StUdies in Intelligence (1998)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY SecretCENTRAL I NTELL IGENCE ANENCY

SOURCES METHODSIXEMPT ION3B2B

NAZI WAR CRINESDISCLOSUREACY

DATE 2001 2006

Prussian Nobleman, SS Officer, and CIA Agent

The Case of Otto Albrecht Alfred vonBolschwing (S)Kevin C. Ruffner

66The CIA generally

avoided most of theseintelligence fabricators,

although it did fallvictim to a number

of scams.

1.1414.4 ■ •

Kevin C. Ruffner, a member of theHistory Staff; is on a rotational assign-ment with the CounterintelligenceCenter.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysisexpressed In Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflectofficial positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Governmententity, past or present. Nothing In the contentsshould be construed as asserting or Implying USGovernment endorsement of an article's factualstatements and Interpretations.

The situation in postwar Europe inthe late 1940s and early 1950soffered many opportunities forexploitation. Just as black-marketeerstook advantage of material shortages,others sold information to the com-peting powers. As tensions mountedbetween the Western Allies and theSoviet Union, the rubble-strewn cit-ies of Europe, especially those inGermany and Austria, became an"intelligence jungle." (U)

One retired CIA officer recalledyears later that "the inevitable result,in cold and hungry Europe of thetime, was a proliferation of paper-mills such as had never been seen inEurope's history. To those of us try-ing to make sense of it all, it seemedthat every down-at-heel veteran ofthe Abwehr, the Gestapo, RSHAAmt VI, and all the Fascist organiza-tions of Central and SouthernEurope was peddling fabricated infor-mation sources to notional spynetworks, and that CIC, MIS, theBritish FSS, the Austrian Stapo, theForeign Service's Peripheral ReportsOfficers, the Grumbach organiza-tion, the Gehlen organization, theItalian Carabinieri, Amt Blank, theFrench SDECE, and Radio FreeEurope all were elbowing and shov-ing each other to buy the stuff; likeso many women in Mary's basementon the day after Christmas." I (U)

The CIA generally avoided most ofthese intelligence fabricators,although it did fall victim to a num-ber of scams. 2 Decades later, thebona fides of some CIA agentsrecruited during this period are stillthe subject of conjecture and

FOR COOR MATO WITH

debate. 3 Otto Albrecht Alfred vonBolschwing, a Prussian-born Naziofficer, is a case in point. Personalityissues and doubts about his overallusefulness marred his work for CIAin Austria. Yet, the Agency failed toresolve these matters and evenbrought Bolschwing to the UnitedStates. Bolschwing's presence inAmerica subsequently attracted theattention of the Department of Jus-tice, the GAO, and the US Congressdecades after his espionage role. (U)

The Gehlen Connection

During the Allied occupation of Ger-many and Austria, it was notuncommon for American intelli-gence agencies to share assets withthe Gehlen organization, the nascentWest German intelligence service. Asearly as 1948, one CIA officerreported that the Germans "tookover some of the informants droppedby Munich operationsbase after ithad been conclusively establishedthat the intelligence they furnishedwas of no v- alue whatsoever," TheUS Army's Counter IntelligenceCorps (CIC) and the Military Intelli-gence Service (MIS) also picked upagents when they had been droppedby CIA's predecessors, the OSS, theStrategic Services Unit (SSU), andthe Central Intelligence Group(CIG). As early as December 1946,Headquarters told counterintelli-gence officials in Germany that "webelieve our best policy would be steerclear of it and let such agents andinformers who are being lured awayby higher inducements go theirmerry way. It seems a shame that

6 370 ST:. Secret 61

SecretBolschwing

anyone is willing to pay so much forvery low grade and mostly unverifi-able information." 5 (S)

As the Cold War intensified, theGehlen organization, known initiallyby its codename RUSTY, became animportant player in the intelligencewar in Western Europe. The Ger-mans, in particular, claimed to haveIlnique access to intelligence behindthe Iron Curtain. After the Agencyassumed responsibility for the Ger-man intelligence organization in mid-

• 1949, the Agency needed more infor-mation about Gehlen's personneland operations. 6 In fact, both theCIA and the US Army in Germanyconducted their own separate intelli-gence-gathering operations againstGehlen throughout the early 1950s.7The Agency also kept a close eye onknown German intelligence agentsand, in one important case, tookover a top Gehlen agent and madehim a CIA source. (S)

Gaining control of one of Gehlen'sagents presented an unusual opportu-nity for CIA, corning at a time whenCIA had just recently assumedresponsibility for ODEUM (CIA'snwar-oge,lationaLterna.for RUSTY).Ththency Wanted to Curl:iappetite for expansion, particularlyin Austria, which was also occupiedby the four Allied powers. ThomasA. Lucid, a CIA officer assigned toGehlen's headquarters in Pullach,wrote in late 1949 that "ODEUMshould not be allowed to build, plan,or even desire to extend itself intoAustria, whether as a little AustrianODEUM or as a branch of the Ger-man ODEUM, with recognitionfrom or penetration into the Aus-trian Government in the leastcomparable to the recognition andrelative position they hope to achieve,

here in Germany." ODEUM's

activitiesin Austria, "if at all, it mustbe restric_ted to a low-level, purelyoperational favor-for-favor horse-trading basis."8 (S)

Coming to CIA's Attention

Otto Albrecht Alfred vonBolschwing seemed an ideal candi-date for CIA recruitment. He wasurbane and friendly, spoke and wroteEnglish well, and offered uniqueinsights into ODEUM'i foreignintelligence activities. Operating inAustria, Bolschwing had reestab-lished his wartime ties to members ofthe hog Guard, a Rumanian Fascistgroup, scattered throughout south-ern Europe. Bolschwing had joinedRUSTY in 1947, although he gradu-ally fell out of Gehlen's favor by1950 because of his unwillingness toprovide Pullach with operationalinformation. Throughout 1949 and1950, CIA debated whether to pickup Bolschwing from ODEUM anduse him as an American source. (S)

In a late 1949 memorandum, Luciddiscussed the future of Americanintelligence in Austria with RichardHelms, the chief of Foreign BranchM responsible for central Europe.Otto von Bolschwing figured promi-nently in Lucid's plans. "It wouldseem," Lucia dedared, "that a basisdoes exist for splitting Bolschwingaway from ODEUM and at the sametime making the action work to AIS[American Intelligence Service]advantage. For example, he might beable to break into the future officialAustrian IS, at the same time remain-ing a collaborator of ours." Lucid didhave some reservations aboutBolschwing. "The suggestions regard-ing Bolschwing," he wrote, "shouldnot necessarily be taken as an indica-tion that we regard him as a topflight

operative. As a matter of fact, he maybe, but if this is the case, he hasapparently managed co keep a bushelhandy for concealment purposes."Lucid also added, "Always giving thedevil his due,,he may indeed havegreat potentialities which could benursed along, particularly in thepolitical field. His proposal for theestablishment of Balkan coveragecontains nothing really startling,except perhaps through the volumi-nous claim to contact with all ofthose named."9 (S)

Lucid's mixed feelings aboutBolschwing echoed earlier senti-ments expressed by the CIG. A tracerequest to Headquarters from Aus-tria in the spring of 1947 broughtword that "Otto Albrecht AlfredBolschwing is shady character."10Upon receipt of this information, thecounterintelligence chief in Austriaresponded, "After considering theinformation on subject provided byHeadquarters, together with Heidel-berg's reply to our inquiry, we havedecided not to use subject in anycapacity. No approach will be madeto him." He added that' "we willmake an effort, however, to be keptinformed on his activities, particu-larly with regard to the CE aspect."11(S)

Bolschwing's Background

Bolschwing's personal history was,indeed, "not the best." I2 Born in1909 in Prussia, the son of a noble-man, he was orphaned at an early agewhen his father was killed in actionon the Eastern Front during WorldWar I. As a young man, Bolschwingworked with several trading compa-nies and other businesses inGermany, Great Britain, and else-where in Europe. He set out to make

62 Secret

SecretBolschwing

44

his fortune in the British mandateterritory of Palestine, where hebecame embroiled in early Nazi intel-ligence activities in the MiddleEast. 13 (U)

Bolschwing's own "life history,"(written for CIA in the fall of 1949)contained a number of fanciful exag-gerations about his activitiesfollowing his return to Germany inthe mid-1930s. 14 While he deniedhis Nazi past and claimed that healways resisted the regime in his state-ments to CIA, Bolschwing actuallyworked for the section of theGerman Sicherheitsdienst (SD) deal-ing directly with the "Jewishproblem." In 1940, Bolschwing tookover the post of SD representative inBucharest, Rumania, where he sup-ported Iron Guardists in theirabortive January 1941 coup attemptagainst Ion Antonescu. Bolschwingundertook this action without theapproval of his superiors in Berlin,thus prompting the German ForeignMinistry to protest the SD's interfer-ence in the Reich's external affairs.Following the suppression of theIron Guard revolt, Bolschwing spenta "few months" in confinement inGermany. His arrest and imprison-

+Theiteat-3,Valra6 hsub.sequerit; -demotion in the SS later enhancedhis self-projected image as a Resis-tance fighter—an aspect that heplayed up by obtaining certificatesfrom US Army units attesting to hisunderground activities at the end ofthe war. 15 (S)

Bolschwing's statement in 1949 that"my political ideas were not on anationalistic but European basis, anysmall-scale nationalism (chauvinism),to my mind is antihistorical, I furthersaw and still see no chance of individ-ual European nationalism in a moralfight against world communism"

By early 1950, CIA decidedto take Bolschwing as anagent despite some initial

reservations.

