Defend your Virtual Infrastructure with Windows Server 2016 Security

Richard TimmeringPremier Field Engineer

… perhaps it’s obvious but why does all this matter?

First: context refresher

”There are two kinds of big companies, those who’ve been hacked, and those who don’t know they’ve been hacked.”

Source: McKinsey, Ponemon Institute, Verizon

CYBER THREATS ARE A MATERIAL RISK TO YOUR BUSINESS

Impact of lost productivity and growth

Average cost of a data breach (15% YoY increase)

$3.0 TRILL ION $4 MILL ION

Corporate liability coverage.

$500 MILL ION

“ .”- M C K I N S E Y

Breaches cost a lot

of money

(Average $4M based

on Ponemon Institute)

Customers pay

for your service

You pay customers

compensation to

keep them using

your service

Productivity

Employees efficiently

perform the majority

of work activities

using a desktop

computer

Employees waste hours

a day running back and

forth to a fax machine(assuming you still have

one)

Overspending Reflex

Appropriately sized

& dedicated

IT Security team

IT Security team exponentially

increases in size and remediation

efforts require new

and expensive

products

$ $$

$

$

Industry Reputation

Industry credibility, positive

reputation, customer confidence

Corporate secrets

are secret

Loss of credibility, embarrassing

information exposed, customer’s

lose faith

Corporate secrets are public

knowledge; potential loss of

competitive advantage

Ransomware

HBI/MBI assets available for

day-to-day business

operations

Assets encrypted and key business

IT services rendered

useless

Customer trustCustomers happy to trust

you with their PII

Customers reluctant

to share information

with you

Attack

24–48 hours Mean dwell time 150+ days(varies by industry)

First host compromised

Domain admin compromised

Attack discovered

attack

Malicious Attachment Execution

Browser or Doc Exploit Execution

Stolen Credential Use

Internet Service Compromise

Kernel-mode Malware

Kernel Exploits

Pass-the-Hash

Malicious Attachment Delivery

Browser or Doc Exploit Delivery

Phishing Attacks

ESPIONAGE, LOSS OF IPDATA THEFT RANSOMLOST PRODUCTIVITYBUSINESS DISRUPTION

ENTER

ESTABLISH

EXPAND

ENDGAME

NETWORK

DEVICE

USER

in-common?

Insiderattacks

Phishing attacks

Fabricattacks

Pass-the-hash(PtH) attacks

Stolencredentials

Stolen admincredentials

Insiderattacks

Phishing attacks

Fabricattacks

These privileged accounts have the keys to the kingdom; we gave them those keys decades ago

But now, those administrators’ privileges are being compromised through social engineering, bribery, coercion, private initiatives, etc.

Administrative Privileges

Attack

Attack the applications and infrastructure

Attack the virtualization fabric itself

Ongoing focus & innovation on

preventative measures; block

known attacks & known malware

Protect

Comprehensive monitoring

tools to help you spot

abnormalities and respond to

attacks faster

Detect

Leading response and recovery

technologies plus deep

consulting expertise

Respond

Isolate OS components &

secrets; limit admin. privileges;

rigorously measure host health

Isolate

Security Posture

– Security isn’t a bolt-on;

Protect credentials and privileged access

Windows Server 2016

Ben Mary Jake AdminDomain admin

Typical administrator

Cap

ab

ilit

y

Time

Social engineering leads to credential theft

Most attacks seek out and leverage administrative credentials (PtH or Pass-the-hash)

Administrative credentials often inadvertently provide more privilege than strictly necessary… and for an unlimited time

Ben Mary Jake AdminDomain admin

JEA and JIT administration

Cap

ab

ilit

y

Time

Just Enough Administration (JEA)

Just in Time Administration (JIT)

Capability and time needed

Ben Mary Jake AdminDomain admin

JEA and JIT administration

Cap

ab

ilit

y

Time

Just Enough Administration (JEA)

Just in Time Administration (JIT)

