raf mediterranean review no 9

7/28/2019 Raf Mediterranean Review No 9

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DECLASIEf

SECURITY

Th e R.A.F. Mediterranean Review is an 0. U.O. document,a n d a s such m ay be issued to O ff i c e r s ' M e s s a n d S t a t i o n

Reference Libraries (K.R. and A.C.I. 882. 2236 (c), 2287).

It is intended fo r the information o f al l Off icers a nd flyingcrews under conditions of securi ty approved by th e CommandingO ff i c e r , w ho will e n s u r e tha t wi th in these l imi t s it h a s a s w i d e

a c i rcu la t ion a s poss ib l e .

N o quo ta t ion o r e x t r a c t f rom th e R . A . F. M e d i t e r r a n e a n

Review ma y be made without the permission of th e Deputy A irC o m m a n d e r , H e a d q u a r t e r s , M e d i t e r r a n e a n All ied A ir F o r c e s .Unauthorised quotation consti tutes an offence under th e OfficialS e c r e t s A c t s , 1911 a n d 1920, a n d will be dea l t wi ih accord ing ly

(K.R. and A.C.I. 1071, 1072, 2238).

C o p i e s n o t r e q u i r e d for r e c o r d p u r p o s e s s h o u l d be d i sposed of

a s Secret Waste in accordance with A M 1.O. A.411/41.

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OCTOBER TO DECEMB

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Contents

Invas ion Year A S h o r t Rev iew o f European Even t s in 1944. . . P a g e 5

Thke Invasion of Italy (Part V)-lst October - 31st December, 1944

I. Introductory. . ............ ....... ...... 13II. Renewal of Enemy Resistance......... ......... 17

III. i .A .T.A .F ' s Increased Commitments ... .......... 25

IV. Enemy Counte'r Attacks........31

The Medi t e r ranean Aflied -Strategic A ir Force-Trends of

Activity, October to December, 1944-......... 41

F he Balkan Thea t re : Greece and Yugoslavia ........... .55

Operations in the Aegean-October to December, 1944 ............ 83

R . A . F. Educa t iona l Serv ice-Act iv i t i es in M.A.A.F..... ... ... 93

:Mobilising a N a t i o n . ................... ... 103

Je t Propu l s ion . ................... ................. 10 6

Special Opera t ion Aga ins t , th e B r e n n e r Route . ......... 123

M i n i n g of t he Danube by N o. 20 5 Group .... . . . .

R .A.F. Medical Branch-Malar ia Control in Corsica ... ... 1...1 ^

No... 4 Nava l Figh te r Wi n g in th e M e d i t er r a n e a n -1 9 4 .1 ....... 15 2

Enemy Ingenu i ty Ver sus Allied Interdic t ion. . . ...... 160

T h e Magne t i c Sweeper. ....... :........... ........... 16 3

From the 540s. ....... .......................... .167

Acknowledgmen t . . . . ................ 175

M ap T he European Batt le Areas-3lst December, 1943, to

31st December, 1944 ...... ... ...... ....... . 4

Tact ical Bombing Effort-October to December, 1944 ,, 14

T he I ta l ian Battle Area-30th S e p t e m b e r to

31st December, 1944......................18

Poin t s of Interdict ion by A ir at 13th November, 1944 ,. 22

Points of interdict ion by A ir a t 2n d January, 1945 . 39

Strategic B o m b i n g Efffor t -October an d November, 1944 ,, 43

St ra t eg ic Bombing E f f o r t - D e c e m b e r , 1944 ... ..... ' 52Greece an d Yugoslavia-Battle Area ... .... 54

Greece an d th e Athens A r e a ... .. . . 57

T he Dalma t i an Coas t .... ............. .... 62

T he Aegean Sea Area.... 84

Locations of P d w e r Stations on th e Verona - Innsbruck

Railway.... ......... ........ . 12 4

T he Course o f the Danube ... ' ..... ........... 13 2

Malaria Control inl Corsica.. . . . . . . . . ..... 44


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F o r e w o r d

iThe Foreword in th e preceding number

of th e R.A.F. ilMediterranean Review ended oil a note of optinmism a note

indicating t ha t . poss ib ly th e en d o f th e E u r o p e a n wear with G e r m a a v 'was in

sight. With , th e passing of the year 1944 that end is no t ye t realised,

bu t nevertheless it is still in sight. Th e events an d t rends of activity

- r e v i e w e d in t h i s n u m b e r show clearly, n o t only m e t i o d s by wchich th e H u n

is being crushed an d strangled in. the air, on th e grounLld, on the seq an.d

u n d e r th e sea, but- also r evea l s [lie w i d e r Vision a i r aadv, a t w o r k zWithin tl e

Royal Air Force to ensure that Peace, when won, shall be retained, upheld

an d enjoyed by those t rained to take their place an d shoulder' the i r respan-

sibilities in civil life as thoroughly as " they were t rained to take them in war.

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Invas ion Yea

A Short Review of European Evenis in

1 9 4 4

W E HAVE REACHED th e Sixth W ar Chris tmas,

an d reached it through a year of accomplishment

unparalleled in History. Ge r man Industry

ha s been disrupted and the German Armies

defeated in th e field. O ur po w er to st r ike th e

e nemy on land and se a an d in th e a ir has been

demonstra ted in it s full m i g h t an d to it s full

purpose . W e ar e inside th e Siegfr ied Line.

In a recent speech to th e Ger man People,Hitler said tha t th e f ight no w w as no longer fo r

vic tory or defeat, bu t fo r survival or

annihilation. Although not distinguished fo r h is

in tui t ion, who shal l sa y t ha t Corporal

Schickeigruber Is not r ight?

P nO i:i1933 Hi t l e r comes to power. Germany wi thdrawsf rom th e League of Nat ions .

1935 Consc r ip t i on is i n t roduced into G erm any.

1938 Hi t l e r, d e m a n d i n g t h a t Sude ten Germans

be restored to t he Re ich , m a s s e s A r m i e s on Czech

f ront ier.

Grea t Britain mobil izes h e r N a v y a n d M r.

Chamber l a in goes to Munich.

Brit ish G o v e r n m e n t p e r s u a d e s Czechoslovakia to

a g r e e to cede al l . t e r r i to ry wi th m o r e t h a n fifty

per cent . Sudeten- Germans , a n d in r e tu rnguaran tees with France th e future bounda r i e s of

Czechoslovakia.

G e r m a n t roops m a r c h u nopp oaosed IntoCzechoslovakia.

1939 Withou t warn ing a n d in defiance ofMunich a g r e e m e n t , N a z i t anks en te r Prague.Czechoslovakia is ove r run .

Brit ish Governmen t g ives under t ak ing to Poland

"... t h a t in t he even t of any act ion which c l ea r ly

t h rea tens Poland ... H is M ajes ty ' s Governmen t

would, feel t hemse lves bound a t once to l end th e

Po l i sh . Governmen t a ll s u p p o r t in t he i r power. "

Announced in th e House of C o m n o n s t h a t s ince

1933 Germany ha o s p e n t a sum : es t ima ted at

6,000,000,000 on w a r prepa ra t ions .

H i t l e r invades Poland an d Great. ,Britain dec l a r e s

war.

1940 G e r m a n t roops en te r Norway and ove r run

th e coun t ry in a w eek .

Headed by n ine arioured divis ions and i m m e n s e

a ir power, th e G e r m a n A r m y crashes t h r o u g h

Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg to cross th eMeuse in to . France. All ied fo rces a re spl i t and

th e enemy dries n o r t h to th e Channe l Por t s .

Sou th of th e Somme, th e F r e n c h A r m y re inforced

by tw o Br i t i sh d iv i s ions is opposed to 120 G e r m a n

divis ions .

Dunk i rk -250 ,000 Bri t ish , t roops abandon ing a r m sa n d equ ipmen t a re evacua ted ; 80,000 do no tr e tu rn .

France capi tulates .

Italy, declar ing w a r on Grea t Bri ta in , launchesa n offensive in Africa which in si x months ca r r i e sh er t r oops Into Egypt , th e Sudan a n d Kenya.The M e d i t e r r a n e a n s closed.

Bat t l e of B r i t a i n . In t h ree m o n t h s a handfu lo f R.A.F. squad rons oppose and de fea t the ful l

weigh t of t he Luf twaff e , des t roy ing 2,375 G e r m a na i rc ra f t .

I ta ly i nvades Greece.

Eigh th A r m y a t t a c k s th e I t a l i ans in th e WesternDesert a n d fo rce s them to re t i r e f rom E g y p t ino ne week.

1941 I t a l i ans driven o u t o f Cyrenalca . Eigh th

A r m y offensive ha l t s on th e G e r m a n menace toGreece.

Exped i t iona ry Force f rom Middle E a s t despa t chedto Greece.

G e r m a n s send th e Afr ika K o r p s to re inforce theI t a l i ans in Tripolitania The E i g h t h A r m y is

dr iven back . th rough Cyrenalca into Egypt .

Germany invades Yugosiavia an d Greece, a n d the.

Brit ish Expeditionary' Force is withdrawn toCrete. Germans i nvade Crete by a ir a n d force

t he evacua t ion o f Br i t i sh t roops.

Coup d'etat in I raq t h rea tens oi l suppl ies . Posi t ion

res to red by Brit ish intervent ' m pt Brit ish.act ion in. Syria~, , h rance f rom

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Germany a t thel zent of- he r strength, unab ' c on enemy supplies,defeat the .t.A.F. and, invade Britain, decid ports an d a ir bases, reinforced Eighth Armyeliminate the Soviet Army before returning tothe :final struggle in the West. The invasion ofRussia begins.