99

failed to convince CIA about histrustworthiness. 16 One report notedthat "most evaluations of B (basedalmost without exception on study ofbiography rather than personal associ-ation) run as follows: self-seeking,egotistical, and a man of shiftingloyalties. His protests of democracyand, more particularly, feelings ofAustrian nationalism seem to contra-dict his history." 17 (S)

Another observer Wrote, "He is anadventurer, a lover of intrigue, and awire-puller who is fond of power."Furthermore, "Bolschwing states thatin his position in Rumania he wasable to frustrate many of the evildesigns of the Nazi regime, but itshould be remembered as a blackmark against him rather than a pointin his favor that he arranged theescape of [Horia] Sima and others ata time when these men were at theheight of their crimes." The reportadded, "if one adds to these objec-tions the difficulties inherent inBolschwing's involvement with polit-ical reporting on Austria, it is hard tosee how, among all our other com-mitments, much could be gained byhaving MOB [Munich operationsbase] take him over as the principalagent for three Rumanianprojects. 18 (S)

The Rumanian projects in question,ODEUM Projects 114, 115, and116, involved members of the IronGuard faction under ConstantinPapanace. Based primarily in Italy,the group broke away from the main

body of Horia Sima's Iron Guardmovement while quarantined in Ger-many during the war. Bolschwing'sODEUM projects claimed to havewidespread political and military cov-erage throughout Rumania throughhis Iron Guard contacts. 19 Afterreviewing Bolschwing's potential,James H. Critchfield, chief of CIA'sPullach operations base (POB), com-mented, "We are convinced thatBolschwing's Rumanian operations,his connections with the Papanacegroup, his internal Austrian politicaland intelligence connections, and,last but not least, his knowledge ofand probable future on ODEUM'sactivities in and through Austriamake him a valuable man whom wemust control" 20 (S)

CIA Takes Bolschwing

By early 1950, CIA decided to takeBolschwing as an agent despite someinitial reservations. In late January,Bolschwing met with Gehlen and dis-cussed the terms of his leavingODEUM. Bolschwing, in turn,informed US intelligence about thisdevelopment, and Critchfield thenspoke with Gehlen about the detailsof Bolsc.hwing's departure. 2/ Ironi-cally, Critchfield found that"UTILITY [Gehlen] expressed con-viction that the Papanace connectionis of great value and should be sal-vaged" and that he "stronglyrecommended that the MS in someway establish connection withBolschwing and attempt to obtainfrom him a comprehensive descrip-tion of these operations."Consequently, Critchfield directed

.3 Bolschwing's firstcase officer, to contact Bolschwing tolearn more about his work with theRumanians. 22 (S)

Secret 63

SecretBolschwing

Shortly afterwards, C. reportedon his contact with Bolschwing andprovided a description of his sources,both Rumanian and Austrian. L.

stated that "UNREST[Bolschwing's CIA cryptonym issuedin February 1950] has risen steadilyin the opinion of this case officer andPOB in the last six months... He isunquestionably an extremely intelli-gent person, an experiencedintelligence Operator, a man withunusually wide and well-placed circleof friends, acquaintances, andsources, and a man whose grasp ofthe political-intelligence fieldthroughout the Balkans, and, to alesser degree, in Western Europe, isof a high order." 23 Both C._and Critchfield were impressed byBolschwing's motives to work forAmerican intelligence as opposed tostaying with Gehlen. "Probably thesingle ambition of Bolschwing," thechief of POB observed, "which isgreater than that of playing a keyrole in Austrian intelligence is tobecome an American citizen andwork in some capacity in politicaland intelligence affairs in Europe orin the United States as an Americancitizen."24 (S)

A CIA Coverup

CIA's interest in Bolschwing soonextended to concealing his Nazi past.In early 1950, the Austrian Ministryof Interior investigated Bolschwing'sstatus in that country (Bolschwingwas a German citizen) and requestedhis Nazi Party records from the USArmy's Berlin Document Center(B DC). When Pullach received wordfrom CIA's Berlin operations base(BOB) about this request, it immedi-ately asked that his file be withheld.A BOB officer, Peter M. F. Sichel,agreed to pull Bolschwing's records

and hold them separately, althoughhe warned that Bolschwing wasprominently mentioned in the "Ger-man Primer."25 In a revealingmemorandum to Pullach, Sichel for-warded his recommendations:

I. We would like to draw your atten-tion to some circumstances, which, inmy opinion, make it unwire to have anegative file check on such persons asvon Bolschwing.

2. The files at the Berlin DocumentsCenter as to Nazi membership and SSmembership, as well as the SS personnelfiles, a4e so complete that it is unlikelythat any person checked, who was amember of eitherof these two organiza-tions, would not be fiund in the files.On top of this, the persons you are deal-ing with are so well known and theirbackground so well publicized in thepast that I deem it improbable that youcan protect them from their past history.

3. At the end of the war, we tried to besmart and changed the name of severalmembers of the SD and Abwehr inorder to protect them from the Germanauthorities and the occupation authori-ties. In most cases, these persons were sowell known that the change in namecompromised them more than if theywere to face a denazification court and

face the judgment which would havebeen meted out to them. Meanwhile,the developments in Germany and prob-ably also in Austria have been such thatmembership in the SS, in the SD, or inthe Abzvehr no longer is regarded as astrike against any personality. Since Iregard it impossible to keep secret suchassociations, except in cases where a per-son was a clandestine agent of a givenorganization, I request you to reassessthe advisability of withholding

igArmation available in the BerlinDocuments Center.,

4. For the recorc4 I would like to state,however, that we can withhold suchinformation if desired. 26 (S)

C.l -commented on CIA'sefforts to obscure the German's Nazibackground:

UNREST requested us to extractor block files which he believedwere in the Berlin DocumentCenter, to prevent their being -sent to Austria in case of a .request for them. This was done.These files, of which we have acopy, show that UNRESTbecame a member of theNSDAP in 1932 with the num-ber, 984212. This is mentionedin his personal history. He was amember of the SD Hauptamtand in 1940 was promoted toObersturmfilehrer, in 1941 toHauptsturmfiahrer. In February1945, he was demoted toenlisted man in the SS andthrown out of the organization.UNREST explains in his autobi-ography that he received in 1935a predated membership in theparty which made him appear tohave been a member since 1932.Subject was arrested by theGestapo first in the winter of1937-38, later in 1942 inGreece, and in September 1942in Vienna, when he was sent toBerlin and held in a Gestapoprison until April 1943. Norecords of these arrests appear inthe file from the Berlin Docu-ment Center. UNREST'sstatement in his personal histoly,"that he held no real SS member-ship and that his party

64 Secret

SecretBolschwing

membership was somehow myste-rious" refers probably to the factthat, as an SD man, he automat-ically became a member of theSS and that he received his partymembership in 1935, but ostensi-bly belonged beginning in 1932.We believe that firrher explana-tion of UNREST's SD, SS, andNSDAP connections are in orderand will request that he provideit. We will later exploreUNREST'S reasons for keepingthese files from the Austrians.`7(S)

C.- .3 soon learned thatBolschwing's ostensible reason forhaving the Americans deny his Nazirecord to the Austrian Governmentcentered around his own suspiciousbusiness activities in that country.Bolschwing worked in an American-sponsored firm, the Austria VerlagGmbh, but he ran into tax problemswith the Austrians. As matters devel-oped, CIA denied Bolschwing'sBDC file not only to the Austriansbut also to the Army's 430th CICDetachment and the Criminal Inves-tigative Division (CID). Thisproblem dragged on through 1950,

VeriAdading CIA to reqiiestCID's assistance in stalling any Aus-trian investigation of Bolschwing.28While both CIA and CID decidedagainst taking any action inBolschwing's favor, CID declined toprovide any assistance to the Aus-trian probe. The AustrianGovernment apparently dropped thecase by the end of 1950 through lackof evidenCe. 29 (S)

Performance Questions

In the midst of Bolschwing's legal'problems, CIA also expressed dissatis-

CIA was disappointed withwhat little informationBolschwing providedabout his operational

activities.

