property casedigest part 1

7/28/2019 Property Casedigest Part 1

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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)

Athena Louise Erandio 2A | Batch 2014 | 1

Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate CourtFacts:

Adriano Maneclang in this case filed a complaint for quieting of titleover a certain fishpond located within the 4 parcels of land

belonging to them situated in Pangasinan but the trial courtdismissed it by saying that the body of water is a creek constitutinga tributary to Agno River therefore public in nature and notsubject to private appropriation.

o They appealed it to the IAC which affirmed theaforementioned decision. Hence, this review on certiorari.

However, after having been asked to comment to the case thereon,they manifested their lack of interest and the parties to the case (thecomplainant and the awardee in the public bidding Maza) decided toamicably settle the case saying that judgment be rendered and that thecourt recognize the ownership of the petitioners over the landthe body of water found within their titled properties.

o They say that there would be no benefit since the NIA already constructed a dike and no water now gets in and out of theland.

Issue: Whether or not the fishpond is public in nature.

Ratio: Yes. A creek is defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and

participating in the ebb and flow of the sea.o It is a property belonging to the public domain and is

not susceptible to private appropriation andacquisitive prescription.

o The mere construction of the dikes by NIA nor its conversionto a fishpond altered or changed the nature of the creek asproperty of the public domain.

The compromise agreement is null and void and of no legal effect because it is contrary to law and public policy.

Villarico v. SarmientoFacts:

Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue highway by a strip of land belonging to thegovernment.

Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a portion of the saidgovernment land and a part thereof was occupied by Andoks LitsonCorp.

In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villaricoacquired a portion of the same area owned by thegovernment.

o He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that respondents(Vivencio) on the government land closed his right of way tothe Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on a portion of hislot.

Issue: Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA.

Ratio: No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way

to the lot belongs to the state or property of public dominion.o It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined to

privileged individuals but is open to the indefinite public.Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built isfor the use of the people as passageway hence, it is a property for public dominion.

o Public dominion property is outside the commerce of man and hence, it cannot be:

Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matterof contracts

Acquired by prescription against the state Cannot be the subject of attachment and execution Be burdened by any voluntary easement

It cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favorof the petitioner and petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself andhe cannot claim any right of possession over it.

Abrogar v. PeopleFacts:

Abrogar here is being accused with theft under Article 308 of theRevised Penal Code. The information alleged that he effectively stolethe business from PLDT while using its facilities.

o He filed a motion to quash the information since according tohim it does not contain material allegations charging thepetitioner with theft of personal property since long distancecalls and the business of providing telecommunication arepersonal properties under theft.

Issue: Whether or not "stealing the business from PLDT while using its

facilities" constitutes taking of personal property within the meaningof Art. 308 of the RPC.

Ratio: PERSONAL PROPERTY is defined as anything susceptible o

appropriation and not included in the chapter in real property in the


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Civil Code. This court has consistently ruled in the past that any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal orincorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft.

o Any property which is not included in the enumeration in thechapter on real property and capable of appropriation can bethe subject of theft under the RPC.

TO appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing and itmay be committed through the use of the offender's own hands, as wellas any mechanical device such as access device.

o Accused here was charged with using ISR or the unauthorizedrouting and completing of international long distance callsusing lines to make the calls.

o This is punishable as subtraction under a Revised Ordinanceof Manila.

The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service islikewise personal property which can be the object of theft under theRPC.

o It is not included as real property in the Civil Code but inprevious cases, it has been held as personal property.

Petitioners acts constitutes theft of respondent's businessand service by means of unlawful use of the latter's facilities.

o Hence, the amendment information describes the offenseinaccurately by making it seem that what he took were thelong distance calls rather than the business.

o It cannot be said that PLDT is the owner of the "calls" becausethey merely encode the voices and decode them.

o It is the use of the communication facilities without theconsent that constitutes the crime of theft.

Tayag v. LacsonFacts: Respondents (the Lacsons) herein were registered owners of 3 parcels

of land in Pampanga which were tenanted agricultural landsadministered by a certain Renato Espinosa.

o The farmers and tillers executed in favor of petitioner herein(Tayag) Deeds of Assignment wherein they assigned theirrespective rights as tenants and tillers of the landholdingspossessed and tilled by them for a consideration. In the saidDeed of Assignment, the said amount was to be payable" when the legal impediments to the sale of theproperty to Tayag no longer existed". Also in the saiddeed, Tayag was granted the exclusive right to buy theproperty if and when the Lacsons, with concurrence of thefarmers, agreed to sell the property.

Tayag set a meeting with the tenants to work out the implementationof the said deed but the tenants instead wrote to Tayag and said that

they decided to sell their rights to the property to the Lacsonsinstead.

o Tayag instituted a civil action against the tenants because hehas already been making partial payments to the subjectproperty, as well as an action against the Lacsons because healleges that they induced the tenants to breach the agreement between them.

In answer to the complaint against them, the successors in interest of Lacson (since he died already during the pendency of the case) statedthat they never induced the tenants to violate the contract with Tayagand that the tillers had no right to enter into the transaction

without their knowledge and consent. They also allege that tcontract between Tayag and the tenants are contrary to theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

o On the other hand, the tenants, as answer also to thecomplaint filed against them stated that they were merdeceived into believing that the alleged partialpayments were loans. They say that they never knew tha what they signed with Tayag was a Deed of Assignment.

Tayag herein prayed for injunctive relief against the tenants prevent them from selling their rights and interests in the land toLacson, and upon knowledge of this, Lacson motioned to dismiss suchprayer.

o The court ruled in favor of Tayag saying that the injunctiverelief is entitled to him because of his material allegations inthe civil case. Hence, Lacson petitioned for certiorari to theCA.

o The CA ruled in favor of Lacson and said that he cannot beenjoined since they were not privies to the deeds of

assignment executed herein.

Issues: Whether or not the issuance of the RTC of the preliminary injunction

is warranted. Whether or not Lacson and the tenants can be enjoined from selling to

each other the rights and interest of the subject property. Whether or not the deeds of assignment executed by the tenants were

contrary to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Ratio: The respondents here contend that the CA cannot permanently enjoin

the parties to institute a simple civil action again since the only question posted to them when they filed a petition for certiorari is" whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for reconsideration of


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the respondents for the denial/dismissal of the petitioner'splea for a writ of preliminary injunction"

o In the decision of the RTC before it was appealed to the CA,they ruled that the petitioner was entitled to injunctive relief,however, this court rules that the RTC committed graveabuse of discretion when it granted the petitionersuch injunctive relief.

o Preliminary injunction is an extraordinary eventcalculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of thingsuntil the merits of the case can be heard. It rests on the sounddiscretion of the court. It is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should rest on the existence of a causeof action. If the right is doubtful, injunction is not proper.

o In this case, petitioner failed to prove the existence of theessential requisites for him to be entitled to such injunctiverelief. The respondents cannot be enjoined to dispose theirproperty.

