radicalisation and resilience case study indonesia

RadicalisationandResilienceCaseStudy

IndonesiaPradanaBoyZulianandHasnanBachtiarUniversityofMuhammadiyahMalangSeptember2020

http://grease.eui.eu

Thiscasestudyispartofaseriesofin-depthreportsonreligiouslymotivatedviolentradicalisation–andresiliencetoit–in13countries.Theseriesexaminesperiodsinwhichreligiousradicalisationandviolencehasescalatedandanalysesrelevantpolicyandpoliticaldiscoursessurroundingthem.Whileseekingtoidentifyfactorsthatdroveradicalisationandviolenceineachcountry,thecasestudiesalsocriticallyassessprogrammesofpreventionandresilience-building,identifyinggoodpractices.ThisserieswasproducedbyGREASE,anEU-fundedresearchprojectinvestigatingreligiousdiversity,secularismandreligiouslyinspiredradicalisation.Countriescoveredinthisseries:Australia,Belgium,BosniaandHerzegovina,Egypt,France,Germany,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,Morocco,Russia,TunisiaandtheUnitedKingdom.

TheGREASEprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion'sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementnumber770640

IndonesiaRadicalisationandResilienceCaseStudyGREASE

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TheEU-FundedGREASEprojectlookstoAsiaforinsightsongoverningreligiousdiversityandpreventingradicalisation.Involving researchers fromEurope,NorthAfrica, theMiddle East, Asia, andOceania,GREASEis investigatinghowreligiousdiversity isgoverned inover20countries.Ourwork focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices thatmay (ormay not) proveuseful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on howdifferent societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities andmigrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can begovernedsuccessfully,withanemphasisoncounteringradicalisationtrends.Whileexploringreligiousgovernancemodelsinotherpartsoftheworld,GREASEalsoattemptstounravel theEuropeanparadoxofreligiousradicalisationdespitegrowingsecularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failedbecause second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, withsometurningtojihadistterrorismnetworks.Theresearchersaimtodeliverinnovativeacademic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights forgovernanceofreligiousdiversity.TheprojectisbeingcoordinatedbyProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidoufromTheEuropeanUniversityInstitute(EUI)inItaly.OtherconsortiummembersincludeProfessorTariqModood fromTheUniversityofBristol (UK);Dr.H.A.Hellyer from theRoyalUnitedServices Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr.MilaMancheva from The Centre for the Study ofDemocracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Racius from Vytautas Magnus University(Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA(Germany);ProfessorMehdiLahloufromMohammedVUniversityofRabat(Morocco);Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation(Turkey); Professor PradanaBoy ofUniversitasMuhammadiyahMalang (Indonesia);Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research DevelopmentCentre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University(India);andProfessorMicheleGrossmanofDeakinUniversity(Melbourne,Australia).GREASEisscheduledforcompletionin2022.ForfurtherinformationabouttheGREASEprojectpleasecontact:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidou,[email protected]

http://grease.eui.eu/GREASE-Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingTogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectives


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Contents

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................4

METHODOLOGY................................................................................................................................6

CONCEPTUALISATIONSOFRADICALISATION:RADICALISM,EXTREMISM,ANDTERRORISM........................................................................................................................................7

COUNTRYBACKGROUND..........................................................................................................10INDONESIA:AUNIFICATIONOFCOMPLEXITIES.........................................................................11THEGOVERNANCEOFRELIGIOUSDIVERSITY.............................................................................12STATE-RELIGIONRELATIONS......................................................................................................14THEGOVERNANCEOFRELIGIOUSDIVERSITY.............................................................................15

DRIVERSOFRELIGIOUSLY-INSPIREDRADICALISATIONANDASSESSMENT..17RADICALISM................................................................................................................................17RELIGIOUSINTOLERANCE...........................................................................................................18FUTURETRENDSOFRADICALISM...............................................................................................20

STATEANDNON-STATEAPPROACHESTORELIGIOUSLY-INSPIREDRADICALISATION..........................................................................................................................22GOVERNMENTPOLICIESINCOUNTERINGTERRORISM..............................................................22EXPANSIONOFCIVILSOCIETYAPPROACHBYGOVERNMENT....................................................23CIVILSOCIETY-LEDAPPROACHESTOCOUNTERINGRELIGIOUSLYINSPIREDRADICALISATION......................................................................................................................................................25

CRISISCASESTUDY:THELIMITSOFDERADICALISATION.......................................26

INDONESIANBESTPRACTICESOFCOUNTER-RADICALISM....................................30ANTI-RADICALISMANDTERRORISMAGENT..............................................................................30HUMANISTICAPPROACH.............................................................................................................31EDUCATIONALAPPROACH..........................................................................................................33RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................................................................34

CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................35

REFERENCES..................................................................................................................................36


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IntroductionThisreportexaminesreligiousradicalisminIndonesia,lookingathowithasevolvedover time,especiallyduringpost-NewOrderperiod to thepresent.TheNewOrderofIndonesianpoliticsbeganin1966andlastedmorethan32years.Itwasanauthoritarianpoliticalsystemthatcreatedmanyrestrictionsfor Indonesian people over the course of its rule. The regime was finallytoppledbymassandstudentdemonstrationswhichwerepartlytriggeredbythe regional economic crisis acrossmost of Southeast Asia in 1997. In thewake of the regime’s collapse in 1998, a new phase of Indonesian politicsstarted.ItiscalledEraReformasi(theReformEra)andspanstheperiodfromthe fall of Suharto’s regime until now. This timeframe is selected as thisperiod marked a new phase in Indonesian democracy that has broughtsignificant impacts in both political and religious life. One of the mostimportant manifestations has been the proliferation of various Islamicreligiousgroupsthatofferdifferentandoftencontradictoryunderstandingsofandorientationstowardsmanyaspectsoflife.ConsideringtheverycomplexnatureofIndonesianIslam,describingIslamicreligious orientations in Indonesia is not an easy task. Although manytypologies have been identified and employed by scholars, in this article,Zulian’s category of three classifications of radical-conservative, moderate,and liberal-progressive1will beused as an entrypoint fordescribing thosecontestingandcontradictoryunderstandingsandorientations.Basedonthiscategorization–andconsideringhowtheterms‘radical’, ‘conservative’,and‘extreme’ are used – we present a conceptual discussion on terms andconceptscommonlyusedtodescriberadicalism.Thisisalsomeanttoavoidsemanticconfusionandensureclarityonhowthosetermsareemployed.The diversity of Islamic religious orientations in Indonesia has beenmanifested inmany important issues. Despite the fact that democracy hasbeenadoptedinIndonesianpolitical life,debatehasemergedoverformsofgovernment and the relations of Islam and the state. Radical-conservativegroups who aspire to the establishment of an Islamic State in Indonesiacondemndemocracyas‘infidel’andarguetheinevitabilityofadoptingIslamas thepolitical system.At the same time,moderate andprogressive-liberalgroupswhoembracemoremoderateviewsbelievethepoliticalsystemandformofgovernmentcurrentlypracticedinIndonesiahasprovensuitableforthe country and Muslims. Moreover, the position of Islam and Muslims inIndonesia – and worldwide – is a contested issue within the Muslimpopulation itself.Thesedissentingviewsspring fromthesharedviews thatMuslims lagWestern society but differ on the causes. Radical-conservative

1PradanaBoyZulian,FatwainIndonesia:AnAnalysisofDominantLegalIdeasandModeofThoughtofFatwa-makingAgenciesandTheirImplicationsinthePost-newOrderPeriod(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,2018).


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Muslim groups view Western imperialism as the root cause of Islam’sperceptionasbackwardandthusapproachtheWestastheenemy.Moderateand progressive-liberal Muslims, on the other hand, basically share thisopinion on the cause of Muslim backwardness. They do not, however,attributeittoWesternimperialismalone,butalsotoMuslims’attitudesandmentality. Interestingly, views on Western imperialism also correlate tobeliefsongovernment.Radical-conservativegroupsperceivetheIndonesianformofgovernmentasapartofWesternimperialism;thus,sincetheWestisthe enemy, government is also seen as an enemy. Fawaz A Gerges (2009)describes this situation very comprehensively, revealing that those whoperceivetheWestandtheirrespectivegovernmentasanenemylabelthemas‘farenemy’and‘nearenemy’respectively.Moreover,contestingandcontradictoryunderstandingandorientationscanalsobe found inhowIslamshouldbepracticedwithinthewidercontextofsociety.Theprocessofsociety’sIslamisationisanotableexample.Ingeneral,twomajororientationsarecompeting.Wewouldcallthesetwoorientationsformalist (followed by radical-conservative groups) and substantialist(adoptedbymoderateandprogressive-liberalwings).The formalistgroupspropose that Islamic lawbe adopted formally aswayof life forMuslims inIndonesia. In fact, the formalisation of Islamic teachings has been takingshape in the regional legislations of some provinces and regencies, awaveknownastheformalizationofSharia.Thesubstantialistgroups,ontheotherhand, believe that Islamic values have actually beenpart of Indonesian lifeandarepracticedby itscitizens,Muslimsandnon-Muslims.Oneexample istheIndonesianstatephilosophyofPancasila(literally,fivepillars).Pancasilawas a national consensus among the country’s founding fatherswhowerereligiouslydiverse.AsPancasilaisfullycompatiblewithIslamicteachings,itis seen as the crystallization of Islamic values and therefore there is nourgentneedforitsformalisationatanygovernancelevel.Islamic radicalism isactuallyoneamongmanyreligious trends in thepost-New Order period. In such a context, the association of radicalism withMuslim groups is inevitable since Islam constitutes Indonesia’s largestreligiousgroup.Thisreport’smainfocuswillthusberadicalMuslimgroupsorradicalismbasedonIslamandpracticedbyMuslims.Asbrieflymentionedearlier,oneofradicals’mostfundamentalrhetoricalorientationsisthattheyaretheenemyofinfidelgroups,whichareperceivedaspreventingtheformalimplementation of sharia law. In addition, the governments of modernpolities are also seen as enemies.However,Muslim radicals are basically athreatforallcitizensregardlessofreligioustraditions.Fromwhathasbeentaking place so far, it is very evident that radicalism has posed a seriousthreat for thewholeof society in Indonesia. Indeed,Muslims in general donotfeelsecurefromthethreatofradicalism,althoughtheyembracethesamereligion as those radicals. This situation is natural, since those radicals


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professareligiousdoctrinethatisdifferent,ifnotunique,andinmanycasesevencontradictorytothemainstreammajorityofIndonesianMuslims.ApartfromthespectrumofreligiousorientationsinIndonesia,rangingfromthosewho adopt liberal interpretations to those who embrace a more radicalreligious stance, themajority ofMuslims in Indonesia aremoderate in thesensethattheyfollowanon-extremeposition.Considering the huge impact of radicalism on society, the Indonesiangovernment has taken variety of actions to deal with radicalism, violentextremism, and terrorism. Some of these have proved to be effective. Butothergovernmentpolicieshaveignitedcontroversyacrossawiderspectrumofsociety.Amongthemostcontroversialistheviolentsuppressionofthosewhohavecommittedradicalactions.Inanattempttoidentifyanderadicateradical groups, government authorities have used armed security forces,includingboth thepolice and themilitary. For example, the security forceshave raided sites suspected of being a base where radicals formulate,arrange,andstrategizetheiractions.Inmanycases,thosepoliceactionsareoften seen as violations of basic human rights and do not respect theprincipleofpradugatakbersalah(presumptionofinnocence).Itisaprincipleof Indonesian law thatnobody is presumedguiltybefore the lawuntil it isproventhattheyhavecommittedaviolationorcrime.