9faction with Bolschwing's overallperformance. Given a newcryptonym of USAGE in March1950, Bolschwing failed to redirecthis efforts to expand his coverage insoutheastern Europe; he preferred tosupply "political information, largelyovert" about internal Austrian mat-ters. "This," Critchfield noted inAugust 1950, "is quite contrary toout desires, since our primary inter-est is in fact in thcBalkans and notin Austria." At a meeting withBolschwing that month, Critchfieldtold him explicitly:

USAGE must immediately shifthis emphasis not only to clandes-tine operations into the Balkans,but within this field must getdown to the business of reportingdetailed operational informationand bridle his own tendencies toproduce political and sociologicalstudies, interesting from an his-torical and academic point ofview, but not the type of mate-rial which will ensurecontinuance of his saltily. Thehistory of the Legionary Move-ment in Rumania, which he hasbeen preparing for Pon four tosix months, will be of interestand possibly add some new infor-mation on the subject. However,USAGE must first establish his

position with us as a clandestineoperator before we are willing tofinance the exploitation of hisintellectual interest in the Bal-kan problem. 3° (S)

wr. Bolschwing reacted with surprise to

the American discontent with his" reporting," and he insisted that "his

Austrian coverage and connections asthe aircraft carrier from which he canoperate into the Balkans." He prom-ised, however, to expand his contactwith Papanace's Rumanian sourcesas well as activate two operations inHungary.3I Bolschwing, in fact, trav-eled to Rome with Austrian IronGuard leader Ion Magarit to consultwith Papanace about resurrectingnets throughout Rumania andGreece. Bolschwing, posing as USArmy Capt. Albert A. Eisner (CIAprovided this cover), never fullyreported the results of his Rome trip,and nothing really came out of hiscollaboration with the Iron Guard-is ts . 32 (S)

CIA was disappointed with what lit-de information Bolschwing providedabout his operational activities.Bolschwing did provide source iden-tities in his networks, although theAgency dropped the Papanace con-nection in early 1951 as too

expensive and duplicative of informa-tion already obtained in Italy.33Pullach bate also questioned theeffectiveness of his ongoing Austrianprojects and proposed Hungarianprojects. In the summer of 1951, theAgency summarized that "it seemsapparent that while Pullach relationswith USAGE have been cordial, and

while USAGE has professed to becompletely cooperative, Pullach has

not been much more successful than

ZIPPER in terms of overall results."

POB's Critchfield added, "There

appears to be little hope that he willever develop into a first-class

agent." 34 (S)

Secret 65

SecretBolschwing

CIA Transfers Bolschiving

Rather than drop Bolschwing as anunproductive agent, Pullach basetransferred USAGE to the Salzburgoperations base (S013) in Austria.The Agency made this move aftermuch discussion among Pullach,Salzburg, Vienna, and Washingtonbecause Headquarters felt thatBolschwing was better suited toreport on internal Austrian mattersthan he could on activities behindthe Iron Curtain. Headquarterswanted Detachment 35, a specialjoint CIA and CIC unit in Austria,to determine if Bolschwing shouldbe retained by American intelligence.James Critchfield had initially sup-ported the CIA's takeover ofBolschwing from Gehlen. Only afew months later, he now expressedserious reservations about the Ger-man agent.

If an agency takes him over with-out knowing his past, they willinevitably be bogged down in aseries of "assessment periods" andgrandiose schemes employingscores of people to exploit shad-o _gures in the target area via

•-ectiffeTzlines vgncknever seem- tomaterialize. They will be facedwith large. payrolls for piddlingreturns, and masses of paper onall the relatively inconseluentialaspects of his operation.'

His new case officer in Salzburg, C-.3 however, found

Bolschwing . to be "reliable, efficient,amenable to direction, and can beincreasingly guided into activitiesdirectly supplementary to Austrianstation activities." 36 After complet-ing a polygraph examination in April1952, CZ .3reported to Headquar-ters that USAGE "is genuinely

44Bolschwing's new case

officer accepted hisexplanation about his Nazi

past without qualms orunusual questions.

9/devoted to the United States; he pos-sesses truly extraordinary energy andefficiency; and he will cheerfullyaccept and is anxious to receive direc-tion and guidance." C. excusedBolschwing's previous failure withPullach base because "it wouldappear that his past sins—whichwere in any event chiefly the result oflack qf thorough direction—may beforgiven." In c .= eyes,Bolschwing "may be considered oneof the most valuable assets of the Aus-trian station."37 Bolschwing's newcase officer accepted his explanationabout his Nazi past without qualmsor unusual questions. (S)

SOB had big plans for Bolschwing,who now claimed to have severalnew projects, including penetrationoperations into Czechoslovakia, intel-ligence sources on the Soviets'strength in their zone in Austria, con-tacts with Austrian police, andpolitical parties. 38 For the next twoyears, Bolschwing (now known asGROSSBAHN after his transfer toSalzburg) assisted CIA in gainingintelligence on Soviet order of battlewhile also providing support to

SOB's other collection operationsagainst the Soviets. Bolschwing

worked for CIA under a loose jour-nalist or publishing cover with sevensubagents. In early 1953, CIA esti-mated the total yearly cost for

Project GROSSBAHN (includingBolschwing and his sources) at$20,000. 3 (S)

COing to America

Bolschwing's main activity duringthis period focused on gaining admit-tance to the United States. In earlySeptember 1952, a concurredwith several other CIA officials thatBolschwing should depart Austria forAmerica for security purposes. Not-ing his "Jong and faithful service forUS intelligence," C._ 7 felt that"the granting of citizenship and con-tract agent clearance toGROSSBAHN would permit him toconcentrate his full energies on opera-tions and his own support problemsand to integrate his activities directly •with DYCLAIM [CIA] systems andtargets." c.. -= the chiefof SOB, concurred in this recommen-dation and added:

We are certainly aware of theexceptional measures we are ask-ing in GROSSBAHN's case, butwe feel that the action will bemost beneficial to the operationsof this base. GROSSBAHN is anexceptional individual andoffers, we believe, sufficient long-range potential to warrantextraordinary measures to gethim on the team. He is devotedto United States interests, vitallyinterested in and capable of long-term intelligence work, and hasall the earmarks of a professionalintelligence operator and execu-tive. Coupled with hisdemonstrated loyalty and reliabil-ity, these qualities make him avery rare bird, and one weshould go to considerable painsto exploit 40 (S)

To support Bolschwing's immigra-tion, a 3 prepared a packet ofmaterial pertaining to Bolschwingand his intelligence work. Among his

66 Secret

Von Bolschwing in 1953. (S)

SecretBolschwing

various reports, Bolsc.hwing wroteanother autobiographical account ofhis life, Nazi activities, and work forthe Resistance. After reciting hisstory (in a more embellished formthan his 1949 account), Bolschwingnow exclaimed "I may also state thatI have never been in the pay of SS orthe party or the German Govern-ment, and I flatter myself that atleast in this respect I am an excep-tion."41 (S)

Upon the receipt of C packet,Headquarters commended Salzburg'sefforts to provide better security forits operations and personnel,although Bolschwing's proposedimmigration also raised severalissues. Officials in Washingtonexpressed concern whether the Aus-trian station understood the legalrequirements for a foreigner co gainan immigrant visa and obtain UScitizenship. The process, Washing-ton declared, was not as simple as

just bringing Bolschwing to Americafor three months and then returninghim co Austria. On another note,Washington asked what advantagesBolschwing would have as an Ameri-can citizen and a long-term agent inAustria as opposed to his current sta-",=4,11942

fficerwPr.rieddief.desk Ptt7t PO-sawing could become dissat-isfied once he came to the UnitedStates. As a note of caution, Head-quarters warned that "in the event .that it is finally decided to gothrough with the proposed course ofaction, GROSSBAHN should clearlyunderstand that we do not and can-not assume unlimited responsibilityfor him."43 (S)

The Headquarters communiqueengendered more discussion in Aus-tria. 44 L Bolschwing'slatest case officer, detailed in a .lengthy memorandum about SOB'sreasoning behind Bolschwing's

immigration to the United States inthe-spring of 1953. C. -3 defendedSalzburg's course of action because"we feel GROSSBAHN's back-ground and experience qualifies himfor consideration in a position asclosely approximates that of staff sta-tus as his citizenship status willallow. C. .= added that "we will doall possible to imprint in his mindthat taking the initial steps towardUS citizenship will in no way obli-gate us, morally or otherwise, toassist him in his relocation shouldthe course of events force his sever-ance with KUBARK (CIA)." 45 (S)

In Jate August 1953, Headquarterscabled Austria and granted its permis-sion to bring Bolschwing to theUnited States.46 The Agency, how-ever, refused to use its special legalauthority and warned that it maycake some time for the INS to waiveBolschwing's Nazi Party membershipand allow him to enter the UnitedStates. CIA also demanded that itwanted to terminate its associationwith Bolschwing upon his immigra-tion "unless much stronger, morespecific plan presented for futurework upon return to Austria. Onbasis past performance we (are)unconvinced future efforts as

recruiter will be productive enoughto warrant undertaking sponsorshiphis return. Such sponsorship," Wash-ington added, "[is) bound to makeultimate disposal much more diffi-cult."47 (S)

