . .... .

On only half of the days in the latter part of west of that town and south of Forli. High-lightsOctober was an appreciable, effort over the Fifth of the D.A.F. battlefield attacks were theArmy's battle area practicable; weather conditions harassing of the enemy's movement across thefrom 25th to 30th October, in particular, almost Savio river on 20th October; help for our groundprevented air operations entirely. The U.S. forces in their enlargement of their SavioThunderbolt activity against guns and enemy bridgehead on the 24th; harassing the enemy'spositions-particularly against the concentrations retreat to the Ronco river line on the 25th; andsouth of Faenza, Imola and Bologna-was support for operations in the Meldola-Forli areastrongest and most successful on the 16th, 19th, on the last day of the month. After a spell of20th, 24th and i31st. On a few occasions, also, inactivity due to unserviceable landing grounds,Tactical medium bombers added more weight to did good work, particularlyD~\~3 ~ dd odwrk atiual

against a fortified village six miles west ofCesena, but the Marauder squadrons were still,unfortunately, bogged down.

Attacks on Enemy Communications

of co

eastwa o d' s t eagainst military traffic occurred in the Cremona -Mantua area (the results achieved are included inthe. tntn.la given lte-r); mlmernis ra.il c.utf wirP

An Allied Force Headquarters' Operation affected on the Faenza-Bologna line and in theMemorandum issued in the spring of 1944 stated Milan and Genoa areas; and roads were crateredthat "the main function of all classes of bomber most extensively between Ferrara and Parmaaircraft in a land campaign is to interfere with and the bomb-line.movement of enemy forces and their supplies." , " The U.S. medium bombers' effort duringThis dictum had certainly been acted upon in October was whittled down by unfavourableItaly, reaching its apotheosis of achievement two weather to an even greater extent than that ofmonths prior to and during the "Diadem" the light and fighter-bombers, their total effectiveoffensive (begun 12th May, 1944), when the sorties for the month on all duties amounting tointensive air attacks on the enemy's communi- 1,947-just over half of their September total.cations rendered his build-up in central Italy During the eleven days when operations wereiisufficient to meet the demands of sustained practicable, the medium bombers carried out 85heavy fighting. For a time then in the early attacks on bridges, destroying sixteen andsummer of 1944 it looked as if the Allied armies damaging 27. Most of the missions were flownwere all set for a drive to the extreme north of north of the Po, particular attention being paidthe peninsula and the air offensive against lines to lines running south to Milan and Padua. Routesof communications was therefore somewhat to the north and west of Milan Were cut as therelaxed. In July, however, it was evident this result of the attacks on the railway bridge atrapid advance was not going to materialise Ponte San Pietro, and bridges at Lonate Pazzaloimmediately and the paramount need was to and Galliate and combined road-rail bridges atrestrict the enemy's build-up south of the Po. The Cameri and Magenta.. The routes running intobombing of the Po bridges was begun accordingly the Po valley from the north-east were blockedon 12th July and attacks on communications, by the bombing of the railway bridges at Nervesa,particularly railways, traversing the entire Po Piazzola and Padua. Lateral lines running throughvalley became M.A.T.A.F's main commitment. Mantua a~d Verona were disrupted at variousThe Strategic bombers, meanwhile, attended to points; and four Po bridges, which had notthe disruption of the frontier routes at their more previously been permanently disabled, weredistant points and rear. marshalling yards as attacked.previously. This division of labour between the The combined M.A.T.A.F. results of the attackstwo Forces still obtained during October, the on communications in October were:-44 bridgesmonth under immediate review, destroyed and 83 damaged; 2401 cuts on railway

So far as M.A.T.A.F's attacks ono communica- tracks; one tunnel destroyed and two damaged;

tions were concerned, the areas covered by the 280 locomotives destroyed and 76 damaged; 645

three main formations in October were as follows, railway carriages and wagons destroyed and

The Desert Air Force operated to the east of the 1,384 damaged; 423 military vehicles destroyed

Verona-Ostiglia-Bologna railway; XXII T.A.C. and 290 damaged; and 58 ships and boats sunk

covered the more extensive territory to the west and 174 damaged, A further limiting of enemy

of that line; and the medium bombers (ranging supplies was achieved by the destruction of 23

over both these areas) concentrated on cutting dumps.bridges north of the Po and across the river itself. Meanwhile, the Strategic Air Force in the

SMay of D s cs a s course of operations against communications onS D.A F s c o m m u c attacks- three days and seven nights dropped a total

particularly the destruction of the Savio river bomb-load of 20 tons, mainly on the enemy'sbridges-were bound up with the advance of the bomb-load of 2,500 tons, mainly on the enemy'sEighth Army and have already been mentioned, more northern commuinications, concentratingEighth Army and have aleady' been mentioned particularly on the important Brenner Pass route.Further north, cuts inflicted on railways were part ary o the prevented the coPatinuousmost prevalent on the Verona-Modena and Bad weather, however, prevented the coitinuousRvenra-Bologna stretches. On a Mnumber of effort necessary to achieve a serious interdictionRavonenna-Bologna stretches the frontier routes.days, also, armed reconnaissances-particularlyby Mustangs-over the rear north-eastern areas The Coastal Air Force's quota to the offensive

imposed- a considerable toll on rail traffic- against enemy communications during October

outstanding achievements being the destrudtion included the sinking of two merchant vessels and

of seventeen locomotives on 12th October, 30 on the damaging of twelve more, nine smaller craft

the 21st and ten on the 30th. Equally striking sunk and 52 damaged, and one bridge destroyed

results were obtained against canal traffic, a total and one damaged.

of 52 boats and barges being destroyed and 166damaged. Failure to Stem Enemy's Supplies

Meanwhile, XXII T.A.C., whose effort aga . m iosm oned in thecommunications was more pronounced in ee in e o e hted the fial phase oflatter half 9f the month, despite the limi in l 1 onth co centrated effort in thefactor of bad weather maintained the interdic ion Po valley and the establishing of a line of

P ~S!fl~ii~

Points of Interdiction by Air at 13th November, 1944.

interdiction along the Po, Piave and Ticino rivers-- an air offensive which had as twin objectives thelimiting of the enemy's build-up south of the Poand the hampering of an expected withdrawalof the German armies to the Alps. Consideringthe limiting factor of bad weather in October, theM.A.T.A.F. effort during the month achieved ageneral success, particularly in continuing to stopvirtually all transportation across the Po to thebattle area during the hours. of daylight-

In view of the success of the above-mentionedsustained interdiction offensive and M.A.S.A.F'sintermittent cutting of the frontier routes, thequestion naturally arises, "How did the enemymaintain a sufficient flow of supplies to his troopsto withstand full-scale attacks by both the Fifthand Eighth Armies? " The answer is, " By anintensive repair programme and a number ofingenious improvisations." These are consideredin more detail elsewhere in the Review, but it ispertinent here to emphasise some of apB2W

schemes at this period. So far as the actual entryof supplies into Italy was concerned, the Germanscountered to a great extent the effect of the airattacks on the frontier routes by skilled andspeedy repairs (rendered more easy by theaccumulation of bridging materials near targetsites) and the construction of rail diversionsaround vulnerable points. For the passage ofsupplies over the rivers further south, particularlyover the Po, the enemy's repair programme couldnot keep pace with the damage inflicted;consequently the use of pontoon bridges at nightonly, crossings by ferries (also principally atnight), the construction of pipe lines and othermethods were brought into play.

Attempts were made by both Strategic andTactical night bombers to interfere with theenemy's nocturnal supply activities, but, ingeneral, these achieved little success owing to thedifficulties of locating the targets (the locations

H of the pontoon bridges were constantly changed,

Aircraft over the target at Magenta road bridge, two spans of which were cut.

for instance),) the poor visibility 'usuallyprevailing, and insufficient forces available for asustained effort.

Thus, in spite of the Allied air attacks theGermans continued to supply their forward troopswith their estimated needs of approximately2,000 tons daily. It must be emphasised, however,that the enemy's accumulation of supplies waskept down to a level sufficient only for defensivewarfare and was quite inadequate for anysustained major offensive action.

Features of M.A.T.A.F's October Effort

In certain respects October ended a phase ofM.A.T.A.F. activity. In particular, in thefollowing moth the Force's zone -of operations

was to be significantly extended in Italy and itsaid was once more to be required in Yugoslavia.

The dominant feature of the month was thelimiting factor of bad weather. M.A.T.A.F'seffective operational sorties (excluding transportaircraft missions) came to 13,554 - nearly10,000 short of the September figure; andthe total bomb-load dropped just exceeded the8,000 tqns mark, or a little over half of theprevious month's tonnage. Nearly 4,500 tonswere dropped on lines of communication and justover 3,300 tons on enemy concentrations. Detailsof the results achieved have already been given.

Help with the important work of destroyingthe enemy's morale was provided by five missionsflown by a total of 36 U.S. Mitchells on "nickel"

StEl[

Bombs exploding on the Magenta road bridge.

Results of the attack on the Magenta road bridge.

~B1~P~BB

(leaflet) dropping over the areas of Bologna,Imola and Forli.

The enemy's air force was still conspicuous by itsabsence. M.A.T.A.F's combat victories, accordingly,amounted to a mere eight enemy aircraftdestroyed and seven " probables." A few more.(including reconnaissance aircraft) were destroyedon the ground, particularly by XXII T.A.C.Thunderbolts. , M.A.T.A.F's operational losseswere 20 bombers and 77 fighters (includingreconnaissance aircraft); two of these losses only.were traced definitely to enemy air action, therest being due to flak and other causes.

f A ... was

the rocket anEvidence as to their worth useythe end of October, but their la u edthat they were yery definitely worth their salt.

Features of 51st Troop Carrier Wing's effort,apart from the routine work of ferrying personneland equipment, included the evacuation of nearly1,500 patients from the forward areas; theferrying of several thousands of reinforcementtroops from France to Italy; and help with Balkanoperations.

III. M.A.T.A.F's INCREASED COMMITMENTS

Capture of Forli

The Allied Armies' limited gains during theearly part of November-and, as it turned out,for the whole of the month-were made. almostentirely by Eighth Army troops on the Adriaticfront. As previously, the Germans defendedstubbornly and exploited the river barriers to thefullest extent, and once again such statements as," Rain and mud continue to.-hamper operations "introduced many of the Allied Commander'scommuniques.

During the first few days of the month a haltwas called to the advance of the Canadians' rightflank up the east coast, but 5 Corps continued topress on towards Fori--over half the way toFaenza from Cesena on the Rimii- Bolognaaxis. Polish troops on the left flank, meanwhile,continued to make progress further south.

Beginning on 1st November the Tactical AirForce again assumed commitments in theBalkans, the formations affected being theDesert Air Force and the Tactical mediumbomber wings. This additional activity-whichis considered elsewhere in the Review-inevitablyimplied a reduction in D.A.F's effort on close-support for the Eighth Army, certain wings, ineffect, being held for employment against Balkantargets on a first priority basis. In the event,however, the decrease in D.A.F's Italian effortwas not so great as anticipated as the weatherin Yugoslavid was often worse than in Italy,permitting Tactical operations on only half thedays of the month.

The Desert Air Force's small effort during thefirst four days of November was mainly directedacross the Adriatic, but on the 5th began a spellof four days good flying weather in Italy whichcoincided with the critical phase of the battlefor Forli. On the opening day of this goodweather spell D.A.F. flew approximately half ofits 400 sorties in support of our troops approachingForli and on the following day a still greatereffort was practicable, while ahead of theCanadians bridges over the Ronco river south ofRavenna were also successfully attacked. On the

7th, as the battle raged in the vicinity of theForli airfield, some two miles from the town, theclose-support effort was further stepped-up; inaddition to over 300 D.A.F. sorties againstparticular close-support targets 92 Tactical U.S.Marauders added weight to the air assault by"fragging" the areas of the enemy's troopconcentrations. The next day 90 per cent. ofD.A.F's 526 sorties were flown in attacks aheadof the advancing 5 Corps, who captured Forli onthe 9th.

The best indication of the success achieved bythe air support is given by citing typical passagesfrom the messages of thanks and congratulationsaddressed to the Desert Air Force. The Brigadiercommanding a British infantry division engagedin the fighting wrote to the A.O.C., D.A.F., "Inmy experience air support has never been closer6r more accurate, and all my chaps weretremendously stimulated by it. Such co-operation'sends their tails right over their heads." On astill higher level the G.O.C., 5 Corps, stated that,"The speed of answering calls, the accuracy ofbombing and straffing and the way in which allattacks were pressed home at low level wasadmired and appreciated by all ranks. Thedestructive and moral effect on the enemy wasthe greatest contribution to the success of to-day'soperations."

The Approach to Faenza

After Forli had fallen the next main item onthe Eighth Army's programme was an advance toFaenza, still further along Highway 9 in thedirection of the eventual goal of Bologna.

By 20th November, 5 Corps in their progress'towards Faenza had established positions alongthe east bank of the Montone river, seven milesnorth of Forli, and were holding a line along theCosina river, south of Highway 9. Further southstill the Poles, after a temporary set-back, werepushing forward in the area north-west ofCastrocaro, while in the coastal sector advancedCanadian units were only two miles south ofRavenna.

r.. 7.

From 16th to 20th November,. of the 3,

sorties flown by the Desert Air, Forceabouttwo-thirds was devoted to iclose-support work.The light bombers we're again able to add weightto the fighter-bomber attacks, but the Marauderswere still non-participants due to unserviceablelanding grounds. The main part of the close-support effort was directed to helping the drive,on Faenza and good immediate results werereported by the forward "Rover" controls. Anexample of the more general results achieved wasthe 2,000 yards advance along Highway 9,achieved by a British division on 12th Novemberafter the way had been cleared by an intensiveair blitz.

In addition to attacks on the usual battlefieldstrgets a sustained offensive (including help frm

the Tactical U.S. Mitchells) was kept up againstthe enemy's three bridges at Faenza. Until the18th the bridges were all serviceable-" apparentlyhaving charmed lives," as the compiler of theD.A.F. War Diary put it; in the course of thenext three days operations, however, all wereblocked or damaged.

Operation " Harry"

The Eighth Army was now poised for a directassault on Faenza. The plan was to make themain thrust along the axis of Highway 9, theattack on a four division scale to open on21st November. The first necessity was for 5Corps to establish a bridgehead over the Cosinaprior to 'a further advance to the Lamone river.As it was desired, to launch a daylight assault,.considerable bomber support was necessary.

To aid the establishment of the Cosina riverbridgehead and the ' subsequent advance amaximum close-support programme was laid on,bearing the code-name of Operation "Harry."Apart from a further stepping-up of D.A.F'seffort, the main feature was the calling in of theTactical U.S. Mitchell wings. In the course ofoperations on 21st, 22nd and 24th November, theAmeican medium bombers flew a total of 321sorties against enemy concentrations, particularlynebelwerfers, mortars, field guns and semi-portable guns, in the general Faenza, area; inorder to prevent their use against 5 Corps troopscrossing the Cosina river. Meanwhile, of theDesert Air Force's total of 1,500 sorties flownfrom 21st to 24th November, inclusive, about1,200 were on close-support missions. Bothpre-arranged and "Rover" control targets wereattacked by the fighter-bombers, a specialfeature of the assaults being the successachieved by rocket-firing U.S. Thunderbolts.At long last, also, the D.A.F. Marauders resumedoperations and they, together with the Baltimores,effectively pounded defended areas, particularlyto the south of Faenza in the Polish troops' sphereof influence.

In all the "Harry" attacks small bombs wereused as it was essential to avoid creating roadblocks in the path of our ata kingm tr psA

SAccording to Army sources the operation waslargely responsible for preventing the enemyusing his reserve forces in the Faenza sector.

By 24th November, also, D.A.F. had succeededin destroying two of the bridges over the Lamoneat Faenza and seriously damaging the third.

During the last six days of November, however,bad weather caused a virtual cessation of the airactivity over the Adriatic sector. The only pointof interest was the shooting down of two Stukanuisance-raiders-one by a Beaufighter and oneby anti-aircraft fire-on the evening of the 28thover the Forli-Ravenna area.

Although swollen streams had now slowed upthe advance of our ground troops, by the end ofNovember 5 Corps and 2 Polish Corps held a linealong the Lamone river from a point four milesnorth-east of Faenza to some nine miles south-west of the town and were preparing for arenewed attack.

Negligible Change on the Fifth Army's Front

An indication of the difficulties of the terrainand weather confronting the Allied armies in Itayis given by the fact that the Novemberadvance of the Eighth Army from the Ronco tothe Lamone river, considered in the precedingsub-sections, was a mere eleven miles (at thenearest points) as the plane flies. And yet thisprogress could be termed considerable comparedwith the progress of the Fifth Army against theformidable defence screening the approaches toBologna and in the more lightly-held areas to the/west.

It was clear that if a break-through to' Bolognacould not be effected in October there was far

Sless hope of its accomplishment in November,when weather conditions had further deteriorated,the impetus of our assault had been lost andthe Germans had further stabilised their lines ofdefence.

In 2 Corps' sector, therefore, there was virtuallyno change in our positions during November andthe opportunity was taken of regrouping andbringing up reliefs. On the Fifth Army's rightflank, however, Indian troops of 13 Corps madelimited advances in the Modigliana area, beat offa number of counter-attacks and made contactwith elements of 2 Polish Corps of the EighthArmy. In the western battle area minor advanceswere made by 4 Corps in areas to the south-westof Vergato-not without local counter-attacks bythe enemy; two or three miles progress was madeup the Serchio valley;, and a slight ameliorationof our positions occurred on the Ligurian flank.

In view of the largely static military situation,the general bad weather over the forward areas,and the more lucrative targets available in theshape of communications and dumps (consideredlater), intimate support df the Fifth Army inNovember by XXII T.A.C. was a minor activity,accountin for less than a third of its total effort

* l s. Army targets most consistently

~j: -; i a.ii~Wi. l ~ h:I:

attacked by the T.S. Thunderbolts and, in the latterpart of the month, also by the 8th S.A.A.F. WingSpitbombers (transferred from D.A.F.), were-guns,occupied buildings, strong-points, command posts-and headquatters in the central sector at the

vulnerable approaches to Bologna from the south-

east and south; there was also a lesser effort

against the defended areas some.vhat more to the

west in the general Vergato area.

Blockade of, the Frontier Routes

Simultaneously with the direct assistanceafforded the Eighth and Fifth Armies, mentionedin the preceding- pages, the Tactical Air Force

was,; as previously, continually engaged in cutting

the enemy's Italian 'lines of communication.

This activity absorbed the greater part ofM.A.T.A.F's November. effort. Expressed Interms of bombs dropped, attacks on Italian

communications accounted for 65 per cent, ofM.A.T.A.F's total of' 10,671 tons for the month;in addition, there was an extensive straffing effort(including the employment of rockets).

November witnessed a distinct change of policy

in M.A.T.A.F's offensive against' communicatlons.

As indicated on pages 22 and 23, M.A.T.A.F's

Interdiction of communications in the Po valley

and the cutting of bridges over the Piave and

Ticino rivers, combined with' M.A.S.A.F's -bombing

of the more distant vulnerable points on the

frontier routes, narrowed but failed to dam up

the stream of enemy supplies reaching theGerman forces in the field. A new tack was

clearly necessary 'and it was decided thatM.A.T.A.F. should now concentrate' primarily on

actually preventing enemy railway trafficentering Italy by the north-central and north-eastern frontier routes-the Brenner Pass line,

the by-pass line from Trento to Cismon and theroutes- through north-eastern Italy, where they

crossed the Brenta, Piave and Tagliamento rivers.M.A.S.A.F. bombers were afso available from

time to time, as previously, to add weight to the

bombing of the frontier routes.' A supplementaryadvantage of the new policy was the fact thatthe enemy's export of food and industrialequipment from Italy .to the Reich would alsoinevitably be, handicapped.

On the above-mentioned frontier. routes' theTactical medium bombers dropped 44 per cent.of-their total November bomb-load of a little over5,500 tons and M.A.S.A.F. unloaded a further1,000 tons.

The medium bombers' offensive against the

Brenner Pass route-the enemy's most vital supplyline-began on 4th November andwas maintainedalmost daily until the 19th. For the first weektheir sphere of operations extended only to Trento,'while the Strategic heavy bombers covered themore northerly section of the route; laterM.A.T.A.F. undertook to attack the entire route.The medium bombers 'dellvered- 56 attacks of

which four-fifths were against the primary line,

DI

In addition to the few iriYge n n ' rei : 'fills were repeatedly bombed and other targetsincluded stretches of track and corniches. The

Strategic bombers for their part hit severalvulnerable points, including the Ora and Abesbridges and two marshalling yards,. and tore upmany portions of line. In addition, a successfulM.A.T.A.F. effort was directed against trans-former stations on the southern half of the routein order to: force the enemy to substitute steamfor electric power, with a resultant reductionin traffic capacity. This activity-Operation"Bingo "-is considered separately' elsewhere inthe Review.

The interdiction of the Brenner route was

somewhat weakened after 19th November due toadverse weather and the switching of. the mediumbomber effort against targets at Faenza insupport of the Eighth Army (mentioned on thepreceding page). The XXII T.A.C. fighter-bombers then lent a hand in helping to -maintain

the Brenner cuts-.their most outstapndingachievements being the blowing up of anammunition train and a great -stretch of track,on the by-pass line near Ospedvaletto on 21stNovember and the widespread devastation oftrack on the lower section of the main route aweek ,later.

As a result of the Tactical-cum-Strategicoffensive, all evidence indicated that the Brennerroute was not open to through-traffic for morethan 48 hours from 4th November to theend of the month. This aerial blockade wasaccomplished moreover, in spite of very heavyflak defences and smoke screens.

Meanwhile,, the north-eastern frontier routeswere also being attended to. Against these themedium bombers. delivered 35 attacks (570sorties). In particular, ten attacks were made onthe railway bridges at Padua; other targetsattacked were in the territory further north andeast as far as the Tomba bridge and tothe westto Montebello on the Vicenza-Verona line. TheStrategic bombers helped by attacking the threeprincipal bridges over the Tagliamento river witha further 236 tons. 1 At the end of November onerailway bridge only-that at Nervesa-wasserviceable over the four main rivers betweenUdine and Padua.

As in the case of the Brenner route, theM.A.T.A.F. - M.A.S.A.F. attacks rendered through-traffic on the three north-eastern frontier railwayroutes virtually Impracticable from 4th .Novemberto the end of the month.

Interdiction in Po Valley Continued

In addition t blocking the entrances into taly,it was still necessary to maintain the interdictionof routes across the Po valley, in order to isolatethe German forces in the line as far 'as possiblefrom their more forward supply points. It shouldbe noted, however, that north of the Po the

previou4lna'rf rhrdition along ;h Ticino river

-w ich a theGermans reinforcing north-west Italy-was nowswitched eastwards to the river Adda, as Italianswere replacing German troops in the north-west,and this move could be accomplished by shortroad journeys. Attacks on the Adda bridges, inparticular, prevented the rail movement ofsupplies from Milan and Turin to the battle areaand to the east.

The main burden of the Po valley communica-tion attacks in November fell on the Tacticalfighter-bombers. Their primary area was theterritory stretching from the bomb-line to the Poriver, from the east coast westwards to Piacenza;of secondary importance was the area north ofthe river up to Verona. The XXII T.A.C's sphereof responsibility indicated on page 21-inview of D.A.F's extra Balkan commitments-wasextended eastwards to the line Verona along theriver Adige to Legnano and then southwards tothe Po.

Most of XXII T.A.C's November effort of over4,000 sorties against communications targets wereflown in the Po valley. D.A.F's effort' againstcommunications was far less owing to itsintensive, close-support activity, but most of itsassaults on bridges and tracks also occurred inthe Po valley, as well as a quarter of its effortagainst railway traffic-the remainder beingdirected across the Adriatic. The XXII T.A.C.destroyed or damaged 98 bridges and its toll ofrailway carriages and wagons put out of actionon five particular days exceeded the 1,000 mark;most damage to railway tracks was done on theline running west from Verona and that betweenBologna and Piacenza. The Desert Air Force, forits pai't, gave regular attention to the Padua -Ferrara line and carried out armed reconnaissanceon seven days over the 'railways in the areaFerrara-F enza-Ravenna-all supply lines forthe enemy forces facing the Eighth Army. BothXXII T.A.C's and D.A.F's best results againstroads and vehicles were achieved in the courseof missions primarily against railway targets.

The medium bombers' activity against the Povalley bridges was directed mainly against thosein the west-central sector: in addition, ten attackswere made on repaired bridges over the Po itself,particularly on the one at Casale MonferratoThe Strategic bombers also helped by attackingthe heavily-defended Ferrara bridge by day anda pontoon bridge at Ficarolo by night.

Other attempts to defeat the enemy's transpor-tation of supplies across the Po included U.S.Boston and U.S. Thunderbolt attacks on pontoonbridges and ferry sites, on stores of pontoonshidden by day along the banks in readiness fortheir night use, on river-craft, and on the newly-laid oil pipe-lines.

Combined R

The accetagainst com(includingfolows '- 74

Results

pted claims- of M.A.T.A.F's pilotsmunication targets during Novemberattacks in Yugoslavia) were as

d ed 4+;

631 cuts on railway tracks; 665 locomotivesdestroyed or damaged (including a high propor-tion in Yugoslavia); 2,797 units of rolling stockdestroyed or damaged; 1,060 vehicles destroyedor damaged; and 28 small craft sunk and 63damaged.

The Coastal Air Force co-operated by sinkingthree merchant vessels and damaging anotherthree and sinking seventeen smaller craft anddamaging 45 more; putting out of action threebridges and hitting another nine; and destroyingor damaging 38 vehicles and 26 units of rollingstock.

M.A.S.A.F's effort and general achievementsagainst the enemy's Italian communications havealready been indicated.

Enemy Supply Situation Still Uncritical

Complementary to the air offensive over theenemy's lines of communication was M.A.T.A.F'seffort against the German stores alreadyaccumulated. In all, about 50 dumps or storesdep6ts were attacked during November, chieflyduring the third week of the month.

Most attention was paid to ammunition andfuel dumps, with a lesser effort against foodstores. The best results against fuel dumps,which were now mainly located north of the Po,were achieved in the area between the river andthe Brescia-Verona railway line. The mainattacks on ammunition dumps, on the other hand,were delivered' against those just behind the frontin the Bologna, Imola and Faenza areas. In all,44 .dumps were destroyed (eighteen fuel, tenammunition and sixteen other dumps) and, inaddition, three factories were put out of actionand eleven damaged.

Nevertheless, this destruction of the enemy'ssupplies and the continued cutting of his commu-nications were still- insufficient to preventKesselring maintaining a sufficient build-up southof the Po for defensive warfare. The enemy'singenious improvisations for maintaining arestricted stream of supplies and reinforcementsto the front, were still successful in denying tothe Allied Air Forces the ultimate and logicalresult of their' sustained offensive.

Counter Air Force Operations

For the first time for some months anappreciable effort in November was again directedagainst the enemy's Italian airfields. In view ofthe disparity in strengths between the opposingair forces, the M.A.A.F. attacks savoured some-thing of a Goliath belabouring Tom Thumb. YetTom Thumb-in the shape of the Italian FascistRepublican Air Force, flying mainly ME. 109swith German markings-had merited the chastise-ment for. the revived interference, albeit usuallytoken, with Allied medium and heavy bombermissions, particularly over the Brenner Passroute.

The enemy fighters' main victory was, scoredon the 5th when three U.S. Marauders were shot

The loss of five aircraft in achieving this

2 ( i

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Nervesa R.R. bridge di~ring attack.

by e

success, however, appeared to have dampenedthe Fascist flyers' ardour as the 30 to 35 fightersobserved on the next day studiously avoidedcombat.

The renewed sporadic activity of enemy fightersmeant that the Tactical medium bombers hadonce again to be given fighter escort; itconstituted a threat to the success of our 'airoperations against the frontier routes, small it istrue, but best stamped out at the outset; andprovided enemy propagandists with the oppor-tunity of puffing up this vest-pocket effort toformidable proportions for use as a moralebuilder.

Photographic reconnaissance revealed that theItalian fighters, like those of the few remainingGerman units, were dispersed on several airfields.In particular, the Italian fighters were basedmainly at VilIafranca, Vicenza, Aviano and Udine;the night-harassing Stukas at Villafranca andVicenza; the Tac/R ME.109s at Udine; and thelong-range reconnaissance aircraft at Bergamoand Ghedi.

On the night of the 17/i8th, accordingly,No. 205 Group medium and heavy bombers begancounter air force operations again by dropping212 tons of bombs on the Udine and Vicenzaairfields; on the morrow American heavy bomberscontinued the good work by covering the samefields and those at Villafranca and Aviano witha 952-tons bomb-load. The M.A.S.A.F. attacksrendered the Udine, Vicenza and Vilafrancaairfields temporarily unserviceable and left 50 to60 enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged on theground. Meanwhile, the Tactical fighter-bombershad also begun an offensive against the airfieldat Ghedi and this, together with attacks on theBergamo and Villafranca landing grounds, wascontinued intermittently for the next twelve days,while U.S. Bostons included these targets in, theirprogramme of night intruder attacks.

The M.A.SI.A.F.-M.A.T.A.F. attacks put paidto any effective activity; by the Fascist flyersfor the rest of the year and further limited thesmall G.A.F. effort.

Unusual Missions

On several occasions in November M.A.T.A.F.carried out special attacks which were outsidethe usual run of operations.

Pride of place must be given to a laudableattempt by four U.S. Thunderbolts on 4thNovember' to write finis to Adolf Hitler's careerby bombing a Milan hotel which the Fuehrer wasreported to be gracing with his presence.Unfortunately (for the world) Hitler had leftprior to the attack.

Two less bizarre attacks were carried outtowards the end of the month. Medium bombershit a block-ship at Spezia which the enemy wastrying to manoeuvre into place in the harbourin preparation for a later evacuation; and

Spitbombers unpleasantly interrupted the" curri-culum of a school for budding swimming saboteurson an island near Venice.

Help for Italian Partisans

The Partisan movement in northern Italy wasnow ,growing fast and it was evident that itneeded more help if its sabotage effort in theGermans' rear was to be really effective.

For some time Tactical U.B. Bostons had beenflying occasional supply-dropping missions atnight over areas at the northern limits of theApennines, and from 12th October No. 205?Group supply-dropping aircraft had includednorth Italy in the areas catered for; droppingduring November, in particular, 1,316 containers(151 tons of supplies). Area fighter cover forthe latter day supply-dropping was provided byXXII T.A.C.

To help the Partisans operating nearer theactual scene of hostilities, however, M.A.T.A.F.towards the middle of the month assumedresponsibility for supply-dropping south of thePo. A start with this new commitment wasmade by escorted Tactical C.47 transports,towards the end of the month, when ammunitionwas dropped to Partisans less than ten milesfrom the front. In all, 27 tons of vital supplieswere dropped-the prelude to a really intensiveeffort in the following month.

M.A.T.A.F's Increased Effort in November

During November M.A.T.A.F's effectiveoperational sorties (excluding transport aircraftmissions) were stepped-up to well over the 17,000mark. The total bomb-load dropped-10,671tons-also showed a gratifying increase over theprevious month's figure. Some 65 per cent. ofthe tonnage was expended on Italian lines ofcommunications and about 30 per cent. on close-support missions: the remainder was dividedamong other targets in Italy and objectives inthe Balkans. The main results of the offensiveoperations in connection with- the Italiancampaign have already been indicated.

Continuing the effort begun in October twelveU.S. Mitchells were made available each weekfor leaflet dropping. In the latter half of themonth these aircraft switched their effort fromthe central and eastern battle areas to north-westItaly, in order to work on the already poor moraleof the Fascist Republican divisions. No. 205Group aircraft also continued to help with" nickelling" over north Italy, flying one specialsortie and also dropping leaflets in the courseof bombing and supply-dropping missions,

A special feature of the air reconnaissanceactivity was the provision each day of aircraft forartillery reconnaissance over the front for thepurpose of directing Allied fire.

M.A.T.A.F's combat victories were still fewowing to the paucity of the enemy's air activity,nine being destroyed and three probablydestroyed. Of the 122 Tactical aircraft (excluding

DE I WE

. ~~i"I~i~i: I

r~sr~ "d~~4~~~

transport aircraft) which failed to return fromoperational missions 25 were bombers and theremainder fighters (including reconnaissanceaircraft); as usual, flak caused the majority of thecasualties.

The ,Tactical transport aircraft's main activity,as previously, consisted of the ferrying ofpersonnel and equipment, etc; in particular,

u .''upbth' FifthArmy. A secondary effort was devoted to thevital activity of evacuating the sick and woundedfrom the forward zones, 4,783 patients beingflown back to base, mainly from hospitals in theFlorence area. The promising start made withthe new drive to supply the Italian Partisans hasalready been mentioned.

IV. ENEMY COUNTER ATTACKS

Capture of Ravenna

As mentioned on page 26 the end of Novemberfound the Eighth Army forming up to the Lamoneriver, which had already been crossed well to thesouth of Faenza. The first week of Decemberwas to witness the renewal of our offensive inthe eastern sector.

The Eighth Army's first attack was launchedon 2nd December by the Canadians on. the rightflank northwards against the enemy positionsbetween the Montone and Lamone rivers in thedirection of Russi, with the capture of Ravennaas its first main objective.

The initial assault, which achieved immediatesuccess, was aided by a D.A.F. close-supporteffort of some 400 sorties against targets mainlyahead of the Canadians in the Russi area. Asusual the Spitbombers played the major part,but considerable help was also given 'byBaltimores and U.S. rocket-firing Thunderbolts.Forward controls spoke highly of many of themissions flown.

The Canadians, after capturing Albereto,by-passed Russi and then invested Ravenna on the4th by a pincer movement. The 114 JaegerDivision (the formation so soundly drubbed atAnzio) did not wait upon the order of their goingbut went at once. The Canadians were soon ableto report that practically all the remaining groundeast of the Lamone was free of the enemy.

Meanwhile, on the same day that Ravenna wasgathered into the bag a strong air effort wasdirected against the enemy's defences on thenorth bank of the Lamone in the area south-west of Faenza, as part of the softening-upprocess for the crossing of a British division of5' Corps on the next day. In addition to thegreater part of the 590 close-support sortiesflown by D.A.F. during the day-the Spitbombersreceiving valuable assistance from Kittyhawks,Thunderbolts, Marauders and Baltimores-nearly50 Tactical medium bombers lent a hand withthis pre-offensive blitz by " fragging" selecteddefended areas.

The 5 Corps troops crosses the Lamone threemiles south-west of Faenza according to plan on

enemy quickly realised the gravity of this move,however, and immediately switched a freshmobile formation from His Bologna reserve to helpto check it. For several days attack after attackwas made against the bridgehead and our advancewas halted. During this period of conflict, thatis from 5th to 9th December, bad weatherprevented D.A.F. affording close-support excepton the last-mentioned day.

The Canadians Strike Agati

While the attention of the enemy's Tenth Armywas rivetted south-west of Faenza the Canadians'flanking movement which had engulfed Ravennaturned westwards on 10th December to cross theLamone at two points north-east of Faenza. TheTenth Army had clearly been caught on the wrongfoot and the Canadians' two bridgeheads, atVillanova and south-east of Bagnacavallo, wereswiftly merged and an advance was made to theCanale Naviglio by the 12th and a crossingeffected the following day.

During the first two days of the Canadians'assault most of D.A.F's close-support effort ofover 1,000 sorties was directed against quellingopposition, particularly guns and mortars in thepath of our advancing troops.,

Meanwhile, the enemy had hurriedly switched

infantry reinforcements from the Fifth Army

front to the Bagnacavallo area and these backed

up by tanks began a series of counter-attacks.The support of the Desert Air Force, however,helped the, Canadians to get supporting weapons

across the water and all efforts to dislodge them

from their position failed. D.A.F's effort on 12thand 13th was rendered abortive by bad weather,but on the following day in spite of continued

unpropitious conditions a number of successfulfighter-bomber missions were flown immediatelyahead of our hard-pressed troops. The Commanderof. the 12th Canadian Brigade expressed hisappreciation of this help under difficulties in thefollowing mesage : "Air support provided undervery unfavourable conditions to-day was of greatassistance to us in our operations on the CanaleNaviglio. Effort this morning succeeded inreducing enemy shelling and mortaring to aminimum."

the 5th, thus establishing a uridugeheau much

nearer the town than that already effected by On the following day, 15th December, the

the Poles on the Eighth -Ars et e ea er became kind again and the Canadians

received their due share of D.A.F's total of 544close-support sorties.

The D.A.F. ISpitbombers deserve' special mentionfor their aid to the Canadians from 10th to15th December. According to ground reportsthey did excellent work particularly in straffingslit trenches along the banks of the Navigliocanal, in helping to repel tank attacks, andgreatly limiting the enemy's shelling andmortaring which were impeding our bridgingoperations:

Fall of Faenza

While the Canadians were making their advanceand withstanding enemy counter-attacks north-east of Faenza 5 Corps vas still repelling'attacksto the south-west of the town. As the attacksagainst the Canadians were petering out ourformer offensive was resumed on the 14th, NewZealand troops having then taken over from theBritish division which had secured the bridgeheadand defeated all attempts to eliminate it. 'Withthe capture of Celle by the New Zealanders theenemy was obliged to pull out from Faenza, aprocess which was accelerated by a ground-airassault. Most of the town was in our hands onthe 15th but it took several more days to clearall enemy elements from the northern outskirts.South. of the town Indian and Polish troopscontinued to follow up the enemy's withdrawal.

From 15th to 17th December a very considerablepart of D.A.F's total of 1,000 sorties on close-support missions was directed towards helpingthe ground forces to invest Faenza, particularlyby the elimination of gun and mortar positions.

Meanwhile, an air offensive had already beeninitiated-in so far as weather conditions andother commitments permitted it-against the nextjunction along the highway to Bologna,, CastelBolognese. In particular, on 10th Decembernearly 100 medium bombers, aided by a strongfighter-bomber effort, hit the town and itsapproaches, and on the 15th the area. received 30air attacks.

The capture of Faenza and the progress madebeyond the town did not, however, augur anEighth Army break-through. Already by 17thDecember the German forces had practicallystabilised their position along the Senio river and'the wearisome task now confronted the EighthArmy of clearing the eastern bank of determinedtroops in strong positions.

Little Change on Fifth Army's Front

During the period of the Eighth Army's thrustsconsidered in the preceding sub-sections there waslittle change in positions on the remainder of thefront. South of Bologna patrolling only was theorder of the day and little activity except heavyshelling of the American forces on the Ligurianflank was reported in the western battle area.In 13 Corps' sector only, on the Fifth Army'sright flank, was there any appreciable offensive

action, the Corps' drive towards Imola along theaxis of the Santerno river meeting strongeffective resistance at Tossignano. Further eastthe Corps had already made contact with Polishtroops of the Eighth Army west of Brisighella.

During this largely quiescent period on theFifth Army's front the harrying of communica-tions (considered 'later) yielded better dividendsthan air attacks on Army targets, and consequentlyabsorbed the greater part of XXII T.A.C's totaleffort of over 5,000 sorties during the first threeweeks of December. Nevertheless, an adequateclose-support programme was carried out in spiteof intermittent bad weather.

, A constant commitment, as previously, was thesoftening-up of the enemy's fortified positions atthe approaches to Bologna from the southand south-east and attacks were made onheadquarters and dumps (including attacks bymedium bombers) in the vicinity. The successachieved against targets in the latter categoryduring the month is indicated on page 36.

From 9thDecember, onwards, also, cdnsiderableclose-support was given to 13 Corps in theirdrive towards Imola, when stiff opposition wasencountered at Tossignano. In particular, duringthe/ three days 14th to 16th December most ofXXII T.A.C's close-support sorties were flownagainst the enemy's forces counter-attacking inthat area.

SIn the western battle area, meanwhile, the moststriking commitment-undertaken with the twinobjects of helping the operations of our navalforces and to atone for our shortage of artilleryon the Ligurian flank-was the pounding ofcoastal guns south of Spezia by U.S. Thunderbolts.This activity began on the 9th, was continued onthe 13th and carried out every day during thethird week of the month.

Counter-Offensive in Serchio Valley

In the fourth week of December the westernend of the Fifth Army's front-previously bestknown as an area in which press-ganged Italiansreadily sought admission to the Allied prisoner-of-war cages-again flared into activity.

An intensive repair activity on roads, andbridges was noted by the Allies with interest andwhen a fairly, formidable build-up becameapparent in the Serchio valley XXII T.A.C. atonce turned its attention to that area, U.S.Thunderbolts on 22nd December, in particular,hitting targets at Poggio, Piazza, Castelnuovo andCamporgiano.

The expected enemy counter-attack materialisedon Boxing Day with German forces pressingsouthwards down the Serchio valley. Some easygains were at once made by the enemy-including the capture of Barga, Galliccno aridSommooolQnia-but this was due to our plannedwithdrawal rather than enemy pressure. By theend of the year, however, 4 Corps (with 'Indiantroops particularly distinguishing themselves

s~ti~s.. '~'

against the German 148 Infantry Division) north-eastern Italian areas and the Balkansalready practically restored the status quo, theenemy yielding ground fairly readily.

The XXII T.A.C. during the period df theenemy's curious abortive counter-attack turnedpractically its entire close-support effort againstSerchio valley targets. In particular, from 27thto 30th December (when the majority of XXIIT.A.C's 2,000 plus sorties was devoted to helpingthe Fifth Army's left flank) nearly 300 buildingsin enemy occupied towns and villages weredestroyed or damaged. The fighter-bomberattacks on troop concentrations, meanwhile, werehelped by a medium bomber assault on troops atAulla. Simultaneously, a full scale effort wasalso made to cut the enemy's road supply lines toSpezia and the north; in particular, during thefour days mentioned above U.S. Thunderboltsdestroyed or damaged fifteen road bridges on thesupply routes and the Tactical medium hitanother.

Writing two months after the event it is stilldifficult to see the point of the enemy's marchingup and down the Serchio valley a la Duke ofYork. It is probable that the offensive wasoriginally intended to have a greater scope andcertainly the enemy troops in the area had beenreinforced-a fresh German regiment had beenput into the line, and two independent Alpinebattalions and the "Italia" Division were alsoready for the fray. Marshal Graziani wasreported to have been a keen advocate for themove, but once it was realised that there was nochance of tactical surprise and strong Alliedcounter-measures had been prepared it is safe toassume that his exhortations received scant noticefrom Kesselring. While the counter-attackwas in progress there was a natural inclination-particularly by German propagandists-tocompare the Serchio valley effort with VonRundstedt's offensive on the Western Front. Thiswas rather in the same category as a comparisonbetween a Lancaster and the "Flying Flea."While Von Rundstedt on the Western board ofbattle was planning to effect at least a temporary" check " Kesselring's Italian move turned out tobe nothihg but the manoeuvring of a few pawns.

Enemy Withdraws Across the Senio

Meanwhile, in the eastern battle area after thefall of Faenza the Eighth Army inexorably pushed

Moreover, on six days of the last fortnight ofthe year bad weather stopped or virtually stoppedD.A.F's activity altogether.

The main close-support efforts were carriedout on 22nd, 26th and 27th, over 900 sorties beingflown on missions to help the Eighth Army,mainly by ISpit-bombers. The D.A.F. fighter-bombers kept up consistent attacks on the enemy'sSenio positions from Alfonsine to the FifthArmy's sphere of influence: In particular, theoffensive was continued against Castel Bolognese,gun positions were hit around Imola, further upHighway 9, and a considerable effort was directedagainst resisting enemy troops in the Lugo area,north of Faenza.

"Isolation of Italy" Continued

In spite of the intermittent calls for strongclose-support efforts, attacks on the enemy'slines of communication in Italy during Decemberstill remained M.A.T.A.F's most outstandingcommitment. In terms of bombs dropped, ,inparticular, this activity absorbed about 62 percent. of the Forces's total load of 10,105 tons.

As in the preceding month the Tactical AirForce's most ambitious task, the isolation of Italyby the aerial blockade of the frontier routes, againheaded the list of priorities for the mediumbombers-which since the middle of Novembercomprised only one wing of U.S. Mitchells (sixteensquadrons).

For the greater part of December, however-until Boxing Day, in fact-bad weather screenedthe frontier routes to a considerable degree andthe enemy's repair and improvisation programmeswere greatly intensified in order to take fulladvantage of this temporary protection. Inparticular, for a fifteen day spell during themiddle of the month the mediums were unableto penetrate the overcast over the Brenner Passline and XXII T.A.C's fighter-bombers were calledupon to cause as much interference as thecircumstances permitted.