MethodologyIn preparing this report, we used several methodological tools. First, ingatheringdata,weundertookfieldworkwhich includedobservation, formaland informal discussions, interviews, and media monitoring. Observationswereinitiallymadebyvisitingresearchsiteswhichsofarhaveshownradicaltendenciesandwherethetrendsareprojectedtoparallelthoseofthepastorshowevengreater tendency for the future.Observation includedvisits andinformalpersonalcommunicationwithradicalswhohavetransformedtheirviewfromextremenarrow-mindednessindealingwithreligiousdoctrinestomoreopenandprogressivevisionsofreligionandreligiosity.Interviews were conducted with prominent local leaders involved inradicalisation-preventioneffortsintheirrespectiveareas,orthosewhohavebecome sympathetic to radical ideologies due to intensive encounterswithradicals, or those who have shifted their views after being approached byradicals. Interviews with those respondents resulted in authentic andexclusive data as their information is based on daily experience of localleaders.Mediamonitoring anddocumentation are two stepswe took to ensure thevibrant dynamic of religiously-motivated radicalism in Indonesia can be


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followed inproportionalways.As in otherparts of the globe, themedia inIndonesiaareinfluencedbytheir ideologies. Insuchacase,mediacoverageof religiously-motivated radicalism has been fundamentally diverse.However, beyond their divergence and potentially contradictory analyses,thisreport focusedonlyondatapresented.Thisstepwas taken inorder toavoidanalyticalbiases.All data gathered was analysed using existing theoretical frameworks.However, theanalysisoffered in this report is solelyour responsibilityandunlessotherwisequoted,allanalysesandinterpretationsofdataaredrawnfromourinsights.

ConceptualisationsofRadicalisation:Radicalism,Extremism,andTerrorismLikeothercontroversialterms,radicalism,especiallyinitsrelationtoIslam,isahighlycontestedconcept.Itisfrequentlyconfusedwithotherlabelssuchas Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic revivalism, militant Islam, Islamist,Islamism,extremism,andeventerrorism.Unsurprisingly,radicalismcanalsohave diverse meanings such as extremism, revolutionary acts, and utopia.Similarly,associationswithdifferentcontextssuchastheLeft,liberalism,andsocialismarealsocommon. ‘Butsincethetermisrelative,anyfundamentalcriticismoforassaultonexistingpracticescanreasonablybetermedradical’.(SmelserandBaltes,2001:12723).In relation to fundamentalism, radicalism cannot be distinguished from italong a clear-cut line. Qiuntan Wiktorowicz defines fundamentalism as acombination of political and religious radicalism. It ‘constitutes a distinct,specific,modernsocialmovementandideologypromulgatingadherencetoastrict and intense interpretationof a scripture or holy text’. This definitionunderlines a radical element of fundamentalism. Moreover, Islamicfundamentalism is also a ‘political-religious movement which explicitlyrejects all forms of secularization andwhich aspires to social orderwhose“fundament” is Islamic law’. Similarly, radical Islam is also described as‘irrational zealots inspired by a warped interpretation of Islam thattransmogrifies edicts of peace into demands for violence’ (Wiktorowicz,2005:45).Consideringthisvariedunderstandingoftheterm,whatIrefertoasradicalIslamgroupsinthispaperarethosewhousereligiousreasonsforpolitical purposes, adhere to strict meanings of the scripture, and arepolitically assertive, utopian, and exclusive in thinking, aspiring to theformalisationofIslamiclawandthefoundingofanIslamicstate.Therefore, defining radicalism, especially in relation to its correspondingreligionand inaspecificcontext, isnotaneasy task. If religiousradicalismrefers toanyactsofviolence inspiredbyandorbasedonreligiousreasons


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andmotivations, it is not an exaggeration to state that radicalism exists inIndonesia. As stated earlier,Muslims are the largest religious group in thecountry,soit issociologicallyevidencedthatradicalismismostlyrelatedtoMuslims.Althoughotherreligiousgroupshavethesamepotentialtocommitradical acts, in the Indonesian context an association between religiousradicalismandIslamisunavoidable.However,ifnumbersmatter,radicalismis a narrow practice with huge impacts. Therefore, if a comparison of thetotal number of Muslims in Indonesia to those who are radicals is made,radicalism basically is an orientation adopted by a tiny minority ofIndonesian Muslims. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, a prominent Muslim scholar inIndonesia, strongly holds this view. He illustrates that those who followradical ideologyaredesperate individualswhodonothaveamorepositiveattitudetowardslife.2Among the many definitions of radicalism, it is important to present aformulation proposed by Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme(IndonesianNational Agency for the Eradication of Terrorism) as an entrypoint.Itdefinesradicalismas‘anattitudeaspiringfortotalandrevolutionarychangesbydrasticallyconfusingexistingvaluesthroughviolentandextremeactions'. Similarly, Turmudi and Sihbudi (2005: 1) identify that somereligiousgroupsarecalledradicalbecausecomparedto ‘normal’behaviour,theiractionsareconsideredharsh,rude,andviolent.Ingeneral,theiractionsarebasedonaperceivedincompatibilitybetweenpracticesandthereligiousdoctrinestheyembrace.Inspecificrelationtoreligion,ESivan(1990)viewsreligious radicalismas ‘amodeof thought andactions’. Furthermore, Sivanmaintainsthatoneofmotivationofsuchactionsbyradicalsistherejectionofculturesandvaluesperceivedasnon-indigenousorinauthentic(ibid.:1).Despitethenuancetheycarry,thesedefinitionsarebasicallyinagreementontwopivotalpoints.Firstly, religious radicalismemergesoutofnarrow-andeven close-mindedness on religious doctrines. The perception that someactions are inauthentic (in Sivan’s term) or incompatible (in Turmudi andSihbudi’s identification)as formsof incompatibilitywithreligiousdoctrinesareclear indicationofunwillingness toacceptpluralityofunderstandingofcertain doctrines of religion.While religious doctrines are divine in origin,theyarehumanin interpretationandunderstanding.McLaughlin(2012:9),who explores radicalism from a philosophical point of view, identifies theprimacyof thispoint: ‘radicalism isboundup, theoretically,withsimplistic,dogmatic,andreactionaryworldviews(religiousorideological)’.Secondly, an important feature of radicalism is that it is revolutionary andextreme or involves elements of revolution and extremism. Such an

2https://www.solopos.com/buya-syafii-penganut-radikalisme-adalah-kaum-putus-asa-yang-patut-dikasihani-895389,accessedon05/07/2020.


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association is not unique. McLaughlin (2012: 9) sees synonymity betweenradicalism and extremism. In his words, ‘radicalism and extremism areascribedtoothers…’Thismeansthatextremismisaninextricableelementofradicalism.Webelievethatextremismandviolencearetwouniquefeaturesofradicalismsettingitapart fromotherreligiousorientations. It ispossiblethat people subscribe to narrow- and close-mindedness in religiousorientations.Butas longas thisorientation isdeterredona cognitive leveland not manifested in the form of extremism and violence, it is notconsideredradicalism.Thelogicbehindtheseexplanationsisthatradicalismandviolentextremisminvolvenotonly ideology,butalsoactions.A.M.Hendropriyono, the formerHeadofNationalIntelligenceAgency(BadanIntelijenNegara)oftheRepublicof Indonesia, believes that radicalism and terrorism are actions based onvalue system and worldview. As an example, Hendropriyono (2009: 1)arguesthattheradicalsortheperpetratorsofterrormostlyseethemselvesas holy subjects and agencies, and as such also believe that the acts ofterrorism they have been committing are endeavours to uphold humanity.Likewise, Zuhairi Misrawi asserts that acts of terrorism cannot merely beassociated with the actors themselves. In his view, terrorism is closelyrelatedtotheologicalbeliefs.Thisconveysameaningthatalthoughactorsofterror and radicalism can be tackled (i.e. through imprisonment and orcapital punishment), the ideology of radicalism cannot easily be eradicated(Misrawi, 2009: vii). More specifically, Ansyaad Mbai, former head of theIndonesia National Agency of Terrorism Eradication (Badan NasionalPenanggulangan Terorisme), informs that terrorism in Indonesia isreligiouslymotivatedandcommittedbyfollowersofhard-lineIslamaspiringtothefoundingofanIslamicstatethroughviolentmeans(Mbai,2014:23).The Republic of Indonesia, via the Badan Nasional Pencegahan Terorisme(National Agency for Eradication of Terrorism, BNPT), describes terroristsand their activities as: a) a group of individuals committing violent acts tobreakthe lawinplannedandmeasuredways;b)actscommittedbygroupsorprofessionalsorbothagainst thestateor individuals inorder toachievethegoalofapoliticalandideologicalshiftinthenameofreligion;c)groupsthatintimidateindividuals,groups,orthestatetocreatefearandfeelingsofinsecurity;d)acts thatmotivateor intimidatepeople to leavetheir familiesand adopt terrorist organizations as their new families; e) individuals orgroups seeking to create fear and insecurity and promote radical ideas bypublishingandpubliclyacknowledgingtheviolentactstheycommit.3Basedon this description, BNPT further identifies terrorist targets as includingphysical infrastructure such as houses of worship, objects of pilgrimage,

3LembagaIlmuPengetahuanIndonesiaandBadanNasionalPencegahanTerorisme,ModulPencegahanTerorismediIndonesia(Jakarta:LIPIandBNPT,2018),12.


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shopping centres, government offices, foreign embassies, hotels, andpublicfacilitiessuchasstations,airports,orotherpublicareas.