-German Army 500 miles into Russia on a 1,000mile front is halted a t the gates of Moscow.

Reinforced Eighth Army opens second offensivein Western Desert.

Following Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour,America declares war on the Axis.1942 Russians counter-attack on 500..-mile frontan d push the enemy back 80 miles.Eighth Army, having advanced to El Agheila,prepares to meet German counter-attack.Ne w German offensive in Russia now forward 250'miles on a 1,200 mile -front from Orel to th eCaucasus.

As a result of the German counter-attack inLibya the Eighth Army is now back a t Gazala.Enemy, launches abortive attack a t Gazala;Eighth Army counter-attacks an d is checked.Enemy opens offensive and forces Eighth Armyback to El Alamein.

Germans make three abortivedestroy the R.A.F. in Malta.

attempts to

opens offensive a t El Alamein. The German routbegins.

Strong British an d American Forces land inFrench North Africa.

Russians open winter offensive an d regain muchof the, lost ground.1943 Germans, surrendering 248,000 prisoners,defeated and driven from North Africa a t Tunis.Mediterranean re-opened to Allied shipping.

Following abortive German attack, Russianslaunch full-scale offensive on 1,000 mile front.

Allied Forces from North Africa capture Sicily.in 38 days, inflicting 165,000 casualties on theenemy.

British an d American troops land a t Salerno. Italycapitulates.

Stated in Parliament that since September, 1939,the R.A.F. alone ha s made 1,147 attacks anddropped 283,000 tons of bombs on Germany, inaddition to an ever increasing U.S.A.A.F. effort;that Allied aircraft production is now more than

-four time tha t of Germany; an d tha t creditbalance of new building over shipping losses ha sreached 6,000,000 tons pe r year.

At the Lord Mayor's Days Luncheon, 10th

,November, 1942, Mr . Winston Churchill said," This is no t the end. It is no t even the beginningof the end. Bu t it is, perhaps, the end of thebeginning."

The Prime Minister had been speaking of th eBattle .for Egypt. Rommel, conclusively defeatedat Alamein, wa s on the run , : Strong Allied forceshad landed in French North Africa and the R.A.F.was already in action there against the enemy.In the East, the German drive had been held atStalingrad and in the Caucasus, and the Russianswere ready for their counter-attack.

October, 1942, marked the Turn of the Tide.Spring, 1943, saw the Germans expelled fromTunisia, and in the summer Sicily wa s capturedand the Mediterranean, which ha d been closed toAllied shipping since March, 1941, wa s re-opened.On 9th September, British and American troopslanded at Salerno and Italy capitulated. Threeweeks later the Foggia airfields fell to the EighthArmy, and the Allied Air Forces stood at 50 0miles range from Munich.

Far-reaching in. effect, these successes werereflected in two events of outstanding importance.The first was that defeat in Africa delayed bythree months the opening of the new Germanpush in the East and permitted the Russians not

only to -check their. thrust in one week but tocounter-attack immediately on a 1,000 mile front.The second, which came late , fi vas

even greater significence. On 28th December,

an official statement from London announcedthe appointment of Allied Commanders for th eInvasion of Europe. It wa s faithfully celebratedon New Year's Eve by a full-scale raid on Berlinto bring the total of bombs unloaded on theGerman capital to a round 10,000 tons.

Stalemate in ItalyAlthough for some weeks after the Salerno

crisis the Allied Armies made good progress,they were. slowed in October through difficultiesof terrain an d weather hampering ai r activity,and by the end of the year faced a position ofstalemate on a line south of Cassino to the Sangroriver.

This was an unsatisfactory situation. Thefull. and continuous deployment of maximumGerman forces in Italy being vital to our MasterPlan for the Invasion of France, it was essentialthat the initiative be regained forthwith and th eenemy prevented from stabilizing his position.Supreme Command decided, therefore, that if theline was impregnable to frontal assault, adiversionary movement would have to beengineered from the side. Anzio wa s launched.

The object of this " leap-frog" wa s to acceleratethe capture of Rome and establish a line northof the capital; this to be accomplished by

occupation of the high ground around Colli Lazialif ' my's communications to the

i roo . be dominated. It was a

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hazardous move, for the Germans had thirteendivisions, with a further eight in reserve, to theAllies eleven and a half committed in th efield.

Anzio did not achieve its object. The initialassault, on 22nd January, took the enemy bysurprise, bu t he reacted swiftly and although

persistent attacks failed to dislodge the invadershe succeeded in pinning them down andpreventing any breakthrough. It becamenecessary fo r us to think again, and think quickly.

In an effort to breach the battle line and linkup with the forward bridgehead, it was nowdecided to tr y an all-out ai r offensive against thestronghold of Cassino. On 15th March, 1,000 tonswent down and in a matter of hours the fortressbecame a heap of rubble. Instead of achievingits object-the destruction of the garrison-,excessive demolition provided numerous roadblocks and strong points and turned the scale infavour of the defenders. Again the enemy linestood firm.

The Cracking of the NutWar is ever a matter of trial and error, and

with two failures recorded the Allies droppedback on th e lesson of Al'amein-that of causingweakness and attrition to the enemy by cuttingby air his lines of supply and communication,while at the same time assembling a force withwhich to hi t him on the ground at a momentwhen he is unable to sustain a defensive effort.

On 19th March, the first stage of the planwent into effect, the main ai r offensive opening

with the land offensive on thenight

11/12thMay. By 22nd June, 137,949 sorties had beenflown and 84,603 tons of bombs dropped onmarshalling yards, bridges, road transport andlines of communication. The effect was paralysing.Transport was forced from the railways to theroads where fighter-bombers made hay andcompelled the enemy to restrict movementto the hours of darkness. Vehicles had to bewithdrawn from the forward areas in order tomaintain a skeleton supply line, and inconsequence combat units were left withinsufficient transport to continue the battle. Atonce it became a vicious and entirely destructive

circle.Before the operation had been completed the

whole front broke open and British, Canadian,American, French and Polish troops surgedforward. Rome fell on 4th June, and in six weeksthe enemy, although not ye t driven back to th ePisa-Rimini line, had lost 80,000 casualties andupward of 15,000 vehicles.

Allied Bombing PolicyThe essential need for the retention of the

initiative in Italy, the reason for this, and itsrelative importance to the Master Invasion Planhave been mentioned. Before and during the

period of the operations referred to above, forcesin considerable strength were assembling inGreat Britain and, in April, 1944, as a security

measure, all Foreign Diplomats and Courierswere stopped from leaving the country. Thesetwo aspects of pre-invasion activity rested on athird. No effective land campaign could succeedagainst Germany unless the enemy's essential warpotential was rigorously restricted and unless theAllies could command the sky both during th elandings and through

theperiod

of subsequentoperations.

From the outset it was realized that the keyto modern warfare lay in oi l -a fact which,naturally, had not escaped the enemy eye.Twenty-four enormous synthetic oil plants ha dbeen built in Germany at the beginning of thewar, and these provided about .40 per cent. ofthe country's needs. She had also the Rumaniansupplies and several new fields on her own soil.From all sources the total annual yield was about1,250,000 tons- jus t enough fo r Germany'simmediate requirements. In: 1942, aiming toincrease supplies, she launched an offensive in

the Caucasus. Fortunately, by a hair's breadth,it failed to achieve its object.

The problem facing the Allied Bomber Forcewas therefore twofold. Firstly to restrictproduction in the German aircraft industry andreduce activity in the Luftwaffe in order thatinvasion forces in France and bomber formationsover the Reich could operate undisturbed byfighter interference, and secondly to carry out aconcentrated air offensive against the enemy'sentire oil resources.

The Assault gn the Fighter Factories

Fo r nine months, from July, 1943, toMarch, 1944, the Eighth and Fifteenth UnitedStates Air Forces, tackling first-things first, wentfor the fighter assembly and aero-engine factories-a struggle which culminated in the last sevendays of February when almost every one of theseplants was bombed in, single week. The resultshowed itself on D-Day. Whereas in 1942 theG.A.F. had planned to increase production to2,500/3,000 single-engined aircraft per month--.an output which would no t ,only have madepossible effective protection of the Reich butwould have seriously interfered with invasion-their first-line strength on all fronts in June wasless than 1,500 aircraft, only half of which wereserviceable.

Complementary to the effort against FW.190and ME.109 output, systematic strikes weredirected a t plants producing Germany's latest andmost cherished aircraft-the ME.262 jet-propelledfighter. Messerschmitt's parent factory atLeipham was smashed; the research stations atPeenemunde and Rechlin, along with numerousairfields used fo r experimental work, wereattacked; and repeated raids were made on th ejet-fuel plants at Peenemunde andHolsriegelskreuth. In spite of the faith pinned

on this type of aircraft, the total numberoperating by the end of the year was not morethan 150.

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The offensive against oil opened in April andwas still in progress when the year closed. Itshould perhaps be called th e second offensive,because in 1940 and 1941 Bomber, Commandattempted the ,task and found it beyond theirthen-available power and capability. . Two greatAmerican Ai r Forces, the

Eighth an d Fifteenth,now undertook the major share of the job, aircraftfrom Britain concentrating on the syntheticplants, principally those at Leuna, Brux andPolitz, and the Mediterranean force tacklingPloesti. Night, and later day, attacks on theRuhr fell to the R.A.F.

Figures tell the story more vividly than words.In May, 1944, a 20 per, cent. reduction had beeneffected; in September the loss to the enemy was77 pe r cent. and his supplies only 23 pe r cent. oftheir pre-attack level. By December, only thirteenbut of Germany's 24 synthetic oil plants remained-five only of these within M.A.A.F. range.