Consequently, the Agency took stepsto have Bolschwing admitted as animmigrant under the regular Ger-man quota, and he obtained animmigrant visa at the American Con-sulate in Munich in August 1953.The Agency's Eastern Europe (EE)Division approached the AlienAffairs division for assistance in coor-dinating Bolschwing's movement

with the INS. From the beginning,CIA made no attempts to concealBolschwing's NSDAP membershipor his SD service. EE, however, didnot go into any great detail about hispast other than repeatingBolschwing's own stories. 48 Mean-while, CIA in Austria "rechecked"third agency files, notably CIC andArmy G-2, for references pertainingto Bolschwing. Two of the docu-ments (both derived frominformants) pinpointed Bolschwingas a member of Adolf Eichmann'sstaff. 49 (s)

CIA reacted seriously to the localtraces and gave Bolschwing a thirdpolygraph examination in September1953. 5' Bolschwing, "a rather poorLCFLUTTER (polygraph) subject,"underwent examinations for a totalof 22 hours during three separatedays that month. The examinerdetermined that "it appeared ques-tions regarding subject's activitiesprior to 1945 cause more LCFLUT-TER tension and disturbance thanquestions regarding his activities sub-sequent to 1945." When asked, for

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SecretBolschwing

example, about his connection toEichmann, Bolschwing claimed thathe had met him only twice andrefused to offer to join the "Eich-mann Sonderkommando." After"detailed discussion" on this point,the examiner concluded that "it doesnot appear that subject has beenwithholding any important informa-tion regarding Eichman[n], but,considering his initial reaction to thequestion, it is some minor factrelated to the matter that subject isunwilling to mention." 51 (S)

When asked about any official posi-tions that he had held with theNazis, Bolschwing "produced signifi-cant reactions every time thatparticular questions was asked." Thepolygraph operator then comparedBolschwing's reactions to questionsthat dealt with his activities bothbefore and after the end of the war."It is this examiner's considered opin-ion that this difference is not due toany deception but rather to the factthat subject is unable to recall all theexact details behind all the activitiesthat he has engaged in prior to thewar and during the war, and there-fore becomes emotionally disturbed

41X-rhAF/fteitert..that..be might. haveforgotten some essential point." 52 (S)

Despite the fact that CIA hadalready told the INS aboutBolschwing's NSDAP membership,Agency officials in Austria advisedhim not to admit this fact after hisarrival in the United States. 53 CIAworried that if Bolschwing admittedthis at a later date, the INS "wouldbe forced, for appearances sake, tofollow the letter of the law" anddeport the German. Bolschwing'simmigration visa had been procuredsolely through CIA's efforts despitethe objections of the INS. C.

also told Bolschwing not to

44Bolschwing's immigration

visa had been procuredsolely through CIA's efforts

despite the objections ofthe INS.

99contact any member of the CIA inthe United States, except in case of"dire emergency." This restrictionincluded the renewal of social con-tacts or trying to reenter theintelligence business.54 (S)

Headquarters quickly responded tothe field station's request about whatBolschwing should state about hisNazi record. In addition to warningBolschwing against applying for anysensitive or government jobs, EEelaborated on what approachBolschwing needed to take in theUnited States:

Assuming that he has not deniedNazi affiliations on his visaapplication form, he should defi-nitely not deny his record if thematter comes up in dealings withUS authorities and he is forcedto give a point-blank answer.Thus, if askeo4 he should admitmembership but attempt toexplain it away on the basis ofextenuating circumstances. If hewere to make a false statementon a citizenship application orother official paper, he would getinto trouble. Actually, GROSS-BAHN is not entering theUnited States under false circum-stances, as ODURGE [INS] willhave information concerning hispast record in a secret file. Hewill enter legally under anODURGE interpretation of theprovisions of the immigrationlaw applicable to his case. (Of

44- course, we are asking that theygrant such a favorable interpreta-tion.)55 (S)

By the end of 1953, Bolschwing'sonly real duties involved his prepara-tion to leave Austria with his wifeand son. He had already turned overhis agents to CIA case officers,although SOB expected his depar-ture to be . delayed until January1954. The layover required an exten-sion of Bolschwing's immigrant visawhich expired in December 1953.56The base, meanwhile, tied up looseends—a chore complicated onceagain by the fact that Bolschwinghad never paid Austrian taxes. TheAgency circumvented this dilemmaby having Bolschwing and his house-hold baggage leave the country underthe identity of Capt. Albert D. Eis-ner—a CIA pseudonym thatBolschwing had used in his earliertax battles.' 7 (S)

In wrapping up its affairs withBolschwing in Austria, CIA summa-rized the course of events thatresulted in his immigration. "It wasthe consensus of opinion (Headquar-ters, VOB, and SOB) that agent'stime in Austria had been used up; hewas too badly compromised and toowell identified as being a KUBARKagent in all circles." C. V stated that"GROSSBAHN was told that hisdays of usefulness in Austria wererapidly drawing to a close, and, if hewere ever to realize his ambition ofgetting to the States and becoming aUS citizen, now is the time to do it."CIA also advised Bolschwing that "ifhe did not accept the terms beingoffered to him at present, no guaran-tee could be made as to his ultimatefuture.” 58 (S)

68 Secret

uhrs'w

CIA-provided US Army ID card in the name of Capt. Albert A. Eisner. (S)

SecretBolschwing

As he left Austria for the UnitedStates (under the sponsorship of RoyGoggin, who had met Bolschwing atthe end of the war), the Germanagent expressed his pleasure: "I haveregarded it an honor to serve theUnited States and its government,and I feel utmost gratitude that I amadmitted to the United States tobecome a cidzen." 59 Bolschwing andhis family quickly setded in America.Writing from his hotel in New YorkCity to his CIA point of contact,Bolschwing admitted, "I do wish toexpress my thanks for the excellentarrangements with the immigrationauthorities. We were called for onthe boat and the chief inspector, whowas in possession of a govt. memo-randum signed by AssistantCommissioner Hogan, personallysaw to our immediate being passedthrough all formalities." 60 (S)

With a sigh of relief, Headquartersreported the safe arrival ofBolschwing in New York to Agencypersonnel in Austria. EE Divisionstated "it seems difficult CO believethat the GROSSBAHN case is at lastat an end, and we sincerely hope thathe has said a permanent good-bye CO

intelligence activities."61 Bolschwing

torrirr e7c-ileti- into ruew routine-inthe United States, working with vari-ous firms in New York andCalifornia; he became an Americancitizen in 1959. (S)

Bolschwing's Ties With Eichmann

Following the apprehension of AdolfEichmann in 1960 and his subse-quent trial and execution in Israel,the CIA examined its records con-cerning the "architect of the FinalSolution." . 2 of the

Counterintelligence Staff discoveredthat Bolschwing actually played a

larger role in the SS than he had pre-viously admitted. At the same time,some of Bolschwing's former CIAcontacts in Austria, including C.

grew suspicious of GROSS-BAHN's claims. In 1961, C -1stated that one of Bolschwing'sagents had proven "fraudulent" fol-lowing Bolschwing's departure to theUnited States.62 The Agency, how-ever, did not take any action againstBolschwing . after learning about hisfalse record, beyond asking him towithdraw his application for a USGovernment—sponsored position inIndia. 63 In 1963, Headquartersinformed its German station andbases that Bolschwing would be inEurope on a private visit and that hehad no connection with theAgency. 64 (S)

SLU Discovers Bolschwing

Over a decade later, in 1978,Bolschwing came to the attention of

the Special Litigation Unit (SLU) ofINS during its investigation of thewartime role of Valerian Trifa, aRumanian Iron Guard leader, andnow a bishop in the United States.Eugene M. Thirolf, an SLU attor-ney, inquired about certain Germanofficials posted in Rumania in 1941,and he requested information fromCIA on Otto Albrecht Alfred vonBolschwing, a German SS captainand the SD's representative in Bucha-rest during the early years of WorldWar 11.65 Thirolfs request raisedalarm bells in CIA because ofBolschwing's extensive record in theAgency. A quick review of these filesby both CIA and Martin Mendel-sohn, SLU's chief, revealed thatBolschwing "may not have beentotally frank when he neglected tomention past membership in theNazi Party" upon applying for natu-ralization in 1959. 66 By early 1979,SLU launched a separate investiga-tion of Bolschwing's immigrationand his wartime activities; ironically,

Secret 69

SecretBolschwing

Mendelsohn had initially planned touse Bolschwing as a witness againstTrifa. C. an attorneywith CIA's Office of General Coun-sel, warned in early March 1979 thatan investigation of Bolschwingthreatened the Agency because a pre-liminary examination of his recordsraised a number of "obvious ques-tions" about his relationship withCIA over the years.° (S)

OS! Enters the Picture

Jeffrey Mausner took over theBolschwing investigation for theDepartment of Justice's new Officeof Special Investigations (OSI) in thesummer of 1979 and continued toexamine the Agency's holdings. 68 ByNovember 1979, Martin Mendel-sohn approached CIA with severalurgent questions regarding its affilia-tion with Bolschwing. In light ofOSI's imminent suit againstBolschwing, the Department of Jus-tice was concerned whether CIA hadany objections to the legal proceed-ings or if the German couldblackmail the Agency. Mendelsohnalso expressed uncertainty as tovOlioials..might testifyon Bolschwing's behalf in view of hisclose connections with the Agency.69(S)

In January 1980, representativesfrom the CIA's Office of GeneralCounsel (OGC) and the Directorateof Operations (DO) held a meetingwith OSI co thrash out Mendel-sohn's questions. Speaking for theAgency, the DO'ssaid that CIA did not plan to assistBolschwing with his defense. Giventhe fact that Bolschwing's knowledgeof CIA operations was dated,doubted that the Agency had toworry about any form of blackmail.