CountryBackgroundFor a very long time, Indonesia has been known as a home for moderateIslam(Madjid,1994;Hefner,2011;Menchik,2016).Conceptually,moderateIslam is a contested term (Benkin, 2017; Zulian, 2007). However, anacademicdiscussiononthenatureofmoderateIslamthroughareviewofallscholarlydebateson thesubject isnotwithin thescopeof thisstudy.Here,moderate Islam is understood as a ‘middle path’ in understanding andpracticing Islam(Kamali,2015).Whilemiddlepathhasmanymeanings, itsmost important are adoption and practice of non-extreme religiousorientationsandtheprincipleofmoderation.Inoneway,moderationcanbeimplemented by combining two extremes. For example, beingmoderate inIslam refers to a balance between antiquity and modernity, betweenauthenticity and change – that is, not completely rejecting progress whileclinging steadfastly to the past. In otherwords,moderation requires open-mindednessandtolerance.In an Indonesian context, there are at least two manifestations of thismoderateness.First,Muslims’ socialacceptanceofpeopleofother religionsandfaiths.AlthoughIndonesiaisaMuslim-majoritycountry,otherfaithsarerecognisedbythestateasofficialreligionsandhavecoexistedharmoniouslyfordecades.The fact thatdifferent religious communities livepeacefully inIndonesia shows that in termsof religiousdiversity, the Indonesian case isveryinteresting.Second,IndonesianIslamislinkedtotheacceptanceoftheIndonesian state philosophyPancasila, which can be literally translated as‘five principles’.This acceptance is fundamental in explaining the nature ofharmony and tolerance in Indonesian religious life. As a state philosophy,Pancasilahas served as a commonplatform for the Indonesian people andhasplayed the roleof ‘social glue’ for Indonesia’s religiouslyandethnicallydiversesociety.However, moderateness and harmony are not the sole characteristics ofreligiouslifeinIndonesia.Asallfactsandrealitieshaveabinary-oppositionelement, this is also the case with the country’s religious life. Recentdevelopments, especially in the post-Suharto period, require specialattention. During the more than 30 years of Suharto’s rule (1966-1998),Indonesiawasunderanauthoritarianstyleofgovernance. In1998,studentdemonstrationswithwidespreadpublicsupporttoppledtheSuhartoregime.This paved the way for a more democratic and open Indonesia. Morespecifically,oneconsequenceofthisnewpoliticalphasehasbeentheliftingof political restrictions and greater political openness. Thus, as William


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Liddle (1996: 323) predicted, in a more open political climate, religiousgroups thatweresuppressedwillemerge into thepublicsphere.Combinedwith other factors, this has led to the appearance ofmore radical religiousgroupssuchasJemaahIslamiyah,AnshorutTauhid,andFrontPembelaIslam.The emergence of Islamic radical groups has challenged both Indonesia’simage as a home of tolerant Islam aswell as the peaceful and harmoniousrelationshipamongreligions.BombattacksonvarioussitesacrossIndonesia,including non-Muslim and Muslim places of worship, can be seen asindicators of the existence of Southeast Asian militant Islam networks inIndonesia. Although this radical orientation (which means adherence toideology of violence) is only a marginal manifestation among IndonesianMuslims in general, it has inevitably changed the image and landscape ofreligious life in the country. These attacks can also be seen as a pivotalmoment for the re-emergence of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. Aninteresting point related to these radical actions is that almost allperpetrators are connected. The Indonesian government has responded tothis challenge very dynamically. However, radicalism has not been fullyeradicated and active cells remain thatmay still pose a threat to religiousmoderatenessandtoleranceinIndonesiaatanytime.Hand-in-handwithreligiousradicalism,recentdevelopmentssuggesttheriseof Islamic populism in Indonesia, a phenomenon seen around the world(Hadiz, 2018; Rahmat, 2018). One indicator is the deeper involvement ofreligion inpoliticsand itsuseasan instrument forachievingpoliticalends.Based on this brief description of recent developments in Indonesianreligious life and political dynamics, Indonesia is currently facing someimportant challenges, namely: a) the growing trend towards Islamicconservatism; b) the latent threat of radicalism; and c) the penetration ofIslamicpopulismintobroadersociety.Thelatterisaffectingalmostallwalksof life, especially the political domain, including the public debate over therelationship between Islam and the state as well as the re-examination ofsecularism in an Indonesian context. These challenges underline theimportanceandsignificanceofunderstandingthedynamicsofradicalisationandsecularizationincontemporaryIndonesia.

Indonesia:AunificationofcomplexitiesIndonesia is officially known as Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (TheUnitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). As its name indicates, it isbasicallyaunificationofcomplexes: islands,regions,religions,cultures,andlanguages. Its total area is 1,916,862.20 square kilometres spanning theSabang, Aceh in the west to Merauke, Papua in the east. Indonesia is an‘archipelago state’ as it is composed of around 16,065 islands (IndonesianStatisticalAgency,2018:9-10)commonlygrouped into fivemajor islands–


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namely Java, Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua – and four mainarchipelagos – namely Riau, Bangka Belitung, Nusa Tenggara, andMaluku.Indonesia’s 34 provinces are spread over those main islands andarchipelagos: Java Island covers six provinces (DKI Jakarta, Banten, WestJava, Yogyakarta, Central Java and East Java); Sumatera Island and RiauArchipelago includes ten provinces (Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra,South Sumatera, Lampung, Bengkulu, Riau, Kepulauan Riau, and BangkaBelitung); Kalimantan, the largestmain island, covers five provinces (WestKalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan andNorth Kalimatan) as well as the eastern part of Malaysia and BruneiDarussalam; the Island of Sulawesi hosts the provinces of South Sulawesi,North Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, West Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, andGorontalo; theNusaTenggaraArchipelagoconsistsof threeprovinces(Bali,West Nusa Tenggara, and East Nusa Tenggara); Maluku covers twoprovinces, Maluku and North Maluku; and, Papua, includes two provinces,PapuaandWestPapua.Politically, Indonesia is one of the largest democracies in theworld today.Having experienced authoritarianism under Suharto, Indonesia hastransformed into a democratic country following the regime’s collapse in1998. With political restrictions lifted and legal reforms enacted, politicalpartiesmushroomed.Thefirstdemocraticelections,heldthefollowingyear,saw 48 parties participating, including some that are Islam-based. In the1999 elections, voters cast ballots for members of the lower and upperhouseswhothenvotedforpresident.Thesystemchanged,however,andin2004, Indonesia experimented with the first presidential election throughdirect popular vote. In addition to the president, governors, and otherexecutives, local leaders are also elected by direct ballot. This has createdanother layer of complexities in Indonesian society as legislativerepresentativesarealsoelectedthesameway.

ThegovernanceofreligiousdiversityReligionisoneimportantelementthataddstoIndonesia’ssocialandculturaldiversity.ArecentreportbyPEWResearchCenterreveals that Islamis thesecond largest religion in theworld, followedby some24.1per centof thetotalworldpopulation.Muslimcommunitiesarespreadacrossallcontinents:Africa,America,Asia,Australasia, andEurope (PewResearchCenter2017).Indonesiaishometoanestimated209millionMuslims,or12.7percentofallMuslimsworldwide.However, this doesnotmake Indonesia an exclusivelyIslamic state. While Islam is the religion with the largest following, otherfaiths also exist in the country. Christianity (both Protestantism andCatholicism), Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism are all officiallyrecognisedby thestate.According to IndonesianStatisticalAgencydata for


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2018, Indonesia’s population numbered 237 million with Muslimsrepresenting the largest religious group (87.18 per cent), followed byProtestants (6.9 per cent), Catholics (2.9 per cent),Hindus (1.69 per cent),Buddhists(0.72percent),andfollowersofConfucianism(0.05percent).Asamajorreligiousgroup,IslaminfluencesalmostallaspectsofIndonesians’wayoflife,fromculture,tradition,andsocialinteractiontopolitics.However,it should be noted that Islam in Indonesia is a non-monolithic entity. Twomajordenominationsof Islam,SunniandShia,arebothpresentandwithineachdenominationtherearealsogroupswithdifferentorientations.SunniistheIslamicdenominationfollowedbymostIndonesianMuslims,butitisnotasingleentityasitencompassesmanyreligioussubgroupsandorientations.The twomost importantSunnigroups in Indonesiaare themodernistsandtraditionalists. The former is associated chiefly with an Islamic movementcalledMuhammadiyah, founded in 1912,while the latter is representedbyNahdlatul Ulama’, popularly known by its acronym NU and established in1926. Both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’ are major moderateIslamic groups that shape dominant orientations of Indonesian Islam ingeneral.IntermsofschoolsofIslamiclaw,NahdlatulUlama’followsImamal-Shafii’s or Shafiite teachings, while Muhammadiyah does not rigidly andexclusivelydeclareitsaffiliationtoaspecificIslamicschool(mazhab).AsidefromthesetwomajorIslamicgroups,smallerMuslimgroupsalsoexistsuchas The Persatuan Islam (Unity of Islam) known as Persis and based inBandung; NahdlatulWathan (NW), which is based inMataram,West NusaTenggara,andMathlaulAnwar;andPersatuanTarbiyahIslamiyahIndonesia.ShiismandAhmadiyah,ontheotherhand,aretinyminorityMuslimgroupswithapresenceonlyinsomepartsofIndonesia.InadditiontotheseIslamicorganizations,itisalsoimportanttonoteMajelisUlama’Indonesia(IndonesianCouncilofUlama’).Asbriefly indicatedabove,Indonesian Muslim groups are subdivided into many groups andorganizations that can be broadly categorized as civil society groups. It isinteresting that these civil society groups are then united within a bodyfounded and sponsored by the state calledMajelisUlama’ Indonesia(MUI).Establishedin1976bytheNewOrderadministration,MUIwasintendedasaforumforallIslamicorganizationsinIndonesia.Sunnism’s two main trends – modernist and traditionalist – also meritfurtherexamination.TheemergenceofthesemovementsinIndonesianIslamcan be seen as stemming from its dialectical nature. The founding of bothMuhammadiyahandNahdlatulUlama’didnotoccurinavacuumfromsocio-politicalconditionsatthetimeofcolonization.AhmadDahlan,thefounderofMuhammadiyah, established the organization as a response to what washappening both globally and locally. At the global level, Ahmad Dahlan’sattempt was part of a reform movement taking place across the Muslim


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world.Leading reformers suchasMuhammadbinAbdulWahhab, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abduh were very influential in shapingDahlan’s mindset for Islamic reform in Indonesia. In other words,Muhammadiyahwasfoundedasanattempttodealwiththeintellectualandcultural backwardness of the Muslim world at the dawn of modernity.Likewise, at the local level, Muslim backwardnesswas also experienced inIndonesia–whichatthetimewasknownasNetherlandsEastIndies–intheframeworkofcolonialism,as Indonesiawasheavilydependenton itsDutchcolonialmasterforregulatingandobservingitssocial,political,andreligiousactivities.

State-religionrelationsGiven thecomplexity in thesphereof religion, identifying thenatureof therelationship between state and religion in Indonesia is fundamental. Sincethe beginning of the modern period of Indonesian history, the interplaybetween politics and religion has been pivotal in shaping the politicaldynamics and religious landscape. Theoretically, the relationship betweenpoliticsandreligionisnotmonolithic.DinSyamsuddin(1993:6)arguesthatthis relationship canbe identified in three categories: integral, secular, andsymbiotic.Thefirstviewbelievesthatstateandreligionareinseparable.Thesecond view argues that state and religion each have their own role anddomain,andthatbothareindependentandseparate.Thelatterviewarguesthat state and religionbasicallyoperate in theirowndomains, but that thedomainsofstateandreligionareinterconnected.Usingthiscategorisation,neithertheintegralnorthesecularviewisrelevantto the Indonesian case. Constitutionally, Indonesia does not have a statereligion,but it isnotasecularstateeitherandadoptsaconsensusbetweenthese twopositions throughaparadigmcalledNegaraPancasila.Thus, it isnotsolelygovernedonthebasisofreligiousprinciplesnor is it isasecularstatewhere the term ‘secular’hasananti-religiousconnotationrather thanthemeaningofseparationbetweenreligionandstate.Historically,inthepre-independence period, the discourse on the type of government thatIndonesiawouldadopttookplaceamongtherepublic’sfoundingfathers.Onthe one hand,Muslim leaders such asMuhammadNatsir, KaharMuzakkir,andWahid Hasyim aspired for Indonesia to be an Islamic state or a statebasedonIslamiclaw;nationalistleaderssuchasSukarnoviewedthesecularstateasasuitablemodelforIndonesia.AccordingtoMahfudMD,thetensionbetweenthesetwodiametrically-opposedpositionswasinevitable.However,itcouldonlyberesolvedbytakingamiddleground.Bothsidesagreedtoacompromise:Indonesiawouldnotbeareligion-basedstateasMuslimswerenottheonlyonesstrugglingforindependenceandIndonesiahasareligiouslydiversepopulation;however, Indonesiawouldnotbe a secular state either


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(Republika, 2019). As an alternative, the Pancasila state was the mostrationalmiddlepathadoptedbythesetwooppositeorientations.The late Munawir Sjadzali (1993), the long-serving Minister of ReligiousAffairs during Suharto’s administration (1983-1993), explained thatPancasilastateisnotreligion-basedstate.Hedescribedareligion-basedstateasdefinedbyseveraltraits,namely:a)astatethathasanofficialreligion;b)thesourceoflawisthescriptureoftherespectiveofficialreligion;and,c)thepowerofthestateisheldbyreligiousleaders.AllthreeconditionscannotbefoundinIndonesia.AlthoughIslamisthereligionwiththebiggestfollowinginthecountry,itisnotthestate’sofficialreligion.Intermsoflaw,Indonesiadoes not take any scripture as a source of its laws, although somemay beinspiredbythescriptureoftheseveralreligionsrecognisedinIndonesia.Andlastly,religiousleadersinIndonesiaarenottheholdersofstatepower.Atthesametime, it isnotasecularstateas inasecularstate,politicsoraffairsofthe state are totally separate from any religious affairs. Thus, while thegovernment is present in the citizen’s religious life, it is not too deeplyinvolvedinpersonalreligiousaffairs,butonlytotheextentneededtogovernandenhancethequalityofcitizens’religiouslife.

