UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA FRANCE, MILLAU VIADUCT BRIDGE

A PROJECT CASE STUDY REPORT: PROJECT MANAGEMENT

PROJECT TEAM: SHOBHIT SHEKHAR, CO-ORDINATOR, 21777517 DEVYN JACKAMARRA, MEMBER, 20761794 HARSH HASMUKHBHAI PATEL, MEMBER, 21804443 KHADIJA BEGUM, MEMBER, 21822517 XIAOFAN WU, MEMBER, 21795592 ERIC TANG, MEMBER, 21929169 ZIYING ZHANG, MEMBER, 20933753

UNIT CO-ORDINATOR: DR. COSIMO FAIELLO, PROJECT MANAGEMENT, UWA PROJECT COMPANY: VIADUCT DE MILLAU, FRANCE PROJECT MANAGER: CHRISTIAN LEYRITT CHIEF ARCHITECTS: MICHEL VIRLOGEUX & LORD NORMAN FOSTER

Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE MILLAU VIADUC (VIADUC DE MILLAU) .......................................... 1 SECTION A: CASE STUDY WRITING ....................................................................................................... 2

1 THE NEED TO CONSTRUCT THE PROJECT: ................................................................................ 2 2 INTRODUCTION: ............................................................................................................................. 2

2.1 Estimated Pathways .................................................................................................................. 3 2.1.1 The Great Western ................................................................................................................ 3 2.1.2 Near RN9 ............................................................................................................................. 3 2.1.3 The Great Eastern ................................................................................................................. 3 2.1.4 Intermediate (Mediante), west of Millau ................................................................................ 4 2.1.5 The Choice Of Technical Design ........................................................................................... 4

3 STAKEHOLDERS: .................................................................................................................................. 5 3.1 The local authorities ................................................................................................................. 5 3.2 The conceding authority ........................................................................................................... 5 3.3 Eiffage ..................................................................................................................................... 5 3.4 The Arrondissement Interdépartemental des Ouvrages d’Art (AIOA) ....................................... 5 3.5 The Compagnie du viaduc de Millau ........................................................................................ 5

3.5.1 Eiffage Construction.................................................................................................................. 6 3.5.2 Eiffel Construction .................................................................................................................... 6

PROJECT TIME FRAME ..................................................................................................................... 6 SECTION B CASE STUDY ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 9

1. CONCEPTUALIZATION/INITIATION ........................................................................................... 9 2. PLANNING ..................................................................................................................................... 11 3. EXECUTION .................................................................................................................................. 13 4. FINALIZATION ............................................................................................................................. 14

SECTION C: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CASE .............................................................................. 16

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONCEPTULAIZATION ...................................................................... 16 RECOMMENDATIONS TO PLANNING........................................................................................... 17 RECOMMENDATIONS TO EXECUTION ........................................................................................ 19 RECOMMENDATIONS TO FINALIZATION ................................................................................... 20

CONCLUSION AND ATTRIBUTES TO SUCCESS .................................................................................. 22 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................ 22 APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................................. 23

MANAGEMENT STRATEGY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 23 RISK MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................... 23 COST MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................. 24 HUMAN RESORCE MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................... 25 GANTT CHART ......................................................................................................................... 27

GROUP MEETINGS ........................................................................................................................... 31 PROJECT WORK ALLOCATION GUIDE SUPER GROUP ...................................................... 32 REFERENCES: ................................................................................................................................... 37

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE MILLAU VIADUC (VIADUC DE MILLAU) The Millar Viaduct (French: Viaduc de Millau) is the world’s tallest cable-stayed bridge that hangs over the river Tarn near Millau in southern France. Conceived and designed by French structural engineer Michel Virloguex & British architect Sir Norman Foster who had seen a vision to give it an iconic view in the world. It has the mast’s summit at 343 m above the base structure. Also, it’s the 12th highest bridge in the world having 270 meters drop from the bridge road to the valley below. The 2460 meters long bridge is a spectacular architectural and design feat. It’s also one the most glamorous bridges that ever exist in planet.

Figure 1: http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/millau-viaduct-france-tallest-bridge-in.html) The construction of Millau Viaduct Bridge required one of the most state of art techniques used in the field of Civil Engineering. Until then no construction site had ever combined, in one single place, such a mixture of technology climbing framework, specifically surface coats, high performance concrete and the innovative materials that were all instrumental in the success of this extraordinary construction. The bridge was opened in 16 December 2004 to close the “missing link” on the A75 autoroute connecting Paris in the north to Perpignan in the south. Millau Viaduct was the result of 17 years of ideas, proposals and designs that resulted in reducing 37 miles off the former route through the region. But instead of choosing a mundane design that simply did the job, the French went big!

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SECTION A: CASE STUDY WRITING 1 THE NEED TO CONSTRUCT THE PROJECT: Due to the problems of traffic on the way from Paris to Spain, along the path through the Tarn valley near the town of Millau, leading to congestion in the summer from holiday traffic, construction of the bridge to span the valley was required. To start with, arrangements were examined and by October of 1991, the decision was made to build the high crossing of Tarn River by a structure of around 2.5 km. An alternate motivation might have been the promotion of the economic development and tourism locally by improving access to the area. It was also intended to mitigate the local problems in the town of MILLAU. 2 INTRODUCTION: The Millau Viaduct is a part of the A75 motorway, a 2.46 km tolled bridge across the Tarn River valley in southern France. It commenced in 2004 and is also the world’s longest cable-stayed span. The project was the first pike program to benefit from two government policies, requiring 1% of the project budget to be allocated to regional economic development and making motorway drivers to stop at nearby villages. The viaduct has turned into a visitor fascination in its own right, and the modern improvement in the zone has benefited from the 1% policy. The Viaduct is a multiple cable-stayed span bridge, based on the honour winning configuration by Norman Foster & Partners and Segelerg-EEG-SERF, which itself derives from an initial concept by French engineer Michel Virlogeux. Throughout 1993–1994 the legislature consulted with 7 designers and 8 structural architects. During 1995–1996, a second meaning contemplate was made by five associated architect groups and structural engineers. In January 1995, the administration announced a revelation for open investment with request configuration methodologies for a rivalry.