66Pressure mounted in 1980

as famous Nazi-hunterSimon Wiesenthal

announced Bolschwing'spresence in the United

States.

99

warned, however, that theAgency did not know whatBolschwing's case officer, c

a had told him when applyingfor a visa because L z had sincedied. Likewise, the DO noted thatthe INS possessed an "auxiliary" fileon Bottschwing at the time of hisdeparture from Austria; neither CIAor the INS, however, could locatethese records. The Agency expressedconcern about this fact in the eventBolschwing's attorney subpoenaedall CIA material relevant to thecase." (S)

Mounting Pressure

Pressure mounted in 1980 as famousNazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthalannounced Bolschwing's presence inthe United States. 71 Despite C.verbal assurances in January 1980that CIA had no objections to OSI'ssuit, the Agency failed to report thisin writing. Pressed by OSI's newdirector, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., for ananswer to his office's letter of 50November 1979 about Bolschwing,CIA delayed any formal answer untilthe summer of 1980. At that time,OGC attorney C.--tried to clarify some of OSI's con-cerns about the Agency's standing onthis case and the availability of itsrecords for use in court. He reiter-ated point that "CIA has noobjection to the initiation of proceed-ings against von Bolschwing. Indeed,

oat-position on this matter isneutral, and our only interest is toprotect sensitive and classified infor-mation concerning our formerrelationship with von Bolschwing."72(S)

OSI still expressed great anxiety ...about the Agency's knowledge ofBolschwing's background at the timeof his immigration in the mid-1950s.OSI's concerns resulted from .another Nazi war criminal caseWhen OSI dropped its suit against aformer CIA agent because of the dis-covery of corroborating evidence inAgency files. Jeffrey Mausner submit-ted an eight-page letter to theAgency in which he emphasized that"most of our cases are based on aclaim that the defendant misrepre-sented his Nazi background at thetime of his entry into the US or atthe time of his naturalization. It is,"Mausner wrote, "therefore importantto know exactly what INS, StateDepartment, and CIA knew aboutvon Bolschwing at the time of hisentry and naturalization." OSI askedthat the CIA search its records forany "preliminary questionnaire" usedby the State Department's consularoffice in Munich to process his visaapplication in the second half of1953. Likewise, the Department ofJustice asked the Agency to producean expert witness to discuss therecordkeeping procedures of theAlieriAffairs Staff of the 1950s inorder to testify as to how this officeinterfaced with INS. OSI clearlywanted to avoid any controversiesregarding "third agency" material inCIA files. 73 (5)

The Agency, however, could not sat-isfy OSI's requests because thepassage of time had rendered it diffi-cult to reconstruct the complicatedtwists involved with Bolschwing's

70 Secret

SecretBolschwIng

immigration. C- was dead, andofficers familiar with the work of theAlien Affairs Staff in the early 1950shad long since retired. While theAgency identified third agency mate-rial within its files and sent copies ofthese documents for review by theproper officers (including the StateDepartment, Army, and NSA), CIAcould not reconstruct the "auxiliary"file on Bolschwing. 74 (S)

In early 1981, OSI held an "on therecord" interview with Bolschwing athis home in California. Representedby his son, attorney Golman V. vonBolschwing, OGC's C.._and the DO's C alsoattended the meeting. After discuss-ing procedural issues, "Gus"Bolschwing did most of the talkingand tried to defend his father'sactions after nearly half a century.He labeled OSI's actions as "hypoc-risy" because the details ofBolschwing's life had been known toAmerican authorities before hisarrival in the United States. "...andso I wonder as I sit here," theyounger Bolschwing asked, "does themeans justify the end? Do twowrongs make a right? It is just as dif-

ul&fpr y At this p_oini.toprove his case, to disprove pieces ofpaper that are now 40 years old, as itwas for certain individuals who didtry to do justice to find and to prose-cute Germans when there were noliving witnesses or it was very hard toobtain living witnesses."Bolschwing's son then described hisfather's deteriorating physical andmental condition which affected hisability to recollect events in his past.Subsequent questioning by Mausnerconfirmed that Bolschwing's mem-ory about his membership in theNazi Party and the SS was, indeed,fragile. 75 (S)

OS! Files Suit

OSI filed suit against Bolschwing inlate May 1981 in the US DistrictCourt for the Eastern District of Cal-ifornia. Allan Ryan and his attorneyslinked Bolschwing's wartime activi-ties in Germany and Rumania toGerman efforts to persecute theJews. Bolschwing faced three countsof procuring his citizenship in 1959through willful misrepresentationwhen he failed to declare his mem-bership in the Nazi Party, the SS, theSD, and the RSHA—all organiza-tions declared criminal by theInternational Military Tribunal inNuremberg. The Department of Jus-tice also accused Bolschwing of alack of good moraLcharacter for hisactions during World War II and formaking false testimony. The courtordered the former German officerto appear at the US Attorney's Officein Sacramento for deposition and toprovide all records, photographs, orother documents from 1932 to1945. 76 (U)

Claiming Service as OSS Agent

To limit the damage to his case,Bolschwing presented a new twistwhich appeared in a Sacramentonewspaper shortly after OSI filed itssuit. Bolschwing now claimed thathe had actually served as a "secretagent" for the OSS during the war."It's not true," Bolschwing said, "Inever served in the SS or Gestapo orSD (the intelligence branch of theSS). I did serve in the OSS for theAmericans, and I did parachute intoAustria." According to Bolschwing,"It was dangerous work in Germany(for the Americans)." In a separatestatement, Bolschwing confided thathe had even met William J. Dono-van, later director of OSS in New

wp".York before the outbreak of WorldWar II. Allan Ryan, speaking forOS!, immediately denouncedBolschwing's statement. "What hesaid is not true. Our case relates fromthe middle 1930s through the war,and, during that period, he was not adouble agent for the United States oranything like that. He was not affili-ated in any vvay with the USGovernment." 17 (U)

Like many of OSI's other cases, theBolschwing suit presented numerouslegal complications. Bolschwing'sattorneys, including his son, believedthat they needed security clearancesto speak with him about his relation-ship with the CIA during thepostwar years. The defense alsowanted access to all governmentrecords pertaining to Bolschwingwhich delayed the case because nei-ther OSI or CIA were able to meetthe request for production. OSI pro-tested against the need for totalproduction as opposed to using onlythose government records relevant tothe court case. This promptedBolschwing's attorney, Arthur J.Ruthenbedc, to tell the media in Sep-tember 1981 that "my hands havebeen tied.... I'm just trying to getauthorization for my client to talkwith me." He added, "We're in a realCatch-22 situation. One arm of thegovernment prosecutes the case, andanother says you can't talk to yourclient."78 OGC'ssaw this situation in a different light:"Your hypothetical inability to repre-sent your client, based upon yourperception of unknown contractuallimitations, similarly suggests a desireto infuse this litigation with prema-ture issues." 79 Bolschwing, accordingto both OS! and CIA, was free to dis-cuss all issues with his attorney,although the Department of Justicestipulated that classified material

Secret 71

NOTES

1. C —1 to C.D CIA Executive Director,

SecretBolschwing

could not be discussed -outside thecourtroom. (U)

Records access and the defense'sbelief that it needed special permis-sion to speak with Bolschwinghampered the suit; in the meantime,Bolschwing's health continued todeteriorate. At the behest of OSI,

M prepared a classified affidavitto support the government's motionfor a protective order.the DO's Information ReviewOfficer (IRO), cited the need to pro-tect critical national securityinformation from unauthorized dis-closure as well as to protectconfidential sources. The IRO com-mented that the "DO filesconcerning von Bolschwing containextensive information on intelligencemethodology in use by CIA." TheAgency, C. asserted, "...cannot,on the public record in this litiga-tion, acknowledge the existence ofsuch information without jeopardiz-ing the sanctity of classifiedinformation."° (S)

CIA's efforts turned out to be unnec-essary as OSI's director announcedin late 1981 that Bolschwing volun-

lere.d laimçriccitizenship Su admitting his mem-bership in various Naziorganizations. As a consequence,OSI did not take Bolschwing tocourt, although Ryan agreed that theaging Bolschwing, diagnosed with aprogressive neurological condition,"

could remain in the United Statesuntil his health improved as to per-mit deportation. Ryan, in a preparedstatement, refuted Bolschwing's last-minute claim that he had served as awartime OSS agent. He also notedthat the consent decision, offered byBolschwing's defense, "was made by

this office in consultation withhigher authorities in the Department

44Bolschvving voluntarily

surrendered his Americancitizenship after admittinghis membership in various

Nazi organizations.