Fighters had been grounded, industry hampered,naval and U-boat activity reduced to impotence,and road transport and Panzer Divisions forcedto a policy of strict fuel economy. A recoveryprogramme had been given priority overeverything including aircraft and U-boatproduction. That was the measure of success inDecember. While the final lap of the racebetween repair and attack remains yet to bedecided, (the value of the reduction which hasbeen achieved is indisputable.

This concentration of effort against oilnecessitated a let-up on the fighter-factory

offensive and enabled the industry, in large part,to recover. That was inevitable. Nevertheless,although by dispersal and undergroundmanufacture the G.A.F. had rebuilt their front-line single-engined fighter strength to about 2,300by December, th e recovery came too late. Thefighters were needed over France to repel thelandings and check the advance through th esummer and autumn of 1944, an d at that timethey were no t available. Now, their usefulnessis. bu t a fraction of what it could have been. TheAllies have th e bases and they have the aircraft.The roof over Germany is off.

Confusion to Industry

Although the offensives against fighter factoriesand oil were th e main and most effective air-strikes delivered at any one class-group in th eGerman war machine in 1944, wide-scale attackswere undertaken on other industrial targets andagainst whole sections of the communicationssystem.

Ball-bearing factories, ranking 'in importancenext to oil, suffered continuously and wereproducing at the end of the year only 45 per cent.of their pre-attack output. Systematic raids were

also carried out on plants manufacturing armour,motor transport and ordnance, this effortincreasing in intensity in relation to land front

operations an d reaching peak through September-October. Loss of output varied in most casesfrom a few weeks to several months.

Weather naturally proved a controlling factorand on occasions it was necessary to concentrateon an industrial area rather than on a specifictarget. Berlin became a favourite centre, butmany other towns suffered recurring attacks.

Interdiction of Traffic

SWhile th e offensive against communicationswas no less important than that directedat industrial targets, overall results have beenmore difficult to assess, an d a full appreciationwill probably no t be possible until the Allies get

,well into Germany. At th e beginning of 1944 th evast rail-network, strung out from Brest to th eRussian border, was, in spite of repeated attack,no t overtaxed. On D-Day, 6th June, however, asa result of pre-invasion strategical an d tacticalbombing, only half the normal quantity of

locomotives and cars were available in France,coal was in six-days' supply, one-fifth of repairfacilities were unserviceable, and 74. bridges andtunnels ha d been rendered impassable. By th eattack on bridges alone, the area west of th eSeine and north of. the Loire was virtuallyisolated; later, prior to the invasion of SouthernFrance , attacks on the Rhone bridges cut th eGerman forces in half and a t a critical time heldGerman armour on the west bank out of th eimmediate battle area.

In the case of Normandy, the pre-occupation ofth e enemy's forces in land fighting coupled with

the continuous bombing and fighter straffing,allowed no recovery; he wa s forced to acceptthings as they were and make the best of it. InSouthern France, the position, although slightlydifferent, was 'equally hopeless; labour for repairwork was -just not available.

The effect of the traffic interdiction operationin I taly which made possible the breaching of th eGustave Line, ha s been indicated earlier. Theseoperations go on. Some are concentrated in timeand space and produce a quick result; others arelong-term and less spectacular. All count.

Over Two Million Tons of Bombs

While complete statistics are not available, anindication of the scale of air effort in 1944 isgiven in the records of Bomber Command, theEighth U.S.A.A.F. and M.A.A.F.

During the year Bomber Command and theEighth U.S.A.A.F. dropped 1,395,000 tons of

bombs on German targets-more than twice th eweight unloaded in the first four and a quarteryears of the war. In addition, M.A.A.F. dropped590,358 tons, mostly on oil installations andcommunications. Fighters and fighter-bombersfrom all three ai r forces, . frequently beating

their own recoE$

umbers of sorties pe r day,dest od h 'd s of enemy locomotives,

jpl . ... , . . vehicles. .. .


11/94

Opening of the Second Front

In spite of the wave of rising impatience whichcharacterised a section of the British Press inthe spring of 1944, stony silence reigned supremewithin the Cabinet and no taunt extracted the oneword needed to confirm or deny the significenceof the large-scale exercises that ha d being going

on fo r some time over the southern half ofEngland.

Evaluation of the importance of that silence-it is difficult to overpraise the skill with whichit was maintained-and the confusion which th esurprise of the Normandy Invasion caused theGerman High Command, is now possible.

On 9th June, three days after the first landings,Rommel, Commanding Army Group B, afterdirecting that Cherbourg be held at all cost,intimated to General Dollman of the SeventhArmy that he could provide no reinforcementsnor share the anxiety felt over the port, because

the German Supreme Command fully expected abig landing to be attempted higher up the coast,an d for this all available airborne forces wouldbe committed. Hl e explained furthermore, in replyto a request for immediate ai r support, that unitsof the Luftwaffe were " changing stations " andmight not be available fo r several days.

Events that followed are now history. In Berlinon 20th July, an unsuccessful attempt was madeto assassinate Hitler and effect a coup d'etat .Gestapo intervention restored "order " and indue course eight Generals and a number of lesserfry paid with their lives. Evidence a t the trialshowed that the 'conspirators ha d planned toarrest all those directing food and armamentproduction, open concentration camps, and makeimmediate contact with the Allies. Although th epurge failed, it was refreshing to find suchenlightened thinking within th e Reichswehr.

Meteoric Progress in Normandy

Allied progress through July and August, afterthe situation of stalemate on the Caen-Tilly frontha d been broken by an ai r attack that sent down5,000 tons of bombs on the perimeter defences in49 minutes, was metedric. The pocket west ofArgentan which the Germans allowed to be drawnround three flanks while they obstinately triedto drive west to Avranches was closed on18th August by British, Dominion and Americanforces with loss to the enemy of 30,000 killed an d45,000 prisoners, and four days later a Maquisuprising in Par is overran th e city an d paved th eway for it s occupation by th e Americans comingeastward from Chartres and Dreux.

calamity. ' i r ican and French troops wereashore on-~Southern France.

Invasion of th e French Riviera

The conquest of Southern France by GeneralPatch's forces and the link up of this SecondInvasion Army with General Patton's troops at

Sombernon an d Chatillon took exactly 26 days-approximately one-half of the time scheduled. Ityielded 80,000 prisoners to swell the total to400,000 taken since the landings in Normandy.

.Systematic pre-invasion bombing ha d followedthe pattern of the June adventure, and securityplus a carefully engineered deception programmeeffected the necessary degree of surprise. Onlyten poor quality divisions met the landing; airopposition was virtually non-existent. Everywhereahead of the advancing army Forces of the FrenchInterior sabotaged communications and tookcommand of territory. The German Nineteenth

'Armypulled back

with considerable skill, and bythe Devil's luck managed to evacuate most of itsfighting troops before the Belfort Gap could beclosed. Bu t it was touch an d go.

Broadly speaking, France was clear of Nazioccupation by , the end of August. A fewstrongholds in the east, on the English Channeland the Frenie Atlantic coast had not beenovercome, bu t th ir value to the enemy and theireffect on the main campaign was now negligible.That which had been accomplished in less thanthree months supplied a pert answer to th emessage sent by Hitler to all units in Calvados onthe /morning of 6th June-"The Fuehrer desiresthe annihilation of the Allies by the evening."

Failure of the Secret Weapons

Although Mr. Chamberlain's famous " Missed theBus " comment of 1940 proved almost immediatelyto be singularly inappropriate, no phrase couldmore fairly represent Germany's strategic positionwhen, almost exactly four years later, the longpromised retaliatory weapons, the flying bomband long-range rocket, were launched againstEngland.

The potential menace which the flying bomboffered was a real one and one that wasrecognised from the outset and not underrated.Reconnaissance had pin-pointed a considerablenumber of static ramp sites, an d from this andother information a fair assessment of the dangerhad been calculated. It was fa r from incon-siderable-particularly in view of the forthcominginvasion.

BrI ovmv v. i + o-/r Itto iy C t ,rd 4-wy r p cs e p

The position fo r the enemy by mid-August ha d bombing, during which over 100,000 tons went

become critical. All the German Commanders in down on some hundreds of launching sites and

the north ha d disappeared. C-in-C West, Von storage depots, and on communications, theRundstedt, had been relieved; Rommel and, quantitive plott4. t of the flying bomb wasDollman killed. The Allies, wtln arlly1000,000 :de v ly reduced and its debut postponed until

troops and more than 2,500,000 tons O c pre-mvasion period ha d passed.in Normandy, had already taken o v p f 0o0 r ?'? missile fell on England on 13th June,prisoners. And that was no t th e tMotal of the 1944--a week after the Normandy landings ha d


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been securely lathe German fighl e to

be effective. Of -d launched over th e80 days main offensive against Southern England,only one-third reached the Greater London area.An indication of the peak efficiency of thecombined defences is provided by the record of28th August. On that day, of 101 flying bombsknown to have been launched, 97 were destroyed.

Terror-weapon No. 2, the long-range. rocket,came into the picture three months after itspredecessor; since when, until the end of theyear, approximately 350 incidents occurredin England, considerably more in Belgium an d afew in Northern France, Holland and Luxembourg.

The sites, widely dispersed and at much greaterrange, have been more difficult to attacksystematically, although good results are creditedin an increasing number of cases. Fortunately,the rocket is an inaccurate and strictly limitedweapon; so fa r it has proved its nuisance valuebut nothing more.