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2.1 ESTIMATED PATHWAYS:

Figure 2 Source: Omega Centre, Millau Route 2.1.1 The Great Western (grand Ouest) (black route) It was longer than the eastern option by 12 km (7.5 mi), following the Cernon valley. Technically easier (requiring four viaducts), this result might have been judged to bring opposite effects on the environment, in particular on the picturesque villages of Peyre and Saint-Georges-de-Luzençon. It might have been more exorbitant over the first option, and served those district seriously. 2.1.2 Near RN9 (proche de la RN9) (red route) It would have served the town of Millau well, but presented technical challenges would have had a strong impact on existing or planned structures. 2.1.3 The Great Eastern (grand Est) (yellow route) The construction of the route, which is passing east of Millau and crossing the valleys of the Tarn and Dourbie on two very high and long bridges (spans of .8 km and 1 km or 2,600 ft and 3,300 ft), was recognized as a major concern. This alternative might have permitted access to Millau only from the Larzac plateau, using the long and tortuous descent from La Cavalerie. Although this option was shorter and better suited to through traffic, it did not ultimately serve the necessities of Millau and its area.

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2.1.4 Intermediate (Mediante), west of Millau (blue route) It might have been underpinned via nearby opinion, yet all the introduced geological difficulties, notably on the address for crossing those valley of the tarn. Master examination inferred that these obstacles were not insurgence. The fourth option was opted by ministerial decree on 28 June 1989. It encompassed two possibilities:

(1) The helter-skelter solution, envisaging a 2500 m (8200 ft) viaduct more than 200 m (660ft) above the river;

(2) The low solution plunging under the valley and crossing the river on a 200 m (660 ft) bridge then a viaduct of 2300 m (7500 ft) extended by a tunnel on the Larzac side.

After in-depth development investigations by the service of state funded works, those low results might have been surrendered or it might need intersected water table, required a negative effect on the town. After the choice of the helter-skelter viaduct, five groups from claiming designers and researchers worked on a technical solution. The concept and design for the bridge was devised by French designer Michel Virlogeux. He acted with the Dutch building firm ARCADIS, answerable for the structural building of the span. The "high solution" obliged the construction of a 2,500 m (8,200 ft) long viaduct. From 1991 to 1993, the structures division of Sétra, directed by Michel Virlogeux, conveyed preliminary investigations and examined the feasibility of a single structure spanning the valley. Taking into account technical, structural and fiscal issues, the Administration of Roads opened the question for competition among structural designers and engineers to widen the search for practical plans. By July of 1993, 17 structural designers and 38 architects applied as candidates for the preliminary studies. With the help of a multidisciplinary authority, the Administration of Roads chose eight structural engineers for a technical study and seven architects for the architectural study. 2.1.5 THE CHOICE OF TECHNICAL DESIGN Simultaneously, a school of international experts representing a wide range of expertise (technical, architectural and landscape), chaired by Jean-François Coste, was established to elucidate the choices that had to be made. In February 1995, on the foundation of proposals of the architects and structural engineers, and with backing of the class of experts, five general designs were finalised. Those rivals might have been relaunched: five combinations from claiming designers and structural engineers, drawn from the best hopefuls of the primary phase, were formed; each was to conduct in-

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depth investigations of one of the general designs. On 15 July 1996, Bernard Pons, minister of Public Works, announced the decision of the jury, which was constituted of elected artists and experts and chaired by Christian Leyrit, the director of highways. The solution of a cable-stayed bridge, presented by the structural engineering group Sogelerg, Europe Etudes Gecti and Serf and the architect Foster+Partner was declared the best. Nitty gritty investigations were carried out by the successful consortium, steered by the highways authority until mid-1998. Following wind tunnel tests, the shape of the road deck was altered and detailed corrections were made to the design of the pylons. When the details were eventually finalised, the whole design was affirmed to late 1998. 3 STAKEHOLDERS: 3.1 The local authorities The community of Millau and the Millau – Grands Causses grouping for communes would regularly include in an extent of this sort in perspective of the scale of the nearby effects of the future viaduct. 3.2 The conceding authority The State (Ministry of Infrastructure) is the yielding power. The Ministry opened the concession of the viaduct to competition and awarded it to the Eiffage group which is therefore both the structure’s builder and concessionary. The group has therefore set up specific structures to perform all the tasks that are necessary in order to construct and then operate the viaduct. 3.3 Eiffage It is the third largest group in France in the field of construction, civil building and development related benefits. It is right now in fifth position in Europe. It has a staff of 41,000 in France and the rest of the world and in the financial year 2000 had an ex-VAT turnover of 6.25 billion Euros. 3.4 The Arrondissement Interdépartemental des Ouvrages d’Art (AIOA) It has been given responsibility by the yielding power to direct observing. The AIOA reports to the Infrastructure Directorate of the Aveyron département which is also the construction manager for the works on the A75 motorway on both sides of the viaduct. 3.5 The Compagnie du viaduc de Millau This company is a subsidiary of Eiffage and is the structure’s concessionary for a 75 year period. This share of the organization might have been uncommonly set up to the motivation and draws on the experience of the Eiffage concessions branch. This company is the project owner, and has the authority for the entire funding of the project and its subsequent management. It conducts

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transactions with the other parties involved with the viaduct (Central Government, local authorities, etc.). The Compagnie du Viaduct de Millau has allocated the works to two large subsidiaries of the Eiffage group: Eiffage construction will be responsible for concrete construction and Eiffel for metal construction. 3.5.1 Eiffage Construction (It had a turnover of 3.40 billion Euros in the year 2000, with a total of 17,000 employees including 2,800 designers and executives) will take part throughout the construction process, from land-use planning to maintenance of the structure, not forgetting promotion of the viaduct and general contracting. Eiffage development will be available on the whole those areas of France through its system for 160 territorial subsidiaries. The company also has a major presence in Belgium and performs large-scale works elsewhere in Europe (Copenhagen Metro, Poznan by-pass, PontVentoux dam in Italy, etc.), in Asia and Africa. In the case of the Millau viaduct, its subsidiary Eiffage TP, which is one of the largest French civil engineering and earthworks companies, will have the responsibilities for all the concrete structures. 3.5.2 Eiffel Construction It is a French pioneer in metal construction with a turnover of 122 million Euros in 2000 and a staff of 700. Eiffel has a strong influence in France with four factories, three in the East of France (Lauterbourg, Metz and Nancy) and one at Fos-sur-Mer, as well as corporate offices in Valenciennes and Le Havre. It also has offices in the U.K. (London) and Germany (Hanover). Eiffel is at the leading edge of innovation for buildings, bridges, engineering structures, boilers, mechanical engineering, water gates, and for the oil industry (offshore platforms). It realizes half of its turnover outside France. PROJECT TIME FRAME