The rightful owner of the property in question is the respondent(Lacson) and he cannot be enjoined by the trial court from disposinghis property without any other limitations than those established by law in accordance with the Civil Code.

o The right to dispose, sell, encumber, transfer andeven destroy the property is in the hands of theowner. It also includes the right to recover the possessionof the property from any other person whom the owner hasnot transmitted by appropriate action.

o However, it is not absolute, it is limited by the law, such asthe agrarian reform laws.

The respondents in this case were not parties to the deeds of assignment and there is no evidence that they agreed, expressly orimpliedly to the deeds or to the terms set forth therein. He eventestified in the RTC that he had no knowledge of such deeds.

The action of Tayag against the tenants also have no legal basis sincethe terms of the deed of assignment itself states that the sale will only happen if the legal impediments to the sale no longer exists.

o In this case the l egal impediments were that the Lacsons, havenot yet decided to sell the property, and the lack of approvalfrom the Department of Agrarian Reform (since the parcel of land was subject to the CARP)

o Contrary to what the petitioner avers, this is no optioncontract since the grantors were merely the tenants andnot the registered owners of the property.

On the issue of the CARP, the tenants, by assigning their rights tothe petitioner herein, would become disqualified from becoming beneficiaries of the land hence, they would become landless again for a

measly sum. This scheme of the petitioner is subversive, and in violation of public policy and the agrarian laws.

Panganiban v. OamilFacts:

2 properties are the subject of this case, the first one is the "21stportion" and the second one, we refer to as "the Canda St. portion."Petitioners in this case and their father (Partenio) are the co-owners of such property. 1/2 to the father, as his conjugal share, and 1/the remaining half to the petitioners as surviving heirs.

Oamil was the buyer in this case and she filed an action for specificperformance in the trial court praying that the father be ordered toexecute a deed of sale of the parcel of land which is covered by theiragreement. However, there is a confusion as to what the subject of theagreement was (whether it was the 21st portion or the Canda portion)

o In its decision the RTC ordered that the deed of absolute sale be executed, however they did not state which portion of the property should be deeded.

Acting on this decision, the petitioners averred to the CA that theirproperties were still being subject of a partition proceeding and thattheir case is still pending with the Court of Appeals. Hence, the RTCcannot yet decide on which property was the subject of the sale between Oamil and Paternio.

o When the partition proceeding was decided, the Canda portion was awarded as the conjugal share of Paternio.

o However, the CA still rendered a decision to the contrary andstated that the subject property in the sale consists of the 21st portion thereby disregarding the decision inthe parition proceeding.

o Respondents here moved for reconsideration but it was deniedfor being dispensable parties to the case despite their claims of co-ownership.

They appealed to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are indispensable parties to the civil

case for the reason that they are co-owners of the subject property. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the subject property of the

sale was the 21st portion and not the Canda portion despite thedecision in the partition proceeding.

Ratio: They can intervene in this case since they are indispensable

parties to the case. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of anundivided thing or right belongs to different persons and during its


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existence, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of thecommunity property until the partition thereof.

o All that a co-owner has is an ideal or abstract or proportionateshare in the entire land or thing.

o Before partition, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common property.

In the event of a division, assignees of one or more of the co-ownersmay take part in the division of the thing owned in common andobject to its being effected without their concurrence. Butthey cannot impugn any partition already executed, unlessthere has been fraud, or in case it was made, notwithstanding a formalopposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of thedebtor or assignor to maintain its validity.

o The decision in the partition case determines what Paternio,and the respondent (as his successor in interest) is entitled toin the civil case.

o As the successor in interest, they cannot acquire any superior right in the property than what Partenio isentitled to or could transfer or alienate afterpartition.

In the contract of sale, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such sale are the same rights as the vendorhad as co-owner and the vendee merely steps into theshoes of the vendor as co-owner.

The decision of the courts in the partition proceeding is thelaw of the case and is conclusive on the issue of whichspecific portion of the property became the subject matter of the sale between Partenio and Oamil.

o The effect of the transfer is limited to the portion which may

be awarded to him upon the partition of the property, itcannot exceed the portion of Partenio. The principle of conclusiveness should be observed by the

courts.o In order that it can be conclusive, it must be of the same

parties, and that the issue must be identical.

Bongalon v. CA Facts:

Rosalia is the owner of a lot and sometime in the year 1943, her 3children, Trinidad, Conchita and Teodora executed a deed of saleconveying to Cirila a part of the lot.

o On the same day, Cirila, Trinidad and Conchita and Teodoraexecuted another deed of sale conveying to Pedro Bongalona part of the lot for a consideration.

However, acting alone, Cirila executed another deed of absolute saleconveying the said lot to Amparo which was subsequently declared inher name for tax purposes and paid real estate taxes therefor.

Meanwhile, in an extrajudicial settlement instituted by Pedro, hedeclared that Cirila is the only heir of Rosalia and therefore, he is theonly heir of Cirila making the subject property's TCT here issued in hisown name. He thereafter filed a case for Quieting of title and Recovery of portion of the property and damages against Amparo alleging thathe is the registered owner of such property.

o In support of his claim during the trial he presented the deedsof absolute sale executed to him and the extrajudicialsettlement declaration that Cirila was the owner of the entirelot which she later sold to Amparo (double sale).

The trial court ruled that Pedro was the rightful owner of the property and ordered Amparo to vacate the land in question.

o Respondent appealed to the CA and reversed the RTC decisiosaying that, the basis of the complaint of Pedro is that heinherited the said property as evidenced by the ExtrajudicialSettlement of the Estate but such extrajudicial settlement istainted with fraud and misrepresentation since thereare 7 more children.

Issues: What is the basis and extent of Pedro's interest in the subject

property? Whether or not the sale to Amparo casts a cloud on Pedro's title. Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid.