Credential Guard

Capability and time needed

Ben Mary Jake AdminDomain admin

JEA and JIT administration

Cap

ab

ilit

y

Time

Just Enough Administration (JEA)

Just in Time Administration (JIT)

Credential Guard

Remote Credential Guard Capability and time needed

Real-world case:

Root-cause:

Post-remediation:

Protecting Active Directory http://aka.ms/privsec

1. Separate Admin account for admin tasks

3. Unique Local Admin Passwords

for Workstationshttp://Aka.ms/LAPS

2. Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) Phase 1 - Active Directory adminshttp://Aka.ms/CyberPAW

4. Unique Local Admin

Passwords for Servershttp://Aka.ms/LAPS

2-4 weeks 1-3 months 6+ months

First response to the most frequently used attack techniques

2. Time-bound privileges (no permanent admins)http://aka.ms/PAM http://aka.ms/AzurePIM

1. Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) Phases 2 and 3 –All Admins and additional hardening

(Credential Guard, RDP Restricted Admin, etc.)http://aka.ms/CyberPAW

4. Just Enough Admin (JEA)

for DC Maintenancehttp://aka.ms/JEA

9872521

6. Attack Detectionhttp://aka.ms/ata

5. Lower attack surface

of Domain and DCs http://aka.ms/HardenAD

Build visibility and control of administrator activity, increase protection against typical follow-up attacks

3. Multi-factor for elevation

Protecting Active Directoryhttp://aka.ms/privsec

2-4 weeks 1-3 months 6+ months

2. Smartcard or Passport

Authentication for all adminshttp://aka.ms/Passport

1. Modernize Roles and

Delegation Model

3. Admin Forest for Active

Directory administratorshttp://aka.ms/ESAE

5. Shielded VMs for

virtual DCs (Server 2016

Hyper-V Fabric)http://aka.ms/shieldedvms

4. Code Integrity

Policy for DCs

(Server 2016)

Move to proactive security posture

Protecting Active Directory http://aka.ms/privsec

2-4 weeks 1-3 months 6+ months

proactive security posture2-4 weeks 1-3 months 6+ monthsAttack

Detect Attacks

Harden DC configuration

Reduce DC Agent attack surface

Prevent Escalation

Prevent Lateral Traversal

Increase Privilege Usage Visibility

Assign Least Privilege

Defense

Protect applications and data in any cloud

Windows Server 2016

Protecting the OSDefend against new exploits and block attacks without impacting legitimate workloads

Control Flow Guard

Windows Defender

Device Guard

Control Flow Guard (CFG)

Helps prevent attacks that use memory corruption vulnerabilities

CFG places controls on how an otherwise-trusted application executes code

Provides defenses against exploits such as buffer overflows

Helps ensure that trusted binaries execute as intended

Windows Defender

Deep integration with Windows security systems

Anti-tampering (protecting critical dependent OS Services)

Registry hardening; “file-less” malware

Actively protects against malware without impacting workloads

In-box anti-malware that is Server-workload aware

Device Guard

Windows can be locked down to run ONLY trusted binaries

Untrusted binaries, such as malware, are unable to run

Protects kernel mode processes and drivers from zero-day attacks as well as vulnerabilities through the use of HVCI

Code Integrity policies can be signed and protected against malicious administrators

Hardware Rooted Code Integrity

Respond more intelligently with log analytics integration

Windows Server 2016

operational insights

Windows Server 2016

Enhanced Auditing and Event Logs

Protect applications with just enough OS

Windows Server 2016

CONTAINER CONTAINER CONTAINER CONTAINER CONTAINER

VM VM VM VM VM

protecting new apps

Hyper-V CONTAINER

Hyper-V CONTAINER

Hyper-V CONTAINER

Hyper-V CONTAINER

Hyper-V CONTAINER

Hyper-V Containers

Nano Server

VM VM VM VM VM

Windows Server 2016

Protect the virtualization fabric

Windows Server 2016

Software Defined Networking (SDN) & Micro-segmentation

Windows Server 2016

Phishing for secrets

The attack

N

N

N

N

N

Micro-segmentation

Using the distributed firewall

Virtual Appliances

Protect the virtualization fabric

Windows Server 2016

Protect the Virtualization Fabric

Windows Server 2016

virtual machines

Contrast:

SHIELDED VM

HOST GUARDIAN SERVICE

GENERATION 2 VM

✓

✓ ✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Security Assurance Goals

Encryption of data, both at-rest & in-flight▪

▪

Fabric admins locked out▪

▪

Attestation of host health required▪

NOTE: Shielding is not intended as a defense against DoS attacks

two modes of shielding

Shielded▪

▪

Encryption Supported▪

▪

▪

▪

NOTE: a VM’s shielding type is dictated/configured by the Shielding Data from which the shielded VM is born

who’s it for?

As a Hoster

As a Tenant

As an Enterprise

deployment scenarios

Enterprise private cloud

Public cloud: general hoster/tenant

Branch office

Compliance

Decryption keys: controlled by external system

Guest VM Shielded

VM

H Y P E R - V H O S T 1

+ K E Y P R O T E C T I O N

+ H E A L T H A T T E S T A T I O N

H O S T G U A R D I A N

S E R V I C E ( H G S )WIN

DO

WS

SE

RV

ER

20

16

HY

PE

R-

V H

OS

TS

Guest VM

GUARDED FABRIC

Guest VM

Guest VM Guest VM

H Y P E R - V H O S T 2

Guest VMGuest VM

Guest VM Guest VM

H Y P E R - V H O S T 3

Guest VMGuest VM

Why certainly, I know you & I must say you’re looking very healthy today!

Virtual Secure Mode

Virtual Secure Mode

Virtual Secure Mode

Please, guv’na, can I ‘ave some

more keys?

Attestation Modes

TPM-trusted

Complex setup/configuration▪ Register each Hyper-V host’s TPM (EKpub) with the

guardian service

▪ Baseline CI policy for each different hardware SKU

▪ Optional: Deploy HSM and use HSM-backed certificates

Specific host hardware required▪ Needs to support TPM v2.0 and UEFI 2.3.1

Highest levels of assurance▪ Fabric-admin untrusted

▪ Trust rooted in hardware

▪ Compliance with code-integrity policy required for key-

release (attestation)

RECOMMENDED STEADY-STATE

Admin-trusted

Simplified Setup/Configuration▪ Setup an Active Directory trust + register group

▪ Authorize a Hyper-V host to run shielded VMs by

adding it to the Active Directory group

Leveraging Existing H/W ▪ H/W needs to support Hyper-V on Windows Server

2016

Weaker levels of assurance▪ Fabric-admin is trusted

▪ No hardware-rooted trust or measured-boot

▪ No enforced code-integrity

INITIAL ADOPTION SIMPLIFIER

: TPM-trusted attestation

Trusted

Boot

Code

Integrity

Trusted

Boot

Code

IntegrityUEFI UEFI

All measurements valid?Guarded

Host

Shielded VM

Host Guardian Service

Attestation: validates the health of the host (boot and CI measurements)

: admin-trusted attestation

Trusted

Boot

Code

Integrity

Trusted

Boot

Code

IntegrityUEFI UEFI

Guarded

Host

Shielded VM

Host Guardian Service

Attestation: no boot measurements or code-integrity policies are taken into account

Correct AD group?

Shielded Virtual Machines

Demonstration

a few Spotlights

Generation 2 VMs onlyLeveraging virtual EFI, Secure boot, virtual TPM

Hyper-V Host: Windows Server 2016Guarded host requires Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition

Shielded Guest VM OS supportWindows 8 / Windows Server 2012 or newer

vTPM not tied to physical TPMPermits VM mobility, e.g. Live Migration

restricting admin access

Capabilities that might expose VM state unavailable

Several virtual devices are removed

Requirements:

Host Guardian Service

Guarded hosts

Optional: Fabric Management

1. Setup Guarded Fabric…

a) Deploy and configure Host Guardian Service

b) Upgrade Hyper-V hosts and fabric manager

c) Configure Hyper-V hosts as guarded

1. get TPM’s endorsement key -> add to HGSNB: this task is performed once on each and every fabric Hyper-V host