The Russian Steam Roller

The success which, has attended Alliedco-ordination of Eastern and Western theatreoperations through the last year offersindisputable proof of the suicidal idiocy of Hitler'sdecision to attack Russia in 1941. Winter 'of the1941-2 campaign cost the Germans in killed alonemore than the whole of the four and a quarteryears of the last war. It also probably cost themthis war, for a victory in the' Caucasus at thatcrucial time might well have proved catastrophicto the Allies.

Things, however; did not turn out that way.Over 165 Nazi Divisions were held and defeatedby the Russian 'Army and the Russian W inter,and after a short offensive in November-March,1942-3; and an abortive one-week counter-attackby the Germans in the following summer, theSoviets ha d the situation in complete control andwere able to launch a full-scale drive in July,1943, that by mid-May, 1944, brought the lineforward into Rumania an d Poland up to Vitebskand the Estonian border.

The pattern then changed its shape. Movementceased in White. Russia, to flare up a few weekslater in the Finnish sector, where in 24 hours theRed Army breached the Mannerheim Line -a taskthat had taken them four months in 1940-andpushed on beyond the Sistra river; the thrustbeing accompanied by a complementary operationbetween Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega.

In spite of the pressure, however, Finland heldout and the Russians did not achieve the quickvictory on which they had banked. As ithappened, this was relatively unimportant becausea bigger opportunity now offered on the CentralFront where, with our second front in Normandywell launched, it was unlikely the enemy couldafford reinforcement.

' lThe Gates of Warsaw

Russia struck, therefore, at the Vitebskpositions, and struck with such force that withina month the line moved westward 350 miles,liberating Bialystok, Brest Litovsk, Deblin,Lublin, Jaroslavl and Przemysl and bringingSoviet troops within shelling distance of Warsaw.

Here again the offensive rested to permit are-grouping an d allow the supply position time tocatch up. Within Warsaw itself, the PolishPatriots had risen and there was intense fighting.Elsewhere the front became quiet-but only fo r amatter of hours.

On 19th August the Carpathian-Black Sea Frontbroke into life, and two days later the Russianshad stormed th e Galatz Gap and were fanningout towards Bucharest . On the 24th Rumaniacapitulated and on the 26th Bulgaria asked foran armistice. September brought the Red Armyf o r a r d to Belgrade and the first week ofNovember saw most of Hungary in Russian handsand Budapest under fire. By the time the yearclosed, th e line ha d received further indents andran from the East Prussian border to Warsaw,thence through Czechoslovakia to north-west ofBudapest, and from Lake Balaton down acrossYugoslavia to the Adriatic. It containedapproximately 150 German divisions.

Alies Reach the Siegfried Line

General Dittmar, Official Commentator of theBerlin Radio, spoke to the German People onWednesday, 6th September; 1944. He said, " Fouryears ago we were the undisputed masters; we

are now beaten by the methods we forged."The General was right. The Canadian First

and the British Second Armies had crossed theSeine and reached Brussels and the approaches ofAntwerp, cutting of f th e whole of the P as de Calaisarea in eight days. The American Third Armywas '-across the Marne and Meuse and alreadyhad reconnaissance patrols forward on to Germansoil around Saarbrucken. Troops of GeneralPatch's Seventh Army were hustling the GermanNineteenth Army in its retreat for the BelfortGap. It was clearly a matter of days before thewhole of the West Wall from Kleve to the Swiss

border would be under Allied assault.Germany at this time, it was estimated, ha d

probably 49 divisions in the line and anothereighteen in reserve or re-fitting. Nineteen weredisposed in Holland and north of Dusseldorf, tenin the Cologne sector, eleven between Coblenzand Strasbourg, and nine in the southerh pocketfrom Strasbourg to the Swiss frontier. TheSiegfried Line, which had been reached by theAllies at a number of points between Kleve andTrier, and stood only a mean 40-odd miles aheadof them on the southern length Trier-Karlsruhe-Basle, was at its strongest in the Strasbourg-Trier sector and around the shorter front Aaclen-Munchen Gladbach- tha t is, opposite the mainindustrial cent res .Nor th of Munchen Gladbach


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its strength was largely an unknown quantity.Various reports, many of them propagandist,had alleged that fortifications' existed in thisdistrict; air reconnaissance gave 'no confirmation.

Following the policy that th e surest way to getthrough a strongly defended line is to go roundit, plans-were made for an airborne operation to

secure the crossing of the great water barrierof the three branches of the Rhine and thefloodings within their perimeter around Arnhem-beyond which there was barely a hill betweenthe German border and Berlin. This operation,the biggest of .its kind ever undertaken, wasentrusted to the First Airborne Army andlaunched on Sunday, 17th September.

The Glory of Arnhem

Nothing in this wa r will outmatch the braveryof the me n of Arnhem. Six thousand five hundredof them were dropped or landed by glider atEindhoven

and Tilburg behind the Escaut Line,at Arnhem on the Lek, and at Nijmegen on th eWaal. Only two thousand came back.

At Escaut , resistance vanishedovernight andGeneral Dempsey's tanks shot forward to occupy

SNijmegen. Further north at Arnhem, oppositionby picked S.S. battalions was at its fiercest, andalthough the paratroops dominated the vital Lekbridge for a short time they were unable to holdou t against the weight of tanks, self-propelledguns, multiple mortars and flame throwers, andafter nearly ten days and nights of almostceaseless fighting had to retire across the Lekbefore the American Second Army-who,striving desperately to push on beyond Nijmegen,found the enemy at Elst , just five miles short, ofArnhem, fa r stronger and better prepared thanhad been anticipated-could break through andjoin up.

The achievement at Arnhem, sadly overcast bythe shadow of the losses involved and relativelydisappointing in the immense possibilitiescomplete fulfilment offered, was, nevertheless,of considerable importance. Nijmegen and th eWaal crossing were secured. It remained nowfor the Canadians to eliminate opposition onWalcheren Island and the Scheldt pocket

dominating Antwerp's approaches to open theone port all-essential to any sustained offensiveagainst the 'Siegfried positions.

Breaching of the Dortmund-Ems Canal

Whatever satisfaction Germany derived fromher local triumph at Arnhem, she can have foundlittle comfort in two surprises R.A.F. BomberCommand provided in the closing months' of1944-the breaching of the Dortmund-Ems canaland the sinking of the " Tirpitz."

bombs smashed both channels of the embankedsection near Ladbergen, draining the canal foimore than seven miles and completely disruptingwater communications through the Ruhr andRhineland, and between' the industrial areas ofCentral and Eastern Germany and the North Seaports.

The fact that the iron ore of France-Luxembourg, Spain and the Scandinaviarcountries had already been cut off made this newloss catastrophic. Before the attack, pig iron andsteel outputs were down to nine and fourteei:million tons respectively. The breaching of th eDortmund-Ems canal lowered the respectiveoutputs, by direct and indirect causes, to fourand eight million tons. Furthermore, it deprivedthe iron and steel works at Osnabruck, Peine andSalzgitter of coking coal from the Ruhr.

Sinking of the " Tirpitz "

Hardly less serious was the second blow whiclcame on iSunday, 12th November, when R.A.F.Lancasters attacked the battleship "Tirpitz" inTromso Fjord.

Thirty-two aircraft flew on this operation and29 made the strike. They used 12,000 pound.bombs, and in spite of intense flak securedseveral direct hits. The " Tirpitz " was se t onfire, capsized, an d sank in a matter of minutes.

The destruction of this battleship removed aconstant menace" to convoys carrying warmaterial through Alton Fjord to Russia,eand setfree a number of Allied capital ships for otherduty. A vessel of 45,000 tons, completed asrecently as 1941, she was the fourth of Germany's"battle wagons" to go to, the bottom-herpredecessors being the " Bismark," the" Scharnhorst " and the " Graf Spee." Only oneLancaster failed to return.

The Greek Tragedy

The legend that Luck goes in Threes held goodat this time. The Bulgarian volte face, the stridesmade by the Russians towards the west, and theconstant harassing attacks on communications byYugoslav Partisans and aircraft of B.A.F. werenow rendering Greece and the Aegean untenable

to the enemy. His supply position both overlandand through the Adriatic was precarious and th estrategic value of his occupation had shrunk tonegligible proportion. In August, therefore, hebegan to pull out, leaving only a minimum ofthird-rate troops to guard the back door.' Bythe beginning of November, Greece was free.

Happily, the tragedy of Greece through the lastquarter of 1944 is now over. Possibly, with apeople possessed of such innate individualism andsubjected hitherto to a rule akin to dictatorship,

The attack on the Dortmund-Ems canal was it wa s inevitable. Time only will prove whether

made in September, at a time when all branches the country can establish a New Order and rebuild

of enemy transport were sthggling ( et its constitution.urgent military and economic demaand rgao'-gs cupation, beginningentirely successful. Twelve-thousan h Pe nnese and the big

* * . '' * * ' "'i" ,*.','i ,,., 'v a ' .,, ;ci. ;i g


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airborn fi o g , c minat ing

in the bitter and drawn-out battle fo r law andorder in Athens, ha s been told too often to needrepeating. Subjected to criticism, the action takenha s proved it s worth. The visit of Mr. Churchillon Christmas Day marked a new turn innegotiations between the Government and th eguerillas which the appointment of Archbishop

Damaskinos as Regent ha s since stabilized.Rundstedt's Counter Offensive

By the first week of November, as a resultof Commando landings on Walcheren Island, th ebattle of th e Scheldt had finished an d th e port ofAntwerp was free. It remained now to sweepth e approaches an d clear th e demolitions andsunken ships fo r the Allies to have available a

harbour within 65 miles of th e front line.