To a certain extent, however, the equipping ofa U.S. Mitchell group with special equipment for" blind bombing" and the use of instruments forbombing in certain cases by the fighter-bombershelped to lessen the limiting effect of badvisibility.

the enemy rearguards back to their next delaying The Brenner line again received most attention.line along the west bank of the Senio river. The medium bombers carried out 31 attacks on aActually, .this process was not completed by the dozen targets from San Michele to San Ambrogio;end of the year, the Germans still continuing to in addition to the bombing of the bridges, fillskeep one bridgehead over the river. In general, and diversions, landslides across the opening ofwith fresh divisions shielding a further advance the San Ambrogio tunnel were caused by thealong the axis of Highway 9 the Germans' position bombing of the cliff above it. The mediumon the Eighth Army front was stronger at the bombers most intensive effort occurred during theend of the month than at the beginning, fine weather spell 26th to 31st December, whena

From 18th December onwards in view of the high proportion of the 1,000 plus effective sortiesmore static nature of the ground operations flown were directed against Brenner targets.increased emphasis was laid by the Desert Air During the same fine period M.A.S.A.F. U.S.Force on road and railway interdictiok~n-I /the iea b bes lent ahax y dropping 1,000 tons

l-- 43i X3

UE5IAS4

Latisaisa rail bridge before the attack ont 11th November, 1944. t

'he attack in progress aisd, below, the result.

DE~ASS ED

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on five bridges, the Verona marshalling yards andvulnerable stretches of line.

Tactical U.iSI. Thunderbolts in their consistentsupplementary effort carried out nearly 80missions against Brenner line tracks andmarshalling yards during the month, achieving,in particular, 149 cuts.

By night, meanwhile, Tactical light bombersregularly covered the route, concentratingparticularly on harassing the road convoysnecessitated by the reduced railway traffic.

From 1st to 28th December, inclusive, theinterdiction achieved on the Brenner route wasfairly short-lived, the enemy's repair programnecoping successfully with the damage inflicted:for the remainder of the month, however, thestepped-up M.A.T.A.F.-M.A.S.A.F. offensiveagain rendered the route (including the alternatelines via Cismon and Belluno) impassable.

The frontier routes from the north-east toPadua received somewhat less attention from themedium bombers than the Brenner line. For thegreater part of December M.A.T.A.F's primaryobject, as before, was to cut the bridges over thefour main rivers (the Brenta, Piave, Livenza andTaglianento) and attack other targets in theirvicinity, the mediums and fighter-bombersplaying equal parts. So far as the latter wereconcerned those controlled by D.A.F. made nearly20 attacks on railway targets between the Piaveand Livenza rivers, while the XXII T.A.F. fighter-bombers (having extended its sphere of respon-sibility east of the Adige river in order to relieveD.A.F., which was devoting a considerable effortto helping the Eighth Army) delivered twelveattacks, in particular, on the Brenta rivercrossings. Meanwhile, tracks were constantlycut over a wide area. In addition, D.A.F.Marauders and Baltimores, reverting to thetactics of the previous spring, strengthened theinterdiction by flying just under 500 sortiesagainst the Treviso, Castelfranco and Udinemarshalling yards and other junctions during thelast eleven days of the year. Towards the endof the month, also, Strategic U.S. heavy bombershit locomotive dep6ts in the same areas.

From 5th to 25th December, inclusive,photographic interpretation indicated that onmost days through-traffic was possible on twoof the north-eastern routes (not the moresoutherly one on which the repair effort wasmeagre) up to the Brenta river. Interdictionalong the Brenta was easier to achieve than atthe rivers to the north-east as the bridges werelonger and thus easier to hit and more difficultto repair. Moreover, rail diversions had beenlaid across the Piave and Livenza river beds,when the water-levels had fallen, and this madeinterdiction by air attack still more difficult toachieve.

During the fine weather spell at the end of theyear, however, the medium bombers extendedtheir attacks northwards against all the most

vulnerable bridges and viaducts across the riversnear Postwmia, Piedico2Ve and Tarvisio. TheStrategic bombers also helped by attacking(both by day and night) four targets in the sameareas. At the close of December the three north-eastern routes were accordingly cut at theirfurthest points. In addition, the mediums andfighter-bombers strengthened the interdiction bya series of blocks at the river Livenza, furthersouth.

Thus, at the end of 1944 through-traffic to andfrom Germany and its south-eastern occupiedterritory was again impossible.

Po Valley Attacks

Simultaneouslyfrontier routes theacross the Popreviously.

with the blockade of theinterdiction of communicationsvalley was maintained as

In particular, continuing the policy of theprevious month, lines of communication andmovement both north-south and laterally wereconstantly attacked from the line of the riverAdda eastwards. This area received priority inthe Po valley offensive. One hundred and fiftyattacks were made on open stretches of trackin the area between the Adda and Adige riversand this, combined with the bombing of bridges,particularly across the Qglio, resulted in thecutting of north-south railway communicationsbetween Lake Garda and the Po for the greaterpart of the month. Transportation by day acrossthe Po itself was as previously rendered generallyimpossible. On the . lateral railway in thenorthern Po valley from Milan eastwards toVerona, meanwhile, XXII T.A.C. took aconsiderable toll of rolling stock and causednumerous cuts. The Desert Air Force, operatingfurther east, achieved a similar success(particularly in the latter half of the month) onthe north-south Padua-Ferrara route.

Attacks on communications in the lessimportant western area of the Po valley had asaim the cutting of the routes to Genoa and Turin,and consisted mainly of U.S. Mitchell attacks onthe bridges at Torreberetti, Chivasso, Asti,Voghera and Pontetidone. Rail traffic fromPiacenza eastwards south of the Po was largelyimpracticable owing to XXII T.A.C's offensiveon railway bridges in this area, which accountedfor approximately half of the Command's railwaybridge-breaking effort.

The month saw a determined effort to harassthe enemy's night transportation activity,particularly across the Po to his forward areas.U.S. Bostons played a great part by regularlybombing ferry points and pontoon bridges, andBeaufighters and R.A.F. Bostons also intrudedsuccessfully on enemy night movement both inthe southern Po valley and further north. Afeature of the night bombers' effort was theflying of over 160 sorties, mainly against targetson routes south of Bologna, under radar controlfrom ground stations.

35

)I 1'1

s r

The state of ter c ac ie ae o ,-s umps) were destroyed and 27 factoriesenemy's routes in north Italy at the close of 1944 destroyed or damaged.is indicated on the map on-page 39.

Combined Results

During December M.A.T.A.F's claims againstcommunications targets (all in northern Italyexcept for some results achieved in a small 358sorties effort over the Balkans) were asfollows :-87 road and railway bridges destroyedand 129 more damaged: 711 road blocks andrailway cuts: six tunnels damaged: 792 vehiclesdestroyed and 589 damaged: 141 locomotivesdestroyed and 328 damaged:- 2,675 units of rollingstock destroyed or damaged: and six small vessels,sunk and 47 damaged.

The Coastal Air Force in its offensive missionssank a gun-boat and sixteen, barges and smallcraft and damaged 43 other vessels (mainlybarges). In attacks on ground targets in Italy60 vehicles were destroyed and 20 damaged;damage was done to 35 units of rolling stock;and one bridge was hit.

The help afforded by M.A.S.A.F. has alreadybeen indicated and is also dealt with elsewherein the Review.

Increased Effort Against Dumps

A greater bombing effort was directed againstthe enemy's accumulated supplies in Decemberthan during either of the two previous months,more than 600 sorties being flown in the courseof over 60 missions. In particular, dumps wereoften bombed as alternative targets (particularlyby the mediums) when low cloud screened thebriefed communication targets. Fuel dumps werestill No. 1 priority in the stores category, followedby ammunition and general stores depots, whichreceived particular attention from the fighter-bombers.

The majority of the dumps attacked were in-the forward areas, especially around Bologna,Imola and Spezia. In addition; an appreciableeffort was directed against dumps in the westernend of the Po valley, where visibility was normallymuch better than-in the east. The-main weaknessin the dump striking programme was the scantattention paid to the lucrative stores targetsaround Verona and Venice; in these areas,however, the primary need was to disrupt theenemy's communications.

On a number of occasions mediuns: speciallyequipped for "blind-bombing" hit cloud-obscuredstores targets and on at least one-occasion U.S.Thunderbolts also bombed by the use of instru-ments. The outstanding success of the wholeseries of attacks, in fact, was achieved byspecially-equipped U.S. Mitchells towards theend of the year, when terrific explosions andflames half a mile high wer- caused as the resultof an attack on a munitions depot near Bologna.

As a result of the M.A.T.A.F. bomber andfighter-bomber attacks in December 30 dumps(eleven fuel, seven ammunition and twelve other

Attacks on Enemy Airfields

The enemy's air effort - during Decemberremained at a low ebb and counter air forceactivity was accordingly still a minor com-mitment.

Most of the airfield attacks were carried outby the 350th Fighter Group (U.S. Thunderbolts)controlled by XXII Tactical Air Command. Inthe course of the month the-group destroyedor damaged 65 aircraft on the ground. The mainsuccesses were achieved .at Milan/Bresso airfieldon the 23rd (a mixed bag of twelve aircraft), atThiene on the 24th (fifteen Fascist fightersdestroyed and two damaged), and at Lonate onBoxing Day (22 Italian torpedo-bombers andother types disabled).

By night, also, .Tactical light bombers in thecourse of their armed reconnaissances regularlycovered the dispersal areas and runways of allprincipal landing grounds in use by the enemy,

Increased Help for Italian Partisans

Towards the end of November it was decidedthat the Italian Partisans needed at least 550tons of supplies monthly in order to maintain-their sabotaging and harassing activities. Asalready mentioned the supply of the Partisans byair was now a M.A.T.A.F. commitment.

The December weather was the reverse offavourable for supply-dropping missions and ononly half the days during the month could theactivity be successfully carried out. The Tacticaltransport aircraft's total sorties on supply-dropping for December came to 360, but nearly100 of these were abortive owing to bad weather.Three hundred and sixty-five tons of stores,ammunition, etc., were dropped to the Partisansand Special Forces-that is, two-thirds of theamount promised by all Allied means. M.A.T.A.F'sC.47 effort was supplemented on occasion byStrategic heavy bombers, and towards the endof the year D.A.F. fighter-bombers did some goodwork in supplying special equipment which neededprecision-dropping.

Supply-dropping unless performed accuratelyis, of course, worse than useless as it is apt toprovide windfalls for the enemy. It needs to beemphasised, therefore, that M.A.T.A.F's effort,in spite of bad weather, a few failures to receiveground signals and the presence occasionally of,enemy, fighters, was extremely successful, about90 per cent. of the supplies dropped apparentlybeing recovered.

On a number of occasions, also, close-supportwas afforded to the Italian Partisans. Thesemissions included attacks on German positions inthe north-western coastal sector to aid a Partisanassault; attacks on enemy security troops atvarious points which had concentrated to eliminateresistance groups; and, on at least one occasion,

fit. ii ,J .a

U1i~K

Excellent coverage ccsed many fires and explosions in this attack onTortona amnmunition storage, 14th December, 1944.

2 j r

=l

In this attack on Castelnuovo R.R. bridge on 16th November, 1944, the decking

of the bridge was torn up and the east end knocked off the abuttment.

'DJAB E

5.00 EFFECTIVE BLOCK4E' TEMPORARY BLOCK

~_. MAIN RAIL SUPPLY ROUTESAVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY

I r PRINCIPAL RAILWAYSOTHER STANDARD GAUGE LINESCOURSE OF RIVER P0

-i---- PD ROAD BRIDGE CUT

Points of Interdiction by Air at 2nd January, 1945.

the deliberate prolonging of a night air raid

warning before- bombing in order to provide cover

for Partisan sabotage activity.

M.A.T.A.F's Sustained Effort in December

During ' ecember M.A.T.A.F's effective

operational sorties (excluding transport aircraft

front. In addition, night intruder aircraft alsohelped with pamphlet-dropping. No. 205 Groupaircraft aided the Tactical effort by flying threespecial," nickelling" missions over northern Italy,dropping one-and-a-half million leaflets and many -more were dropped in the course of their bombingmissions.

missions) in spite of bad weather exceeded the Reconnaissance commitments continued to be19,000 mark, and the total bomb-load dropped- extensive. Of M.A.T.A.F's total effort of some10,671 tons-fell little short of the Novemberfigure. sortIes on these duties approximately 48

per cent was absorbed by photographic com-Approximately 62 per cent. of this tonnage mitments, 24 per cent. by tactical reconnaissance,

was dropped on lines of communication, in north fifteen per cent. by weather missons, and thirteenItaly, about 30 per cent. in the course of close- per cent. by artillery reconnaissances.support operations, and the rema ctories in December,targets in Italy and in the Balk . t the same as In theresults of the offensive missions o .i t ne estroyed and threealready been mentioned. ighters, in particular,

The usual allotment of U.IS Mitchells for shot down three raiders and probably destroyed" nickelling"- was continued, and "Frontpost," another. The toll taken of grounded aircraft isin particular, was delivered to refitting and mentioned on page 36. One hundred and twenty-assembly 'areas and headquarters. behind ;the . four Tactical aircraft were lost on operational

Ba~-~,

u.s ,,rBGI irj

i~i~~i'-~i. ;1 jrIvrmW

i~ji~

missions in all areas-24 bombers and theremainder fighters (including reconnaissanceaircraft). Flak and bad weather accounted forpractically all these casualties.

M.A.T.A.F's air transport wing continued itsferrying of troops, equipment and supplies inItaly and to and from Italy, Corsica and France.In addition, over 5,000 sick and wounded wereevacuated from the forward areas. The increasedhelp afforded by the C.47s to the Italian Partisanshas already been considered: a less agreeablebut urgent" luty, dealt with elsewhere in theReview, was the flying of troops and ammunitioninto Greece in early December to help counterthe E.L.A.S. uprising.

Situation at End of 1944

During the last quarter of 1944 there was nofundamental change in the strategic position inItaly. In particular, the previous rupture ofthe Gothic Line had not precipitated the enemy'swithdrawal across the Po as expected.

On the other main European battle fronts atthe close of the year the foreboding lull precedingthe Russians' cyclonic drive extended along* thegreater part of the Eastern Front, while in thewest Von Rundstedt's counter offensive-one ofthe last desperate throws of a High Commandturned gamblers-was already showing signs ofpetering out. The Southern Front in Italy alonepresented the picture of a strong line tenaciouslyheld. This successful defence was not "all doneby mirrors," as the saying of the moment has it.Apart from the enemy's skilful exploitation ofdifficult terrain and bad weather (which hasbeen stressed in general and particular terms inthis and previous issues of the Review) it mustbe emphasised that reinforcements arrived withoutbreak to Kesselring's forces and continued toexceed losses. It is astounding--and clearlyproves the importance attached by the Germansto holding out in Italy-that towards the end ofthe year, when Von Rundstedt was making hissupreme effort, reinforcements from Norway

were allowed to pass undiverted behind the-entireWestern Front to their Italian destination.

At the close of .1944 Marshal Kesselring had athis disposal 26 German divisions (including onePanzer, three-Panzer-Grenadier and two Paratroopdivisions), one Cossack cavalry division, fourItalian divisions and various security formations.There were then sixteen German and one Italiandivisions in the line and four German and oneItalian divisions in reserve. Other formationshad guard commitments in the rear, the ItalianFascist forces, in particular, now bearing thesole responsibility for protecting the Liguriancoast.

The overwhelming air superiority enjoyed bythe Allies could not be brought fully to bearon the enemy owing to adverse weather.Nevertheless, during the last three months of1944 the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Forceflew over 50,000 effective sorties (excludingtransport aircraft missions) and dropped morethan 29,560 tons-of bombs, almost entirely inItalian operations. In addition, the Strategic andCoastal Air Forces also rendered their ownspecialised help. Such advances as were madeby our ground forces were aided and in certaincases rendered possible by accurate close-supportmissions, and the air offensive on the enemy'slines of communication, although not succeedingin damming-up his stream of supplies entirely,at any rate ensured that Kesselring lacked themeans to initiate any major offensive move.

The general situation in Italy at the end of 1944bore a marked resemblance to the stalemateprevailing at the close of the preceding year.Then Kesselring's forces stood on a line coveringCassino and it was not until the "Diadem"offensive began in the following May that theywere driven northwards. Similarly, it nowappeared unlikely that the enemy would bebudged from his positions covering Bologna untilthe return of fine weather again made practicablean Allied ground-air offensive on a grand scale.

_ I

The Mediterraneaii AiStrategic Air Force

(Trends of Activity October to December, 1944)

THE WRITING OF AN ACCOUNT- of activities byan air force over a limited period presents afar more difficult problem than covering theactivities of land or sea forces. They, at least,have definite objectives which they either gainor lose, but aircraft visit the same objectivestime after time, and their results are oftenneither spectacular (in the strategical sense)nor even, at times, individually assessable. Airoperations for three months can thus makeextremely- dull reading, unless they can behandled and written as part of an overall assaultplan or plans. A vista of time is really required,however, to fit the varying pieces of the puzzletogether in their relative importance, but in thefollowing survey of the work of the MediterraneanAllied Strategic Air Force during the last quarterof 1944 an attempt has been made to presentthe story in the most comprehensible way. Theaccount is divided into four parts ; Part I givesthe Strength and Composition of M.A.S.A.F.;Part II covers the Function and Scale of Effort,including limiting factors ; Part III shows theDirection of Effort broken into sub-sections byaircraft employment and type of target ; Part IVis a short Conclusion.

PART I.

STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION

The strength and composition of theMediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force duringthe last three months of 1944 remainedapproximately the same as in the precedingquarter. The U.S.A.A.F. elements comprised theFifteenth Air Force, and the R.A.F. and Dominionelements No. 205 Group. The Fifteenth AirForce, under the command of Major-GeneralN. F. Twining, U.S.A.A.F., with headquarters atBari, consisted of four bomber wings of U.S.Liberators (B.24s) comprising fifteen groups offour squadrons each, and one U.S. Flying Fortress(B.17) bomber wing, made up of six groups alsoof four squadrons each. Th .tegfighter squadrons were nthe XVth Fighter Commaformation, formed into twthree groups of. U.iSl Lightnings (P.38s)and three groups of U.S. Mustangs (P.51s).Other operational formations included a photo-

graphic recbnnaissance group and a weatherreconnaissance squadron.

No. 205 Group, commanded by BrigadierJ. T. Durrant, S.A.A.F., continued its conversionfrom a medium to a heavy bomber group. ItsR.A.F. strength comprised three Wellington, oneWellington/Liberator, one Liberator and oneHalifax/Liberator squadrons ; its Dominionelement consisted of two S.A.A.F. Liberatorsquadrons.

Although the Fifteenth Air Force and No. 205Group remained predominantly day and nightstriking forces respectively, they changed rolesperiodically during the quarter under review-the American heavy bombers carried out anumber of night raids, and aircraft of No. 205Group made a considerable day effort in bombingand supply-dropping missions, plus the transport-ation of troops and supplies to our land forcesin Greece in December.

PART I

FUNCTION AND SCALE OF EFFORT

The function of the Strategic Air Forceremained the same. Primarily, it continued toattack strategic targets in- the southern part ofthe Reich and in the few remaining south-eastEurope occupied or satellite states, thusmaintaining, together with the Anglo-Americanair offensive launched from bases north andwest of the enemy, the two-way bombing ofthe German war resources and lines ofcommunication. Subsidiarily, the Force aided theAllies' campaign in Italy, the Russian offensivein the southern sectors of the Eastern front, theYugoslav Partisan activity and the Alliedoperations in Greece.

The total bomb load dropped during the quarter,50,000 tons, was, however, only a little more thansixty per cent. of the tonnage dropped by theForce in the preceding three months.

Effort

in; e effort were the weather,ete dmore and more, as winter

advance and the limitation and loss of targetsfor Italian based aircraft as vast stretches ofterritory in south and south-eastern Europe fell

_ ____

into Allied handy under adv nces by the Russians,and the Get' r dvAcuation of Greece and with-drawals in Yugoslavia.

Blind Bombing

Restriction by bad weather would have been Igreater but for the Increasing use of thePathfinder technique for blind bombing through10/10ths cloud or smoke overcast, which ensured .

that when the use of major forces was prohibitive Ithe aerial offensive could be maintained by smallnumbers of specially equipped aircraft. Sufficient Isuccess was achieved to inspire a signal from theCommanding General of the Mediterranean Allied:Air Forces in December commending the FifteenthAir Force as "the leading exponentin the worldtoday of blind bombing" and continuing, " as a . I

result of its December attacks on oil and the I

amazing results accomplished, It has easily takenthat front rank position." I

Fifteenth Air Force Completes First Year ofOperations

On 31st October, 1944, the Fifteenth Air Forcecompleted its first year of operations under

M.A.S.A.F., during which It flew 142,787 sorties, i

dropped 192,000 tons of bombs, shot down 3,594

enemy aircraft in combat and destroyed 2,000 on I

the ground, for a total loss of 2,200 aircraft.A creditable twelve months effort which not i

only caused the enemy considerable damage andloss,. but which proved the value, of the' Foggia

airfielda

Analysis of Effort for the Quarter

The following monthly analysis of the scale

of effort for the whole Strategic Air Force reveals

the consistency of that effort, when the shortageof daylight hours and general deterioration "in

the weather with the progress of winter is

remembered.

Main'Targets Represented by Bomb Tonnage

Oct. Nov. Dec. Total

1/Rs and M/Ys ::.

Oil Inst.....Enemy Concent.

) t h e r Industrial

TargetsLirfields....

DumpsEnemy movement ...Highways

7,675 8,1413,146 4,8361,418 1,632

2,183422

100

59

3461,360

750324

256

7,153 22,9697,664 15,646

173 3,223

88821

305

788

122

3,417

1,8031,155

1,112

437

Percentage Employment of Fighter Aircraft

Escort Duty ...Fighter Sweeps and

Ground Straffing...RecceF/Bombervisc.

per cent. per cent, per cent.

76 65 88

16 156 82 7

- 5

Counter Air

j/ac Destroyed in

Combat .... ...

i/ac Prob. Destroy-ed in Combat ...

,/ac Destroyed onGround

48 36 - 83 167

3 7 21 31

268 30+

M.A.S.A.F. Aircraft Lost or Missing as F/B

Casualties

.5th A.F.

205 Group

.5th A.F. Fighters

Totals

1s9

2763

128

2470

199

760

46658

193

229 222 266 717

Effective Sorties

Oct. Nov. Dec.

15th Air Force 5,849 6,895 7,132

205 Group 924 1,556 1,164

15th. A.F. Fighters 4,230 4,735 6,166

Totals. ... 11,003 13,186 14,462

Bomb Tonnage Dropped

15th Air Force ... 13,206 14,898 15,843

205 Group (incl.

mines) .......... 1,870 2,554 1,23615th A.F. F/Bs ... 19 263 93

Total

19,876

3,64415,131

38,651

-43,947

5,660375

Totals. ....... 15,095 17,715 17,172 49,982

Supplies and Leaflets Dropped

205 Group

Supplies (in tons) 210 712 482

L e a f le t s(thousands) ... 19,573 26,500 10,247

1,4

M.A.S.A.F. Aircraft Lost or Missing (F/B) as aPercentage Against Effective Sorties

15th A.F. Bombers--

139. 128 199- =2.37% - = 1.62% = 2.78%5,849 7,895 7,132

466Average -- 2.28%

20,876

Fighters-

63 70 60-= 1.46% - 1.47% -= .97%4,230 4,735 6,166

193Average - 1.27%

15,131

- 205 Group-27 24 7

= 2.92% ' =1.54% -.- =.60%04 924 1?556 1,164

56,32058

Average = 1.59%3,644

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PART UI

THE DIRECTION OF EFFORT

Oil Targets

During the six months period April to

September, 1944 the dominant commitment of the

Mediterranean Allied ,Strategic Air Force was

the curtailment-in co-ordination with the

operations of Bomber Command and the Eighth

U.S. Air Force operating from Great Britain-of

the enemy's oil production. This offensive had

met with such success that in September, owing

to the combined effects of bombing and the loss

(particularly in Roumania) of oil production and

storage centres through capture by the Allies,the enemy's monthly total output o'f all finished

products was estimated at 314,000 metric tons,representing only slightly more than 23 per cent.of the pre-attack level; the September petroleum

output, in particular, was put at 106,000 metric

tons or only 20 per cent. of normal production.

There is no doubt that the decline in production

and the drain on strategic reserves seriously

hampered the German armies and the Luftwaffe

at a most critical point in the war; moreover,inevitable drastic reductions in allocations to

industry prevented the necessary stepping-up of

war production generally to meet the increased

demands of intensified operations.

Although the last statement is in actual fact

true, it may well be challenged in view of Von

Rundstedt's offensive launched in December,especially when captured documents revealed that

some, at least, of/ the infantry divisions -were

better supplied with fuel-than they had been for

months.

The answer is threefold. In the first place the

enemy had conducted a vigorous and thorough

fuel saving campaign during the late summer andautumn, forcing down the use of motor transport

by 40-50 per cent., substituting rail transport,in its place even right into the forward areas,

and then using horse drawn vehicles to complete

supply. Not the least important factor aiding

these conditions was the static nature of

\operations during this period, and it is doubtful

whether, without this prime factor, even with the

drastic fuel economies he effected,. the enemywould have been able to reduce his fuel needs to

the low level of his "saving" allocations.

In the second place it should be rememberedthat oil installations are extremely difficult

targets to bomb, owing to the large number of

small units which comprise them, and the areaover which they are spread. Blechhammier southsynthetic refinery for example sprawls over an

area of 450 acres, and although during 1944 it

was attacked fifteen times and sustained theweight of 3,500 tons of bombs, mainly 500-lb.long-fused to allow penetration, it was-never put

out of action completely. In- fact it can bconfidently asserted that it is ao

-impossibility to bring all iv t

installation to a standstill for any appreciableperiod by bombing alone.

The third portion of the answer to the aboveproblem, which is really a corollary of the second,lies in the first class repair arrangements initiatedby the Germans, in which dumps of material wereplaced ready to hand, so that repair gangs wereat work almost before the last bomber haddeparted. The thoroughness of these counter-measures are typical of German ingenuity incounteracting our attacks, not only on sourcesof production, but also on lines of communication.

Progressive Attacks

In October, out of a total of 3,146 tons ofbombs dropped in six days operations on oilinstallations by the Fifteenth Air Force, thelargest weight (1,175 tons involving 480 heavybomber sorties) fell on the two synthetic oilplants at B!lechhacnmer in German Silesia. Thesouthern plant was attacked twice, chiefly bysynchronous Pathfinder technique, but badweather prevented results commensurate with theeffort. In the northern plant, however, most ofthe installations to the north and. west were hitand oil fires started.

Other main attacks included the Odertalpetroleum refinery (estimated original monthlyoutput of 7,Q00 tons refined products) where apower house, transformer station and controlhouse were damaged and a gas holder destroyed;Brux synthetic oil plant in Czechoslovakia, wheretwo attacks were hampered by cloud overcast;Lobau oil refinery in the Vienna area (estimatedmonthly output 17,000 tons of refined products);the Vienna/Winterhafen oil storage installationsand adjoining marshalling yards, where con-siderable devastation was caused by /245 U.S.Liberators dropping 558 tons of bombs. Othertargets included a few oil refineries in Austriaand South Germany, and the oil storage depotsat Regensburg in Germany proper.

The Eighth U.S. Air Force and BomberCommand, operating from Great Britain, attackedthe oil installations at Hamnburg, Wesseling,Bottrop, Buer, Sterkrade/Holten and Wanne/Eikel. Heaviest load in one raid was 1,656 tonsdropped on Hamburg by American heavies.

In spite. of these operations, however, theenemy's total output of all oil production forOctober was believed to show an increase of122,000 metric tons over the previous month,petroleum products in particular showing anincrease of eleven per cent.

This upward trend clearly called for a biggerAllied air effort to stop it, and in November,aided by improvement in the use of blind bombingtechnique, the Fifteenth Air Force was able to

step up its effort on oil installations by 1,690tons to a total of 4,836. The main weight (over3,000 tons) was sustained by six oil refineries and

- Boil depot in the general Vienna area, which,i g to the continued constriction of Greater

S any, were now of increased importance and

k ip lair s z : r

The road and railway bridge at Maribor under attack on 14th October, 1944.

had, consequently, undergone considerable repairs.Florisdorf refinery was bombed on four days, theattack on 5th November by 368 U.iS. Liberatorsand 132 U.S. Fortresses representing the largestM.A.S.A.F. force up to that time to bomb a singletarget. But at Florisdorf, as at Korneuburg,Schwechat, Vosendorf, Lobau, and Winterhafenin the. same area, and also at Regensburg, cloudcover generally prevented assessmen rultUncertain results were also e iealthough five attempts (inclu a j

were made by a total force of 268 aircraft. TheMoosebierbaum refinery, fifteen miles north-westof Vienna, was hit on three occasions (once witha 450 tons bomb load) and severe damage wasbelieved to have been inflicted.

Better luck was experienced at Blechhammersouth, the plant being rendered temporarilyinactive as h of three attacks involving

ad 548 tons.SGreat Britain werear ame targets as in October,

plus the oitjustallations at Gelsenkirchen,Merseburg, Hombdrg, Castrop-Rauxel, Dortmundand Misburg.

It was evident that the Germans placed greatervalue on the targets selected by Bomber Commandand the Eighth U.S. Air Force, for whereas theyoffered little opposition other than flak to theFifteenth Air Force, over the targets in Germanylarge formations of fighters attempted tointercept our aircraft. During three days ofintense activity (2nd, 26th and 27th November),however, the Eighth U.S. Air Force discouragedthis fighter activity by shooting down 386 enemyaircraft.

An assessment of the enemy's oil output forNovember put the figure at 34 per cent. of normalpre-attack production, an increase of two per cent.on October, indicating that although our attackswere keeping production down to approximatelyone-third of normal output, they were notsucceeding in forcing it lower.

By 5th December there were thirteen syntheticoil plants known to be in action in Axis-controlledterritory, but apart from several widely scattered'refineries and those in the Vienna area, theenemy's entire oil output now within the FifteenthAir Force sphere of operations was represented"by the, five synthetic oil installations atBlechhammer North and South and Odertal inGerman Silesia, Oswiecim in Polish Silesia, andBrux in Czechoslovakia.

In consequence these five targets received 61per cent. of M.A.S.A.F's total bomb load of 7,664tons dropped on oil installations during December.Individual bomb loads on plants were-2,112 tonson the Blechhammer plants, 1,158 tons on Brux,1,138 tons on Odertal, and 279 tons on Oswiecimi.The most intensive period of operations coveredthe five days, 16th to 20th December, over 1,300effective heavy sorties being flown on thesemissions, in addition to a strong effort against oiltargets other than those indicated above, 900tons being dropped during the month in theVienna area and 600 tons on Regensburg.

Most of the bombing was done by Pathfinder'technique through cloud and smoke overcast withsuch success that it was considered thatproduction in the areas subjected to attack wastemporarily reduced to only ten per cent. of theirpotential capacity, a result which earned thecommendation previously quoted.

In general during this month, as throughoutthe quarter, enemy air opposition over theFifteenth. Air Force's oil targets was slight, thestrongest interception encountered being that on17th December by 100 ME. 109s and FW. 190sbetween Brno and Odertal,-of which the strategicbombers- claimed 26 destroyed and two probables,and their fighter escort 22 destroyed and threeprobables. U.S. losses were fifteen Liberators,four Lightnings and two Mustangs , ..

The air offensive from the United Kingdomagainst oil did not reach the sce pf te e

November effort, the overriding commitmentsduring this period being the pounding of com-munications to dislocate the enemy's supply ofthe Western battle area and to impede VonRundstedt's attack.

It can be said with some truth, however, thatby the end of 1944 the cumulative effect ofrepeated air attacks on the German oil industrywas becoming more and more apparent and therising trend, especially in synthetic production,had been checked.

Attacks on Other Industrial Targets

The tonnage of bombs dropped by M.A.S.A.F.aircraft during the quarter on other industrialobjectives. was 2,183 during October, 346 inNovember, and 888 during December. Theoffensive on these targets would have beengreater and more effective but for therestriction by bad weather. As it was, the maineffort was directed against the most importantwar production centres within M.A.S.A.F'ssphere of responsibility-those in Austria. Theindustrial areas in Vienna generally, and inparticular ordnance depots, the Ostereichischemotor works and A.F.V. diesel engine worksreceived most attention. On many occasions cloudcover completely obscured the target, and,especially in October before the improvementin synchronous Pathfinder technique, resultswere disappointing. Post raid reconnaissancephotographs of the assembly plant and aeroengine works at Steyr, for example, revealed nodamage; results were also meagre on the aircraftfactory at Klagenfurt, on a large ordnance depotsouth of Vienna, in Germany proper at theMunich-Allach plant (engaged in the productionof B.M.W. 801 aero-engines) and on, a factory atAugsburg producing diesel engines for armouredvehicles. At the Skoda works at Pilsen inCzechoslovakia, likewise, at that time the largestundamaged enemy armament plant turning outheavy guns, tanks etc., results usually could notbe assessed after attacks. Considerable damagewas inflicted, however, on the Graz Neudorfaircraft factory, the tank works at St. Valentin,ordnance depots and the Herman Goering worksat Linz and, nearer at hand, the three works atMilan believed to be manufacturing road vehiclesand armaments and executing ordnance repairfor the German armies in Italy.

Attacks on Lines of Communication

The term "Lines of Communication" becomeselastic when applied to attacks by the 'StrategicAir Force, for targets under this nomenclatureranged from bombing the Brenner Pass route inNorthern Italy, to marshalling yards in Munich,from bombing marshalling yards in Hungary tomining the Danube. (A full account of the lastactivity is given on page 131). There is alsodifficulty in the separation and classification ofte e !ol some occasions marshalling

e .rii , i in conjunction with attacks

on oil depots and industrial targets, partly dueto spillage experienced in the Pathfinder methodof bombing.

In Southern Germany and Austria

As already indicated oil was target No. 1throughout the quarter, and in' general thereforethe bombing of railway centres in Austria andBavaria represented attacks on alternative oropportunist targets by parts of large bomberformations which were unable. to carry throughtheir briefed attacks owing to bad weather. InOctober such attacks occurred on an average ofone day in every three, Austrian targets includingthe marshalling yards at Graz, Innsbruck andSpittal, and Bavarian targets including Munichwest marshalling yards (a primary target on thenight 28/29th October and the following day),Rosenheim and Salzburg.

The west, and to a lesser degree the east,marshalling yards at Munich were also heavily-attacked in November, 1,471 tons of bombs beingdropped on this key communication centre duringfour days and two nights. Smaller scale attackswere also made on Augsburg, Regensburg andagain on Salzburg and Rosenheim. Attacks werereported on the Austrian railway targets alreadyenumerated, in addition to the marshalling yards,at Villach, Klagenfurt, Gussing and Linz, the.latter being a bottle-neck through which all east-west traffic in the Danube basin must pass.Industrial targets attacked at the same timesincluded an ordnance depot at Graz, a tankfactory at Kapfenburg, an aircraft factory atKlagenfurt and the Herman Goering works atLinz.

In December even greater emphasis was laidon the above railway targets in Austria andSouthern Germany, the lateral railway com-munications system being considerably dislocated,for example, by further attacks on Linz; onInnsbruck and Salzburg on the two main linesfrom Vienna to Western Germany and junctionpoints of secondary lines carrying east-westtraffic; on Rosenheim, the main marshalling yardon the electrified line between Salzburg andMunich, and a junction point with the electrifiedline to Innsbruck and the Brenner Pass line; onthe marshalling and goods yards in Vienna itself,and again on these at Villach, Graz, Regensburg,Klagenfurt and Wels, plus lesser attacks on twelvesimilar targets. In all, 5,000 tons of bombs wereunloaded on these targets during December.

Attacks on Italian Railways

Fifteenth Air Force aircraft by day, and No.205 Group aircraft by night, continued to playtheir part in the air interdiction of the enemy'scommunications system in northern Italy. Asdescribed elsewhere in this number of the w,bridges and viaducts on the o e esrunning into Italy from Austria'especially the Brenner line froVerona, were the principal targetof our policy, first implemented in October, was

add n o specific targets. nemy countermeasures for the quick repair of bridges andtrack diversions, etc., are considered on page 160.Bad weather during October, however, preventedthe regularity of attacks necessary to achieveappreciable interdiction, although during themonth some 650 U.S. heavy bombers by day,and some 340 No. 205 Group aircraft by night,dropped 1,620 and 860 tons of bombs respectivelyon communication targets, including some onroad traffic.

During November nearly 2,500 tons, and duringDecember 2,000 tons, were the bomb loads droppedto supplement the Tactical Air Force's effort toblock the entry of military supplies into Italy, or,as was reported from time to time, attempts tomove important machinery and plants from Italyto Germany. An account is given on page 123 ofthe operations in November which ,aimed, by thedestruction of power stations combined with cutsat numerous points, to force the Germans tosubstitute steam for electric traction on theBrenner route, thereby greatly reducing itscapacity. The small scale American attacks on6th November on the converter stations atSralorno, Ora and Bolzano were not, however,particularly successful when compared withM.A.T.A.F's attacks on transformer stationsfurther south. But amendment came the nextday, when 470 tons of bombs dropped by Strategicaircraft achieved the object of creating numerousblocks on the line, destroying rolling stock, andseverely damaging the bridges at Albes and Ora.

.Attacks on vulnerable points were repeated laterwith the consequence that, as a result of theTactical and Strategic Air Forces' attacks theBrenner railway supply route was reported tohave been out of action from the 4th almost tothe end of November. A spell of bad weatherin December permitted the enemy to re-open theBrenner Pass route but, operating on the fourdays, 26th to 29th December, M.A.S.A.F. aircraftdropped well over 1,000 tons of bombs on the route,in addition to the heavy attacks, alreadymentioned, on Innsbruck. Main targets were theBressanone bridge, the Avisio viaduct, marshallingyards at Verona, and vulnerable stretches of line.Less successful attacks were made on the bridgesat Ora, Mezzocorona and Vipiteno. By the end ofthe year the Brenner route was once againblocked, as were also the three alternative routesentering north-east Italy, following attacks amongothers in November and December, on the bridgesat Casarsa, Latisana, Pinzano, Piave/Susegana,the Venzone viaduct and the locomotive depots atUdine and Castelfranco Veneto. The satisfactoryconclusion to erady mentioned was theeo combined employment of

a trategic Air Forces, and.th f of the latter alone. Thedo e ied in one overall plan, andSto operations recounted, there

were attacks by M.A.S.A.F. aircraft cuttingcommunications across the Po such as, for

Attack on Banhida marshalling yards on 13th October, 1944.

example, a day attack on Ferrara railway bridge,and a night attack by No. 205 Group on thepontoon bridge at Ficarolo, the last being one ofthe enemy's answers to our interdiction efforts,a pontoon bridge furtively assembled at dusk anddismantled at dawn.

Communications In Hungary and Yugoslavia

Valuable assistance was rendered to the Russianforces driving forward into Hungary andYugoslavia, and to the Yugoslav National Army

48

nrI

of Liberation and Land Forces Adriatic, byM.A.S.A.F. aircraft in their attacks on rail androad communications in the zones connected withthe above forces. The main targets in Hungarywere the marshalling yards at Ersekdjvar,Banhhda, Komarom, Gyor, Szekesfehervar, andSzombathely. At the first four mentioned yards,which were chock-full of wagons in October inuse for the supply of the German forces, the Alliedbombers destroyed hundreds of units of rollingstock; widespread damage was inflicted at all

the marshalling yards attacked, and through linescut at Szombathely, Szekesfehervar andKomarom. 'Strategic fighters and fighter-bombers inflicted destruction on rail and roadroutes throughout the quarter; on the 12th and13th October for example their tally includedsome 80 locomotives and a " bag" of rollingstock, road vehicles and barges on the vitalBudapest-Gyor-Vienna routes, and on the20th the destruction of 22 locomotives and damageto over 400 units of rolling stock on the railwayline from Sajo Szentpeter to Ipolysz6g in northernHungary. Another outstanding day's work tookplace a month later, when on 19th November126 U.S. Thunderbolts attacked targets in theEsztergom-Veszporen-Vienna area, c 1 a i m sincluding the destruction of 65 locomotives. Atactical development of note in November wasthe high level bombing of pin-pointed targets byformations of fighter-bombers led by U.S.Lightning " droopsnoots " carrying bombardiersand precision bombsights in their modified nosesections.

The dominant features of the military situationof this period were the Soviet "forces' siege ofBudapest, and the withdrawal of German forcesin Yugoslavia northwards to Bosnia, enforced bythe loss of Greece and the generally deterioratingconditions in the Balkans.

During October and November the averagebomb tonnage dropped in Yugoslavia and Hungaryby M.A.S.A.F. aircraft lending weight to theBalkan and Tactical Air Forces assaults was inthe region of 3,500 tons, of which by far thelarger portion was delivered by aircraft of No. 205Group. This figure was, however, reduced to lessthan half in December due to bad weather and athinning out of targets caused by the enemy'scontinued withdrawal.

Hungarian targets definitely declined in valuein November, the main targets during thatmonth being two key marshalling yardswest ofBudapest, Gyor and Szombathely, and inDecember at Hegyeshalom on the main doubletrack south of the Danube leading to Budapest,and the east marshalling yards at Sopron on themain lateral communications line to theHungarian front and the supply route to. Zagreb,in north-west Yugoslavia.

Railway targets in Yugoslavia throughout thequarter were the marshalling yards and bridgeat Maribor, the marshalling yards at Zagreb andSarajevo, the bridge at Zenica and the bridges onthe German escape route-hit by No. 205 Group-at Bioce, Matesevo and Mojkovac.

Enemy concentrations, vehicles and withdrawingcolumns were constantly pounded~ inrtheeregonsof Podgorica, Novi Pazar, Vsegrod, ,S e. :;

Prijepolje, Rogitica, Metrovica, ;j W, :Matesevo. Considerable losse in ah dvehicles were inflicfed on hostile forces; theenemy's withdrawal programme was seriouslyupset and a number of his key communicationscentres were devastated. Many roads were

blocked by landslides caused by bombing the hillsabove. An idea of the destruction caused bybombing and straffing is given by the fact that inDecember the enemy lost no fewer than 1,000vehicles between Podgorica and Kolasin due toattacks by Balkan Air Force (whose operationsare considered-separately elsewhere) and No. 205Group:

Colonel Olberg, the German Military Comment-ator, naively described the enemy's harassedretreat as "advance from the Balkans in fullbattle strength to take part in the fighting in thearea south of Budapest."

Tactical Support

In addition to the attacks on enemy commun-ications and retreating forces in YugoslaviaM.A.S.A.F. -combined with M.A.T.A.F. on 12thOctober to produce the most concentrated assaultcarried out by the Mediterranean Allied AirForces up to that date, in an effort to help theFifth Army's approach to Bologna. The FifteenthAir Force's share in these operations numbered700 escorted U.S. Liberators and Fortresses whichdropped more than 1,200 tons of bombs onbivouacs, barracks, dumps and depots of variouskinds. A further hundred heavy bombers wereprevented from fulfilling their missions by thebad weather. The Strategic Air Force's losseswere four heavy bombers and one fighter; asmall price to pay for the. result achieved inassisting the Fifth Army's advance towardsBologna, which was, however, limited by otherfactors.

Counter Air

Counter air force operations during Octoberwere confined principally to the four days, 11thto 14th, and a fifth on the 21st, when theenemy airfields to the west of Budapest,particularly at Seregelyes, Tapolca, Szombathely,Szekesfehervar, Gyor and Esztergom wereattacked. Claims were 200 hostile aircraftdestroyed on the ground and approximately 20 incombat for the loss of ten Fifteenth Air Forcefighters. It should be recorded, that Mustangswere outstandingly successful in these operations,as they were also in an attack on the Prostejorairfield in Czechoslovakia, when ten aircraft weredestroyed on the ground. Attacks on Gyor weredesigned to disrupt the resumption of assemblingM.E. 109s there.

Also during October, in order to speed orperhaps to "God-speed" the parting Germanguest, Strategic fighters straffed transportaircraft landing grounds in the Athens andSal o a reas, dsroying 30 plus aircraft -on

S u i ith fighter attacks were alsou t ii d by small scale night attacks on thethie mai Athenian airfields.