Ratio:

When Rosalia died, she passed on the piece of property to hersurviving spouse and their five children. Such heirs inherited the lot inco-ownership at 1/6 undivided share each. After their father died, theirshares increased to 1/5 each. Since they were co-owners of theproperty, the extent of Pedro's share in the property is only upto the undivided shares of Cirila, Trinidad, Teodora andConchita (the sellers). He did not acquire ownership of the entire lotsince the other co-owners did not take part in the sale.

o Each co-owner has dull ownership of his part and may alienateit but the alienation affects only the portion which pertains tohim in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

The deed of sale to Amparo casts a cloud on Pedro's title.(Cloud means any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, orproceeding which is apparently valid or effective but in truth it isinvalid).


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o The sale to Amparo is invalid because at the time of theexecution, Cirila had no interest to sell the lot because shealready sold her interest to Pedro.

Pedro falsely stated that Cirila was the only heir of Rosaliaand in turn, he was the sole heir of Cirila. This is not a minordefect and renders the Extrajudicial settlement void. But thiscancellation does not deprive him of the right to maintain action forquieting title. He has interest over the lot insofar as it as sold to him by the co-owners.

Resuena v. CA Facts:

Juanito is the co-owner of parcels of land in Cebu. He owns 6/8 of Lot1 and late Spouses Bascon owns 2/8 thereof. The other lot, Lot 2 isowned in common y Juanito and the heirs of Nicolas but theproportion of their undivided shares was not determined.

Resuena herein, allegedly with the permission of Spouses Bacsonresided in the upper portion of Lot 1 and Rosario resided in a portionof Lot 2 with the permission also of Nicolas.

Juanito developed the lots in question into a resort and he demandedthat Resuena and Rosario vacate their homes. .

o The MTC ruled in favor of Resuena and Rosario saying thatsince it was not yet partitioned, he had no right to evictthem.

o On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC and saidthat any of the co-owners may bring an action inejectment because in a sense a co-owner is the owner andpossessor of the whole and that the suit is deemed to beinstituted for the benefit of all co-owners.

o The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issues: Whether or not Juanito, as co-owner has the right to eject Resuena

and Rosario. Whether or not the verbal agreement (that the seashore portion will be

Juanito's share and the upper portion, theirs) between them (other co-owners) was already an executed contract.

Ratio: Respondent has the right to eject petitioners. According to the

Civil Code, any one of the co-owners may bring an action to eject.It is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondentto evict petitioners. He may bring actions to exercise and protect therights of all co-owners. But an adverse decision cannot prejudice therights of co-owners.

The verbal agreement between them hardly establishes adefinitive partition. Despite such agreement, their co-ownershipremain inchoate and undivided. Since they are not successors ininterest, Juanito is not estopped.

Balcodero v. CA Facts:

Bosing and Oday are spouses with three children but sometime in1946, he left the conjugal home and started to live with Josefa Rivera with whom he begot one child names Josephine (petitioner in thiscase).

During their cohabitation, Bosing purchased a parcel of land andindicated that his civil status as married to Josefa (the common law wife).

o He even married said common law wife while his marriage with Oday was still subsisting.

o 3 years later, the legal wife and Josephine executed anextrajudicial partition on the lot bought which they allege wastheir conjugal property. A TCT was issued in favor of Josephine.

The common law wife here alleges that it was a conjugal property between her and Bosing.

Issue: Whether or not the action for reconveyance of the property has

prescribed. Whether or not the action for reconveyance is based on implied or

constructive trust. Whether or not the property belongs to the petitioners

Ratio: The property remained as belonging to the conjugal property

of Bosing and Oday since all property of the marriage is presumedto belong to the conjugal partnership. The provisions under Article 147or 148 shall apply as the case may be.

A constructive trust was deemed to have been created by operation of law at the time of Bosing's demise. As stated Article 1456, if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, theperson obtaining it is by force of law considered to be a trustee of animplied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The period or prescription starts to run from theestablishment of an implied trust. The applicable prescriptivperiod here, since it arises from law, is 10 years. It is counted from thetime the transaction affecting the property is registered with the


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corresponding issuance of a new certificate of title. IN this case, only 6 years and 4 months have elapsed.

The legal wife herein is not disqualified to the estate since there was nolegal separation case instituted by the deceased despite her allegedmarriage to another man.

Imperial v. Court of AppealsFacts:

The subject properties in this case are Lot 1091 and Lot 1052 co-owned by Adela and Melanio Imperial.

o Adela executed a document which waived her rights overthe lots mentioned but in turn, Melanio also executed adocument which declared that the document executed

by Adela was a simulated one in order to expedite theregistration of the lots in his name.

o Nevertheless, by virtue of the document of waiver which Adelaexecuted, Melanio was able to obtain the lots herein in hisname. Thereafter, he executed another document whichacknowledged the half share of his sister in both lots andfurther stated that his sister was entitled to the proceeds of thesale of the subdivision in the said lots.

Later, it was found out that Melanio was able to sell Lot 1052 and theproceeds of said sale were not given to Adela. Hence, her daughterfiled this case which prayed for the reconveyance of the entireLot 1091 since the proceeds from the sale of Lot 1052 werenot given to her mother (as the co-owner thereof).

o In defense of the claim of Rosa (successor of Adela), Melaniocontended that Adela already sold the said property to him while she was still alive as evidence by 3 receipts purportedly

for payment for the said property.

Issue: Whether or not Lot 1091 should be reconveyed to Adela.

Ratio: In this case, the SC found out that contrary to what Melanio avers,

there was no deed of sale executed by Adela in favor of Melanio ceding lot 1091. 3 receipts were presented as evidence andthe last one bears the date "May 7, 1980" which is impossible since the Adela already died on May 4.

o Also, in examining the receipts presented, the court came up with the conclusion that the amounts mentioned therein a repaid by petitioner to Adela without the intention that it waspart of the purchase price of Lot 1091. It was only the latter'sshare in the proceeds of the sales of subdivision lots which were part of 1091.

o If a sale was intended by the siblings, it is unusual that he didnot ask for the execution of a Deed of Sale which ceded to himthe share of Adela in the lot.

The lot now belongs to the estate of the late Adela ImperialSolleza represented by her heirs in this case.