Time Frame Project Approach Occasion Details 1987 Feasibility studies/Research Selection of estimated pathways –

studies from the CETE d”Aix en Province

1988-1990 Feasibility studies/Research Conducting primary viable research 1988 Feasibility studies/Research Selection of an expert committee

within the road authority. 1989 Feasibility studies/Research Establishment of AIOA: inter-

disciplinary administration for

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structures like bridges. The AIOA is liable for conducting all the processes on A75 Head of the AIOA : G. GILLET

1988-1989 Feasibility studies/Research Choosing A75 route from four possibilities.

28 June 1989 Feasibility studies/Research Selection of the median option which crosses Millau. The choice fits with the environmental constraints and development ambitions.

1990-1991 Feasibility studies/Research Selection of the routes which crosses the Tarn valley, from ‘high’ and ‘low’.

29 October 1991 Feasibility studies/Research Top authority decision to pass the Tarn via the high route because it is the cheapest and the shortest and it considers all safety requirements.

1992 Feasibility studies/Research SETRA examines different past projects to get the idea that how viaduct can be crossed.

1993/1994 Project design and conception

International committee formed to advise the road director with formation of 7 architects and 8 engineering consultancies.

1993 Project design and conception

Call for refining and improvement of the design

12 July 1993 Project design and conception

The top authority approves the design which consists a structure of 2.4 km long and .2 km high

1994 Project design and conception

Choice of the project and organizing a competition to select the project.

1994-1995 Project design and conception

Final studies of the project with all the architects and design engineers.

1996 Project design and conception

Selection of the preferred project design : team Norman Foster-Segelerg The cable-stayed bridge won the challenge because it was more efficient.

1998 Procurement Change of governance and introduction of BFOT.

1999/2000 Procurement Organizing an international tender of BFOT type where the contractor is bound by conditions in terms of time and financial aspects.

23 November 1999 Public enquiry The first inter ministry decree is amended in order to conform the

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concession conditions and allow the toll system.

March 2001 Procurement EIFFAGE won the bid for the delivery of the Millau Viaduct.

30 May 2001 Procurement Signature of the concession contract. 8 October 2001 Procurement The council of the state approves the

project via MINISTRY decree Procurement Decision to build the viaduct with

metal rather than concrete. 10 October 2001 Project delivery/Construction Beginning of the construction phase. 20 February 2002 Control of construction Establishment of the expert

committee of ACDC by Jean Francois Coste.

14 December 2004 Project delivery/Construction

Inauguration of the Millau viaduct and beginning of the operation phases after couple of days.

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SECTION B CASE STUDY ANALYSIS KEY MANAGEMENT STAGES 1. CONCEPTUALIZATION/INITIATION: • The initial study of the France Millau Viaduct started in 1987. Contemporary to the Normandy

Bridge which is also a cable stayed hanging bridge, which was also conceived and designed by same design engineer, and was planned to be made. The conception which Viaduct drew upon the experience, combined with 10 years of studies with the administration. It is commemorating that initially, Millau Viaduct was treated as an A75b infrastructure, authorized under NRA (National Road Administration).

• As the project started to grow, NRA in charge of developing had gone through internal amendments. In 1989-1990 the head of road directory, “Jean Berthier” actually decided the actual route of the Viaduct.

• “Christian Leyrit” succeeded him and supervised complete delivery of Millau Viaduct Project from conception till opening. He was replaced by Patrick Gandil for operation phases. As compared to other decisions, Christian Leyrit held the responsibility for selecting design of Millau Viaduct through international competition having several group of engineers, architects and representatives of governments. Also, such design had an important inflection point in designing of bridges in France, particularly when comparing to the Normandy Bridge. It was uncommon to subject expertise of SETRA and external opinions and experts.

• The Millau Viaduct represents for the first time that design in a project would depend upon a competition, a decision which was later justified when the wonder was made.

• After the SETRA and Roads Directorate defined five “best options” for the future of the Millau Viaduct and invited 5 integrated engineer and architect teams for competing by expatiating each choice. The 5 options came through a “brainstorming” process organized within SETRA and calling of international experts. The competition began in 1995 and started the selection of the British architect Sir Norman Foster in 1996.

• It was extracted from cable-stayed solution which was originally suggested by Michel Virlogeux, who had also designed the bridge of Normandy while working with SETRA.

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• However, the design that came up didn’t prescribe the method of construction, i.e. whether to build the bridge in steel or concrete. Since either of the solutions was possible but the challenge was to get it the best one. It was suggested to use concrete, not steel, but later when project entered the realization stage it was “steel” which became the solution since it was the crucial to avoid construction delays and preoccupancy which was not isolated from Millau Viaduct’s key enabling method.

Also, the decision was to entrust the private sectors for financing and delivering the project. (Source: Compiled by author) PROBLEMS FACED

(Source: Contrat de concession)

• The problem was to decide the way to cross the Tarn Valley for which choice between the high and low solutions was an vital concern as no proper design was presentProblem 1

• Apart from indisputable proofs of the positive effects of Viaduct on local economic development some of them deplore insufficient leadership from the state levelProblem 2

• There was lack of public funds available for the existing missing link in A75 for which 2 million francs was required. Management was in awe to get the funds as public funding was not enough and expenses couldn’t be borne by them. It was the question of hour.Problem 3

