products liability suggested standard jury instructions...

© 2018 Pennsylvania Defense Institute September 2018

Products Liability

Suggested Standard Jury Instructions

Pursuant to

Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc.,

104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014)

2018 Edition – Supercedes 2017 Edition


16.10 GENERALRULEOFSTRICTLIABILITY

[Nameofplaintiff]claims that [he/she]washarmedby [insert typeofproduct],whichwas

[distributed][manufactured][sold]by[nameofdefendant].

Torecoverforthisharm,theplaintiffmustprovebyafairpreponderanceoftheevidenceeach

ofthefollowingelements:

(1)[Nameofdefendant] is inthebusinessof[distributing][manufacturing][selling]sucha

product;

(2)Theproductinquestionhadadefectthatmadeitunreasonablydangerous;

(3)Theproduct'sunreasonablydangerousconditionexistedatthetimetheproductleftthe

defendant’scontrol;

(4)Theproductwasexpectedtoanddidinfactreachtheplaintiff,andwasthereafterusedat

thetimeofthe[accident][exposure],withoutsubstantialchangeinitscondition;and

(5)Theunreasonablydangerousconditionoftheproductwasasubstantialfactorincausing

harmtotheplaintiff.

RATIONALE

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS §402A, is the basis for strict products liability inPennsylvania.Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328,399(Pa.2014)(“PennsylvaniaremainsaSecondRestatementjurisdiction.”).

TheelementslistedinthisinstructionaredrawnfromSection402A,whichprovides:

Onewhosellsanyproductinadefectiveconditionunreasonablydangeroustotheuserorconsumerortohispropertyissubjecttoliabilityforphysicalharmtherebycausedtotheultimateuserorconsumer,ortohisproperty,if

(a)thesellerisengagedinthebusinessofsellingsuchaproduct,and

(b)itisexpectedtoanddoesreachtheuserorconsumerwithoutsubstantialchangeintheconditioninwhichitissold.

RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§402A(1).

The jury should be given additional instructions, as appropriate, to elaborate on each of theelementsofthiscauseofaction.

ThecontrarySSJI(Civ.)§16.10retainstheAzzarello‐erainstructionthataproductisdefectiveifit“lackedanyelementnecessarytomakeitsafeforitsintendeduse.”SeeAzzarellov.BlackBros.Co.,391A.2d1010(Pa.1978)(endorsingajurychargeinstructingthataproductmustbe“providedwitheveryelementnecessarytomakeitsafeforitsintendeduse”).

TheSSJIchargeisreversibleerrorandshouldnotbegiven. TheSupremeCourtoverruledAzzarello inTincher, specifically rejecting the jury charge that Azzarello had endorsed. See Tincher, 104 A.3d at 335(declaringAzzarellotobeoverruled);378‐79(criticizingAzzarellostandardas“impractical”andnotingthatthe“everyelement” languagehadbeentakenoutofcontext). GivinganAzzarellochargepost‐Tincher is“aparadigmexampleoffundamentalerror.”Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,180A.3d386,399(Pa.Super.2018))(“TincherII”). Suchacharge“employ[s]anincorrectdefinitionofaproduct‘defect’inlightoftheSupremeCourt’sdecision”inTincher.Id.SSJI(Civ.)§16.10thus“undervaluestheimportanceoftheSupremeCourt'sdecision”inTincher.TincherII.180A.3dat401.

EvenbeforeTincher,the“everyelement”juryinstructionhadlongbeenthesubjectofcriticism,withtheSuperiorCourtremarkingthreedecadesago,“[t]hisinstructioncallsforthfantasticcartoonimagesofproducts,both simple and complex, ladenwith fail‐safemechanism upon fail‐safemechanism.” McKay v. Sandmold

16.10

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Systems,Inc.,482A.2d260,263(Pa.Super.1984)(quotingSheilaL.Birnbaum,UnmaskingtheTestforDesignDefect:FromNegligence[toWarranty]toStrictLiabilitytoNegligence,33VAND.L.REV.593,637‐39(1980)).Given the longstanding problems with this instruction, as well as its express rejection in Tincher, the“every/anyelement”languagehasnoplaceinamodernPennsylvaniajurycharge.

The“suggested”instructions“existonlyasareferencematerialavailabletoassistthetrialjudgeandtrialcounselinpreparingapropercharge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273(Pa.Super.1992).

Morerecentprecedentusestheconceptofthedefendant’s“control”inarticulatingthedefect‐at‐sale elementof §402A. SeeBarnishv.KWIBuildingCo., 980A.2d535, 547 (Pa.2009).Oldercasesexpressthesameconceptastheproductleavingthedefendant’s“hands.”SeeDuchessv.LangstonCorp.,769A.2d1131,1140(Pa.2001).Theseinstructionsusetheterm“control”asamoreprecisedescription.

“Thesellerisnotliableifasafeproductismadeunsafebysubsequentchanges.”Davisv.BerwindCorp.,690A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1997). Whether a post‐manufacture change to a product is “substantial” so as toprecludestrictliabilitydependson“whetherthemanufacturercouldhavereasonablyexpectedorforeseensuchanalterationofitsproduct.” Id.(citingEckv.PowermaticHoudaille,Div.,527A.2d1012,1018‐19(Pa.Super.1987)).ThisstandardaccordswithTincher’srecognitionofnegligenceconceptsinstrictliability.SeeNelsonv.AircoWeldersSupply,107A.3d146,159n.17(Pa.Super.2014)(enbanc)(post‐Tincher);Roudabushv.Rondo,Inc.,2017WL3912370,at*3(W.D.Pa.Sept.5,2017)(same);Sikkeleev.AVCOCorp.,268F.Supp.3d660,711‐13(M.D.Pa.2017)(same),reconsiderationgrantedonothergrounds,2017WL3310953(M.D.Pa.Aug.3,2017).

“[R]equirementsofprovingsubstantial‐factorcausationremainthesame”forbothnegligenceandstrictliability.”Summersv.CertainteedCorp.,997A.2d1152,1165(Pa.2010).ThePennsylvaniaSupremeCourthasrepeatedlyspecified“substantialfactor”asthecausationstandardinproductsliabilitycases.E.g.Rostv.FordMotorCo.,151A.3d1032,1049(Pa.2016)(post‐Tincher);Reottv.AsiaTrend,Inc.,55A.3d1088,1091(Pa.2012);Harshv.Petroll,887A.2d209,213‐14&n.9(Pa.2005).Seeinstruction§16.80.


16.20(1) STRICTLIABILITY–DESIGNDEFECT−DETERMINATIONOFDEFECT

FindingofDefectRequires“UnreasonablyDangerous”Condition

ThePlaintiff claimsthatthe[identifytheproduct]wasdefectiveandthatthedefectcaused

[him/her]harm. Theplaintiffmust prove that theproduct contained adefect thatmade the

productunreasonablydangerous.

Theplaintiff’sevidencemustconvinceyouboththattheproductwasdefectiveandthatthe

defectmadetheproductunreasonablydangerous.

Inconsideringwhetheraproductisunreasonablydangerous,youmustconsidertheoverall

safetyoftheproductforall[intended][reasonablyforeseeable]uses.Youmaynotconcludethat

theproduct isunreasonablydangerousonlybecauseadifferentdesignmighthavereducedor

preventedtheharmsufferedbytheplaintiffinthisparticularincident.Rather,youmustconsider

whetheranyalternativeproposedbytheplaintiffwouldhaveintroducedintotheproductother

dangersordisadvantagesofequalorgreatermagnitude.

RATIONALE

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS §402A, is the basis for strict products liability inPennsylvania. Section 402A limits liability to products “in a defective conditionunreasonablydangerous to theuserorconsumer.” Restatement(Second)ofTorts§402A(emphasisadded).“PennsylvaniaremainsaSecondRestatementjurisdiction.”Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328,399(Pa.2014).Thus,

ina jurisdictionfollowingtheSecondRestatement formulationofstrict liability in tort, thecriticalinquiryinaffixingliabilityiswhetheraproductis“defective”;inthecontextofastrictliabilityclaim,whetheraproductisdefectivedependsuponwhetherthatproductis“unreasonablydangerous.”

Tincher,104A.3dat380,399.“[T]henotionof‘defectiveconditionunreasonablydangerous’isthenormativeprincipleofthestrictliabilitycauseofaction.”Id.at400.

For many years, the now‐overruled Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978),decisionprohibitedjuryinstructionsinproductsliabilitycasesfromusingtheterm“unreasonablydangerous.”Insteadofjuriesmakingthisdecision,trialcourtswererequiredtomake“threshold”determinationswhethera“plaintiff’sallegations”supportedafindingthattheproductatissuewas“unreasonablydangerous,”justifyingsubmissionofthecasetothejury.Id.at1026;Dambacherv.Mallis,485A.2d408,423(Pa.Super.1984)(enbanc),appealdismissed,500A.2d428(Pa.1985).