Before passing to further consideration ofcounter air operations during the quarter, itshould be recorded that, owing to the paucity ofenemy fighter opposition encountered during

-a1 y 4

October, for the-first time in their thirteen monthsoperations, Strategic bombers scored no combatvictories.

Early in November, however, Allied aircraftoperating against the southern stretch of theBrenner line were interrupted on a few occasionsby small formations of enemy fighters,presumably flown by personnel of the ItalianFascist Air Force. Air reconnaissance ascertainedthe location of- the enemy's air bases, and theAllied air forces set to the task of reducing thehostile air forces in Italy to their formerimpotence. From 18th to 29th November Tacticalfighter-bombers kept up an offensive on theairfields at Bergamo, Ghedi and Villefranca; theStrategic Air Force ably supported these counterair activities in an. intensive 24-hour period ofoperations, dropping 952 tons of 'bombs by dayand 212 tons by night on the airfields at Udine,Vicenza, Villefranca and Aviano, renderingthe first three temporarily unserviceable anddestroying or damaging 50 to 60 aircraft. Asanticipated, these operations somewhat dampedthe ardour of the Fascist flyers.

On the whole the enemy's fighter oppositioncontinued to be slender during the whole ofNovember; American fighters shot down 32hostile aircraft and probably destroyed four;American heavy bombers claimed three destroyedand two probably so ; 205 Group destroyed oneand probably destroyed three. With referenceto the claims by the R.A.F. and Dominion aircraftof No. 205 Group, it is worthy of note that thevarious interceptions took place on the night of22/23rd November over Szombathely marshallingyards, our aircraft making 20 plus sightings andsustaining fourteen- encounters. G.A.F. tacticsincluded the employment of ground trackindicator lights, flares, searchlight indicatortracks, fighter co-operation, plus controlledfighters with a light in the nose. One report ofan engagement stated that the gunner was unableto bring his guns to bear in time, but when theaircraft broke away " below and behind" he fireda short burst over the tail turret to "scare thefighter." .But, to quote No. 205 Group'scomment, "he probably scared the Tail Gunner."

Victories over enemy aircraft in Decemberwere the highest for the quarter, 49 beingdestroyed and seventeen probably destroyed bythe American bombers and 34 destroyed plus fourprobably destroyed by U.S. fighters. Anotherseventeen hostile aircraft were destroyed on theground.

M.A.S.A.F. losses for the period are- detailedon page 42. Of those a very small percentagewere due to encounters with enemy aircraft, thehighest figure being seven per cent. in December.The greater portion of casualties was due to flak.

Supply Dropping

The dropping of supplies, now a regular andimportant commitment of No. 205 Group,gradually extended -in effort and scope

progressively through the quarter. In additionto supplying Marshal Tito's forces in Yugoslavia,henceforth to be known as the Yugoslav NationalArmy of Liberation, supplies were dropped toPartisan forces operating in Northern Italy behindthe German lines. In October 237 sorties wereflown on these missions dropping a total of 1,748.containers of an average weight of 240 lb. neteach, including six sorties with twelve containersfor Warsaw. In November sorties rose to 768,a record for the Group being established on thetwo days 4th and 5th November, when 358 sortieswere flown and 351 tons of supplies.were dropped.in all during the month 151 tons were dropped inNorthern Italy and 555 tons in Yugoslavia. Anappreciable amount of material enabling andencouraging -serious interference with the enemy.

The sphere of these operations was enlargedfurther in December to include Troop and SupplyTransport missions to reinforce our land forcesfighting against the insurgents in Athens. Inseven missions covering the 12th to 21st of themonth 277 sorties were made, conveying. 2,043troops with equipment and over 400 tons ofsupplies. In addition 494 sorties were flown toYugoslavia and 2,923 containers- (482 tons)successfully dropped. Not the least interestingfeature of these activities was the fact that manyof the sorties were made in daylight, a newdeparture for aircrews specifically trained to flyby night. On some days, in fact, supplies weredropped when 10/10ths cloud forced bomberaircraft to return to base with their missionsunfulfilled, a performance all the more creditablewhen the difficulties and hazards of flying insuch mountainous terrain-with its tricky andvariable wind currents-is remembered. Thefollowing signal was received by the Group fromMarshal Tito's forces-" Please thank pilots offour Liberators and six Wellingtons for fineperformance in coming down through 10/10thscloud over " X" today to drop in bad visibility.All stores will be recovered."

PART IV

CONCLUSION

The foregoing account provides sufficientevidence of the trends of activity and illustrates.the varied employment of the MediterraneanAllied Strategic Air Force in the concludingmonths of 1944. As the quarter progressed itbecame clear that bad weather alone could notscreen the enemy from effective aerial attack.Experience gained in blind bombing technique bythe valuable method of trial and error in operationsled to an improvement in results exceedinganticipations. In five days in November, 16th to20th, the average number of Strategic aircraftairborne each day for attacks in Austria, Bavariaand Polish Silesia was 400 fighters and 700bombers. On each of nine days in December also400 to 599 bomber aircraft were despatched andon another five days 600 to 799, No. 205 Group

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Bomibs exploding onr Pinzano road 'and, railay bridge on 4thz Octber.

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51.1

STRATEGIC BOMBI1NG EFFORTDECEMBER, 1944

FIGURES AFTER NAME OFPLACE INDICATE TONS OF

ARCS INDICATE DISTANCESIN MILES FROM FOGGIA

BOM BS PROPPED

NUMBRUCK- 20,r .* OECTAL - 2112

1iOLIN-ll0 " MO<M RAVSKA OSTRAVA- 120

PI SASTI-376

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LA~NDHUT-86 *AMSTETTEN-131 \ *:

AL7BU~:373.?. " *. " \

- **.~1AN MIFSC URGN TAR6T-230 MHEGY-HL341SOPRON- 293

""" ;.. "S77 *150 KAMAMERN-14 "CZELLDOMOLK- 167 BRENIBER PAS-'X16 .. .q GRAZ-487-----.-.4

VIITNO3 KLAGENFRT-? 5 : ., 5ZOMBATH-ELY-1713RESSANONE. 18T VEZN''e.~ * KORMEND-leORAI3-- -vp *42a0 XVILLACH ,MARBOR-36Ei.-tMEZZOCORONA 23" UD U~E-157 ,.344AVSiO - 6 --- " LATIANAROVERETO-I7 2 %

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flew 1,630 sorties in iovember, constituting itshighest monthly total for four years. In fact the1944 figures for the Group make interestingreading, especially in view of its conversion froma Medium to a Heavy Bomber Group whichcontinued in gradual transition from Marchonwards. The totals for the year are :

Number of sorties ...Bombs & Mines droppedLeaflets dropped ......Troops transported ...Supplies dropped ......

Aircraft Casualties.

Total Loss ...Damaged ...

Personnel Casualties.

Killed ... ...Injured ... ...Missing ...

14,27224,454 tons.184. million.2,0432,237 tons gross.

.. 332... 222

... 184

... 119

. 1,153

It is estimated that 33 per cent. of the missingpersonnel have subsequently been accounted for.

Another 205 Group record was established inNovember when bomb loads carried solely bybomber aircraft averaged 3.44 tons per aircraft,and by type of aircraft-Wellington 2.75 tons,Halifax 3.95, Liberator 4.38 tons.

The succcess of the Group's activities by dayhas already been mentioned, but the success insupport of the National Army Of Liberation byharassing the Hui in Yugoslavia deserves specialrecord, motor transport, enemy troops and bridgesbeing the general run of target rendered moredifficult, than usual by the continual change intarget altitude along the mountainous roads aridthe tricky nature of the local winds.

Pride of place, however, in an overall reviewof the quarter's work by M.A.S.A.F. must begiven to the Fifteenth Air Force's continualoffensive against the enemy's oil installations,which, .by the end of the year,- whittled downproduction to one tenth of its potential within thebombing range of Italian based aircraft.

So far as the attacks on ing yards andrailways were concerned, experience of theGermans' skill and ingenuity in repair work andrapid improvisation has proved the unwisdom ofexpecting startling break-downs for any lengthof time in their supply system as a result ofbombing. Attacks must be heavy, constant anddelivered simultaneously on alternative routes toachieve an appreciable interdiction. The effectof constant bombing is, however, ,accumulative;each successful attack inevitably places morehindrances in the path of efficient transportationwhile the communication goes through the stagesof being (a) inconvenienced (b) dislocated and (c)out of action. It is certain that the M.A.S.A.F.attacks on railways in Austria and SouthernGermany had caused the system to pass beyondthe stage of (a) by the end of 1944, and itseemed well over the threshold of the ominous" dislocation " stage.

Apart from the one large scale effort inOctober to help the Fifth Army and a limitedsupply dropping in Italy, the tactical missions inaid of the Allied ground forces were all associatedwith operations in the Balkans.

Counter air force operations-once themain preoccupation of our air forces in theMediterranean theatre-absorbed an extremelysmall effort owing to the Luftwaffe's continuedimpotence.

The Fifteenth Air Force fighters, in additionto meeting their main commitment of providingbomber escort, caused widespread havoc on theground by bombing and straffing, particularly inHungary and Austria. In this instance a fullerappreciation of the fighters' achievements can begained by extending the period under review toinclude September. During the last four monthsof 1944 the M.A.S.A.F. fighters destroyed 445grounded aircraft, 526 locomotives, 539 railwaycarriages and wagons, 537 military vehicles and28 stationary installations.

Although the M.A.S.A.F. operations reviewedconstituted little more than three-fifths of theeffort put out in the preceding quarter, they were,nevertheless, a powerful contribution towards theenemy's total discomfort.

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The Balkancll, iE

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Greece and Yugoslavia

IN A SUMMARY of Bal k an Air Forceoperations through. July-September, 1944, givenin the last issue of the R.A.F. MediterraneanReview, mention was made of British landingsin the Peloponnese-one by a seaborne Commandoforce put ashore on Kythera island on 16thSeptember, and another by a small party ofparatroops dropped over Araxos airfield on theafternoon of the 23rd. Some account was alsogiven of the reconnaissance activities of theseforces during September, and of their progressin clearing the greater part of the peninsula asa stage preparatory to a more ambitiousoperation.

This main operation, planned jointly by, MiddleEast and Balkan Air Force, had a triple objective-the occupation of Athens immediately followingGerman withdrawal; the establishment of theGreek Government in Athens; the introduction atthe earliest moment of measures for relief of thecivilian population.

Instructions for implementation of the planwere given on 10th October, 1944, Commanderin the Field Land Forces Adriatic having reportedMegara, an airfield 20 miles west of the capital,securely in British hands. The following dayconvoys mounted from Italy and Middle Eastput to sea, and on the 12th the first detachmentof 2nd Ind. Para. Brigade :with essential storesand equipment dropped on Megara airfield. Bythe afternoon of the 14th British troops of theoriginal Kythera force, crossing to Piraeus fromtheir advanced base at Poros, had moved intoAthens.

their house in order in circumstances morefavourable. That this ambition, pursued notwithout cost, is at long-last in sight of fulfilmentmay be perhaps a sufficient answer to thosecritics who sought to expose an honourableendeavour as a mischievous political move insupport of reactionary policy.

Airborne Descent on Megara

The rapid progress made by the forwardparties in the Peloponnese, and the desirabilityof capitalising this and exploiting straight on toAthens with a minimum of delay, decidedA.F.H.Q. to amend the original idea for anen masse paratroop drop and launch at once asmaller mission allowing the balance of airborneforces to be brought up on subsequent days.

Following this plan, fourteen C.47s withparatroops and nine Halifaxes loaded withsupply containers flew to Megara under heavyfighter escort on the 12th. Although spasmodicshelling of the airfield did not interfere withoperations, a strong ground-wind caused casualtiesto personnel on landing and resulted in seriousloss of valuable stores.

This ground-wind persisted and forced theabandonment of paratroop missions planned forthe 13th. Nine gliders, however, landed airfieldconstruction equipment-the runway having beenblown by the enemy before evacuation-andfurther stores were successfully dropped byHalifaxes. On the morning of the 14th conditionshad improved and although 20 aircraft towing

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le cVmIJledU LU LUrn UbA, 0O .smade the journey and drnopped over 1,000

adverse comments have been heard concerning made the journey and dropped over 1,000

British " intervention " in Greece subsequent to personnel and 130 containers-the policy being to

the expulsion of the Germans, it may not be out complete the mission on the following day,

of place to mention, as preface to an account of subject to weather.

these operations, that an E.L.A.S plot to seize This proviso was wise, for the night of thepower in Athens by armed force was already in 14th brought torrential rain which causedmotion before the British landings beg t suhsidence f thelrepaired runway craters andthis plan would have succeeded but foof plans for theand decided -British action is unquei e An on that day beingFortunately, details of E.L.A.S intent rb r-uppl. Fortunately thewithin the knowledge of the Cabinet I do -. delay, ep iing th 'importance of theIt is sufficient to say here-some notes on the weather-factor in combined operations, was notpolitical and internal situation are given later- critical. As mentioned earlier, the Kythera forcethat the sole aim of H.M. Government, as the had entered Athens on the afternoon of the 14th,Prime Minister told the House of Commons on and later in that day sections of the 2nd Para.8th December, was to avoid a coup d'etat, Brigade, boarding caiques at Pavko andpreserve peace in the City of the Violet Crown disembarking at S'karamanga, had also reached

and allow the Greek people a fair chance to set the city.

55

I -

n t 'f, ntered three days later they found little damagemissions er 6 et part from the dock area and power station.conveying par r s e Marathon Dam on which the capital's water20 gliders landing equipment-the o rbsupply depends remained intact, and while a foodtroops released over this airfield for the period shortage was evident, provisions for housing and12th-16th October being approximately 126. clothing appeared adequate. After the wildofficers and 1,820 other ranks. By the morning enthusiasm of the people had spent its first wind,of the 17th; KaJamaki, five miles south of Athens, the city was reported quiet and the populationhad been made serviceable, and from that day orderly and in control. On 18th October, M.onwards this base was used for re-supply and for Papandreou and his Government made athe landing; of follow-up personnel. ceremonial entry, their arrival being greeted in

In addition to the hold-up of air operations byadverse weather, delay was caused and casualtiessuffered by the sea convoy through minesencountered off the island of Aiyina, east of theGulf of Saronikos. Althpugh this convoy did notcommence , disembarkation at Piraeus until lateon the 16th-24 hours after the planned arrivaltime-efforts of the shore party brought unloadingup to schedule by mid-day on 18th October.

A Thousand Sorties by B.A.F.

Over the period 23rd September-21st October,1944, aircraft of Balkan Air Force and squadronsattached flew approximately 1,000 sorties indirect and" indirect support .of the landings inGreece. Of these about one third were in thepreliminary stage covering Araxos, and thebalance during the main operations at Megaraand Kalamaki. Approximately 400 of the sortieswere by gliders and transport aircraft conveyingparatroops and supplies,

Venturas from Brindisi made One nickellingraid, two attacks on Volos harbour (sinking fourships, one of 4,300 tons, and damaging fifteen)and one on road-transport concentrations atPhlorina. Spitfires, Beaufighters and Hurricanesbased on Araxos carried out over 150 sorties onescort duty and reconnaissance, and on straffingmissions mostly in the Gulf .of Corinth, whileother fighters from Italy made repeated attackson road and rail communications around Lamina,Larissa, Volos and Salonika. Intruder operationsin the Aegean undertaken on fifteen nights,resulted in the destruction of one JU.88 and oneH.E.111.

The Liberation of Athens

The welcome which greeted the arrival ofBritish forces left no doubt as to the feelings ofthe majority of the Greeks in Athens. At Megarawhere some hours before the landings a growingthrong had assembled around the airfield, troopsdazed on the ground and enveloped in theirparachutes found themselves surrounded bywomen pressing bunches of herbs in their faces,overcqme .by emotion and delirious with joy.Accounts brought back by crews who flew overthe capital at the time of the march in, describea scene, of the wildest enthusiasm, with crowdscheering and processions of citizens paradingalong streets decked in flowers and bunting.

On 11th October the Germans had 'declaredAthens an open city, and when British forces

generous mood oy a large aemonstration imcluingsome 15,000 members of E.A.M.-this party atthat tie showing itself in open support of theGovernment and the Allies.

A Country in Turmoil

To trace the course of events which led to therecent disturbances in Greece, it is necessary togo back to October, 1943, when after two yearsof luke-warm militant resistance to Germanoccupation,-Greek guerrillas (E.L.A.S.) suspendedactivity against the enemy and transferredattention to disarming their more conservativerivals, the members of the Democratic NationalLeague. (E.D.E.S.).

Excuses offered in justification of this changeof front were various. It may be that dissatis-faction over Allied policy in Italy coupled withour reverses in the Aegean played a minor part,although it appears more likely-perhapsunquestionable in the light of subsequenthappenings-that these factors provided merelya. convenient opportunity for E.L.A.S. to 'desertthe cause of national liberation and resolve theissue into one of vicious and premeditated politicalwar.

Whatever the seed of its origin, this deep enmitybetween the rival bands of Left and Right-bothbearing arms provided by the Allies-soondeveloped into a barbaric conflict which,varying in intensity and punctuated by occasionalinconsequential clashes with the forces ofoccupation, saw culmination a year later in pitchedbattle for Athens. From time to time exhaustionand enemy reprisals-for the Germans were notslow .to capitalise the situation-tempered theinternecine quarrels of the guerrillas and offeredhope that some measure of unity might bereached. Many conferences took place-and arestill taking place-between the parties and theemigre-, Government, and on more than oneoccasion terms for a truce survived all but thelast and vital round. Although outside theperiod of this review, it is satisfactory to notethat up to the time of writing the latestagreement for a "cease fire " at midnight on14th January, 1945, .has been observed.

While history has shown the Balkans as soilfertile for the fostering of secret societies, thesemovements have been less popular in Greece thanin countries further north-partly because Greecewas freed earlier than others from the Ottomanyoke, but largely because the people are possessedof a more innate individualism. Unfortunately,

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this indivridualism has proved a two-edge sword, mountains. E.L.A.S. comprises abut two-thirds

infusing the various factions with a wholel-hearted of the effective guerilla population, and during

enthusiasm but denying them the co-operation the period of occupation controlled most of Freeessential to the achievemfent of their ideals. Greece. It would be unfair to say that this party

did not on occasion join battle with the Getmans;The Rival Political aPaties. but equally unwise not to discern the deeper

Politically, the country has two main parties, political significence of many of its operations.'E.A.M. and E.D.E.S., and many ot e t' K.K.A.' (National andimportance"-each with a welter of ti h the same alms aspolicy as ineffective as its title is a through a personal

E.A.M. (the National Liberty P to , Commander of theE.L.A.S. is the military instrument )', ccnto j le late party P. an all-Greek Resistanceby the Communist element, is the most powerful Organisation, is a Right Wing republican grouporganisation in Greece and has to date exercised in Salonika, conspicuous in the past for its activea dictatorship not only in the main towns iit in preference of German to E.L.A.S. rule, whilethe countless villages and settlements in- the E the only other party of an importance

Supplies being dropped by aircraft to Partisans in Yugoslavia.

worthy of notice, comprises a Greek Officers'Organisation founded in the Peloponnese duringthe summer of 1943 and since subjected toperiodical attack by E.L.A.S. with varying degreesof success.

The career of the emigre Government in a'has been barely less settled than thme tvarious parties within the cou

beginning of April, 1&ULI

'failure to co-ordinate the policies of the fighting

forces and guerrillas, M. Tsouderos tendered his

resignation to King George of the Hellenes, and

a-f later M. Venizelos, son of the former

ster, attempted to form a newlasted only until the 23rd, when

o leader of the Socialist Democratic

took over and founded the government

'wfmh up to the end of the year, although

i

I

Rockets from a S.A.A.F. Beaufighter of the Balkan Air Force streakingtowards a German barracks at Tirana, capital of Albania, a few days before

the town was liberated.

it suffered many changes, represented theconstitutional Government of Greece.

M. Papandreou's Programme

On 27th April, 1944, under the watchwords" One Fatherland, One Government, One Army,'M. Papandreou declared his programme :-

(1) The reformation and good discipline ofthe Greek Armed Forces in the MiddleEast under the banner of our HellenicFatherland.

(2) The unification under the orders of theUnited Government of all the guerrillabodies of Free Greece, and, themobilisation, when the hour comes, of

This merchant vessel, attacked with cannon by Beaufighters as it approachedAlexandrovo Harbour (Krk Island), on 20th October, 1944, was left circling

helplessly and on fire.

all the fighting forces of the nationagainst the invader.

(3) The cessation of the reign of terror inthe rural districts of Greece, and theassurance of personal security andpolitical freedom for the people when andwherever the invader withdraws.

(4) Continuous endeavours for the sufficientdespatch of food and medical suppliesto enslaved Greece.

(5) The securing at the time of theforthcoming liberation of our country, ofOrder and the Freedom of the Greek

lult uch a manner that, freed from

physical and moral compulsion, theymay decide with full sovereignty theConstitution, the Social Order and theGovernment of their choice.

(6) The imposition of severe sanctions bothagainst the betrayers of their" countryand those who have exploited the miseryof our people.

(7) Forethought for the immediatesatisfaction, after liberation, of thematerial needs of the Greek people.

(8) The full satisfaction of our nationalrights. Our complete national restorationand the securing of our new frontiers arethe demand of the whole nation.

No Agreement Reached

Events over the period from the issue of tuisprogramme to the time of the British occupationof Athens again emphasise the determination ofE.A M./E.L.A.S. to pursue their extremist policy.At Koutsaina on 6th May, 1944, E.L.A.S. .andE.D.E.S. held a conference, the subject of whichwas the adjustment of the spheres of influenceof the two guerrilla groups. As with all earlierdiscussions it broke down on the usual issue-the inability of the parties to sink their politicalaspirations. In the Lebanon' on 10th May, ameeting to.ok place between the PapandreouCabinet and the leaders of all parties in Greece,including E.A.M., at which provisional agreementwas reached to establish a joint government totake over power in Athens when, with or withoutAllied aid, the city was freed from the Germans.

The effect of this agreement was negligible..Fighting continued between E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S.,and between E.L.A.S. and the Rallis SecurityBattalions-these Greek guerrillas, armed by theGermans and declaring their policy as thesuppression of Communism, being at that timemore than twice as strong as the forces 'ofE.D.E.S.

On 27th July, 1944, E.A.M. placed new termsbefore the Greek Government in exile. They wererejected as unacceptable by M. Papandreou--amove which E.A.M. countered with an offer tojoin the government if the Prime Ministerresigned: This pr.oviso was later withdrawn, andat the end of August five members of P.E.E.A.(Political Committee of National Liberation)arrived in Cairo for discussions. On 7th September,with British plans formulated for a landing inthe Peloponnese, the emigre Government wastransferred from Cairo to Caserta. As statedearlier, it made a formal entry into Athens on18th October.

The Russian Advance into South-East Europe

While the surge forward of the Soviet Armiesin South-East Europe, recognised both in its localimportance and in the significance of itspossibilities, has received note in earlier accountsof the war in the Balkans, it has beenimpracticable to include details of the offensivein a survey limited to operations in Yugoslaviaand the Aegean. -

Happily the march of eveatenlargement of the canvas. On 28th Septembe1944, Moscow Radio announced an agreementwith the Partisan National Committee wherebyRussian troops were to be allowed occupation ofterritory in Yugoslavia, conditional only upon itsvacation on completion of operations and on thecivilian administration remaining in Partisanhands. A few days later, Soviet forces joinedwith those of Marshal Tito, and by- the middleof October Belgrade was free of German rule.Without diminishing the importance of thisprogress, it was now plain that a situation hadbeen reached of the highest strategic potentialityto both ourselves and the enemy-the Russianoffensive, begun on 19th August, 1944, with thebreak through at Galatz, was within an ace ofachieving its main objective, the establishmentof a joint and continuous front from southernHungary to the Adriatic Sea.

The effect of this drive into Yugoslavia fromthe east, coupled with the Partisan backing in thewest and the movement northward of strongBritish forces from the Athens area, created aposition of increasing danger for the sevenremaining divisions of German Army Group E.then in process of extricating themselves fromCorfu, north-west Greece and the Aegean.

By the week ending 15th October, all railcommunications were severed south of Belgrade,leaving the enemy only the Partisan-infestedmountain roads across Bosnia or the limitedalternative of air transport as means of escape.On the-Adriatic coast the tightening of the pincerssaw the transfer of two German divisions, 118Jaeger and 264 Infantry, from Dalmatia to theZagreb-Brod railway area and a step-up in theshuttle-service of small craft from Dalmatianports to the main reception centre at Fiume.Although Corfu surrendered on 8th October andthe evacuation of the coastline from Peljesac. toGruda was finally completed around the sametime, further south both Kotor and theMontenegrin coast were still firmly held-thesedistricts being vital to preservation of the onlyescape routes.

In Hungary, the prospect of the arrival ofthe Russians at Budapest brought a radioproclamation from the Regent, Admiral Horthy,on 15th October, to the effect that he wasopening negotiations for an armistice. To thisthe Germans reacted swiftly. Arrow Cross troopscarried out a successful coup d'etat in theafternoon, seized the radio station-and establishedSzalaski as master of the city. On the eveningof the 16th, Radio Budapest declared that Horthyhad retracted his order, and an hour laterannounced his alleged abdication.

Operations in Yugoslavia and Albania

The last instalmert of the narrative ofoperations in Yugoslavia and Albania (R.A.F.Mediterranean Review No. 8) closed at the BritishCommando assault north of .arande. The presentchapter opens with the capture of this town and

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hills beyond, and the hoisting of the white flagby the German garrison on Corfu.

With two firm Allied salients established southof Belgrade, one Ripanj-Topolo-Lapovo-Petrovac-Zagubica and the other Leskovac-Nis-Pirot,controlling the main communications Belgrade-Sofia on the east side, the enemy pulled back inAlbania to Durazzo-Elbasan-Podradec-Kastoria,and Valona and the Berat oilfields returned toPartisan hands.

Further north in withdrawal from theDalmatian coast, Split and certain small portsincluding Trogir were evacuated by the thirdweek of October, and before the month closedPartisans supported by Russian artillery, hadmade slight advances east of the line Novi Sad-Mitrovica and were moving on to the mainGerman defences through Sid to the Bosut andDrina junctions with the Sava.

At the end of this month troop movements inMontenegro gave indication of the enemy'sintention to attempt at all cost the reopening ofthe five withdrawal routes through the mountainsof Zetska. These routes were (i) Kraljevo-Sarajevo, (ii) Mitrovica-Sarajevo and (iii)Prizren-Sarajevo in the centre area, and (iv)Scutari-Niksic-Trebinje-Mostar and (v) Scutari-Bar-Kotor-Cavtat-Dubrovnic-Mostar in the westcoastal zone. Apart from passes and othersections of the roads then under Partisansurveillance, the following towns were inYugoslav hands-Prijepolje .and Priboj on route(ii), Berane and Pljevlja on route (iii), Niksicand Trebine on route (iv), and Cavtat andTDubrovnic on route (v).

Successes by Naval Forces

Naval forces in the month of October sank aschooner and damaged two others in convoy onthe 8/9th, destroyed four E-boats, four F-boatsand three L-boats in another convoy off Zaraon the 11/12th, and sank two I-boats and capturedtwo others off Dugi on the 21st. Inconclusiveactions were fought between Partisan patrol boatsand enemy M.T.Bs off Viron the 22nd/23rd, andbetween British naval units and a Germandestroyer on the-23rd/24th and similar forcesand an escorted merchantman on the 28/29th.On the night of 1st November, H.M.S. "AvonVale" and H.M.S. "Wheatland" intercepted andsank west of Pag Island the torpedo-boat"Audace " and its two escort vessels screeningthe enemy's- evacuation of Zara-Sibenik.

Although weather interfered with air operationsin the first and third weeks, Balkan Air Forceflew over 3,000 sorties during October. Principaltargets for the first seven days were German gunpositions harassing our ground forces in southernAabania, the Mostar marshalling yards and, insupport of Partisan operations, the enemy centreof Benkovac, east of Zara. In the second week,effort was focussed on the German withdrawalfrom Greece with strikes against communications,shipping, motor transport and rolling stock.

Attention was also given to Ston .7 eacpeninsula) and Kriz (near Zagreb), and to enemytroop concentrations at Derska (north ofSibenik).

Attacks against communications continuedduring the second half of the period, and by theend of the month the sum total of transportclaims amounted to 39 locomotives, 20 wagons,129 M/T vehicles,. 36 ships and twelve aircraftdestroyed, with 43 locomotives, 113 wagons, 226M/T vehicles and 22 ships damaged. B.A.F. lost44 aircraft with a further 46 damaged.

The Value of Greece to Germany

With the final withdrawal of German forcesfrom the soil of Greece on 3rd November, 1944,it is interesting to pause a moment first on theeffect of this loss to the enemy, and then on theproblems facing the Government of the country.

Although in so far as her economic contributionis concerned, Greece may be considered as havingbeen denied to Germany since Allied bombing andPartisan activities completed dislocation of thenorthern railway routes through Yugoslavia andBulgaria in early September, her value hitherto,particularly in chrome after the cessation ofTurkish deliveries in April, 1944, had beenconsiderable.

In the short period April-September, 1944,Greece provided approximately 4,000 tons amonth, or 25-30 per cent of Germany's totalchrome supplies. This was her only substantialcontribution. The production of pyrites, 250,000tons per annum before the occupation, was downto 25,000 tons; her bauxite mines, delivering 4,000tons a month in 1942, gave only 200 tons a monthin 1944; and her output of metal ore, whichpreviouisly had been in the neighbourhood of 1,000tons per annum, was at a standstill. Of theremaining industries, those of cotton, wool andtextiles offered a restricted stock of clothingmaterial, while the small shipbuilding yards gavelimited facilities for the construction of cementbarges and the upkeep of caiques and coastalvessels.

So much for the position of Greece' vis-a-visGermany: if the loss of certain commodities wasserious to the enemy, the economic resultant ofthe occupation was no whit less critical for theGreek population.

Problems Facing the Government

Three main problems faced the Government-the stabilisation of currency, which throughmalicious German planning was in a state ofhopeless inflation; the disarmament of E.L.A.S.and the reformation of the Regular Army; thereconciliation of central political control with the-de facto administration of E.A.M.

On 24th October, M. Papandreou made a startwith a Government re-shuffle in favour ofVenizelists (Liberal element), followed by theannulment of laws and decrees promulgated byP.E.E.A. and by measures for the restoration ofproperty sold during the occupation ;Two

63 , /

1 % :1 " i :] ) ::'i.) -=-....

days later came a decree calling up the 1936-39 7th November was (a) the considerable Russianclasses for military service and a statement to progress to the south-west along the Carpathianeffect that the army of the Middle East and the passes into Slovakia-enabling troops in southernguerrilla forces including E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. Poland to join with those in Transylvania,were to be disbanded and reconstructed into permitting forces in Hungary to be supplied byRegular Army units. A subsequent announcement, railways of the main Polish network and releasingarising from the arrests made by unauthorised thereby the roundabout route through Rumaniapersons during the Anniversary Celebrations for use of the Southern Armies, and (b) the(Italian attack on Greece in 1940), ordered the significent advance northward of Marshaldissolution of the National Civil Guard-an Tolbukhin's Army from the Szeged area betweenorganisation founded by E.L.A.S. for the the Danube and the Tisa to the suburbs ofmaintenance of order in territory controlled by Budapest.E.A.M. .These movements were so important that at

Early in November, policy having been declared one moment the fall of the Hungarian capitalfor the stabilisation of the drachma at 600 to the appeared imminent. A combination of wet£1, the Government began to tackle the question weather, stubborn defence and sharp cdunter-of disarming the irregulars-fixing the date for attacks, however, brought the Russians to adissolution of E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. at 10th standstill on the flanks and caused them to fallDecember. On 11th November, the new drachma back slightly from the immediate approaches.(referred to as the English drachma) came into The setback was temporary, but it held thecirculation and was well received. Prices stabilised assault in check until the middle of December.quickly at a lower level, and with imports of Then, with a wedge driven first north-westAllied. supplies and stocks from the Peloponnese beyond Eszhergom and finally west and down tothe food situation became easier. Unemployment, the south-east, Soviet forces surged forward tohowever, remained serious, the chief difficulty surround the city.being in the re-organisation of industry and theshortage of raw materials.

The Government had now to implement itsdeclared programme for disarming the guerrillas.On 8th November, the E.A.M. press urged thedissolution of 3 Mountain Brigade and the GreekSacred Regiment (both formed in Egypt in April,1943, following the mutinies when the majority.of the Greek Army and Navy, calling for aRepublic, were interned by the Allies) as acondition precedent, and on 9th November,3 Mountain Brigade marched ceremonially throughAthens to a welcome greater if anything thanthat which had been accorded M. Papandreouon 18th October.

That the proposition put forward by E.A.M.was likely to cause' a crisis became evident inthe last week of November. Meetings betweenthe Prime Minister and- members of theCommunist Party, at which the latter called notonly for the dissolution of the forces mentionedabove but for an immediate plebiscite on theconstitutional issue, were freely reported asmaking no headway, and while all remainedoutwardly calm in Athens,"in areas beyond thecapital the Government retained little more thannominal control. On 19th November, withpermission of the Cabinet, a demonstration of20,000 people took place in Constitution Square.Arms were not carried and there were noincidents. It was but the lull before the storm.

The Gates of Budapest

Before recounting the next chapter in the Greekpolitical crisis, it is expedient to turn to theencouraging progress of events on the Sovietsouthern front and in Yugoslavia.

Most outstanding development in the Hungariansector through the fortnight 21st October-

_ ..

The German Withdrawal Plan

The encirclement and siege of Budapest isreferred to later. Before it developed the Germansretreating through Macedonia had reachedSkoplje, and further north in the Sandjak, wherethe Sjenica road was described as black withtraffic, troops were reported at Plevlja. Followingthese withdrawals, the Partisans re-occupiedKumanovo, Stip, Veles, Bitolj, Prilep and Negotin,all in the Iber Valley, while other forces inDalmatia took Drnis and invested Knin, cuttingthe town off from its lines of communicationwith the enemy centre at Bihac.

Movements in Yugoslavia now showed clearlythe pattern of the withdrawal plan of GermanArmy Group E. The evacuation of Pec andPrizren had effectively severed the last remainingland-link between 21 Mountain Corps and thebulk of its parent formation, leaving the greaterpart still in the Iber Valley, with its mostnortherly elements at Kraljevo and its rearguardsjust clear of Pristina. This force, committedirretrievably to the two routes Sjenica-Visegradand Kraljevo-Uzice, had to meet Partisanambushes and Allied air attacks along the roadsand Bulgarian pressure in its rear, while thesmaller force to the south-west, concentratedaround Scutari-Podgorica-Kotor, could call on noreinforcements 'and was handicapped further bythe recent Partisan occupation of Cetinje on thePodgorica-Kotor road. With weather conditionsin Montenegro worsening' every day, it nowseemed highly probable that considerableequipment would have to be abandoned and thatwhen Army Group E. eventually reached Bosnia,it would arrive as a much weakened formation-an unfortunate predicament for an enemy relyingon these six divisions and assorted supportingtroops as his main strategic.jrserve in the south.

A bridge near Gorica under attack by S.A.A.F. Beaufighters. Note damage

from preceding aircraft.

Much that was anticipated came to pass. By

the end of November, although the last phase

of the withdrawal into Bosnia had been completed

with comparative success, many of the enemy's

troops were unable to fight their way out, and

even those who succeeded paid dearly in the

process.In the most northerly sector, 7 SS. and 104 '

Jaeger were blocked in the area of Zvorni1c.

Twenty miles to the south, forces in Vlaseniica

were equally tied down,, while those in Sarajevo

could only filter through on the Zenica road with

great difficulty. North-west of Sjenica the

position showed no improvement to the enemy,

further withdrawal having been halted by the

ece~sity of det ching uits for proteion of a

oft nv'T for the

tigto

Rolling stock being attacked with rockets at Novska by Beaufighterson 20th November, 1944.

extricate itself from the Danitovgrad-Podgoricapocket. It was now clear that all efforts to openthe Niksic route weFe to be abandoned; it hadbeen an abortive operation, especially to 181Division, which suffered considerable casualties.

Perhaps the most important strategicalcontribution made by the Partisans at this timewas the final capture of Knin-a key town which.

'"- *

with Mostar 100 miles to the south-east, blockedthe two main entrances from the Dalmatiancoast to central Yugoslavia. Knin was heavilygarrisoned, and in its loss the Germans took ahard knock. They also provided themselveswith an uncomfortable problem-for to counter-attack would mean the denuding of other areasfor reinforcements,

Rolling stock under attack by S.A.A.F. Beaufighters at Katina on22nd November, 1944.

November Air Operations

Operations by Balkan Air Force duringNovember showed a marked increase on thoseof the preceding month, over 4,600 sorties beingflown at cost of only 38 aircraft lost and 57damaged-a casualty rate of less than six per centabove the October losses, in spite of an increaseof fifty per cent. in sorties; 4,096 of the sortieswere by aircraft based in Italy and the balanceby A.H.Q. Greece.

This total was the highest attained by B.A.F.since it began operations in July, 1944. Fightersand fighter-bombers (including Italianf Air Force)flew .approximately 2,650 sorties; bombers andG.R. aircraft 206 sorties; and aircraft (includingNo. 205 Group, U.S.A.A.F. and Russian AirGroup) on supply-dropping and special duties,1,662 sorties. In addition to the above T.A.F.,D.A.F. and S A.F. carried out considerable Balkanoperations during the month; the former twoattacking communications targets in northernYugoslavia and shipping in the Gulf of Fiume,and the latter marshalling yards and troopconcentrations mostly in the Sarajevo-Mariborareas.

B.A.F. fighters and fighter-bombers, con-centrating against transport and rolling stockmoving eastwards, destroyed in November 283M/T vehicles, 21 locomotives and fourteen wagons,and damaged 312 M/T chices, twelve locomotivesand seven wagons. They also attacked withsuccess two railway station" and, sundryammunition dumps. ' .

D.A.F. on four days of the first week, shotup over 100 locomotives on the Sarajevo-Brod andZagreb-Maribor lines, destroyed three JU.52s onthe ground at Brezice, and sank a Siebel ferry,a corvette and a merchant vessel outside Fiume;following this with 64 locomotives and 55 trucksattacked in the second week. T.A.F. claimeda 200-ton merchantman in flames, damage tobridges and rolling stock on the Sarajevo-Brod,Brod-Zagreb and Zagreb-Maribor railways, andapproximately 50 locomotives destroyed.

M.A.S.A.F. bombed troop concentrations atPodgorica, Mitrovica, Sjenica, Prijepolje, NoviPazar anid Visegrad, and the marshalling yardsat Sarajevo, Brod, Maribor and Sarajevo West-some targets on more than one occasion. Theyalso straffed roads between Sarajevo and NoviPazar, railway bridges at Doboj, Vrbastica andKukavica, and numerous lengths of track.Aircraft of No 205 Group attacked many of thesame targets as the Fifteenth Air Force (especiallyVisegrad) and in addition, with No. 334 Wing,dropped supplies in Yugoslavia.

Although in the first week of the month 20-30FW: 190s were reported in the Skoplje area,enemy activity was confined to limited recon-naissance by ME.109s, probably based onSarajevo, and air transport (JU.52s.and HE.llls)operating over the country Vienna-Sarajevo-

: CJ_

Attack on Fiume by Baltimores in progress in November, 1944.

Showing commendable moderation towards theSerbs, * especially on the question of theMonarchy, the Partisans greatly reduced thedanger of civil disturbances, consolidated theirposition and laid down the essential foundationsfor the restoration of administrative control. Bythis foresight, they-also won over to their causea number of prominent Serbs including two

* Although ft was the Serbs of the Sumadijewho undoubtedly gave the initial impetus to thePartisan Movement, the Mihajiovic (reactioniary)influence in Serbia has always provided aserious barrier between the Serbs and thePartisans of Marshal Tito. - Ia

generals, the son and daughter of GeneralMihajiovic,' and the Chief of Police andGendarmerie of Nis.

On 21st October, the B.B.C. broadcast astatement that Great Britain and the SovietUUnion had agreed to pursue a joint policytowards Yugoslavia and had recognised theunalienable right of the Yugoslavs to settle theirown constitutional questions after the war. Onthe 23rd, the Free Yugoslav News Agencyannounced that Dr. , Premier of the RoyalYugosl v U~4 pe last issue of the

w ), and Marshal Titoberted territory, and

on 2nd November the Free Yugoslav Radio statedthat these discussions had resulted in anagreement between the Yugoslav Premier andMarshal Tito for the formation as soon as possibleof a United Yugoslav Government.

Evidence of the determination of the Partisansto get their country back on a level keel camefrom all sides. In Belgrade, the functions of theformer Municipality were taken over by aNational Liberation Committee, with sub-committees for food and the reorganisation ofrailways and other communications in liberatedSerbia. There was also indication of modificationin the recent somewhat uncompromising attitudeshown towards the Western Allies-this possiblya result of over-vigorous pro-Russian propaganda,realisation of the need for further supplies, andappreciation of the part played by the Allies inthe liberation-of France and in aid to Greece.

On 7th November, at a celebration in Belgradeof the Soviet October Revolution, the principalspeaker, General Dzilas of the Communist Party,claimed that the Yugoslav people had earned theright to decide their own internal organisationin harmony with the Moscow and TeheranConferences; that the defeat of Mihajlovic was aserious blow to reactionary circles abroad; andthat the Partisans' object in making the Tito-Subasic agreement was to demonstrate theirdesire to collaborate with all those wishing forthe liberation of Yugoslavia.

Following this meeting Dr. Subasic, - withPartisan representatives, left for Moscow fordiscussions with M. Molotov. A report issuedshortly after their arrival announced that thePremier had expressed his satisfaction at findingthere the same understanding of Yugoslavia'sproblems as existed in Great Britain and theUnited States: another report by the MoscowRadio stated that the Soviet Governmentwelcomed the efforts of Marshal Tito and Dr.Subasic to unite all national forces in thecreation of a democratic and federativeYugoslavia.

Open Warfare in Greece

The December diary of events in Greece makessorry reading: With the internal positiondeteriorating and. the atmosphere tense on theissue of disarmament of the guerrillas, GeneralScobie, British Military Commander, on 1stDecember, broadcast over the Athens Radio adeclaration promising protection for the GreekGovernment and people against acts of unjustifiedviolence or attemped coup d'etat. On the sameday, leaflets were dropped by British aircraftreiterating that by a decree of the GreekGovernment the guerrillas would be disbandedduring the period 10-20th December, and that theforces of the E.A.M. Civil Guard would be takenover forthwith by the National Militia. In spiteof appeals by M. Papandreou, however, Left-Wing, members refused to endorse this decreeand on the same day as General Scobie made his

announcement the six ministers of E.A.M./KK.E.withdrew from the Government.

Seventy-two hours after this incident theballoon burst. There had been fighting in theDrama area for some days, but owing to E.L.A.S.holding a ring against outside intervention fewdetails had filtered through. On the morningof the 3rd a general strike began in Athens, andas a result permission granted by the Cabinetfor a political demonstration was withdrawn.Eye-witness accounts of what followed are notentirely conclusive. The Government ban wasopenly ignored, and as the various processionsconverged on Constitution Square shots wereexchanged between the demonstrators and thepolice. Which side fired first has not been finallyestablished, but ten civilians and one policemanwere killed.

Although no further rioting or shooting tookplace this day, E.L.A.S. forces were infiltratingquickly, and on the 4th hostile activity began inmany districts, including the centre of the city.British troops with tanks, on the morning of the6th, stormed and occupied E.A.M. Headquartersin Korai Square and then secured IK.E.(Communist) Headquarters in ConstitutionSquare. Along the Piraeus Road and in thearea around the Acropolis fighting was heavyand continuous, British aircraft flying low tomachine-gun E.L.A.S. positions. One among manydisgraceful features of the situation was theconduct of certain members of Right-Wingelements, such as the notorious "X " organisation,who, with Union Jacks pinned to their garmentsand in the guise of helping the British, beganlooting and paying-off old scores. Another suchinstance was the general conduct of the Athenianpolice, many of whom spent the days sittingon roof-tops machine-gunning anything andeverything.

On 14th December, the curfew fixed at 19.00hours was extended over the whole twenty-fourexcept for the period 12.00-14.00 hours. Bitterfighting continued, and although negotiationswere still taking place no terms to include thesurrender of arms could be obtained from E.A.M.On the 19th, after all ammunition had beenexpended and four hours before a relief columnarrived, A.H.Q. Greece (Kifisia) fell to theguerrillas, and on the morning of the followingday General Scobie issued a warning by leafletsdropped by aircraft that E.L.A.S. guns firing at09.00 hours on the 21st would be attacked withall the forces at his command. While this warningwas effective in quelling fighting in the centreof the city, British troops working round thePiraeus area found opposition as strong as ever.