99of Justice and was not reviewed by,or submitted for the approval of anyother government agency." 81 (U)

A Closed Case?

The case ended in March 1982,when Bolschwing died at the age of72 of progressive supranuclearpalsy.'2 Despite his death, the casehas great significancejor the CIA asit raises questions about the Agency'srecruitment policies during the earlyCold War. During the 1970s and1980s, the GAO conducted twomajor investigations to ascertain therole of Federal agencies in assistingNazi war criminals." In addition,the OSI had its own cases; needlessto say, the Nazi war criminal investi-gations have attracted considerableCongressional, media, and publicinterest. The CIA, in particular, hasbeen criticized for its postwar activi-ties and secrecy. The Bolschwingcase reinforced widespread percep-tions that the Agency assisted Nazisafter the war and also brought themto the United States." Echoes of theBolschwing case continue to reverber-ate today as several members ofCongress have presented bills toforce the Agency to open its recordson all Nazi war criminals and collab-orators. (U)

wr- 22 December 1983, Directorate ofOperations Records, Job CBox 8, folder 170, CIA Archives andRecords Center (ARC) (U). ra former CIA officer in postwar Aus-tria, believed that "the ones that gotmost of this misinformation were theones with the most money (or black-market cigarettes): CIC and theGehlen organization." (U)

2. For a lengthy study of the problemsof false intelligence, see Paper Millsand.Fabricators, a 1951 CIA study.CIA History Staff Records, HS/CSG-2375 and HS/CSG-2485, Job L.

.-3 Boxes 2 and 5 (respec-tively), CIA ARC (S).

3. As an example of one such controver-sial case, see David E. Murphy,Sergei A. Kondrashev, and GeorgeBailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs.KGB in the Cold War (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1997) aboutAmerican agent Igor G. Orlov. (U)

4. Henry Hedcsher to Richard Helms,"Operation RUSTY," 18 March1948, DO Records, JobBox 5, Folder 8, CIA ARC (S).

5. Security Control, Foreign Branch Mto Security Control, American Zone(AMZON), CIG, "OperationRUSTY," 27 January 1947, X-9213,DO Records, Job C.. .. 6,(no folder listed), CIA ARC (S).

6. For further information about theearly years of the West German intel-ligence service, see Kevin C. Ruffner,"A Controversial Liaison Relation-ship: American Intelligence and theGehlen Organization, 1945-49,"Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 41, No. 1(1997), pp. 69-84, (S).

7. The Army's CIC, in particular,resented the development of RUSTYand the free range that its agentsoperated in Germany. After theCIA's assumption of the German ser-vice, the CIC launched its ownintelligence-gathering project, Opera-tion CAMPUS, against Gehlen. CIA,

72 Secret

SecretBolschwIng

1.0".likewise, launched-an intensive data-gathering operation, known asUJDREDGER and later WEN-TURE, to identify Germanintelligence personnel and methods.The Agency also implemented a tele-phone and mail intercept program,known as CALLIKAK. See . C..

C..

ClandesFine Services Historical Series-, DCI History Staff, 1973,4

vols. Vol. 3, pp. XI-12 through XI-21, and Vol_ 4, p. XXVII-10 containspecific information about CIA's col-lection program. Name trace requestsand results for UJDREDGER arefound in DO Records, Job C.

.7 Box 1, Folders 10-17, CIAARC (S).

8. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, to Chief,FBM, "ODEUM and Austria,* 12December 1949, MGL-A-945, (S),in Otto von Bolschwing, file C.

-7 DO Records. This samedocument is Also found in DORecords, Job C._ Box 5,Folder 5, CIA ARC (S). .

9. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, to Chief,FBM, "ODEUM and Austria," 12December 1949, MGL-A-945, (S),in Bolschwing, C.. n (S).

10. Washington to Vienna, Heidelberg,27 March 1947, (S), in Bolschwing,

.See.akosSer-nrity Con-trol Division to CommandingOfficer, Austria, "Otto AlbrechtAlfred von Bolschwing," 25 March1947, X-9573, DO Records, JobC, Box 6, (no folder

listed), CIA ARC (S).

11. Security Control Division, Austriato Chief, FBM, "Otto AlbrechtAlfred Bolschwing," 16 April 1947,(S), in Bolschwing, (S).

12. Undated, unsigned, typed note inBolschwing, C.. (S).

13. A synopsis of Bolschwing's life andNazi career is found in Allen A...Ryan, Jr., Quiet Neighbors.. Prosecut-ing Nazi War Criminals in America

_ (San Diego: Harcourt Brace"Jovanovich, 1984), pp. 218-239(U).

14. See chief of station, Karlsruhe, toChief, FBM, "ODEUM Person-nel—Otto Albrecht Baron vonBolschwing," MGL-A-507, 3 Octo-ber 1949, enclosing Bolschwing,"Statement on Life History," 14September 1949, (S), inBolschwing, .-J

15. Bolschwing received certificatesfrom various American units in Aus- •tria, including the 71st and 410thInfantry Regiments for service inthe summer of 1945. He laterclaimed to have worked with the44th Infantry Division from Aprilthrough June 1945; the 103rdInfantry Division in July andAugust 1945; tEe 84th InfantryDivision until December 1945;and, finally, with 3rd Army Intelli-gence through December 1946.One of the officers who providedBolschwifig with a certificate, Lt.Col. Roy F. Goggin of the 71stInfantry Regiment, later sponsoredhim as an immigrant (U)..

16. Bolschwing, "Statement on LifeHistory." (U)

17. Undated, unsigned memorandum,"UNREST (Bolschwin g) Files," inBolschwing, C. ..3 (S).

18. Undated, unsigned, untitled report,with letterhead "Central Intelli-gence Agency Washington 25,D.C.," in Bolschwing, C._(S).

19. FDM, Memorandum, "Projects114, 115, 116 (Bolschwing Ruma-nian Projects)," 9 February 1950, inBolschwing, J (S). Seealso t to S. B. Bossard,"ODEUM Rumanian Projects Con-trolled by von Bolschwing," 15November 1949, in Bolschwing,

C (S).20. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, to

Chief, FDM, "ODEUM Situation

Austria," 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1198, in Bolschwing, C(S).

21. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, toChief; FDM, "Interim Solution tothe Bolschwing-Austrodeurn Prob-lem, 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1200, in Bolschwing,(S). Bolschwing's account of his dis-missal is found in chief of station,Karlsruhe, to Chief; FDM,"Bolschwing Report--ODEUM, "1February 1950, MGL-A-1199,enclosing *Final Conversation withGerman Organizational Chiefs," 26January 1950, in Bolschwing, C

(S).

22. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, toChief; FDM, "Interim Solution cothe Bolschwing-Austrodeum Prob-lem," 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1200, in Bolschwing(S).

23. AUSTRODEUM II," Extract ofReport, 20 March 1950, MGL-A-1540, in Bolschwing, C._ .=(S).

24. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, toChief, FDM, "ODEUM SituationAustria," 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1198, in Bolschwing,(S).

25. The German Intelligence Services,two volumes of British Intelligencereports on German Abwehr and SD/SS intelligence personnel, organiza-tions, and operations compiledduring World War II. The "Ger-man Primer" was used by Alliedintelligence during the war andremained in use afterwards. SeeCSHFC DVol. XI, p. 12.Acopy of the "German Primer" isavailable in the DCl/HS files. (S)

26. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, to chiefof base, Pullach, "Operational FileChecks," 24 April 1950,MGB-A-5974, in Bolschwing, C.:—(S).

Secret 73

SecretBolsch wing

27. “AUSTRODEUMII," Extract ofReport, 20 March 1950, MGL-A-1540, in Bolschwing,(S).

28. At least 24 cables about •Bolschwing's tax situation andCIA's efforts are located in

2 (S).

29. For CIA's summary report ofBolschwing's tax case, see "USAGEStatus as of 15 June 1951," (S), inBolschwing C. -= An Aus-trian report noted Bolschwing'saffiliation with the "CIC" inSalzburg and that he did notundergo denazification because ofhis claims to have been an activeunderground fighter. Report alsostates Bolschwing's SS rank andthat he served in the SD. See chiefof station, Vienna, to chief of sta-tion, Karlsruhe, "Austrian PoliceReport on Otto von Bolschwing,"12 November 1950, MAV-A-7053,(S), in Bolschyving, (S).