The offensive which this success presaged

opened in th e middle of 'the month against th eGerman pocket west of th e river Maas, andfollowed a strong assault by American Third

Army troops on th e fortress of Metz and anattack by the First French Army east of Belfort.Resistance in all sectors was fierce, bu t by th ebeginning of December the British Second Armyha d eliminated th e Maas bridgehead andoccupied the suburbs of Venio, the Americansha d taken Metz and crossed th e German borderon the Saar front, an d the French were beyondMulhouse in the Doubs Valley.

Then came a set-back. On Sunday, 16thDecember, against a lightly held 75 mile frontfrom Aachen to Trier, Rundstedt launched a full-scale counter-attack employing 150,000 infantry

an d paratroops supported by four Panzerdivisions and the biggest ai r concentrationassembled fo r some considerable time.

The .first thrust drove a corridor through theAmerican line between St. Vith an d Malmedy an dth e second sent the Panzer Lehr Division into

Bastogne, leaving an island of Allied troops cutoff at S t. Vith. These attacks were accompaniedby determined fighter-bomber operations which in

th e first 36 hours cost the enemy 194 aircraft.

A Sixty-Mile Penetration

By the end of December th e break-through

had been enlarged to include Beauring, butthe enemy ha d not succeeded in crossing th eMeuse-one Panzer division at Celles was withinfour miles of th e river-nor in outflanking Liege:He had, however, penetrated 60 miles west ofthe pre-attack front line.

The story of th e elimination of the bulge and

the complete defeat of Rundstedt's Army fallswithin January and February of the New Year.It wa s successfully accomplished by holding on

the south, ,punching at the nose an d cuttingthrough the body of the salient from th e north.Just as a German victory here would haveseriously affected the speed of the WesternOffensive, so their defeat an d the loss it entailedwill probably tell in favour of the Allies.

Wa r Against the U-Boats

Although by December, 1944, improved devicesfo r sub-surface battery chgrging and ai r changingpresaged a recrudescence of opei-sea U-boatactivity and the commencement of inshoreattacks, the year ha d been the most successfulof any for anti-submarine operations.

Germany began the wa r with approximately100 U-boats; in 1944, in spite of th e fact that wewere then sinking some four U-boats a week,she ha d 400 in service and was in a position topu t 150 to sea a t an y one time. That this weightof effort failed to make an y decisive impressionon Allied sea-traffic was due to tw o factors-themagnitude of American shipping output, whichby mid-1943 ha d made secure the position fo r alltime, and the magnitude and tactics of CoastalCommand and th e Royal Navy.

Through 1944, Germany was employing pre-fabrication for U-boats, enabling them to be builtin about six weeks-as against eight months

in earlier years; she wa s also developing th eSchnorkel sub-surface replenishment apparatuswhich ha s been in action since the spring. Theinitiative, a t th e moment with th e enemy, maynot remain there fo r long. We have ye t to bebeaten in the counter-measure race.

The Sixth Christmas

To have reached the Sixth W ar Christmasprovokes sobering reflections, fo r after th eGerman rout in France many prophesied therewould be no Sixth W ar Christmas; that the NaziArmies, once on th e run, would fail to checkthe rush or extricate themselves in sufficient

strength to provide a barrier; that weight ofnumbers an d the cumulative bombing programmeha d achieved their respective purposes.

Time has shown th e wish father to the thought.The German Army is still,fighting resolutely an dthe German People, reduced to dull apathy, isstill in the firm grip of the Gestapo. A recentstatement indicated the Nazi Party's militarypolicy for the future; it now remains to be seenwith what degree of success this can beimplemented or frustrated.

If the pointers are reliable, it would appearthat Hitler is prepared, though not without bitter

struggle, to sacrifice Germany above the southernpocket an d to leave the last battle to the gatesof. Munich, where, with his flanks protected bythe Schwarzwald a id Bohmerwald and his baseby th e Alps, he will, it is reported, attempt to

hold siege "until an Isolationist replacesRoosevelt-presumably a t th e 1948 elections-andwithdraws the American Forces from Germany,leaving th e British and Russian Armies ofOccupation to wage a Third World W ar amongstthemselves."

If true, this is the fanatical dream of a

desperate gang whic g omed from th e outset to

failure in every apolitical and economic

aspect, f e termany nothing but


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I A -A, :e

The Invasion of ItalyP a r t V- S t a l e m a t e Again

1st October to 31st December. 1944

I. INTRODUCTORYBY TH E EN D of ,September (as narrated in the held by the Allied Supreme Commander, which

last issue of the Review) the Allied Armies in were certain sooner or later to win him the game,Italy, backed by strong air support, had breached were the superiority enjoyed by his ground forcesthe Gothic Line along its entire length, except in equipment and supplies and the ace ofin the extreme west. As had happened several overwhelming ai r superiority. In respect of thetimes before in the Italian campaign, however, latter, however, deteriorating weather was boundthe situation flattered io deceive. The develop- to prevent its full explgitation.ment of this break-through into the occupation So far as military strategy was concerned, theof the remaining areas of I taly still under Axis Germans appreciated that the " schwerpunkt"domination was to be the reverse of easy owing of their defensive system lay south of Bologna,to the enemy's renewed stubborn resistance. an d in order to remain strong there some ground

The general policy of Army Group "C " - t h e would have to be yielded on the Adriatic -flankenemy forces holding northern I t a ly - fo r th e by gradually withdrawing behind successiveperiod under review was believed to have been water obstacles.formulated by Hitler himself. Its purpose was The general line held by the Allies in I taly atsimple-to

hold the Apennine positions to the the beginning of the period, ran, in general terms,last and prevent the Allied Armies entering th e from the mouth of th e Fuminico river on theagriculturally rich and industrially productive Adriatic coast, south-westwards to the Mercatoplains of Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto. To area, thence north-westwards to the area somecarry out his directive, Marshal Kesselring was 20 miles south of Bologna, thence south-westwardsapparently allowed by the German High Command to north of Pistoia and south-westwards againto retain all his t roops-28 German and four to Pietrasanta on the west coast. At that timeItalian divisions (by no means at full-strength, facing the Germans, from east to west were 1however) and various security formations. The Canadian, 5 and 10 Corps of the_ Eighth Armyonly proviso appeared to be the possible later in the Adriatic sector, and the Fifth Army,necessity (which turned out to be the case) of comprising 13 , 2 and 4 Corps, across the rest ofwithdrawing at least two divisions from I taly to the peninsula,' with the heaviest concentrationsmeet the Russian advance in south-east Europe. south of Bologna. The Germans at the beginning

Kesselring was not without some good cards of October had nineteen or twenty divisions in

in his hand. His divisions in the line actually the battle area which were supplemented byoutnumbered those of the Allies; he still held another one or two by the middle of the month.strong moun tain positions and was protected byriver barriers; and, nost important, General Allied Air SupremacyWinter was again at hand to help. him with his Although the German Army was still a teamdefensive warfare. The Marshal's most serious to be reckoned with, the Luftwaffe could hardlydisadvantage was his tenuous supply lines, be said to be fielding even a fourth eleven. TheThere were four main railway routes entering G.A.F., which at the beginning of the ItalianItaly available to him-the Brenner P a s s route campaign, after the immense losses incurred infrom Austria an d the three lines entering from North Africa an d Sicily, could still 'boast ath e north-east. These frontier routes and th e Mediterranean strength of well over 1,000more southerly network of lines in th e Po valley aircraft, was now represented in I taly by awere wide-open to air attacks and it required niggardly 25 long-range and fifteen tacticalconstant labour, skill and ingenuit iF , r ~atre ou t 30 second-lineGermans' part to slip through sufficiel n t ', S,t" Other formationsand equipment to their forces south oo i taly is, what. M.A.A.F.enable them to maintain their effort. ' t Jleft,f M -iem- d some nonths since joined

. * .. -- *i .^^ t ..., cct i \.ay/ i; i:i ;_ i .^ ,s~


16/94

.

the main body of the Luftwaffe in the west tohelp with the Canute-like task of trying tostem' the tides of the Anglo-American invasionand aerial offensive. Brief, infrequent and

usually inglorious appearances were also beingmade in the Italian skies by the Italian FascistAir Force, comprising a job-lot of about 50single-engined fighters and 20 torpedo-bombers.

In contrast to the enemy's Lilliputian air powerthe Mediterranean Allied Air Forces in Octobermustered a strength of over 3,900 aircraft ofoperational type ( that is, excluding the powerfulforce of transport aircraft) in Italy, Corsica an dSardinia and further forces were based along th eNorth African seabord, in Southern France,on Malta and on Vis. It is true that th eMediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force, whichaccounted for 48 per cent. of the above-mentionedstrength in Italy and the adjacent western islands,was committed primarily to attacks on objectives

beyond the Italian frontiers, bu t its efforts couldbe switched to help the Mediterranean campaignwhenever essential.

Offensive operations over Italy were, as

previously, ,predominantly the MediterraneanAllied Tactical Ai r Force's concern. Fo r th egreater part of the period under review, theForce was composed of the Desert Air Force,the XXII Tactical Air Command (a newformation made up of the short-live'd XII FighterCommand and further former XII T.A.C. unitsreturned from Southern France), the 57th and42nd U.S.A.A.F. medium bomber wings (thelatter Wing left the Mediterranean theatre in

mid-November) and the 51st Troop Carrier Wing.

Fo r the most part during the last quarterof 1944 D.A.F. operationally controlled threeSpitfire, wings, one Kittyhawk/Mustang (P.51)wing, one Spitfire reconnaissance wing, oneU.S. Thunderbolt (P. 47) group, two wings

V..