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2. PLANNING: PROBLEM FACED: The major problem of traffic congestion on the route from Paris to Spain (A75-A71) passing through the Tarn valley near the town of Millau had been recognised, however, the very first challenge was what single structure could be the solution, something that could both act as an access to Millau and a crossing of the Tarn River DESCRIPTION: Whatever the solution was, this would prove to be an enormously challenging task, as the valley is roughly 2.5km across, end to end and nearly 300m deep. The technical services involved were firstly faced with the decision of whether or not they were to build a high structure, which crossed over the entire valley or a lower option, one that sloped down and across the valley and river. After much consideration and reasoning the higher option, being a bridge, was seen to be more suitable and beneficial to become the crossing of the valley. Now that the crossing had been decided to be a bridge, several types of bridges had to be analysed and sorted so that a suitable styles could be narrowed down and eventually one was to be selected. Many designs were considered but only a group of five types of bridges were seen to be suitable for such a large task. On July, 1996, from the five suitable types of bridges the solution of a cable-stayed bridge designed by the architects Fosters & partners was declared to be the best and is what we see today in the Millau Viaduct. Of course, with any type of bridge, there are the inherent positives and negatives. Cable-stayed bridges are great for longer spanning needs and have come a long way in their design over recent years. In fact cable-stayed bridges are now highly recommended alongside suspension bridges for long spans between 700m and 1500m. Also, cable-stayed bridges are known to look highly elegant which is a huge positive, as this is a main factor in the decision making process of the bridge design. No one likes an eye sore running through a beautiful country side. For example, the longest cable-stayed bridge at the time, before the Millau, was the Tatara Bridge in Japan (figure 2) which looks very impressive and captivating

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PROBLEM FACED: Although, as previously stated there are drawbacks. As seen previously with the Tacoma bridge disaster, swaying caused by the wind can be very dangerous and wind-induced vibration of stay cables is very common with cable-stayed bridges, so both were taken into heavy consideration during the designing process DESCRIPTION: Once the bridge type had been decided and the design was finalized, costs were able to be calculated and they came to roughly a staggering EUR 400m. Initially, the costs were planned to be covered by the state but due to the lack of public funding available to cover the cost of the Millau Viaduct this was not possible and other sources had to be establish in order to for the whole plan to go ahead. (Omega Centre).

Figure 3: http://www.pieway.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Tatara-Bridge-%E2%80%93Japan.jpg

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3. EXECUTION: PROBLEM FACED: CONTROLLING A challenge in this project was the problem of how to correctly and safely place the decking onto the pillars. The bridge decking would be built and then pushed onto the pillars, however this presented a few problems. How does one push a concrete slab in the order of tonnes across the several pillars of the bridge? As the decking is pushed over gaps between pillars, how would bending be controlled? And what would control the process?

DESCRIPTION: Pushing the bridge decking across the spans of pillars required the use of many high pressure hydraulic systems that lift and then push it along. Each pillar has one of these launching systems and together they lift and push the 2.46km decking. Each of these launching systems consists of a hydraulic lifting cylinder and either two or four skates that each consist of two horizontal hydraulic cylinders. The hydraulic lifting cylinder has a lifting capacity of 250 tonnes while the horizontal hydraulic cylinders have a pushing capacity of 60 tonnes each. The process of pushing the decking along the piers is to lift with the lifting cylinder, the horizontal cylinders retract and then push the decking along the skates. As the hydraulic system pushed the deck horizontally, the mass of the decking would cause it to bend downwards between gaps of the pillars. To counteract this problem, a nose recovery system is used to counteract the bending. This system consists of four hydraulic cylinders and is built at the end of the deck. As the nose of the deck approaches a pillar or support tower, the nose recovery system is activated to pull the nose up to the correct level. Once at the correct level the decking can then continue to be pushed onto the next pillar without any collisions. MONITORING To support the bridge decking, pillars are used, but the spans between pillars can be as great as 342m, causing bending and strain on the decking.

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DESCRIPTION: To counteract this, temporary support towers between pillars help support and control bending of the deck between the gaps. The support towers closest to the abutments are only 12 to 20 meters high and thus are raised using cranes. The five remaining support towers are between 87.5m and 163.7 meters high and consequently will require hydraulic stage lifting to be built. To control the process of lifting and pushing the decking, all the hydraulic cylinders and pressure lines contain position and pressure transducers that send all the information to the control panel. The control panel displays position and load information to operators allowing them to monitor the process. If any of the loads or positions exceeds safe limits, operators can quickly stop the process. Oil level and temperature sensors also allow the operators to stop the process in case of oil pressure drops caused by leaks or any other malfunctions. The PLC system takes information from the control panel and operates the hydraulic cylinders according to a program. The system is programmed to restrict load difference between hydraulic cylinders to a maximum of 5% and allow for a maximum difference in height of 3mm. All of these safety measures combine to reduce the risk of any damage or danger to workers and also to ensure damage to surrounding environment is limited. 4. FINALIZATION: The project was completed on 14 December 2014 when the inauguration ceremony was held on the day. The on time completion of the project is attributed to: The selection of constructing material (integration of concrete and steel) and design;

• The construction method; • Integration of research and studies;

The state and the administration also facilitated the project to be delivered on time, the AUOA who provide the access roads for the construction site at the earliest stage.·

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PROBLEMS FACED: • Under the BFOT-PPP type of procurement the funding of the project relies on the users of

the viaduct. This type of funding is regarded to be an innovative form of funding and financing, the revenues are generated from toll collection or subsidies (doesn’t cost taxpayers anything). The aim of the viaduct is to offer the best level of service and relieving Millau's bottleneck.

• The toll barriers of lanes were extended to 18 in 2005 and more recruitment of employments adapts the flows since the realistic level of traffic was superior to the forecast where originally was 14 lanes. In 2005 there are twenty percent more vehicles than anticipated, and in 2008 even more vehicles crossed the viaduct including heavy goods traffic.

• Other than the toll activities, the viaduct also add more services: security, maintenance, communication. Where the communication service generates revenue through massive tourism each year.

To conclude, the key element that lead to the success of Millau Viaduct are following: Perfection of planning: the initial design of the Viaduct by four experts P.Godin, M.Rat, M.Panet, and M.Virlogeux was challenged by public, design competition lead to the involvement of international experts and the British architect Sir Norman Foster that improved the process. TYPE OF PROCUREMENT: BFOT-PPP type of Procurement dominated by strong governance and risk management. The construction: the technical choices, to construct in steel instead of concrete which was less time consuming, allow the piers and the deck to be built simultaneously, and fabricate the pieces in factory that reduces delays, provide workers a safer working environment.