TincherexpresslyoverruledAzzarello, findingAzzarello’sdivisionof laborbetween judgeandjury“undesirable”because it “encourage[d] trialcourts tomakeeitheruninformedorunfoundeddecisionsofsocialpolicy.”Tincher,104A.3dat381.“[T]rialcourtssimplydonothavetheexpertisetoconductthesocialpolicyinquiryintotherisksandutilitiesofaplethoraofproductsandtodecide,asamatteroflaw,whetheraproductisunreasonablydangerous.”Id.at380.

Tincher found “undesirable” Azzarello’s “strict” separation of negligence and strict liabilityconcepts.“[E]levat[ing]thenotionthatnegligenceconceptscreateconfusioninstrictliabilitycasestoadoctrinalimperative”wasnot“consistentwithreason,”and“validate[d]thesuggestionthatthecauseofaction,soshaped,wasnotviable.” Id.at380‐81. Farfromseparatingstrict liabilityandnegligence,Tincheremphasizedtheiroverlap.Id.at371(describing“negligence‐derivedrisk‐utilitybalancing in design defect litigation”); id. (“in design cases the character of the product and theconductofthemanufacturerarelargelyinseparable”);id.at401(“thetheoryofstrictliabilityasitevolvedoverlapsineffectwiththetheoriesofnegligenceandbreachofwarranty”)(internalcitationsomitted).

16.20(1)


InTincher,thecourtrejectedtheprevailingstandardthatadefectiveproductisonethatlacksevery“element”necessarytomakeitsafeforuse.104A.3dat379.Initsplace,theTinchercourtinstituteda“composite”standardforprovingwhenadesigndefectmakesaproductunreasonablydangerous:thiscompositestandardincludesbothaconsumerexpectationstest,andarisk‐utilitytest.Seeid.at400‐01.Thesetestsarediscussedin§§16.20(2‐3),infra.

Before Azzarello, proof that “the defective condition was unreasonably dangerous” was anacceptedelementofstrictliability,alongwiththedefectitself,existenceofthedefectatthetimeofsale,andcausation.E.g.,Bialekv.PittsburghBrewingCo.,242A.2d231,235‐36(Pa.1968);Forryv.GulfOilCorp.,237A.2d593,597(Pa.1967).GiventheSupremeCourt’srejectionofAzzarelloanditsrationale,post‐Tinchercaseshavereturnedtothatpre‐Azzarello formulation,andholdthat juriesmustbeaskedwhethertheproductatissueis“unreasonablydangerous.”See,e.g.,Highv.PennsySupply,Inc.,154A.3d341,347(Pa.Super.2017)(“theTincherCourtconcludedthatthequestionofwhetheraproductisinadefectiveconditionunreasonablydangeroustotheconsumerisaquestionoffactthatshouldgenerallybereservedforthefactfinder,whetheritbethetrialcourtorajury”);Amatov.Bell&Gossett,116A.3d607,620(Pa.Super.2015)(“inTincher,theCourtreturnedtothefinderoffactthequestionofwhetheraproductis‘unreasonablydangerous,’asthatdeterminationispartandparcelofwhethertheproductis,infact,defective”),appealdismissed,150A.3d956(Pa.2016);Hatcher v. SCM Group, Inc., 167 F. Supp.3d 719, 727 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“a product is onlydefective ... if it is ‘unreasonablydangerous’”);Rapchakv.HaldexBrakeProductsCorp.,2016WL3752908,at*2(W.D.Pa.July14,2016)(“theTincherCourtalsomadeclearthatitisnowuptothejury not the judge to determine whether a product is in a ‘defective condition unreasonablydangerous’totheconsumer”);Nathanv.TechtronicIndustriesNorthAmerica.,Inc.,92F.Supp.3d264,270‐71 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (court no longer to make threshold “unreasonably dangerous”determination;issuesofdefectarequestionsoffactforthejury).

Charging the jury to decide whether defects render products “unreasonably dangerous” isconsistentwiththevastmajorityofstatesthatfollow§402A(or§402A‐basedstatutes).SeeArizona−RAJI(Civil)PLI4;Arkansas−AMJICiv.1017;Colorado−CJICiv.14:3;Florida−FSJI(Civ.)403.7(b);Illinois−IPJI‐Civ.400.06;Indiana−IN‐JICIV2117;Kansas−KS‐PIKCIV128.17;Louisiana−La.CJI§11:2;Maryland−MPJI‐Cv26:12;Massachusetts−CIVJIMA11.3.1;Minnesota−4AMPJI‐Civ.75.20;Mississippi−MMJICiv.§16.2.7;Missouri−MAJI(Civ.)25.04;Nebraska−NJI2dCiv.11.24;Oklahoma−OUJI‐CIV12.3;Oregon−UCJINo.48.07;SouthCarolina−SCRC–Civ.§32‐45(2009);Tennessee−TPI‐Civ. 10.01; Virginia − VPJI §39:15 (implied warranty). Compare: Georgia − GSPJI 62.640(“reasonablecare”);NewMexico−NMRA,Civ.UJI13‐1407(“unreasonablerisk”);NewJersey−NJ‐JICIV5.40D‐2(“reasonablysafe”);NewYork−NYPJI2:120(“notreasonablysafe”).

Tincherleftopentheextenttowhichthe“intendeduse”/”intendeduser”doctrinethatdevelopedunderAzzarelloremainsviable,orconversely,whetherithasbeendisplacedbynegligence concepts of reasonableness and foreseeability. 104 A.3d at 410; see, e.g.,PennsylvaniaDep’tofGen.Servicesv.U.S.MineralProductsCo.,898A.2d590,600(Pa.2006)(strictliabilityexists“onlyforharmthatoccursinconnectionwithaproduct’sintendedusebyanintendeduser”).Thisinstructiontakesnopositiononthatissue,offeringalternative“intended”and“reasonablyforeseeable”language.

The contrary SSJI (Civ.) §16.20 omits the §402A phrase “unreasonably dangerous,” therebyignoringTincher’sreturnofthis“normativeprinciple”ofstrictliabilitytothejury.SeeTincher,104A.3d at 400. The SSJI charge thus “employ[s] an incorrect definition of a product ‘defect’ in light of theSupremeCourt’sdecision”inTincher,and“undervaluestheimportanceoftheSupremeCourt'sdecision”inTincher.Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,180A.3d386,399,401(Pa.Super.2018)(“TincherII”).The“suggested”instructions“existonlyasareferencematerialavailabletoassistthetrialjudgeandtrialcounselinpreparingapropercharge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273(Pa.Super.1992).

The second paragraph of the charge, regarding the scope of the unreasonably dangerousdetermination,followsthepre‐Tincher§402Adecision,Beardv.Johnson&Johnson,Inc.,41A.3d823(Pa.2012),which“decline[d]tolimit[unreasonablydangerousanalysis–then“relegated”tothetrialcourtbyAzzarello]toaparticularintendeduse.”Id.at836.“[A]product’sutilityobviouslymaybeenhancedbymulti‐functionality.”Id.Therefore,“alternativedesignsmustbesafertotherelevant

16.20(1)


setofusersoverall,not just theplaintiff.” Id.at 838. Accord,e.g.,Tincher,104A.3dat390n.16(characterizingBeardasholdingthatthedefectdeterminationis“notrestrictedtoconsideringsingleuseofmulti‐useproductindesigndefect”case);Phatakv.UnitedChairCo.,756A.2d690,693(Pa.Super. 2000) (allowing evidence that “incorporating the design [plaintiffs] profferedwould havecreatedasubstantialhazardtootherworkers”);Kordekv.Becton,Dickinson&Co.,921F.Supp.2d422,431(E.D.Pa.2013)(the“determinationofwhetheraproductisareasonablealternativedesignmustbeconductedcomprehensively”).



ConsumerExpectations

Theplaintiffclaimsthat[he/she]washarmedbyaproductthatwasdefectiveinthatitwas

unreasonablydangerousundertheconsumerexpectationstest.

Undertheconsumerexpectationstest,aproductisunreasonablydangerousifyoufindthat

the product is dangerous to an extent beyondwhatwould be contemplated by the ordinary

consumerwhopurchasestheproduct,takingintoaccountthatordinaryconsumer’sknowledgeof

theproductanditscharacteristics.

Under this consumer expectations test, a product is unreasonably dangerous only if the

plaintiffproves first, that therisk that theplaintiffclaimscausedharmwasunknowable;and,

second, that therisk that theplaintiffclaimscausedharmwasunacceptable to theaverageor

ordinaryconsumer.

Inmakingthisdetermination,youshouldconsiderfactorssuchasthenatureoftheproduct

and its intendeduse; theproduct’s intendeduser;whether anywarningsor instructions that

accompaniedtheproductaddressedtheriskinvolved;andthelevelofknowledgeinthegeneral

communityabouttheproductanditsrisks.

RATIONALE

Thisinstructionshouldonlybegivenafterthecourthasmadeathresholdfindingthattheconsumerexpectationstestisappropriate,underthefactsofagivencase,asoutlinedbelow.

InTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328(Pa.2014),thecourtrejectedtheprevailingstandardthatadefectiveproductisonethatlackseveryelementnecessarytomakeitsafeforuse.Id.at379.Initsplace,theTinchercourtinstituteda“composite”standardforprovingwhenadefectmakesaproductunreasonablydangerous:thiscompositestandardincludesbothaconsumerexpectationstest,andarisk‐utilitytest.Seeid.at400‐01.

Bothtestshavetheirown“theoreticalandpracticallimitations,”andarenotbothappropriateinevery products liability case. See id. at 388‐89 (limitations of consumer expectations test), 390(limitationsofrisk‐utilitytest).Althoughtheplaintiffmaychoosetopursueoneorboththeoriesofdefect,thatchoicedoesnotbindthedefense.Rather,thedefendantmaycallonthetrialcourttoactasa“gate‐keeper”andtosubmittothejuryonlythetestthattheevidencewarrants.Id.at407(“Adefendantmayalsoseektohavedismissedanyoverreachingbytheplaintiffviaappropriatemotionandobjection”). Judicial “gate‐keeping” toensure thateach test isonlyemployed inappropriatecases“maintain[s]theintegrityandfairnessofthestrictproductsliabilitycauseofaction.”Id.at401.Asdiscussedbelow,post‐Tincher“gate‐keeping”hasbeenrepeatedlyinvokedagainsttheconsumerexpectationstest.

Under the consumer expectations test, a product is unreasonably dangerous by reason of a“defectivecondition”thatmakesthatproduct“uponnormaluse,dangerousbeyondthereasonableconsumer’s contemplations.” Tincher, 104A.3d at 387 (citations omitted). This test reflects the“surpriseelementofdanger,”andaskswhetherthedangerposedbytheproductis“unknowableandunacceptabletotheaverageorordinaryconsumer.”Seeid.;Highv.PennsySupply,Inc.,154A.3d341,348(Pa.Super.2017).

Theconsumerexpectationstestis“‘reservedforcasesinwhichtheeverydayexperienceoftheproductuserspermitsa conclusion that theproductdesignviolatedminimumsafety

16.20(2)


assumptions.’”Tincher,104A.3dat392(quotingSoulev.GeneralMotorsCorp.,882P.2d298,308‐09(Cal.1994)). Theconsumerexpectations testdoesnotapplywherean“ordinaryconsumerwouldreasonablyanticipateandappreciatethedangerouscondition.”High,154A.3dat350(quotingTincher,104A.3dat387).

As noted above, the Supreme Court recognized several “theoretical and practicallimitations”oftheconsumerexpectationstest.Becausethistestonlyfindsadefectwherethedangerousconditionisunknowable,aproduct“whosedangerisobviousorwithintheordinaryconsumer’scontemplation”wouldnotfallwithintheconsumerexpectationstest.Id.at388. SeeHigh,154A.3dat350‐51(obviousnessofriskcreatedjuryquestionunderTincherfactorsforconsumerexpectationstest).

On theother endof the spectrum, the consumerexpectations testwill ordinarilynotapply to products of complexdesign, or that present esoteric risks, because an ordinaryconsumer simply does not have reasonable safety expectations about those products orthoserisks.Tincher,104A.3dat388.AstheTinchercourtexplained:

[A]complexproduct,evenwhenitisbeingusedasintended,mayoftencauseinjuryin a way that does not engage its ordinary consumers’ reasonable minimumassumptionsaboutsafeperformance. Forexample, theordinaryconsumerofanautomobilesimplyhas‘noidea’howitshouldperforminallforeseeablesituations,orhowsafeitshouldbemadeagainstallforeseeablehazards.

Id.(quotingSoule882P.2dat308).

Accordingly,post‐Tinchercasesdeclinetoallowtheconsumerexpectationsstandardincasesinvolvingcomplicatedmachinery.See,e.g.,Yazdaniv.BMWofNorthAmerica,LLC,188F. Supp.3d 468, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (air‐cooled motorcycle engine); Wright v. RyobiTechnologies, Inc.,175F.Supp.3d439,452‐53 (E.D.Pa.2016) (“rip fence”on table saw);DeJesusv.KnightIndustries&Associates, Inc.,2016WL4702113,at*8‐9(E.D.Pa.Sept.8,2016)(industriallifttable).

These holdings are consistent with those in other jurisdictions applying a similarconsumerexpectationstest.See,e.g.,Brownv.RaymondCorp.,432F.3d640(6thCir.2005)(ordinary consumer has no expectation regarding safety of forklift design) (applyingTennessee law); Fremaint v. Ford Motor Co., 258 F. Supp.2d 24, 29‐30 (D.P.R. 2003)(consumer expectations test “cannot be the basis of liability in a case involving complextechnicalmatters,”suchasautomotivedesign);Kokinsv.Teleflex,Inc.,621F.3d1290,1295‐96 (10th Cir. 2010) (“complex product liability claims involving primarily technical andscientificinformationrequireuseofarisk‐benefittestratherthanaconsumerexpectationstest”)(emphasisoriginal)(applyingColoradolaw).

The contrary SSJI (Civ.) §16.20 does not use Tincher’s formulation of the consumerexpectationstest,butratherthetestenunciatedinBarkerv.LullEngineeringCo.,573P.2d443 (Cal. 1978). While Tincher at times looked to California law, including Barker, indiscussing theconsumerexpectations test, thePennsylvaniaSupremeCourt chosenot tofollowBarker.Instead,theCourtchosethelanguageappearingintheaboveinstructionasthegoverningtest.SeeTincher,104A.3dat335(holdingthatconsumerexpectationstestrequiresproofthat“thedangerisunknowableandunacceptabletotheaverageorordinaryconsumer”), 387 (a “product is defective [under the consumer expectations test] if thedangerisunknowableandunacceptabletotheaverageorordinaryconsumer”).

The contrary SSJI’s omission of Tincher’s controlling language – “unknowable andunacceptable”−isincorrect.Section16.20thus“employ[s]anincorrectdefinitionofaproduct‘defect’inlightoftheSupremeCourt’sdecision”inTincher,and“undervaluestheimportanceoftheSupremeCourt'sdecision”inTincher.Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,180A.3d386,399,401(Pa.Super.2018)(“TincherII”).The“suggested”instructions“existonlyasareferencematerialavailabletoassistthetrialjudgeandtrialcounselinpreparingapropercharge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273(Pa.Super.1992).



Risk‐Utility

Theplaintiffclaimsthat[he/she]washarmedbyaproductthatwasdefectiveinthatitwas

unreasonablydangerousundertherisk‐utilitytest.

The risk‐utility test requires theplaintiff toprovehowa reasonablemanufacturer should

weighthebenefitsandrisksinvolvedwithaparticularproduct,andwhethertheomissionofany

feasible alternative design proposed by the plaintiff rendered the product unreasonably

dangerous.

Indeterminingwhethertheproductwasdefectivelydesignedundertherisk‐utilitytest,and

whetheritsrisksoutweighedthebenefits,orutility,oftheproduct,youmayconsiderthefollowing

factors:

[Notallfactorsapplytoeverycase;chargeonlyonthosereasonablyraisedbytheevidence.]

(1)Theusefulness,desirabilityandbenefitsoftheproducttoallordinaryconsumers−the

plaintiff,otherusersof theproduct,and thepublic ingeneral−ascompared to thatproduct’s

dangers,drawbacks,andrisksofharm;

(2)Thelikelihoodofforeseeablerisksofharmandtheseriousnessofsuchharmtoforeseeable

usersoftheproduct;

(3)Theavailabilityofasubstituteproductwhichwouldmeetthesameneedandinvolveless

risk,consideringtheeffectsthatthesubstituteproductwouldhaveontheplaintiff,otherusersof

theproduct,andthepublicingeneral;

(4) The relative advantages and disadvantages of the design at issue and the plaintiff’s

proposedfeasiblealternative,includingtheeffectsofthealternativedesignonproductcostsand

usefulness,suchas,longevity,maintenance,repair,anddesirability;

(5)Theadverseconsequencesof,includingsafetyhazardscreatedby,adifferentdesigntothe

plaintiff,otherusersoftheproduct,andthepublicingeneral;

(6)Theabilityofproductuserstoavoidthedangerbytheexerciseofcareintheiruseofthe

product;and

(7)Theawarenessthatordinaryconsumerswouldhaveofdangersassociatedwiththeiruse

oftheproduct,andtheirlikelyknowledgeofsuchdangersbecauseofgeneralpublicknowledge,

obviousness,warnings,oravailabilityoftrainingconcerningthosedangers.

RATIONALE

Thisinstructionshouldonlybegivenafterthecourthasmadeathresholdfindingthattherisk‐utilitytestisappropriate,underthefactsofagivencase,asoutlinedbelow.

InTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328(Pa.2014),thecourtrejectedtheprevailingstandardthatadefectiveproductisonethatlackseveryelementnecessarytomakeitsafeforuse.Id.at379.In itsplace, theTincher court instituteda “composite”standard forprovingwhendefectmakesaproductunreasonablydangerous:thiscompositestandardincludesbothaconsumerexpectationstest,andarisk‐utilitytest.Seeid.at400‐01.