A Regent Appointed

Although political negotiations were stillproducing no solution, a proposal to appoint asRegent Archbishop Damaskinos, a man widelyacknowledged in Greece. as above the intriguesof politics both by virtue of his office andthrough his own personality, was now provoking

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L 1 I ! i, L III near Bioce, Yugoslavia.

Rocket projectile attack by Beaufighters of No. 19 Squadron, S.A.A.F.,against the village of Gracac on 4th December, 1944.

discussion. On Christmas Day, Mr. Churchill andMr. Eden arrived in Athens, and on the 26th aconference was held at which all parties wererepresented. This conference continued for ihireedays. While it terminated with no agreenentreached on the disarmament issue, it dis cla majority-vote in favour of a Regency.

The original proposal for this change inconstitution had been placed before King Georgeof the Hellenes and rejected. On 30th December,reports from London s dtdtl he King hadwithdrn w is en an under-

g t ss his returna.w Archbishop

:rgfD~-fi ";

84

famaskinos was elected to office the dayfollowing this announcement.

By the end of the first week of December,fighting had spread outside Athens and E.L.A.S.were pressing hard in a number of districtsincluding the Epirus. The general strike, whichhad embraced Patras, Salonika and Volos, wasover in these towns, but at all Greek ports ofimportance H.M. ships were standing-by, and onor about the 15th orders were given to evacuateE.D.E.S. troops and civilians from Kavallo, Volos,Kalamai, Preveza, the Ionian Islands and placeson the north shore of the Gulf of Corinth. Navalvessels remained and in most ports the situationcontinued tense.

Noblesse Oblige

While no inclusive figures are available forDecember, it is known that British casualties inGreece, between the third of that month and 6thJanuary, 1945, amounted to 2,101, including 237killed.

During the period preceding that in which thesecasualties were inflicted, British ships andaircraft were importing approximately 20,000tons of food per week to the Piraeus and another20,000 tons to other Greek towns. They werealso bringing footware and clothing at a rateof nearly 90,000 tons.a week. That it was impos-sible to continue these deliveries needs nocomment. The cessation of essential foodsupplies, occurring as it did before stocks hadbeen accumulated, produced at once the mostacute hardship over the whole country, and inAthens alone, on one typical day in December,British troops served no fewer than 112,000 freemeals to a starving population.

Air Support to Ground Operations

Squadrons of A.H.Q. Greece (B.A.F.), insupport of ground troops repelling E.L.A.S.forces, flew 1,092 sorties in December, 932 ofwhich were by fighters and fighter-bombers and160 by G.R. aircraft. Primary duty of the fightersand fighter-bombers was armed reconnaissancemainly in the Athens-Piraeus-Corinth area, wherecontinuous attacks were made against gunpositions, M.T., road blocks and fuel dumps. At thesame time R.P. Beaufighters, which flew 352sorties, straffed seven E.L.A.S. Headquartersbuildings, damaged the W/T station at Piraeusand blew up a number of ammunition dumps.Transport claims included 99 motor vehiclesdestroyed or damaged.

General Reconnaissance aircraft bombed therailway station north-west of Eleusis, straffedrailway stock in the town itself, and droppedleaflets and supplies. Only three B.A.F. aircraftwere reported missing and four damaged.

Enemy Withdrawal through YugoslaviaAt the beginning of December the enem

route to the north-west was t ebridgeheads, one fo sbased on Bar o

the area of Virovitica-Slatina and the other byan all Russian concentration at Vukovar. Anadvancing joint Russian-Bulgarian-Partisancolumn moving across the Srem, already inpossession of Tovarnik, Sid Martinici and "a railblock on the Vinkovci-Brcko line, also increasedthe threat.

West of these positions the Germans continuedto hold tenaciously to the Okucani-Brod-Vinkovci sector of the main railway, the securityof which remained vital to Army Group E.(including the Corps which had made its way upthe Drina to Bijeljina, only to find the Vinkovci-Brcko railway cut.) Army Group E. withdrawingfrom Serbia to Montenegro and Bosnia was asyet still south of the Sava and east of a generalline Brod-Sarajevo-Mostar.

It is interesting to note here that the enemywas again in the precarious position in which hehad found himself a few weeks earlier-and forthe same reason. In his refusal to cut losses, adecision imposed no doubt by the manpowershortage, he had left retirement dangerously lateand stood in grave risk of losing possession ofthe one essential railway west of Brod, and beingforced to fight to Zagreb along the Partisan-controlled roads of central Bosnia.

The cause of this delay in .the Germanwithdrawal was the joint actions in Novemberthat, following the evacuation of Pec and Prizren;had split Army Group E., leaving the greaterpart in the Iber Valley and 21 Mountain Corps inthe area Scutari-Podgorica-Kotor (see page 64).21 Mountain Corps, under constant air andPartisan attack, was now a few miles south ofMatesevo, while the relief column coming to itsaid from the north had reached Mojkocac. Theseforces joined during the third week of December,and as a result northward movement of thebeleaguered Corps was speeded up. Bad flyingweather, which restricted air operations in thelast week of the month, gave further assistanceto the withdrawal, and by the 28th, with theVisegrad-Sarajevo section of the route stillstrongly held by the enemy, the head of thecolumn was through Sarajevo and able to moveat its own pace.

Further German Forces Brought Up

Notwithstanding the pull-out of 21 MountainCorps and supporting troops, the Germans con-tinued to hold tight to the Mostar area, whilefurther up the coast the introduction ot new gunson Rab gave indication of the importanceattached to the Northern Islands.

In the west Slavonia sector, which as the neckof the bottle was the most vital area of all,additional German forces were brought up inmid-December and an attack launched to increasethe depth of defence forward of the main line

eb to Nagykanisza. This operation clearedt artisans from Novigrad and Durdovac, and

its progress the enemy made anotherSin the Drava-Sava pocket which eliminatedussian bridgehead at Vukovar, and at the

72

A merchwrnt .1i p left by the Germans& as. a block to the entrance to theCorinth Canal at;'ts~ Aigean Sea end,

}

British troops going ashore from landing craft at Salonika on 9th November, 1944.

c an paralysed by fear asA thens.

~$id~ir~D

A ree o~~ /*~

DEC IFlED

A British paratrooper .waiting to snipe E.L.A.S. troops as they leave aburning building in Athens.

Paratroopers and Gre4kpolicemen advancing under sniping fire in Ath i

74

British paratroopers await a chance to cross a street in Athens.

British paratroopers making e'r covering

e ".

Supplies were dropped by aircraft to British prisoners of E.L.A.S in Greece.The scene at Kifisikhori, where prisoners had made the words "FAGS,NEWS" in stones on the ground above a white "T". The crew of theWellington taking the photograph dropped all the cigarettes they had withthe latest B.B.C. Bulletin written out by the Wireless Operator. As the

aircraft left, the word "Thanks " was being marked out in reply.

same time opened a counter-attack in an attemptto clear the Vincovci-Brcko railway.

At this stage the most northerly of thewithdrawing forces of Army Group E. hadevacuated Pozega and Uzice and its main bodywas in the area of Osijelc-Vinkovci. Althoughunits of 118 Jaeger Division had been abandonedin Dalmatia, the bulk of Army Group E.,, nowprotected north and south by the Drava-Danubeand the Sava and reinforced by the presence ofconsiderable G.A.F. personnel in the Osijek area,could be said to be out of the wood. Afterpenetrating to Otok, Allied forces were forcedto -give ground, leaving the. position fluid in Sidand Tovarnik, while around the Barcs bridgehead(Zagreb-Nagykanlsza line) the attack that hadopened tentatively in mid-December increased its

pressure in the Bjelovar region (east of Zagreb)and drove the Partisans north and east back toPitomaca.

December Air Operations-Yugoslavia

While the December total of 4,653 sorties beatthe previous record of 4,604 flown in November,bad weather on many days curtailed airoperations and only 1,706 fighter and fighter-bomber sorties were carried out over Yugoslaviaagainst 2,258 for the preceding four weeks. (N.B.The figure of 2,650 quoted on page 67 includesfighter sorties by A.H.Q. Greece).

Effort was directed mainly against theevacuation route of 21 Mountain Corps, theprincipal sectors being the Mostar:Sarajevo-Brodrailway and the general troop concentration area

DE~B~~Iz

A Beau fighter patrolling over the Acropolis, the key position of one flank

of the British forces in Athens.

Bioce-Matesevo-Kotasin. Claims for transport

and rolling stock exceeded November, no fewer

than 319 M.T. vehicles, thirteen locomotives and

27 wagons being ;destroyed, and 553 vehicles,

seventeen locomotives and 63 wagons damaged.

Other targets included barracks and marshalling

yards at Bjelovak, motor transport at Podgorica,bridges north of Scutari, and a power station and

gun sites on Lussino Island.

Attacks on the German garrison at Gracac by

R.P. Beaufighters, Baltimores and Venturas were

followed by the capture of the town by the

Partisans on 9th December, 500 of the enemy

being killed and 800 taken prisoner. Booty

Included 30 tons of ammunition, 1,500 rifles and

120 machine-guns. Another tcarget, the first

important one at sea for two months, was a

400-ton schooner carrying ammunition- through

the .Podgorski Channel. It was attacked .by

R.P. Beaufighters, which claimed 25 hits and saw

the vessel blow up.

Fifteenth Air Force and No. 205 Group, T.A.F.

and D.A.F., and No. 334 Wing operated with

Balkan Air Force as in 'previous. months.

Fifteenth Air Force attacked the marshalling

yards at Maribor and the railway bridge at

Zenica; No. 205 Group bombed Bioce, the

Podgorica-Klopot and Bioce-Matesevo roads,bridges at Opasanica, Matesevo, Babljac and

Mojkovac, and dropped many tons of supplies;

Baltimores, Marauders and fighters of T.A.F.

and D.A.F. struck at the barracks and

marshalling yards at Bjelovar, bridges and rolling

stock on the Zagreb-Kriz, Brod-Sarajevo and

Zagreb-Maribor lines, destroying in particular

two ammunition trains. They also bombed the

viaduct at Orovnica and the bridge at Litija on

the principal railway from north Italy to

Yugoslavia. No. 334 Wing was restricted by

weather, but its aircraft dropped and landed

supplies in Yugoslavia and Albania, including

provisions for a Victory Celebration in Tirana.

Of the 4,653 sorties flown, 3,561 were by

aircraft based in Italy and 1,092 by A.H.Q. Greece

(see page 77). Single-engined fighters and

fighter-bo ers from. Italy flew 1,382 sorties,

R.P. ters 324 and bombers 462. Sorties

b * i duties aircraft, including Noa 205

I

A.H.Q., Greece (Kifisia), captured on 19th December, 1944, after allammunition had been expended and four hours before a relief column arrived.

Group, U.S.A.A.F., Russian Air Group and ItalianAir Force (SM. 82s and C. 1007s) totalled 1,393.Only 25 B.A.F. aircraft were lost and seventeendamaged.

Budapest under Siege

By the end of the first week of December, theforces of Marshal Tolbukhin, after taking CsepelIsland (site of the Manfred Weiss Works,Hungary's largest industrial undertaking, and theTokol Aircraft Factory), had surged forward tothe eastern bank of Lake Balaton, the scale ofthe attack diverting the enemy's attention fromthe sector north of Budapest and enabling theRussians to effect a considerable penetrationembracing Vac on the Danube bend and Ipolysagon the Slovak frontier. Although south-eastof the city the Germans were now able to containMarshal Tolbukhin's assault and make some localgains, they, were unsuccessful in preventingSoviet forces from capitalising their breakthrough in the north and establishing by themiddle of the month a substantial bridgeheadacross the Ipoly.

This bridgehead the Russians at once developedby fanning-out east and northward intoCzechoslovakia, accompanying this movementwith a thrust on the front south-east of thecapital that took first the key town ofSzekejfehervar and then went on apace to thenorth, cutting the main Budapest-Vienna railway,capturing Biscke and Esztergom, and linking upwith Marshal Malinovsky's forces to complete theencirclement of Budapest.

On 23rd December, 1944, Moscow Radioannounced that a. National Assembly had beenconstituted at Debrechen, and on the same dayRadio Kossuth, stating that an armistice wouldbe concluded with Russia and other countries atwar with Hungary, gave the programme of thisparty as including a complete purge of Fascistand reactionary influences, an Agrarian revolu-tion, and a policy of friendship towards theUnited Nations and the neighbours of Hungary.Two days later, Moscow announced the formationof a Provisional Government of Liberation, withGeneral Miklos (hitherto Commander of theHungarian First Army) as Prime Minister and

S IF, IED

IF p AIFR

Another view of the Beau f ighter attack on the village of Gracac on4th December, 1944,

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a

Th;is photagvapk shows a 400-ton sclzoonev at Karlobeg xploding after

sustaining 25 direct R.P. F;ifs on 18th December, 1944.

81

Ten direct and eight probable R.P. hits were scored in this attack on thePower House at Lussin Piccolo on 17th December, 1944. At the request of

the Navy,- the harbour was also straffed with cannon fire.

General Voeroes (Chief of Staff to GeneralHorthy) as Minister for National Defence.

Six or seven enemy divisions, including threeHungarian formations, defended Budapest, thegarrison being split into two pockets one in thebend of the Danube to the north and the otherwithin the city itself. On 26th December, afterthe divisions in the bend had failed to break ,outto the north-west, and with Russian troopsoccupying Ujpest, Alag, Budaors, Csepic andMatyasfold slowly working through the outerdefences, the German Commander declared astate of siege. While outside the period of thisreview, it is interesting to note that although bythe middle of January the enemy relief columnsattempting to drive corridors along the twoBudapest-Vienna highways had made comeground east of Komarno and retaken Esztergom,two-thirds of the city of Budapest was in Russianhands.

Honourable MentionOn 31st December, 1944, Balkan Air Force

completed its first six months of operations,

during which, in spite of much bad weather, theCommand with squadrons attached flew 22,317sorties, involving 63,170 flying hours. Sortiescarried out by single-engined fighters and fighter-bombers (including Italian Air Force) totalled9,565; by twin-engined fighters 1,959; and bybombers (including No. 205 Group) 1,957.Special Duties aircraft flew 8,836 sorties andover 34,000. hours. Only slightly over oneper cent. of aircraft failed to return.

Established claims were as follows. Destroyed-1,334 M.T. vehicles, 280 locomotives, 608 wagons,116 ships, 65 aircraft and 129 miscellaneous;damaged-1,937 vehicles, 503 locomotives, 1,141wagons, 125 ships, 43 aircraft and 311 miscel-laneous. Twenty-three Headquarters buildingsand nine bridges were wrecked, and 100 and 62,respectively, seriously damaged.

These figures in some cases exceed those givenearlier in the Balkan Commentary. They includesorties for which details had not been received attime of going to press and may now be consideredcomprehensive and complete.

OCTOBER TO DECEMBER, 1944

AT THE END of the previous quarter it musthave been painfully clear even to the troopsconcerned that the German garrisons in the outerAegean islands had been left to their fate. Almostall the larger vessels had gone to the bottomand those that remained were busy on theevacuation route between Piraeus and Salonika;such air transport as had survived the devastatingM.A.S.A.F. raids on the Athens airfields inSeptember and the attentions of intruderBeaufighters were mainly flying on the escaperoute north from Salonika to Skoplje; the absenceof G.A.F. fighters had let our Naval patrols inamong the Aegean islands to carry out bombard-ments or make landings where they liked; andBritish troops were already established onKythera island, just off the south coast of thePeloponnese, paving the way for the capture ofthe port of Patras and, eventually, the liberationof Athens itself.

The quarter now under review was to bringno crumb of comfort to the isolated garrisons.On the contrary, their outlook grew steadilyblacker as week succeeded week and as the

83

operations described fully in the article on page 55,freed the whole of Greece.

The Enemy Position in October

When October came, the general situation asit affected the Aegean garrisons was, briefly, asfollows. The whole of southern Greece-thePeloponnese-had been evacuated by the Germansand they were now preparing to pull out fromthe Athens area. The Corinth Canal was aboutto be closed by blockships at either end, bylandslides in the middle and by cutting the.bridges across it, while other blockships anddemolition charges were prepared at Piraeus.Everything that could be moved was being-shipped northwards-either direct or via Volos-toSalonika, which had become the chief evacuationbase both for shipping and for transport aircraft.

For carrying out the sea evacuation theGermans could at the beginning of the monthcall on S.S. "Bourgas" (2,900 tons), the mine-layer "Zeus" (2,400 tons), S.S. "TsarFerdinand" (2,000 tons), the tanker "Berthe"

ns), S.S. "Lola" (1,200 tons), the coaster

% 1'

Sea of

"Silva" (490 tons) and four destroyers-threeof which had just slipped round from the Adriatic-in addition to such smaller craft as had eludedthe Allied air and naval net in the past months.As may be imagined, this was by no means anadequate . escape fleet. Any hope of general'evacuation by air was similarly slim, for allavailable transport aircraft were reserved forbringing out "key personnel and specialists fromthe major island outposts.

As for the rank and file, it was pretty obviousby then that, barring miracles, they had, as thesaying is, had it. The number oleft in Cret

to 19,0

tionist Italians. The majority were on Crete-some 13,000 Germans concentrated mainly in thenorth-west corner of the island-and very fewwere other than low category troops of mixednationalities and doubtful fighting value.

The food supply position, however, was on thewhole thought to be fairly good-enough for fourto six months-but lack of shipping naturallymade satisfactory distribution between the islandsa constant headache.

Forces at Our Disposal

This, then, was how the enemy was placedin the Aegean in early October. For our part,the Navy had both surface and submarine patrolsoperating among the islands; there were, until

ANTIKYTHERA

Crete

mid-November, the carrier-borne aircraft of No. 4 .,-Naval Fighter Wing, whose activities are fullydescribed in an article on page 152; A.H.Q.,Eastern Mediterranean, although many of itssquadrons had been transferred to Italy (andothers were to be lost before the end of thequarter), still had the services of one Wellingtonsquadron,_ one R.A.A.F. Baltimore squadron,three Beaufighter squadrons and one S.A.A.F.Spitfire squadron for operational use in theAegean; and, as already indicated, the combinedoperations aimed at the capture of Athens wereunder way when Kythera was occupied.

All services-as well as Greek patriots-wereunited in the common task of making the Germanevacuation of Greece and the Aegean as hazard-ous and costly as possible. Conditions for airoperations, which had previously been the majorfactor in the Aegean, were by no means idealas enemy shipping activity shifted northwards,but there was no letting-up of effort, while theNavy, free to move about in the absence ofenemy aircraft, went from strength to strength.

Early Success Against Shipping

First blows against the enemy fell early inOctober. On the 1st " Tsar Ferdinand " and thetanker " Berthe," loaded with troops, stores andequipment, sailed north from Piraeus. On thenight of the 2nd/3rd submarines intercepted themin the Gulf of Salonika and sank them both.

Next day, off the island of Makronesi in theCyclades group, ' a formation of fourteenBeaufighters came upon a convoy consisting ofthree armed caiques and a 200-ton barge, protectedby an escort vessel of 250 tons. All five weredamaged by R.P. or cannon fire, the barge beingleft on fire and abandoned by its crew.

These early successes were augmented in theensuing few days when naval surface forces

Ssank one of the destroyers that had come roundfrom the Adriatic, accounted for five out of sevenlanding craft caught leaving the island of Piscopi(Tilos) and probably sank a coaster and a lighteroff Leros, while carrier-borne aircraft got

S" Silva " en route from Lemnos to Salonika.

Hampering the Enemy's Retreat

Meanwhile, the enemy was being harried inother ways apart from shipping attacks. Onthe Greek mainland British patrols enteredPatras on the 4th and on the same day-exactlya year after the Germafis had wrested Cos fromus-we were back in the island of Samos, whichwe had also occupied at that time. The fall ofSamos, as will be seen, was soon to be followedby that of almost all the, other islands.

Spitfires carried out small-scale sweeps overCrete, on the look-out for M.T. and other targets,and Beaufighters went on with their intruderoperations, although they could no longer matchthe striking success they had achieved between26/27th September and 3rd/4th October when,co-operating with seaborne G.C.I., they accountedfor nineteen transport aircraft shot down, one

probably try a iv e amaged. Thechief reason for t is fajling ; f was scarcityof targets, the enemy, as aha entioned, nowusing most of his transports on ffie - routefrom Salonika.

This transport traffic to the north was, how-ever, dealt a blow on 4th October when 39M.A.S.A.F. long-range Mustangs attacked theAthens airfield of Kalamaki, Eleusis and Tatoi,destroying nine aircraft on the ground anddamaging another twenty-one. A return visitwas paid to these airfields two days later by 55more M.A.S.A.F. Mustangs, which added fiveaircraft destroyed and ten damaged, while 35Lightnings attended to the Salonika airfields,claiming a further thirteen destroyed and eightdamaged. The final attack on Eleusis, Kalamakiand Tatoi came on the night of the 9/10th, whennineteen M.A.S.A.F. Wellingtons dropped some44 tons of bombs, scoring hits on hangars, run-ways and dispersal areas.

The Occupation of Athens

By the time this last raid took place, it wasobvious that the Germans were pulling the lastof their troops out of Attica and on the 11ththe local German commanding officer declaredAthens an open city. Three days later part ofthe small British force, which had establisheditself on the island of Poros, at the entrance tothe Gulf of Athens, drove in to the city. Onthe previous day a R.A.A.F. Baltimore haddropped a package containing important informa-tion required by our force on Poros beforelaunching an assault 6n Aegina, an island furtherup the Gulf.

After quitting Piraeus-which was blocked withthree large vessels, along with two floating docksand a number of smaller craft-the Germansconcentrated a considerable volume of shippingin Volos, at the head of the Gulf of that name.On the morning of the 13th over 70 active vesselswere present, including " Lola,'' one of the lastsurviving merchantmen, and two destroyers.

Unfortunately, these three major vessels haddeparted for Salonika by the time that nineS.A.A.F. Venturas of Balkan Air Force launchedan attack -in the afternoon. The attack was,nonetheless, a successful one, the largest victimbeing S.S. "Adriana" (4,350 tons), which hadonly recently been made serviceable and whichwas st1ll on fire on the 16th, being presumed atotal loss. Other vessels claimed as sunk orbadly damaged in Volos were the corvette" Brigitta" (400 tons), a 250-ton coaster andsixteen or seventeen miscellaneous craft.

The two destroyers did not escape for long.One failed to reach Salonika with "Lola" (shehad been damaged previously and probablysank), while the other, having left the harbouragain on the 15th, was disposed of by our navalforces in the Gulf of Salonika while on asoutherly course. This was the last of theAdriatic destroyers, leaving, only , one 6therdestroyer to be sunk by, the 'ravy.:o f .tle;Sporades on the night of he 19/20th.

85 .. .

+ +..,+.? + :, , +.. .. . + .+ + + _ ., ..

The German garrison in the Town Hall at Naxia, Naxos, was attacked byBeau fighters on 15th October, 1944.

The Fall of the Islands

As the Germans fell back on Salonika, theAllies not only followed them up the mainland,but took over the more strategically-placedislands. Syros (in the middle of the Cyclades)had fallen on 13th October and was followed bythe capture of Naxos (also in the Cyclades) andLemnos (commanding the approach to theDardanelles) on the 15th, by that of Scarpanto(between Crete and Rhodes) on the 17th and bythat of Santorin or Thera (at the base of theCyclades) on the 18th.

Normally naval landing parties were sufficientto effect the surrender of the islands, but in thecase of Naxos the R.A.F. had to be called in.Here a building that was the headquarters of thegarrison was reported to be held in strength bythe Germans.

Four Beaufighters were briefed to deal with

arwhite

affair with two or three storeys and a red roof-was easily distinguished and at least nine R.P.hits were registered as well as many cannonstrikes.

The roof and walls were damaged, but accurateassessment of final results was impossible owingto the smoke, dust and debris flying about. Allcrews, however, felt sure that few of the garrisonwould have survived the attack unless they hadgone to ground in the cellars.

Attacks on Land Targets

Although shipping reconnaissance was steadilymaintained, worth-while targets were usually outof range and, consequently, A.H.Q., EasternMediterranean's aircraft could turn their attentionto land objectives. On most days in mid-OctoberBaltimores bombed the airfield at Maleme (Crete)to hinder possible evacuation attempts by air,and attacks were similarly made on Calato air-field, Rhodes. Both instantaneous and delayed-action bombs were used.

A Coastal Battery at Lakidha Point photographed by a R.A.A.F. Baltimore

during the bombing attack on Melos Island on 21st November, 1944.

On the 24th another German-occupied buildingwas attacked-this time on Calino, the islandlying between Cos and Leros. Five Beaufighters(a sixth returning early) located the building-a former hospital now used for billets-andattacked in line astern. Thirty-two 60-lb. R.P.hits were claimed, apart from hundreds of cannonstrikes, and when the Beaufighters left the targetarea clouds of smoke and dust were rolling upthe valley and there was a 30-ft. wide hole inthe face of the building.

S.A.A.F. Spitfires continued to fly their sweepsover Crete, but found little to interest them inthe target line. They did, however, corroboratethe reports that the German garrison wasr with-drawing more and more into the north-westcorner of the island.

Series of Attacks on Melos

After the fall of Naxos and Santorin, the onlyCycladean island that the Germans still controlledwas Melos. This they were apparently deter-mined to hold on to at all costs, in spite of

naval bombardments, which were augmented,from 25th October onwards, by attacks fromthe air.

Coastal defence batteries were the primarytargets and altogether, between 25th October and2nd November, seven attacks were made byR.A.A.F. Baltimores and one by Beaufighters.The Baltimores operated in formations of betweensix and eight aircraft and, for the most part,released their bombs from between 6,000 and8,000 ft.

The guns were well sited and difficult to tackle,but in spite of the spirited defence put up bythe gunners no aircraft was lost. Results wereimpossible to assess accurately, although in theattack on 31st October black smoke arose fromthe area of the target, which may have been afuel or ammunition dump.

A feature of the mission by eight Beaufighterson the 29th was that eight Hellcats of No. 4Naval Fighter Wing acted as anti-flak cover forthem. The Hellcats led the formation, indicatedthe target and made a well-timed and effective

87

:~lp

tAi .j.f ':

Attack in progress on Rhodes Harbour, 27th November, 1944, photographedby a Baltimore in the first wave.

anti-flak attack. The result of the Beaufighters'R.P. fire could not, however, be observed.

After the attack on 2nd November, Melos wastemporarily unmolested from the air 'but, as willbe seen later, the garrison was not given muchpeace.

The Evacuation of Salonika

While this series of attacks was being launchedagainst Melos, it was evident that the garrisonsthere and elsewhere in the Aegean islands thatwere still occupied would be finally and irrevoc-ably sealed off by the German evacuation ofSalonika.

On 28th October-the anniversary of Mussolini'sinvasion of Greece four years ago-photo aicreconnaissance revealedthA gl li m a

airfields had been cratered and the administrativebuildings destroyed. For some time obviouspreparations had been made for destroying theharuour facilities and by the time that the firstBritish patrol entered on the afternoon of the30th the dock area had been isolated by thedemolition of three bridges and, as anticipated,"Lola" and " Zeus" had been sunk as block-ships at the south-east entrance to the mainharbour. All guns had been dismantled and theenemy was streaming northwards towardsSkoplje. Belgrade had fallen to the Russians onthe 20th and the Germans were not going torisk their main forces being cut off if theycould possibly help it.

As for the island garrisons on Crete, Rhodes,Leros, Cos, Melos and the one or two minor out-

in

Photograph of the attack on Rhodes Harbour, 27th November, 1944, takenby a Baltimore in the second wave.

posts remaining, they had no option but to staywhere they were, whether they liked it or not.Their's was Hobson's choice. Such, shipping asremained to them was suitable only for inter-island traffic and even if they eluded the navalblockade there was no escape port that theycould make for. The only aircraft that couldnow fly in to Crete or Rhodes would have tocome from the Vienna area and, although bring-ing the consolation of mail from home, would notbe able to fly out more than a handful ofpersonnel at a time from the islands.

The Garrisons Still Hold Out

The garrisons-still estimated at over 22,000Germans and Italians-were not yet, however,down and out. The Crete garrison was well

equipped with artillery and had eased its defenceposition by consolidating all available forces intoone area. The Rhodes C.O. was said to be afanatical Nazi determined to resist any attemptedlanding. From Leros reports stated that theFuehrer himself had ordered a fight to the finish.The Melos garrison, although only about 600strong, showed no signs of surrender and a newcommander there was said to have been raisingmorale by terrorist methods.

The Germans, indeed, hit back when they hadthe chance. A raid by one of our landing partieson the island of Piscopi, between Rhodes andCos, brought an immediate reaction, some 200troops being rushed across from Rhodes. Theislet of Archangelo, to the north of Lero j aalso occu~p i. t ii*' - ^ .: .k t& ~ u ' ^ *

ECL3A I ED

Photograph of Poros taken by a R.A.A.F. Baltimore before it dropped apackage containing instructions for our advanced forces to proceed with the

occupation of Aegina (see page 85).

Small ships moved cautiously between theislands, dodging our naval patrols and reconnaiss-ance Beaufighters. They were not always luckyand on the night of 4/5th November a destroyersank a coaster as it was attempting to reachRhodes from Leros.

On several occasions in November aircraftco-operated with the Navy in the search forenemy shipping, Beaufighters locating targets forsurface units, which sank a lighter off Alimniaisland on the 12th and two similar craft inLivadia Bay, Piscopi, on the 14th.

German Raids from Leros

As indicated above,all their punishmentSpecial Assault Unit

the Germans did not takelying down. On L 1

was formed. lcWiP a

out reconnaissances on moonless nights andraiding islands where Allied supplies were beingreceived.

The first objective of this unit, on the nightof the 12/13th, was Lisso, to the north of Leros,and four nights later they visited Levita, to thesouth-west. Here the raiders amused themselvesby burning the Union Jack and replacing it bythe German naval ensign.

For our part, attacks were resumed on Melos.On the 14th it was bombarded by naval units,and on the 21st eight Baltimores bombed coastalgun positions. A landing by a small naval partywas also made, following which the garrisoncommander thought it advisable to concentrate

flnost of his forces in the eastern part of the

Beaufighter attack in progress against the German Headquarters at Calinoin November, 1944.

Shipping reconnaissance by Beaufighters stillcontinued to be rather like looking for a needlein a haystack, although naval units with whichthey co-operated had better luck, sinking twoassault craft north-east of Alimnia on the 21stand a launch near Calchi two days later. Resultswere unobserved, however, when eight R.A.A.F.Baltimores bombed a concentration of small craftin Cos harbour on the 23rd and again on the27th when another formation of seven Baltimores-went for shipping at Port Mandracchio, Rhodes.

Bad Weather Hampers Operations

A patch of bad weather that set in towardsthe end of November hampered air operations.Of seven Baltimores briefed to attack shippingat Mandracchio on the 29th, only three foundthe target area through a gap in 9/10th cloudand, on 4th December, hopeless weather con-ditions forced back ten Baltimores when theywere airborne to bomb a coastal battery insupport of a naval bombardment of Mandracchio.

Three days earlier, however, a reconnaissanceBaltimore had been contacted over the R/Tby_ naval units and had successfully spotted

while gun positions on Alimnia werebombarded.

The weather also interfered with the fightersweeps over Crete, although on 4th DecemberS.A.A.F. Spitfires straffed a number of transportvehicles in the Suda Bay area and found a fewmore targets again on the 11th.

The Baltimores often had to be content withdropping propaganda leaflets over the occupiedislands.

The Melos C.O. Ambushed

Raid and counter-raid still went on among theislands, sometimes one side taking the initiative,sometimes the other. The most notable ofthese cat-and-mouse operations occurred on 5thDecember when an Allied patrol on Melosambushed a car and wrote-off all the occupants,among them being the commander of the garrison.

The enemy for his part showed signs of havingdesigns on Simi and a small force of landingcraft was intercepted near there on the 11th bythe Navy, one being sunk and the remainderturning back to Rhodes. There were alsoru r'" on

*Ura rolil' .

Patmos, but these proved to be without founda-tion. What seemed' to be true, on the otherhand, was a report that commando training wasbeing carried out on Cos.

On the 16th naval units came upon two morevessels attempting to reach Rhodes from Leros,sinking one and capturing the other. On thesame day two Beaufighters attacked a caiquesouth-west of Lipsos; they drove it on to therocks and it was considered probably destroyed.

Baltimores at this time made another seriesof attacks on shipping in Mandracchio harbour,Rhodes, on the 9th, 13th, 14th, 19th, 20th and28th. Formations varied between ten and eightaircraft and bombs were normally released frombetween 7,000 and 8,000 ft.. The target areawas well covered on most occasions, but resultswere difficult to gauge with any degree ofaccuracy.

Pairs of Beaufighters maintained their shippingreconnaissance every day that weather permitted,but still found little to interest them.

Decline in Enemy Morale

When the end of the year came, there wasa temporary and uneasy lull on the Aegeanfront. The Germans kept their grip on Crete,Rhodes, Leros, Cos and Melos and, on the lastday of the year, the commanders of the firstfour islands held a conference on Leros.

Although the contents of the agenda are notknown, it is fairly certain that among thesubjects discussed was that of discipline amongthe remaining troops, which was by no meansall it should have been.

Back in November a prisoner-of-war reportedthat in a Crete corporals' mess a portrait of theFuehrer was often used for target practice; on30th November some 80 German soldiers weresaid to have been recaptured while trying toescape from Crete to Turkey; in December an

anti-Hitler movement in Rhodes was reportedto have 2,000 members and to be spreading;and from Leros came the news that 500 Germanshad laid down their arms and refused to fightany more.

Propaganda leaflets dropped by the Baltimoreswere thought to be having the desired effectin driving home the hopelessness of Germany'sposition-so much so that the Rhodes C.O.ordered the destruction of all leaflets found andwarned his men not to touch them because theywere contaminated.

Outposts No Longer of Value

It may be said, then, that the Aegean outpostswere now more of a liability than an asset tothe German High Command. The only realreason for them-to provide bases for counteringany thrust aimed at the Greek mainland-hadvanished when the German troops fell back .onSalonika. Retention of them might possibly beexcused on-grounds of prestige and propaganda,but it could be argued that loss of face is betterthan loss of manpower when every soldier isneeded to defend the Reich. The 18,000 or soGerman troops bottled up in the islands, thehandful of small craft left to them and theG.A.F. contribution of a couple of Fieseler Storchaircraft could hardly be regarded as a seriousthreat to our position in the EasternMediterranean.

They were certainly not sufficient to tie downa large air force in anticipation of potentialtrouble brewing, for most of the R.A.F., S.A,A.F.and R.A.A.F. units formerly employed in theAegean had even before the end of the yearbeen transferred to more active spheres ofoperation.

For those that remained this quarter had notbeen a particularly exciting one, but the scarcityof headline-making, incidents was not due to lackof trying but to lack of opportunity.

POSTSCRIPT TO " ASSISTANCE FOR WARSAW "

In view of subsequent information that has come to hand, it is felt

that more emphasis- might have been given in the short article in No. 8 of theReview to the part played by No. 148 Squadron in the attempts made in

August, 1944, to supply Polish' patriots in Warsaw with arms andammunition.

This squadron's Halifaxes had been engaged in supply-dropping inPoland and north Italy since early April. Losses had mounted steadily, and

on 5th August strength was reduced to only one officer pilot and one

effective crew. Nevertheless, when the call came a week later to assist the

Warsaw patriots, the squadron managed to get six aircraft into the air.Between the nights of 12/13th and 18/19th August the Halifaxes

put up their maximum effort over Warsaw as well as maintaining the normal

supply of stores to the Italian partisans. By the last day of August only twoserviceable aircraft remained, seven crews twelve Halifaxes having

been lost during the month . l l

EDUCATIONALEDUCATION AL

ACTIVITIE STHE LAST TWO YEARS have seen the final

stage of the African campaign and theconsolidation of the Allied position in thatcontinent, the lifting of the siege of Malta, theconquest of the central Mediterranean islandsand the driving of the enemy through Italy to thenorthern fringes of the Apennines. In what wasonce a wholly mobile command the stabilisedareas have greatly increased, but always therehave remained, close to the front, units in whichthe old circumstances still prevail. - It has beenthe task of the R.A.F. Educational Service toadapt the General Education Scheme to thesediverse conditions and it may be claimed that itsactivities, in spite of the shortage of accom-modation and other amenities, have been limitedonly by lack of staff.

Prior to March, 1943, all educational querieswere sent to Headquarters, R.A.F., Middle :East,but from that month, when three EducationOfficers were attached to H.Q., Western Desert,Nos. 205 and 210 Groups respectively, the

'strength has gradually grown until now it standsat 27-eight below establishment and stillsmall in relation, to its commitments.

IN MA-AFFrom Benghazi to Tunis

By July, 1943, what was afterwards to evolveas the Central and Western Mediterranean Areawas ready to begin its separate existence with

the' formation of a new Eddcational Area for

units west of Benghazi. To it three officers wereappointed, one to No. 214 Group, as AreaEducation Officer and for units in and east of

Tripoli, one to No. 114 M.U. for units west thereof,and one to R.A.F. Station, Castel Benitq andNo. 205 Group units in Tunisia.

The General Education Scheme aimed to meetits needs by means of classes and correspondencecourses, by the provision of library facilities and

through the medium of lectures and discussiongroups. Such was the enthusiasm that in spiteof the scattered nature of the units, which

precluded civilian teachers and threw them backon their own resources, the return for September,1943, showed a class attendance of some 440. Of

these~ abot a quarter were studying Mathematics,more than a half English and Modern Languagesand a smallei number .Navigation, Shorthand andBookkeeping . .

Photographic class at No. 336 P.R. Wing.

Classes Held in the Open

Nor does this constitute the whole picture, forthere were many units which set up classeswithout waiting for sanction or for officialpayment, and of these no records exist. Classeswere held in tents, in ramshackle huts or evenin the open with the outside of a lorry for ablackboard. Some 170 correspondence courses insuch subjects as Engineering, Radio andJournalism were approved and as many moredeferred pending more basic study by theapplicants.

The library position was very difficult, only550 books being at first available, a numbertotally inadequate to the needs of 16,000 airmen.Thus, many who were not interested in courses,owing to the long postal delays, and who had noopportunity for class instruction, had this oneremaining form of study denied them. Lecturerswere rarely available, but especially on thesmaller units, which often claimed an attendanceof forty per cent. of their strength, voluntardiscussion groups were extremely popular

Later Stages in North Africa

SBy the end of 1943catered for, as wellOfficers, had mo aeatime,

on Christmas Day, a new group of six EducationOfficers arrived from the United Kingdom totake up the tale in North Africa. Of these threewere immediately attached to the larger unitsand one was sent to join those already teachingEnglish to French personnel in Morocco. TheSenior Education Officer and the remaining one,both of whom later transferred to Italy,constituted the staff at H.Q., M.A.A.F. (LaMarsa). Since then the establishment hasbeen increased and the work is at presentcarried on by six officers and one-languageInstructor.

The initial, policy of placing Education Officersat larger centres has continued, so that Blida,Maison Blanche, Setif and No.. 351 M.U. each havetheir own, while the other units, containingapproximately half the total personnel, are underthe charge of the Area Education Officer, No. 218Group, and his assistant. These units are too

Sdesired, but some measure of satisfactionLd through the assistance of airmanters.

Lack of Accommodation

From the outset the execution of the GeneralEducation Scheme was handicapped by lack of

I4.;..-

accommodation and equipment, and muchimprovisation has been necessary, although thesituation is now much improved. Fortunate indeedwas the Education Officer who could claim thesole right to a tent or marquee for his work;generally he had to compete for accommodationwith other station activities. Canteens, diningrooms and offices had all at one time or anotherto be pressed into service. (The accompanyingphotographs are a measure of the progress thathas been made). The supply of books, at firstvery small, is still inadequate, but each EducationOfficer now possesses a library which is fairlywide in scope and the total number of volumesnow held is round about five thousand.

In spite of teething troubles, most of thedemands made on the Educational Service inNorth Africa. have been provided for. Classinstruction has been placed on a sound footing atthe bigger centres, but only in a few other placeshas it been possible to arrange for oralinstruction, owing partly to the demand in eachsubject from the smaller units being insufficientand partly to the difficulty of providing suitableinstructors.

English, Mathematics and European Languageshave, as usual, been the most popular subjects,but the full range has included such diverse

matters as Building Construction, Commerce,Economics and Art, and much of the credit forsuccess in these subjects, obviously beyond thecapabilities of any one Education Officer, belongsto those personnel who have offered themselvesas part-time teachers.

The Purpose of Studies

The total of official correspondence courses inthe North African area has reached 750, those inAccountancy, Engineering, Agriculture, Law,Insurance, Secretarial work- and Teaching havingproved the most popular, while in the PostalStudy section, London Matriculation, Electricityand Magnetism and Radio subjects, MotorMechanics and Diesel Engineering have allreceived attention.

Most studies are directed toward post-waremployment, some students desiring to refreshtheir previous knowledge, others to reach adefinite objective in their career, and althoughfor the most part time has been too short forthem to reap their reward, some, candidates havealready presented themselves for ILondonMatriculation.

As the War nears its end it is expected thatmen will avail themselves of the opportunities for

Portrait class in progress at No. 336 P.R. Wing.

SA$SiF IEDobtaining a qualification and will offer themselvesfor professional and vocational examinations.

Progress in Malta

From North Africa it is but a short step toMalta where conditions are now almost normal. Inspite of the fact that airmen are divided intowatches, that locally trained airmen live at homeand that both the work and the billets of Britishairmen are often at some distance from StationHeadquarters, there is still considerable scope forEducational activities. There are now twoEducation Officers to meet the needs of the R.A.F.on the island, and two unit reference librarieswith eight branches. In the airmen's mess atAir Headquarters there is an Information Room,

. Recreation Library and a study room, while theoffice block houses three good classrooms Similaramenities are being incorporated into buildingsnow in course of construction for peace-time use.

Twenty-four classes weekly now meet on theisland, about three and a half per cent. of thetotal British R.A.F. personnel are engaged on

official correspondence courses and students arepreparing for London Matriculation and otherexaminations such as those of the Royal Societyof Arts, London Chamber of Commerce and theCity and Guilds. On one unit there is anarrangement whereby twenty discussion groupsmeet simultaneously, stopping work for thepurpose. A start has been made with the manualside of vocational training at an M.U. wherevolunteer pupils gain practical experience in theworkshops, and it is hoped to extend this schemeto building construction with the assistance ofthe Air Ministry Directorate of Works.

Early Days in Italy

The first Education Officer in Italy took up hisduties about two months after the invasion.To-day Italy holds about three quarters of thetotal personnel and two thirds of the EducationOfficers in the M.A.A.F. Command. The earlydifficulties were much as they had been inNorth Africa-a shortage of staff, of books andof accommodation. In the first three months

The Art Studio at H.Q., No. 205 Group.

r

The Library at H.Q., No. 205 Group, in February, 1945.

there were only two Education Officers in thecountry, one on the Adriatic side and one in theNaples area, and even by the late summer of1944 the number had not risen above seven,although Italy was occupied as far north as theGothic Line.

The greatest initial demand for educationalfacilities came from D.A.F. units, and to meetit extensive use was made of the services ofEducation Liaison Officers and airmen on units,most of them schoolmasters, who volunteered toorganise classes and to advise on Courses. Inaddition it was arranged to employ a staff ofclerks to stencil copies of Tutorial Courses andof other publications which were in great demand.By the end of March, 1944, over 1,350 men werereceiving instruction either in classes or bycorrespondence courses, although enthusiasm forthe latter was damped by long postal delays andby the difficult conditions for private study. Inspite of the complete stoppage at one peroid ofthe supply of pamphlets, the lecture and studygroup scheme was very successful during this

first winter, especially on those units which hadacquired the habit in the Desert, and addedstimulus in the larger towns was given by a teamof Army Lecturers on whom the R.A.F. constantlycalled for talks on current affairs. Many unitsalso sent representative officers to attend aone-day course in A.B.C.A. at Bari.

The Second Phase

During March, 1944, the Senior Education Officermoved from La Marsa to Caserta and in themonths that followed four other members of theEducational Service were added as reinforce-ments, but nothing could be done with such asmall number to keep pace adequately with therapid movement northward which followed thebreaking of the deadlock at Cassino.