30. Extract, MGL-A-3208, 29 August1950 [Notes of meeting betweenCritchfield and Bolschwing, 24August 1950], (S), in Bolschwing,

C. See also chief of sta-tion, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM,"OFFSPRING-Austria," 29 August1950, MGL-A-3208, DO Records,

C .Box 5;_foleler.5,CIA ARC (S), Bolschwing's code-name changed from UNREST toUSAGE on 17 March 1950. See -Cable, SO to Pullach, Karlsruhe,and Vienna, OUT 51267, 17 -March 1950, (S)-in Bolschwing,C (S).

31. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, toChief, FEivi, "USAGEiOperationaiReport, 12 September 1950, MGL-A-3321, (S), in Bolschwing, C.

(S).

32. In addition to providingBolschwing with a military identifi-cation card and "dog tags," theAgency also established a "back-stop" military unit for CaptainEisner. Chief of station, Vienna, to

chief of station, Frankfurt,"USAGE-Military Cover Address,"12 June 1952, MASA-1751, DORecords, Job .2 Box 13,Folder 7, CIA ARC (S).

33. The identities of many ofBolschwing's contacts and Head-quarters trace results are located inhis 201 file. For an example, seechief of station, Vienna, to Chief,EE, 14 May 1952, MAS-A-1644,endosing the Personal Record Ques-tionnaire on Dr. Anton Fellner and,Austrian lawyer, who published aNazi paper, the Volkisther Bea,.backer in Austria before the war.He later commanded a propaganda .unit in Russia and became a colonelin the SS. Many of Bolschwing'scontacts and sub-agents shared simi-lar badcgrounds. The identities of:

34. USAGE Status is of 15 June 1951"and "Rumania," in Bolschwing,

(S). Donald Huefnerat 1-1eadquarters demanded thatPullach base determine what itplanned to do with Bolsc.hwing.Chief; FBM, to chief of station,Karlsruhe, "USAGE," 31 July1951, MGK-W-9897, inBolschwing, (S).

,35. See Chief, FDM, to chief of sta-

tion, Karlsruhe, "USAGE," 25October 1951, MGK-W-11190, inDO Records, Job C.Box14. Folder 5. CIA ARC (S) Forother correspondence, see chief of•station, Vienna to Chief, FDM,"USAGE," 26 September 1951,MAS-A-811, (S), and chief of sta-tion, Vienna, to Chief; FDM,"USAGE," 28 November 1951MAS-A-1030. (S), in DO Records,Job C.- Box 14, folder 5,CIA ARC. See also chief of station,Frankfurt, to Chief, EE, "Takeoverof USAGE by SALZ," 5 February

1952, MGL-A-10265, inBolschwing, C (S).

36. Chief of station, Vienna, to Chief;EE, "USAGE-Salzburg BaseAssessment," 7 May 1952, MAS-A-1418, in Bolschwing, C.(S).

37• IbieL; . Bolschwing's polygraphreporrisoted his response as toWhether he was hiding anything .frOinCIA.- ffIt .woUld, of course, beremarkable, if the subject had noth-ing important to hide from us. Heseveral times stated that his life wasan open book to us, and we couldask what we like. Sensitivity to thequestion was not of an order thatwould indicate this man had some-thing Vitally important to concealfrom us but that there was at leastone thing that he would rather notdiscuss about his past." Chief of sta-tion, Frankfurt, to Chief; EE, -"Detailed Report of CARRIAGETest of USAGE on 19 April 1952,"21 April 1952, MGM-A-09283, in.Bolschwing, C (S).

38. Undated, unsigned report ofBolschwing operations at time oftakeover by Salzburg base inBolschwing, ar. (S).

39. Acting Chief, Projects Branch, toChief,-Plans, "Project GROSS-BARN (Formalization andRenewal), 16 February1953, inBolschwing, C. (S).

40. Chief of station, Vienna, to Chief,EE, "GROSSBAHN-U.S. Citizen-ship," 29 September 1952, EAS-A-112, in oIN I

uiscawing, L(s).

41. Ibid. The Austrian station also sentinformation to Headquarters con-cerning Bolsdiwing's second wifeand child. See chief of station,Vienna, to Chief, EE, "GROSS-BAHN-U.S. Citizenship,"1 October 1952, EAS-A-113, inBolschwing, (S).

Bolschwing's agents by name andcode number are found in chief ofbase, Salzburg to chief of station,Vienna, "GROSSBAHN PersonnelIdentities." 12 August 1953, SOB/644, in DO Records, Job C.

Box 13, Folder 7, CIAARC (S).

74 Secret

SecretBolschwing

42. Chief, EE to chief of station,Vienna, "GROSSBAHN-U.S. Cit-izenship," in Bolschwing,

3 (S).

43. Ibid.

44. US attempts to procure Austrian cit-izenship for Bolschwing wereabortive. See chief of base, Salzburgto chief of station, Vienna, "Groovy/Grossbahn Citizenship," 14 Novem-ber 1952, SLZ-7069; chief ofstation, Vienna, to chief of base,Salzburg, "Grossbahn Citizenship,"19 December 1952; chief of base,Salzburg to Chief, EE, "Gross-bahn-Austrian Citizenship," 8April 1953, EAS-A-1147; and chiefof base, Salzburg, co chief of station,Vienna, "Grossbahn-Austrian Citi-zenship," 24 June 1953, VIENSOB/1200, in Bolschwing, C

(S). Bolschwing failed toget Austrian citizenship because hehad not lived in the country for therequired 10 years and from opposi-tion within the AustrianGovernment.

45. Chief of base, Salzburg, to Chief,EE, "Grossbahn-U.S. Citizen-ship," 14 April 1953, EAS-A-1188,in Bolschwing, C. (S).

46. Bolschwing was not the only mem-ber of Gehlen's staff to enter the

°V--• "I'- --tiier14tates.... kir a Ilst-OffitArwarGerman intelligence service person-nel residing in America, see Chief,EE, to chief of base, Pullach,"Former ZIPPER/UPSWING Per-sonnel in the U.S.," 21 December1956. EGL-W-2995, DO Records,Job Box 2, Folder 38,CIA ARC (S).

47. Cable, DCI to Senior Representa-tive Austria, OUT 84658, 28August 1953, in Bolschwing, C

(S).

48. Chief, EE, to Director of Security,ATTN: Alien Affairs Officer,"Request for Aid in Facilitating USEntry for Agent," [undated], in

Bolschwing, C (S). Seealso C to E..

M "Mechanics of Aiding Agentto Obtain US Visa," 19 May 1953,in Bolschwing, C (S). Anote at the bottom of this pagestates CIA anticipated problems inobtaining visa becatise ofBolschwing's Nazi Party affiliations(S).

49. Chief of base to Chief, EE, "Ottovon Bolschwing-Local Traces," 28September 1953, EASA-2171, inBolschwing, c (5).

50. Bolschwing's first polygraph tookplace in April 1952, and a second

• test occurred in May 1953, whenCIA learned that one of his agentshad been in totich with WilhelmHoettl, a former SS officer andnotorious intelligence peddler. SeeChief, EE to chief of base, Salzburg,"Grossbahn-CC-2," 26 Novem-ber 1952, EAS-W-82; chief of base,Salzburg to Chief, EE "Grossbahn-CC-2," 2 February 1953, EAS-A-770; and chief of base, Salzburg, toChief, EE, "Grossbahn-GeneralSecurity," 6 May 1953, EASA-1310, in Bolschwing, c_(s)

51. C.. • to chief of operations,Salzburg, "LCFLUTTER Test ofGROSSBAHN," 29 September1953, SIM/89; and Cable, SeniorRepresentative Austria to DCI, IN22563, 30 September 1953; ,co Chief, EE, "Resume LCFLUT-TER Test of Grossbahn," 15October 1953, EAG-A-2210, inBolschwing, 1 (S).

52. Ibid.

53. The CIA also informed the StateDepartment about Bolschwing'simmigration and Nazi record. SeeCable, Senior Representative Aus-tria to DCI, IN 35971, 20November 1953, in Bolschwing,

(S).

54. Chief of base, Salzburg, to Chief,EE, "GROSSBAHN-Termina-don," 29 October 1953,EAS-A-2412, in Bolschwing,(S).

55. Chief, EE, to chief of base,Salzburg and chief of station,Vienna, "GROSSBAHN-Termi-nation, 24 November 1953, EAS-W-576, in Bolschwing,

(S).

56. Chief of base, Salzburg, to Chief,EE, "GROSSBAHN-ProgressReport for the Period 1 October co30 November 1953," 10 December1953, EAS-A-2619, and chief ofbase, Salzburg, to Chief, EE,"GROSSBAHN-Termination,"10 December 1953, EASA-2619, inBolschwing, C (S).

57. Chief of base, Salzburg, to Chief,EE, "GROSSBAHN-Final Termi-nation Report," 27 January 1954,EAS-A-2869, in Bolschwing, C

(S).