17/94

Vercelli road and railway bridge under attack on 4th iNovember, 1944.

S15 1


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Ora road and railway bridge under attack on 11th November, 1944.


19/94

of light bombers, and one Marauder (B. 26)medium bomber wing. In th e above formationsR.A.F. squadrons numbered 21, S.A.A.F. twelve,R.A.A.F. four, U.S.A.A.F. three and R.C.A.F. andPolish Air Force one each. Th e XXII T.A.C. wasmade up in general of four U.S.A.A.F.Thunderbolt groups (twelve squadrons), a

S.A.A.F. wing of Spitfires and Kittyhawks (twoS.A.A.F. an d two R.A.F. squadrons), a U.S.A.A.F.light bomber group (four squadrons), two R.A.F.Spitfire tactical reconnaissance squadrons, tw oU.S.A.A.F. Beauf ih ter night-fighter squadrons, aBrazilian Air Force Thunderbolt squadron an d aU.S.A.A.F. photographic squadron. The Tacticalmedium bomber force consisted for the first halfof th e period of twelve squadrons of U.S.A.A.F..Mitchells (B. 25s) an d th e same number ofU.S.A.A.F. Marauders and later of sixteen,squadrons of Mitchells only.

In numerical strength M.A.T.A.F. exceeded th e1,800 mark (excluding transport aircraft) fo r th egreater part of th e period, bu t was reduced bysome 300 aircraft by the end of the year.

M.A.T.A.F's 'Commitments

The Tactical Air Force's basic commitments inI taly were (a) counter ai r force operations, (b)the provision of ai r protection over the forwardareas, (c) affording close support to th e groundforces, (d) attacks on enemy lines of com-munication, (e) the destruction of enemy supplies,and (f) reconnaissance duties.

To meet the first two commitments mentionedabove-in earlier campaigns of paramountimportance-a minimum

effort sufficed owingto

the Luftwaffe's impotence M.A.T.A.F's' majorefforts were absorbed by tasks (c) and (d).

As had long been the tradition, the Desert AirForce continued to give intimate aid to the EighthArmy and the XXII Tactical Ai r Command wasmade responsible for supporting the Fifth Army'soperations. When necessary some effort could

be orce to help in th eother 's th e Tact ical

and/or St ra te t i called onto help with close-

The heaviest commitme

to be th e pounding of the enemy's i oe nomunication-particularly railways-in" orde to

restrict his build-up in th e battle area. Shortlyafter th e beginning of the period under review,the Desert Air Force was allotted th e area eastand north of th e line Verona-Ostiglia-Bolognafor attacks on communications and the XXIITactical Ai r Command was responsible forattacks to the west of that area. Later in th eperiod the area of th e latter Command wa sextended further east. The medium bomber'sfunction was to add weight to the attacks inthe Po valley an d strike at vulnerable pointsfurther north. From November onwards th eTactical Air Force- extended its attacks onrailways northwards, with special emphasis on

the Brenner P a s s line, as it became increasinglyclear that the destruction of the bridges over th ePo had no t resulted in th e expected Alliedstranglehold on supplies reaching the GermanArmy in th e field. Less help was then requiredfrom the Strategic Ai r Force against the frontierroutes.

Th e Coastal Ai r Force's commitments so fa ras the Italian campaign was concerned includedthe protection -of the rear areas and convoys;anti-shipping activity in th e Gulf of Genoa andthe northern Adriatic; supplementary attacks onroad transport and other targets, particularly innorth-west I taly; and air-sea rescue missions.

It is no t purposed in this account to give detailsof th e Royal Navy's achievements. But it shouldbe borne in mind that protective duties (albeitnow restricted) remained a constant commitment,offensive action was taken against enemy shippingin the Ligurian and northern Adriatic seas, andbombardments were carried out of th e Genoa area.

II. RENEWAL OF ENEMY RESISTANCE

Fifth Army's " Minor Advances " during th e first half of October. An attemptedOctober opened with leading troops of the Fifth break-through to Bologna, aided by the air

Army in the central sector sixteen miles south of support considered in th e following section, wasBologna- the key strong-point of the German found to be impracticable.defence line. It was immediately evident that not On 15th October 13 Corps was held up nearonly a dogged defence bu t local counter-attacks Bocconi and seven miles or so north of Palazzuoola;could be expected, reminiscent of the palmiest 2 Corps, advancing along the Firenzwola-Bolognadays of th e Gustav line resistance. To stiffen his axis, after heavy fighting were in possession ofdivisions in the threatened central sector, Livergnano (three Land a half miles north ofKesselring. transferred not only piecemeal Loiano); and 4 Corps troops, advancing on eitherreinforcements from his Adriatic flank but more side of Highway 64, were three miles south-eastsubstantial formations from th e quiet western of Vergato, and further west in th e Serchiosector and the Genoa area. The remark "

Minor valley had reached Gallicano. These limited

advances have been made against very stiff advances-particularly in the. central sector-

opposition an d most difficult terrain," culled from were helped, and in some cases perhapsa despatch of this time, could, accordingly, be made rossible, by the ai r support mentionedapplied to th e whole of y's ctvity ,i he nex tio

; ctlon.


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21/94

Operation "Pancake"

Apart from a maximum effort on th e first da yof the month, when M.A.T.A.F's sorties on allduties exceeded the 1,200 mark, reports on Alliedai r activity up to 12th October usually began," Bad weather contiriued to hamper operations."This bald statement when applied to Italian

operations should conjure up a picture of landinggrounds turned into quagmires as well aslowering winter skies inimical to tactical missions.

During the first eleven days of October aircraftunder the operational control of XII FighterCommand (later in the month re-designated XXIIT.A.C.) flew most of the 2,400 sorties carriedout on battlefield operations ; even so, strongclose-support was practicable on five daysonly. U.S. Thunderbolts played the major partwith attacks on enemy's positions, buildings,troop concentrations, guns, etc., mainly in th ecentral sector and U.S. Bostons helped duringthe earlier part of October by bombing bivouacareas an d dumps. On the first four days of th emonth, also, D.A.F. directed most of the effortof its Kittyhawks and Mustangs an d a Spitbomberwing towards helping th e thrust towards Bologna;in particular, four missions flown against Loianoon the 3rd (in the direct path of our troops)succeeded in virtually demolishing the northernpart of that fortified town. These operations,however, only represented ' aerial skirmishingbefore the full-scale M.A.T.A.F.-.cum-M.A.S.A.F.blitz of 12th October-the intensive phase ofOperation " Pancake."

As its code-name suggests, the operation was

designed to flatten enemy opposition-in thisinstance in th e path of the Fifth Army troopspressing on towards Bologna. The more distanttargets in the Bologna area were allotted to th eStrategic heavy bombers and Tactical mediumbombers, while the Tactical fighter-bombersranged over the battlefield proper.

On 12th October the attacking heaviesnumbered 697 (over 100 more were thwarted bybad weather from reaching their objective);effective U.S. Mitchell sorties came to 141(attacks by 72 more Mitchells were frustrated

by cloud cover and the entire effort of th e U.S.Marauder wing was also rendered abortive); andover 270 fighter-bombers took part. The totalbomb-load dropped in this most concentratedattack by M.A.A.F. bombers up to that dateamounted to 1,661 tons. The heavy bombersattacked seven "material" targets (vehicleworkshops, stores and ammunition depots) andtwo barracks and a bivouac area, and th emediums pounded two bivouac and stores areatargets, a barracks and a fuel dump. Of. thefourteen targets attacked by th e Allied bombersphotographic interpretation showed that five couldbe termed destroyed and eight damaged. Thefighter-bombers, meaniwhile, attacked 60 targets

in the usual " close-support " category. On 13thand 15th October the fighter-bombers continuedtheir close-support operations ,a t maximum

pressure and on the latter day the mediumbombers pu t up a full-scale effort against Povalley communications to hamper the supply ofthe central sector.

Apart from the material damage caused in the" Pancake" operations, reports from militaryunits emphasised the tonic effect on the morale

of our own troops and such immediate results asthe decrease in enemy artillery fire. A reportissued by G-2, Fifth Army, concluded by sayingthat "the air support... was eminentlysuccessful.. Classified targets were attacked in atimely, accurate and most effective manner, thusaiding materially th e advance of th e Fifth Armyin taking: important terrain."

The Fifth Army's projected break-through toBologna did not, however, as already mentioned,materialise. The German defence had againproved a nu t which could not be cracked by ashort, intensive effort-steady and prolongedArmy-Air Force pressure was again required.

Eighth Army Approaches Cesena

In th e Adriatic sector, meanwhile, the EighthArmy was pushing slowly. forward. At thebeginning of October the Canadians had reachedthe line, of the Fiumicino river from the sea upto and including Savignano; on their left 5 Corpshad advanced a little beyond Tribola ; and10 Corps troops had followed up the enemy'swithdrawal along the remainder of the EighthArmy's front. Our forces had as aim an advancetowards Bologna from the south-east and asimultaneous progress up the Adriatic coast. Th e

Germans, in accordance with their general policy,were fighting a stubborn action and yieldingground only under extreme pressure, whileexploiting terrain and weather conditions to themaximum extent.

In spite of atrocious weather which, inter alia,caused the water-logging of several easternlanding-grounds-that at lesi with its concreterunway was a striking dry exception-D.A.F.rendered as far as possible its usual yeomanservice to th e Eighth Army.