It was not until the autumn that the arrivalof six officers from the United Kingdom, and thecommissioning of others locally, made possiblethe first reasonably compre ion ofeducato f il Other

k 4 e JvI , and

V ;f1AThere are gaps still to be filled. Now,,in the earlypart of 1945, Education Officers are located atH.Q., M.A.A.F. (Unit), at Headquarters,M.A.C.A.F. and B.A.F, and at both Rear andAdvanced Headquarters,: D.A.F., at Nos. 205 and214 Groups, at Nos. 239, 283, 287 and 324 Wingsand at No. 110 M.U.

Coastal Air Force

Until recently the scattered nature and theexacting duties of Coastal Air Force militatedagainst educational work, but now, as operationaldemands decrease and as the cessation ofhostilities looms ahead, there is a re-awakening,of interest. Classes are commencing throughoutthe command, taken by airman schoolmasters andothers who have emerged as teachers fromamong the personnel on the various units. Theadministration is in the hands of officers whohave volunteered for liaison work with theEducation Officer at Headquarters.

Discussion Groups are multiplying apace-scarcely a unit exists which has not at least one,and some of the larger ones have as many astwenty. On several of the Air-Sea Rescuelaunches the whole crew meets daily and withevery meeting become more fluent and betterinformed- on matters of vital importance for thepost-war era. All this has been possible' onlythrough the inspiring enthusiasm of the Leaders,many of whom have attended two-day coursesat Headquartes, and such is the importance ofthis development that it has been considerednecessary to enlist the full-time services of anofficer to supervise it, while a mobile team ofDiscussion Group " experts " is being set up totour the Command.

Much ,of the success of the scheme inM.A.C.A.F. can be attributed to the fact thatthe Groups meet in service hours, and theextension of this practice to cover classes willencourage many airmen to attend them. They

*will be so organised that they will meet for onehour during service time and for one in theairmen's free time.

A corollary of this development has been thesetting up of' Information Rooms on units.Accommodation, furniture, -heating, literatureand exhibition material are everywhere at a.premium, but already certain units have openedsuch rooms and their interesting displays, no lessthan their comfort, are attracting airmen inincreasing numbers.

No. 205 Group

i;il-r :::6. 1a ; --;jr:::I h~::Z~ UI

five classes are in progress, some of the workis of a high standard, and one unit in particularcombines practical instruction in drawing andpainting with lectures on the history of Art, AtHeadquarters the studio, well equipped withdrawing boards and easels made in the carpentrysection, is open all day and every day, instructionbeing given three times weekly by a formermember of the staff of United Artists. On oneunit a photographic club with a membership of60 has been in existence for several months.

For the benefit of music lovers a gramophonelibrary has been formed at Group Headquartersand at present consists of 180 classical and lightclassical records. Units in the area selectprogrammes from those available and in thisway several regular music circles are held. Therecords were bought through Welfare funds andit is hoped to increase the library in number andscope. Two former Cathedral directors of musicgive their services and one of them conducts theweekly practices of glees and part-songs of theCombined IServices'. Male Voice Choir whosemembers are drawn from the Army and R.A.F.

With the introduction of compulsory discussiongioups there has been an increased demand forsome added degree of background knowledge andto meet it a panel of lecturers has been set up,whose members visit units on request. Reciprocalarrangements exist whereby American lecturerscome to British units to talk on politics and sociallife in the United States, and R.A.F. personnellecture to the Americans on such subjects as theBritish Constitution, Local Government andTrades Unionism. In addition Brain Trusts andquizzes are popular, and a start has recently beenmade with the showing of documentary filmsfrom Army and American sources.

Balkan Air Force

It is only since the beginning of this year thatan Education Officer has been allotted to B.A.F.,but prior to this much had been done to helpneighbouring units of this Command by those atNos. 205 and 214 Groups, and at No. 110 M.U.Class teaching is given in a wide variety ofsubjects including Serbo-Croat, with the additionof English instruction for Allied personnel.

Music circles have been formed at all Wingsand voluntary discussion groups are longestablished. Following recent training coursesfor leaders, including one at R.A.F. Station, Vis,an organised scheme is being put into effect.

Desert Air Force

Much of the foregoing may be said to apply, in From the earliest days in Africa and moregreater or less degree, to other formations in particularly after their arrival in Italy, there hasM.A.A.F. At No. 205 Group there is no shortage existed in the Desert Air Force a strong desireof civilian part-time teachers and some of the for educational facilities, and every effort wasItalian classes have now passed the elementary made by the Education Officer at No. 214 Group,stage and are doing much to improve the working through- Liaison Officers and unpaidcoversational powers of the students. Mathematics airman schoolmasters, to satisfy this demand.classes comprise all grades from elementary to The difficulties were, however, almost insuperablecalculus. Art is gaining in popularity, but the en, during October, 1944, it was at lastsupply of material is still deficie . s to attach four Education Officers to the

Information Room, No. 614 Squadron.

formation they were. welcomed with. tremendousenthusiasm.

As a result of the co-operation of the units

themselves, improvised accommodation was

quickly forthcoming, in spite of the many obvious

difficulties to be expected in forward areas. EachEducation Officer was established in some sort ofoffice, a classroom was found, blackboardsappeared as if by magic, of chalk there was some,but of stationery hardly any. Personnel attendingthe classes had to equip themselves as best theymight with pencils, rulers and notebooks, somecame equipped with writing pads, others managedto find scrap paper which served the purposeequally well. And so,the work began.

The first response was almost overwhelming andto the many other problems was added the shortageof text-books. Some part-time teachers, however,managed to work without them and only in somelanguage classes were there enough for eachmember to have a copy. At this time eachEducation Officer had as his complete libraryone medium-sized box of books which was trans-ported along with his personal kit.

Trying to Keep Warm

With the approach of winter, the main problemconfronting all. Education Officers -was thedifficulty of raising the temperature above the

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point at which concentrated effort on the part ofthe pupils became impossible. Stoves were supplied,but even two of these together were found to belittle more than useless and the eventual solutionwas an oil-drip fire, constructed by the pupilsthemselves from a fifty gallon drum, a few feetof piping and a" Jerry Can." As for the tent, whichon one unit was used as overflow accommodation,at one time the ink was frozen solid when theday's work began, the gales played havoc withthe already gaping seams and the soil on whichit stood was of such a peculiar nature that rainwater which fell outside came up through thefloor after the manner of an artesian well,forming pools and, a three-inch layer of mud. Thechairs occupied by the Education Officer and hisclerk quickly began to subside into the morassand operations had to be temporarily suspendeduntil some approximation to stability could beachieved at a lower level.

In spite of the many obstructions, however, ofwhich that of transport difficulties was not theleast, comprehensive programmes of classes wereeventually in progress, not only on the Head-quarters Units but- on a variety of widely dispersedsmaller ones which the Education Officers hadbeen able to visit and on which Liaison Officersand airman schoolmasters had been established.

Library and Reading Room at the Educational Bureau at H.Q. No. 218 Group.

been trained, some 70 classes had been formedat which more than 900 students were attendingand over 200 applications had been received forcorrespondence courses.

Those who have experienced an Italian winterin a forward area will appreciate that great creditis due alike to the Education Officers and to thbpersonnel in the formation who, by diligence andperseverence, achieved' such results in make-shiftunacademic surroundings and under conditions ofgreat physical discomfort.

The Task of the Future

of whom were drawn into its ranks while still onthe threshold of adult life.

Some of these men and women had alreadyadvanced far along the path of their chosen career,have jobs awaiting them and may even havebeen fortunate enough to find work in the Serviceclosely akin to their civilian employment. Othersagain either have no career to which to return orwill have had their outlook so broadened, alike byhuman associations and by contact with hithertostrange lands and customs, as to be no longercontent to resume their pre-war calling. Of thesesome will wish to adapt their service trade to

Now, as the German War approaches its end, civilian uses whi]the Royal Air. Force is faced with a task new, demanding,unprecedented in its history, and one which general educatioimanifestly cannot be fulfilled by the limitedresources of the Education Service alone-a task Educational andwhich is nothing less than to prepare for their All alike facereturn to civil life vast numbers of men and to enable them iwomen, most of whom have for long periods been and responsibledivorced from their normal occupations and many understand the eO f lI3U EB

le others will aspire to somethingit may be, a higher standard ofn than that previously attained.

Vocational Trainingdifficult problems of readjustmentto take their place as intelligentcitizens in a devastated world, toever more complicated machinery

of modern society, and to appreciate theprivileges and the duties of life in a democraticcommunity. Prejudice, loose thinking, hastyjudgment, self pity and a tendency to lay all mis-

,fortunes on a legendary "they," all these weak-nesses become doubly dangerous when theindividual, released from Service discipline, is freeto pass from thoughts and words to action. Theairman, moreover, needs help to brace himselfagainst the day when he must leave the economicshelter of the Service to face the open competitionof the outside world.

This, outlined in its simplest terms, is thepresent probleh ; a problem that increases incomplexity with each attempt to find a practicalsolution, inasmuch as every service man orwoman is an individual with his or her specialdifficulties. It is clear that no scheme, howevercomprehensive, could cater adequately for eachand every one, so infinite is their variety, socomparatively short the time available. The mostthat can be hoped is to offer general trainingwhich may be of. use to all and specialisedassistance in as many broad categories as maybe uermitted by the resources already availableor able to be provided speedily. On the basis ofthese considerations the R.A.F. Educational' andVocational Training Scheme, as originallyembodied in A.M.O. A.942/44 and since amplified,has been evolved.

Resettlement Training

In that it is common to all, and in that thosewith a more comprehensive educational andcultural background can be used to help theirless fortunate fellows, that aspect of the problemwhich deals with citizenship or ResettlementTraining, to-quote the terminology of the A.M.O.,is perhaps the most readily soluble. Here theproposal is to rely principally on DiscussionGroups, wherein questions of current and futureinterest can be examined, diverse points of viewbe expounded and those taking part gradually betrained to acquire the habit of subordinating theirown selfish or sectional interests to the commonweal.

To a. considerable degree this part. of the schemeis already in operation and should extend rapidlyas more service time becomes available and asmore and more men, to whom the British Wyand Purpose and other pamphlets are available,pass through the short courses in Leadership.Clubs, lectures, films and broadcasts all have theirbearing on Resettlement Training and may beused to supplement the Discussion Group.

Educational Training

Next in order of difficulty there arises the!question of Educational Training, which will aimat the improvement of the individual's general

background of knowledge and culture rather than

to fit him for any specific employment.' Here it

must be assumed that the students will fall into

one or another of three categories-those who are

already above Matriculation standard, those who

must remain content with something else. Forthe first of these, facilities -for correspondencecourses and for private study under the guidanceof Education Officers and Instructors will beoffered and it may be possible, in this theatre, toenlist the help of outside bodies such as thelocal Universities.

For the se.cond group teaching will be arrangedto lead up to the Forces Preliminary Examination,which is being recognised by Universities ascarrying certain exemptions for the purpose ofadmission to particular faculties and colleges.This examination, which is being conducted by theCivil Service Commission, will be in two parts,the first comprising English, General Knowledge(including current affairs and citizenship) and athird subject which, except in specially approvedcases, must be either Mathematics or Latin ; andthe second part embracing two out of a verywide range of subjects including science andlanguages. Candidates must pass in both parts,which, however, may be taken separately, andneedless to say those students who feel able towill be encouraged to matriculate as heretofore.

For the third group, those, who wish to improvetheir general education at a level below thestandard of School Certificate, .the training willbe directed generally towards the R.A.F. WarEducational Certificate, which should be of usewhen seeking those forms of employment forwhich matriculation is not required. This againis in two parts, only the first of which is com-pulsory, and an essential preliminary is acertificate on the part of an Education Offider tothe effect that the candidate has done satisfactorypreparatory work.

In this examination service women are speciallycatered for, inasmuch as the four subjects inPart I, in three of which the candidate must pass,include Housewifery along with English, Mathe-matics and General Knowledge. Part II again-offers .a wide selection, of which the candidatemay choose two or, exceptionally, three subjectsand his success will be annotated on thecertificate already gained.

Vocational Training

Lastly, there is Vocational Training, directedtowards improving the qualifications of those whowere trained or employed before the war in acivilian occupation, towards the, ;,cbnve:ion ofservice trades to peace-time uses, or towardspreparation for post-service trainingjn the, caseof those who had no civil eifleyment beforejoining the R.A.F. The courses and syllabuseswill be laid down by the Air Ministry in collabora-tion with the Government Department concernedand will, as far as possible, be arranged so asto lead smoothly into the further training that aman may receive after his release. Both manualand non-manual occupations will come within thescheme.

Practical instruction on Stations, courses inbasic' theoretical subjects necessary for groups

101

of trades, conversion ourses, study syllabuses each lasting a fortnight. The school, which isand text books, attendance at technical schools staffed by specially selected Education Officersand colleges-all find their place in the machinery sent out from the United Kingdom, is for allfor implementing the plan, which, while it could ranks, and all educational instructors will benever cover every aspect of human endeavour, taught how to approach citizenship and resettle-should be able to offer to every individual. some. ment problems.knowledge or skill which will haye a direct bearing For those who were not professional, school-on his civilian occupation. masters in civil life, there is instruction in

This then is the plan, which will come into teaching methods, a library is provided and there

operation at a date to be announced later and are facilities for private study. Those whoprobably immediately after the end of hostilities pass through the school cannot necessarily be

against Germany. It is designed for the period guaranteed employment as full-time instructors

prior to the service man's or woman's release, at the end of hostilities, but those who are will

the time of which it will in no wise affect. Train- as far as possible be allotted to their present

ing, amounting to about six hours a week, will units and in the meantime they are encouragedtake place in Service time and will be compulsory. to seek employment as part-time teachers, under

the General Education Scheme, in order to keepRecruitment and Training of Instructors in practice. The administration of the school

and of the E.V.T. scheme as a whole is in theThe essential pre-requisite of such a scheme, hand of the Training Department; the syllabuses

however, is an adequate supply of properly trained to be followed and the supervision of the teachinginstructors covering a wide range of subjects- ae the responsibility of the Education Service,several thousand are needed for the Central and, whe officers will be available to offerWestern Mediterranean theatre alone, to supple- whose officers will be available tooffement the handful of Education Officers and the professional guidance and advice.limited number of part-time teachers and airman The Scheme Must Not Failschoolmasters who have hitherto borne the burdenf th General Education Scheme There are This scheme is ambitious, the more so because.

of the General Education Scheme. There are a time ofmany professional teachers in the ranks of. the it must be carried through at a time of

R.A.F. and many others who have had experience uncertainty and flux, depending much on the

as Service instructors. The first problem is to co-operation and goodwill of many people, all

persuade them to volunteer for this work, the of whom are feeling the strain of war and of

second to give them the specialised training which service overseas. Nevertheless, It must not fail.These for whom it is intended have deserved wellwill make them effective with a Service audience of their country and for its sake, as much ad frin novel and rather-trying circumstances. of their country and for its sake, as much: as for

Snovel and rathertrying circumstancestheir own, they must not be allowed to go backUncertainty as to conditions of employment for to civil life ill-equipped for the stupendous task

some time made volunteers slow to come forward, of reconstruction that lies ahead. They willbut the assurance that the date of their own return home the richer by great experiences andrelease and their financial position will remain by good comradeship, but nothing can whollyunaffected should help to overcome their reluct- compensate them for the "lost years" and itance. Many airmen and some officers in fact would be intolerable if, through any fault of thestand to, gain both in rank and in emoluments. Service to which they have given so much, they

The training of instructors began in the autumn Should feel cheated and at a disadvantage com-

)f 1944 when this Command was allotted a pared to those who have been able to remain in

number of vacancies at No. 2 R.A.F. Instructors' civil employment. The extent to which R.A.F.

School (E.V.T.) at Heliopolis, but the really personnel are able to play in peace the full and

effective start was made in February, 1945, with honourable part which they have borne in war

the opening of No. 8 School at Lecce in the will be the measure of the Scheme's success and

south of Italy. Here it will be possible to train for the R.A.F. Educational Service a test of its

nearly two hundred instructors a month in courses own endeavour.

Till

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Mobilising A.-1- -JB -y ~r -- J JL _7 .LLi^ A - . ^^ .* ^JJ ^

THE NORM AL PRACTICE of the R.A.F.Mediterranean Review is to publish only originalarticles or features. In the following article,however, which is reprinted by kind permissionof the Times Weekly Edition, departure from thatpractice is considered to be justified by therevelations contained in the figures quoted fromthe Government White Paper which clearlyindicate the astronomical effort made by the,people of the United Kingdom in prosecution ofthe war.

"For five years men and women have lived,and worked under complete blackout. Family lifehas been broken up, not only by the withdrawalof men and women to the Services, but byevacuation and billeting.

"Production has been made more difficult bythe dispersal of factories to frustrate the airattacks of the enemy, and by the need for trainingnew labour to unaccustomed tasks. There havebeen two long periods when work was carried onunder constant and severe air attacks. Since 1940one and three-quarter million men have giventheir limited spare .time, after long hours ofwork, for duty with the Home Guard. Most otheradult male civilians and many women haveperformed part-time civil defence and fire guardduties out of working hours.

More People Employed

"Between 1939 and 1944 there was an increaseof three and a half million people in the Servicesor in industrial employment. Two and a- quartermillion people not previously in industrialemployment were brought in and employmentwas given to one and a quarter million peoplepreviously unemployed. Of the total of 22 millionsin the middle of 1944,

"47 per cent., or 10.3 millions, were inthe Services or whole time civil defence oremployed in engineering, shipbuilding,metals and chemicals-industries mainlyconcerned in the output of munitions;

"26 per cent., or 5.7 millions, were inagriculture, , mining, national and local

,government service, public utilities,transport, shipping (including the MerchantNavy), and the manufacture of food, drinkand tobacco-industries which it has beennecessary to maintain or expand duringthe war ;

"27 per cent., or six millions, were inbuilding and civil engineering, thetextile, clothing and other manufacturingindustries, the distributive trades andcivilian services.

"At the middle of 1944 7.6 million personswere engaged in the manufacturing industries(excluding mining), and of these 76 per cent.were engaged on Government work, .20 per cent.on work for the home market, and 4 per cent. inproducing goods for export. The scale ofmobilisation of man-power achieved has been fargreater than was attained in the last war. Tenmillion men born in the years 1892 to 1926 and11.6 million women born in the years 1893 to 1926have been registered for either military serviceor industrial employment. In addition, there, havebeen registrations of persons with special skill,such as coal miners and shipbuilders.

"At the middle of 1944 out of sixteen millionwomen aged fourteen to 59, 7.1 millions were inthe auxiliary services, whole-time civil defence,or industry-an increase of over two and a quartermillions since the beginning of the war,- or,counting each woman working part timeseparately, an increase of nearly two and threequarter millions. At the middle of 1944, 900,000women were doing part-time work in industryand 350,000 were doing part-time civil defencework. A great number of those who have takenup employment during the war are marriedwomen who are doing industrial work in additionto their domestic duties.

Total Armed Strength

"At "the middle of 1944 the strength of thearmed forces of the United Kingdom (includingthose locally enlisted abroad) was 4,542,000. Thetotal strength of the British -Commonwealth andEmpire forces at the middle of 1944 was 8,713,000.The number of men reported as killed, missing, orprisoner of war is not included in this total. Ifallowance is made for these and for mendischarged on medical and other grounds the.totalnumber of men who are serving or who haveserved since the outbreak or war.has been overten millions. The comparable figure for the lastwar was nine millions.

" The casualties to all ranks of the armed forcesof the United Kingdom during the first five yearsof war, as reported up to September 3rd, 1944,were :-

K illed ............................ 176,081Missing ...................... 32,275Wounded ...................... 193,788Prisoner of War ............ 154,968

STotal 563,112

" Casualties to the British Commonwealth andEmpire forces during the first five years of waras reported up to 3rd September, 1944, were

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925;963, of whom 242,995 were killed,:missing, 311;500' Wounded, and 290,865 prisoner'of war.

" From the beginning of the war to August 31st,1944, 29,629 merchant seaman serving in shipsregistered in the United Kingdom have beenkilled by enemy action at sea and 4,173 have beeninterned by the enemy: The figures exclude thenumber of merchant seaman who have beenwounded or injured.

" In addition to the casualties sustained by thearmed forces and the Merchant Navy manycivilians in the. United Kingdom have beenkilled or injured and detained in hospital by enemyaction. From the beginning of the war toJune 12th, 1944, when the flying bomb attacksbegan, 51,822 people lost their lives and 62,900were injured and detained in hospital. FromJune 13th to August 31st, 1944, 5,476 were killedand 15,918 were injured and detained in hospital.The number of civilians killed or injured anddetained in hospital in the United Kingdom sincethe outbreak of war to August 31st, 1944, was136,116, of whom 57,298 were killed. Of this totalkilled 7,250 were children and 23,757 were women.

Supply of Munitions

" Of the total supply of munitions produced by,or made available to, the British Commonwealthand Empire since the beginning of the war, it isestimated that about seven-tenths has beenproduced in the United Kingdom, while aboutone-tenth has come from other Empirecountries-making about four-fifths from BritishCommonwealth and "Empire sources. Theremaining one-fifth of the Empire supplies has-come from the United States. Of this total

American contribution nearly four-fifths has

taken the form of lend-lease and the remainder

in the form of British cash purchases. All shippingservices, as distinct from construction of merchant

vessels, have been excluded. The production of

war material by the United -Kingdom from

September, 1939, to June, 1944, was as follows :-

"Naval Vessels. Major naval vessels, 722;Mosquito naval craft 1,386 ; Other naval vessels,3,636:

"-Ground Munitions. Field, medium and heavyartillery equipments, 13,512 ; heavy anti-aircraftequipments, 6,294 ; light anti-aircraft equipments,15,324; machine guns and sub-machine guns,3,729,921 ; rifles, 2,001,949; tanks, 25,116 ;wheeled vehicles for the services, 919,111.

"Aircraft. Total aircraft, 102,609; heavybombers, 10,018; medium and light bombers,17,702 ; fighters, 38,025.

"The increase in ships has called for an evengreater increase in naval munitions. It is nownecessary to arm regular warships with manyoffensive and defensive weapons additional tothose fitted in the early stages of the war.Moreover, much additional equipment is requiredin the way of radar and wireless apparatus,control gear, and devices for protection against

Rit gus forms of enemy attack, includingsur a craft, U-boats, aircraft, and mines of themagnetic and other types. In addition practicallyevery merchant ship must be equipped withcomplete defensive armament, including many ofthe weapons and devices fitted in war vessels. Atone period the amount of merchant shipping inhand for repair was over 2,500,000 gross tons.

Changes in Equipment

" Production of munitions for the ground forcesrose steadily from the outbreak of war until early1943 and there were marked changes in the typesof equipment produced. In the cas3 of tank andanti-tank equipments, two-pounders gave placeto six-pounders and they, later, were replacedby seventeen-pounders . Ammunition not onlygrew in weight but also became morecomplicated and difficult to make. Fightingvehicles now are heavier and more highlypowered than they were, and wireless sets and,other types of signal equipment have becomemuch more elaborate.

" At the beginning of the war total deliveries ofnew aircraft were at the rate of 730 a month,and over a quarter of these were trainers. By1943 the average rate of deliveries had trebledand as measured by structure-weight hadincreased nearly six-fold; 3,889 heavy bomberswere delivered in the first six months of 1944,compared with only 41 in the whole of 1940. Theoutput of fighters showed an increase from 110a month in 1939 to 940 a month in the first halfof 1944.

"The repair of aircraft has absorbed anapprec:able proportion .of the capacity of theindustry. For every six aircraft newly producedin 1943, four aircraft underwent major repairs in

the United Kingdom.

"The iron and steel industry had previouslyrelied on large imports of iron ore. -The homeoutput of iron ore has been increased by morethan one-half since before the war. The totalsteel production has been consistently above thepre-war average (notwithstanding the need to

increase greatly the proportion of alloy and high-grade steel produced).

""A substantial contribution to the domesticsupply of steel has been made by a severecurtailment of our exports of steel products. Inthe light metals industry magnesium productionis more than eleven times the pre-war rate-anachievement which has meant the creation ofvirtually a new industry.

" Since 1941 our manufacturing resources havebeen turned from export production to still moreurgent uses. The value of United Kingdomcommercial exports has fallen from £471,000,000in 1938 to £232,000,000 in 1943. Attempts have

been made, so far as possible, to export goodswhich do not make great demands on manpower.Thus exports of spirits have been continued.Exports of textiles, which are produced mainlyby female labour, have declined less than those

of engineering products. The export of motor-cars and commercial vehicles has virtually ceasedsince 1941, and the amounts of iron and steel.manufactures, machinery and coal sent tooverseas markets have been drastically cut.

Increased Taxes

" With a larger number of persons in employmentor in the services, increased hours of work andhigher money earnings, the total incomes ofprivate persons before taxation rose from£4,779,000,000 to £7,708,000,000 between 1938 and1943. Most of this increase has, however, beensaved or taken by the Government in. the form ofincome-tax and other direct taxes.

" The number of income-tax payers has beenincreased from 4,000,000 in 1938-39 to 13,000,000in 1943-44, and the income-tax payable by themfrom £336,000,000 to £1,183,000,000. Before thewar less than 1,000,000 manual wage-earnerswere liable to income-tax and they paid £3,000,000;in 1943-44 the number increased to 7,000,000 andthey paid £200,000,000. A person with an earnedincome of £10,000 a year now pays more thantwo-thirds of his income in income-tax and surtax.Of the aggregate incomes of persons with £250to £500 a year 3 per cent, was paid in income-taxin 1938 and 142 per cent. in 1942. Of the aggregateincomes of persons with £500 to £1,000 a year,11 per cent. was paid in income-tax-in 1939 and28 per cent. in 1942. Business and corporatebodies, no less than persons, have been called uponto pay increased taxes during the war. Apartfrom the increase of income-tax, an excess profits

'tax of 60 per cent. was imposed in 1939, and thiswas increased to 100 per cent. in 1940. The taxpaid on beer and tobacco alone was more than£600,000,000 in 943-about two-thirds of the totalrevenue from all sources collected by the CentralGovernment in a single year before the war.

" While the Governmeft Ion luxury and less essential articthe same time, adopted the policy of givsubsidies to keep down the level of prices or foodand other essential goods. The amount expendedin subsidies for this purpose was £190,000,000 in1943.

" Private saving (the savings of persons andbusinesses) have increased from £351,000,000 in1938 to £1,749,000,000 in 1943. By far the greaterpart of this increase was accounted for by therise in personal savings, which increased nearlyninefold between 1938 and 1943.

" Since the war began there has been an increaseof about 10 per cent. in the total number ofrailway passenger journeys. To a considerableextent this rise has been caused by the increasedtravelling of members of the British forces andof the large number of American and other alliedforces stationed in the United Kingdom. Thenumber of passenger train miles is now 30 percent. below the pre-war level, and the averageload carried by passenger trains is 125 per cent.greater than before the war.

"The total number of private cars licensed hasfallen from 2,000,000 in August, 1939, to 700,000at the beginning of 1944, and their use has beenrestricted to essential purposes. The amount ofmotor spirit used for private cars is now onlyabout one-eighth of what it was before the war.Considerable restrictions have been imposed onomnibus services.

"Out of about 3,000,000 houses in the UnitedKingdom at the outbreak of war 4,500,000 havebeen damaged by enemy action. Of those, 202,000have been totally destroyed or damaged beyondrepair. A substantial number of those serious'ydamaged are still unhabitable, and the greatmajority have not vet been fully repaired."

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WITH THE INCREASINGLY frequent appearanceof ME 262 turbo-jet fighters over both theMunich area and Western Front, the announce-ment from London that Gloster Meteors havebeen in action for some time, against flyingbombs, and a recent release by Washington ofadvance details of the Bell P.59, it may beopportune to review briefly the course of progressin this new field of aircraft development.

For reasons of security, unfortunately, such areview must exclude all but slender reference tothe important strides made in both experimentaland production stages by Allied engineers. Thisaspect it is hoped to cover at a later date. Inthe meantime, much that is interesting can befound from a study of jet-unit developmentwithin the Luftwaffe.

Intelligence summaries have already given anindication of what is happening in Germany bothon the ground and in the air. These appreciationshave been supplemented by accounts of combats-revealing new tactics and startling performancefigures-and by, tentative details of enemy jet-propelled fighters obtained from captured docu-ments, information given by prisoners of war,and reports on crashed aircraft. This advanceintelligence, issued as it became available, hascontained, necessarily, a number of statementssince found to need modification. It has now beencarefully revised and correlated, and, with certainadditional notes, forms the basis of this survey.

The Principles of Jet-Propulsion

While all four heat engines-the steam engine,steam turbine, internal combustion engine andgas turbine-convert heat to power through themedium of expanding .gasses, the former threerely also on the pressure of the gas against the

100 lbs. per square inch in the internalcombustion engine to 2,300 lbs. per square inchin the steam engine. In the gas turbine, however,energy is provided entirely by the force ofexpansion, the pressure rise (to only about75 lbs. per square inch) being purely incidental.

The principle of the gas turbine-which is theprinciple of jet-propulsion-is fundamentallysimple. Air is sucked into- a container,compressed, and admitted to a combustionchamber where its oxygen combines with thehydrocarbons of a spray-injected petroleum fuelto produce a hot flame. At 1,000 deg. F. or more,the gas product of this combustion, now by virtueof expansion standing under considerablepressure, is passed at high speed through aventuri nozzle directed against the vanes of aturbine, the shaft of which, in the case of a gasturbine used as a prime mover, is coupled to thesecondary mover.

It is in this detail-the form in which the energyis transferred-that lies the difference betweenthe gas turbine and the jet-propulsion unit. Thelatter functions in exactly the same cycle ofoperations as regards air intake, compression andcombustion of gasses, but employs the turbinewheel merely as a component of the machine todrive the impellor, and utilises the energy- oftheexpanding gas, not, as with the gas turbine, torotate a shaft, but-by process of exhausting thisgas through a rear venturi-to produce a thrust,which, by equal and opposite reaction, providesthe motive power normally supplied by aninternal combustion engine.

The thermal efficiency (percentage of heatenergy in the fuel converted into useful energy)of a simple gas turbine is 17 to 22 per cent.,depending on operating-temperature and design.

cylinder head-this varyi ilising exhaust heat will raiseD[3;

this figure to 27 per ce. ; two compressors aidan intercooler (a device f:r -eobling the, air aftercompression) will increase it to 28 to 30 per cent.;and the fitting of a re-heat combustion chamberand a second turbine will bring the figure up to30 to 32 per cent. When metals can be developedto stand a temperature of 1,500 deg. or more,the thermal efficiency will be even higher.

With aircraft the importance of this isapparent-a power unit utilising its - fuel tomaximum efficiency offering the choice ofimproved performance through a decrease inweight or, alternatively, longer range withoutproportionate increase in fuel load.

Although all -jet-propelled aircraft work on thesame basic principle, they must be separated intotwo distinct classes-those powered by axial-flowturbo-jet units, which draw their oxygen fromthe atmosphere (the type referred to above),and those in which the oxygen is carried in liquidform within the fuselage or nacelle. In the caseof the former, the maximum height capable ofachievement will be approximately 67,000 ft.-beyond which level air becomes too thin forcompression. For the latter, the limiting factoris entirely one of size-an aircraft with sufficientfuel (ethyl-alcohol and liquid oxygen) beingcapable, in theory, of flight to the moon.

Basic Types of Unit

As stated above,- jet units are of two types-theliquid-rocket jet and the axial-flow turbo-jet. Bothutilise. the energy of expanding gasses, but differfrom each other in mechanism and working.While the forms described below are typical andillustrative of the main characteristics, variationsin detail, as with all other engines, will be foundin the various units fitted to aircraft.

The mechanism of the rocket-jet unit asemployed in the HS.293 glider bomb and theME.163 fighter (see pages 110 and 117) is asfollows. C02 at 150 atm. provides pressure toforce the two working liquids, hydrogen peroxideand potassium permanganate into the combustionchamber, where initiation is by an explosivecharge which punctures a diaphragm in the mainair line. The pressure in the combustion chamberis estimated to be 30 atm., the temperature ofthe gasses prior to emission through the jet isprobably about 1,200 deg. C., and the thrustproduced thereby is of the order of 1,900 lbs.(N.B.-These figures are for HS.293. Figures forME.163 not available). Endurance of the HS'.293unit is approximately eleven seconds, and thatof the ME.163 unit approximately seven-tenminutes. (N.B.-The abnormally short enduranceof these units as compared with other types ofpower unit may. at first sight create a false andunfavourable impression as to their usefulness. Itshould be kept in mind that power output froma jet-propulsion unit is very high and concentrated,and that it is used -only in short bursts-theaircraft or bomb depending in large part ongliding as a planned flight-condition).

By reason of the weight imposed through thenecessity of carrying its own oxygen in the fuel,

the liquid-rocket unit is of limited useoand in' most types, including the ME.262 twi Yunit fighter, the AR.234, the Gloster Meteor, theBell P.59 and the Lockheed P.80, axial-flowturbo-jet pattern units are employed.

This type of unit has already been described inoutline. It operates on diesel oil (or kerosene orlow-grade.petrol) and is normally set in motionby a small mobile gasolene engine or an electricmotor that disengages when the jet-unit startsup. In the case of the ME.262, where the motorsare Jumo. 004s, fuel is admitted to each com-bustion chamber between the eight-stagecompressor and the turbine, and the power outputis controlled by a streamline valve in the dischargeSventuri-the estimated maximum speed of theunit being approximately 8,700 R.P.M., the staticsea-level thrust approximately 1,950 lbs. and thefuel consumption approximately 440/500 gallonsper unit per hour at sea-level.

Four Fuels Employed

The rocket-jet unit installed in the A.4 LongRange Rocket (see page 121) employs four fuels-two main and two subsidiary for driving theturbine-and is contained entirely within the shellcasing of the projectile. It works on the bi-liquidprinciple, whereby ethyl-alcohol and liquid oxygenare combined to produce a high-temperature gas,the gas being exhausted through a venturi in thetail. Components are containers for each fuel(the alcohol tank insulated against freezing),turbine-driven centrifugal pumps for transferringthe fuels from tanks to combustion chamber, anda steel venturi closed at the combustion end bya battery of burner cups. As the rate of transferis very high, both- containers are pressurised-the alcohol tank by nitrogen from bottles, and theoxygen tank by a quantity of oxygen by-passedthrough a heat exchanger and returned in theform of gas. The turbine driving the pumps isoperated normally by an independent powrer unit,using as fuel (possibly) hydrogen peroxide andpotassium permanganate "solution (see note aboveon HS.293 and ME.163 units). To combatexcessive heat build-up and transfer in the com-bustion chamber and venturi, this element isdouble-walled for liquid cooling- over the greaterpart of its length.

In operation, oxygen is passed by pipe line tosprayer roses in each of the burner cups, whilealcohol is fed in similar manner to jets in thewalls of the cups. The combination of theseliquids produces a great quantity of hot gaswhich, developing considerable pressure throughexpansion, is exhausted, under control, through aventuri.

A further variation in jet-propulsion practiceis seen in the FZG.76 Flying Bomb; where thepower unit consists of a new form of athodyd(impulse-duct engine) surmounted on the fuselageof the bomb. This unit comprises a metal shell,the front containing a rectangular grilleincorporating twelve jets and an arrangement ofshutters, which close when the pressure inside

iF>E

Ar. 234. First seen in the air on 21st November, 1944. Probably in limitedproduction.

the shell is greater than that in front of the grilleand open when the reverse condition obtains. Thejets, disposed in three rows, project into thecombustion ends of three venturi tubes, and thecharge is ignited by a sparking plug placedapproximately 16 ins. to the rear of the grille.Fuel tanks of 150 gallons capacity are carriedwithin the bomb fuselage, together with awirebound spherical bottles containing c d

air for forcing the fuel up into the combustionchamber.

In operation, a charge of air is admitted bythe grille, fuel is forced through the inductionpipe and jets, and combustion takes place byelectrical ignition. The rise of pressure inside

chamber closes the spring leaves behind thee:, and the expanding gasses expel throughenturi. As the pressure in the combustion

This Caproni " Campini" flew 168 miles in December, 1941.

chamber falls and the shutters open, a freshcharge of air is admitted and the cycle repeated.

The unit operates intermittently in conformitywith the opening and closing of the shutters.and produces a noise remiiscent of a single-cylinder motor-cycle engine running slowly. Fuelsupply is continuous but fluctuating, beingregulated to maintain correct mixture forvariations in forward speed and altitude. Ignitionduring flight is caused by the hot or flamingresidue of gas remaining in the duct.

Early Development in Italy

To attempt an historical survey of jet-propul-sion development would call for considerablymore data than is at present available. Thefollowing review, therefore, offers not acomprehensive record, but a resume of miscell-aneous information, presented, so far as ispracticable, in chronological order. That detailscovering the early period are somewhat thread-bare and disjointed is acknowledged. The factsavailable were few, and in most cases of littlemore than tertiary interest. Of late, however,the straw has been more plentiful and of richerquality. It is hoped that such account as isgiven of more recent events will, in measure,compensate for the frugality of the openingchapter.

First in the field of jet-propulsion was theall-metal Caproni Campini, produced in Italysome time before the war and illustratedabove. This aircraft, a low-wing monoplaneconventional in appearance but for absence

of airscrew and the unusually large cross sectionof the fuselage at the rear, was powered by acomposite unit in which drive for the impellorof the turbo-jet element was supplied by asmall internal combustion engine. Figures ofperformance are conflicting, but the mostreliable reports give the maximum speed asapproximately 445 m.p.h.

This is probably the only jet-aircraft to reachproduction stage in Italy ; certainly no Italianjet-propelled fighters have appeared and, so faras is known, this form' of power unit has notbeen adopted for heavier aircraft.

Progress Made by Germany

Germany, on the other hand, concentratingincreasingly on jet-development for somethingover three years, has made considerable progress,and is now operating at least three types offighter, in addition to the FZG.76 Flying Bomb,the A.4 Long-range Rocket, and a jet-unit forassisted take-off. The well-known aeronauticalauthority and last war ace-pilot, Ernst Udet-a power in R.L.M. (German Air Ministry) beforehis death-sponsored the movement and guidedits policy, and all the principal manufacturers,with Messerschmitt in the lead, have aircraftin experimental and/or production stages.Messerschmitt design has been administered bythe glider expert, Dr. Lippitsch, and that ofHe chel by the direktor, Dr.J ~nchel. Heinkelsfo ry tothefountain

he

Heinkel 280. Production of these aircraft, undertaken at Vienna Schwechat, wassuspended after the Allied air offensive against German fighter production.

Hauptmann Wolfgang Spate (a fighter ace andStaffelkapitan in J.G.54) and the famous womanFlugkapitan, Hanna Reitsch-who flew theprototype HE.280 over a year ago.

The operational exploitation of jet-propulsionby Germany falls conveniently into three stages.The first dates from the introduction in summer,1943, of the HS.293 radio-controlled glider boinb-a miniature pilotless aircraft incorporating a600 kg. bomb, launched from a carrier fixed tothe underside of a DO.217 mainplane. This-thefirst jet-propelled aircraft to be used operationally-was the parent and forerunner of the FZGFlying Bomb, also a pilotless miniature aircraftbut one now powered by an improved-type unitutilising atmospheric oxygen and capable ofconsiderably longer endurance.

Flying bombs, as is all too well known, wereoriginally launched against Southern Englandfrom static platforms sited along a wide lengthof coast centred on the Pas de Calais, andpossessed a range of approximately 150 miles.They disclosed marked progress both in thedevelopment of jet-units and in their adaptationto aircraft practice, and have led, logically, to thefinal stage-the introduction of full-size pilot-controlled fighters, capable of outstandinand climb, and, when

> , I

containing their own oxygen, of revolutionaryperformance at high altitude.

Rockets, assisted take-off units, and unitsprovided as complementary to internal combustionengines, although important, represent ancillarydevelopment and do not mark definite progressstages. Reference to their characteristics andfunctions is made later.

First Application to Aircraft

The early research and experimental work forthe HS.293 jet-propelled radio-controlled gliderbomb-stated to be a development, by Dr. Wagner,of a French invention made at Bensangon--wasundertaken in 1941-1942 by a unit known asE and L Kdo. This unit, based at Garz (islandof Usedom, Baltic Sea) and equipped withDO.217Es, merged later into - II/KG.100 andmoved in spring, 1943, to Istres le Tube, nearMarseilles, for attacks on Western Mediterraneanconvoys, and then to cognac, north of Bordeaux,for operations in the Bay of Biscay.

While no complete specimen of this gliderbomb has fallen into Allied hands, sufficientfragments have been recovered for a fairdes i be furnished.

is a minature all-metal mid-winge h a span of 10 ft. 3 ins. and an

• -: .. -.. -a -. - -

overall length of 12 ft. 4 ins. Five feet of the of the FZG.76 Flying Bomb is entirely of steel.front section of the fuselage comprise a warhead Construction is robust, and the design has beencontaining a normal Rheinmetall impact fuse and simplified for ease of production. The fuselagea filling of Amatol or Trialen: the rear portion is is of sections bolted together, the centre bayhollow and houses a stabilising gyro, a self- holding two spherical compressed air bottles ofdestruction device, and the radio-control unit. 1 ft. 9 ins. diameter and a fuel tank of 150The power element-a bi-liquid rocket type jet- gallons, the front section enclosing the warheadpropulsion unit, as described earlier-is fitted in and magnetic compass, and the rear compartmenta sheet-alloy shell suspended below the fuselage, housing the automatic pilot, gyros, and servoand comes automatically into action when the mechanism for operating the control surfaces. Theglider is released from its carrier under the jet-propulsion unit, of the aerQthermodynamic-mainplane-control thereafter being by radio duct pattern (impulse-duct engine), following afrom the parent aircraft. Schmidt patent of 1943 (described earlier), is

For strikes against shipping at- sea and in contained in a sheet-metal shell, 11 ft. 3 ins. long,harbour-the only use to which this weapon has surmounted on the rear-half of the fuselage. Twobeen put, and where, in the Mediterranean, it models, distinguishable only in size, have beenwas normally employed against escort vessels identified. One has a tapered mainplane of 16 ft.(leaving the JU.88s accompanying the DO.217s to span, the other a wing of parallel chord withattack the merchant ships with torpedoes)--the squared tips and a span of 17 ft. 6 ins. Thebomb was usually released with the DO.217 in smaller model, 25 ft. 4 ins. long overall, carrieslevel flight, distant three to five miles from the a warhead comparable in weight and blast effecttarget and at altitude 3,000 to 5,000 ft. Observers to the SB.1,000 kg. bomb.report that launching was made not directly at Control of the weapon in flight is effectedthe ship, but when the parent aircraft was flying solely by an automatic pilot monitered by aon a parallel course-thereafter the bomb being magnetic compass housed in the nose. The masterturned in towards the target, aiming by eye gyro is caged during the initial acceleration andalone. It is reasonably established that the released automatically as the flying bomb leavesHS.293 was released at 200 m.p.h. and climbed the launching ramp. When the bomb has climbedrapidly, drawing away from the DO.217 during to a pre-determined height, a barometric capsule,the period in which the thrust was acting and through a servo motor, tilts the mounting of thethus coming up into the bomb-aimer's vision, main gyro gimbol and sets the automatic pilotReaching a speed of approximately 350 to for level flight-the duration of which is400 m.p.h. by the time fuel was expanded and controlled by an air-log.thrust cut off, the bomb assumed a,steady glide of After the pre-set mileage has been travelled,around 23 deg., flattened out on approaching its detonators fired by the air-log unit free atarget, and finished its flight at approximately spring-loaded lever on the tail which instant-250 m.p.h. aneously locks the elevators, operates a guillotine

Used regularly in convoy attacks and against to sever the pick-up pipes and lockthe rudder,invasion shipping off Salerno and Anzio, this and releases catches to deflect two spoilers belowweapon, although causing some sinkings and the tail plane, causing the bomb to dive.damage, has not proved formidable. The maindrawback seems to have been the difficulty While performance figures are very conflicting,

presented to-the' bomb-aimer in lining up from well authenticated reports indicate that the true

a moving aircraft. Other explanations offered air-speed may be approximately 350 to 400 m.p.h.

by prisoners, of war indicate trouble yith and the normal operational height about 2,300 ft.

directing mechanism, inefficient assembly, and During a period of 80 days systematic

failures due to humidity entering " loaded" cases bombardment of Southern England, the enemyin storage. launched more than 8,000 of these bombs, of

which approximately 2,300 reached the GreaterThe FZG.76 Flying Bomb London area. In the first week of the attack

The FZG.76 Flying Bomb, product of the about 33 per cent. were intercepted and 35Peenemunde Research iStation and successor to per cent. found their target; by the end of twothe HS.293 glider bomb, made its operational and a half months some 70 per cent. of bombsdebut on 13th June, 1944, when, shortly after were being shot down and only 9 per ceit.dawn, the first of, a series of long anticipated getting through the combined defences. On 28thattacks was launched against Greater London. August, 1944, out of 101 bombs whichIt was on small scale, and only four missiles approached the South Coast, four only reachedwere subsequently located. Although each had London and 97 were destroyed. Of the totalexploded, sufficient fragments remained for accounted for over the period, fighters claimedscientists to assemble a fair description of the no fewer than 1,900.weapon and an estimate of its capabilities. Thisearly picture has since been elaborated and r in oomodified as a result of fuller examinations, and ;thi hthe ' lS otionis now comprehensive. concinerning jjth e r d ser-

Apart from the extreme nose and control schmitt jet-fige s p ntsurfaces which .are of light metal, the structure work at Augsburg as far back as have

mie

Provis. onai Drawing of the ME.262 in flight.

given descriptions of a tailless aircraft, referredto as "Die Motte" (Moth), seen at Peenemundein the spring of 1943. There is evidence alsothat Eprobungskommando 262, a unit engagedin the perfecting of, the ME.262 and in thetraining of pilots to fly it, was stationed atLechfeld during the early part of 1944.