16.20(3)


Bothtestshavetheirown“theoreticalandpracticallimitations,”andarenotbothappropriateinevery products liability case. See id. at 388‐89 (limitations of consumer expectations test), 390(limitationsofrisk‐utilitytest).Althoughtheplaintiffmaychoosetopursueoneorboththeoriesofdefect,thatchoicedoesnotbindthedefense.Rather,thedefendantmaycallonthetrialcourttoactasa“gate‐keeper”andtosubmittothejuryonlythetestthattheevidencewarrants.Seeid.at407(“Adefendantmayalsoseektohavedismissedanyoverreachingbytheplaintiffviaappropriatemotionandobjection”). Judicial “gate‐keeping” toensure thateach test isonlyemployed inappropriatecases“maintain[s]theintegrityandfairnessofthestrictproductsliabilitycauseofaction.”Id.at401.

Undertherisk‐utilitytest,aproductisinadefectivecondition“ifa‘reasonableperson’wouldconcludethattheprobabilityandseriousnessofharmcausedbytheproductoutweightheburdenorcostsoftakingprecautions.”Id.at389(citationsomitted).Aproductisnotdefectiveiftheseller’sprecautionsanticipateandreflectthetypeandmagnitudeoftheriskposedbytheuseoftheproduct.See id. Therisk‐utility testaskscourts to“analyzeposthocwhetheramanufacturer'sconduct inmanufacturingordesigningaproductwasreasonable.”Id.Thisstandardisa“negligence‐derivedrisk‐utilityalternativeformulation”that“reflectsthenegligencerootsofstrictliability."Id.at389,403.

Indefiningthis“cost‐benefitanalysis,”manyjurisdictionsrelyonthesevenrisk‐utilityfactorsidentifiedbyJohnWade,aleadingauthorityontortlaw.Seeid.at389‐90(quotingJohnW.Wade,ON THE NATURE OF STRICT TORT LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837‐38 (1973)). ThePennsylvaniaSupremeCourtdidnotfullyendorsetheseso‐called"Wadefactors,"asnotallwouldnecessarilyapply,dependingonthe“allegationsrelatingtoaparticulardesignfeature.” Seeid.at390. Given their longevityandwidespreadapproval, sixof the sevenconceptsaddressedby theWadefactorsareincorporatedintotheaboveinstruction,tobeselectedandchargedinparticularcasesastheevidencewarrants.SeegenerallyPhatakv.UnitedChairCo.,756A.2d690,695(Pa.Super.2000)(applyingseveralWadefactors;“thesafenessof[plaintiffs’]proposeddesignfeaturewasafactorthatwasrelevanttothedeterminationofwhetherthechairwas‘defectivelydesigned’”).Theabove instructionomits the finalWade factor,whichconcerns theavailabilityof insurance to thedefendant.ThisconsiderationisinappropriateforajurychargeinPennsylvania.See,e.g.,Deedsv.UniversityofPennsylvaniaMedicalCenter,110A.3d1009,1013‐14(Pa.Super.2015)(discussionofinsurance violated collateral source rule). It has been replacedwith a factor examining variousavenuesofavailablepublicknowledgeaboutrelevantproductrisks.Otherfactors,notlistedhere,maybeappropriateforjuryconsiderationinparticularcases.SeeTincher,104A.3dat408(“thetestwearticulatetodayisnotintendedasarigidformulatobeofferedtothejuryinallsituations”).

Like the consumer expectations test, the risk‐utility test has “theoretical and practicallimitations.”SeeTincher,104A.3dat390.Thegoaloftherisk‐utilitytestisto“achieveefficiency”byweighingcostsandbenefits,butsuchaneconomiccalculationcan,insomerespects,“conflict[]withbedrockmoralintuitionsregardingjusticeindeterminingpropercompensationforinjury”inparticularcases.Id.Additionally,theholisticperspectivetoproductdesignsuggestedbytherisk‐utilitytest“maynotbeimmediatelyresponsive”inacasefocusedonaparticulardesignfeature.Id.Thus, although no decision has yet occurred, there may be cases where the risk‐utility test isinappropriate.

ThecontrarySSJI(Civ.)§16.20truncatesthefactorstobeconsideredintherisk‐utilityanalysis.ItparaphrasesonlytwooftheWadefactors,drawingnotfromTincher,butfromthe California decision, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). WhileTincherattimeslookedtoCalifornialaw,includingBarker,indescribingtherisk‐utilitytest,thePennsylvania SupremeCourt chosenot to followBarker, and instead cited theWadefactorsinpreferencetothetestenunciatedinBarker.Section16.20thus“employ[s]anincorrectdefinition of a product ‘defect’ in light of the Supreme Court’s decision” inTincher, and “undervalues theimportanceoftheSupremeCourt'sdecision”inTincher.Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,180A.3d386,399,401(Pa.Super.2018)(“TincherII”).

Tincher’sbroadersweepindicatesthatitwouldbeerrortoforeclosepotentiallyrelevantfactorsapriori.SeeTincher,104A.3dat408(“Inchargingthejury,thetrialcourt’sobjectiveis‘toexplaintothejuryhowitshouldapproachitstaskandthefactorsitshouldconsiderinreachingitsverdict.’Whereevidencesupportsaparty‐requestedinstructiononatheoryordefense,achargeonthetheoryordefenseiswarranted.”)(internalcitationomitted).The

16.20(3)


Wade‐factor‐based approach here, rather than SSJI §16.20(1), best reflects Pennsylvanialaw,andoffersawide‐ranginglistoffactorsintheproposedjuryinstruction,withtheintentthatthecourtandthepartiesineachparticularcasewillidentifythosefactorsreasonablyraisedbytheevidenceforinclusionintheultimatejurycharge.The“suggested”instructions“existonlyasareferencematerialavailabletoassistthetrialjudgeandtrialcounselinpreparingapropercharge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273(Pa.Super.1992).

* * *

ThecontrarySSJI(Civ.)§16.20alsoincludesan“alternative”juryinstructionthatwouldshift the burden of proof in the risk‐utility test to the defendant. Such an instruction isprematureandspeculative.Itshouldnotbeincludedinanystandardcharge.Asnoted,theTincher court drew on certain principles of California law, while rejecting others. SeeTincher, 104 A.3d at 408 (adopting Barker “composite” defect analysis); id. at 377‐78(rejectingCronin “ringsofnegligence”approach). Tincher’sdiscussionofBarker and theburdenofproductionandpersuasionwaspuredictum,andrecognizedassuch.Thepartieshadnotbriefedtheissue,andtheCourtexpresslydeclinedtodecideit.Seeid.at409(“[W]eneednotdecideit[i.e.,thequestionofburden‐shifting]toresolvethisappeal”).Rather,theSupremeCourtalsodiscussed“countervailingconsiderations[that]mayalsoberelevant,”including,interalia,theprinciplethatPennsylvaniatortlawassignstheburdenofprooftotheplaintiff.Id.

In Pennsylvania, the burden of proving product defect has always belonged to theplaintiff. See Tincher, 104 A.3d at 378 (discussing “plaintiff’s burden of proof” underAzzarello).Accord,e.g.,Phillipsv.CricketLighters,841A.2d1000,1003(Pa.2003);Schroederv.Pa.Dep’tofTransportation,710A.2d23,27(Pa.1998);Spinov.JohnS.TilleyLadderCo.,696 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa. 1997);Davis v.BerwindCorp., 690 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1997);Phillipsv.A‐BestProductsCo.,665A.2d1167,1171(Pa.1995);Waltonv.AvcoCorp.,610A.2d454,458(Pa.1992);Rogersv.Johnson&JohnsonProducts,Inc.,565A.2d751,754(Pa.1989).Shiftingtheburdenofproofwouldbeadrasticstepandachangetoafoundationalprincipleoftortlaw.TotakethatstepwouldruncountertotheTincherCourt’srepeatedrespectfor“judicialmodesty.” SeeTincher, 104 A.3d at 354 n.6, 377‐78, 397‐98, 406. Indeed, theTincherCourtexplainedthatresolutionoftheburden‐shiftingquestion,likeothersubsidiaryissues,wouldrequiretargetedbriefingandadvocacyinafactuallyappositecase.Seeid.at409‐10.Accordingly,theexpresslyundecidedquestionofburden‐shiftingisinappropriateforinclusioninastandardjurycharge.


16.30 STRICTLIABILITY–DUTYTOWARN/WARNINGDEFECT

Evenaperfectlymadeanddesignedproductmaybedefectiveifnotaccompaniedbyadequate

warningsorinstructions.Thus,thedefendantmaybeliableifyoufindthatinadequate,orabsent,

warningsor instructionsmade itsproductunreasonablydangerous for [intended] [reasonably

foreseeable]uses. Aproductisdefectiveduetoinadequatewarningswhendistributedwithout

sufficientwarnings tonotify [intended] [reasonably foreseeable]usersofnon‐obviousdangers

inherentintheproduct.

Factors that youmay consider in deciding if awarning is adequate are thenature of the

product,theidentityoftheuser,whethertheproductwasbeingusedinan[intended][reasonably

foreseeable] manner, the expected experience of its intended users, and any implied

representationsbythemanufacturerorotherseller.