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SECTION C: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CASE 1. RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONCEPTULAIZATION: THE NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE GEOLOGICAL ENGINEERS. As faced with the problem to choose one option between the two, they must have communicated with the architects and geographical designers in order to get a good insight about the region thereby helping them with the design procedures. Furthermore they must have gathered all of the information about the challenges which are going to be faced and acted accordingly. THE STATE AUTHORITY NEEDS TO BE CO-OPERATIVE. Due to the construction of Millau Viaduct, the localities will benefit economically. This project is also going to improve the relationships among the local communities. Considering these benefits, the State authority must have taken active interest to guide the project in a lucid manner and provide the management team all the necessary means. In addition to that the local people must have also convinced the State government about the same. COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT IN TERMS OF FINANCIAL ASPECT. Funding is the most important part of any project as it can defer the original design due to lack of funds and render it insufficient. In this case the senior management team must have previously analysed the funding requirements and the capability of the people to fund the project. Accordingly they must have invited the private sectors to provide the funding thereby balancing the overall budget. Being one of the marvelous project the team must have asked for assistance from the central government to provide necessary funding.

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO PLANNING: • In order to solve the problem of traffic congestion, a structure that could cross the Tarn

valley had to be thought of. The technical services in charge, came up with the idea to invite five teams consisting of both engineers and architects and have them compete by sharing and elaborating on their ideas through brainstorming processes. Although all of the solutions by the company were highly successful, there still are other options that could have been used in order to get the same result or maybe even better one. Instead of creating a competitive brainstorming atmosphere, the technical services could have also set up a focus group. An advantage of this would be instead of competing, the experts could have collaborated, which in turn could save time, money and create more viable ideas.

• The resulting ideas from the brainstorming processes were separated into two types of infrastructure, a high or a low option. The high solution, being a 2,500 m viaduct more than 200 m above the river. The low solution, descending into the valley and crossing the river on a 200 m bridge, then a viaduct of 2300 m extended by a tunnel. Both options were analysed by the Centre for Technical Equipment Studies and initially the lower option seemed more suitable. However, due to safety, economic and geotechnical limitations, the high option was chosen. The deciding factors were all very important ones and seem to be based on specific stakeholders like the local government and executive management. Nevertheless, consultation with the local people, another stakeholder could have been included as well, as they are the people who have to live there and most likely will be the most frequent users of the crossing.

• Because of the high altitude of the would be bridge and surrounding geography, the wind had to be carefully studied and accounted for in order to prevent any damage or destruction of the viaduct. The wind dynamics in the area, were studied through records from meteorology stations so that the directional patterns of the wind and mechanisms such as steady and gust forces were identified. This allowed for the engineers to create appropriate models of the bridge and predict it’s responses to the wind during different scenarios using wind tunnel technology. As a risk management tool, an expert in wind and structure issues was appointed this job, because this is such a huge risk for the project, more tools and techniques could have been used as a part of the risk management process to ensure long lasting success and safety of the structure.

• The large costs of this project were initially planned to be covered by public funding, however this proved impossible, as it was far too expensive. In 1998 the Minister of

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Transport and Equipment made the decision to procure the bridge under a concession scheme in order to avoid postponing delivery by delay of construction. This concession scheme transferred the responsibility of the project to the private sector. The main source of funding the Millau Viaduct is through toll payments made by users, trucks and other motorists. The change of source of funding could have been avoided if the project cost estimation was done prior to the planning for cost management however this wasn’t the case. The source of funding was decided before the cost of the entire project was calculated, this is why funding was shifted to private funding, as there was not enough money in the private sector. This could have been a cause of the internal finance protocols, which if so, should be changed.

Figure 4: http://millau.e-monsite.com/pages/1-1-le-choix-de-l-ouvrage.html

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO EXECUTION: Recommendations on how to select a qualified sub-contractor to perform the technical activities and to supply the technical components. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MONITORING

• Given the foreseeable difficulties in building such an elegant giant, there were many aspects to be considered regarding the selection of a highly qualified sub-contractor to perform the engineering of hydraulics for this project. Since it’s known to the engineering world that hydraulic engineering is relied on practical experience more than creativity, the requirements covered not only the manufacture of the hydraulic parts, but also the similar experiences of provision of hydraulic solutions as well as the delivery of the hydraulic parts where experiences could insure the feasibility and quality of the project, and on-time delivery makes everything stick to the Gantt Chart.

• The chosen sub-contractor was Enerpac, a global market leader in high pressure hydraulic tools, controlled force products and solutions for precise positioning of heavy loads (Enerpac, 2015). When we take a glance at the introduction of this company, we would not be wondering any more why this company was the one to take charge in performing some of the most important actions in this project. Obviously, Enerpac had done some quite similar jobs successfully in their previous projects such as Lifting and Installing the Deck Sections of the Golden Horn Metro Bridge in Istanbul, Turkey (Enerpac, 2015) and the University Bridge in Bydgoszcz, Poland (Enerpac, 2015), etc. In those projects, Enerpac utilized the methods which were almost the same as those that were applied in this project, and showed strong control and impressive experience in solving problems in decking process of building bridges by advanced hydraulic technologies.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTROLLING: On the other hand, the hydraulic system in this project was designed and built by Enerpac's Construction Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain (Enerpac, 2015). Even though it is quite common nowadays to perform international cooperation in engineering field, an accurate delivery of the hydraulic components would still be one of the major concern regarding the completion of the project. Using an amount of imported equipment could easily lead to the possibility of logistic delay due to long distance transportation and various unforeseeable factors, and for most situation in project a slight delay may cause unexpected cost overruns, variations, and other escalating issues. To avoid such potential risks, a recommendation could be given to adopt local supplier to perform the manufacture of the hydraulic parts according to the original solution provided by Enerpac. RECOMMENDATIONS TO FINALIZATION: Environmental footprint Due to the scale of the project, the carbon footprint was inevitably high, but it was thought that because the viaduct has established a new route that is about 67km shorter therefore the lesser, carbon emissions from automobiles could offset the carbon footprint from construction of the viaduct. The recommendation to this issue is that the construction company Eiffage should be responsible for the reforestation of Tarn Valley. Corresponding measures could be in place for recuperation and treatment of rain water and road residual to minimize environmental impacts. Suicidal event Millau Viaduct is so far one of the tallest bridge in the world. Regarding to its altitude and elegance. It possibly become a choice of suicidal site. It is recorder that in 2005, a man abandoned his car on the bridge, climbed over and jumped from the Viaduct, a sad tragedy. Although it might not be easy to change one’s mind from suicide, however from this event it can be seen that more protective guards should be put in place to prevent such events. For example, the side rail can be redesigned so that no one is able to climb over it. Furthermore, security could be employed so that they can watch out for such things, which would then give a much better chance to prevent anything like that happening again.