Tumlos v. FernandezFacts:

An action for ejectment was filed against the petitioners herein(Tumlos). In this action the spouses (Fernandez) allege that they areabsolute owners of a building wherein the petitioners arresiding. However, Guillerma Tumlos herein alleges that he spouseshave no cause of action since she is a co-owner of the property as evidenced by a contract to sell wherein it was stated thatshe is a co-vendee of the property in question together withMario Fernandez.

o she further states that she and Mario had an amorousrelationship and that they acquired the property in questionas their love nest.

o They acquired the property during their cohabitation. RTC ruled that she was a co-owner thereof and could not be ejected

from it. The CA ruled that the claim of co-ownership must fail since the

provision governing them is Article 148 which requires that there beproof of actual contribution in the purchase of the subjectproperty.

o They found her contention to be unjustified.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is a co-owner of the property Whether or not they cannot be ejected on the ground that they havethe substantive right of support

Ratio: She is not the co-owner of the property. The governing provisi

is Article 148 because their alleged cohabitation amounted toconcubinage. Since it was clear that Mario was incapacitated to marry Guillerma because he had a wife, the governing provision is Article148.

o She failed to present any evidence that she made an actualcontribution to the purchase of the subject property andanchors her claim merely on her cohabitation.

o In this article, administration does not amount tocontribution.

Petitioner argues that since Mario is liable for support, this prevailsover the rights to eject her in the building. But the court stated that


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this is an ejectment suit and is summary in character andmust deal solely with the issue of possession of the property in dispute.

o Besides, the support claim cannot hold since the law requiresthat there be extrajudicial demand and none was made here.

Munoz v. RamirezFacts:

Spouses Ramirez here are owners of a residential house which they mortgaged with the GISIS to secure a loan. The title to the saidproperty however, was transferred to Munoz herein by virtue of a salein order to pay for the loan they contracted with GISIS with Erlindaacting as attorney in fact.

A downpayment was given but the petitioner refused to give theremaining balance because one of the spouses unsigned an affidavit.

o Since they failed to pay the rentals and failed to repurchase theproperty, he filed an ejectment suit against the spouses.

It was later found out that the land where the house in question was built was paraphernal property of Erlinda because it was acquired by agratuitous title from her parents.

o The Special power of Attorney allegedly executed by Eliseo wasalso found out to be a forgery hence, Erlinda had no power tosell the land without the consent of the husband (if theproperty is conjugal).

The RTC and CA ruled in favor of the spouses.

Issue: Whether or not the property (house) is conjugal Whether or not the contract between petitioner and the spouses is an

equitable mortgage

Ratio: All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be

conjugal unless the contrary is proved. But in this case, since theresidential lot was inherited, it was the exclusive property of thespouse. To find out whether the house is conjugal orparaphernal, we have to look at the improvements made on theseparate property of the spouses.

o When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increasein value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to theconjugal.

o Otherwise, it is paraphernal.o In this case, the improvements were less than the value of the

property, hence paraphernal.

o The written consent of Eliseo is not necessary hence, whatevercontract entered into is valid.

It is an equitable mortgage because the vendor remained inpossession as the lessee, the purchaser retained for himself a part of the purchase price, the vendor bound himself to pay for the taxes, and because the real intention was to securethe payment of a debt. These instances, according to the civil codegives rise to the presumption that it is an equitable mortgage.

Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio De JesusFacts:

Gregorio De Jesus (respondent) filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession with damages over the subject property inthis case. In his complaint, he stated that he acquired said property and when he caused a verification survey of it, he discovered thatthe northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon

by a building of PNB (petitioner). In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner said that when he

acquired the lot from Mayor Ignacio, the encroachment wasalready in existence and they even tried to remedy the saidencroachment by an offer to sell the area. Unfortunately, this sale didnot materialize by reason that the lot was mortgaged.

The trial court decided the case in favor of the respondent declaringhim to be the rightful owner and ordered the petitioner to surrenderthe possession of the property to respondent and to cause the removalof any improvement thereon.

The CA sustained this decision of the trial court but deleted the awardof damages.

Issue: Whether or not PNB was a builder in bad faith over the encroachedproperty.

Whether or not the provisions on Article 448 of the Civil Code should be applied to this case.

Ratio: PNB would fall short from its claim of good faith in this case

since he was quite aware and was, in fact advised, prior to itsacquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a partof the building sold to it stood on the land not covered by theland conveyed to it. Good faith should be understood to be anintangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition and it encompasses among other things, an honest belief,the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. Good faith implies honesty if intention


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and freedom from knowledge of the circumstances which out to putthe holder upon inquiry.

o One is considered in good faith if he is not aware that thereexists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw whichinvalidates it.

The provisions of Art 448 of the Civil Code does not apply tothis case. It refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works and not to acase where the OWNER OF THE LAND IS THE BUILDER

who then later loses ownership of the land by sale orotherwise for, elsewise stated, "where the true ownerhimself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant."

Sula Nayon Inc. v. Nayong Pilipino FoundationFacts:

Nayong Pilipino Foundation (respondent) leased a portion of theircomplex to Sulo (petitioner) for the construction and operation of ahotel building to be known as the Philippine Village Hotel. Thecontract of lease was renewable for a period of another 25 years and when the lessee notified the lessors of the intention to renew thecontract, they agreed.

Petitioners, however, defaulted in the payment of their rentals. Thus,respondents demanded them to pay in arrears and vacate thepremises.

o A complaint for unlawful detainer was instituted in the MeTCand a decision was rendered in favor of the respondentsstating that Article 448 does not apply to the instant case ascontended by the petitioners. They, instead, applied Article

1678 of the Civil Code which grants them the right toreimburse of the value of the improvement.o On appeal, the RTC modified the ruling and stated that

petitioners in this case were builders in good faith and thushave a right to indemnity, applying Art. 448 of the Civil Code.

o The CA reversed this decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the MeTC have jurisdiction over the case since there

was no demand to satisfy the requirement of extrajudicial demand inejectment cases.

Whether or not the rules on accession, as found in Article 448 and 546of the Civil Code apply to the instant case.

Ratio: There was a demand letter in this case and it was adequate to

satisfy the requirement of "extrajudicial demand." It was sent

by respondent through registered mail requesting them to pay rentalsarrears or else it will be constrained to file the appropriate legal action.Contrary to what they aver, this demand is already adequate since the word "vacate" need not be employed in all notices. There can be noother interpretation of the notice given to them. This was a noticeor demand to vacate.

Article 448 does not apply to the instant case. It is intended to apply to a case where one builds or sows on land in whichhe believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where theonly interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such asa tenant.

o The petitioners here had no adverse claim or title to the land.They even recognize that the respondents are the owners of the land. Their claim that they should be considered as builders in good faith who have the right to the possession of the property until reimbursed cannot be countenanced.

o The mere introduction of valuable improvements on the landdoes not give the right of retention to the petitionersand reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a

builder in good faith. They may not "improve" the lessoout of its property.