RATIONALE

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS §402A, is the basis for strict products liability inPennsylvania. Section 402A limits liability to products “in a defective conditionunreasonablydangerous to theuserorconsumer.” Restatement(Second)ofTorts§402A(emphasisadded).“PennsylvaniaremainsaSecondRestatementjurisdiction.”Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328,399(Pa.2014).Thus,

ina jurisdictionfollowingtheSecondRestatement formulationofstrict liability in tort, thecriticalinquiryinaffixingliabilityiswhetheraproductis“defective”;inthecontextofastrictliabilityclaim,whetheraproductisdefectivedependsuponwhetherthatproductis“unreasonablydangerous.”

Tincher,104A.3dat380,399.“[T]henotionof‘defectiveconditionunreasonablydangerous’isthenormativeprincipleofthestrictliabilitycauseofaction.”Id.at400.

For many years, the now‐overruled Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978),decisionprohibitedjuryinstructionsinproductsliabilitycasesfromusingtheterm“unreasonablydangerous.”Insteadofjuriesmakingthisdecision,trialcourtswererequiredtomake“threshold”determinations”whethera“plaintiff’sallegations”supportedafindingthattheproductatissuewas“unreasonablydangerous,”justifyingsubmissionofthecasetothejury.Id.at1026;Dambacherv.Mallis,485A.2d408,423(Pa.Super.1984)(enbanc),appealdismissed,500A.2d428(Pa.1985).

TincherexpresslyoverruledAzzarello, findingAzzarello’sdivisionof laborbetween judgeandjury“undesirable”because it “encourage[d] trialcourts tomakeeitheruninformedorunfoundeddecisionsofsocialpolicy.”Tincher,104A.3dat381.“[T]rialcourtssimplydonothavetheexpertisetoconductthesocialpolicyinquiryintotherisksandutilitiesofaplethoraofproductsandtodecide,asamatteroflaw,whetheraproductisunreasonablydangerous.”Id.at380.

WhileneitherAzzarellonorTincher involvedalleged inadequateproductwarningsorinstructions, comment j to §402A recognizes that “to prevent the product from beingunreasonablydangerous,thesellermayberequiredtogivedirectionsorwarning.”TincheracknowledgedthatoverrulingAzzarello“mayhaveanimpactupon...warningclaims.”104A.3dat409.BeforeTincher,theSupremeCourtheldthat“[t]oestablishthattheproductwasdefective, the plaintiff must show that a warning of a particular danger was eitherinadequate or altogether lacking, and that this deficiency in warning made the product‘unreasonablydangerous.’”Phillipsv.A‐BestProductsCo.,665A.2d1167,1171(Pa.1995).Tincherrestoredthe“unreasonablydangerous”elementofstrictliabilitytothejuryasthefinderoffact.104A.3dat380‐81.

AfterTincher, “[a]plaintiffcanshowaproductwasdefective”wherea“deficiencyinwarningmadetheproductunreasonablydangerous.”Highv.PennsySupply,Inc.,154A.3d341,351(Pa.Super.2017) (quotingPhillips, supra). With design andwarning defect claims routinely tried together,jurieswouldbeconfused,anderrorinvited,byusingtheoverruledAzzarelloinstructioninwarningcases.Thus,theTincher/§402A“unreasonablydangerous”elementshouldbechargedinwarning

16.30


cases.SeeAmatov.Bell&Gossett,116A.3d607,620(Pa.Super.2015)(Tincher“providedsomethingof a roadmap for navigating the broaderworld of post‐Azzarello strict liability law” inwarningcases),appealdismissed,150A.3d956(Pa.2016);Horstv.UnionCarbideCorp.,2016WL1670272,at *15 (Pa. C.P. Lackawanna Co. April 27, 2016) (Tincher and “defective product unreasonablydangerous” apply towarning claims); Igwev.Skaggs, 258F. Supp.3d596, 609‐10 (W.D. Pa. 2017)(plaintiff“mayrecoveronlyifthelackofwarningrenderedtheproductunreasonablydangerous”);Wrightv.RyobiTechnologies,Inc.,175F.Supp.3d439(E.D.Pa.2016)(“[a]plaintiffraisingafailure‐to‐warn claim must establish ... the product was sold in a defective condition unreasonablydangeroustotheuser”);Inmanv.GeneralElectricCo.,2016WL5106939,at*7(W.D.Pa.Sept.20,2016)(“aplaintiffraisingafailuretowarnclaimmustestablish...thattheproductwassoldinadefective condition ‘unreasonably dangerous’ to the user”);Baileyv.B.S.Quarries, Inc., 2016WL1271381,at*14‐15(M.D.Pa.March31,2016)(Azzarello...anditsprogenyarenolongergoodlaw”withrespecttoplaintiff’swarningclaim).

TincherreliedheavilyonDavidG.Owen,ProductsLiabilityLaw(HornbookSeries2ded.2008). 104 A.3d at 387‐402 (twelve separate citations). The Owen Handbook furthersupportsapplyingTincher’snegligence‐influenceddefectanalysistowarningclaims.OwenHandbook§9.2at589(“claimsforwarningdefectsinnegligenceandstrictliabilityintortarenearly,orentirely,identical”).

AnotherissueTincherleftopenistheextenttowhichthe“intendeduse”/”intendeduser”doctrinethatdevelopedunderAzzarelloremainsviable,orconversely,whetherithasbeendisplacedbynegligenceconceptsofreasonablenessandforeseeability.104A.3dat410;see,e.g.,PennsylvaniaDep’tofGen.Servicesv.U.S.MineralProductsCo.,898A.2d590,600(Pa.2006) (strict liability exists “only for harm that occurs in connection with a product’sintendedusebyanintendeduser”).Thisinstructiontakesnopositiononthatissue,offeringalternative“intended”and“reasonablyforeseeable”language.

The Pa. Bar institute’s SSJI (Civ.) §16.122 fails to followTincher by omitting §402A’s“unreasonablydangerous”defectstandard,returnedtothejurybyTincher.The“suggested”instructions“existonlyasareferencematerialavailabletoassist thetrial judgeandtrialcounselinpreparingapropercharge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273(Pa.Super.1992).Here,theSSJIignoreTincher’s“significant[]alter[ationof]thecommonlawframeworkforstrictproductsliability.”Highv.PennsySupply,Inc.,154A.3d341,347(Pa.Super.2017).

AlsounliketheSSJI,thisinstructionfollowsTincherbyincludingfactorsthatajurymayconsider in evaluating whether a defective warning made the product unreasonablydangerous.See104A.3dat351(“whenacourtinstructsthejury,theobjectiveistoexplaintothejuryhowitshouldapproachitstaskandthefactorsitshouldconsiderinreachingitsverdict”). The factors arederived fromTincher’s list of those relevant to the “consumerexpectations” design defect test. Id. at 387. Using these factors is appropriate since“express”representationssuchaswarningsandinstructionsareamajorsourceofconsumerexpectationsaboutproducts.Id.;High,154A.3dat348.


16.35 STRICTLIABILITY–POST‐SALEDUTYTOWARN

Theduty toprovideanadequateproductwarningcanariseevenafter theproduct issold,

undercertaincircumstances. First,asyouwere instructedearlier,theproduct'sunreasonably

dangerous conditionmust have existed at the time the product left the defendant’s control.

Second,thepotentialharmmustbebothsubstantialandpreventable.Third,thedefendantmust

have learned about the risk created by the product’s unreasonably dangerous condition

sufficientlybeforetheplaintiffsufferedharmsothatthedefendantcouldtakereasonablestepsto

warnreasonablyforeseeableusersabouttherisk.Fourth,areasonableandpracticalmeansmust

haveexistedsothatthedefendant’spost‐salewarningwouldhavebeenreceivedandactedupon,

eitherbytheplaintiff,orbysomeoneelseinapositiontoact,inawaythatwouldhaveprevented

theplaintiff’sharm.

Factors that youmay consider in deciding if a post‐salewarning should have been given

includethenatureoftheproduct,thenatureandlikelihoodofharm,thefeasibilityandexpenseof

issuingawarning,whether theclaimeddefectwasrepairable,whether theproductwasmass‐

produced,oralternativelysoldinasmallanddistinctmarket,whethertheproduct’suserscould

be easily identified and reached, and the likelihood that the product’s purchaserswould be

unawareoftheriskofharm,.

RATIONALE

Pennsylvaniarecognizedapost‐saledutytowarninWaltonv.AvcoCorp.,610A.2d454,459(Pa.1992).ThedutyrecognizedinWaltonwaslimitedbynegligenceconsiderationsofreasonablenessandpracticality.Id.at459(“sellersmustmakereasonableattemptstowarntheuserorconsumer”).“[T]hepeculiaritiesoftheindustry“support[ed]theimposition”ofapost‐saledutytowarn.Theproductwasnotan“ordinarygood...thatcouldgetsweptawayinthecurrentsofcommerce,becomingimpossibletotrackordifficulttolocate.”Id.Rather, theproductwas“notmass‐producedormass‐marketed.” Id. Products“sold inasmallanddistinctmarket”withproductservicersthat“areconvenientandlogicalpointsofcontact,”arecandidatesforpost‐salewarningduties,particularlywherethemanufacturer“remainedincontact”withsuchservicers“fortheverypurposeofkeeping[them]currentonallpertinentinformation.”Id.