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Increase maintenance of the Viaduct Since opening, the volume of the passing vehicles is increasing every year and the level of traffic is greatly superior to the forecasted expectations. It is necessary to increase the maintenance frequency to ensure the highest safety level and also maintain its longevity. The Viaduct has become one of the most recognised tourism sites in France, therefore safety is the most important issue that should be emphasized.

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CONCLUSION AND ATTRIBUTES TO SUCCESS: The Millau Viaduct Bridge, is considered as a first missing piece of A75 (Clermont Ferrand-Montpellier). Recalling the FNTP’s conference in October 2003 chaired by the Director of the Road Directorate Patrice Parise, Jean Francois Coste, Pascal Lechanteur and Marc Legrand outline The main factors of success as decisions related to:

(Source: Viaduc de Millau, Revue Travaux n*216, Fevier 2005)

SUMMARY: Taking the whole project process in account, the success of the Millau Viaduct is manifested in:

(Source: allendemontral.wordpress.com/le-monument-2)

The technical choices, in particular the decision to build the bridge in steelThe people who contributed to the different phases of the Viaduct

The procurement decisions and concessionThe initial planning and route.

1• The “Planning”: From the case study of the initial route to the choice of theproject, The design of the Millau Viaduct consists of the original design proposalof the administration (SETRA) conceived by Michel Virlogeux. However, expertand public scrutiny challenged this initial project leading to the involvcement ofthe British architect. Sir Norman Foster and international expertise andcompetencies. As a result, the project improved over the process.

2• The “Construction”: The Millau Viaduct does not constitute a technologicalinnovation in itself but is characterized by a genuine and innovative applicationof existing techniques. The decisions to build the deck in steel is part of thisprocess and helped in reducing delays, and delivering the project on time andproviding good safety conditions for workers on site.

3• The “Procurement”; The success of the BFOT process relies on sound projectgovernance and treatment of risks. The Millau Viaduct is a case of cooperation& coordination between actors at varous stages of the project. The procurementstage drew greatly upon the previous conception stage led by theadministration.

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APPENDIX: MANAGEMENT STRATEGY ANALYSIS RISK MANAGEMENT: Potential risks always concern the stakeholders for a big project. In this particular project where most of them mainly spanned the aspects as follows:

Limited Budget - The shortage of public funds disabled the French State to perform such construction independently. Another qualified funder should be involved in this project. Technical Solution – As the highest cable-stay bridge with a maximum of 342m distance between the piers, special technology was needed for tackling many detailed technical issues in this project. These issues were what method to adopt to place the decking onto the piers, how to deal with the long distance between the piers, etc. Environmental Issues – Noise, visual disturbance and other environmental aspects must be considered and controlled along the construction. Due to the consideration of the risks above, a decision was made that this project was to be performed with a scheme called concession/BFOT. This means the bid winner, Eiffage, could also get a contract of 75 year operating of the bridge at the same time. In such methodology, the planner of the project successfully transferred the project risks (or to be described as responsibilities) to the

00.5

11.5

22.5

33.5

44.5

5

LIMITED BUDGET TECHNICALSOLUTION ENVIRONMENTALISSUES

CONCEPTPLANNINGEXECUTIONFINALIZATION

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private funder, Eiffage, exchanging with an operating contract which interested Eiffage naturally with future profits. In other words, the risks were reallocated. Even though this methodology is widely used nowadays in the world, it is not deniable that such a way of risk-sharing is also a risk to the project itself. Since no regulations or clear definitions were set up for such practice, there would be some unexpected issues and troubles such as negative economic effects, etc. Detailed working specifications were highly demand to be with the contract between the risk sharers. However, this methodology proved itself to be a successful example in this project. The accurate description and definition of the risk sharing in the contract which was correctly proportional to the profits led this project to an effective accomplishment without any frustration.

1. COST MANAGEMENT

Millau Viaduct had achieved enormous success with its cost management in regard to it being on schedule and within budget completion, regardless of some minor incidents caused by extreme weather condition. The building company Eiffage had overcome such complexity of the work and beat its schedule completion time by one month. They finished the whole project in just 36 months after putting down the first stone of the bridge, all due to the effective management of the project. Key success of the project was the significant amount of time spent ensuring that the end result was a structural solution that "didn't detract from an area highly prized for its natural beauty." [Lynn, (2005)] The project’s final expenditure is $470 million, nearly half of the original bid price. This is indicative of Eiffage’s effective project planning on cost management. "Eiffage's bidding team was under strict instruction to eliminate all important uncertainties and ensure the bid price would be accurate ... trawling through every engineering detail raised Eiffage's engineering cost to nearly $4 million." [Reina, (2004)]. The company had done extensive analysis at the initial bidding stage, ensure every subtle engineering detail to be analyzed as accurate as possible, therefore minimize risk due to uncertainties. The company also had a contingency budget to risk management in place in case of uncertainty. The project’s concessionaire procurement type of ‘build - operate - transfer’ also facilitate its performance on cost management, and incentive the company to effectively manage its time therefore start earning revenue from collection of tolls. Source: [Lynn, (2005)], [Reina, (2004)]

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2. HUMAN RESORCE MANAGEMENT Human Resource Strategies:

• The Millau Viaduct bridge required 10 years of research and 4 years of implementation to be completed. The project required the long research time due to the violent winds in the area, the deep valley and the difficult crossing. These difficult conditions presented many challenges that required several different approaches to be investigated. In this time, many engineers, architects, lawyers, local authorities and Government and local representatives.