The rights of the lessees herein are governed by Article 1678 of theCode which stated that the lessor has the option of paying one half of the value of the improvements which the lessee made in good faith, which are suitable for the use for which the lease is intended. Thelessee may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse toreimburse.

o The laws are incorporated in each and every contract hence, if there is no special agreement between the parties as to how to

proceed in cases of default or breach of contract, theaforementioned provision should apply despite the fact thatthe hotel amounts to 2 billion pesos and what will bereimbursed to them only amounts to a little more than 26million.

Cynthia Cruz Khemani v. The Heirs of Anastacio TrinidadFacts:

Cynthia Khemani here is the registered owner of Lot 107 which waspurchased from Jose Pena. However, heirs of Anastacio Trinidadherein are claiming ownership and allege that their predecessors ininterest have openly, publicly, peacefully and adversely possessed saidsubject land in the concept of an owner since 1950.

Before all of these controversies arose, it must be noted thatthe land in dispute has already been decided upon in aprevious case which involved Jose Pena. Lot No. 107constituted a part of Lot 355 before . Such land (Lot 355 inclusi


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of Lot No. 107) was sold to Jose Pena. Pena requested the BoL (Bureauof Lands) to adjust the area of the lot awarded to him but the BoLdenied such request since it stated that it belonged to the government.

o The Office of the President however decided and held that theentire area of Lot 355 belonged to Pena and not to thegovernment.

o Mendoza (another third party) filed a special action forcertiorati claiming that he was denied due process when theOffice of the President decided to award the lot to Pena. Heasserted ownership over them on the strength of aMiscellaneous Sales Application.

o This case was elevated to the Supreme Court which wasdecided upon in favor of Pena.

At present, despite the decision over Lot 107 in the past wereproclaimed, the heirs of Trinidad are now claimingownership over said lot and state that the have beenpossessing it since 1950.

o They further claim that they applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the land which was approved by the BoL.

The heirs of Pena motioned to dismiss the case alleging that thepredecessors in interest were mere "informal settlers" who had beenallowed by Mendoza (the former adverse claimant to the land) tooccupy it and that since there was already a decision in the previouscase, that this was res judicata.

In their answer, respondents claim that they are not barred since they were not parties to the case and there is no identity of causes of action.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. They filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which held that certiorari

is not the proper remedy and that there is no re judicata.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper

remedy in assailing the order of the RTC in denying the motion todismiss.

Whether or not there is res judicata

Ratio: The filing of petition for certiorari is proper. It has been settled

that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor disposes a case. As such, the generalrule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss cannot bequestioned in a certiorari case.

o But there are exceptions to this general rule. It is allowed whenthe ground is improper venue, lack of jurisdiction orres judicata as in the case at bar.

There is no res judicata in this case since there is no identity of parties and causes of action. Res Judicata literally means thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing settled by judgment. Itis said that there is res judicata when the ff. requisites concur:

o Former judgment is final o It is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject

matter and the partieso It is a judgment or an order on the meritso There is between the first and the second actions identit

parties, subject matter and causes of action. The cause of action in the first case was the alleged grave abuse of

discretion of the Office of the President in awarding the lands to Penaand in the second, the basis is on their adverse possession of the landin the concept of an owner for over 40 years and the alleged fraudulentissuance of a patent and certificate of title to Pena.

o The parties in the two cases have their own rights and interestsin relation to the subject matter in litigation.

According to PD1529, a person deprived of his land throughactual fraud may institute an action to reopen or review adecree of registration within one year from entry of suchdecree. In this case, the patent was issued in favor of Pena on Sept20, 1993 and the filing for review of decree was instituted on January 27, 1994 or well within the prescribed one year period.

o Also, under the petitioners name in the title, a Notice of LisPendens, it cannot be said that petitioner is an innocentpurchaser for value as well aware of respondents claim overthe property.

o Even if they filed it after 2 year, they may still file an action based on an implied trust which prescribes in ten years from

the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over theproperty. Under the circumstances, it would be more in keeping with the

standard of fairness to have a full blown trial where the evidentiary matters are thrashed out.

Frondarina v. MalazarteFacts:

The property in question in this case is Lot 5 which was acquired by Flordelina Santos from Iluminado Amar and was thereafter acquired by Cirila Gongora. Cirila Gongora, sister of Frondarina, filed aMiscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands.

o Said disputed land was declared in Gongora's name forpurposes of tax declaration and she also paid the real estatetaxes on said property for years.

o Frondarina obtained the disputed lot from her sister thereafteras evidenced by a Waiver of Rights to the parcel of land.


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Frondarina declared the lot in her name for taxation purposes andpaid the real estate taxes on such property for years. She also had thelot surveyed and fenced it with 4 strands of barbed wire andtended 2 mango and 1 coconut tree on the lot.

Malazartes here came into the picture and out of no where alleged thatthey bought the said lot from Romeo Valencia and that they have been residing on the lot since 1988. On the sad date, they immediately started construction of their house on the lot without a building permit because their application to build was notgranted due to the complaint filed by Frondarina.

o To support their claim, they presented their caretaker, Lorenza Andrada to testify in their favor.

The MTCC ruled in favor of the Frondarinas who have sufficiently established their cause of action against the Malazartes.

But this was overturned by the RTC who stated that the Malazartes were in actual and physical possession of the lot through theirpredecessor in interest Romeo Valencia.

o The RTC anchored their decision on the fact that theFrondarinas were not in actual and physical possession of theland as such was only possesses by their caretaker

o Allegedly, this caretaker was threatened by the Malazartes butthe trial court deemed this as mere hearsay evidence since thecaretaker was not really presented to testify as witness.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

Issue: Who are the owners of the lot? If the aforestated question rules that the Frondarinas are the owners,

do the Malazartes have the right to indemnity as builders in good

faith?

Ratio: The court gives credence to the claim of the Frondarinas that

they and their predecessors in interest had been in peaceful,physical possession of the said lot since 1971. Although the factis that none of the parties have actually been in possession of the land(since it was possesses by their caretakers), the actuations of theFrondarinas are more in accordance with the usual course of humanconduct and common experience. The claim of the Malazartes thatthey occupied said lot for 15 years deserves scant consideration sincehis job took up most of his time.

Romeo Valencia also testified that he checked with the BoL and wastold that the lot has not been declared in the name of any person.However, this statement of his is not true as there was a taxdeclaration in Cirila's name. The latter also applied for aMiscellaneous Sales Application before. Seeing as there is

already a falsity and misrepresentation in the testimony of Valencia,the court rules that his testimony does not constitute evidence of thetruth of the said allegations.

o The testimonies of Frondarina were more consistent with one who has been deprived of possession by force. They soughthelp from officials and reported incidents. Such is more inaccordance with a person who has been illegally and unfairly deprived of possession.