Walton’srelianceonconsiderationsofreasonablenessandpracticalitywasvindicatedwhenTincherabolishedthedichotomybetweennegligenceandstrictliability.SeeTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328,380‐81(Pa.2014)(Azzarello’s“strict”separationofnegligenceandstrict liability concepts is “undesirable”; “elevat[ing] the notion that negligence concepts createconfusion in strict liability cases to a doctrinal imperative” not “consistent with reason,” and“validate[d]thesuggestionthatthecauseofaction,soshaped,wasnotviable”).

No post‐sale duty to warn has been imposed on “common business appliances.”Habeckerv.ClarkEquipmentCo.,797F.Supp.381,388(M.D.Pa.1992),aff'd,36F.3d278(3d.Cir.1994);Boyerv.CaseCorp.,1998WL205695,at*1‐2(E.D.Pa.1998)(same). SeeIerardiv.Lorillard,Inc.,777F.Supp.420,423(E.D.Pa.1991)(impossibletogivepost‐salewarningstocigarettesmokers). Theremustbe“logicalandconvenientlocationsthroughwhich[product]manufacturerscancontactcustomers”beforeapost‐saledutytowarncanexist.Traskv.OlinCorp.,2016WL1255302,at*10(W.D.Pa.March31,2016)(post‐Tincher).

TincheralsoconfirmedthattheRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§402A,remainsthebasisforstrictproductsliabilityinPennsylvania.Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328,399(Pa.2014). AsdiscussedintherationaleforInstruction§16.10,section402Arequiresthatanydefectexistwhentheproduct leavesthedefendant’scontrol. InDeSantisv.FrickCo.,745A.2d624(Pa.Super.1999),thecourtappliedthedefect‐at‐salerequirementinthecontextofapost‐saledutytowarn,holdingthat“whethertheclaimisgroundedinnegligenceorstrictliability,nopost‐saleduty

16.30


towarnaboutchangesintechnologyexistedwheretheproductwasnotdefectiveatthetimeofsale.”Id. at 630‐31. DeSantis therefore rejected Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability §10(1998), which extended post‐sale warning duties to products not defective when leaving thedefendant’scontrol.AccordInmanv.GeneralElectricCo.,2016WL5106939,at*6(W.D.Pa.Sept.20,2016)(followingDiSantispost‐Tincher);Trask,2016WL1255302,at*9n.20(same).

ThefactorsinthesecondparagrapharedrawnnotonlyfromWalton,butalsofromtheextensive discussion inPatton v.HutchinsonWil‐RichManufacturingCo., 861 P.2d 1299,1315(Kan.1993).

Beyondwarnings,nodutytorecallorretrofitaproductexistsunderPennsylvanialaw.Lynchv.McStome&LincolnPlazaAssocs.,548A.2d1276,1281(Pa.Super.1988);Slikerv.NationalFeedingSystems,Inc.,2015WL6735548,at*11(Pa.C.P.ClarionCo.Oct.19,2015)(post‐Tincher); Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1990) (applyingPennsylvania law);Talaricov.Skyjack, Inc.,191F.Supp.3d394,398‐401(M.D.Pa.2016)(post‐Tincher);McLaudv.IndustrialResources,Inc.,2016WL7048987,at*8(M.D.Pa.2016)(post‐Tincher); Inman, 2016WL5106939, at *7 (post‐Tincher);Padillav.Black&DeckerCorp.,2005WL697479,*7(E.D.Pa.2005);Girardv.AllisChalmersCorp.,787F.Supp.482,486n,3(W.D.Pa.1992);Boyer,1998WL205695,at*2.Norhasageneralpost‐saledutytowarnbeenimposedonasuccessorcorporation,corporateaffiliates,orthird‐partysuppliers,See LaFountain v. Webb Industies Corp., 951 F.2d 544, 549 (3d Cir. 1991) (applyingPennsylvanialaw);Zhaov.SkinnerEngineCo.,2013WL6506125,at*4&n.13(E.D.Pa.Dec.10,2013);Olejarv.PowermaticDivision,1992WL236960,at*5(E.D.Pa.Sept.17,1992);Gillyardv.EasternLiftTruckCo.,1992WL25826,at*3(E.D.Pa.Feb.7,1992).


16.40 “HEEDINGPRESUMPTION”FORSELLER/DEFENDANTWHEREWARNINGSOR INSTRUCTIONSAREGIVEN

Wherethedefendantprovidesadequateproductwarningsorinstructions,itmayreasonably

assumethatthosewarningswillbereadandheeded. Youmaynotfindthedefendantliablefor

harmcausedbytheplaintiffnotreadingorheedingadequatewarningsorinstructionsprovided

bythedefendant.

RATIONALE

“Where warning is given, the sellermay reasonably assume that it will be read andheeded;andaproductbearingsuchawarning,whichissafeforuseifitisfollowed,isnotindefective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.” Restatement (Second) of Torts§402A,commentj(1965).CommentjisthelawofPennsylvania.E.g.,Davisv.BerwindCorp.,690A.2d186,190(Pa.1997);Hahnv.Richter,673A.2d888,890(Pa.1996)(bothapplyingcomment j). Thus, “comment j gives an evidentiary advantage to the defense” wherewarnings are adequate. Viguersv.PhilipMorrisUSA, Inc., 837A.2d 534, 538 (Pa. Super.2003),aff’dmem.,881A.2d1262(Pa.2005).Thecommentjpresumptionwasrejectedbythe Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability §2, comment l & Reporter’s Notes(1998). InTincher,however,Pennsylvaniadeclined to “move” to theThirdRestatement.Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328,399(Pa.2014).Thus,thecommentjpresumptionremainsthelawofPennsylvania.

InDavisthedefendantcouldnotbeliableforitsproductlackinganunremovableguardwhereitadequatelywarneduserstousetheguardandavoidtheareainquestionwhiletheproductwasoperating.Because“thelawpresumesthatwarningswillbeobeyed,”id.at190(followingcommentj), itwas“untenable”thatdefendants“mustanticipatethataspecificwarning” would not be obeyed. Id. at 190‐91. Disobedience of adequate warnings isunforeseeableasamatteroflaw. Id. AccordGigusv.Giles&Ransome,Inc.,868A.2d459,462‐63(Pa.Super.2005);Fletcherv.RaymondCorp.,623A.2d845,848(Pa.Super.1993);Roudabushv.Rondo,Inc.,2017WL3912370,at*7(W.D.Pa.Sept.5,2017)(post‐Tincher).Thus,where plaintiffs advance design defect allegations, as inDavis,Gigus,Fletcher, andRoudabush,juriesshouldbeinstructedonthelegalimportofrelevantwarnings,shouldtheyfindthemadequate.

ThePa.BarInstitute’sSSJI16.40isclassifiedasawarninginstruction.Thatisincorrect.Inwarning defect cases,where thewarning is “proper and adequate,” id., the defendantnecessarily prevails on the warning’s adequacy alone. E.g.,Mackowick v.WestinghouseElectric Corp., 575 A.2d 100, 103‐04 (Pa. 1990). Thus a warning causation instructionpredicated on an “adequate” warning is superfluous because where a warning is foundadequate,thejurywillneverreachcausation.Theeffectofadequatewarningscanonlybea subject of jury consideration where the defect that is claimed to render the productunreasonablydangerousisnotthewarningitself.SeeCloudv.ElectroluxHomeProducts,Inc.,2017WL3835602,at*2‐3(E.D.Pa.Jan.26,2017)(jurytoconsiderwhetherplaintiffconductinnot“heedinginstructions”that“areasonableconsumer”wouldhavefollowedispartofdesigndefectanalysis).


16.50 STRICTLIABILITY–DUTYTOWARN–“HEEDINGPRESUMPTION”INWORKPLACE INJURYCASES

[Thisinstructionisonlytobegivenincasesinvolvingworkplaceinjuries.]

Ifyoufindthatwarningsorinstructionswererequiredtomaketheproductnondefective,and

thattheproductwasunreasonablydangerouswithoutsuchwarningsorinstructions,thenthelaw

presumes, and you would have to presume, that, if there had been adequate warnings or

instructions,theplaintiffwouldhavefollowedthem.

Thispresumptionisrebuttable,andtoovercomeit,thedefendant’sevidencemustestablish

thattheplaintiffwouldnothaveheededadequatewarningsorinstructions. Ifyoufindthatthe

defendanthasnotrebuttedthispresumption,thenyoumaynotfindforthedefendantbasedona

conclusionthat,evenwithadequatewarningsorinstructions,theplaintiffwouldnothavereador

heededthem.