2. get TPM’s baseline measurements -> add to HGSNB: this task is performed once for each type of server hardware

3. create code-integrity policy -> add to HGSNB: this task is performed once for each type of server hardware

4. Configure attestation and key protections endpoints

d) Run guarded fabric diagnostics

2. Create shielded VM fabric artifacts…

a) Prepare template disks for use by shielded VMs

b) Create shielded templates

4. Deploy/manage/maintain shielded VMs…

a) Create new shielded VMs on guarded fabric

b) Obtain/maintain BitLocker recovery keys per shielded VM

c) Troubleshoot failed shielded VMs as necessary

3. Create shielded VM tenant artifacts…

a) Obtain guardian key(s) from guarded fabric(s)

b) Create/obtain owner keys to protect your shielded VMs

c) Obtain volume signatures for trusted template disks

d) Create shielding data and upload to guarded fabric(s)

e) Ongoing management tasks (keys and misc. artifacts):

1. Maintain/protect owner keys

2. Maintain trusted volume signature catalogs

PHASE 1: HOSTER / I.T. staff…

PHASE 2: HOSTER / Fabric administrators…

PHASE 3: TENANT / I.T. Security staff…

PHASE 4: TENANT / VM owners…

Details:

build a PoC?

Minimalist (using nested virtualization)

More representative of production deployment

Summary & Compliance Mapping

Windows Server 2016

UNPARALLELED SECURITY

• least vulnerable OS 4 years in a row

221

277

233

430

9273

40

156

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

2012 2013 2014 2015

Linux Kernel Windows Server

Reported Vulnerabilities

our track record + 2016 innovations

Built-in security mechanisms

Virtualization-based Security (VBS)

HOST SECURITY Hyper-V based fabric

✓ Nano-based Hyper-V host

GUEST SECURITY Secure on any fabric

a different pivot

• Hyper-V Shielded VMs compliance mapping whitepaper

• JEA and JIT compliance mapping whitepaper

• Device Guard compliance mapping whitepaper

• Credential Guard compliance mapping whitepaper

• Windows Defender compliance mapping whitepaper

3rd-party assessment of compliance mappings across various security-related offerings in the Windows Server 2016 wave

Shielded VM Compliance Mapping

ISO 27001: 2013 PCI DSS 3.2 FedRAMP; NIST 800-53 Revision 4

Enforcing Separation of

Duties

A.6.1.2– Segregation of duties 6.4.2 – Separation of duties between test

and production environmentsAC-5 – Separation of Duties

Implementation of

Least Privilege Access

and Partitioning Tenant

Functionality

A.9.2.3 – Management of

privileged access rights

A.12.1.4 – Separation of

development, testing, and

operational environments

6.4.1 – Test and Production Environment

Separation

7.2 – User access control on need-to-

know basis

7.2.3 – Default “deny-all” setting

AC-6 – Least Privilege

AC-6 (10) – Prohibit Non-Privileged

Users from Executing Privileged

Functions

SC-2 – Application Partitioning

Protecting Information

Stored in Shared

Resources

None8.7 – Restricted access to databases

containing cardholder data SC-4 – Information in Shared Resources

Protection of Data at

Rest

A.8.2.3 – Media Access

3.4 – Verifying stored PAN is unreadable

3.4.1 – Disk encryption usage and access

control

6.5.3 – Insecure cryptographic storage

SC-28 – Protection of Information at Rest

SC-28(1) – Protection of Information at

Rest

Security Function

Verification and

Integrity Monitoring

None11.5 – Change-detection mechanism

deployment

SI-6 – Security Function Verification

SI-7 – Software, Firmware, and

Information Integrity

https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt130644.aspx

https://youtu.be/Vp5E1-4Ks8E

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/datacentersecurity

Preliminary mappings contained in this and other related decks

http://aka.ms/privsec

https://mva.microsoft.com/

Resources