ThegovernanceofreligiousdiversityFrom the above description of the complexities of the Unitary State of theRepublic of Indonesia, it is obvious that Indonesia is indeed the result ofmulticultural consensus. For this reason, the government has set someregulations to govern religious diversity and almost all aspects of religiouslifeinthecountry.Religionisthatimportantanelement.This section describes some of the practices set by the Indonesiangovernment to govern this dynamic. Diversity of religion is not unique toIndonesia; the country’s status as a neither a religion-based nor a secularstate, however, is unique. Despite this constitutional formulation, thegovernment regulates religious diversity and life in the country as, in theIndonesiancontext,beinganon-religion-basedcountryreferstothefactthatIndonesia is not governed according to certain religious principlesexclusively.At the same time, it ismandatory for all Indonesian citizens toprofessareligionof theirpreference. Inthiscontext, theterm ‘secular’alsocomeswith its specificmeaning: it doesnot signify separationof state andreligionorautonomyofreligionfrompoliticsandstate;rather,itindicatesadetachedbutdefinitepresenceofreligioninthecountry’sgeneralaffairs.This last statement may raise a question: how do people know thatsomebody is atheist or religious? As religious preference or orientation issomething very private, how does it come to the state’s attention? The


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answeristhatreligiousidentityispubliclydeclaredbecauseitisrecordedonthenationalidentitycard,orKartuTandaPenduduk(KTP).Acitizenmaybedeniedanationalidentitycardifheorshedoesnotexplicitlystatehisorherreligiousaffiliation.Referring back to Indonesian identity as Negara Pancasila, it is clear thatPancasila is a crystallization of the religious identity of the Indonesianpeople.The firstprincipleof thisstatephilosophy is ‘KetuhananYangMahaEsa’,whichcangenerallybetranslatedastheunityofGodhead.Thisserves,first and foremost, as the Indonesian national principle regarding religiousdiversity. The phrase ‘unity of Godhead’ at the same time signifies theprimacy of professing a religion – an obligation to embrace one of thecountry’ssixofficialreligionsaswellasaguaranteethatthegovernmentwillprotect the citizen’s religious preference given that it complies with thestate’sprinciple.In addition to outlining the state philosophy in governing its affairs, theConstitutionalsostipulateshowreligionoperateswithinIndonesiansociety.ThisisstatedinArticle29,paragraph2:‘Thestateguaranteesthefreedomofits citizens to profess religion of their preference and to perform ritualsbasedon their religionsandbeliefs’. It isobvious from thisArticle that theState of Indonesia grants freedom to embrace any religion and that theexerciseoftherespectivereligion’sritualswillbeprotectedbythestate.Asan implementation of this principle, houses of worship of all religions arebuilt inIndonesia.However,aspeopleofdifferentfaiths livesidebysideinthe community, the building of houses of worship often creates strainsamong them.A2006decree, signed jointlyby theMinisterofHomeAffairsand the Minister of Religious Affairs, sought to prevent such horizontaltension.AnotherimportantelementofgovernanceofreligiousdiversityinIndonesiawastheestablishmentoftheMinistryofReligiousAffairs.Inmanycountries,itmayseempeculiarthatreligiousaffairsareregulatedbythegovernment,as many people might also believe that religious activities are a privatedomainofhuman life.As themajority isMuslim, thisMinistrydealsmostlywith administering Muslims’ religious life. However, proportional sectionsforallotherreligionswerealsocreated.ThegovernanceofdiversityofreligioninIndonesiacanalsobeseenfromthedesignation of public holidays, which include religious observances. ForMuslims, the days of the feasts of Idul Fithri and IdulAdha are consideredpublicholidays.ThesameisalsothecaseforChristians,whoenjoyaholidayfortheirsacreddayofGoodFridayandthecelebrationofChristmasDay.TheIndonesian government also shows respect to Hindus, Buddhists, and the


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followers of Confucianism by recognising their holy days as a nationalholidayforallIndonesiancitizens.From a normative point of view, the governance of religious diversity inIndonesiahasbeenwell reflected in theConstitutionand formal regulationissued by the state. The question of how these normative rules areimplementedisoutsidethisnarrative’sscope.

DriversofReligiously-InspiredRadicalisationandAssessmentIndonesiahasbeenwidely recognizedasaMuslim-majority country that isrelatively moderate, inclusive, and tolerant compared to other Muslimcountriesmainly in theMiddle East (Madjid, 1994;Hefner, 2011;Menchik,2016). Some argue that Indonesia, as the country with theworld’s largestMuslimpopulation,hasbeenabletoperpetuatethenotionandpracticeofthenational principle of ‘unity in diversity’ (Steenbrink, 1998; Ramage, 2002;Intan,2006).TherealityofIndonesia’smulticulturalismhasbeentakenintoaccountbythoserecognizingitastheMuslimcountrythattendstoabandonany kind of devastated religious conflict and terror (Abdullah, 2003;Suparlan,2003;Wahid,2009;Mas'udi,2010).However, inthepost-Suhartoera,differentrealitiesofthesurgeofviolentreligiousradicalisationareoftendepicted. Although in terms of number, cases of terrorism have beengradually declining in the period of the second decade of reformation, thecases of religious intolerance have remained steady in the same period.Consequently,thefuturetrendofradicalismstillneedstobeconsideredveryseriously.

RadicalismAsstatedearlier,thefalloftheauthoritarianSuhartoregimein1998pavedthe way for the re-emergence of religious groups that had been longsupressedbytheregime.Amongtheinevitableconsequencesofthiseasingofthe repression is a rise in religious conflicts generated by politicalcontestation,forinstancesomeoftheturmoilinAmbon,SulawesiandPoso,Maluku(Schulze,2002;Sukma,2005;VanKlinken,2007;Schulze,2017). In2002,aspartoftheglobalimpactoftheSeptember11,2001,attackintheUS,IndonesiaexperiencedtheBalibombing(RamakrishnaandTan,2003;Singh,2004;Magouirketal.,2008;West,2008;Galamas,2015;Zora,2015)thatleft202dead;responsibilityfortheblastwasclaimedbyJamaahIslamiyah(JI),theal-QaedabranchinSoutheastAsia.Thiswasfollowedbyothermajoractsof terrorism: in 2003, a JI cell exploded a bomb at J. W. Marriot Hotel inJakarta,leaving11deadand152severelyinjured(Oak,2010);in2004,fivepeople were killed and hundreds seriously injured by a bomb in theAustralianEmbassyinJakarta(Subhan,2016);ayearlater,anotherbombing


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destroyedKuta,Bali,killing22andinjuringmorethan100(ibid.).Thelatterwas the most traumatic and significantly shook the country’s nationalsecurity.Terrorism experts believe that all these attacks were committed by JInetworks.Indonesiawasnotstruckbyotherattacksuntil2009,whenbombswent off at the J. W. Marriot Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Jakarta(Sukmaetal.,2011;Subhan,2016),leavingsevendeadandinjuring50.Thedestruction and trauma marked this as the darkest period for Indonesia,placingitunderthethreatofterrorinthefirstdecadeafterreformation.Intheseconddecadeofthepost-authoritarianera(2010-2017),thenumberof terrorist incidents motivated by extremist religious ideology decreaseddramaticallydespiteseveralsmallerattacksattributedtotheglobalactivityof the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Southeast Asian ISIS branchessuchas JamaahAnsharal-Daulah(JAD)and JamaahAnsharal-Tauhid(JAT)have claimed responsibility for attacks during this period. On January 14,2016, for example, an ISIS network launched an attack in Thamrin Street,Jakarta, that killed eight people (Fenton and Price, 2016; Suratman, 2017;Sundokoetal.,2018).OthersmallerattackstookplaceinSurabaya(June8),Surakarta (July 5), Medan (August 28), and Samarinda (November 13)(Subhan, 2016). There were no fatalities from these incidents. In 2018,however, three churches in Surabayawere targetedby terrorist attacks onMay13,May16,andJune3;11peoplewerekilledand50injuredinthefirst(Irawan,2018).In2019,therewasoneincidentinSukoharjo,onJune3(TheJakartaPost,2019).Therewerenovictimsinthislatestattack.However, there is another critical issue influenced by the phenomenon ofISIS.TheIndonesianPoliceheadquarters(MabesPOLRI)inJakartareleasedan official document listing Indonesian terrorist leaders and otherinternationalactors(POLRI,2017).Atthesametime,MabesPOLRI,throughtheheadofitspublicrelationsdivision,GeneralSetyoWasisto,informsthatthereare671 Indonesianswhohaveparticipated in terroracts in IraqandSyria (Movanita, 2017). The latest data from the head of the presidentialoffice,Moeldoko, list590Indonesian fighters inSyria; thisdoesnot include103 dead, 86 returned to Indonesia, and 539 being deported to Indonesia(Kumparan,2018).Inaddition,57IndonesianradicalIslamistshavegonetothe Philippines; 5 are known to be alive, 32 have been killed, and 7 weredeported(ibid.).