The "Motte" is now known to be the ME.163,and the P/W who saw it at Peenemunde statedthat the aircraft jettisoned its wheels aftertake-off, climbed rapidly at a steep angle, andlanded, after a gentle glide, on skids.

ME.163s, identified at Zwischenahn in April,1944, have appeared recently at Lechield, Jesau,Zwischenahn and Wittmundhafen. Preparationsfor the operation of these aircraft-the clue towhich appears to be a group of five smallbuildings that apparently play a specialised partin the servicing of the aircraft-have also beenobserved at Oranienburg, Brandenburg, Parchim,Ardorf and other airfields. The first sightingof an ME.163 in the air was by an Eighth AirForce B.17 crew on 25th April, 1944. The enemykept his distance and there was no combat.

Details of the activity at Lechfeld, some ofwhich have since been confirmed, indicate thatthis was a base for advanced training for theME.262, and that pilots before handling the new

jet-fighter were given dual on ME.llOs andME.410s. An early statement on the ME.262described the take-off and landing speed as about150 m.p.h. the maximum speed at 15,000 ft. asapproximately 500 m.p.h., and the rate of climbas five minutes to 30,000 ft. Recent combatreports indicate that the figures quoted for thisaircraft and for the ME.163 do not exaggerate

their performance.

The ME.262, first identified on the ground atSchwabisch-Hal on 25th June, 1944, and seenrecently in, numbers at Leipham, Augsburg,Kitzingen, Lechfeild, Neuburg and Rechlin Larz,was first met in combat one month later; sincewhich date these aircraft have been increasinglyactive on both the Western Front and in theMunich. area. An account of one engagementwith a Mosquito follows the detail description ofthe ME.262 given below.

Pioduction of the ME.262, standing in January,1944, at approximately 100/150 aircraft permonth, may be expected to reach 300/500 amonth in the near future; these figures are ofnotable importance in view of the increasing oilshortage in Germany.

In additioIt- Wesserschmitt programme,kee el vo proelled aircraft in the

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ield, the HE 280 and. Heinkel " T." AlthoughSch erhauit7:'( na) was the scene of -consider-able HE.280 activity for some time, neither ofthese aircraft has yet been encountered. Arloshave one model, the AR.234, with a speed ofapproximately 450 to 500 m.p.h., the first ofwhich was seen by an Eighth Air Force forma-tion on 21st November, 1944; Dorniers are knownto be busy with jet-propulsion at their Lowenthalfactory; and another jet-aircraft, provisionallydesignated the " 66," has been seen recently atRechlin.

Development of Airfields

It is apparent that very large airfields arenecessary for the ME.262 and ME.163, runwaysof the minimum length of 2,000 yds. with goodapproaches being essential. These requirementsare an embarrassment to Germany, where air-fields within the country have been rarely usedfor basing operational units and where' little hasbeen done until recently to improve the G.A.F.stations of 1939.

Reference was made above to certain airfieldsalready identified as associated with the ME.262and ME.163. To these lists can be addedGiebelstadt, Holn, Hapsten, Lubek Blankensee andMuhldorf in Germany itself; Aalborg, Grove,Skrydatrup, Tiratrup and Vandel in Denmark;and Eggemoen and Haslemoen in Norway. Thesedo not constitute the whole. The most strikinglengths, yet observed are 3,360 yds. at Hapstenand 3,250 yds. at Lechfeld. The normal averageappears to be around 2,200 yds.

-From the location of these improved bases itis clear that the enemy is mainly concernedwith forming a line of airfields from which jet-fighters can attempt to shut the door to bomberforces routed between Holland and Norway. Atpresent somewhat less effort is being concentratedin Southern Germany, where defence seems to becentred on Giebelstadt, Schwabisch-Halt, Neuburg,Lechfeld and Muhldorf.

The ME.262 Turbo-Jet Fighter

The ME.262 is given priority in descriptionbecause it has been seen in the greatest numbers,and appears, up to the moment, to be the enemy'sforemost jet-fighter and ground-attack aircraft.

Capture intelligence and statements by prisonersof war describe the ME.262 as a single-seatall-metal mid-wing monoplane of conventionalappearance and high finish. It is saidto be 34 ft. 9 ins. long, with a single fin andrudder and swept-back square-tipped mainplanesof 41 ft. span, incorporating twin underslungnacelles. Weight and wing-loading are mentionedas approximately 10,000 lbs. and 44.5 lbs. persquare foot respectively. The undercarriage, ofthe retractable tricycle pattern, has short oleo--legs giving minimum clearance when the aircraftis on the ground.

Propulsion is by two Junkers TL axial-flowpower units (Jumo 004s), the turbines of whichare set in motion by small'two-stroke gaofe

77oe

engines mounted at the front of the motor assem-blies: Four self-sealing tanks, containing approxi-mately 400 gallons diesel oil, are installed underand behind the pilot's seat. (N.B.-Additionaltankage in the rear part of the fuselage andunder the pilot's feet provides a further 180gallons).

While reported performance figures varyconsiderably-527 m.p.h. was reached during.earlytrials at Augsburg-cruising and maximum speedsmay be of the order of 500 and 550-plus m.p.h.respectively. An estimated rate of climb of atleast 5,000 ft. per minute at high altitude isprobable.

It is interesting to note by comparison thatthe latest model FW.190 (DB.603 engine), witha wing loading of about 48.5 lbs. per squarefoot, has a maximum speed of approximately450 m.p.h. at 23,000 ft. and needs approximately15 minutes to reach 32,000 ft., while the AmericanMustang P.51 D (Packard V.1650 engine) hasa speed of 437 m.p.h. at 30,000 ft. and needsthirteen minutes to reach this altitude.

Jet-Fighters in Action

On 25th July, 1944, a P/R Mosquito operatingfrom Great Britain was intercepted at 29,000 ft.over Munich by a twin-engined fighter believedto be a ME.262. The enemy outdistanced thereconnaissance aircraft and, in an engagementlasting fifteen minutes, delivered attacks at800 yds. from both rear and below. He wasthen eluded and the Mosquito, suffering onlyslight damage, managed to cross the Alps andland in Italy.

This engagement, the first reported with ajet-propelled aircraft, has since been followedby almost daily combats on the Western Front,by encounters by M.A.A.F. formations attackingindustrial targets in Southern Germany, and byregular interceptions of aircraft on photo-recon-naissance in and around the Munich area. In

-connection with the latter missions, and as asidelight on the importance of photographic coverof this sector, it is of interest to note that P/RMosquitoes now fly with an escort of P.51s orP.38s.

Although the ME.262 is considerably fasterand superior in climb to the normal fighter athigh altitude, it can be out-turned at any speedand out-climbed at low altitude. For evasiveaction, climbing turns and steep turns are recom-mended, while, at heights above 15,000 ft., thehalf-roll and steep dive has proved effective(the ME.262 cannot be dived at over 30 degs.due to structural limitations). It is also impor-tant to remember that the fuel consumption ofthe jet-fighter is abnormally high at sea-level,and that, for this reason, it is unlikely to con-tinue any engagement at nought feet.

SA Mosquito Meets an ME.262

From a wide selection of combat reports thefollowing is chosen as possibly the most illuminat-ing. t a ncerns a P/R Mosquito over South

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This Mosquito-on a mission to photographGunzburg/Leipham airfield-had an uneventfuloutward journey, covering the last leg at30,000 ft. with indicated air-speed 220 m.p.h. Onapproaching the target the pilot checked all-clearon both sides and made a 90-deg. diving turn onto the aerodrome. He then levelled out for hisphotographic run, glanced up at the rear mirror-and saw an ME.262, 400 yds. astern and closingrapidly.

Spare tanks were jettisoned, engines given fullboost and revs. and the aircraft put into astarboard turn (" Why? Because we usually doa port turn on to the target, and instinctivelyI thought the enemy would expect me to gothat way"). Simultaneously the ME,262 openedup with 30 mm. cannon, hitting the port aileronand elevator and demolishing the protrudingnacelle. The Mosquito, with throttles jammedand no portside control, started to spin-a semi-flat spin that became tighter and more rapidas the ground grew nearer.

At 19,000 ft., after trying conventional recoverytactics without success, the port pitch-lever wasbrought back and with this the spin slowed up.Stick and rudder did -the rest and the aircraftcame on to a level keel. The observer, pinnedin the nose, crawled out and gave the I.A.S. inthe spin as 420 (true air-speed 580 m.p.h.)-healso reported that the enemy was closing fora second attack.

Unable to take starboard evasive action orexceed 210 m.p.h., the pilot turned again toport-well inside the jet-fighter who tried tofollow this manoeuvre but overshot by miles.That the Mosquito was unarmed-with anythingbut a camera it could have destroyed the ME.262in the first attack-must now have been evident

'to the enemy, who came back eleven times(without scoring another hit!), making threeattacks head-on, two from the quarter, two fromthe beam and four more from astern.

This engagement lasted forty minutes, andwhen eventually the Mosquito escaped into cloud-- at 8,500 ft., after a last desperate attempt toram the ME.262-it was over Schwaz, 90 milesfrom peiphm. Here the mountains are 8,000 ft.high. The altimeter was working, but most ofthe other instruments, including the artificialhorizon, had by now become unserviceable.

The Mosquito made base. To use the pilot'swords on entering the circuit: "Just give ustwo wheels and we'll be all right." The wishwas not granted. The hydraulics had been shotaway and the emergency system would not work-nor would the radio. There was only onething for it-at 400 ft. switches were cut andthe aircraft trimmed for a belly landing. Boththe pilot and observer '"stepped out." Theyreported that the Merlin engines had been atfull-boost for two hours-the normal limit is fiveminutes-and, although a bit tired, had nevermissed a beat. Seven minutes petrol remainedin the tanks.

The iThe ME.163 fighter, n ipwo Ph

Peenemunde 30 or "Die Mott" rreprisoner of war statements, is of futappearence with a short bulbous "tear-drop"fuselage, sharply swept-back maiiplanes, anabnormally high fin and no horizontal tail sur-faces. In addition to the operational modeldesignated the ME.163 B (length 20 ft., span31 ft., root chord 9ft.) there is a trainer, theME.163 A, the span of which may be slightlywider. Both are powered by Walter liquid-rocketunits, the trainer having a " cold" unit andemitting a dirty-white smoke, and the fighteremploying a "hot" unit which produces greaterthrust and- emits a blue-tinged flame.

Take-off is normally effected under the air-craft's own power, but may be rocket assisted.Wheels are jettisoned after launching, and thelanding made on a centre skid. A gas-driventurbine operates the fuel pumps, and in thefighter version a small propellor in the noseprovides energy for generation of current toactuate the aircraft's instruments.

Maximum speed is 525 to 600 m.p.h. and theclimb- approximately 5,000 ft. per minute at sea-level and 10,000 ft. per minute at 40,000 ft.

-Endurance at full power, however, is only sevento ten minutes in spite of a fuel tankage statedto be 330 gallons (the reason for the bulbousfuselage). While this endurance may be extendedto three-quarters of an hour by intermittentgliding (a planned flight condition and not oneenforced), it offers an obvious limitation to theduties for which the aircraft can be employed.

The ME.163, first observed in the air on 25thApril, 1944, is now met frequently over Germanyby Eighth and Fifteenth Air Force bomberformations, and aircraft on photographic recon-naissance missions. It is easily recognised byits stubby deep fuselage and absence of tail-andby the abnormal length of its contrails-and hasbeen reported by pilots as possessing beautifullines, while appearing very manoeuvrable thoughsomewhat unsteady in flight.

Gunners of one formation put the speed' ofone ME.163 encountered at 25,000 ft. as over600 m p.h. (true air-speed), and stated that itwas impossible to track the aircraft with turretsor free. guns. Others estimated the climbingangle of this ME.163 at 50 degs. and the rate ofclimb at this angle as 5,000 ft. per minute. Inmost engagements the enemy has started hisattack in an engineless glide from above, comein from ahead or astern and gone away underpower. Attacks so far have met with no con-spicuous success and a number of ME.163s havebeen shot down. The best tactics against thisaircraft are probably those already indicated forthe ME.262.

Resum6 of Other Types

While the two essrsc tnsbove a j -pseen in a i

Di Ii

Provisional Drawing of the HE.219.

enemy jet-aircraft in experimental and productionstages. Such details as are known are givenbelow. They should be treated with considerablereserve.

Many prisoners have spoken of the HE.280and the Heinkel "T"-describing the former asa single-seat twin-ruddered mid-wing monoplaneof conventional appearance, powered by twoB.M.W. TL axial-flow units (B.M.W. 003s) andhaving a speed of approximately 500 m.p.h.. at30,000 ft., a rate of climb of 6,000 ft. per minute,and a ceiling of 47,000 ft.: and the latter as alow-wing monoplane with a barrel fuselage, lowaspect-ratio mainplanes and a large tail, poweredby a liquid-rocket unit and utilising skids inlieu of undercarriage for landing. Accordingto recent information the HE.280 has beenabandoned.

Another aircraft mentioned frequently is theAR.234. This fighter was seen by an EighthAir Force Fighter Group during a mission on21st November, 1944, but the enemy, thoughmaking a pass, did not join combat. It isdescribed as a single-seat twin turbo-jetmonoplane having a slim fuselage upswept toa high-set tail unit, high aspect-ratio mainplaneswith pronounced taper on trailing edge, singlefin and rudder and tricycle undercarriage.Length is 36 ft. to 38 ft. and wing span 45 ft.to 47 ft. Jet-units are stated to be B.M.W.,presumably' Type 003. Power output of these

'units is considered comparable with that of theJumo.004s installed ' 26 v.; se-lvv l

1 1. • . . ,

static thrust approximately 1,950 lbs. per unit,and fuel consumption 1.25 lbs. per hour per ib.thrust. Take off is said to be rocket assistedand speed 400 to 500 m.p.h. at 13,000 to 16,000 ft.

Messerschmitt development, in addition to theME.262 and ME.163, may include a fighterreferred to as the Dusenjager Modell Regensburg(Jet-propelled fighter Regensburg model) andanother single-seat aircraft designated the ME.328.The Regensburg was reported as about thesame size as an ME.109, with a nose resemblingthe Italian Caproni Campini (indicating aturbo-jet power unit), a speed of 450 m.p.h. atoptimum height and a ceiling of 40,000 ft. TheME.328 (the existence of which-actual orprojected-has been confirmed from a captureddocument) is stated to be a single-seat metalaircraft of about \20 ft. span, possessing amaximum speed of 525 m.p.h. In Septemberlast, a good source mentioned this aircraft asin production by a firm called Neu-America nearBressanone. A suggestion has been venturedthat the ME.328 may be employed as a rammingaircraft-there is no confirmation of this, butthe very small span and reported low endurancelends credence to the idea.

A recently interrogated prisoner, ex-employeeat the Vienna/Schwechat Heinkel Factory, hasprovided details of another alleged development-the HE.343. This was described as a four-jetmulti-seat mid-wing monoplane, with the tailunit set high in manner similar to the Westland

f t

Now in active pioduction in the United States

Chain drive to external control vanes. 10. Pipe leading from alcohol tank to warhead.

Electric motor. 11. Nose probably fitted with nose switch,or other device for operating warhead

Burner cups. fuze.

Alcohol supply from pump. 12.* Conduit carrying wires to nose of

Air bottles. warhead.

} 13. Central exploder tube.Rear joint ring and strong point for 13. Cenal exploder tube.

transport. 14. Electric fuze for warhead.

Servo-operated alcohol outl

Rocket shell construction.Radio equipment.strong point for

Radio equipment. rt.

18. Pitch and azimuth gyros.

19. Alcohol filling point.

20. Double walled alcohol delivery pipe topump.

21. Oxygen filling point.

22. Concertina connections.

23. Hydrogen peroxide tank.

24. Tubular frame holding turbine and pumpassembly.

25. Permanganate tank (gas generator unitbehind this tank).

26. Oxygen distributor from pump.

27. Alcohol pipes for subsidiary cooling.

28. Alcohol inlet to double wall.

29. Electro-hydraulic servo motors.

30. Aerial leads.

Whirlwind. Two jet-units were reported asmounted under each mainplane, one at the centreof gravity and one forward of it. Apparentlythis aircraft-if existing-is in very early stageof development. Its length is stated to be about54 ft. and its wing span slightly higher thanthis figure.

Like "a Tired Pigeon"

The only other report available comes fromOranienburg, and is of a small tailless machinewith "tear-drop " fuselage and sharply swept-back mainplanes possessing such marked adhedralthat the aircraft at rest, according to theinformant, "bore the appearance of a tiredpigeon."

Details of this aircraft-for which there is noconfirmation--are particularly interesting. Thefuselage, circular in cross section, has a maximumdiameter of 5 ft. and a length of, 11 ft. 6 ins.,and the wing roots extend from immediately aftof the plastic nose to within a few inches ofthe rear end. Except for a large air-inlet duct,the nose is transparent plastic on all sides, whilethe rear end of the fuselage resembles a cylinderperforated by 25 circular holes.

Although provision is made for a pilot (tolay prone), the informant stated that this air-craft was always flown without one-remotecontrol being from a mobile cabinet on the air-field. No details of launching or landing are'available (the former is alleged to take placefrom a thirty-foot vertical metal track), nor isanything known as to performance.

Jet-Units for Supplementary Power

In addition to the use of jet-propulsion forprimary power-units in aircraft, it is beingadopted for other purposes-in particular tosecure extra power for take-off, and to supple-ment internal combustion engines and therebygive increased speed and/or range to aircraftso provided.

From a number of assisted take-off setsexamined, it appears that the 'apparatus com-prises a hi-liquid rocket-type jet-unit (of thepattern used in the HS.293 glider bomb, andsimilar in principle to the power element of theME.163) installed in a streamlined light-alloynacelle. These units are attached to the under-side of the aircraft's mainplane and jettisonedafter take-off. To enable units to be safely landedand re-used, a self-opening parachute using astatic line is incorporated. It has been knownfor some time that JU.88s have employed jettison-able rocket-units for take-off, control switchesbeing a standard fitting in this aircraft.

Little information is available on supplementaryunits, although prisoners have stated that experi-ments to incorporate these in the ME.410, theDO.217 and the HE.219 are in progress. In thecase of the ME.410 (two DB.603A2 engines) aturbo-jet unit is said to be fitted in the fuselageand-to add approximately 100 m.p h. to the speed,while with the DO.217 (two B.M.W 801A. engines)the unit is reported as fixed above the fuselage

and used only after switching off the internalcombustion engines when the aircraft has reacheda suitable height In the HE.219 (two DB.603s)the turbo-jet unit, about 20 ft.. long and 3 ft.diameter, is contained in a nacelle below thefuselage at the crossing of the mainplanes. Staticthrust at sea-level is estimated at approximately3,000 Ibs.

It is of interest to note in connection with theDO.217, that a further report states that trialswere recently carried out at Hoersching with anew turbo-jet fighter iiounted pick-a-back onthe Dornier.

The A.4 Long-Range Rocket

The information given above on jet-propulsionas applied -to enemy fighters and take-off units,concludes the resume so far as aircraft andaircraft ancillary equipment is concerned. Oneother important development has been seen-thelong-range rocket.

Rumours of rockets of enormous dimensionsbecame current towards the end of 1943, whenprisoners of war spoke of experiments and trialsat Peeneunde, Luneburger Heide and the islandof Rugen with projectiles described vaguely asvarying in weight from two to 80 tons. Theseweapons, reported to be radio-controlled, werealleged to climb almost vertically at comparativelylow speed and emit orange flame and cloudsof dark grey smoke. Rigid security was enforcedat Peenemunde and great secrecy surrounded thetrials. Crews operating the rockets were, it isstated, known as " Anti-terror Regimenter " (sic).

Best known as the V.2 from German propa-ganda attempts to picture it as a decisive weapon,the A.4 Long-range Rocket has been in useagainst Southern England since 8th September,1944. From that date until 31st December, 1944,approximately 350 incidents have occurred inEngland, considerably more in Belgium, and afew in Northern France, Holland andLuxemooury.

The performance of this rocket is phenomenal.With a take-off weight of over twelve tons (ofwhich eight and a half is fuel), it attains amaximum speed of about .5,000 ft. per second(3,400 m.p.h.), and after the power has beencut off follows a parabolic path rising to analtitude of between 60 and 70 miles.

For launching, the rocket stands in a verticalposition with its four stabilizing fins orientatedto conform with the desired azimuth bearing ofthe target. On ignition, it rises with increasingspeed and is controlled for trajectory by a pitchgyro, the axis of which is continually changedthrough the rotation of a cylindrical drumoperating a series of electrical contacts. Inflight, the rocket is held on course by an azimuthgyro and governed for range. by an integratingaccelerometer which not only cuts off the fuelwhen the correct velocity has been attained (thiswas., dpne by radio-control in earlier models),bt Ictl.s-.a I eis consequent upon ato t

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Gloster Meteor-the first R.A.F. jet-propelled aircraft.

4,635 M.P.H. Theoretically Possible

Rockets fired against England to date haveshown an average range of about 190 miles,the maximum so far being 220 miles. Whilethe velocity of these rockets at fuel cut-off pointhas been calculated as approximately 5,100 ft.per second (vertical angle of inclination to hori-zontal at this point being 33 to 39 <eg.) a velocityof 6,800 ft. per second (4,635 m.p.h.) is theoreti-cally possible, which, using the optimum angleof 41 deg., would give a range of about 340 miles.

During descent through the atmosphere, resis-tance slows the speed of the rocket to about2,500 ft. per second (1,700' m.p.h.) and in theprocess builds up considerable heat. Althoughin 25 per cent; of the incidents reported therocket has disintegrated in the air, possibly dueto over-heating, it is of no consequence as thewarhead falls intact and explodes in a normalmanner.

The A.4 Rocket is 45 ft. 10 ins. long and 5 ft;in diameter. It has a sharply pointed nose, fourstabilising fins at the rear end, and in general,shape is fundamentally suited to its supersonicspeed. The shell is constructed in much thesame form as an aircraft fuselage, with anouter skin spot-welded and rivetted to circum-ferential formers and longitudinal stringers. Inthis shell, from front to rear, are a .conicalwarhead (5 ft. 8 ins. long, weight 2,150 lbs., detailsunknown), a controls compartment (azimuthgyro, pitch gyro, integratiig accelerometer, andinstruments forming amplifying link between:gyros and servo-motors operating control vanes),two main' fuel tanks (7,610 lbs. ethyl alcohol

and 10,930 lbs. liquid oxygen) and ap auxilliarygas generator activating a turbine to drive twocentrifugal' pumps supplying the fuels to thecombustion chamber. The control, vanes are eightin number, four within the gas-flow of theventuri and four externally on the outer edgesof the fins. A description of the general principleof the propulsion unit is given on page 107. Thisunit is estimated to produce a maximum thrustof 68,500 lbs. acting for 65 seconds, or with aby-pass in operation, a thrust of 30,000 lbs.

Allied Developments

The importance of the jet-fighter as an instru-ment of war, the enormous possibilities that thefield offers, and the very obvious fact that withdevelopment in its bare infancy even a generalisa-tion, seemingly harmless, may supply somethingto the enemy, is sufficient to make any apologyfor lack of statement on Allied plans redundant.

That Group Captain Frank Whittle, the leadingBritish authority on jet-propulsion, has beenactively engaged on experiments for more thantwelve years'is known. That the Gloster Meteorwas flying in 1941, and has been used operationallywith success, -is also known. Beyond thosefacts, so far as Great Britain is concerned, silencemust reign. On the other side of the Atlantic,the Americans have been busy and at least twomanufacturers-Bell and Lockheed-have jet-aircraft in production. No details have beenpublished nor should any be published. Untiljet-development has passed from the experi-mental to the " mass-production off-the-line"stage the less said about our plans the better.

I _

Special Operation Agai nst

The Brenner Route

CONTINUOUSLY FROM THE late summer of

1942-when the Middle East air forcessuccessfully restricted Rommel's supply of hisforward areas by sustained attacks on his linesof communication--a major commitment of theAllied air forces in the Mediterranean theatre hasbeen the blitzing of the enemy's supply routesin order to deny him the power to wageoffensive warfare.

The. aerial attention paid to particular linesof communication, whether road, railway, sea ofair routes, has varied according to the enemy'stransportation facilities in the country in whichthe campaign was fought and the particular stageof the land battle. So far as the Italiancampaign is concerned, the most constant airoffensive has been necessary to maintain a stateof interdiction on enemy-held railway routes;attacks on road and, to a lesser extent, seacommunications have from time to time beenon a heavy scale-particularly when defeats inthe field have set enemyvehicles scurrying alongthe escape roads-but, in general, these attackshave been subsidiary to those against therailways.

Importance of Brenner Line

Kesselring's retreat from central to northernItaly, begun in June, 1944, implied a progressiveshortening of his Italian lines of communicationand attendant reduced difficulties of supply. Bythe autumn, when it became, clear that theGermans were not going to be easily budgedfrom the deep defence zones south of the Po,a clear pattern again became discernible inM.A.A.F's interdictory attacks designed toweaken the enemy's build-up. In general, theStrategic bombers concentrated on cutting theBrenner, Tarvisio, Postumia and Piedicollerailway routes into north-central and north-eastern Italy at their furthest points (theroutes into the north-west had. been lost tothe Germans by the invasion of southernFrance); Tactical medium bombers aimed atcreating an inner ring of interdiction on theabove-mentioned routes somewhat further south;and both Tactical medium and fighter-bomberscombined to cut bridges over the Po and railwaycommunications further west.

So long as flying conditions were favourable-that is until mid-September--a satisfactory stateof interdiction was maintained on all vital railway

routes. With the deterioration of the weatherin October, however, it was evident that constantinterdiction, particularly on the frontier routes,was impracticable.

At the outset of the Italian campaign theBrenner line (Innsbruck to Verona) was creditedwith carrying half of the total rail trafficentering and leaving Italy, and, in particular,most strictly military supplies came in viathis route. As the enemy's supply positiondeteriorated in southern France and the Balkansthe importance of the Brenner line wascorrespondingly increased until the route becamethe all-important link in the enemy's supplysystem. The limiting of this railway traffic fromAustria was, accordingly, one of the major tasksconfronting the Allied Air Forces.

Even when good weather made successful airattacks on the Brenner line possible thecurtailment of traffic achieved was oftendisappointing. The fewness of points vulnerableto air assault-principally bridges and viaducts-made it possible for the German engineers toconcentrate bridging materials near all targetsites and to repair even extensive damage in anastonishingly short time. Moreover, raildiversions had been constructed, or were inprocess of construction, around most of thesevulnerable points. Repeated. attacks werenecessary, therefore, to maintain the interdictionfor a- sufficient space of time to have anappreciable effect on the enemy's accumulationof supplies and material. The approach ofwinter and inevitable bad weather meant thatthe necessary regularity of attacks could not bekept up.

The Higher Command now believed that thebest hope of depleting the enemy's stock in hisdumps south of the Po lay in devising a bombingprogramme which aimed at the permanentreduction of the capacity of the Brenner line, tobe . carried out in conjunction with the usualprogramme for establishing blocks.

The Electrified System

As is the case with most European railways,the Brenner route was designed to use electricityfor power, which is vastly more efficient thansteam power for locomotion where gradients are

23 n s ep ca c .of thlectrifiedamns

123

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MlAP SHOWING"THE

LOCATIONIS BRENNERO

OF POWERl COLLE ISARCO

STATIONSLECVON THE

VERONA. INNSBRUCKVANRAILWAY CIS o

Estimatcd dJily hauIrSgz BOLZANO CAMPODAZZO

STEAM .6750 tons R____________________ POWER STATION

O " TRANSFORMER STATIONSALORNO

- CONVERTER STATION

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TRENTO

CONEC_ 0/ OAr Ra//wrys:

"i--I PRINC)PAL----- +~ SECONDARY '

INNSBRUCK

/E RONA

Trento.-Three direct hits on the transformers and six morewithin the yard destroyed three of the five transformers anddamaged the remaining two. The target area was heavilycratered, cabling destroyed and the control house damaged

Al.-A very ,heavy concentration of hits .on the. target areaand just to- the east. The control house, was badly damnaged,there were six direct hits on the transformei yard, the

transformers apparently being destroyed.

I/erona.-Damage mainly caused 'by blast to three banks of

transformer racks, wire towers and the east portion of the"T "-shaped control and switching building.

Domnegli ra.-Tkree direct hits on the south end of thetransformer yard destroyed two transformers and damagedtwo high-tension line towers- immediately west. Near misses

damaged the generator house.

approximately 800 to frightl rgh thePass. Thus about 24,000 tons could be transporteddaily when the line was in full working order.

Technical specialists of the Italian StateRailways estimated that if the Germans couldbe forced to switch from electric to steamlocomotion the capacity of the Brenner linewould be reduced to 8-10 trains daily. Suchsteam trains would be able to haul only 675 tonseach, making the maximum capacity of thesteam-powered line some 6,750 daily-a mere28 per cent of the electrified line's capacity.

Owing to the plentitude of hydro-electricpower in north Italy, any attempt to destroyit at its source would be too complicated to bepracticable.

The most vulnerable points on the electrifiedrailway, system were the power stations-thetransformer stations (where power was steppeddown from the high voltage of the long distancetransmission lines to the operating voltagerequired for the railway) and the converterstations.

There were fourteen power stations betweenVerona and the Brenner Pass, spaced ten milesapart on the severest gradients and twice thatdistance along less steep stretches. These powerstations were so designed and located, however,that the removal of any one of them would notcause any appreciable disruption of the system; itneeded, in fact, the elimination of threeconsecutive stations to make electric locomotionimpossible on the sectioh of the line betweenthe outer destroyed stations.

It had to be borne in mind, also, that evenafter success had been achieved in destroyingthe power stations repeat raids would probablybe necessary to prevent the employment ofimmediately available replacement equipmentand, less likely, the use of mobile power stationsP -'"eshifts for the destroyed permanentstations,

The Power Stations Considered as Targets

The locations of the power stations on theVerona-Innsbruck line are indicated on the mapon page 124. They consisted of two main types-the big transformer stations on the D.C. sectionof the line Verona- to Trento and the smallerconverter stations on the A.C. section runningfrom Trento northwards.

So far as the transformer stations were-concerned, the parts most vulnerable to 'airattack were the actual transformer units,normally located in the open close to thebuildings wherein the control panels were housed.For an effective attack, therefore, bombs had topenetrate the buildings and detonate at groundlevel in order to destroy. the housed equipment,while fuzing had to be for maximumfragmentation to destroy the unit outside. Inrespect of the latter the fracture of the case ofthe transformer by bomb fragments or betterstill by rocket projectiles would cause the unit

to burnwould render necessary the major repair jore-winding them.

In the converter stations all the vital partswere located in the buildings, normally on theground and first floors. The converterequipment was solidly constructed and destructioncould best be accomplished by bombs fuzed todetonate at ground level so that penetration ofthe casing could be effected.

The "Bingo" Plan

Taking into consideration the facts mentionedin the foregoing sections, Headquarters,Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force duringthe last week in October, 1944, issued its plan-under the code name of Operation " Bingo "-forthe destruction of the electrified system of theBrenner line in conjuction with the bombing ofother vulnerable points.

The Tactical Air Force was to be maderesponsible for the destruction of four transformerstations, namely: (a) three miles south-west ofVerona, (b) near Domegliara, (c) at Ala and(d) at Trento. In particular, the Desert. AirForce was instructed to eliminate the station nearVerona, while the medium bombers of the 57thBombardment Wing and the fighter-bombers ofthe XXII Tactical Air Command were to destroythe other three stations. Meanwhile, the 42ndBombardment Wing medium bombers were tooperate in force in order to create as many blocksas possible on the section of the line betweenDcmegliara and Trento.

The M.A.T.A.F. attacks were to besupplemented by Strategic Air Force heavybomber assaults against the converter stationat Salorno, the one south of Ora and the powerstation south-west of Bolzano. In addition, otherforces of heavy bombers were to create as manyblocks as possible on the Trento-Innsbrucksection of the line. The target times of theStrategic Air Force's attacks Were' to be soarranged as to provide the maximum diversion.

Detailed and accurate descriptions of thetargets were drawn up from all availableIntelligence sour'>s and full information wasprovided of the enemy's flak defences.

On the basis of the evidence provided bybomb-damage analyses of previous attacks onpower plants the use of 500 lb. G.P. bombs with.1 and .01 fuzings was directed as being the mosteffective, and rocket projectiles were to beemployed where possible against exposedtransformer units.

The XXII Tactical Air Command was toundertake area cover commitments for theTactical attacks and the M.A.S.A.F. fighterswere responsible for any additional protectionrequired by the heavy bombers.

"Bingo" in Operation

A week of bad flying weather followed theissuing of the "Bingo" directive and the

-71

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pe ti>fit $citu Th&t t'be 'executed before themorning of 6th November. On that date " Bingo "was activated according to plan.

The Verona transformer station was attackedby twelve rocket-firing U.S. Thunderbolts (P.47s)and 22 -Kittyhawks with bombs; 21 strikes werescored with rockets on the transformer and fouron the buildings and fourteen direct bomb hits onthe main buildings and two on the transformer.The Domegliara transformer station was bombedby 36 U.S. Mitchells (B. 25s) and sixteen U.S.Thunderbolts; later photographic reconnaissanceshowed that, besides other damage, twotransformers were destroyed. The transformerstation at Ala was attacked by 36 U.S. Mitchellsand seventeen U.S. Thunderbolts (the latteremploying both bombs and rockets); photographicreconnaissance, revealed that the control housewas heavily damaged and all the transformerswere apparently destroyed. The fourth station,at Trento, was bombed by 30 U.S. Mitchells(including six "window "-droppers) and sixteenU.S. Thunderbolts, while an anti-flak mission wasflown by several more U.S. Thunderbolts to affordprotection for the Mitchells; later photographicevidence showed that three transformers weredestroyed and the remaining two probablydamaged, and the. control house was damagedand the cabling destroyed.

Enemy opposition failed utterly to interferewith these missions. Several enemy fighters madeunaggressive ineffective passes at formationsover Domegliara and Trento, but the onlydamage suffered by the Tactical aircraft in theabove-mentioned attacks was the holing of afew aircraft by flak.

Closely co-ordinated with the attacks on thefour transformer stations was the effort directedagainst rail targets on - the Verona-Trentosection of the line by U.S. Marauders, whichflew 103 sorties in the course of six missions.These succeeded in creating seven blocks betweenRovereto and Verona. No enemy opposition wasexperienced and no losses incurred.

Meanwhile, the Strategic Air Force wasImplementing its part of the "Bingo" plan, 25.U.S. Liberators (B. 24s) with 46 escorting U.S.

T.ig n sW(s. ir l sent to attack thethree assigned targets. Although the targetareas at Salorno, Ora and Bolzano were covered,photographic reconnaissance revealed no seriousdamage to any of the power stations. Intenseheavy flak was encountered by some of theattacking aircraft, but no losses or damage weresustained.

On the following day, 7th November, theStrategic Air Force completed its task of creatingas many blocks as possible on the route northof Trento. Over 190 UJS. Liberators, wellescorted by U.S. Mustangs (P.51s), pressed hometheir attacks on the line, dropping approximately470 tons of bombs. Hits were scored on a longstretch of the line and explosions were causedamong rolling stock at two yards: of the bridgeshit those over the Isarco and Adige rivers atAlbes and Ora, respectively, received mostdamage,

Success of "Bingo"

The success achieved by operation "Bingo"in forcing the switching over from electric tosteam power on the Brenner route betweenVerona and Trento was confirmed both byphotographic interpretation and ground reports.

For several weeks after the operation thissection of the line was covered by reconnaissanceaircraft about three times a day wheneverpracticable. During this time only steamlocomotion activity was observed; moreover, thepresence of long road convoys along sections ofthe route probably indicated that steamlocomotives were also not over-plentiful.

Meanwhile, reliable agents' reports continuedto come in stressing the cessation of electrictraction and a considerable lightening of trafficon the line. Typical statements read: "18thNovember--No Brenner traffic passed throughthe main yard at Verona between 3rd and 12thNovember ". " 25th November-Due to damageto four electric sub-stations on the Brenner line,only steam locomotion operates between Veronaand Trento".

"Bingo", it was evident, had justified thehighest hopes of Its planners.

~IUPi~WhlU~aj_

Mining Of The

No.Danube

205 Group

THE RIVER DANUBE, second largest river inEurope, rises in the Black Forest region; it isjoined in ite course of 1,720 miles by nine majortributaries, the rivers Inn, March, Waag, Drava,Tisa, Sava, Morava, Seret and Prut, and finallydebouches into the Black Sea. It is shared by sixcountries-Germany, (including Bohemia andMoravia), Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumaniaand Bulgaria. Owing to navigation problemswhich may have arisen between the abovecountries, the Danube was made an internationalriver and before the war was c6ntrolled byBritain, France, Italy and Rumania.

The river is navigable for 1,500 miles. Riversteamers can reach Ratisbon in Germany andsea-going vessels can penetrate to Turnu Severin,just east of the Iron Gates; but for two monthsduring the winter navigation is made difficult byfloating or fixed ice, particularly in the lowercourses of the river.

The larger river ports such as Braila, Rusciuk,Giurgiu, Turnu Severin, Belgrade, Novi Sad andBudapest are well equipped with storage andloading facilities capable of handling theenormous quantities of grain, fodder, oil seedsand other agricultural products of the Balkans;the oil products of the Rumanian oil fields centredat Ploesti; and the coal from the Pernik mines,the most important centre of coal production inthe Balkans. Bottlenecks are few, the only oneworthy of note being the famous Iron Gateswhere the river flows through a deep gorge-in theOrsova area.

The Transylvanian Alps and the mountains ofYugoslavia increase the difficulties of road and-railway engineering in the Balkans, but in theDanube nature has provided a natural water gapcapable of transporting 10,000 tons of materialdaily.

A Lifeline to Germany

It is a natural tendency to think of the riverDanube in the terms of "blue "-" Strauss "-" Vienna "-" waltzing," but in Nazi eyes it stoodfor communication between the Third Reich andthe vast grain lands of Hungary; a lifeline to theRumanian oil fields; a link with Turkey; and astrategic route to the Russian front. It isestimated that, during 1942, 8,000,000 tons ofmaterial reached Germany via the Danube alone.

The river carries loads vastly superior to thoseof the inadequate Balkan railway system. One

"Rhine-type" barge can carry 1,000 tons;compare the advantages of loading one suchvessel against the disadvantages of loading 100ten-ton railway wagons. These conditions, idealfor handling large quantities of coal, grain, oilseeds and fodder, are invaluable when the questionof oil transport is considered; there is nocomparison between the vulnerable, expensive oiltank wagon and the easily handled bulk loads ofthe barge.

A quick review of the Axis oil position clearlyindicates the importance that Ploesti held in theirwar economy. At the beginning of the war60 per cent. of Germany's oil, apart from a smallquantity obtained from wells inside Germany,came from the great Rumanian oil refineriescentred at Ploesti. Rumania was then the fourthlargest producer in the world, having refineriesat Ploesti and pipe lines to Constanta oh theBlack Sea and to Giurgiu, the port used for

_transhipment of oil to Germany. One hundredand fifty thousand tons of oil per month reachedGermany, being carried by barge to Vienna orBratislava where it was transferred into oil tankwagons.

Increased Traffic in 1944

When the Axis lost the use of the Lwow-Cernauti railway, they were compelled to divertan increasing volume of military traffic to thevulnerable and already overloaded Hungarian andRumanian railway system. The mounting airoffensive of M.A.A.F. against these lines ofcommunication made it necessary to find somealternative method of transport, and a projectwas put in hand to make still greater use of theDanube. At this time there were 250-300 tugson the river, each capable of pulling 1,200-1,500tons carried in barges.

With the exception of the Iron Gates canal, theriver has no bottleneck marshalling yards, andbarges make very uneconomical bombing targets,as they can be dispersed along the river. Hencefor bulky and non-perishable goods, not requiringquick transport, the river was ideal formaintaining a steady, -uninterrupted flow ofmaterial into Germany. By the middle of March,1944, the new programme of river transport wasdeveloping and the greater part of the oil trafficwas being diverted from the railways to: theriver. Between October, 1943, and February,1944, river traffic increased until it was estimated

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to exceed railI t$ fftc by 28 per cent; inMarch, 1944, it ias stepped up to 200 per cent.over the corresponding rail traffic. It was clear,therefore, that even a temporary stoppage ofriver traffic at this juncture would havefar-reaching effect on Germany's war potential.

In consequence, plans were made by M.A.A.F.to mine stretches of the fiver at a time when theSoviet forces had crossed the river Dniester andwere in a strategic position for opening a summeroffensive through the Gal'atz gap into the basinof the lower Danube.

The Mining Offensive Begins

The second week in April at a time when theDanube was by far the most important singletransport route in Eastern Europe, saw theopening of the mining offensive (Operation" Gardening ") by aircraft of No. 205 Group, inclose liaison with naval specialists. These were.not the first mines to drop in Danubian waters,as, during 1941, magnetic mines were probablydropped from ships or laid from the shore bypartisans, and during 1943 the Russians laid afew mines from aircraft between Giurgiu and thesea. But at no time was the mining of sufficientmagnitude to disrupt shipping until the R.A.F.operations between April and October, 1944, whenthe river was effectively mined, reachingmaximum intensity in August.

The mine-laying aircraft were originallydespatched during " moon " periods, as the successof the operation depended largely on goodvisibility and reasonable illumination from themoon. ,Later on successful experiments weremade during "non-moon" periods with flareillumination by pathfinder aircraft,' and it wasfound possible to mine any given stretch of-theriver at any period of the month.

Tactics in mine-laying varied according to thepart of the river over which the aircraft wereoperating. When the depth of the waterpermitted, high level drops were made, but inshallow areas the average height of release was200 ft. Much lower altitudes have been known,40 or 50 ft. being fairly common.

During the whole of the mining period 428aircraft were despatched and only ten of thesefailed to return. Several members of the missingaircrews escaped from captivity and wererepatriated when Rumania fell.

The First No. 205 Group Mission

The first mission of three Liberators andnineteen Wellingtons was airborne on the night of8/9th April and 40 mines were dropped nearBelgrade.' By 15th April a further 137 mineswere added, so that by the end of the monththere was a considerable number of minessomewhere- in the river, setting the enemy thebeginning of a problem that was to last until theadvancing Russian forces denied the Axis theuse of the river.

During May, 364 mines were dropped by forcesof Liberators and Wellingtons. From the night

133

of 31st May/1st June there was no mining untillst/2nd July when the offensive was re-openedwith the largest mission of the operation.Seventeen Liberators and 57 Wellingtons weredespatched and successfully laid 96 1,000-lb.mines and 96 1,500-lb. mines. Enemy oppositionwas encountered and four of our aircraft weremissing, this being the occasion of our heaviestloss. The attack was pressed home the followingnight when ten Liberators added 60 mines. Therewere no further operations during July until the30th/31st when another large force of aircraftdropped 177 mines.