RATIONALE

DuringtheAzzarelloera,somecourtsrecognizeda“logicalcorollary”tothecommentjpresumption that adequatewarnings are read and heeded (see Rationale for SSJI 16.40,supra) thatwhereawarning is inadequate,aplaintiffwillbepresumedtohavereadandheededanadequatewarning,hadonebeengiven.Cowardv.Owens‐CorningFiberglasCorp.,729A.2d614,621(Pa.Super.1999),appealgranted,743A.2d920(Pa.1999);Pavlikv.LaneLimited/Tobacco Exporters International, 135 F.3d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1998) (applyingPennsylvania law). However, the bankruptcy of the asbestos defendant in CowardforeclosedthePennsylvaniaSupremeCourtfromrulingontheissueinCowardandthehighcourthasyettorevisitit.

InTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328(Pa.2014), thecourtdeclinedtoadopttheThirdRestatement of Torts, which would have abolished the comment j presumption, and thus its“corollary.”Id.at399;compareRestatement(Third)ofTorts,ProductsLiability§2,commentl&Reporter’sNotes(1998).

InPennsylvania,theheedingpresumptionhasbeenlimitedtoproductsliabilitycasesinvolvingworkplaceinjuriessuchasCoward.“[W]heretheplaintiffisnotforcedbyemploymenttobeexposedtotheproductcausingharm,thenthepublicpolicyargumentforanevidentiaryadvantagebecomeslesspowerful.”Viguersv.PhilipMorrisUSA,Inc.,837A.2d534,538(Pa.Super.2003),aff’d,881A.2d1262(Pa.2005)(percuriam);accordMoroneyv.GeneralMotorsCorp.,850A.2d629,634&n.3(Pa.Super. 2004) (heeding presumption “authorized only in cases of workplace exposure,” notautomobiles);Goldsteinv.PhillipMorris,854A.2d585,587(Pa.Super.2004)(sameasViguers);Slikerv.NationalFeedingSystems,Inc.,2015WL6735548,at*1(Pa.C.P.ClarionCo.Oct.19,2015). SeeDemmlerv.SmithKlineBeechamCorp.,671A.2d1151,1155(Pa.Super.1996)(“proximatecauseisnotpresumed”inprescriptionmedicalproductcases).

Theheedingpresumptionis“rebuttableuponevidencethattheplaintiffwouldhavedisregardedawarningevenhadonebeengiven,Coward,729A.3dat620,withtheburdenofproductionofsuchevidence initiallyon thedefendant. Coward, 720A.2dat622. Once thedefendanthasproducedrebuttalevidence,theburden“shiftsbacktotheplaintifftoproduceevidencethathewouldhaveacted to avoid the underlying hazard had the defendant provided an adequate warning.” Id.Examplesofproperrebuttalevidenceare:(1)thattheplaintiffalreadyknewoftherisk,or(2)infactfailedtoreadthewarnings(ifany)thatweregiven.Id.at620‐21(discussingSherkv.Daisy‐Heddon,450A.2d 615, 621 (Pa. 1982), andPhillipsv.A‐BestProductsCo., 665A.2d1167, 1171 (Pa.1995));see,e.g.,Nesbittv.Sears,Roebuck&Co.,415F.Supp.2d530,543‐44(E.D.Pa.2005).Rebuttingtheheedingpresumptionrequiresonlyevidence“sufficienttosupportafindingcontrarytothepresumedfact.”Coward,729A.2dat621.


16.60 STRICTLIABILITY–DUTYTOWARN–CAUSATION,WHEN"HEEDINGPRESUMPTION"FORPLAINTIFFISREBUTTED

[Noinstructionshouldbegiven.]

RATIONALE

Oncetheheedingpresumptionhasbeenrebutted, it“isofnofurthereffectanddropsfromthecase.”Coward,729A.2dat621;accord,e.g.,Overpeckv.ChicagoPneumaticToolCo.,823F.2d751,756(3dCir.1987)(applyingPennsylvanialaw).Thus,thereisnoneedforaseparate standard instruction, concerning how the jury should proceed once thepresumptionhasbeenrebutted.Cf.PBISSJI(Civ)16.60(“DutytoWarn–Causation,When‘HeedingPresumption’forPlaintiffIsRebutted”).Wherethejuryistodecidewhethertheheedingpresumptionisrebutted,theonlyadditional instructionappropriateintheeventthatthejuryfindsinfavorofrebuttalisthegenerallyapplicablecausationinstruction.Thus,thereisnoneedforaseparateSSJI16.60.


16.70 STRICTLIABILITY–FACTUALCAUSE

Ifyoufindthattheproductwasdefective,thedefendantisliableforallharmcausedtothe

plaintiffbysuchdefectivecondition.Adefectiveconditionisthefactualcauseofharmiftheharm

wouldnothaveoccurredabsentthedefect. Inorderfortheplaintifftorecoverinthiscase,the

defendant'sconductmusthavebeenafactualcauseoftheaccident.

RATIONALE

This instruction incorporates the first paragraph of PBI SSJI (Civ) 16.70, which is acorrect statement of the “but for” causation requirement of Pennsylvania law. “But for”causationisawell‐establishedelementinordinaryPennsylvaniaproductliabilitycases.E.g.,Summersv.GiantFoodStores, Inc.,743A.2d498,509(Pa.Super.1999);Firstv.ZemZemTemple,686A.2d18,21&n.2(Pa.Super.1996);Klagesv.GeneralOrdnanceEquipmentCorp.,367A.2d304,313(Pa.Super.1976);E.J.Stewart,Inc.v.AitkenProducts,Inc.,607F.Supp.883,889(E.D.Pa.1985)(followedinSummersandFirst). Wheremorethanonepossiblecauseoftheplaintiff’sharmisatissue,seeinstruction16.80,below.

ThePBIcommentary,however,isnolongerviableafterTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328(Pa.2014).Itssuggestionthat“foreseeability,”andthusabnormaluse,were“strickenfromstrictliability”as“atestofnegligence”isnolongerthelaw.Tincherfound“undesirable”Azzarello’s“strict”separation of negligence and strict liability concepts. “[E]levat[ing] the notion that negligenceconceptscreateconfusioninstrictliabilitycasestoadoctrinalimperative”wasnot“consistentwithreason,”and“validate[d]thesuggestionthatthecauseofaction,soshaped,wasnotviable.”Id.at380‐81.Farfromseparatingstrictliabilityandnegligence,Tincheremphasizedtheiroverlap.Id.at371(describing“negligence‐derivedrisk‐utilitybalancingindesigndefectlitigation”);id.(“indesigncasesthecharacteroftheproductandtheconductofthemanufacturerarelargelyinseparable”);id.at401(“thetheoryofstrictliabilityasitevolvedoverlapsineffectwiththetheoriesofnegligenceandbreachofwarranty”)(internalcitationsomitted).

ThePBIcommentaryastoabnormaluse,relyingonthepluralitydecisioninBerkebilev.BrantlyHelicopterCorp.,337A.2d893,898(Pa.1975),isalsoobsoleteinthatBerkebilewasoverruled,specificallyastoabnormaluse,byReottv.AsiaTrend,Inc.,55A.3d1088,1100(Pa.2012)(rejecting“non‐precedentialsentimentsraisedbytheleadopinioninBerkebilethat‘abnormaluse’istobeusedasrebuttalevidenceonly”).AsconfirmedinReott,abnormaluseremainsawell‐establishedstrict liabilitydefenseinPennsylvania. SeealsoBarnishv.KWIBuildingCo.,980A.2d535,544‐45(Pa.2009);Sherkv.Daisy‐Heddon,450A.2d615,617‐18(Pa.1982);Brillv.SystemsResources,Inc.,592A.2d1377,1379(Pa.Super.1991);Metzgarv.PlayskoolInc.,30F.3d459,464‐65&n.9(3dCir.1994)(applyingPennsylvanialaw).

Other topics mentioned in PBI SSJI (Civ) 16.70 are separately addressed in thesesuggestedinstructions.Theproperuseofevidenceofaplaintiff’sconductisaddressedinsuggested instruction16.122(4). Crashworthiness isaddressed insuggested instructions16.175,16.176,and16.177.


16.80 PRODUCTSLIABILITY–(MULTIPLEPOSSIBLECONTRIBUTINGCAUSES)

In this case youmust evaluate evidence of several possible causes, including a defective

conditioninthedefendant’sproduct,todecidewhich,ifany,arefactualcausesoftheplaintiff’s

harm. Apossiblecausebecomesa legalcauseoftheplaintiff’sharmwhen itwasasubstantial

factorinbringingthatharmabout.Inorderfortheplaintifftorecoverinthiscase,thedefective

conditioninthedefendant’sproductthusmusthavebeenasubstantialfactorinbringingabout

theplaintiff’sharm.Morethanonesubstantialfactorsmaycombinetobringabouttheplaintiff’s

harm.

You should use your common sense in determining whether each possible cause was a

substantialfactorinbringingabouttheplaintiff’sharm.Asubstantialfactormustbeanactualreal

factor,althoughtheresultmaybeunusualorunexpected,but it isnotan imaginaryorfanciful

factororafactorhavingnoconnectionoronlyaninsignificantconnectionwiththeplaintiff’sharm.