• To accomplish this project and its challenges, during 1991 and 1993, preliminary and feasibility studies were carried out. The studies conducted by the team of engineers at CETE Mediterranean included deciding between the “high” and “low” solutions. On the 29th October 1991, advice from the Director of Roads, Jean Berthier led to the Ministry deciding to use the “high” solution due to economic and safety reasons and also lower environmental impact. By September 1993, this “high” solution was deemed to be feasible.

• In November 1994, 5 teams were formed, each from SETEC, Jean Muller International, SEEE Sofresid, Sogelerg & EEG & Serf and Secoa. These teams received complete specifications on October 1995 and were to submit their proposals on April 23rd 1996. The DDE’s technical committee evaluated these proposals based on constructability, required studies before commencement and project estimates.

• The decision was made to use the multiple cable stayed span design by Government and state representatives, local officials, engineers and Director of Roads on the 12th of July 1996. Several studies were initiated using engineers and architects to examine the designs technical issues, resistance and response to high winds.

• In December 1999, tenders were called for and 4 candidates had applied by the cutoff date. The tenders were analysed technically, financially and legally. Once the decision of which tender to use was made, the contract was written. The contract said that Eiffage would take concession of the structure for 75 operating years for funding 100% of the site works and the European Bank of Investments would loan 50 million euros to Eiffage.

• As it can be seen, the project required many human resources from a wide range of fields and specialties to complete. They not only include engineers and architects but also lawyers, local authorities, Government and local representatives and banks.

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(Sources:http://www.wctrs.leeds.ac.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/abstracts/lisbon/general/03398.pdf http://www.thecasecentre.org/educators/products/view?id=71016http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FRANCE_MILLAU_PROFILE.pdfhttp://www.openpm.co.uk/OpenPM/Shared/APM/Cases/Millau%20Viaduct%20Case%20Study.pdf)

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GANTT CHART:

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Group Meetings Meeting 1: Date: 7 August, 2015 (Friday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum Chair-person: Shobhit Shekhar Minutes: Everyone was assigned to find an appropriate project proposal with sufficient scope and write a page of summery about respective proposal. Meeting 2: Date: 11 August, 2015 (Tuesday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum Chair-person: Devyn Jackamarra Minutes: Five project proposals were shared to discuss about their scope, availability of resources, feasibility, strong and weak aspects and finally one was decided to be the probable group project and submitted to Dr. Cosimo Faiello for approval. Meeting 3: Date: 18 August, 2105 (Tuesday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum, Eric Tang, Rachel Zhang Chair-person: Harsh Patel Minutes: The project that was decided initially to be carried out was discarded because of not getting spontaneous response from the company representative regarding project details and another proposal (Millau Viaduct) was submitted by Harsh and also an email was sent to Professor Faiello for his consent. Meeting 4: Date: 21 August, 2015 (Friday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum, Eric Tang, Rachel Zhang Chair-person: Khadija Begum Minutes: All of the project members came up with their analysis about the project and shared their views about the project scope, management of time, budget, risk factors and impacts on the environment and respective society.

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Meeting 5: Date: 25 August, 2015 (Tuesday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum, Eric Tang, Rachel Zhang Chair-person: Vincent Wu Minutes: A preliminary plan was made about approaching to report writing. Work allocation was done. The whole team was divided into three sub groups to write different sections. Meeting 6: Date: 1 September, 2015 (Tuesday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum, Eric Tang, Rachel Zhang Chair-person: Eric Tang Minutes: Each sub-group discussed their sections. A little misunderstanding took place due to having different perspectives of different members about how the report should be but later it was resolved through further discussion. Meeting 7: Date: 4 September, 2015 (Friday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum, Eric Tang, Rachel Zhang Chair-person: Rachel Zhang Minutes: Everyone had their sections almost thoroughly analysed and roughly written. The final compilation and editing part began.

PROJECT WORK ALLOCATION GUIDE SUPER GROUP PROJECT REPORT STARTING DATE : 27-AUG-2015 PROJECT REPORT EXPECTED COMPLETION DUE DATE: 05-SEP-2015 PROJECT REPORT REVISION : 06-SEP-2015 & 07-SEP-2015 ACTUAL DATE OF COMPLETION OF REPORT : 06-SEP-2015 Section A: Case study writing Name Work Allocated Current Status

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Shobhit Executive summary COMPLETED on 2/9/2015 Harsh Overview and complete

description of project resources

COMPLETED on 2/9/2015

Note – SECTION A COMPLETED Section B: Case study analysis IT IS AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION (A) ON FIVE MANAGEMENT STAGES: 1. CONCEPTUALIZATION 2. PLANNING 3. EXECUTION (INCLUDING MONITORING AND CONTROLLING) 4. FINALIZATION Name

Work allocated Due date CURRENT STATUS

Devyn Planning part – Write about the planning part i.e the planning of design, bridge design proposals, etc. Also, write about problems and analysis of it (all should be under 600 words)

2/9/2015 COMPLETED ON 2/9/2015

Khadija Planning part- Write the recommendations of the problems in Planning phase (design of bridge) by getting the info from Devyn. (Please work in collaboration with Devyn)

2/9/2015 COMPLETED on 2/9/2015 (Same as Devyn)

Vincent Execution part (Controlling) - Write about technologies involved in designing of bridge, like hydraulics used, launching of bridge, etc. Please write in not more than 600 words.