The lack of testimony of the caretaker (who was not presented as witness) was not fatal to the cause of the Frondarinas as ample andcircumstantial evidence was presented.

The tax declarations also, as well as the payments for taxes for thedisputed lots are much earlier than those allegedly made by theMalazartes.

o Although tax declarations are not conclusive evidence, they aregood indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.

The Malazartes are not builders in good faith. Considering tthey were informed by the petitioners that the disputed lot was owned by them and had the right of possession over said lot, still, they persisted on building their house on it. Respondents therefore are not builders in good faith and shall lose their house without any right toreimbursement.

Yu v. PaclebFacts:

Ruperto Javier here offered to set his lot to Ernesto Yu who acceptedthe offer and gave the price for down payment. Javier then deliveredthe supposed muniments of title to the petitioners. At the time of turn-over, a portion of lot was occupied by Ramon Pacleb

(respondent's son) and his wife as tenants.o Ramon and his wife allegedly surrendered the possession of

their portion to the petitioners and later on, petitionersappointed Ramon as their trustee over the subject lot.

o Petitioners on the other hand, allege that they exercownership rights as well as open, public and peacefulpossession over the property.

Respondent herein was in the United States and upon his return, heentered the property allegedly by means of force,intimidation, strategy and stealth thereby ousting thepetitioners and their trustee. He refused to vacate said propertydespite numerous demands.

An action for forcible entry was instituted in the MTC and the MTCruled in favor of the respondent, Pacleb.

The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto. The CA also ruled in favor of respondent .


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Issue: Whether or not respondent Pacleb had prior physical possession of the

subject property.

Ratio: He had physical possession of the property. Possession is

defined by the Civil Code as to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. It always includes the idea of occupation. Theremust be occupancy, apprehension or taking and there must

be intent to possess. In this case, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical

possession to justify a ruling in their favor. Their claim that the lot wasturned over to them was self-serving in the face of this factualfinding. On the other hand, the presentation of tax declarations andpayments established the possession of the respondent Pacleb.

Possessioni n the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to havehis feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed inpossession. Respondent's son in this case was named as caretaker.However, the loss of trust and confidence in Ramon amounted to thetransfer of the administration of the land to his other son, Oscar.

o Ramon and the wife were mere tenants of the home. They were established as trustees of the petitioners herein but they had no authority to sign any document as they weremere tenants. They had no right to sign the waiver of all rights to the land. In fact, when they signed saiddocument, the caretaker was no longer Ramon, but wasactually Oscar.

Should a question of possession arise, the ff rules are to be observed: o The present possessor shall be preferred o If 2 possessors the one with longer possession preferred o If the dates are the same the one who presents a title o If all conditions are equal deposit the thing in a judicial

deposit pending the determination of ownership.

Copuyoc v. de SolaFacts:

Mario Copuyoc (petitioner) and his spouse are holders of a Contract toSell between them as buyers and the Bank of Commerce. They beganconstructing a house on the property without the consent of therespondent.

o On the other hand, respondent herein alleges that he is theowner of the disputed parcel of land and has been in actualpossession of the property since 1993 when it was sold to her by a Christin Quesada as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale.

It should be noted that the title to the property describes a differentproperty, as the Deed of the respondent in this case, states that theproperty is in Tandang Sora, but actually it is in Loyola.

o 2 testimonies were given in court, one stating that it is not theproperty described and the other, stating that the properties were identical (which the SC gave more weight).

Respondent filed a case with the MTC for forcible entry The MTC decided the case in favor of the petitioners, dismissing the

complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The CA, on certiorari, denied the petition of Copuyoc.

o It stated that the respondent had prior possession of theproperty and petitioner encroached on such possession. Eventhough respondent did not stay on the property, her regular visits to the same are deemed to be possession thereof.

Issue: Who had priority possession over the property subject of this case?

Ratio: The petitioner (Copuyoc) has priority possession over the

property. In forcible entry cases, the plaintiff is deprived of physipossession by means of FITSS. It implies that the possession othe thing has been unlawful from the beginning and that he acquiredsuch possession by illegal means. What is to be decided here is merephysical possession or material possession, not juridical possessionnor ownership of the property. It does not even matter that a party'stitle to the property is questionable. The party in peaceable and quitpossession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.

Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favorprior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him toremain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejectshim.

Petitioner's right to possess the property is not derived fromany claim of ostensible ownership over the same but on theprovision in the Contract to Sell allowing him to takepossession of the property pending reconstitution of the titleand full payment of the purchase price. Ownership was still wthe Bank of Commerce. It has been ruled in an ejectment case that itcannot succeed where it appears that the party had a possessionantedating to that of the plaintiff. To ascertain this, it is proper to look at the possession of the respondent.

o Execution of a Deed of Sale is merely a prima faciepresumption of delivery of possession of a piece of realproperty. It may be negated by the failure of the vendee to takeactual possession of the land sold as in the respondent's case.


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Records show that the respondent never occupied theproperty from the time it was allegedly sold to her.Her regular visits cannot be held to be possession by thecourt since, such visits were not coupled by actual exercise of dominion over the property. She only visited the property for 5times in a span of 3 years, she did not construct anythingthereon, neither did she know the road number where theproperty was located.

Petitioners Copuyoc herein established their actual physical possessionover the property.

o The contention that there is no tax declaration cannot hold water since the petitioners in this case were not even owners of the property yet. In this case, possession is the only issue,not ownership.

Malayan Realty Inc v. Uy Han YongFacts:

Malayan Realty here is the owner of an apartment unit leased to Uy Han over a monthly rental fee. Such rental fee is increased yearly.

o Malayan sent Uy a written notice informing him that thelease contract would no longer be renewed orextended upon its expiration and asked him to vacateand turn over the possession of the property.

o Uy refused to vacate said property prompting Malayan to file before the MTC a complaint for ejectment.

The trial court dismissed the complaint of Malayan and on appeal, theRTC extended the lease contract for a period of 5 years.

In the CA, Malayan Realty alleges that there was an error on the part of the RTC to grant the extension period seeing as Uy did not plead for

this in his appeal. Hence, the CA modified the RTC ruling and reducedthe extension period to a year. Unsatisfied with this decision, he appealed to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the Ca erred in shortening the period to a year.