ReligiousintoleranceReligious intolerancereferstoany intolerantactsconductedinthenameofreligion. It may be considered a kind of manifestation of violent religious


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radicalisation because it involves violence. Intolerance deals with theinstances of ‘sweeping raids on places considered contrary to sharia law,attacksonhousesofworshipofotherfaiths,demonstrationsagainstgroupsperceivedastarnishingthesanctityofIslam,andbeingactiveingroupsthatexplicitlyworktoimposesharialaw’(TheWahidFoundation,2017:10).For an extensive period, there had not been a serious problem with theexistence of Shiism in Indonesia. However, in 2005, a fatwawas issued byIndonesianCouncilofUlama’denouncingShiismasadeviantMuslimgroup.Thisfatwaisanimportantfactorinfuellinghatredandsocialdiscriminationtowards Shiis in Indonesia. Other Muslim minority groups also exist.AhmadiyahandLembagaDakwahIslamIndonesia(LDII)areknownfortheir‘unique’ understanding and practice of Islam, which to a certain extent,marginalizes them. Globally, Ahmadiyah split into two groups, the LahoreandQadian.BotharepresentinIndonesia.TheformerisknowninIndonesiaasGerakanAhmadiyahIndonesia(GAI),whilethelatterispopularlyknownas Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI). As with the Shiis, Ahmadis alsoexperiencesocialdiscriminationandexclusionduetotheirbeliefs.Thefatwaon theirdeviance,also issued in2005by IndonesianCouncilofUlama’,hasfurthermarginalizedthesegroups.Before2008, the numberof cases of religious intolerance in Indonesiahadbeenrelativelystable,neversurpassing50;from2008to2010,theirnumberfluctuatedfrom55to93(TheWahidInstitute,2008;2009;2010).Theactorsof intolerance were the state apparatus, Islamist organisations, Muslimhardliners, and others. The victims of intolerancewere primarily religiousminority groups such as Ahmadiyya, Shia, Christian, and local-indigenousbelievers. In 2011, the number of cases doubled to 185, falling to 110 in2012, then doubling again to 245 in 2013; this number has since steadilyrisen, with 158, 190, 204, and 213 cases in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017,respectively(TheWahidInstitute,2013;2014;2015;2016;2017).In 2018, the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat PengkajianIslam dan Masyarakat), the State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta, andConvey Indonesia conducted research on the issue of intolerance and itsrelationshiptothediscourseofjihadandterrorism.Thestudyinvolved1,859students and university students and 322 teachers and lecturers in 34provincesand68citiesinIndonesia(PPIMandConvey,2018);86percentofstudentsanduniversitystudentsand87.89percentofteachersandlecturersagreethat thegovernmentshouldbanminorityreligiousgroupsaccusedofdeviatingfromIslamicteaching.Amongallrespondents,91.23percentagreethatsharialawshouldbeimposedatthestatelevel;37.71percentagreethatjihadmeans‘qital’orwagingwaragainstnon-Muslims;37.71percentagreethat suicide bombings carry ameaning of the Islamic jihad; and, 61.92per


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cent understand that the caliphate system is the recognised Islamic polity(ibid.).Despitethegradualdeclineinthenumberofterroristincidentsintheseconddecadeafterreformation,thesteadyriseinthenumberofcasesofreligiousintolerance suggests that the level of violent religious radicalisation inIndonesiahasremainedhighandmayleadtonegative impactsonthestateandsociety.In 2016, groups of Islamists from across Indonesian regions travelled toJakarta to protest against the then-Jakarta Governor, Basuki ThajajaPurnama, who was accused of alleged blasphemy. This accusation wasrelated to one of Purnama’s speeches in which he urged the public not tobelieve those who use the Quranic verses for political purposes. WhilePurnama said that thiswas notmeant to disrespect the scripture of Islam,this statement was, nonetheless, perceived differently by some Muslimgroups.Charges filed against Purnama resulted in his imprisonment for two yearsand also the loss of the gubernatorial election to another candidate, AniesBasweden,whowaspromotedby Islamist groups.AlthoughmanybelievedthatthepoliticizationofIslamwouldendwithBaswedan’svictory,thiscasesuggeststhereverse.ThevictoryisevenusedbyIslamistsasaprecedentforintroducing a deeper influence and role of Islamic doctrines into politicalpractices.Obviously,thisextendedtothepresidentialelectionofApril2019.The fact that therewere only two presidential candidates brought sharperpolarizationofreligiousandnon-religiousgroupsorthepiousandnon-piousMuslimgroups,deepening Islam’spoliticization incontemporary Indonesia.Moreover,thedebateoverIslamandsecularismhasreignited.

FuturetrendsofradicalismSince acts of terrorism and radicalism are closely related to ideology andworldviews, theycannotdevelop ina timewhere ideologiesofreligionandreligiousexpressionsareconfined to thoseapprovedbystate, although thepotential of being radical remained latent. In this context, therefore, theescalationofreligiousradicalisminIndonesiahassignificantlyariseninthepost-New Order period with the lifting in 1998 of Suharto-era politicalrestrictions. This opened the way for diverse expressions of Islam in thecountry, includingmorescripturalistic,conservative,andradicalversionsofreligiousexpressionsandmanifestations.Sincethenradicalismhasemergedas a major threat for Indonesia’s governance. Although some groups andindividualsidentifiedasradicalhavebeencaptured,thethreatofradicalismhas not been fully tackled. Ansyaad Mbai (2014) notes that five major


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terrorist attacks since2002wereall associatedwith Jamaah Islamiyah: theBali bombing in 2002, the bomb at J.W.MarriotHotel Jakarta in 2003, theAustralian Embassy bombing in 2004, a secondBali bombing in 2005, andthe J.W.Marriot andRitz-Carlton blasts in 2009. The same groupwas alsolinkedtoseveralminorattacksonhousesofworshipandsomegovernments'vitalobjects(ibid.:7).MbaialsoanalysesshiftsthathavetakenplaceinthenatureoftheradicalismmovementinIndonesiaovertime.Firstly,intermsoftargets,radicalgroupshaveswitched focus fromglobaland foreignsubjects to localanddomesticsubjects(ibid.:20-21).FawazAGerges(2009)notesasimilarreorientationofIndonesianradicalsfrom‘farenemy’(al-aduwwual-baid)to ‘nearenemy’(al-aduwwu al-qarib). The former refers to foreign subjects seen asthreateningIslam,suchasWesternpoliticalactorsshowinghostilitytoIslam,while ‘near enemy’ identifies domestic subjects (including government andits agencies) perceived as posing a threat to Islam,whether in the form ofsupport to those foreign agencies or by holding views contrary to theradicals’ beliefs. Secondly, since 2010 acts of terrorism have beenperpetrated by small jihadi cells (Mbai, 2014: 9). This shift is in line withstrategiesterroristgroupsadoptinresponsetointensivecampaignsbystateagencies aimed at eradicating radicalism. The involvement of formerparticipantsinattacksinpoliceeffortshasforcedactivecellstoreorganise.Mbaifurthermorewarnsthatthepurposeandformsofnetworkcellsarealsochanging very dynamically, giving cells the flexibility to unite and splitaccording to the pressure applied by security forces (2014: 23). From thispoint, Mbai concludes that understanding the shifting nature of terrorismcells is pivotal for gaining more comprehensive insight into the nature ofradicalism,includingpossibletrendsthatcouldhelppreventfutureattacks.Here it is worth examining data that could help project how radicalismtrendsinIndonesiamayunfold.AsurveybyLazuardiBirurevealsthat3outof 33provinces in Indonesia are themost vulnerable for radicalism.Theseare:Acheh,withhighestvulnerabilityindexat56.8percent,followedbyEastJava and Banten, both indexed at 46.6 per cent.4The BNPT also releasedfigures on the number of Indonesians who joined ISIS. There are 515IndonesiancitizensinvolvedinISIS,ofwhom106peoplehavebeendeportedto Indonesia. These figures show that radicalism’s potential threat toIndonesia isquitehigh.This conclusion is supportedbya recent surveybyPusat Pengkajian Islam danMasyarakat (PPIM, Center for the Research ofIslamandSociety)ofSyarifHidayatullahStateIslamicUniversityinJakarta.

4 http://www.suarapembaruan.com/home/survei-ri-masih-rawan-aksi-radikalisme-dan-terorisme/12056


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According to the survey, 51.1 per cent of Muslim student respondentsshowedintolerancetowardsthefollowersofminorityMuslimgroupssuchasAhmadiyahandShia,while34.4percentofthisgroupalsoshowedintolerantattitudestowardspeopleofotherreligions.Thissurveyuncoversimportantfindings regarding jihad. Among respondents who are teachers anduniversitylecturers,82.30percentbelievethatthetruemeaningof jihad isfightingagainstnon-Muslims;thisviewissharedby62.29percentofstudentrespondents.However,93.17percentoflecturersandteachersinthesurvey,and76.65percentofstudentrespondentsdonotagreewiththenotionthatbombingsorsuicidebombingsinthenameofreligionarethetruemeaningofjihad.Althoughfromthisfigure,itcanbeseenthatthepercentageofthosewhobelieve in jihad as a doctrine and tool to behostile tonon-Muslims islower than thosewho believe that bombing is not relatedwith doctrine ofreligion,thisfigureisalarmingforthefuturetrendofradicalisminIndonesia.

StateandNon-stateApproachestoReligiously-InspiredRadicalisation

GovernmentpoliciesincounteringterrorismThe Indonesian Government has paid very serious attention to radicalism,whichhasshowedanincreasingtendencyovertime.However,itseffortstoeradicate radicalism have varied in their effectiveness. Under Megawati’spresidency(2001-2004),thegovernmentissuedatwodecrees,orPeraturanPemerintahPenggantiUndang-undang,knownasPerpuNumber1andPerpuNumber 2, in response to the Bali bombing in 2002. Thiswas passed intolegislationthefollowingyearasLaw(Undang-undang)Number15Year2003and serves as the basis for Indonesian security authorities to deal withradicalismandterrorism(Purwawidada,2014:23).Subsequently,actionstopreventthespreadofradicalideaswerealsotaken.Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, for example,many specialunits dealing with terrorism were formed, from both police and militaryunits.Thiscounterterrorismpolicy ismanifested in the formationofBadanNasionalPenanggulanganTerorisme (NationalAgency for theEradicationofTerrorism). Ansyaad Mbai, an important government counterterrorismanalyst,citestheYudhoyono’sgovernmentapproachtoeradicatingterrorismas harder than approaches employed in previous periods. This policycomprises four derivative strategies: a) ‘making the war on terror asIndonesia’s own’; b) ‘enlisting former terrorists in the anti-terrorismcampaign’; c) ‘letting the elite police force rather than military leadcounterterrorismoperation’; andd) trial of the terrorists has tobe carriedjudiciouslyandtransparently(Mbai,2014:138).