SFor th e first four days of the month D.A.F'smain close-support, as mentioned previously, was

given to the Fifth Army troops in thecentral

sector; at the same time, however, the airoffensive was continued against the bridgesacross the Savio river, which was clearly th eenemy's next major defence line against th eEighth Army. Bad weather then prevented anyappreciable close-support until the 7th when themajority of the 500 sorties flown helped Canadiantroops in the Gatteo area; in addition, aircraftunder advanced " Rover" control succeeded indispersing a threatened enemy counter-attacknear Monte-Leone. Fo r the next eight daysintermittent bad weather interfered with D.A.F'seffort-total daily sorties on all duties varying

from nil to 510. Nevertheless, accurate close-support, generally under " control, wasafforded th e Ar p leSile,particularly


22/94

around Cesena; all the Savio road bridges werecu t by 15th October; and, as mentioned later, aconsiderable toll was taken of rail and canaltransport in the rear eastern areas.

By mid-October, helped and heartened byD.A.F's help, Canadian troops ha d crossed theFiumicino river and the Rigorsa, further west;

leading elements of 5 Coips were only three milessouth of Cesena, and advanced troops of 10 Corpshad reached Ranchio.

Fifth Army's Advance Stemmed

During th e third week of October Kesselringswitched further crack units from the Adriaticfront westwards to pack the approach to Bolognafrom the south-east. There were then elevenGerman divisions astride the main axis of th eFifth Army as compared with seven opposing

Sthe Eighth Army's advance and two in th e quietwestern area. In the latter sector, also, were

elements of an Italian Republican Divisionsandwiched between more reliable German troopsin the old Western Desert style.

Until 26th October the Fifth Army continuedto make a little progress, bu t then a deteriorationin the weather greatly aided the enemy's defence.As one of th e Supreme Commander's ,reports atthis time pu t it : "Heavy rains have made theItalian battle area a sea of mud. All rivers wereat flood stage throughout most of the period(26th to 29th October). Bridges were washedout, many roads were flooded, and in some areassupplies could be moved only by mules ormanhandling." Thus by the end of the monththe enemy had the situation south of Bolognareasonably well in hand and, in particular, hadscreened th e vital areas between Route 65 andCastel Sa n Pietro with his three best divisions,which had previously operated in the Adriaticsector.

The unfavourable weather inevitably restrictedthe air support which could be afforded the FifthArmy. During the first half of October, asalready pointed out, XXII T.A.C. directed its

main effort against close-support targets. Duringthe last sixteen days of October XXII T.A.C's effort-2,294 sorties on all duties-was almost

equally divided between battlefieldcommitments

and attacks on rear communications, as in viewof th e slowing up of ground operations andbad weather over th e forward areas th ecommunications attacks, which are consideredlater, now paid better dividends.

the attacks by bombing storage dep6ts a t CastelSa n Pietro and Imola and communications in th eformer area. The U.S. Bostons operated in forceonly once against troop concentrations in th ecentral sector, but, in addition, in a limited armedreconnaissance effort on a few nights covered th eBologna area as well as the territory westwards

to the coast.

Fall of Cesena

Further east, in the meantime, th e EighthArmy's continued pressure on the weakenedGerman, forces on th e Adriatic front forced themto yield more ground.

The Canadians, advancing on their Rimini -Cesena axis, crossed ye t another river obstacleand by the beginning of the fourth week inOctober, having taken Cervia in their stride,were along th e line of the Savio, with leadingelements across the river some two miles north

of Cesena. The latter town, on the main Rimini-

Bologna route, ha d fallen, meanwhile, to 5 Corps'right flank in conjunction with Canadian troops,and a bridgehead across th e Savio to the west ofthe town ha d been established. To the south-west,2 Polish Corps (who ha d taken over from 10Corps) had made a general advance of five milesor so, capturing Galatea and Civitella di Romagna.By th e end of th e month 1 Canadian Corps troopsin the coastal sector were within seven miles ofRavenna and other elements ha d reached th eRonco river east of For l i ; 5 Corps had crossed th eRonco and forward units were three to four milessouth of Forli ; and the Poles on the left flank

ha d also kept pace with th e general advance.Thus the Eighth Army in its drive towards

Bologna from th e Rimini area had progressed athird to a half of th e way and in the coastalsector well over three-quarters of the wa y toRavenna.

D.A.F's close support to our forces on th eAdriatic front was inevitably patchy, due to th eadverse weather and, particularly, the "sea ofmud" already mentioned. On five of the lastsixteen days in October sorties fell below 100,including three blank or virtually blank days;nevertheless, by taking advantage of a few spells

of good weather D.A.F'stotal

effort topped the3,300 sorties mark.The areas covered by th e close-support

operations (which accounted fo r about half of th etotal effort) reflected the course of the EighthArmy's advance changing from below Cesena to.. ..-- -- . . . . .i-~ - . . .. . -- 4 - oC ... .. . .. . . . .... .

On only half of the days in the latter part of west of that town and south of Forli . High-lightsOctober wa s an appreciable, effort over the Fifth of th e D.A.F. battlefield attacks were th eArmy's battle area practicable; weather conditions harassing of th e enemy's movement across th efrom 25th to 30th October, in particular, almost Savio river on 20th October; help fo r ou r groundprevented ai r operations entirely. The U.S. forces in their enlargement of their SavioThunderbolt activity against guns and enemy bridgehead on th e 24th; harassing the enemy'spositions-particularly against the concentrations retreat to the Ronco river line on the 25th; an dsouth of Faenza , Imola and Bologna-was support fo r operations in the Meldola-Forli area

strongest and most successful on the 16th, 19th, on th e last day of the month. After a spell of20th, 24th and i31st. On a few occasions, also, inactivity due to unserviceable landing grounds,Tactical medium bombers added more weight to did good work, particularlyD~\~3dd odwrk atiual


23/94

against a fortified village six miles west ofCesena, bu t th e Marauder squadrons were still,unfortunately, bogged down.

Attacks on Enemy Communications

of co

eastwa o d' s t eagainst military traffic occurred in the Cremona -Mantua area (the results achieved are included inthe. tntn.la given l te-r) ; m l m e r n i s ra.il c.utf w i r P

An Allied Force Headquarters' Operation affected on the Faenza-Bologna line an d in th eMemorandum issued in th e spring of 1944 stated Milan and Genoa areas; and roads were crateredthat "the main function of all classes of bomber most extensively between F e r r a r a and P a r m a

aircraft in a land campaign is to interfere with and th e bomb-line.movement of enemy forces and their supplies." , " The U.S. medium bombers' effort duringThis dictum had certainly been acted upon in October was whittled down by unfavourableI taly, reaching its apotheosis of achievement two weather to an even greater extent than that ofmonths prior to and during the "Diadem" the light and fighter-bombers, their total effectiveoffensive (begun 12th May, 1944), when the sorties fo r the month on all duties amounting tointensive air attacks on the enemy's communi- 1,947-just over half of their September total.cations rendered his build-up in central I taly During th e eleven days when operations wereiisufficient to meet the demands of sustained practicable, the medium bombers carried out 85heavy fighting. Fo r a time then in the early attacks on bridges, destroying sixteen andsummer of 1944 it looked as if the Allied armies damaging 27. Most of the missions were flownwere all set for a drive to th e extreme north of north of the Po , particular attention being paidthe peninsula and the ai r offensive against lines to lines running south to Milan and Padua . Routesof communications was therefore somewhat to the north an d west of Milan Were cut as th e

relaxed. In July, however, it wa s evident this result of the attacks on the railway bridge atrapid advance wa s no t going to materialise Ponte Sa n Pietro, and bridges a t Lonate Pazzaloimmediately and the paramount need was to and Galliate and combined road-rail bridges atrestrict th e enemy's build-up south of the Po . The Cameri and Magenta.. The routes running intobombing of the Po bridges was begun accordingly the Po valley from the north-east were blockedon 12th July and attacks on communications, by the bombing of the railway bridges at Nervesa,particularly railways, traversing the entire Po Piazzola an d P a d u a . Lateral lines running throughvalley became M.A.T.A.F's main commitment. Mantua a~d Verona were disrupted at variousThe Strategic bombers, meanwhile, attended to points; an d four Po bridges, which had notthe disruption of th e frontier routes at their more previously been permanently disabled, weredistant points an d rear. marshalling yards as attacked.previously. This division of labour between the The combined M.A.T.A.F. results of the attackstwo Forces still obtained during October, the on communications in October were:-44 bridgesmonth under immediate review, destroyed and 83 damaged; 2401 cuts on railway

So far as M.A.T.A.F's attacks on o communica- tracks; one tunnel destroyed and two damaged;tions were concerned, the areas covered by th e 280 locomotives destroyed an d 76 damaged; 645

three main formations in October were as follows, railway carriages and wagons destroyed and

The Desert Air Force operated to the east of the 1,384 damaged; 423 military vehicles destroyedVerona-Ostiglia-Bologna railway; XXII T.A.C. and 290 damaged; an d 58 ships and boats sunk

covered th e more extensive territory to the west and 174 damaged, A further limiting of enemy

of that line; an d the medium bombers (ranging supplies wa s achieved by th e destruction of 23

over both these areas) concentrated on cutting dumps.bridges north of the Po and across th e river itself. Meanwhile, th e Strategic Air Force in th e