2/9/2015 COMPLETED on 2/9/2015

Eric Execution part (Monitoring)- Write about the problems

2/9/2015 COMPLETED on 2/9/2015 (Same as Vincent)

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and challenges faced in using technologies, their analysis etc.(Please work in collaboration with Vincent and get the info)

Rachel Finalization- Write about the finalization and completion of project like how it came to end, how they finalized, PROBLEMS in finalization and the day of opening of bridge (please write in not more than 600 words)

2/9/2015 COMPLETED on 2/9/2015

Shobhit Conceptualization part- Writing all concept used, different concepts in proposals, challenges and All problems relating to it. (Wrote in 700 words)

2/9/2015 COMPLETED ON 2/9/2015

Harsh Conceptualization recommendations and review

2/9/2015 COMPLETED ON 2/9/2015

SECTION C: CASE STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS Name Work Allocated Due date Current Status Devyn Write the

recommendations of your planning part which u did in section B

4/9/2015 COMPLETED on 4/9/2015

Khadija Write the Recommendations of your planning part which u did in section B

4/9/2015 COMPLETED on 4/9/2015 (Same as Devyn)

Vincent W Write the Recommendations of your planning part

4/9/2015 COMPLETED on 4/9/2015

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which u did in section B

Eric Write the Recommendations of your planning part which u did in section B

4/9/2015 COMPLETED on 4/9/2015 (Same as Vincent)

Rachel Write the Recommendations of your planning part which u did in section B

4/9/2015 Completed on 4/9/2015

Shobhit Write the Recommendations of your planning part which u did in section B

4/9/2015 Completed on 4/9/2015 (Same as Harsh)

Harsh Write the Recommendations of your planning part which u did in section B

4/9/2015 Completed on 4/9/2015

SECTION C CONCLUSION Name Work Allocated Due date Current status Vincent Analysis of project by

Risk Management 5/9/2015 COMPLETED on

5/9/2015 Eric Analysis of project by

Human Resource 5/9/2015 COMPLETED on

5/9/2015 Rachel Analysis of project by

Cost Management 5/9/2015 COMPLETED on

5/9/2015 Name Work Allocated Due Date Current Status Shobhit Conclusion Logical

summary 5/9/2015 COMPLETED on

5/9/2015 Harsh Table of content,

references and appendices

5/9/2015 COMPLETED on 5/9/2015

SECTION D GROUP MEETINGS (TOTAL GROUP MEETINGS PLANNED =7) Name Work Allocated Due Date Current Status Devyn Group Meetings

(Agenda) and write about starting 4

5/9/2015 COMPLETED on 5/9/2015

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group meetings Khadija Group Meetings

(Agenda) and write about last 4 group meetings

5/9/2015 COMPLETED on 5/9/2015

COMPILATION OF REPORT AND REVISION Name Work Allocated Due Date Current Status Shobhit Compilation and

revision 6/9/2015 COMPLETED on

6/9/2015 Harsh Compilation and

revision 6/9/2015 COMPLETED on

6/9/2015 Devyn Final Compilation

and revision 6/9/2015 COMPLETED on

6/9/2015

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REFERENCES: Figure 1 http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/millau-viaduct-france-tallest-bridge-in.html Figure 2 Omega Centre, Millau Route Figure 3 http://www.pieway.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Tatara-Bridge-

%E2%80%93Japan.jpg Figure 4 http://millau.e-monsite.com/pages/1-1-le-choix-de-l-ouvrage.html Ministère de l‟Equipement (2004) http://www.environnement.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/millau_cle148b14.pdf (17/02/2010) CEVM (Compagnie Eiffage du Viaduc de Millau) Historique d’un projet né en 1987. Quelques étapes significatives d’un grand viaduc à Millau. Unpublished document. Omega Centre, 2007, France Millau Profile. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FRANCE_MILLAU_PROFILE.pdf. [03 September References: 15] (Enerpac, 2015) Viaduc de Millau, Revue Travaux n*216, Fevier 2005 (allendemontral.wordpress.com/le-monument-2) http://www.wctrs.leeds.ac.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/abstracts/lisbon/general/03398.pdf ) (Lynn, (2005)), LYNN, J., 2005. World's Tallest Suspension Bridge Opens in South France - on Schedule, within Budget [online] (Reina, (2004)) Available from: a REINA, P., 2004. Multispan, Cable-Stayed crossing is High-Level Landmark. Engineering News-Record, 252 (11). Pp. 24-29 http://www.wctrs.leeds.ac.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/abstracts/lisbon/general/03398.pdf http://www.thecasecentre.org/educators/products/view?id=71016 http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FRANCE_MILLAU_PROFILE.pdf http://www.openpm.co.uk/OpenPM/Shared/APM/Cases/Millau%20Viaduct%20Case%20Study.pdf)

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GENG5505 Major Group Project – Marking Guide (Semester 1, 2015)

Group Name: SUPER GROUP Project name: FRANCE, MILLAU VIADUCT BRIDGE Tutorial class attended: FRIDAY, 1 PM Student Name SHOBHIT SHEKHAR Student ID 21777517 Student Name DEVYN JACKAMARRA Student ID 20761794 Student Name HARSH HASMUKHBHAI PATEL Student ID 21804443 Student Name KHADIJA BEGUM Student ID 21822517 Student Name XIAOFAN WU Student ID 21795592 Student Name ERIC TANG Student ID 21929169 Student Name ZIYING ZHANG Student ID 20933753

CONTENT ASSESSMENT CRITERIA Marking Very

Poor Fair Good Excellent Executive Summary (Maximum 1 page) Clarity & conciseness 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 Executive Summary – Total /5 Section A: Case study writing (Approx. 1,500 words) Clarity & conciseness of project background 0 4 5 6 7 8 10 Quality & relevance of research material (i.e. facts) 0 4 5 6 7 8 10 Total Section A /20 Section B: Case Study Analysis (Approx. 2,500 words) Introduction (clarity of purpose & conciseness) 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 Use & relevance of theories & frameworks 0 4 5 6 7 8 10 Depth of analysis, clear & logical argument 0 4 5 6 7 8 10 Total Section B /25 Section C: Recommendations to the case (Approx. 2,000 words) Use & relevance of theories & frameworks 0 4 5 6 7 8 10 Relevance & justification of recommendations 0-2.5 3 3.5 4 5 6 7.5 Insight & synthesis, clear & logical argument 0-2.5 3 3.5 4 5 6 7.5 Total Section C /25 Conclusion (Maximum 1 page) Logical summary 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 Conclusion - Total /5 Table of contents (compulsory), references & appendices Appropriate table of contents, appendices & references 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 Table of contents, references & appendices – Total /5 Group meetings (agenda & minutes) Relevance & consistency of issues & outcome 0 4 5 6 7 8 10 Clarity & conciseness 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 Group meetings (agenda & minutes) - Total /15

TOTAL GROUP MARK /100 %

Additional comments (if required):

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