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ExpansionofcivilsocietyapproachbygovernmentThedevelopmentandapplicationofpoliciestowardsradicalismcontinuesinJokoWidodo’sera.TherearetwoimportantpoliciesthatemergedinthefirsttermofJokoWidodo’spresidency;thesecanbeclassedassecurityandnon-security approaches. The security approach is characterized by revitalizinganeliteunitwithin the Indonesianmilitary forcesnamedKomandoOperasiKhusus Gabungan (Combined Command for Special Operation). This unitcombines special forces for terrorismwithin Army (Detasemen Khusus 81Kopassus), Navy (Detasemen Jalamangkara), and Air Force (Satuan Bravo90). This joint special force was formed on June 9, 2015 by GeneralMoeldoko. However, it was deactivated not long after its formation due totechnicalreasons,forinstancetheexistencewithinthepoliceforceandarmyofspecialanti-terrorismunits.However,duetotherisingtrendofterrorismattacks,andhighpotentialofradicalismamongyouth,in2018thisjointforcewasreactivatedbuthasonly90members.5As radicalism involves ideology, a non-security approachwas takenduringJoko Widodo’s first term. This approach mainstreamed moderate Islam(wasathiyat al-Islam) and established the Badan Pembinaan IdeologiPancasila (Center for the Strengthening of Pancasila Ideology). Theprogramme resulted fromHighLevelConsultationofWorldMuslimScholarsonWastiyyatIslamanditsmainmessageistobringbackIslamasareligionof peace and as a religion of civilization based on teachings of love andpassion,harmony,unity,equality,freedom,andpeaceamongfellowMuslimsand human beings. The High Level Consultation also launched BogorMessages which consists of four points, namely: a) reactivation of themoderate Islam paradigm; b) upholding the moderate Islam paradigm asvalues of life at both the individual and communal levels; c) strengtheningendeavourstoprovetoaglobalaudiencethatmoderationisabasicvalueofIslaminallwalksof life;andd) invitingMuslimcountriesandcommunitiestopromotemoderateIslamparadigmglobally(NUOnline,2018).TheestablishmentofBadanPembinaanIdeologiPancasila,ontheotherhand,isaimedmoreat local levelsandcontexts.Pancasila is thestatephilosophyfor Indonesians and consists of the five principles of Godness, Humanity,Unity,ConsultationorRepresentation,andSocialJustice.AdoptingPancasilaas their sole ideology is compulsory for Indonesians. The establishment oftheCentreisaimedatrevitalizingPancasilaaswayoflifeforallIndonesiansto counter the Islamist campaign for its abolishment on the basis thatPancasila is a human creation and thus does not represent Islamic values.ModerateMuslim leaders, however, believe that Pancasila is distilled from

5 https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180514202206-20-298176/lima-pasukan-elite-anti-teror-di-indonesia


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religiousvalues.DinSyamsuddinonceanIndonesianPresidentialEnvoyforDialogueofReligionandandCooperationamongCivilizations, forexample,maintains that Pancasila is compatible with the basic values of Islam andevenofallreligions.6InthemidstofendeavourstorevitalizePancasilaasastatephilosophy,someIslamist groups, championed by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, conducted awidespread campaign to reject it.7In this context, while the meaning ofradicalism may still be similar to previous administrations, it has beenextended to organizations or religious groups seen as having potential tobecomeradical.Therefore,HizbutTahrir’soppositiontoPancasilaasastatephilosophy has resulted inHTI’s labelling as radical and culminated in thedissolutionofHizbutTahrirIndonesia.Althoughwidelycriticised,thiswasaclear indicationhowanti-radicalpolicywasupheld inadministration’s firstterm.Inhissecondtermaspresident,JokoWidodofocusedevenmoreintenselyontheissueofradicalism:‘Theremustbeseriousattemptstopreventthewidespreadofradicalism’,thepresidentaffirmed.8AccordingtotheCoordinatingMinister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, radicalismshould not be associated with certain groups, such as Islamic groups.9Furthermore, he advised that association of radicalism with a specificreligion shouldbe avoided.Hedefines radicalismas ‘an ideologywilling toreplacethestate’sideologybymeansresistingrulesoflaw,infiltratingyounggenerations’thought’.Regardlessofreligion,anyonecommittingsuchactsiscalled‘radical’.As the national agency responsible for eradicating radicalism, the BNPToutlines two strategies for dealing with radicalism, namely, counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation. The former refers to the instilling ofIndonesian values and non-violent practices. The object of counter-radicalisationisthegeneralpublicwhohavenotbeeninvolvedinradicalorterrorist activity. This strategy is implemented through education, bothformal and informal. Furthermore, counter-radicalisation is carried out byinviting the involvement of local leaders, religious leaders, educationpractitioners, and cultural agencies. Deradicalisation, on the other hand, isdirectedatthoseengagedinradicalandterroristactivity. Itsmainaimsare

6 https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/85788/12/din-syamsuddin-pancasila-sudah-final-jangan-diutak-atik-lagi-15934972147 https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2018/05/07/337/1895377/hti-terbukti-rancang-uud-khilafah-islamiyah-dan-melenceng-dari-pancasila8 https://www.suara.com/news/2019/10/31/151739/jokowi-harus-ada-upaya-serius-untuk-mencegah-paham-radikalisme9 https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20191031200409-20-444673/mahfud-md-sebut-radikalisme-tak-identik-dengan-agama-tertentu


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topersuadethosewhoareinvolvedinradicalactivitytoavoidviolenceandterrorforachievingtheirgoals.Inaddition,thisapproachisalsodirectedatpromotingmoderationofreligiousdoctrinesamongradicals(BNPT,2018.:2-3).However,thegovernment’sinitiativetoeradicateradicalismhaspromptedaseverebacklashfromreligiousgroups,especiallyIslamic.Theeffectivenessofthis policy, nevertheless, is questionable. Amidst all kinds of rules andpolicies taken by the Indonesian government to eradicate radicalism,terroristattackshavefrequentlytakenplace.

Civilsociety-ledapproachestocounteringreligiouslyinspiredradicalisationThe government is aware that eradicating radicalism in an Indonesiancontext also requires the involvement of civil society groups. The mostnotable among Indonesian Islamic civil societies are Muhammadiyah andNahdhatulUlama’(NU).10TheformeriswidelyknownasamodernistIslamicmovementwithanationalnetworkacross thearchipelago.Muhammadiyahoperateswithin therealmofsocialwelfare,providinghealthandeducationfacilities for public. NU, on the other hand, is identified as a traditionalIslamic movement and is also involved in education, mostly in traditionalreligious education through its nationwide network ofpesantren (boardingschools). Although Muhammadiyah and NU operate within different socialbases,theyareunitedbymoderatereligiousorientation.Inthiscontext,bothareregardedasmainpillarsofmoderateIslaminIndonesia.FromMuhammadiyah’s perspective, deradicalisation is an urgent action tobetaken.However,thegroupobjectstotheuseoftheterm‘de-radicalisation’as itpotentiallyhasadehumanizationconnotation for targeted individuals.As an alternative,Muhammadiyah propose the term ‘moderation’,which ismorepositiveandconjuresan imagethathumanizes former ‘radicals’. Thegeneral secretary of theMuhammadiyahCentralBoard,AbdulMu’ti, statedthat bymoderation the groupmeans inviting people tomoderateness.: ‘Inprinciple, those who have been radical can be transformed into betterindividual by adopting tolerant views without losing their identities’.Furthermore, Mu’ti confirmed that Muhammadiyah is open to any socialgroups willing to engage with it as Muhammadiyah is convinced thatmoderation is not a theory, but a practice. As an example, Mu’ti citedinterreligious tolerance, stating it is not a theory, but canonlybe achievedthroughcohabitation.Radicalism,inMu’ti’sview,isnotmerelyatheologicalproblem,butalsocausedbysocialandeconomicdisparities.Inthiscontext,

10 https://www.tempo.co/abc/1677/nu-dan-muhammadiyah-dan-program-deradikalisasi-di-indonesia


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Muhammadiyah believes that a social approach should be seriouslyconsidered. In a more practical way, building awareness of otherness andintimacyaretwoelementsthatshouldbetakenintodailylife.Peoplelearntolivebysideandacceptingdifferencesthroughhabitationandproximity.11Muhammadiyah general chairperson, Haedar Nashir confirmed Mu’ti’sposition.HearguedthatIndonesiaisamoderatenationcomprisedofdiverseethnic and religious groups. Indonesia has been successful in buildingcommon ground for those diversities through its state philosophy ofPancasila, which he sees as a meeting point for any ideologies andorientations;12‘thisfundamentalcapitalshouldbetransformedintoforcetobuild a moderate Indonesia, through moderate ways’. In such a context,Haedar also believes that in dealing with radicalism, moderate ways areinevitable.13Nahdlatul Ulama’, on the other hand, believes that although it has animportant role in deradicalisation, its involvement in such a governmentprogramme has not been adequate. Imdadun Rahmat, a prominentresearcherandactivistofNahdlatulUlama’,arguesthatthegovernmenthasnot fullyengagedNU.14Inapractical context,NUhas launchedacampaignon moderateness through online discussions. Its website “nu-online” hasbeenveryactiveinpromotingmoderateandtolerantorientationsofIslam.15This activity is seen as promising in terms of its effectiveness amongIndonesian Muslim youth who are very active users of the internet.According to Kompas records, in 2015 the NU website was visited by 1.6million users – a 19 per cent rise over 2014. In 2015, the website wasaccessedasmanyas6.9milliontimes,orabout800visitsdaily.16

CrisisCaseStudy:TheLimitsofDeradicalisationDeradicalisation is a difficult task. Its difficulty does not only relate to thecomplexityofdealingwithradicals,butalso theconceptual level.Manyseederadicalisation as a pejorative term, and that rather than denouncingradicalism, it basically has the potential to invite the response of radicals.Therefore, it is not only criticized by certain Islamic organizations such as

11 https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/416004/millennials/muhammadiyah-kunci-redam-radikalisme-ada-di-pendekatan-sosial12 https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/haedar-nashir-moderasi-beragama-bukan-deradikalisasi/5203018.html13 https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/haedar-nashir-moderasi-beragama-bukan-deradikalisasi/5203018.html14 https://www.tempo.co/abc/1677/nu-dan-muhammadiyah-dan-program-deradikalisasi-di-indonesia15https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/65279/NU-Online-dan-Deradikalisasi16https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/65279/NU-Online-dan-Deradikalisasi


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Muhammadiyah,butitalsopromptsamoresystematicbacklashfromradicalgroups.Itshouldalsobenotedthatthespecialcounterterrorismforcewithinthepoliceengagesinviolentcombatwithradicalgroups,andwhileitmaybeeffective, violent deradicalisation imposed by state has only a temporaryeffectanddoesnotdealwiththerootcauseofradicalisation.As a case study example, we focus here on the perpetrators of the Balibombingin2002,whoweresentencedtodeathin2009.Atthattime,capitalpunishmentwasbelievedbymanyscholars, including theauthors, tobeaneffectivemeans for curbing radicalism among youth. At that point of time,oneoftheauthorsraisedaspeculativequestion:aftertheexecutionofthreeBalibombers (Amrozi,Mukhlas,and ImamSamudera),how is the futureofradicalism and terrorism in the birthplace of those radicals alike?Will theexecution be taken as lesson learned by Muslim youth to turn away fromradicalismandterrorism?Orcouldtheexecutionhavethereverseeffectandstrengthen the younger generation's aspiration to be radical like the threebombers?On this set of questions, I proposed my hypothesis: I believe that theexecution was an effective event to ease the radicalism tension andaspirationamongMuslimyouth in the region.However,myhypothesishasproved to be false and ineffective. Rather than eradicating or slowing thepace of the radicalismmovement, the reverse has taken place. Amrozi andMukhlaswerepraisedasmartyrs.AMuslimyouthactivist fromLamongan,Nu’man Suhadi, informed that people in Lamongan and surrouding areaswere impressed by the so-called martyrdom of Amrozi and Mukhlas,overlooking that their terrorist acts had resulted in hundreds of casualtiesandwasactuallyinhumaneinnature.SuhadialsosharedastorywithmethattheburialprocessoftheLamongan-bornradicals(AmroziandMukhlas)wasfollowed by takbir. The burial became a celebration of their boldness infightingtheWestandanIndonesiangovernmentseenastaghut.17Several elder religious leaders share the sameviews.MohammadThohir, alocal leader of a prominent Islamic organization, believes that Amrozi andMukhlasaremartyrs.Heextollstheirreligiousheroisminawaythattomeringslikeafalseconsciousness.Thohirclearlysaid:‘SebagaiseorangMuslim,rugi jika tidak mengikuti prosesi penguburan Amrozi. Dia benar-benarmujahid.(AsaMuslim,formeisabiglostifImissedtheprocessofAmrozi’sand Mukhlas’s burial. They are really shahid)’.18I was thus not surprisedwhenanotherleaderinLamonganinformedmeregretfullythatthethreatofradicalism in the region in the future is more visible. ‘The execution has

17InterviewwithNu’manSuhadi,inLamongan,December20,2019.18ConversationwithMuhammadThohir,inLamongan,EastJava,December21,2019.