Ratio: In this case, the lease period was not agreed upon by the parties and

rentals were paid monthly and respondent has been occupying saidproperty since 1958. The power of the courts to grant a graceperiod is potestative or discretionary depending on theparticular circumstance of the case. A longer term may begranted when equities come into play and may be deemed where itappears, always with due deference to the parties' freedom to contract.

In this case, the petitioner has already been deprived of his property for so long as it was shown that he was unable to have full use andenjoyment of the considerable portion of his property. Such

militates against further deprivation by fixing a period of extension.

However, the court finds that the increase of rental fees per annum was just and fair and is a reasonable valuation of the compensationdue petitioner for the use and occupation of the property from theexpiration of the contract of the lease until the turn over by therespondent.

In conclusion, the respondent was to vacate the premisesimmediately without period for extension and was to pay theincreased monthly rental fees to the petitioner.

Nonito Labastida v. CA Facts:

Private respondents in this case are the owners of a parcel of land andsaid land was leased to the petitioners Nonito Labastida for a monthly rental.

A case was initiated by the private respondent herein praying that theplaintiffs be ordered to vacate the land.

o They allegedly sent notice to the occupants that the property was going to be used as a commercial building and instead of heeding this request, the petitioners repaired the buildingerected upon it and putt additional constructions on the lotand refused to vacate said property.

In their answer, the Labastidas are now stating that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and over the nature of the subject matter of the action since there is no evidence that the 1

year period has elapsed from the time defendants receivedthe written notice to vacate, coupled by the fact that clearly,this was a case of unlawful detainer (which should be filed

with the MTC).o They claim that there was actually no demand made and that if

ever there was a demand, it was made on Feb 20, 1983. Andsince this case was instituted less than 1 year after suchdemand, it is clearly an unlawful detainer case.

The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. Such decision wasaffirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Whether or not the petitioners have a right to possession.

Ratio: It is evident from the allegations of the complaint filed by the

private respondents that the case was actually an unlawfuldetainer one. The respondents here allege that they were theregistered owners of the lot subject of the case and thus entitled to


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possession thereof and that petitioners were mere lessees paying rent.This therefore, amounts to an allegation that petitioners wereunlawfully withholding the possession of the land. Thisrefusal of the lessee to leave the premises gives rise to anaction for unlawful detainer.

o The action therefore, is not a recovery of possession. In case of several demands in an unlawful detainer case, the

period is reckoned from the date of the last demand. The dateof the last demand was on Feb 20, 1983 and this case was instituted onDecember 3, 1983. Thus, it is clear that the case should have been

brought to the MTC. In cases of ejectments based on the expiration of the lease, no notice is

required and any notice given only serves to negate any inference thatthe lessor has extended the period of the lease. Such notice is neededonly when the action is due to the lessees failure to pay the rent or donot comply with the obligations of the lease.

Valdez v. CA Facts:

Petitioners in this case, Bonifacio and Venida Valdez initiated a case inthe MTC against the respondent Gabriel and Francisca Fabella forallegedly, without color of title whatsoever, occupied the said lot by building their house in the said lot. They made repeated demands tothe respondents to vacate the property but they refused to do so.

o In their answer, the respondents contended that thecomplaint failed to state that petitioners had priorphysical possession of the property or that they werethe lessors of the former (as the case was an unlawfuldetainer)

o Petitioners on the other hand claim that the have ownership of the land and have been in open, continuous and adversepossession thereof for more then 30 years.

MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. It was affirmed by the RTC, butsuch decision of the RTC was later questioned by the CA on appeal.

o The CA stated that petitioners failed to make a case forunlawful detainer because they failed to show thatthey gave private respondents the right to occupy thepremises or that they had tolerated the respondentspossession of the same which is a requirement incases of unlawful detainer. It requires an allegation of material possession.

Issue: Whether or not the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case

for unlawful detainer Whether or not the MTC has original jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio: The averments of the complaint did not make out a case for

unlawful detainer. The court went on to discuss the differencesamong accion interdictal, publiciana and reivindicatoria. The courtstated that to justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential thatthe plaintiff's supposes acts of tolerance must have been present rightfrom the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.If it is unlawful from the start, unlawful detainer is not theproper remedy.

If such tolerance is present from the start of the possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawfuldetainer is proper. It is the nature of the defendant's entry into theland which determines the cause of action whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is legal but later becomes illegal, thecase is unlawful detainer. It is necessary that the complaintshould embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutesprovide a remedy as the proceedings are summary in nature.

o When the complaint fails to aver the facts constitutive of thecase, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossesison started, the remedy would either bepubliciana or reivindicatoria.

In this case, the petitioners allege that the inherited the property fromtheir parents and that the possession of the private respondent

was by mere tolerance of their mother and after her death, by their own tolerance.

o Those possessions merely tolerated become illegal once he isrequired to leave. It is essential in cases like this that the

tolerance must have been present right from the startof the possession.o But in this case, the possession was illegal from inception and

not merely tolerated by the petitioners as alleged in thecomplaint considering that they built a house thereon withoutthe permission and consent of the petitioners before them,their mother. Such act is a stealthily act which is forcible entry.

The complaint here do not recite any averment of fact that wouldsubstantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated theoccupation of the property. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties and the failure to allege the key jurisdictional factsconstitutive of the unlawful detainer is fatal.

In conclusion, MTC has no jurisdiction over the case andthere is no valid cause for an unlawful detainer.


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Notes (Case Digests Property)

IGNACIO VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO:Case Doctrine: Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receivefrom the effects of the current of the waters.

The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while theaccretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.

FACTS: Ignacio applied for registration of a parcel of land adjacent to his land, claiming that he has acquired theland by right of accretion. Director of Lands, Valeriano opposed, instead it avers that portion sought to beregistered is property of public domain.ARGUMENTS:

1. Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradualdeposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code

2. Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because theyrefer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea.

ISSUE/S: WON the land subject of the dispute can be acquired by right of accretion of Ignacio.HELD:NO.

The land cannot be acquired by right of accretion.Article 457 is not applicable.The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while theaccretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.Manila bay is not a river.A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:

Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. 7C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)

DE BUYSER VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS: Case Doctrine: Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open toacquisition by adverse possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwisedeclared by either the executive or legislative branch of the government.

FACTS:De Buyser is the registered owner of a lot contiguous to the lot subject of this dispute. On the other hand,defendant Tandayags have been occupying this foreshore land under a revocable permit issued by the Director of Lands. Claiming ownership of the foreshore land, de buyser plaintiff filed an action against spouses Tandayag torecover possession of this land and the Director of Lands for having illegally issued a revocable permit to theTandayags.ARGUMENTS:In asserting the right of ownership over the land, plaintiff invokes Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August3, 1866 which provides:

Art. 4. Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the

sea, form part of the public domain, when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea,and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries,or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of theowners of the estate adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.