SMay of Dcs a s course of operations against communications onS

D .F s c o m m u c attacks- three days and seven nights dropped a totalparticularly the destruction of the Savio river bomb-load of 20 tons, mainly on th e enemy'sbridges-were bound up with th e advance of the bomb-load of 2,500 tons, mainly on th e enemy'sEighth Army and have already been mentioned, more northern commuinications, concentratingEighth Army and have aleady' been mentioned particularly on the important Brenner Pass route.Further north, cuts inflicted on railways were part a ry o the prevented the coPatinuousmost prevalent on the Verona-Modena and Bad weather, however, prevented the coitinuousRvenra-Bologna stretches. On a Mnumber of effort necessary to achieve a serious interdictionRavonenna-Bologna stretches th e frontier routes.days, also, armed reconnaissances-particularlyby Mustangs-over the rear north-eastern areas Th e Coastal Air Force's quota to the offensive

imposed- a considerable toll on rail traffic- against enemy communications during October

outstanding achievements being th e destrudtion included th e sinking of two merchant vessels and

of seventeen locomotives on 12th October, 30 on the damaging of twelve more, nine smaller craft

the 21st and ten on the 30th. Equally striking sunk and 52 damaged, and one bridge destroyed

results were obtained against canal traffic, a total and one damaged.of 52 boats and barges being destroyed and 16 6damaged. Failure to Stem Enemy's Supplies

Meanwhile, XXI I T.A.C., whose effor t ag a . mosm oned in th ecommunications was more pronounced in ee in e o e hted the fial phase oflatter half 9f th e month, despite the limi in l 1 onth co centrated effort in th efactor of bad weather maintained the interdic ion Po valley and the establishing of a line of


24/94

P ~S!fl~ii~

Points of Interdiction by Air at 13th November, 1944.

interdiction along the Po, Piave and Ticino rivers-- an ai r offensive which had as twin objectives thelimiting of the enemy's build-up south of the Poand th e hampering of an expected withdrawalof the German armies to the Alps. Considering

the limiting factor of bad weatherin

October, th eM.A.T.A.F. effort during the month achieved ageneral success, particularly in continuing to stopvirtually all transportation across the Po to th ebattle area during the hours. of daylight-

In view of the success of th e above-mentionedsustained interdiction offensive and M.A.S.A.F'sintermittent cutting of th e frontier routes, th equestion naturally arises, "How did the enemymaintain a sufficient flow of supplies to his troopsto withstand full-scale attacks by both the Fifthand Eighth Armies? " The answer is, " By anintensive repair programme and a number ofingenious improvisations." These ar e considered

in more detail elsewhere in the Review, but it ispertinent here to emphasise some of apB2W

schemes at this period. So fa r as the actual entryof supplies into Italy wa s concerned, the Germanscountered to a great extent the effect of the airattacks on the frontier routes by skilled andspeedy repairs (rendered more easy by the

accumulation of bridging materials near targetsites) and the construction of rail diversionsaround vulnerable points. Fo r the passage ofsupplies over the rivers further south, particularlyover the Po , the enemy's repair programme couldnot keep pace with the damage inflicted;consequently the use of pontoon bridges at nightonly, crossings by ferries (also principally atnight), the construction of pipe lines and othermethods were brought into play.

Attempts were made by both Strategic andTactical night bombers to interfere with th eenemy's nocturnal supply activities, but, ingeneral, these achieved little success owing to th e

difficulties of locating the targets (the locationsH of the pontoon bridges were constantly changed,


25/94

Aircraft over the target at Magenta road bridge, two spans of which were cut.

for instance),) the poor visibility 'usuallyprevailing, and insufficient forces available for asustained effort.

Thus, in spite of the Allied air attacks theGermans continued to supply their forward troopswith their estimated needs of approximately2,000 tons daily. It must be emphasised, however,that the enemy's accumulation of supplies waskept down to a level sufficient only for defensivewarfare and was quite inadequate fo r anysustained major offensive action.

Features of M.A.T.A.F's October Effort

In certain respects October ended a phase ofM.A.T.A.F. activity. In particular, in th efollowing m o t h the Force's zone -of operations

was to be significantly extended in Italy and itsaid was once more to be required in Yugoslavia.

The dominant feature of the month was th elimiting factor of bad weather. M.A.T.A.F'seffective operational sorties (excluding transportaircraft missions) came to 13,554 - nearly10,000 short of the September figure; andthe total bomb-load dropped just exceeded the8,000 tqns mark, or a little over half of theprevious month's tonnage. Nearly 4,500 tonswere dropped on lines of communication and just

over 3,300 tons on enemy concentrations. Detailsof the results achieved have already been given.

Help with the important work of destroyingthe enemy's morale was provided by five missionsflown by a total of 36 U.S. Mitchells on "nickel"


26/94

Bombs exploding on the Magenta road bridge.

Results of the attack on the Magenta road bridge.

~B1~P~BB


27/94

(leaflet) dropping over the areas of Bologna,Imola and Forli .

The enemy's air force was still conspicuous by itsabsence. M.A.T.A.F's combat victories, accordingly,amounted to a mere eight enemy aircraftdestroyed and seven " probables." A few more.(including reconnaissance aircraft) were destroyedon th e ground, particularly by XXII T.A.C.

Thunderbolts. , M.A.T.A.F's operational losseswere 20 bombers and 77 fighters (includingreconnaissance aircraft); two of these losses only.were traced definitely to enemy ai r action, th erest being due to flak and other causes.

f A.. was

the rocket anEvidence as to their worth useythe end of October, bu t their la u edthat they were yery definitely worth their salt.

Features of 51st Troop Carrier Wing's effort,apart from the routine work of ferrying personnel

and equipment, included the evacuation of nearly1,500 patients from the forward areas; th eferrying of several thousands of reinforcementtroops from France o Italy; and help with Balkanoperations.

III . M.A.T.A.F's INCREASED COMMITMENTS

Capture of Forli

The Allied Armies' limited gains during th eearly part of November-and, as it turned out,fo r the whole of the month-were made. almostentirely by Eighth Army troops on the Adriaticfront. As previously, th e Germans defendedstubbornly and exploited the river barriers to thefullest extent, an d once again such statements as," Rain and mud continue to.-hamper operations "introduced many of the Allied Commander'scommuniques.

During the first few days of the month a haltwas called to the advance of the Canadians' rightflank up the east coast, but 5 Corps continued topress on towards For i - -over half the wa y toFaenza from Cesena on th e R i m i i - Bologna

axis. Polish troops on the left flank, meanwhile,continued to make progress further south.

Beginning on 1st November th e Tactical AirForce again assumed commitments in th eBalkans, the formations affected being theDesert Air Force and the Tactical mediumbomber wings. This additional activity-whichis considered elsewhere in the Review-inevitablyimplied a reduction in D.A.F's effort on close-support for the Eighth Army, certain wings, ineffect, being held for employment against Balkantargets on a first priority basis. In th e event,however, the decrease in D.A.F's Italian effortwa s no t so great as anticipated as the weatherin Yugoslavid was often worse than in I taly,permitting Tactical operations on only half th edays of th e month.

The Desert Air Force's small effort during thefirst four days of November wa s mainly directedacross the Adriatic, bu t on th e 5th began a spellof four days good flying weather in I taly whichcoincided with the critical phase of the battlefo r Forli. On th e opening day of this goodweather spell D.A.F. flew approximately half ofits 400 sorties in support of our troops approachingFor l i and on the following da y a still greatereffort was practicable, while ahead of th e

Canadians bridges over the Ronco river south ofRavenna were also successfully attacked. On th e

7th, as the battle raged in the vicinity of th eForli airfield, some two miles from the town, th eclose-support effort was further stepped-up; in

addition to over 300 D.A.F. sorties againstparticular close-support targets 92 Tactical U.S.Marauders added weight to the ai r assault by"fragging" the areas of the enemy's troopconcentrations. The next day 90 pe r cent. ofD.A.F's 526 sorties were flown in attacks aheadof the advancing 5 Corps, who captured For l i onthe 9th.

The best indication of the success achieved bythe air support is given by citing typical passagesfrom the messages of thanks and congratulationsaddressed to the Desert Air Force. The Brigadiercommanding a British infantry division engagedin the fighting wrote to the A.O.C., D.A.F., "Inmy experience air support has never been closer6r more accurate, and all my chaps weretremendously stimulated by it. Such co-operation'sends their tails right over their heads." On astill higher level the G.O.C., 5 Corps, stated that,"The speed of answering calls, the accuracy ofbombing and straffing and the way in which allattacks were pressed home at low level wasadmired and appreciated by all ranks. Thedestructive and moral effect on the enemy wasthe greatest contribution to the success of to-day'soperations."

TheApproach to Faenza

After Forli had fallen the next main item onthe Eighth Army's programme was an advance toFaenza, still further along Highway 9 in thedirection of the eventual goal of Bologna.

By 20th November, 5 Corps in their progress'towards Faenza had established positions alongthe east bank of the Montone river, seven milesnorth of Forli, and were holding a line along th eCosina river, south of Highway 9. Further southstill the Poles, after a temporary set-back, werepushing forward in the area north-west ofCastrocaro, while in the coastal sector advanced

Canadian units were only two miles south ofRavenna.

r.. .


28/94

From 16th to 20th November,. of the 3,sorties flown by the Desert Air, Forceabouttwo-thirds was devoted to iclose-support work.The light bombers we're again able to add weightto the fighter-bomber attacks, bu t the Marauderswere still non-participants due to unserviceablelanding grounds. The main part of the close-support effort was directed to helping the drive

,on Faenza and good immediate results werereported by the forward "Rover" controls. Anexample of the more general results achieved wa sthe 2,000 yards advance along Highway 9,achieved by a British division on 12th Novemberafter the wa y had been cleared by an intensiveai r blitz.

In addition to attacks on the usual battlefieldstrgetssustained offensive (including help frm

the Tactical U.S. Mitchells) was kept up againstthe enemy's three bridges at Faenza. Until th e18th the bridges were all serviceable-" apparentlyha

raf mediterranean review no 9

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