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strengthenedtheaspirationofyoungMuslimgenerationtobemoreradical’,hesaid,sharinghisanxiety.19Asforme,itisnotdifficulttoestablishconnectionbetweentheexecutionandtheriseof radicalism in theregion.Rather thanviewing thoseradicalsasathreat, many people believe that the execution is clear indication of theIndonesian government's arrogance and hostility to Islam. Furthermore,some radical activists also try to establish connections between Amrozi'sexecutionwiththekillingofOsamabinLaden.ReferringbacktoNu’man,heinformedmethatmanyyouthsbelievethatAmrozi,Mukhlas,andbinLadenareunitedbytheirstruggleinthenameofIslamtofighttheUnitedStatesofAmerica. Nu'man himself is a progressive-minded activist. Therefore, thetrendamongyouthstowardsbecomingmoreradicalhasgivenhimconcernaboutthefutureofmoderateIslam.Therefore, if the capital punishment for key actors of terrorism andradicalism is seen as a success and bright starting point for eradicatingterrorism, this is not borne out given the claim of martyrdom by thoseperpetratingviolenceinthenameofreligion.Somereasonscanbepresentedtosupportthisclaim.Firstly,althoughthemainobjectiveofradicalmovementsistoupholdShariaandtoppleglobalregimeslabelledasinfidel(kafir),infactthisobjectivecanbeattainedby thehighest aspiration,namelymartyrdom.Asmartyrdom isthe highest value in radical government hierarchy, the death of a radicalactivistignitestheflameofmartyrdomaspirationamongotheractivists.Theimplicationisthattheterroristmovementisbecomingmoreintensiveusingmany methods and diverse means and even an unpredictable modus andstrategies.Secondly, the loss of a key figure in a terrorist network or cell throughgovernment actions strengthens radicals’ conviction regarding theauthoritariannatureandinfidelityoftherespectivegovernment,inthiscaseIndonesia.BothWesterncountriesandgovernmentsseenhavingaffiliationswiththemareviewedastheenemybasedonthosegovernmentsfightagainstradicalismwhileatthesametimeadoptinggovernancesystemsseenasun-Islamic.Itshouldbenotedthatexcessiveexposureofsuccessincombattingkeyactorsofterrorismwillnotalarmthem.Bycontrast,sucheventsareevenseen as reasons for vengeance. Live broadcasting of raids bycounterterrorism security forces is an example of such counter-productiveexposure.

19InterviewwithKhoirulHuda,onDecember22,2019,inLamongan,EastJava.


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How to eradicate radicalism and terrorism poses a dilemma. On the onehand,theuseofviolenceisunavoidableasamethod.However,whenithasresulted in loss of life, especially on the terrorists’ side, this has beenperceivedambiguouslybybothsides.Inthiscontext,violentmethodsassuchdo not promise any bright success. Another method, however, that hasproved to be successful is ‘enlisting former terrorists to the anti-terroristcampaign’ – the so-called catching thieves using thieves technique. In thisprocess, deradicalisation is achieved by using the experience of formerradicalsorterrorists.According to Purwawidada, the policy of ‘counter-ideology’ can be appliedthroughgrassrootspoliticalmobilizationanddialogue.Meantime,throughapolicyof counter-organization, terrorism’s infrastructure and supportbasiscanbefulfilledthrougheducation,themedia,andbyprovidingmorewelfarefor people, including jobs for youth. If the formula applied in de-radicalisation is false, rather than eradicating radicalism, ‘de-radicalisation’couldcreateamassiveradicalbacklash.Other than theactionsdiscussedabove,anotherpolicy thegovernmentcanapply is ishlah or reconciliation. Ishlah can take the form of buildingcooperation with and using former radical fighters to sway active cellsagainst radicalism. The effectiveness of using thismethod of persuasion isevidentfromthederadicalisationworkofAliImron,theformerBalibomber,and Nasir Abbas, a Malaysian national who committed several terroristattacks, mostly in Indonesia. Nasir Abbas is a former Jamaah IslamiyahactivistwhohadreachedtherankofAmirMantiqiIIortheLeaderofZoneIIIwho isresponsible forSoutheastAsiaregion.Heacknowledges that leavingJamaah Islamiyah was based on a desire to save Muslims worldwide. Heasserts:

‘MydetachmentfromJamaahIslamiyahismotivatedbyagoaltosaveMuslims, to thebestofmyability,so that theyarenot influencedbyfalse doctrines. More specifically, my purpose is that Muslims, inparticular,andhumanbeings,ingeneral,arenotbecomingthevictimsofbombingsorattackswhicharenotbasedontruereligiousreasonandinhumane’.(Djelantik,2010:109).

Ishlahasanapproachcanalsoinvolvesocialintegrationstrategiesforfamilymembersofthosewhohavecommittedactsofterrorism.Beingstigmatizedas familymembers of terrorists, they often face serious problems of socialintegration. At the same time, in the absence of their family leaders, thosefamily members may be economically deprived. Giving assistance andfacilities both for social integration and economic deprivation willtheoreticallypavethesmootherwaysforderadicalisation.


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IndonesianBestPracticesofCounter-RadicalismAs a country with a very vibrant dynamic for dealingwith radicalism andterrorism, the Indonesian governmenthasmademany efforts to copewiththissituation.Somehaveprovenfullyeffective,somelessorpartlyeffective,andothersmayhavebeencompletelyineffective.Thissection,however,willfocusonlyonthebestpracticesthattheIndonesiangovernmenthastaken.Indoing so, it will not cover formalist approaches discussed in the previoussection. Rather, it will present some best practices that are mostlyoverlookedbyacademicsandexpertsonradicalismandterrorism,especiallyinanIndonesiancontext.Bydoingso, it ishopedthatmorecomprehensivepoliciesregardingcounterterrorismandradicalismcanberecommended.

Anti-radicalismandterrorismagent

Asmentionedintheprevioussection,themostprominentinstitutionformedby the Indonesiangovernment fordealingwith terrorismand radicalism iscalledBadanNasionalPenanggulanganTerorisme (known as BNPT). It is anon-ministrygovernmentalinstitutionresponsibleforeradicatingradicalismand terrorism. In performing its duties, BNPT is overseen by theCoordinating Minister of Politics, Law, and Security. BNPT’s head has therank of Minister and reports directly to the president of the Republic ofIndonesia.BNPTwasestablishedbyPresidentialRuleNumber46Year2010,andwaspreviouslytheDeskKoordinasiPemberantasanTerorisme(DKPT)ortheCoordinatingDeskforEradicatingofTerrorism.

The agency’s responsibilities and duties are: a) formulating, coordinating,andimplementingpolicies,strategies,andnationalprogrammesdealingwithterrorism in its relation to national resilience, counter-radicalisation, andderadicalisation; b) coordinating the law enforcement elements ineradicatingterrorism;c)formulating,coordinating,andimplementingattheinternational level through international cooperation; d) formulatingpolicies, strategies, and national programmes for eradicating terrorism; d)performingthecoordinationofpolicies,strategies,andnationalprogrammesto dealwith the problem of terrorism; e) implementing the programme ofnationalpreparedness,counter-radicalisation,andderadicalisation.Based on the above normative formulation, BNPT has been very active inboth curing the problem of active terrorism, but also in anticipating thepossibilityofthespreadofradicalisminthefuture,especiallyamongyouth.However, considering the nature of its duty, which deals mostly withviolence, many see a high potential for basic human rights violations by


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BNPT.20Such a pessimistic view is understandable. However, withoutoverlooking such potential, attempting to deal with radicalism is alsoimportant and interesting andBNPT can, in some areas, be presented as amodelofbestpracticeofcounter-radicalisminIndonesia.Amongrarelyseenaspectsofcounteringradicalismisthehumanisticandeducationalapproach.

HumanisticapproachFor those familiar with terrorism networks in Indonesia, especially BaliBombing I in 2002, the involvement of four siblings from Lamongan, EastJava, receivedwidepublicity.The four siblings areAliGhufron,Amrozi,AliImron,andAliFauzi.Due to theircentralroles in thebombing,AliGhufronandAmroziweresentencedtodeathin2008.AliImronwasimprisonedforlife,whileAliFauzihadalreadybeen released.One storyof thehumanisticapproach taken by BNPT relates how Ali Fauzi informed his brother, AliImron, that Suhardi Alius, Head of BNPT at the time, was about to visitTenggulun, a hamlet in Lamongan. Tenggulun is not only where the fourbomberswerebornandraisedbutisalsowhereanumberofformerradicalfighters currently reside. Alius’s decision to visitwas based on this fact, inhopeshecouldbuildanemotionalconnectionwiththem.Uponhearingthis,Imronresponded:‘Itwillnothappen’.21DespiteImron’sdoubts,thevisitfinallytookplace.AliuswenttoTenggulunandmetaround40peoplewhowere involved in radicalismand terrorism.Thevisitproved tobeeffective,achievingsomethings thatwouldnothavebeenpossiblethroughacoerciveapproach.AsAluisreachedthehamlet,thestory goes, the former fighters cried from happiness and regret; onereportedly hugged Alius, saying hewanted to return to the right path andleavebehindtheradicalroutethathehadtakensofar.Aluissaid:‘letusnotuseviolence.Let’sbuildanewlifewithheartandhonesty’.ThestoryofAluis’svisit isonlya fragmentthatunderlinestheBNPT’sneworientation in dealing with radicalism and terrorism. Ansyad Mbai, theformerheadoftheCoordinatingDeskforEradicatingofTerrorism,believesthat a military approach is not suitable for countering radicalism andterrorism. Themore coercive the policies against and treatment of radicalgroups, themore they become radical andmilitant.22Mbai’s statement andAluis’s initiative proved effective, as this type of approach will be able tobuildemotionalandhumanistic tiesbetweenpoliceandcombatants. Inour

20 https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/314550-penanganan-terorisme-bisa-langgar-ham21 https://www.dw.com/id/bagaimana-bnpt-memupus-terorisme-dengan-humanisme/a-4586525622AnsyadMbai,DinamikaBaruJejaringTerordiIndonesia,135.