During August Wellingtons did not join in the"Gardening" operation; Liberators, operating ingroups of two to thirteen, were sent out at morefrequent intervals to drop a total of 222 mines.Three attacks were made in September wheneleven Liberators and 48 Wellingtons dropped139 mines.

The last mission of this venture was airborneon 4/5th October when four Liberators- andeighteen Wellingtons released the last load of 57mines over areas in Hungary, west of Budapest,north of Gyor and west of Estergom. To theNazis, frantically withdrawing essential equip-ment from their crumbling Balkan "Empire,"this stumbling block at their back door causedendless trouble.

German Counter-Measures

The immediate results of the first miningattacks indicated that the Germans were takenby surprise. The organisation of defensivemeasures to combat the mining was immediatelyput in hand, but was not operating satisfactorilyuntil the middle of August. The "Counter-Measures" organisation consisted of:-

(a) Information regarding mine-laying fromthe air.

(b) Minesweeping.(c) De-magnetising of vessels.(d) Anti-aircraft measures, including fighter

opposition.

(af Information

Information was obtained from frontier guardsposted at intervals along the banks of the river,police and territorial units, anti-aircraft units,military port commanders, shipping personnel andinterchange of information between Bulgarianand German units. The main items of informationrequired were the date, place, number of aircraftoperating and the height at which the mineswere released. Information was checked by unitcommanders and military port authorities, the

original version, together with the verified

information, being immediately transmitted to

headquarters by the adequate telephone system

which inter-connected all sources of information

along the river.

(b) Minesweeping

Authority for operations by minesweepingvessels was given by Navy headquarters for the

1 N H i!1flY

'i'

i :- ~y~ a I

Rumanian vessels; for German vessels by thecommanders of-the respective river sectors. The"maritime sector " formed that part of the riverfrom the sea up to Braila, with headquarters atGalatz; the " lower Danube sector" from Brailato Turnu Severin, with headquarters at Giurgiu;the "middle Danube sector " from Turnu Severinto Budapest, with headquarters at Belgrade.

Minesweeping equipment consisted of tug-boatsequipped to sweep magnetic or acoustic mines, orboth, and one squadron of minesweeping JU.52sfitted with mine-detonating rings. Many vesselsalso were modified to act as minesweepers. Forinstance, the Serbian tug-boat "Jug Bogdan"(450 horse-power) was taken over by the Germanauthorities and fitted out as a minesweeper witha magnetic sweep made up of seven metalparavanes arranged in a diamond pattern andinter-connected by an insulated cable to atransformer on the after deck; an acousticsweep, activated by its movement through thewater, was carried in frbnt of the vessel. Thecaptain of the tug described the minesweepingpersonnel allocated to the vessel as one captain(minesweeping), who directed operations from theshore, and seven Naval ratings, all of-whom werethoroughly terrified of mines. It is interesting,and not surprising, to note that no mine was everexploded during operations by this vessel.

With this method of minesweeping the cablewas often damaged by irregularities in the riverbed or by floating debris, while the paravaneswere affected by currents or whirlpools. Anothermethod was tried in which individual generators,supported by floats, were towed at regularlyspaced intervals. This proved a failure and wasabandoned. The Germans improved on thesemethods by passing the cable over two or threeold barges, which gave a broader sweeping field,together with more speed and safety.

When mines had been dropped in the Rumanianpart of the river, M.D.R. aircraft swept the areafor shallow mines and those of high sensitivity,followed by Rumanian vessels concentrating onthe mined zone, while German and Bulgarianvessels maintained continual sweeping operationsup-river from Giurgiu, until the area was thoughtto be safe.

Up to the end of July the river was consideredsafe for shipping after 24 sweeping operationshad been carried out. After July, however,the difficulties of the German Anti-MiningOrganisation were increased greatly by theintroduction of a timing device in magnetic mines,which allowed them to remain unexploded at thebottom of the river for an indeterminate periodand rendered ineffective the 24 sweepings estimate.

For example, following the mining of theGiurgiu area on the night of 30th July, 60 sweepingoperations in the following four days failed toclear the river and Rumanian shipping wasstopped for seven days. On account of this newfactor of uncertainty, minesweeping was continuedincessantly, the risk of losing vessels was acceptedand shipping was no longer held up. As the

situation on aani e deteriorated,the extreme measure was adopted of allowing oldvessels to drift down the river and explode themines. This was probably done owing to theshortage of minesweeping elements, which werealways in short supply in this area, havingprobably been withdrawn to combat the increasedair mining of the Hungarian Danube.

The M.D.R. aircraft are reported to have givenbetter results than surface vessels, although twoJU.52s were destroyed by explosion of the mineswhich they had detonated near Komarom about12th June. Two other M.D.R. aircraft weredestroyed by Allied fighters.

(c) De-Magnetising

A de-magnetising station was erected atRusciuk, where all Rumanian and foreign vesselswere de-magnetised. A second station was started,but never finished,, at Braila. During the latterpart of June and in early July, the Germans werereported to be financing the building of bothwooden and concrete barges to neutralise theeffects of magnetic mines, but such vessels werenever seen in use.

(d) Opposition to Our Aircraft

Flak positions were established along the banksof the river in the areas most susceptible tomining. These were mostly light flak guns and,owing to the height from which the aircraftdropped their mines, fired fully depressed,forming a low curtain of flak over the river.

The anti-aircraft equipment of vessels wasnever completed, as mining was done at night andusually in areas away from the ports. Flakbarges, however, were equipped and placed atstrategic points, aerial reconnaissance discoveringfour or five of these vessels between Novi Sadand Belgrade.

Three squadrons of night fighters were inoperation over the Rumanian sector of the river,operating from Otopeni (Bucharest) and Zilistea(near Buzau). Their results were neversatisfactory owing to the poor spotting service inYugoslavia, coupled with the slow transmissionof orders, which did not allow them to take offin sufficient time to intercept the mine-layingaircraft, particularly when they were operatingover the Middle Danube.

A balloon barrage existed at Novi Sad andintruder aircraft reported a barrage at 1,000 ft.over Zemun (Belgrade). On the RumanianDanube, an ambitious scheme was projected tocover the river with a protective balloon barragein conjunction with light flak positions andsearchlights. The programme also provided fortwo balloon companies (48 balloons) seaward fromGiurgiu. Work on these projects was begun, butnever completed.

RESULTS OF THE MINING

(a) Shipping

The surprise and unpreparedness of the enemyat the time of the first mining operation was

y ps iie

The Danube passing through a gorge in the Transylvanian maourntain.

particularly noticeable in the busy stretch of river towage to Btidapest, while goods for Sofia were

between Giurgiu and Bratislava, where several delayed owing to the suspension. of river traffic.

vessels were sunk and shipping, generally, Certain areas of the river were re-opened -about

brought to a standstill. 20th May, but the river between Vienna and

In May, reports began to show the cumulative Ruzscik was again closed by the end of the month.

effect of mine-laying ; coal traffic was virtually On 1st June, a Hungarian wireless station,

suspended, as the Bulgarian ports were over- presumably acting on instructions from the

crowded; storage concerns refused to accept Germans, warned all shipping between Goenuye

responsibility for goods owing to the danger of and Piszke to stand still until further notice.

Allied air attacks; and one Budapest shipping During the first week of June photographs

firm went into liquidation as a result of loss by showed the Iron Gates canal to be out of action

mining. In the middle of May, a large consignment as a result of Allied bombing ; it is estimated that

of machinery was held up at Rege i g .awaiting 60,000 tons of goods were held ip at this point.

3LLI

' tew or the " Iron Gates" Canal,; showing the locomotive towing system.

Similar conditions were reported all along theriver. For example, barges. loaded at Szistov atthe end of April were still there on 10th June;barges laden with Hungarian goods destined forTurkey did not leave their port of departure, butwere unloaded again. Photographs showed morethan 100 barges dispersed along the banks of therivers Danube and Sava, while the Begej canal,between Titel and Ecka, was filled with inactivebarges. All traffic was -suspended between Mohacsand Belgrade, and even the Giurgiu-Rusciuktrain-ferry was dispersed two and a half milesup-stream away, from the danger area.

During the first three weeks of July oilshipments from Ploesti amounted to only 59 bargeloads. Even these were not moved withoutdifficulty, as on 12th July the Iron Gates canalwas impassable and on the following day thewhole river was closed between Budapest andRusciuk. The captain of the Slovak tanker,S.D.P.5, has since stated that a tanker normallymade nine return journeys from Giurgiu toBratislava each year, whereas in the summer of1944 it took him four months to go from Giurgiuto Bogoijevo and back; nor did he know of anyt rre than one return journey in

River tug and barges seen below Turnu Severin.

the same period. Oil shipments had previouslybeen transferred to railway tank wagons at

Budapest, but were now being taken only as far

as Novi Sad. Photographic reconnaissance showed

that the cranes, used for lifting the tanks on to

the railway wagons, had been moved to Novi Sad.

This saved nearly half the distance from Ploesti

by water, but it was "robbing Peter to pay Paul,"

as the railways were already overburdened and

suffering under the hammer blows -of the

Fifteenth Air Force.During July the German authorities took full

control of all shipping, as agents were unable to

state the location of their barges at any giventime. River patrol boats, armed with machine-guns, were instituted by the Germans, no doubtto bolster the sagging morale of the Danubiansailors.

Disorganisation and labour shortages wereacute at the ports and, even with the reductionin river traffic, shipments were being delayedowing to the lack of dock workers. The desertionof crews from their vessels and absenteeism onthe docks made it necessary to use prisoners ofwar. Russian prisoners worked on German andHungarian ships ; Italian prisoners worked on

'-^ t;. 1

B^- - -^i ' *, 'n^^^ - *^ ^

1^ ^m I^^^^^ -~ *n.*'"*IK-"- ^ i-i g^f l 1* *

Concentrations of barges on the River Danube at Turnu Severin.

Serb and Croat ships. At one period in July therewere 30 loaded barges at Zemun, idle for lack ofcrews. Compulsion was general, but in spite ofthis, accidents increased and delays accumulated.It was reported, for example, that goods despatchedfrom Germany at the beginning of April had notarrived in Rumania at the end of July.

As previously mentioned, the Iron Gates portionof the Danube which runs through a deep gorgeat Orsova forms the only serious bottleneck onthe river and presents difficult problems ofnavigation. Shipping can proceed only duringdaylight and tugs of more than 1 00(xAS-

power are required to tow barges against theswift current.

From October, 1943, twelve "Cataract" tugswere engaged solely in towing oil tankers and,until December, an average of 20 tankers passedup river daily. In the first three months of 1944,this was reduced to twelve tankers daily, but inlate March the number rose again to its previousautumn level. On 16th April the first mineswere reported and the subsequent results werecatastrophic. Not more than 80 tankers reachedthe p y and early August,

i f discharged into oil

tank wagons at Smederevo, Zemun, Novi Sad andApatin.

In a bombing attack on the Iron Gates canalin May the towing railway was cut and: onelocomotive was damaged. Both towing railwayswere inactive thereafter for ten days, causing areduction of 50 per cent. in the canal's capacity.The actual effect on traffic was less, owing to thesmall amount of movement as a result of Alliedmine-laying.

Casualties to vessels continued in all parts ofthe river ; it is estimated that between 6th Apriland 31st August 60 to 70 tugs and well over200 barges were sunk and many more damaged.

(b) River Organisation

The disorganisation of traffic by repeatedmine-laying and the operational shortage ofbarges caused congestion at a number of ports,where storage facilities were inadequate to meetthe increased demands. The natural hesitancy ofshipowners (and their crews) to operate in themined areas caused friction between the Wehr-macht and the various concerns dealing with theorganisation of river traffic. When the amountof-military traffic was quite small, the control offreight movements was in the hands of the"Frachtenleitstellen " (Freight Control Bureau),which allocated priorities according to the needsof the Reich. - This organisation broke down underthe confusion caused by the mining and theGerman High Command took charge of thesituation. The Royal Hungarian Sea and RiverShipping Company was taken over by theWehrmacht for the transport of military supplies;the Under-Secretary for the Rumanian Navy wasempowered to seize river craft for militarytfansport at any time ; and barges were widelyrequisitioned.

-Some of the more interesting results of thedisorganisation of river control were thetemporary cessation of coal traffic from thePernik mines owing to the lack of storagefacilities; the increase of freightage rates by60 per cent.; the refusal of underwriters to insurecargoes; the inability to locate shipping; therequest to Turkey to cease routeing consignmentsvia the Danube; the authorisation of a loan of200 million Lei for the improvement of shipping ;and the increase of premiums for speed andsuccessful night operations.

Reports frpm the enemy press indicated theadditional administration required to overcome thechaos in shipping -organisation. One read asfollows:-

"Danube freight rates inside Croatia have beendoubled, probably in order to discourage internaltraffic with the object of conserving shippingspace for longer hauls. Charges for goods ware-housed for more than two months in Budapestfree port have, with certain exceptions, beenincreased tenfold; this is the latest in a seriesof measures aimed at reducing the congestionwhich has occurred as a result of the dislocationof Danube traffic-and at achieving a greater

degree of dispersal against Allied air attacks.The exceptions are (i) goods already storedunder long term contracts; (ii) goods stored tothe order of Government or municipal depart-ments; (iii) wool, grain stored in silo, pulses,grass seeds, oil seeds, fodder, plant seeds, milletand vetches. Air raid emergency stocks thusappear to be among the goods exempted.

" Where Allied action makes the use of anormal route temporarily impossible, the Govern-ment has been compelled to bear the extradharges involved in diverting traffic over dearerroutes. Thus the area Freight Control Office atMunich has decided that in cases where goods,which would normally have been dispatched bya combined" rail-Danube route via Regensburg,Deggendorf or Passau, are diverted by theFreight Control Bureau (Frachtenleitstellen)owing to force majeure through another tran-shipment port involving higher freight charges,application can be made to the Reichsbahn-for arefund of the excess."

(c) Periods When the River was Closed

The following figures show the periods whennavigation was suspended for German orRumanian vessels between 9th April and 18thAugust, 1944. Only the most significant datesare shown below.

Following the initial mining, the river wasclosed for 20 days between Turnu Severin andBelgrade to both German and Rumanian vessels,and from Moldova to Belgrade for a furthersixteen days to Rumanian vessels only. Between12th April and 23rd May, Rumanian shipping wasdenied the use of the Sulina canal for 21 days,the Kilia canal for one day, the Saint Georgecanal for three days and the Stari Stambul canalfor eighteen days. In the middle of May Rumanianvessels were again stopped for a period of sixdays between Harsova and Cerna Voda, andbetween Ternu Magurele and Braila; also for aperiod of five days between Giurgiu and PietraSani. From 21st May to 9th June, both Germanand Rumanian shipping were intermittently heldup between Moldova and Belgrade, and the StariStambul canal was again closed to Rumanianshipping for seventeen days. Stretches of the riverbetween Belgrade and the Iron Gates and areaseast of Giurgiu were closed for periods of twoto four days at a time during the month. DuringJuly long stretches of the river between Giurgiuand Belgrade were closed for periods of up toa week at a time; in fact, there were only threeto four days during the month when the riverwas clear.-

A similar state of affairs continued throughAugust and for only one week, up to 18thAugust, was the river clear from Giurgiu to theIron Gates, although German shipping continuedto use it for all but four days during this period.

Night-Fighter Attacks by Coastal.Air Force

In support of the many operations by No. 205Group, night-fighters of M.A.C.A.F. attacked

L Eg - y f

Yom: :.

Barge sunk by mining to the- west of Komarom.

Result of iinzg near Szap.

river craft with cannon fire, using, road andrailway objectives as alternative targets. Duringthe ten-day moon period at the end of June andin early July, Beaufighters of No. 255 Squadronmade twelve patrols covering the river Sava fromBos Samac in Yugoslavia to its point of con-fluence with the Danube, nearly 200 miles tothe east, and the Danube from Baja downstreamfor 250 miles to Bubravica._ The round tripaveraged 900 miles, and in anything but clearweather the terrain over which the aircraft flewrendered the venture extremely hazardous.

The first intruder attack during the night of29/30th June was exceptionally successful,when a group of barges north of Slankamentwas straffed. Oil barges, 200 ft. in length,exploded with vivid red and orange flashes and,within fifteen seconds a cloud of oil smoke hadrisen to 1,000 ft. From a distance of 45 miles,ten hulks could be seen burning down to thewater line. Four other barges and a tug-boatwere also effectively straffed.

On the night of 30th June/ist July the aircraftturned back, as overcast in the target areaobscured the moon. The second and thirdsuccessful penetrations on the nights of lst/2ndand 2nd/3rd July found the element of surpriselacking, as the enemy had apparently re-organised his ground defences. During this andlater missions, progressive A.A. opposition wasencountered. Two low-flying Beaufightersreported being illuminated correctly and suddenlyby searchlights on either side of the river; asno flak was experienced it was presumed thatthe searchlights were radar controlled andintended as 'directional aids to night-fighters.Incidentally it was heard later that, as a resultof the searchlight exposure, our aircraft hadbeen identified as Marauders! Barrage balloonswere also encountered, but in spite of theseincreased defences, successful attacks were madeon 45 "Rhine-type" barges (1,000 tons), threetug-boats and nine smaller vessels, inflictingvarying degrees of damage. A large vessel(300 ft. long, 60 ft. beam) with superstructurewas seen jutting out from its mooring berth;three long bursts of cannon fire left the vesselseverely damaged.

During the next four nights (4th to 7th July),only one aircraft managed to reach the Danubearea, damaging one 300-ft. barge.

On the night of 8/9th July four aircraft againcovered the area damaging eighteen to twenty' Rhine-type " barges and six 100-foot barges.Night-fighter opposition (some using rockets)was encountered, but without conclusive results.

Altogether, eight large oil barges and theircargoes were destroyed 'and 102 other vesselsdamaged, representing 100,000 tons of shipping.

Results of the Operations

A general survey shows the following outstand-ing results of the operations:-

(a) Between April and August, 1944, Germanpriority traffic on the Danube was reducedby at least 60 per cent. and normal trafficby 70 to 80 per cent.

(b) The effects of the air offensive againstcommunications and oil production werematerially Increased.

(c) The enemy was forced to deploy flakpositions, balloons and observation postsalong 'the Danube; to divert considerablenumbers of skilled minesweeping personnel(both naval and air) at -a time when theirservices were required elsewhere; and toput considerable strain on his reservesof manpower to replace and correctdisaffected elements.

(d) Considerable aid was given to the Russianforces in their westward drive. The trans-portation of enemy reinforcements to theRussian front suffered considerable delaysowing to the lack of minesweepingequipment.

(e) The loss of oil and shipping must havehad far-reaching results on other fronts.It is interesting to note the increased useof bullock and horse transport by the Axisforces during 1944; one German prisoneris quoted as having seen " a Tiger tankbeing towed along the Cesena-Forli roadby sixteen oxen."

As a result of the tenacity and bravery of theaircrews, and the unselfish labour of the groundcrews, the operations over the Danube fasteneda tourniquet firmly on one of the greatest life-lines of the Third Reich. Instead of bringingthe life-giving oil needed in modern warfare,the Danube was finally an avenue of retreatused to salvage essential equipment from theBalkan states, now the amputated limbs of adying Germany.

The situation is admirably summed up by thefollowing extract from the Commanding General'stalk to press correspondents in Rome: "Therewas the effective work done by the Wellingtonsand R.A.F. Liberators in mining the Danube riverat a time when the river traffic was helping theHun oppose the Red Army. Between early Apriland October eighteen attacks were made; 1,382mines were laid in the Danube. The mines weredropped at night from altitudes of less than300 ft. Great skill in navigation, great couragein flying through flakland mountain terrain wererequired of the aircrews who did this job. Morethan 60 tugs and 200 barges were sunk andthe time it took for a barge to make a rounfdtrip on the Danube between Giurgiu and Viennawas tripled. Fo long periods traffic on theDanube had to be aended."

RA/ MEDICAL BRA1

MALARIA

THE CAMPAIGN in the Central Mediterraneanarea has given the medical authorities of allservices a full measure of responsibility inplanning and waging a constant attack on thoseenemies of the fighting man which can, withoutsmoke or noise, melt away armies and air forcesin a very short space of time.

Although .the dysenteries and typhus, enteric"fever and other pests demanded constant

vigilance, and received it, it is unquestionably thethreat of malaria that caused the greatest anxiety.

The following account is, therefore, concernedwith the efforts that were made to overcome thedanger to our fighting services on the islandof Corsica from an airborne attack by mosquitoesmany times more deadly than any series ofattacks that could be launched by the Luftwaffe.

Methods of Defence

Before describing the action taken in Corsica,however, it may be of interest to mention brieflythe general methods of defence used againstmalaria.

This defence is best conducted by attackagainst mosquitoes as carriers of the disease atall stages of their life cycle, and by the protection

of men firstly by nets against bites and secondlyagainst the results of bites by those mosquitoesthat evade the net defences.

The chief methods fall under five headings:-(1) Destruction of the adult mosquito by

swat and hand sprayers.(ii) Destruction at the larval stage of the

mosquito.(ill) Destruction of the breeding places of

mosquitoes.(iv) Protection of man against mosquito

bites by the use of nets ard deterrents,long garments and special garmentsat night, etc.

(v) -Protection of man against malariaeven though bitten by mosquitoes, bythe regular taking of mepacrine(atebrine) in small doses.

Of these it is proposed to describe only two ofthe methods, the second and third given above, asthe others are sufficiently well known.

Aerial Dusting with Paris Green

Mos oe ,larvae, are surface feeders andbreat N yif ul tvwater

148

CONTROLIN CORSICA

MALARIA CONTROLIN CORSICA

Map Shows location ofAirfields and division

of Control Areas

N

S c a/e i n M il/e s 1

" AIRFIELDS4 TOWNS

Destruction of larvae an, tIerefpre, he broughtabout by the introduction on the surface of thewater of either oil, to bring about suffocation, ora poison.

Paris Green is a pbst;ne, poisonous tomosquito larvae, very i Fto i a finely,powdered, which is ea1 ha ed n heap.mixture is made usin G ree itliime or'road dust as a diluent. The value of this materialwhen used from aircraft will be appreciated inthe case of areas inaccessible from the ground,exisiting in Corsica in the form of large tractsof marshland. In this manner it is possible todistribute poison on the surface of large areasof water, thereby ensuring that the greatproportion of larvae will never reach the adultstage. By this method alone it is estimated thatpotential malaria carriers are reduced by 90per cent.

Malaria in Corsica

By virtue of its geographical position, Corsicapossessed a unique strategic value to the Alliesin 1944. In May, when the Germans wereentrenched at Cassino, it was well ahead of theGustav. Line and invaluable as a base foraircraft engaged on traffic interdiction. Amonth later it became the stepping-off point foran assault on ,Jlba, and in August it providedthe main assembly area and air base for theinvasion of Southern France.

Malaria is rife in Corsica. It is regarded bythe population as an ever-present scourge, andit caused the Germans considerable anxiety in1943 when incidence of the disease was veryhigh in their forces of occupation. The countryis wild and mountainous with a narrow low-lyingbelt along the eastern shore, criss-crossed bynumerous streams and interspersed with manyacres of marshland. The streams, mostly smalland fast-moving, drain into the coastal plainand dry up in the summer, leaving pools which,often overgrown and difficult to locate, provideideal breeding grounds for anophelene mosquitoes.Before the war, as part of a malaria control andland-reclamation scheme; the French constructeda canal and pumping system for the marshesalong the shores of Lake Biguglia and in thecoastal area as far south as the Alto river. Allpumping stations, however, were destroyed ordamaged by the enemy before his evacuation ofthe island.

At least ten species of anopheles mosquitohave been identified in Corsica. The most commonduring May and June, 1944, was Anophelesclaviger, and in July and August, Anophelesmaculipennis. Although through the seasonApril-October, 1944,' the principal vector wasprobably Anopheles maculipennis, Anophelesclaviger was also thought to be a, carrier asmalaria occurred in areas where only this specieswas identified.

Analysis of Requirements

In January, 1944, fqllowing a survey of Corsicaby U.S. Army Malaria {ciityco petachment 2655,

LIei, re ntrol should be required ini7eand town area of Ajaccio, but extensimeasures will bg necessary for the airfield(three miles east of the town). Water tobe , controlled comprises ten acres ofmarshes and 30 miles of streams. ParisGreen applied with rotary hand dusters isrecommended as larvicide.

2. No control should be necessary in the Cortearea, as this sector is in the centralmountainous part of the island.

3. Port and town area of Calvi should requirelittle control, but the airfield (two milesE.,S.E. of the town), and proposed landingstrip. (four miles S.S.E. of the town) willneed extensive measures. Water to becontrolled comprises 70 acres of marsh and27' miles of streams. Paris Green isrecommended, application to be by rotaryhand-dusters except 'for marshland whichwill require aircraft dusting.

4. The small port and town of Ile Rousseshould not require control. Two miles ofstreams, however, will need Paris Greenapplied by hand dusting.

5. No mosquito control should be necessary inthe Bastia (5) or Porto Vecchio (6) areas.

7. Borgo is the area of low flat coastal plain.There is one airfield existing (three milesN.E. of the town) and six new airfields areplanned. In addition various parts of theplain will be used for bivouac sites. Malariacontrol will be necessary over the wholearea. Water comprises 3,500 acres of openpond (25 per cent. needing control), 500acres of marsh and 64 miles of streams:Paris Green is recommended as larvicide,applicatign on streams to be by rotaryhand-dusters and on marsh and ponds byaircraft dusting.

8. The Ghisonnaccia sector is also an area oflow flat coastal -plain. One airfield exists(east edge of Gare Ghisonnaccia) and sevenmore are planned.plain may be usedmalaria control willwhole area. Waterof open pond (25 per700 acres of marsh,land and 136 miles

Various parts of theas bivouac sites andbe necessary over thecomprises 3,750 acrescent. needing control);550 acres of floodedof streams. Recom-

mendations are as for Borgo area.

A summary df the requirements set out abovedisclosed that larvae control would be necessaryon 2,413 acres of open pond, 1,280 acres of marshand 259. miles of stream. It would also call forspray killing of adult mosquitoes in 800 structuresand for the Drovision._of -aDb~axiBa li 40O@

145

Yugoslav labourers mixing Paris Green.

Division of Responsibility

As a result of the survey under aken inJanuary, responsibility for anti-malaria measuresin the Calvi and Ajaccio areas and over theeastern coastal plain north of the Alto river wasdelegated to the R.A.F., leaving the French tosupervise the large towns and the Americans tocontrol the remainder of the island.

For this task the R.A.F. had available No. 12A.M.C.U. (ex Levant) and two Army M.C.Us ontemporary attachment. At the commencementof operations in April, 1944, No. 12 A.M.C.U. wasallotted the area between the Golo and Alto rivers,"B ", M.C.U. the Calvi and Ajaccio sectors, and" D " M.C.U. the area north of the Golo river. Atthe end of May, when Serragia airfield wasoccupied, "D" unit took over territory fromsouth of its original boundary up to this airfield,the area reverting to No. 12 A.M.C.U. in Auguston increase in establishment of that unit. Fromthe Alto river, to the southern tip of the island,control was exercised by the American unit, 21stM.C.U.

Strength of No. 12 A.M.C.U. before its increasein establishment was one Flight Sergeant andseven airmen, while that of each of the Army

' ;

.

M.C.Us was one Officer, one Sergeant and sixother ranks. In addition to the Service personnel,approximately 230 Yugoslavs-c on s c r'i p t e doriginally by the Italians for duty in Sardinia-were employed as labourers. It is satisfactory tonote that these men turned out to be prodigiousworkers and that their efforts contributed in nosmall measure to the success of the undertaking.

Methods Selected for Control

The large areas of waterways, ponds andmarshland being regarded as the major and mosturgent commitment, measures chosen for theircontrol were those considered most likely toprove satisfactory in the shortest period of time-viz: heavy oiling on the water and aircraftdusting over the marshland.

While most of the stream-oiling was done byknapsack sprayers, many of the larger areaswere covered by pressure pumps operated fromtrucks. "D " M.C.U., controlling the seventeenmiles of canals from the Bevinco ,airfield to Alto,used an American chemical warfare decon-tamination wagon mounted o ten-wheelerchassis, this vehicle igallons andproviding a spr lsure which

penetrated th nhikest reeds and burnt up thevegetation, causing decomposition on the surface

'of the water. The heaviest concentration of oilby this method was about one gallon to 200square feet.

In the area further south, No. 12' A.M.C.U.adopted the same principle, using a fully-rotaryhand petrol-pump bolted to the side of a truck.They also experimented with a motor-drivenorchard sprayer, but the result was lesssatisfactory than that obtained with the rotarypump as the sprayer did not maintain asufficient pressure to drive oil through the densevegetation.

Most of the oil used was grade 2 Diesel, thisbeing easily obtainable and appearing to havea less injurious effect upon'rubber parts than didMalariol. In the concentration in which oil wasused, Malariol appeared to have no appreciableadvantage.

For the extensive marshes which stretch fbrabout eighteen miles along the east coast, 50yards across at their northern extremity by theupper end of Lake Biguglia and three quartersof a mile wide at the lower end of the lake by-Poretta airfield, aircraft dusting with ParisGreen was the only practicable method of cover,

In most In sovergrown wif Eand bushes addedout the swamp areas.

heavily

Aircraft dusting was also en1lo o theairfield and along the Gravone rive t cio,over the stream at Lozari, over the m andriver at Ostriconi and in the Cdlvi area.

Most of the work fell to a Lysander (two wereprovided, but one remained unserviceable for thewhole period), but some was undertaken by anAmerican Boston and on a few occasions anArgus was employed. The, Boston had the greatadvantage of carrying one and a half tons ofdusting compound, and could cover the wholeof the British area in five hours twenty minutes,whereas the Lysander, although superior foroperating in confined spaces, carried only 300 lbs.The Argus was unsatisfactory, being under-powered and slow to respond to the controls-the latter a serious handicap in this type ofwork.

The mixture used was 25-33 per cent. ParisGreen diluted with lime of diatomaceous earth.Of the 100,650 lbs. used, 68,300 lbs. weredistributed by the Boston and 32,350 lbs. bythe Lysander. While only about 10 per cent.

Loading a Lysander.

147

was considered to .haye ee .ofiAbly expended,it is thought 'that uclj he dust as fell onbreeding: cep kiled o'p bximately 90 per cent.of the lay ve. Evdence in support of this wasfound a etta pumping station where as aresult f 2 adult anopheles killed during Juneand Jy, no mosquitoes were identified in Augustor September.

Resume of District Control

The preceding paragraph gives in outline thegeneral plan followed for the wide expanses ofwater and marsh. Notes below cover the moreimportant of the local areas and indicate thework carried out in each case.

Bevinco airfield was the most important of thefive airfields on the east coast and wasconsidered likely to be the most malarious. Halfa mile to the north lay the Bevinco river, whichin this part of its course dried up during summer,leaving pool formations. Between the airfieldand the river was a low-lying area of marketgarden with two canals and a network ofneglected ditches, and on its east side ran acollecting canal bordered by about 70 yards ofmarsh. The only dry area was that to the west.

All the ditches were cleared out and treatedby knapsack oilers, the canals 'oiled by

bowser and the area on side dustedby aircraft.

Borgo airfield lay two and a half miles southof Bevinco, and three quarters of a mile from thecanal and marshes forming the edge of LakeBiguglia.. North-east and west of the field wasthe Rau de Rasignini, south of the runway wasan area of seepage, and east a dry irrigationcanal.

Treatment here followed the measures used atBevinco-air dusting of the canal and marshland,knapsack oiling of the upper reaches of the Raude Rasignini, and bowser spraying of the lowerand broader waterways.

Poretta airfield, two miles south-east of Borgo,was just north of the Golo river and adjoined acanal two and a half miles long and overgrownwith blackthorn and reeds. It was also withinone mile of the canals and marshes forming theborder of the southern end of Like Biguglia-these about three-quarters of a mile wide.

After cutting the main canal from its source,it was first cleared and trenched from the swampbackwards to the river and then oiled by bowser.The marsles, impossible to cross even whenlabourers were clad in thigh boots, were dustedby aircraft.

Oiling with a decontamination truck at Serragia.

A Lysander dusting the edge of Lake Biguglia.

Serragia airfield, south of the Golo and justnorth of the Rau de Serragia, had, an area ofmarshland and two canals, the nearest half amile from the runway. As with others, thecanals were bowser-oiled and the marshes alongthe coast dusted from the air.

Alto, the remaining airfield north of the river,was bordered on its eastern and northern sidesby a heavily overgrown network of drains(tributaries of the canals adjoining Serragiaairfield). There were also marshes east andnorth-east of the site.

A considerable amount of heavy manual workwas required to clear this area. After preparation,part of the drain network was oiled by knapsacksand the remainder by bowser . All marshes wereair dusted and the lower four miles of theriver cleared and oiled.

The districts described above were the mostheavily populated by Service personnel, andconsequently it was essential to search-out anddeal with all probable anophelene breedinggrounds. Throughout this area- there werenumerous rocky streams originating in themountains, which tended to dry up east of themain road while holding. water in pools in theupper reaches. Much time and labour wasj^^p ded in canalizing and oiling, and all the

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major waterways and pockets were brought undercontrol.

On the west side of the Island, Ajaccio andCalvi were the principal areas, with Lozari aminor area.

Ajaccio was the headquarters of the NorthernBase Section organisation and the majority ofunits were camped along the Ajaccio-Corte road.The problem here was more simple of solutionand consisted of clearing and oiling drains andattending to wet areas caused through leaksfrom the open concrete canal carrying the town'swater supply. The other area was the airfieldon the delta at the mouth of the Gravone river,and for control of this the northern branch of theriver was cleared and canalized. On the westside heavily overgrown ditches were cleared andin the centre sector five miles of the Gravoneriver was air dusted.

Calvi had three airfields, one opposite the'railway station (Calvi Main), another between theFicarella and the Calvi-Bonifatto road (St.Catherine) and the third along the Calvi.Calenzana road (Calonzana). Calvi Main wasbordered by the lower reaches of the rivers FiumeSecco and De Ficarella, St. Catherine had a seriesof small streams west of the runway, andCalonpAar fqrmed a watershed for the Rau de

Bartasca.* Oiling and air us A were ad

faslor other\ aerodrom.. "

.L ziarl was a beach used first as a Rest Camp,

then as a landing ground and finally as a

Straining camp for A.A. gunners. The onlydanger area was a small stream at the westernend, and this was cleared, oiled and air dusted.

Pumping Stations and Canals

Reference was made earlier to a canal andpumping system constructed by the Frenchbefore the war for malaria control and landreclamation along the shores of Lake Bigugliaand the coastal marshes of the Alto river.

Each section of this system comprised acollecting canal, at the centre of which was apumping station for transferring the water backto the lake or into the sea as was mostconvenient. All seven stations had been eitherdestroyed or damaged by the Germans, withresult. that the marshes which lay between thefive airfields Bevinco, Borgo, Poretta, Serragiaand Alto were constantly under flood.

The most northerly station had only a fewbreaks in the wire, and these were repaired andthe station put into action for a short, time.

d, had been• 's repairable.

i ' v Borgo and

Poretta were supplied by a common line which

had been destroyed, and the station near Borgowas completely wrecked. The two southern

stations, opposite Serragia and Alto airfields,were in good order but the line supplying themhad been destroyed.

A plan to control the level of these canalswould have been practicable had suitable pumpsbeen available. They were not.

Investment and Dividend

' In addition to the 100,650 lbs. of Paris Greenaircraft dusting referred to above, units underthe administration of R.A.F. Medical Branchundertook 100,383 yards of clearing, 26,851 yardsof new ditching and 199,760 yards of maintenance.They expended 31,613 gallons of oil on larvicidingand sprayed over 4,000 rooms in 856 buildings.

'The most important fact of the season, and

the practical result of the undertaking, was thatno unit suffered operationally from the effectsof malaria. For the R.A.F. only 4 per cent. ofpersonnel became cases during April and May,6 per cent. in June and 10 per cent. in July and

Oiling with a converted petrol pump at Alto.

A typical breeding ground-the marsh of Poretta.

August. In the American forces the rate wasmore steady and averaged 5 per cent. over the

five months April-August, 1944. ,In conclusion, it may be said that the finest

defences against mosquitoes and malaria will fail

unless every member of the fighting forces and

ancillary services does his or her share in the

all-out campaign,, and it is, therefore, only fair

that a share of the victory that was undoubtedly

achieved over the mosquito in Corsica should

go to every man or woman who supported

actively, and at times at the expense of personalcomfort, this all-out effort. Their co-operation is

gratefully acknowledged.

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E

IT IS AN ELEMENTARY principle that anamphibious landing, carried out beyond the rangeof single-engined land-based aircraft, must besupported by carrier-borne aircraft.

While Britain was still on the defensive, thisprinciple was considered by the Admiralty andplans were gradually developed for future large-scale Offensives. In 1942, two " experimentalruns " were made by squadrons operating fromaircraft carriers, first in the British landings onMadagascar and then with the British andAmerican landings in North Africa. For theseoperations little progress had been made inliaison with the Army and the Naval air supportWas mainly confined to fighter protection overthe convoys and beaches.

By 1943 the next stage in carrier-borne supportWas completed when short-range fighter cover forthe Allied landings at Salerno was given. Fivesmall carriers, known then as " Escort Carriers ",provided continuous fighter cover of 24 aircraftover the beachhead for four days. Two fleetcarriers operated further out to sea with anti-submarine patrols and fighter protection for bothcarrier forces. When the beachheads had beensecured and landing strips completed, a formationof 24 Seafires landed ashore from the escortcarriers to provide support for the Army, whileshort-range fighters of the R.A.F. began to comein from the south.

The carrier-borne activity over Salerno wasstill confined to fighter protection, but it providedthe first proof of our ability to operate continuous

missions from small carriers in company. The" baby flat-tops" which featured at Salernoconsisted of H.M. Ships "Hunter," "Attacker,"" Stalker" and "Battler-"; H.M.S. " Unicorn," acarrier of medium size, brought the force up tofive.

Formation of the Wing

After Salerno the first three carriers mentionedabove were formed into a force and equipped forthe special role of the assault, each being givena squadron of 20 aircraft. These squadrons,equipped with Seafires as before, became No. 4Naval Fighter Wing.

In September, 1943, No. 4 Naval Fighter Wingstarted training for its new role of Army Support.on a grand scale. By 1st January, 1944, eachsquadron would have to be capable of carryingout every one of the following roles:-

Air Fighting.Tactical Reconnaissance.Photographic Reconnaissance, with Vertical

and Oblique Cameras.Artillery Reconnaissance.Bombardment Spotting.Ground Attack.Dive and Low-Level Bombing.

R.A.F. pilots, experienced in these roles, wereattached to the Wing to train the pilots. -An AirLiaison Section, consisting of a Major, a Captainand two clerks, was attached to each squadronto co-ordinate training with Army requirementson the same basis ps had already ei veloped

by iesert and Tactical Air Forces. A WingLeader was appointed to supervise Air and Ground .training and to lead the Wing in action.

Army Support Training '

The Wing prepared for operations in the FarEast until January, 1944, when it was learnedthat there was to be an operation "elsewhere "beforehand. The delay gave time for furtherintensive Army Support training in conjunctionwith British and American Army units. Someidea of the scale of the work carried out in thoseseven weeks can be judged by the output of over15,000 prints from the squadron photographicsections.

June, 1944, found the Wing in the Mediterraieanand the pilots, whose previous hopes had beenbent towards the Second Front, realised that thenext job would be the invasion of the South ofFrance. More Close. Support training wasundertaken in the Western Mediterranean withAmerican Assault Forces, both from the shipsand from the shore. The final dress rehearsalwas carried cut when Naval pilots from No. 4Wing were attached to R.A.F. and S.A.A.F.squadrons with the Desert Air Force operatingin Italy. In all, Naval pilots carried out some700 sorties in Italy and operated in all the rolesthey would be expected to perform later.

Land Operations in Italy

The welcome that the Naval pilots receivedfrom the Reconnaissance and Fighter-BomberWings in Italy remains as only a memory in thewealth of operational lessons that were absorbed.At first pilots flew as number two to the veteransof Nos. 208 R.A.F. and 40 S.A.A.F. Squadrons onTac/R and Arty/R and found that they wereable to observe only a fraction of the movementseen by their leaders. But with each trip the

Sinformation they brought back became fuller,and the Naval pilots were briefed to leadimportant missions as -soon as they wereconsidered sufficiently at home in the battle area.

Squadron personnel were split among bomberand fighter Wings, so that experience could begained in all types of missions and the lessonspassed on when they re-joined ship.

Parties of pilots were taken tO the front toobtain a good picture of the conditions of theground forces fighting south of Arezzo, and theybrought a smile to the face of many veterans ofof the Eighth Army when they saw the Navytrucks drive nonchalantly by, their dark bluecovered with dust and the trucks filled withsouvenirs of the land battle.

The encouragement given by both Army andSAir Force and the great value of the .experiencegained formed a firm base and No. 4 NavalFighter Wing confidently aWaited its firstoperation.

Task Force 88 Formed

In preparation for the invasion of southernFrance, the three carriers were joined by a fourth

squadron in H.M.S. "of Task Force 88, consistingcarriers under the command of Rear-ATroubridge, D.S.O. Two American carriers aljoined the force, making a total of nine.

This was divided-into two groups, the secondincluding the two American carriers and H.M.S."Hunter" and "Stalker" under the Flag ofRear-Admiral C. T. Durgin, U.S.N. This groupsailed as a diversion to Alexandria, which gaveopportunities to co-ordinate flying staff workand station keeping, and in four days a firmunderstanding had been reached between theBritish and U.S. carriers.

Invasion of Southern France

On 15th August, 1944, the two groups ofcarriers, bearing a mixed collection of Seafire,Hellcat and Wildcat squadrons, commencedoperations off the south coast of France at St.Tropez. While R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. squadronsbased on Corsica covered the 'eastern landings,the two assault divisions to the west receivedtheir close support from Naval aircraft. Forthirteen days the squadrons operated continuouslyin the coastal area between Bezier and Cannesand up to 100 miles inland.

Success was achieved in all the roles in whichpilots had been trained. The 'first days of theoperation found a large proportion'of one group'seffort flown as fighter cover over our own forceand standing patrols over the beaches, but as thecomplete absence of the Luftwaffe became normal,force cover -was abandoned and every availablesortie was flown to support the rapid advanceinland of the assaulting divisions.

The full potentiality of Tac/R by the Navalforce was not quickly appreciated, but it providedthe majority of the information from which theA.L.Os built up the tactical picture of the landbattle, and. this vital information was passed toArmy H.Q., first in the H.Q. Ship and then ashoreby any available channel. The movement ofllth Panzer Division in its counter-attack rolewas one of those quickly spotted by the pilotsand both tanks and transports were dealt withseverely. Out of some 500 vehicles of this divisionknown to have moved south, 300 were foundabandoned on the roads when the Americandivisions overran the area.

The flak positions around the main centres ofresistance-Toulon, Marseilles and Avignon-werethe chief enemies that the pilots had to avoid, butthe experience gained in Italy helped them to keepout of trouble,

The French battleship " Strasbourg" wasbombarded by Naval units under the direction of,Seafire pilots as she lay at Toulon. Enemy coastalbatteries -were put out of action by Seafire pilotsdirecting the guns of the British, American andFrench battleships on their emplacements soeffectively that by D plus 5 enemy guns remainedsilent for fear of the eagle. eye of the pilotsoverhead, who would immediately call for fire

3 0.1-i

St. Tropez harbour with quays demolished on "D "-Day, 15th August, 1944,photographed by an aircraft of No. 4 Naval Fighter Wing.

from the bombarding ships to be brought downas soon ad the enemy flashes were spotted.

Information Passed Quickly

On D plus 3 it was feared that the enemy15th Panzer Division was moving east toMarseilles from the Bezier-Toulouse area. Arapid move of the carrier group to the west andTac/R by Seafire pilots provided vital informationthat this was incorrect and no movement wastaking place from the west. All informationgleaned by pilots, whether from reconnaissanceor close support missions, was passed by the AirLiaison Sections on board the carriers to theAmerican H.Q. Ship anchored inshore. Here itwas sifted and passed to the Army ashore.Requests from .the Army for .close support orreconnaissance weie passed through the H.Q. Shipto the carrier force: within 30 minutes of thedemand aircraft were taking off from the carriers,and often within an hour they were over thetarget area.