58. Ibid. Bolschwing received termini-don benefits of $400, induding abonus of six months' pay as well asfree transportation on the SSAndrea Doria from Genoa, Italy, toNewYork. Chief, EE to Fl/Plans,"Termination of Project GROSS-BAHN," 22 December 1953, inBolschwing, C (S). Atthe conclusion ot the project, CIAhad 55 reels of microfilm ofBolschwing reports with an addi-tional 10 reels of indexes datingfrom 1948. See Memorandum forRecord, C. Z. RecordsIntegration/Projects Officer,"GROSSBAHN Files (SALZ-CIA-PRO-1)," 16 January 1956, inBolschwing, c (S). allthe microfilm material is located inDO/IMS, Central Files Branch. Inaddition to a large 201 file, exten-sive records pertaining toBolschwing collected by SOB sur-vive as SALZ-CIA-PRO-1 and arenow filed as DO Records, Job L.

, Boxes 9, 13, and 14: CIA _,ARC (S).

Secret 75

SecretBolschwIng

59. For Bolschwing's siionsorship, seechief of base, Salzburg, to chief ofmission, Germany, "GROSS-BAHN-Termination," 23 October1953, EASA-2381, in Bolschwing,

C.. (5). Bolschwing's notefound in his 201 file (5).

60. Bolschwing to "Sidney R. Adams,"2 February 1954, in Bolschwing,

(S).

61. Chief, EE, to chief ofbase,Salzburg, (no tide, no date), EAS77-679, in Bolschwing, E.(S).

62. C w'M "Inge von der Tann,"

(undated c. 1961), Office of GeneralCounsel (OGC) Records, Job a

3 Box 2, Folder 29, CIAARC (S).

63. Gordon M. Stewart, Chief; EasternEurope Division, to DDP, "OttoAlbrecht Alfred von Bolschwing." 10May 1961, 0.GC Records, Job C

„,„7 Box 2, Folder 29, CIAARC (S).

64. Cable, Headquarters to Frankfurt,DIR 70116, 19 September 1963,OGC Records, Job C. , Box2; Folder 29, CIA ARC (S).

§.2 CO C•

13GC; 18 Ju1i19n3; CO1421, with attachment dated 9August 1978, OGC Records, Job C

Box Z Folder 29, CIAARC. .3 also sought informa-don on Boris T. Pash, a US Armyofficer detailed to CIA at varioustimes, and two other Germans,Arthur A. Konradi and Dr. HeinrichGraf von Meran.

66. to Martin Mendel-sohn, 2 February 1979, OGC 79-01118, OGC Records, Job t C.Box 2, folder 29, CIA ARC (S).

67. For a discussion of the early aspectsof this case, see C. _Ito GeneralCounsel, "Otto Albrecht Alfred ;ionBolsc.hwing-Possible violation of 18

-USC 1001 and 1015 (False State-ments to the U.S. Government)," 12Mara 1979, (S). added somecomments to this memo in April1979 that shed further informationabout the early Bolschwing investiga-don. See C -c to ( c"Attached Memorandum on OttoAlbrecht Alfred von Bolsawing," 5April 1979, (C), both documents inOGC Records, Job C.- -1, Box2, folda 29, CIA ARC (S).

68. Mendelsohn to 1 16 July1979. OGC 79-06581; .

.3 • to r "Department ofJustice Investigation of alleged NaziWar Criminals-Otto Albrecht vonBolschwing,* OGC 79-07460, 13

,August 1979, (S); T to22 August 1979, OGC 79-

°7895. (S); ant, C. 3 to C26 October 1979, OGC 79-09696,(S), all documents in OGC Records,Job C Box 2, Folder 29,CIA ARC (S).

69. Mendelsohn to C .3 30November 1979, OGC 79-10974,OGC Records, Job C. . Box 2,Folder 29, CIA ARC (S).

70. C.- , Memorandum for theRecord, 'Meeting with Departmentof Justice Representatives on AllegedNazi War Criminals Otto vonBolschwing and Tscherim Soob-zokov,* 17 January 1980, OGC 80-°0581, OGC Records, Job C

Box 2, Folder 29, CIA ARC(S).

71. Bulletin of Information No. 20, 31January 1980, Dokumentationszen-trum des Bunt/es, Jut/itches VerAterdes Nazirefimes in OGC Records,C.- , Box 2, Folder 29,CIA ARC. In a routing sheet toOGC, C annotated, "FYI. Itlooks like the start of a campaign toget Von Bolschwing" (S).

72. See Allan A. Ryan, Jr., to3 3 May 1980, OGC 80-0492, (S)

ant C 2 reply, C to Ryan,12 June 1980, OGC 80-04978, (S),

both in OGC Records, Job 85-00903, Bost 2, Folder 28 CIA ARC(5). For background informationabout C. I response,sec. C 1 to c _3 "Depart-ment of Justice Questionsconcerning Otto von Bolschwing," 2April 1980, OGC 80-02813, OGCRecords, Job C... .3 Box 2,Folder 29, CIA ARC (S).

73. Mausner, "Otto von Bolschwing,"28 *August 1980; and C a CO

C. -2 "Meeting with DOJ Repre-sentatives concerning their.Investigation of Edgars Lairnielcsand Otto von Bolscliwing, 2 Sep-tember 1980, OGC 80-07543, (5);Note to a , "Otto vonBolschwing," (undated); and C.

3 Director of Security to"Department of Justice

Request re Nazi War Criminals Inves-tigation of Otto Albrecht vonBolschwing,," 19 September 1980,OGC 80-08078, (5), all documentsin OGC Records, Job C. .3Box 2, Folder 28, CIA ARC. (S)

74. The identity and location of the"auxiliary" file remains a mystery.OSI reviewed Bolschwing's 201 file,but it is uncertain if they ever sawSOB's files pertaining.to the Germanagent. For further description ofthese project files and Bolschwing'smicrofilm records, see Note 58above. (U)

75. L -7 to C.3 13 February 1981, OGC 81-

01452, endosing Sworn Statementof Otto Albrecht Alfred vonBolschwing, A8-610-051, 2 February1981. in OGC Files, Job C

-.3 Box 2, folder 25, CIA ARC(S).

76. US v. Otto Albrecht illn.ed vonBolschwing, Civil Action S-81-308MIS, United States District Court,Eastern District of California, 27May 1981. See also US v. Bolschwing,Notice of Taking Deposition, 5 June1981, both documents in OGCRecords, Job E., Box 2,

76 Secret

SecretBolschwing

folder 25, CIA ARC. OSI apparentlydropped the charge of willful misrep-resentation but retained the immoralconduct charge. See C -M to Wil-liam F. Donnelly, "United States v.Otto Albrecht von Holschwing," 29May 1981, DO Records, Job C..

M Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC(C).

77. Ryan to C. .M Mune 1981,OGC 81-05215, endosing "AllegedNazi Denies Federal Charge, Says HeSpied for U.S.," San Francisco Chroni-cle. lc. May 1981), OGC Files, JobC -n Box 2, Folder 25, CIA

ARC. Bolschwing repeated this asser-tion in The New York Timer. See"Man, 71, is Ordered to Reply toCharge of Serving the Nazis," TheNew York Times, 29 July 1981, p.A13. CIA denied that Bolschwinghad any connection with Donovanor the OSS. See C _1 to Ryan, 18August 1981, OGC 81-07107, OGCFiles, Job C Box 1, Folder4, CIA ARC (S).

78. S. Lynn Walker, "Accused Nazi'sDefense Hampered by CIA OrderNot to Talk, Attorney Says," Sacra-mento Union, 10 September 1981.See also toRodney G. Smith, OSI, 10 Septem-ber 1981, OGC Records, Job C...

foidti-ARC (S).

79. C to E 21 Septem-ber 1981, OGC 81-08314, OGC

Records, Jot C.- Box 2,Folder 25, CIA ARC. (S)

80. See C to Neil Sher, DeputyDirector, OSI, 6 November 1981,enclosing C —3 Affidavit,US v. Bolschwing, (S), OGC Records,Job C. Box 2, Folder 25,CIA ARC (S).

81. See "Statement of Allan A. Ryan,Jr., director, Office of Special Investi-gations," with annotated comments,in OGC Records, Job C_Box 2, Folder 25, CIA ARC. (S)

82. Otto von Bolschwing; Ex-Captainin Nazi SS," The New York Times, 10March 1982, p. B-5 (U).

85. United States GAO, ComptrollerGeneral of the United States, Wide-spread CompiracY to Obstruct Probes ofAlleged Nazi War Criminals Not Sup-ported by Available Evidence—Controversy May Continue, GGD-78-73 (Washington, DC: GAO, 1978)and Nazis and Axis CollaboratorsWere Used to Further US Anti-Com-munist Objectives in Europe—SomeImmigrated to the United States, GA/GGD-85-66 (Washington, DC:GAO, 1985). Bolschwing isdescribed as Subject C in the 1985GAO Report (U).

84. Christopher Simpson, Blowback:The First Full Account ofAmerica'sRecruitment of Nazir, and its Disas-trous Effect on Our Domestic andForeign Policy (New York: Weiden-feld and Nicholson, 1988), pp. 252-259 (U).

Secret 77