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personal communicationwithAli Fauzi, the former combatant, he revealedthefactthatradicalsalwaysseepoliceasenemies. ‘Whenwesawpoliceonthestreetorintheiroffices,theonlythingwehadinmindwaswhichpartoftheirbodieswewillshoot,headorheart’.23TheattemptsbytheBNPTandpolicetotakeanon-violentandnon-coerciveapproach is also evident from what could be called ‘engagement fordisegangement’. For instance, BNPT has invited the engagement of formercombatants such as Ali Fauzi to help convert the still-active in terroristnetworks.Aliususevaccinationasametaphor:ifradicalismisavirus,usingavaccinefromthesameviruswouldbemoreeffectiveinitseradication.Andifthis ‘vaccine’wasastrandfromthevirus, itwillbemoreeffectiveincuringthe disease. It is very effective to invite deradicalised fighters to persuadeactiveterroriststopursuethesamepath.24Ali Fauzi, who has been completely deradicalised is not only involved inevents initiatedandorganisedbypolice,buthehimselfsetupa foundationdedicated to re-educating former combatants into abandoning the radicalwayandadoptingamoreopen,pluralistic, andmoderateunderstandingofIslam. The foundation is called Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian, or The PeaceCircleFoundation,andisbasedinLamongan,EastJava.25Oneofitsobjectivesis to educate the children and families of those who have committedterrorism,includingtheterroriststhemselves.Through a personal and humanistic approach, former combatants andterroristsareguidedtothemoderatewaythatincludesacceptingtheideaofnationalism and loyalty to Indonesia. A rare scene took place in YayasanLingkar Perdamaian complex in the summer of 2019. Former combatantsandterroristsgatheredinaplainfieldforthecommemorationofIndonesianIndependenceDay onAugust 17. The ceremonies included recitation of anoathof loyalty to theRepublicof Indonesia.Ali Fauzi,who read the textofIndonesianIndependenceProclamation,26saidhefeltathrilldeepwithinhissoul after reciting the proclamation: ‘I wantmy fellow former combatantsandterroristsalsoexperiencethesame’.27

23PersonalconversationwithAliFauziinMalang,EastJava,28July2020.24 https://www.beritasatu.com/bernadus-wijayaka/nasional/552287/pimpinan-bnpt-silaturahmi-ke-yayasan-lingkar-perdamaian25 https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-timur/d-3459620/ali-fauzi-dkk-dirikan-yayasan-lingkar-perdamaian-di-lamongan26TheoriginaltextwasreadbySukarnoandMuhammadHatta,thefirstpresidentandvicepresidentof theRepublicof IndonesiaonAugust17,1945. Itmarkedthe independenceofIndonesia, and since then the commemorationof Independenceof Indonesiamust includetherereadingofthetext.27 https://regional.kompas.com/read/2019/08/19/09310881/sepenggal-cerita-usai-para-mantan-teroris-laksanakan-upacara-17-agustus


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It’simportanttonotethatAliFauzi’sstoryisanisolatedcase.Amongmanynotable radical leaders who have engaged in disengaging radicals are AliImronandNasirAbbas.Asmentioned,Ali Imron isAliFauzi’sbrotherwhosetoffthebombinBaliin2002.Afteraperiodasafugitive,Imronreflectedonhisowninvolvementintheattackandthisledhimtotheawarenessthathehadkilledmanypeoplewhodidn’tevenknowhim.Thisturningpointwasintensifiedwhenhewasimprisoned,andhelaterassistedpolicetopersuadeactiveterroristsandradicalstoreturntomorepeacefulwayoflife.

Nasir Abbas is a similar case. Abbas is a Malaysian national involved inseveralbombingsinIndonesia,includingtheBaliattack.Hewascapturedin2003 in a region near Jakarta. Abbaswas the leader ofMantiqi III JamaahIslamiyah, which was active across Southeast Asia.28Like Ali Fauzi, NasirAbbas is currently spreading moderate understanding of Islam andcampaigning for peace. He stated his gratitude for being captured by thepolice,sayinghiscapturemarkedthebeginningofhisturningpoint.29

EducationalapproachBNPT does not only deal with former combatants but is also active inpreventingthespreadofradicalunderstandingamongyouththroughmanyprogrammes.OneexampleisJagaKampusKitaorGuardingOurUniversities.This is a programme organized by BNPT in cooperation with prominentuniversities across Indonesia to prevent the spread of radicalism and, inmore specific terms, radical religious understanding among students andacademics. One of authors (Zulian)was involved in a serieswhere hewasinvited to present a spectrum of religious understandings and how radicalunderstandingbegins.Theprogrammeflowsintwostages.Inthefirst,seminarsandworkshopsareorganized for lecturers in Islamic Studies. It is important to note thatIndonesian universities provide courses in Religious Studies to studentsbasedon their respectivereligions. Insuchacontext, religiousorientationstaught in university classes will certainly determine students’ religiousorientation and attitudes. Based on this, preventing the spread of radicalideascanbeachievedbyeducatinglecturerstobemoremoderateandopen.Thesecondstageisfromlecturerstostudents. Inthisstage, lecturersserveascampaignersandadvocatesofamoderateandopenreligiousstanceandorientation.However,itistooearlytoassesstheeffectivenessofthismethod

28https://www.antaranews.com/berita/547323/mantan-teroris-asia-tenggara-nasir-abbas-bersyukur-bisa-disadarkan29https://www.antaranews.com/berita/547323/mantan-teroris-asia-tenggara-nasir-abbas-bersyukur-bisa-disadarkan


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asacounter-narrativetowidespreadradicalism,whichpreviouslyhadbeenunchallenged.

Returning toAli Fauzi’s successfulmodel of deradicalisation, it can be saidthattheeducationalapproachispivotalinshapinghisneworientation.TheBNPT’s role was fundamental in bringing Ali Fauzi to this newunderstanding.AmongstepsthatBNPTtookinhiscasewassendinghimtoahigher education institution.With BNPT funding, Ali Fauziwas sent to theUniversity of Muhammadiyah Surabaya to pursue a Master’s in IslamicStudies.ThisuniversitywaschosenbecauseofitsmoderateIslamicreligiousorientation. As mentioned earlier, Muhammadiyah and NU are twochampionsofmoderateIslamicgroupsinthecountry.InthesessionIattendedwithAliFauzi,hesharedthatwhenstudyingforhisdegree, one of his habits was to challenge professors and lecturers whomostlypromotedprogressive,open,andmoderateviewsofIslam.However,overtime,anewerawarenessgrewwithinAliFauzi’smind,andhestartedtoshift his orientation from close-minded and radical to more open andmoderate.AliFauziiscurrentlypursuingadoctoraldegreeinIslamicStudiesat the University of Muhammadiyah Malang, in addition to running hisFoundation in Lamongan. His new orientation is clearly articulated in astatementmadeduringapublicforumatGadjahMadaUniversity:‘Iamnotaspecialistdoctor,butonceIsufferedfromsuchadiseaseforsomanyyears.Now, I am awake, and I want to cure [other people] who suffered fromdiseaselikeme’.30

ApartfromBNPT’sendeavours,theMinistryofReligiousAffairsisalsotakingpartincounter-radicalisminitiatives.Astherootofterrorismisradicalisminits broader sense, former religious affairs minister Hakim Saifuddin notedthat, as one way of preventing it, moderation should be understood as acommitment to keep the balance in its perfection, where all citizensregardless of their identities and background should listen to each other,learn,andtraintoliveinharmony.Moderationiscloselyrelatedtotoleranceand awareness of togetherness andmutual understanding among differentpeople.31

RecommendationsSome conclusions and recommendation can be drawn from the abovediscussion.

30https://www.ugm.ac.id/id/berita/18814-kisah-penyintas-bom-bali-dan-proses-panjang-memaafkan-pelaku-terorisme31KementrianAgamaRI,ModerasiBeragama(Jakarta:BadanLitbangdanDiklatKementrianAgamaRI,2019),v-vi.


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Firstly,indealingwithradicalismandterrorism,theIndonesiangovernmenthas shifted from a solely coercive policy to a more humanistic approach.Althoughthesetwocannotbeseparatedastheyhavetheirowncontextsandeffectiveness,thehumanisticapproachpromisesgreatersuccessasittouchestheverybasicdimensionofhumanbeings. In this context, thisapproach ishighly recommended and can be considered one of best practice fromIndonesiaindealingwithradicalismandterrorism.Secondly,aspartofhumanisticapproach,aninterestingmodelhasbeentheengagement of former combatants and terrorist in initiatives to counterradicalism and terrorism. This involvement has proven effective. In thefuture,thismodelcanbedevelopedinmoresystematicways.Asinthecasepresentedabove,establishingacentreforformercombatantsandterroristsisfundamentalforshapinganeworientationfortheirpost-radicallife.Thirdly,ashighereducationhasbeenasourceofideasthatinfluenceyouths’turn towards radicalism, an approach that targets education – both formaland informal – is important. The example of Ali Fauzi has shown howeducationhasbeenable to transformhisorientationandunderstanding. Inthe future, therefore, anti-terrorismand counter-radicalisation efforts needto seriously consider cooperation with a range of educational institutions,bothinIndonesiaandoverseas.

ConclusionTosummarize, it isworthreiteratingsomepoints.Firstly, inan Indonesiancontext, radicalism has posed a serious threat to all members of society,regardlessoftheideologiesandreligionstheyembrace.Althoughradicalismexists in all religious traditions, in Indonesia it is mostly associated withMuslim groups. While some might disagree with this, the association isinevitablesinceMuslimsconstitutethe largemajorityofreligiousgroups inIndonesia.However, italsoshouldbeunderlinedthatwhilethisassociationisbasedon the fact that terroristandradicalactionsarecommittedmostlybyMuslims,theperpetratorsareaminoritygroupanddonotrepresentthemajorityofMuslimsinIndonesiawhoaremoderate.Secondly,indealingwithterrorism,successiveIndonesiangovernmentshaveimplemented a range of policies, although a shift can be seen under JokoWidodo’spresidency towardsadualapproachofsecurityandnon-security.Intermsofsecurity,special forceswithinthepoliceandmilitaryhavebeenstrengthened,while inaparallelnon-securityapproach–asradicalismandterrorisminvolveideologyandreligiousorientations–twoactionshavebeentaken, namely the mainstreaming of moderate Islam campaign and therevitalizationofthestatephilosophyofPancasila.


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Thirdly, some policies have proven effective in combatting radicalism.However, other policies and actions need serious reformulation. In thiscontext, deradicalisation is not always a success story. The Indonesiangovernment needs to be more comprehensive in formulating its policies.Options that must be seriously considered are engagement andreconciliation. In fact, the Indonesian government has invited formercombatants to cooperate in approachingand converting activemembersofterrorist cells. However, the familymembers of terrorism perpetrators arealso important to consider. Once stereotyped or stigmatized as a family ofterrorists, they often face problems of social integration. If this issue issuccessfullytackled,deradicalisationwillbecomeamorepromisingstrategythanithasbeenthusfar.Having discussed these facts and the situation regarding radicalism andresilience in Indonesia, some recommendations and examples of bestpractices can be identified: a) from the perspective of the state, theestablishment of special forces in charge of terrorism and radicalism, bothfromthepoliceandarmedforces,hasplayedaneffectiveroleineradicatingradicalism;b)theuniquestrategyadoptedbytheIndonesianpoliceforcetoinvolve former combatants in disengagement and deradicalisation. Thislatter approach has enlisted former combatants such as Nasir Abbas, AliImron,andAliFauzitoactivelyassistwiththederadicalisationcampaign;c)the foundingofpeacecentresby formercombatants;d) the involvementofandinitiativesbycivilsocietygroupssuchasMuhammadiyahandNahdlatulUlama’; and, e) the involvement of educational institutions as education isperhaps the most effective medium for spreading moderate and tolerantorientations.InterviewsandPersonalConversationsInterviewwithNu’manSuhadi,inLamongan,20December2019.InterviewwithKhoirulHuda,on22December2019,inLamongan,EastJava.PersonalconversationwithAliFauziinMalang,EastJava,28July2020.Personal conversationwithMuhammadThohir, inLamongan,East Java, 21

December2019.

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Project name: Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion:BringingTogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectivesProjectAcronym:GREASEProjectCoordinator:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidouContact:[email protected]


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September2020Documentseriesreference:D4.1RadicalisationandResilienceCaseStudies

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