There were two good examples of this closesupport. On 17th August, the Army complainedthat their troops on Port Cros Island were beingheld up by a German garrison in the castle at thenorth-west end of the island and that Naval units

could not bombard the enemy mortar positionsowing to the intervention of a high ridge of land.At 10.00 hours, 50 Naval fighter-bombers launchedan attack with bombs, rockets and cannonfire-and' the German garrison immediatelysurrendered.

On 23rd August, the Army asked for an attackon a heavily defended column of the enemyretreating northwards along the road fromOrange. In spite of intense flak, very poorweather and approaching dusk, 20 Naval aircraftattacked this column less than 500 yards fromour own forces. One hour later the enemy columnwas overrun.

Difficulties of Landing

It is not an easy matter to land a Seafire onthe deck after a long sortie. The deck of anassault carrier allows the pilot 400 ft. to workfrom for take-off and only two-thirds of this forlanding. Of this two-thirds only the first halfis safe for his touch-down because if the pilotlands in the second half, he is likely to damagehis aircraft in the barriers. If he fails to catchany one of the arrestor wires he will certainlywrite-off his own aircraft and probably damagesome of those parked forwarof the barriers;

IA (~2~fI

Above :-Reconnassance photograph by No. 4 Naval Fighter Wing on 20thAugust, 1944, before demolitions in Marseilles dock area by the Germans:

Below :-Furt her reconnaissance six 'days later revealing demolition damage.

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Siebel-Ferry and Flak Ship before attack by Seafires.

Siebel-Ferry later seen to be sinking.

156

A motor vessel creepingup to Salonika. It was destroyed later by a Seafireattack.

The French Battleship "Strasbourg" disabled after .Naval boimbardment

combined with spotting by Seafires of No, 4 Naval Fighter Wing.

45 '

Seafires of No. 4 Naval Fighter Wing on patrol over Piraeus.

for the first few days of the operation there waslittle or no wind and this meant that the relativespeed of the aircraft to the deck of the carrierwas proportionately high. In spite of theseconditions, however, there were very few accidentsand, in fact, throughout the operation it wasfound unnecessary to embark any reserveaircraft.

Sixteen hundred and forty-four sorties involvingsome 2,600 operational flying hours were flownfrom the seven British carriers during theoperation and, although previously five daysoperations had been considered the maximum, itwas found that carriers could operate for at leasttwo periods of five days if a clear 48-hours breakwas given in order to relieve the strain on pilots,staff and deck handling parties.

About 300 of the total sorties werereconnaissance, bombardment spotting andphotographic, and some of the photographsproduced-particularly those of Marseilles harbourbefore and after demolition by the Germans-were of great value to the Army. In additionto the bag of destroyed vehicles, the morale effectof having Seafires ready to bring down Navalgunfire on any German battery that opened up

Sgainst the Allied armada was an importantcontributon by the carrier force.

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Operations in the Aegean

After the excitement of this operation had dieddown, No. 4 Wing sailed to Alexandria, to collectnew aircraft and to prepare to chase the Germansout of the Aegean.

In daylight on 15th September some of theships carrying the Wing, with the Hellcatsquadron in H.M.S. "Emperor," entered theAegean within range of the German shorebatteries on Crete, while others were detached atpoints of vantage around the southern shore.During the nine weeks until 20th November fromone to four carriers were continuously on patrolbetween Crete and Salonika.

These operations were of an entirely new type,because, although the object was to destroyGermans, the carriers and the bruisers anddestroyers operating with them as Force "A"were without direct communication with the Army,which by now had landed on the mainland ofGreece and was forcing its way to Athens. Attackswere made on Crete, on many of the smallerislands, and on the rail and road communicationsalong the eastern coast of Greece itself. Themissions were mainly devoted to softening-upattacks and spotting for Xa|lbombardmentbefore landings b gCommandos,but harass1mla the enemy's

sea and land comniunications with the object ofdestroying the Hun and hastening the liberationof Greece.

Miscellaneous Targets

The island of Melos was found to be a heavilydefended outpost and many sorties were flownagainst this strongpoint. As the German forceattempted to retreat up the east coast of Greeceto Salonika on the only escape route left to themby the increasing, activity of Marshal Tito's forcesto the north, Seafires and Hellcats again andagain destroyed trains and cut the railway linewhich runs parallel with the coast. Continuousreconnaissance and photography by the Tac/RSeafires produced many good targets for theSeafire fighter-bombers, and the German planfor withdrawal by this route was eventuallyabandoned.

In all, between 7th and 20th October, 1944,thirteen engines and 54 trucks- were claimed asdestroyed and a further five engines and 97trucks damaged by Naval air attack, in additionto large numbers of merchant ships and enemyminor war vessels destroyed by the joint effortof air and Naval attack. The Germans had lostso much of their transport by internal and airand sea attack that the final evacuation hadto be carried out mainly on foot by night throughthe mountains of Northern Greece.

Success Against Shipping

Two of the squadrons of 'No. 4 Naval FighterWing had particular success against enemyshipping in the Aegean, bombing missionsaccounting for one 2,000 ton motor vessel, one1,000-ton merchant ship and a 500-ton ship sunkby bombing attack, in addition to many largecaiques, Siebel-ferries and barges which werecaught in a game of " cat-and-mouse " as they'attempted io slip into the island harbours toevacuate the German garrisons.

Since no enemy aircraft had been encounteredduring the operations off the south of France,the pilots hoped they would be lucky enough tofind transport aircraft in the Aegean, but thesehad. already been dealt with successfully byR.A.F. Beaufighters intruding by night into theGerman air escape routes. Two aircraft weredestroyed, however, by Seafires of No. 4 NavalFighter Wing-a DO.24 in Volos harbour and aJU.88 over Athens on 16th October.

On 18th September, a number of B.V.222sa 'H.E.115s were discovered at anchor in Suda Bay. |'An attempt was made to destroy these by dive-bombing with Seafires, but cloud conditionsprevented accuracy. A low-level attack by 24Seafires was arranged for the following day, butdue to the recall of the carriers had to becancelled.

Capture of Levita and Private Wars

On 5th October, H.M.iS. "Hunter " provided airsupport for the entirely Naval capture of theisland of Levita, where the German garrisonmaintained a W/T station,, traffic from which wasintercepted reporting on the movements of ourown forces. A boarding party from, H.M.S."Catterick" and " Aurora" landed successfullyand were, dismayed to find that the only visibleopposition consisted of herds of goats, andimmediately queried the accuracy of the Tac/Rpilot who had reported German activity at dawn.The Tac/R report was found by the Marines tobe only too true half-an-hour later when theGerman garrison put up a stiff fight in the centreof the island before finally capitulating andreturning as prisoners of war on board thedestroyers.

Another operation of some interest was carriedout in support of the Army landing party on theisland of Piscopi, north-west of Rhodes, on 29thOctober. A signal was received that a Britishforce had captured the island on the previous dayand that all the German prisoners had been takenin a cruiser to Alexandria. During the night,however, the Germans on Rhodes had retaliatedand a raiding party had landed on the island andcornered the small British garrison. A Greekdestroyer and four Seafires were sent to the rescueand the Germans were discovered in the southernhalf of the island while the British occupied acorner in the north. Seafire pilots found twoGerman landing craft in a harbour on the south-east coast and passed this information back totheir carrier and to the destroyer. The destroyerfirst bombarded the landing craft and then latersuccessfully evacuated the British landing party,while a flight of Seafires also bombed the landingcraft and straffed the area held by the Germans.

Following the Aegean operation, No. 4 NaValFighter Wing returned to the United Kingdom,where, after two weeks', leave, and assisted bymany new personnel, it once again resumedtraining for future employment.

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159

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In

Allied Interdiction

A FEATURE OF THE Italian campaign from theautumn of 1943 onwards has been the Alliedattempt to cause interdiction by air to the enemy'slines of supply and communication. The theorywas that the Germans, weakened through lack ofessentials, would find it difficult to fightsuccessfully on the defensive, let alone build upsufficient reserves to indulge in offensiveoperations.

The steps taken by the Allies to bring aboutthis state of affairs, by a carefully calculatedbombing policy designed to destroy bridges, cutrailway lines and disrupt marshalling yards, havebeen described fully in previous numbers of theReview and are also referred to elsewhere in thisissue.

The Germans naturally did not take the treat-ment meted rout to them lying down and, in thisarticle, it is proposed 'to indicate briefly 'how,by. counter-measures to our interdiction policy,they contrived to maintain their armies in thefield.

MRasters of Improvisation

All through this war the Germans have provedthemselves to be masters of improvisation. Thisfact is evident from the way in 'which they have/kept their much-bombed factories going, while,another typical case in point was the Greekcampaign in. 1941, during which the advancingGermans got their men and machinery throughplaces that demolitioAs \were thought to haverendered impassable. Similarly, for a defensivecampaign, the dour struggle for Italy has allalong provided samples of their skill andingenuity.

This is Certainly true as far as their speedyreactions to our interdiction policy wereconcerned. Although they have continued toretreat northwards under Allied pressure, thatretreat has never developed into a rout and, inspite of the harassing of their life lines, asufficiency of supplies has contrived to seepthrough.

In making this possible, the Germans knewthat they could expect precious little protectionfrom the Luftwaffe and, for any defence of vitalpoints, would have to rely exclusivdly on smokescreens and A.A. guns. As these could never beubiquitous-although considerable use was madeof specially equipped flak-trains for protectingthreatened points--the Germans had to be

prepared to face two major repair or improvisa-tion problems-(a) -railways and, (b) bridges.

For this task they could call on the vastresources of the Todt Organisation for allplanning and direction. Although certain jobswere on occasion assigned to German ArmyEngineers, direct supervision of work wasnormally turned over to private engineeringfirms. These firms furnished some of thenecessary equipment and the supervisory crews,but most of the actual labour was carried outby Italians who were. pressed into service.

The Railway ProblemIn facing the railway interdiction problem as

a whole, it cannot be denied that the Germanrepair organisation has, through long practice,reached a high degree of efficiency. As soonas the bombers departed, the repair machinerywas set in motion; every advantage was takenof spells of bad weather that reduced both ourbomber and reconnaissance effort; and repairwork was finally brought to such a pitch thatconstant attacks have been necessary if a linewere to be kept anything like' permanently cut.

The German policy, therefore, has been toaccept the fact that many tracks would beknocked out again and again, but to strain everynerve to keep at least the minimum open foressential traffic.

To bring this about, they had the followingalternatives:-

(i) Repair of damage as quickly as possible.(ii) Diversion of traffic and use of minor

lines where practicable, with reliance onroads, if unavoidable, for circumventingrail blocks.

Mobile Repair CrewsFor repair work, the Germans eventually

evolved a. system that has stood them in goodstead. The core of this system comprises anumber of highly-trained, highly-mobile repaircrews, capable of being rushed to any damagedsection,of the line at a moment's notice.

Headquarters of the various crews are locatedat large rail centres, from which detachmentsare dispersed to "waiting" stations. The entirerailway network is divided up among these crews,all of which are thoroughly briefed on the mostimportant sections in their area so that, if oneof these is damaged, all planning and preliminarymeasures for repair have already beenaccomplished. '

160

Enemy sus

The outfits themselves have been described byprisoners as consisting -of the following:-

(a) One rail car carrying three to nine experttechnicians, with various files containinginformation on possible repair measuresand other technical details.

(b) Two to four workshop cars carryingwelding equipment, cdranes, tools, spareparts and so forth..

(c) One to two cars for spare rails and largereplacement parts.

(d) One to two cars for cement, gravel, stoneblocks, etc., for road bend construction.

(e) One to two cars for crews' quarters andkitchen facilities.

The Crews Go to Work

When an air raid is reported, the crews in thatarea are immediately, warned and, in the eventof damage ,occurring, exact information as tolocation and extent is telephoned or radioed tothe headquarters concerned. From there thenecessary instructions are radioed direct to therepair trains, details being added while the trainis in motion.

In some cases small emergency trains, carryingunskilled workers, reach the scene before the

better-equipped crews; their task is to clear

away the rubble and so on, enabling repairs to

begin as soon as the expert technicians arrive.As regards the types of repair work that have

had to be performed, prisoners have indicated

that, while repair to actual tracks was

comparatively easy, landslides caused a great

deal of delay. According to one statement, for

example, traffic on the Brenner Pass line was

interrupted for eight days when bombs fell in

such a way as to cover about half a mile of

track at a bend with debris; the repair work

consisted almost exclusively of excavation, little

damage having been done to the actual rails.

Diversion of Traffic

An alternative to actual repair work, pure andsimple, is provided by the possibility of trafficdiversion to branch lines where such lines areavailable.

The Germans soon became adroit at this re-routeing and, by carefully analysing all potentialrailway targets, had a knack of being able tokeep open at least one line to which trafficcould be switched in order to avoid damagedareas. Alternative lines are always available inthe marshalling yards, so that complete paralysiscan normally be quickly overcome. To avoidcongestion in the larger yards, the widestpossible use has been made of side tracks asoff-loading points.

In the event of there being no chance of adetour line, the enemy has naturally had tofall back on the roads. This, however, is aninconvenient procedure used only as a last resort.

One of the few advantages of road traffic isthat the roads themselves are, on the whole, lessliable to teere damage than the rail tracks andare cons~I r y easier to,.keepserviceable. Even

when bridges are concerned t'Wi w R iniLmatter to make sufficient repairs to let roa"atraffic through than is the case with rail traffic.

The Bridge Problem

This brings us to the problem of bridge repairin general-a problem that must have been aconstant nightmare to the Germans throughoutthe Italian campaign.

Italy is a country in which bridges abound

and, whether they liked it or not, the Germanshad to make an effort to keep a proportion of

them serviceable. They faced up to the bridge.situation with their usual thoroughness and, asthey did with the railways, contrived to find ananswer to the question of getting supplies across.

As far as the minor bridges are concerned,the problem has not been too tough. Efficientplanning in- advance and the use of a certainamount of prefabrication are two factors thathave helped to ensure speedy repair work. Newbridges of from ten to twelve metres can, it isestimated, be erected in from two to ten days,depending on local conditions, and sometimessufficient temporary repairs can be effected ina matter of hours.

Preparing for Trouble

If a major bridge is destroyed, however, thepr o b 1 e m naturally assumes considerableproportions. Here preparation is the keynote.Bridge-building materials are accumulated atstrategic points and, in anticipation of trouble,emergency lines may be laid in advance froma main R.R. bridge to an auxiliary bridge orto a location where a temporary, bridge' can beerected at short notice. If necessary, completeloop lines may be built to avoid existing bridgesand to afford fewer points for possible blocks.

There is always the added anxiety, however,that-even if the engineering work is successfullyaccomplished, no guarantee exists that another.air attack will not undo the result of weeks oflabour by knocking the bridge down again. Atthe Po crossing at Ostigiia, for instance, whenthe permanent bridge was destroyed, theGermans quickly erected a wooden structureto carry the railway - only to see it written-off after two or three days' serviceability.

Although they have had some remarkableengineering feats to their credit, the time came.when the Germans were forced to adopt othermeasures.. As regards the Po river bridges -which offer the - most convenient and typicalstudy - these measures are: -

(1) The use of pontoon bridges.(ii) The use of ferries.(iii) A system of deception.

Night Use of Pontoon Bridges

The use of pontoon bridges and ferries is by nomeans an ideal substitute for the permanentR.R. bridges, but is one that allows at leastthminimum essential requirementstroops south of the river. AlL

n t'he case of pontoon bridges, as these arecearIy far too vulnerable in the event of a dayattack, the Germans devised a scheme wherebythe various sections are scattered along the riverbank, assembled at dusk, used during the hoursof darkness and dismantled again before day-break, the sections being scattered as before. Togive added security, the changes are rung on a

-series of pontoon bridges, one being assembledone night and another in a different locality onthe next night.

This scheme, although it does not enable theenemy to bring over the tonnage he would nodoubt like, has the advantage that the bridgesare not there when our- day bombers or P/Raircraft are on the scene to catch them. Nightphotography offers obvious difficulties and theattempts that have been made to destroy thepontoons while in use have not so far had thedesired effect.

The Ferry System

The chief drawback to the pontoons is the factthat there are apparently none with a capacityin excess of 25 tons. An alternative, however,exists in the ferry crossings, of which no fewerthan 56 have been spotted by P/R.

These ferries, which are almost as importantas the pontoons in the enemy's improvisationpolicy, vary considerably in capacity-from hand-pulled boats carrying only personnel and lightstores to train ferries capable of carrying twoor three loaded rail cars on each trip.

Each rail ferry is normally located near aformer rail crossing point and, leading off fromthe main rail lines, the Germans have constructeda spur line on an earth bank. This runs downto the ferry terminus, where facilities are providedfor transferring cars from the rails to the ferryboats.

Similarly, M.T. ferries with capacities of over70 tons have been created, consisting of two ormore pontoon boats lashed together and capableof carrying several loaded lorries, with fifteenor twenty men. The usual power unit consistsof small tugs or two or three outboard motors.

As they are used principally at night, theferries have not provided good targets for ouraircraft.

Pipe Lines Across the River

A third alternative-at least for the movingof fuel across the Po-is the use of pipe lines.There-is evidence of a number of these, theenemy having constructed rail diversions leadingoff from main lines to transfer points, wherethe oil is unloaded from cars and pumped acrossthe river to cars waiting on the opposite side.

The transfer points are well camouflaged, butin certain cases the actual pipe line can be tracedfrom photographs up to the river bank.

Elaborate Attempts at Deception

Apart from these methods for getting suppliesda he river, the Germans have also adopted

f"th rsubterfuge-deception.1 W A--

This deception scheme began to show itself inDecember, when it was noticed that there wereseveral unexplained delays in the repair of certainkey rail bridges and several apparent inconsis-tencies in maintaining them as serviceable.

A detailed study of air photographs providedthe solution to the mystery by revealing the factthat:-

(a) Certain damaged bridges were repairedonly up to a point so that, although theyappeared impassable, they could be repairedcompletely in only a few hours.

(b) Certain serviceable bridges were made toappear impassable by the removal of oneor more short spans, which could, however,be replaced when necessary with littledelay.

The reason for these curious goings-on isclearly that the enemy hopes to put our P/Rand intelligence off the scent and so protect thebridges in question against the possibility ofattack.

A study of the -railway network as a wholereveals the fact that such subterfuges have beenresorted to under various circumstances:-

(a) When a convenient by-pass route is opento carry the necessary traffic.

(b) When other bridges on the same line areundergoing repairs and it is not consideredwise to make one bridge completely

* serviceable until the entire line can beopened.

(c)- When a diversion is open, enabling thesemi-repaired bridge to be kept in reserve.

(d) When there is a chance to use a bridge bynight only, taking out one or more spansbefore daybreak.

This deception scheme is an ingenious one-but valuable only so long as the reasons behindit remained obscure.

Pros and Cons of the Interdiction Battle

Looking back on the interdiction battle, whatconclusions can be reached?

For our part, it may be said that the inter-diction policy has undoubtedly helped our landforces, in that it has made impossible any chancethat the enemy might have had of launching asustained offensive; it played a vital part inmaking the Anzio landing a practicable proposi-tion and ensuring the capture of Rome; and ithas thrown a great and constant strain on theenemy's already over-taxed resources in bothmanpower and material.

On the German side it may equally truthfullybe said that by determination and ingenuity-to which should'be added the outside factors ofintermittent bad weather and heavy Allied aircommitments elsewhere-they have avoided acomplete supply stranglehold and have contrivedto provide their armies with suf ' ns tofight a dogged delayin ly.

The Magnetic Sweeper

IN APRIL, 1944, No. 236 Medium Night BomberWing began to experience a greatly increasedincidence of aircraft tyre failures due to small,deep cuts; a wastage that increased to such anextent that the normal supply of replacementouter covers could not keep pace with the demand.The position became so desperate by the end ofthe month that no fewer than seventeen aircraftfrom the Wing were grounded through lackof tyres.

The cause of this sudden increase 'in tyrewastage was not apparent at first as the Winghad been operating from the same airfield for overthree months without an undue amount of tyretrouble and it was not until a searching inspectionof the dispersal areas was made that thecause was revealed. The whole area was foundto be littered with splinters from Americanfragmentation bombs, a legacy from theU.S.A.A.F. attacks the previous year prior to theinvasion of Italy. Added to this there was furtherextensive metal contamination by thousands ofwood screws, nails and fittings, the result of firesthat had been made by ground crews fromammunition and packing boxes during the winter.

Hidden by the Mud

During the winter months all this metal hadlain harmless under a covering Sf mud, butdirectly the ground hardened on the advent offine weather the top soil had blown away andexposed the razor sharp edges embedded in theideal matrix of hardened mud.

Extensive and intensive sweeps wereimmediately made of the affected area by linesof personnel walking slowly across the airfield,but although these sweeps did produce a rich haulof the larger and more obvious metal fragiments,the great majority of the small and mostdangerous splinters still eluded detection, as bynow they had rusted to a colour .identical to thatof the ground.

The operational tyre "life " had by now fallento an average of two take-offs and landings pertyre and an immediate solution was imperative ifthe Wing were not to be completely grounded.The only answer appeared to be the constructionand operation of a large and powerful magnetthat could be used to comb the dispersal areas,The Engineering and Electrical staffs of the Wing-put their heads together to produce a " Magnetic

Sweeper " that was christened byirresponsible parties as the " Snifter."

certain

Various Types of "Snifter"

The Mark I Snifter proved to be a failure andnever reached the production stage. Mark II wassuccessful, but neither powerful nor robustenough. By improving and rebuilding thisoriginal machine, however, a Mark V Snifter wasevolved that proved to be the answer to all theproblems.

Three field coils with laminated soft iron coresand bridge pieces were obtained from a hightension transformer found amid the rubble of anearby bombed technical school. These coils weremounted on a chassis made from two four-feetlengths of " H" section girder, these chassismembers also forming the magnet poles. Bysuitably mounting two pneumatic tyred wheelsat either end of the chassis together with smallleading and traveller wheels, the whole assemblycould be towed over the ground with the polessome inch and a half above the ground surface.

To energise the field coils a 24 volt, 40 amp.Petrol Electric set was mounted in the back ofthe towing vehicle, this vehicle being equippedwith a suitable switchboard to enable the currentto be switched off when it became necessary toremove the haul of sweepings.

Producing a Swept Lane

By towing the " Magnetic Sweeper" at a slowwalking pace over the area to be cleared, aneffectively swept lane four feet wide wasproduced. At approximately every hundred yardsthe current was switched .off and the " catch"collected. It was found in operation that metalobjects below the surface of the ground andhitherto unnoticed were drawn up, and as thework proceeded in cleaning up the airfield aremarkably varied collection of metal objects,including armour-piercing bullets, bomb splinters,A.G.S. items and S.A.A. belt clips, was obtained.

The Snifter was operated all through thesummer until the arrival of wet weather in

October rendered its operation unnecessary. Thesuccess of its activities may be judged by the factthat by November the average number ofoperational take-offs and landings per tyre had

more than trebled.

Sl SA1Ii:--K

163

I ~__

__ CI

The " Snifter " being set for use on the ru

\2~) U La

4 i! r

a _

IT, I

Ihe magnetic sweeper hooked to the backzr.. way. before setting out on its

165

RAn ~xfaordinary collect ~on of pieces of metal-jagged bomb splitrbullets, rusty, -nails and bits of tin-pick d

168 3

IT IS PLEASING to record that the crop of

extracts from the Operations Record Books and

Squadron Diaries for the period under review, isa richer harvest than in the previous quarter.Thanks are due particularly to the War Diary

Section, Advanced S.A.A.F. Headquarters, C.M.F,.for active co-operation and the provision of many

of the high-lights.

No. 1. A Rapid Pick Up

(From No. 7 Squadron, S.A.A.F.)

21st October, 1944. The second mission, led

by Capt. M., was on its way out to bomb gun

positions, when they heard tanks reported. They

went to the area given, but saw none, and soproceeded to bomb their original target, obtaininghits; in the target area where gun pits wereobserved. Two cars were destroyed and a thirddamaged when the flight was straffing in thearea north of lake Commachio. It was here that

Capt. M.'s aircraft was hit, in all probability byhis own ricochets, and as he crossed the coast

on the way home glycol was seen streaming from

the aircraft. He headed out to sea, and when

about fifteen miles off the coast, abandoned the

aircraft as the temperatures were rising rapidly.Two aircraft of his flight remained with him, the

others returning to base owing to fuel shortage.

In this case, both Lts. S. and Van D. are to

be commended on the way in which they handledthe incident. Lt. S. went down low to watchhim alight and satisfy himself that Capt. M. was

safely in his dinghy, whilst Lt. Van D. stayed up,transmitting for a fix. As they themselves were

about to leave, owing to fuel running low, anA.S.R. Warwick arrived on the scene, and droppeda lager dinghy and marker floats. Two Mustangsw diected over the dinghy by

h -'e iency of the .A.S.R.]o. &j Bt after

:t EOr t a: c.3

r rr2 a~

"-

~a\ F~" I

baling out at 11.35 hours, Capt. M. was picked upby a Catalina at 12.15 hours.

No. 2. How the Other Half Lives'

(From No. 15 Squadron,. S.A.A.F.)

The 14th and 15th November, 1944, were twomore days of rain which isolated the Squadronmore than ever from the outside world. Theonly remaining road from the camp to therunway was almost impassable, and frequenthold-ups occurred due to trucks becoming boggedor sliding off into the ditches. This was provingan ever increasing hardship to our ground crewson their way to and from the aircraft, to theaircrews getting to their aircraft for operations,and more especially to the Armament Sectionwho had to haul their bombs out of the mud andtake them out to the aircraft. Bombing up is,at the best of times, a difficult task, but for thearmourers to handle very cold muddy bombs,and to trample under the aircraft in mud at leastsix inches deep, and to bomb up and fuze all theiraircraft at least twice a day, is one of thegreatest hardships that any man can undertake;but it is a task that is helping to defeat theenemy in Italy and deserves the highest praise.Not only have all these armourers and " erks"

.to work in the mud, but they have to live in it-their messes are deep in mud, and their livingtents are surrounded by mud and very oftenunder 'water due to the rains.

No. 3. The General Wants to See You

(From No. 417 Squadron, R.C.A.F.)

24th October, 1944. Leading a section ofsix aircraft on a Rover Paddy operation andnickelling raid over enemy territory in the Cec4naarea, P/O H. encountered considerable heavyflak. After the show was over he was headingback to rendezvous with his No. 3 at 8,000 feet,when he noticed the glycol leaking. The enginespluttered, the cockpit filled with smoke, andwhen over friendly territory once more P/O H.decided it was time to bale out. After initialdifficulty in getting clear, he drifted down safelyto a waiting crowd of what he described later as"thousands of Iti's." Immediately on landinghe was offered a jug of-vino by an Italian; at thesame time a British soldier informed himnonchalantly that " The General wants to seeyou."

P/O H. was then taken in a jeep to Head-quarters, where he found Generals B. and H.waiting for him. They provided him with somerum, and informed him that he was just in timefor dinner. During the meal the conversationturned on our Rover Paddy operations, and theGenerals praised the air force's efficientco-operation with Army.

P/O H. returned to the Squadron in GeneralB's Auster, much to his disgust for, in his ownwords," The N.C.O. offered me the jeep for threedays. .Can you beat that? And I had to takethe Auster."

(Fro

14th December. e-14.05 hours with Lt. H. B. leadingwas flying No. 6 in the formation and was thelast to take off. Just as he was picking up hiswheels after becoming airborne his bomb wasseen to fall. The aircraft began losing heightand it is thought that he jettisoned his bomb ashe expected to make a belly landing. The 500-lb.bomb exploded, almost disintegrating the iSpitfire,the remains of which skidded along the runwayfor a few yards, a blazing mass. No. 2 Squadronambulance and our fire tender were on duty; bothwere damaged by shrapnel.

The driver of our fire tender, A/M C. and hisNM.C. crew put up a good show endeavouringto put out the blaze, remaining within a fewfeet of the wreckage although 20-mm. cannonshells were exploding continuously. A nativeCorporal- of the fire crew was seriously woundedwhen the bomb exploded. He was taken to

Shospital, suffering from a compound fracture orthe left hand and wrist, a serious abdominalwound in the left side, and a wound in.the upperright armr. Three more details were slightlyinjured, and some aircraft were holed by shrapnel.M. 'must have be killed instantly by the explosion.

Because of the hole made in the runway by thebomb, the other three aircraft were diverted toBeliaria, and the pilots spent the night there.

27th December. As J. R. took off, black smokewas seen to pour from his engine. He calledcontrol for an emergency landing, but his enginecut and he was unable to get round in time soforce-landed near route 9 about a mile from our'drome. Remembering what had happened whenB. M. jettisoned his bomb, J. R. decided to crashland with his bomb on. His Spitfire hit sometrees, a wing was torn off, and so, fortunately,was the bomb; the aircraft slewed round, andcame to rest upside down, with J. R. pinnedsecurely inside it. As it was near the main roadhelp was available almost immediately. MajorL. with two of our officers, dashed off in a jeepto the crash, but it was fully half an hour beforeJ. R. -could be extricated from the crushed,inverted cockpit. It was extraordinarily luckythat the aircraft did not flame on crashing; J. R.w.s admitted to No. 5 C.C.S. suffering only fromshock and minor abrasions.

No. 5. A Vino (or Six) Well Earned

(From No. 213 Squadron)

October, 1944. "As leader of a formation offour Mustangs I was bzi:fed to strafe aconcentration of six troop trains north-west ofGorgope-Salonika. We were flying at nought feeton the west side of the railway tracks when wecame across a train, which we straffed, severelydamaging the locomotive; continuing on ourcourse we suddenly saw our target on thestarboard side. We turned in to attack and wentstraight down the track at 300 m.p.h. and opened

16 lglE

fire on the first train-the locomotive sufferedsevere damage and numbers of troops werecaught by our hail of fire. I carried on straffingthe other trains; while doing so the aircraftsuddenly shuddered, went out of control, and theport mainplane struck some object. Four feetof the mainplane and all but a foot of the aileronwere torn off-the windscreen was also shattered.The aircraft almost rolled to the left. I stoppedit doing so by applying full starboard aileron andfull revs. and boost, and also endeavoured to usestarboard rudder but this was ineffective because,as I found out later, it had been shot away.

I called up the formation and told them that'I had had it,' fully intending to crash' land inthe nearest field. To my amazement I realisedthat the aircraft might still fly on for a while-well, it didn't actually fly in the true sense ofthe word, it just wallowed round the sky, soI tried to gain height in order to bale out. Onreaching 1,000 feet I called up my No. 3 tellinghim the course to base and to take the lead.I would try to follow. I then surveyed thedamage to my aircraft, and to my surprise therewas a 50-foot length of fencing wire woundinside the spinner at the back of the airscrew.This wire trailed-back under the starboard main-plane and over the tail plane. From the portmainplane there was another piece of fencing wireabout fifteen feet long trailing back. I realisedthat I couldn't bale out very safely in case I gottangledwith the wire. The compass was spinninground like a top and absolutely useless, and themaster compass had been torn away when I losta piece of my port mainplane. I then looked-round the cockpit for something with which to tiethe control column to the starboard side as myarms could not stand the strain of holding thecontrol column over for an hour. I failed to findanything, so lifted my right leg over to the leftof the control column, and found this helpedquite a lot. I continued climbing and eventuallycrossed the mountains and enemy coast at 12,000feet.

I fired the remainder of the ammunitioninto the sea and increased revs. to use surpluspetrol-this also lightened the aircraft. An hourafter being hit I arrived over base and asked myNo. 3 t inform flying control that I was in badshape and that I wanted to land into wind onthe longest runway possible. I couldn't speak toflying control as the radio mast had been carriedaway and transmission was very weak. I jettisonedmy load and made my approach but I couldn'tturn the aircraft on to the runway so I wentround again ; this time I made a colossal circuit,lining straight on the runway at 1,000 feet. Ilowered my wheels and flaps at 200 m.p.h. as itwas the only way I could slow the aircraft becausethe throttle had jammed open; I continued theapproach at 180 m.p.h. and somehow or othermanaged to 'pull the throttle back just beforeI. touched down at 170 m.p.h.; with braking Istopped the aircraft and taxied to dispersal. Ijumped out (and heavens was I glad to be out! )

and surveyed the daim'athe rudder had disappeared and sothe fin ; the airscrew was badly chipped an espinner smashed in. I spent considerable timesmoking many cigarettes and trying to explainto the onlookers who had gathered round howI flew this badly battered Mustang home. Icouldn't really tell them as I didn't know myselfhow I did fly it back. I reckon it was just amiracle, and it was my ' Beautiful L'-the bestMustang ever and I was determined to bring herback and land her whatever else. I then retiredto the mess and got down to a Vino (or six)."

No. 6. Found by a Catalina

(From No. 265 Squadron)

On 26th October, 1944, F/Lt. -L., flyingCatalina A/265, was ordered to carry out a photo-graphic reconnaissance of Bassas Dca India, a coralreef in position 21.27 S, 39.45 E, and also of IleEuropa, a French possession lying about 205 mileswest of Tulear.

Bassas Da India was covered first and thereconnaissance completed. A/265 set course forHe Europa, making a land fall at North point,where the reconnaissance of the island was- tocommence. Before any photographs were taken,however, a company of men, 55 in number, wereseen on the beach making efforts to attract theaircraft's attention. The photographic recon-naissance was abandoned and efforts directedtowards getting into communication with theparty. Messages were dropped in Sea Markercontainers, weighted with food, directing theparty to lower their flag if they were in distress,and this was done.

It transpired that the men were survivors fromS.iS. " Radbury," torpedoed in the MozambiqueChannel on 13th August, and were all Chinesewith the exception of several D.E.M.S. ratings,the Master having been lost with his ship. Returnmessages were passed up from the beach bymarking out large letters on a black tarpaulinand by arranging debris on the sand.

The survivors stated that they had food foronly onp more day.

All details were passed to control, and beforethe aircraft left, owing to P.L.E., further suppliesof food, water, cigarettes and a first-aid kit weredropped.

A/265 took off early on 27th October withadditional supplies for the survivors, who weretaken off on the morning of the 28th by H.M.S." Linaria," on passage northwards through theMozambique Channel, having been diverted to theIsland. They were given passage to Mombasa.

The Southern Indian Ocean pilot states thatgoats, turtles and poultry are to, be found onlie Europa, and that the Island is inhabited bysome Mulattoes. It is felt that the pilot is some-what optimistic, or perhaps out of date, and thatthe survivors were fortunate indeed to be sightedby the aircraft on a chance visit.

169 D 4i~i

The lifeboat is released by the aircraft (see extract No. 8).

It is also thought that it might be an idea tohave a routine check up of lonely reefs and atollsin future when ships are lost and lifeboats, whichare known to have been launched, cannot beaccounted for.

No. 7. Tense Moments

(From No. 60 Squadron, S.A.A.F.)December, 1944. Individual sorties worthy of

notice include one on the 6th when the navigator,having sustained head injuries due to flak in thePilsen area, became unconscious and removed hisoxygen mask while still partly in the bomb-aimer's cockpit. The pilot succeeded in gettingthe mask on again before fatal anoxaemia hadset in, applied first aid dressings, and overcamethe observer's struggles during temporary

hysteria as he became conscious again, meanwhilemaintaining control of the aircraft in spite ofdifficult weather conditions and further flak enroute'to base. The observer recovered sufficientlyto assist later in navigating home.

No. 8. A Perfect Exercise

(From No. 294 Squadron)14th December, 1944. An airborne lifeboat

drop exercise was carried out to-day withconspicuous success. The exercise commencedwith a crew of five officers being left in an "M "type dinghy about eight miles out to sea fromAboukir. On the initial approach of the Warwicka flame float was dropped which failed to operate;two floats were dropped on the next circuit, bothof which fired; the Warwick then made a wide

The parachutes open.

,1704* * ? * ̂

;-."n ' . r s

-fi"" r7

The lifeboat approaches the sea.

&E IIASSIFIED22t

W If iF lEDd^ ^^ ^ B -~

circuit and approached into wind. The airbornelifeboat was seen to release immediately abovethe dinghy, all parachutes developed and aperfect drop was accomplished, the lifeboat.landing approximately 20 to 25 yards away fromthe dinghy; The crew of the dinghy had nodifficulty in reaching the lifeboat and boarding itwas easily accomplished.

No. 9. Value of Reliable Reconnaissance

(From No. 40 Squadron, S.A.A.F.)

December, 1944. This particular recce wasdespatched to the Medecina-Lugo-Imola areas forthe purpose of observing enemy road traffic. Thepilot concerned pinpointed a total of 175 M.T.and nine tank transporters on the roads in theseareas. Fifty of the M.T. were seen stationary ina town at M2742; the target was flashed to" Commander," but owing to the lateness of thehour (approximately 16.00 hours) it could not be

enable him to " shoot our line," with a view tosubsequent publication in the Press. In respect ofone story at least, the joke is definitely on him.He wrote an article about our part in the" reduction" of Melos and sent it on inanticipation of the island's fall. UnfortunatelyMelos obstinately refused to be " reduced " so heis just a little ahead of the news. He is in goodcompany however . . . the B.B.C. has announcedthe fall of Melos-Hbmer nods. (Editor's note-March, 1945. The enemy is stilD.in occupationof Melos).

No. 11. A Clever Piece of Salvage Work

(From No. 119 Maintenance Unit)

Qatar. November, 1944. At the end of lastmonth the party sent to salvage Warwick B.V.357 found themselves almost at the end of theirtether and yet faced with what, at first, seemedan impossible task. They had worked very well

The parachutes subside as the lifeboat floats.

attacked. Nevertheless, on the information collatedby this pilot the Eighth Army were able to deducethat reinforcements were being sent down to thisfront and that a counter-attack could be expected,most probably against our bridgehead across theMontone river in the area south-west of Faenza.This deduction proved correct when at 04.00 hourson, the 9th December the enemy attacked instrength in the area anticipated. Needless to saythe Army were not caught off guard, being fore-warned they were forearmed, and they succeededin beating back all the German attacks. Theenemy reinforcements referred to were lateridentified as the 90th Panzer Grenadiers.

No. 10. Homer Nods

(From No. 459 Squadron, R.A.A.F.)

October, 1944. This month's notable visitor wasF/Lt. P., who was with the squadron for somefourteen days, in order to collect the material to

under most difficult conditions; were all sufferingfrom desert sores and general seediness, and allthey had to show for their trouble was a perfectlyserviceable aircraft entirely surrounded by softsand. Two hundred yards Nvway was a possibletake-off strip, but the job of getting the Warwickacross the intervening space was one at whichthe stoutest heart might falter.

.

It was decided to form a road of timber overwhich the aircraft could be taxied, but it wasobviously impracticable to convey from Bahreinsufficient for the whole distance. The journeyhas to be made by dhow, not a very rapid meansof transport, and a single trip takes five or sixhours. However, the journey was made toBahrein and enough timber procured to make aroad of fifty yards or so in length. It was shippedto the peninsula and lugged by the almostexhausted, but once more enthusiastic airmen, tothe scene of action.

172

Dli ED

Crew of the dinghy approaching the lifeboat.

Everything went well, and in due course thefirst stage was complete and the aircraft readyfor taxying. But now arose another snag; whowas to do the taxying? The pilot had returnedto Shaibah and it was obviously out of thequestion to signal for him until the aircraft wasin a position for take-off. Pilots are not famedfor their patience when waiting for aircraft, andhanging around just to do the odd spot of taxyingwould be almost certain to upset the most angelicof the breed. In the case of this particular pilotit was certain-but we must get back to theWarwick.

One of the airmen, whose knowledge of K.Rsdoes him credit, stated that only qualified pilotscan taxy Service aircraft. It was contended byanother that the ! ! ! ! writer of K.Rs. had neverbeen faced with the job of getting a heavy aircraftoff the Qatar peninsula. The majority consideredthis a good point, and it was decided to suspend

this paragraph of K.Rs. for the duration of thesalvage operation. "A Corporal fitter finally did

the taxying, and did it most proficiently.The work proceeded smartly. When one section

of the road was completed the Warwick was

taxied along it and the next section was started.At last the glad day arrived when the camel trackwas reached and word was sent to Bahrein thatthe pilot was required. The signal reachedShaibah on 2nd November and W/Cdr. G-M. left

for the scene of action the same evening.Taking off was a tricky business, as the track

was narrow and had rocks along the sides.Further to complicate matters, there was a bendabout half way, and this had to be negotiated atspeed, a requirement not usually considereddesirable on a take-off run. W/Cdr. G-M.,however, proved capable of coping with thesituation, and on the second attempt made aperfect take-off and flew the aircraft first to

All aboard . . successful conclusion to the exercise.

N

Ba rei, an hen, after r ue n oThe gratification of the salvage party whenthe Warwick was seen to be airborne wasconsiderable, and it was generally felt that, thesuccessful ending more than repaid them for thelong and arduous work involved.

The entire salvage operation from start tofinish was difficult in the extreme, and the mannerin which it was tackled, and the successful ending,reflect the greatest credit on F/Lt. M., theengineer officer in charge ; on each and everyairman in the party ; and finally on W/Cdr. G-M.,who had to make what can only be described asa very chancy take-off.

No. 12. Satisfactory Results

(From No. 25 Squadron, S.A.A.F.)

11th October: Two Venturas took off thismorning for Brindisi where they had to collectsome special pamphlets to be dropped over theisland of Corfu. Events in south Albania weremoving swiftly to a climax and both Delvine andSarande had fallen into Allied hands. The leafletswere addressed to the Commander of the GermanGarrison at Corfu. They explained the gravityand hopelessness of the situation to him and histrapped garrison and called upon him to surrenderwithin 36 hours. If no surrender had been madeafter the time limit the island and,town would besubjected to an all-out air assault. If he desiredto surrender a white cross was to be displayedin the town square and the adjacent aerodrome.A special envoy had to be sent to Sarande as well,by boat.

; :r i,, a

The Venturas dropp ~ii eir pamphlets, 285packets containing 4,000 each, on speciallyplanned runs and felt confident that most of themhad reached the enemy. As a result a large cropof white flags were reported by Spitfire pilotsoperating in the area, and the complete surrenderof the garrison was reported the next day.

No. 13. The Biter Bit

(From No. 1 Squadron, S.A.A.F.)

23rd November. Lt. H. led the next formationat 10.10 hours. A Timothy show had been laid on,but the weather deteriorated to such an extentthat the kites were ordered to be de-bombed andthe pilots to carry out a Timothy straffing show. Asour aircraft arrived, a line of white smoke shells,bounded at either end by red smoke, was laiddown, and the aircraft had to strafe the areanorth-west of that, to the river Lamone. Eachpilot carried out six straffing runs, selecting abouttwo houses in each run. The damage caused wasconsiderable. A house which H. straffed was seento catch fire, and in anqther, which F. De W.went for, a small explosion occurred. On thisshow 1,130 20-mm. shells were fired, 800 .5 inchshells, and 4,100 rounds of .303 inch. It was nodoubt an inspiring sight to our troops to see thesix ,Spitfires playing merry hell with the enemydefences which had been holding them up. Earlyin the war the Germans used their dive-bomberswith great effect as a close support weapon fortheir ground forces when their armour drovethrough the Allied lines. We are using theseprinciples now with many refinements, and thesignals of appreciation from the Army show howsuccessful they are.

j

174

"" "uc.~ i t ::i E*T;_:.'.:i Ir

k' ""r ~J~

is due'to the

Officers Commanding

HEADQUARTERS, ROYAL AIR. FORCE, MIDDLE EAST

THE MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED STRATEGIC AIR FORCE

THE -MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE

THE MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED COASTAL AIR FORCE

THLE BALKAN- AIR FORCE

A.ILQ., GREECE

A.H.Q., EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE, C.M.F.

No. 205 GROUP

No. 4-.NAVAL FIGHTER WJING

No. 326 WING

No. 336 PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE WING, R.A.F.

THE MEDICAL BRANCH, M.A.A.F.

TIHE EDUCATIONAL SERVICE, M.A.A.F.

PUBLIC RELATIONS. (0) UNIT, C.M.F.

No. 2 ARMY FILM UNIT, C.M.EF.

THE ARMY FILM AND PHOTOGRAPHIC UNIT, M.E.

THLE TIMES WEEKLY EDITION, LONDON

For their kind permission and co-operation

in the production of material

for this number of

THE R..F. IEIDITERRANEAN R evIEW .

and also to ihose Officers who supplied

articles or material or photograph

175

"" t"261Ir- s ~

ALL CIRIIRESPONDENCE

in connection with the Review

-should be addressed to the

OPERATION~S RECORDS OFFICEII

II.Q., M.LA.A.F.,

4 1.1h.F.

176