ISSUE/S: WON claim of ownership has legal basis.HELD:No.Plaintiffs claim of ownership is bereft of legal basis. Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition byadverse possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by either theexecutive or legislative branch of the government. 1


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State shall grant these lands to the adjoining owners only when they are no longer needed for the purposesmentioned therein. In the case at bar, the trial court found that plaintiff's evidence failed to prove that the land inquestion is no longer needed by the government, or that the essential conditions for such grant under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters, exists.The revocable permit issued by the Director of Lands was not an implied declaration that the land is no longerneeded for public use. In the letter of approval by the Director of Lands, it has expressly reserved the right of thegovernment to use it when it is deemed necessary. The state therefor did not relinquish ownership over the land.

GRANDE, ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS:Case Doctrine: accretion does not ipso facto becomes registered land just because the lot which receives it is aregistered land.

FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in thetitle). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by actionof the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less,

had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela againstrespondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint(docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful andcontinuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well asattorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves,asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to theyear 1933 to the present.It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluviumbrought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river.ISSUE:Whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by aTorrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible.HELD:We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registeredowner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership overthe accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registeredland is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vestor give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner,making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placedunder the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The factremain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometimeafter petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to

the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment,therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject toacquisition through prescription by third persons.

REP. OF THE PHIL. VS. CA, ET. AL.:Case Doctrine: The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river isindispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.

FACTS: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperialand Mario C. Tancinco filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property.


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Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition tothe application for registration.Petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because whatactually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of theMeycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.On the other hand, private respondents submit the fact of accretion without human intervention because thetransfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.ISSUE/S: WON there was accretionHELD:There is no accretion.Article 457 of the NCC, requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particularprovision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it bemade through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacentto the banks of rivers.The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. Thisexcludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be theexclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said

property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agreewith the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of landcame into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.xxxxxxxxx However, there isevidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the currentof the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effectof the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. Theland sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on thefishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that the waterin the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on theside of the pilapil facing the riverThe reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is tocompensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering onrivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that therisk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v.City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by specialworks expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred theirdikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property fromthe destructive force of the waters of the river.

BAGAIPO VS. COURT OF APPEALS:Case Doctrine: In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurredthrough avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.

FACTS: Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot which located southeast of Davao river.

While respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite thesoutheast portion of petitioners lot facing the Davao River.

On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint i[2] for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of PreliminaryInjunction and Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of landmeasuring 29,162 square meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo allegedly lost when theDavao River traversed her property. Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river, herproperty became divided into three lots, namely: Lots 415 -A, 415-B and 415-C.

In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the trial court a surveyplan ii[3] prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno which concluded that the land presently located acrossthe river and parallel to Bagaipos property still belonged to the latter and not to Lozano, who planted some 350fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old abandoned river bed.


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For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled property.He asserted that the Davao River did not change its co urse and that the reduction in Bagaipos domain was causedby gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is also because of the rivers naturalaction that silt slowly deposited and added to his land over a long period of time. He further averred that thisaccretion continues up to the present and that registration proceedings instituted by him over the alluvialformation could not be concluded precisely because it continued to increase in size.ISSUE/S: WON there was a ch ange in the rivers course which resulted to avulsion? HELD:NO.The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was brought about by erosion andnot a change in the rivers course. This conclusion was reached after the t rial judge observed during ocularinspection that the banks located on petitioners land are sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on theother side of the river. Additionally, the riverbank on respondents side is lower and gently sloping. Th e lowerland therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried by the river current. iii[11] These findings are factual, thusconclusive on this Court, unless there are strong and exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported by the evidenceon record, or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.

The decrease in petitioners land area and the corresponding expansion of respondents property were thecombined effect of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot

claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbeds former locationcannot even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place gradually over anunspecified period of time, up to the present.The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: 1) Thatthe deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and 3)That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. iv[13] These requisites were sufficientlyproven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was suddenor that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluviumand erosion.

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, representedby his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.2003 Oct 8 1st Division G.R. No. 120864 CASE DOCTRINESCo-owner may file an action against a co-owner; purpose

Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also againstanother co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the lattercase, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannotseek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.Co-ownership; right of enjoyment

The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if thesubject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extentpossible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely,if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells inthe house.FACTS:

Petition for Review on Certiorari.Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DEGUIA.

Abejos contentions:1. he is the owner of the undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond registered Register of Deeds

of Bulacan.2. ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square

meters.


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3. DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent toABEJOs damage and prejudice.

4. DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands todo so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired.

5. asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well aspay damages.

In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged:1. the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed.2. the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her

only heir.3. ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to

possess the entire FISHPOND.4. ABEJOs ownership of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and clai med ownership over an

undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself.5. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a

builder in good faith.RTC decision: in favor of Abejo.CA decision: affirmed the RTC.

Issue 1: WON a co-owner may file an action for ejectment against a co-owner.Ruling:

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, *a+ny one of the co -owners may bring an action in ejectment. Thisarticle covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawfuldetainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion dereivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physicalpossession only. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession.However, accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. Accion dereivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trialcourt.

Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also againstanother co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the lattercase, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannotseek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.

In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, wereiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior topartition as follows:

It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all thatthe co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has noright to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division iseffected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.

As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtainrecognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property

because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinatepart of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half () of the buildingin favor of private respondent.

xxxxFollowing the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal

shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners.Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners of a portion, which is truly abstract becauseuntil there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying orsegregating their respective portions.


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Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is theproper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each co-owner maydemand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownershipunder certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set bylaw.

To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co -owned property. However, the only effect of such actionis a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-ownedproperty. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND betweenABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIAfrom the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equalright to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.Issue 2: WON it is proper for a co-owner to pay for rents while using the property.Ruling:

The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if thesubject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extentpossible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-

owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely,if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells inthe house.

The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail toexercise any of these options, they must bear the consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner topay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property.

In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his usewithout paying the proper rent. Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-ownersfor the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the propertyand should share in its net profits. /adsum

RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GASPAR DEBARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants. 1912 Nov 181st Division G.R. No. 4656CASE DOCTRINESHereditary succession gives rise to co-ownershipCo-ownership; extent "Each co-owner may use the things owned in comm

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