RATIONALE

This instruction restores the “substantial factor” concurrent causation test ofRestatement(Second)ofTorts§431(1965),inconcurrentcausecases.“Wehaveadopteda‘substantialfactor’standardforlegalcausation.”Commonwealthv.Terry,521A.2d398,407(Pa.1987).ThePennsylvaniaSupremeCourthasrepeatedlyconfirmed“substantialfactor”as theproper concurrent causation standard specifically in product liability cases. “In aproducts liability action, Pennsylvania law requires that a plaintiff prove ... that the[product]defectwasthesubstantialfactorincausingtheinjury.”Rostv.FordMotorCo.,151A.3d1032,1037n.2(Pa.2016)(quotingSpinov.JohnS.TilleyLadderCo.,696A.2d1169,1172 (Pa. 1997)). SeeBetz v.PneumoAbexLLC, 44 A.3d 27, 58 (Pa. 2012);Summers v.CertainteedCorp.,997A.2d1152,1165(Pa.2010);Greggv.V‐JAutoParts,Co.,943A.2d216,227 (Pa.2007);Harshv.Petroll,887A.2d209,213n.9 (Pa.2005). SeealsoRestatement(Second)ofTorts§431(1965).

The second paragraph is based on the concurrent causation jury charge affirmed inRoveranov.JohnCrane,Inc.,177A.3d892,899(Pa.Super.2017).“[T]hejuryshouldconsider[whether] the plaintiff’s exposure to each defendant’s product “was on the one hand, asubstantial factor or a substantial cause or, on the other hand, whether the defendant’sconductwasaninsignificantcauseoranegligiblecause.”Id.at897(quotingRost,151A.3dat1049).“[W]ehaveconsistentlyheldthatmultiplesubstantialcausesmaycombineandcooperatetoproducetheresultingharmtotheplaintiff.”Id.at898

WhilethePBI’sSSJI(Civ.)initiallyenunciatedthecorrect“substantialfactor”concurrentcausationstandard(e.g.SSJI(Civ.)§8.04(1980revision),thecurrentsuggestedinstructions,useonly“factualcause,”avaguetermthathasnotbeenrecognizedasanadequatecausationstandardbythePennsylvaniaSupremeCourt. SSJI(Civ.)§§16.70.16.80, Giventhewell‐established Pennsylvania legal pedigree of “substantial factor” causation, and thatterminology’s superior ability to convey the conceptof causation to the jury in languagelaypersonscanunderstand, thesesuggested instructionsadopt“substantial factor”asthestandardforchargingthejury.


16.85 PRODUCTSLIABILITY–(MULTIPLEPOSSIBLECONTRIBUTINGEXPOSURES)

Inthiscaseyoumustevaluateevidenceofthe[plaintiff’s/decedent’s]exposuretoasbestos

from severalpossible sources. Inorder to recover fromanyof thedefendants,plaintiffmust

establishthat[s/he/thedecedent]inhaledasbestosfibersfromthatdefendant’sproduct(s),and

thatthethe[plaintiff’s/decedent’s]exposurefromthatdefendant’sproduct(s)wasasubstantial

factorincausingthe[plaintiff’s/decedent’s]harm.Youmayfindasbestosexposuretobesucha

substantial factor if you believe that evidence establishes that the [plaintiff/decedent] was

exposedtothatdefendant’sasbestoscontainingproduct(s):(1)sufficientlyfrequently;(2)with

sufficientregularity;(3)andtheexposurewassufficientlyproximate–that is,[s/he]wasclose

enoughtotheproduct−thatitcontributedto[his/her]harm.Youmustmakethisdetermination

astoeachdefendantseparately.However,morethanonesubstantialfactorsmaycombinetobring

aboutthe[plaintiff’s/decedent’s]harm.

You should use your common sense in determining whether each possible cause was a

substantialfactorinbringingaboutthe[plaintiff’s/decedent’s]harm.Asubstantialfactormust

be an actual real factor, although the resultmay be unusual or unexpected, but it is not an

imaginaryorfancifulfactororafactorhavingnoconnectionoronlyaninsignificantconnection

withtheplaintiff’sharm.

RATIONALE

Inasbestoslitigation,the“substantialfactor”concurrentcausationtest(seeInstruction§16.80) has been refined to require the plaintiff to produce “evidence concerning thefrequency, regularity, and proximity of [the plaintiff’s or the decedent’s] exposure toasbestos‐containingproductssoldby”eachdefendant.Greggv.V‐JAutoParts,Co.,943A.2d216, 227 (Pa. 2007). See also Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 56‐57 (Pa. 2012)(discussingapplicationoffrequency,regularity,andproximitytest);Nelsonv.AircoWeldersSupply,107A.3d146,157‐58(Pa.Super.2014)(enbanc)(same).“OurdecisionsinGreggandBetz alignedPennsylvaniawith themajorityofothercourtsadopting the ‘frequency,regularity,andproximity’test.”Rostv.FordMotorCo.,151A.3d1032,1049(Pa.2016).

Underthistest,“tocreateajuryquestion,aplaintiffmustadduceevidencethatexposureto defendant’s asbestos‐containing product was sufficiently ‘frequent, regular, andproximate’tosupportajury'sfindingthatdefendant’sproductwassubstantiallycausativeofthedisease.”Rost,151A.3dat1044.Suchevidencevariesfromcasetocase,butmust“tak[e]intoconsiderationexposurehistory,individualsusceptibility,biologicalplausibility,andrelevantscientificevidence(includingepidemiologicalstudies).”Id.at1046(footnoteomitted). Asingle,ordeminimisexposure toadefendant’sproduct is insufficient. Id.at1048(“causationexpertsmaynot testify thatasingleexposure(i.e., ‘oneorademinimisnumberofasbestosfibers’)issubstantiallycausative”);Vanamanv.DAP,Inc.,966A.2d603,610(Pa.Super.2009)(enbanc)(“veryminimalexposureisinsufficienttoimplicateafactissueconcerningthesubstantial‐factorcausation”).

The rest of this instruction incorporates the general instruction on substantial factorcausationdiscussedinInstruction§16.80.

Becausethefrequency,regularity,andproximitytesthasoftenbeenappliedinasbestosmesothelioma cases, this instruction includes as optional phrasing consistent with awrongfuldeathaction.

Whilethefrequency,regularity,andproximitytesthastodatebeenlimitedtoasbestoslitigation,itispossiblethatthistestmightapplyinothermultipleexposurecasesinvolvingotherhazardoussubstances.SeeMelnickv.ExxonMobilCorp.,2014WL10916974,at*7(Pa.Super.June9,2014)(mem.)(testappliesin“exposurecases,”whichcouldincludebenzene).


16.90 STRICTLIABILITY–MANUFACTURINGDEFECT–MALFUNCTIONTHEORY

Theplaintiffmayprove amanufacturingdefect indirectlyby showing theoccurrenceof a

malfunctionofaproductduringnormaluse,withouthavingtoprovetheexistenceofaspecific

defectintheproductthatcausedthemalfunction. Theplaintiffmustprovethreefacts:thatthe

productmalfunctioned,thatitwasgivenonlynormalorreasonablyforeseeableusepriortothe

accident,andthatnoreasonablesecondarycauseswereresponsiblefortheproductmalfunction.

RATIONALE

Theso‐called“malfunctiontheory”isamethodofcircumstantialproofofdefectavailable“[i]ncertaincasesofallegedmanufacturingdefects.”Longv.Yingling,700A.2d508,514(Pa.Super.1997).Toestablishabasisforliabilityunderthemalfunctiontheory,aplaintiffmustprove three things: a product malfunction, only normal product use, and absence of“reasonablesecondarycauses”forthemalfunction:

First,the“occurrenceofamalfunction”ismerelycircumstantialevidencethattheproduct had a defect, even though the defect cannot be identified. The secondelement in theproof of amalfunction theory case,which is evidence eliminatingabnormal use or reasonable, secondary causes, also helps to establish the firstelement of a standard strict liability case, the existence of a defect. Bydemonstrating the absence of other potential causes for the malfunction, theplaintiffallowsthejurytoinfertheexistenceofdefectfromthefactofamalfunction.

Barnishv.KWIBuildingCo.,980A.2d535,541(Pa.2009).Withoutthisproof,“[t]hemerefactthatanaccidenthappens...doesnottaketheinjuredplaintifftothejury.”Dansakv.CameronCoca‐ColaBottlingCo.,703A.2d489,496(Pa.Super.1997).

Thisinstructionfollowsthepost‐BarnishchargeapprovedinWigginsv.Synthes,29A.3d9, 18‐19 (Pa. Super.2011), asmodifiedbyTincherv.OmegaFlex, Inc., 104A.3d328 (Pa.2014), to include “reasonably foreseeable” as the standard for abnormal use. Prior toAzzarellov.BlackBrothersCo.,391A.2d1020(Pa.1978),thestandardforabnormaluseinamalfunctiontheorycase“depend[ed]onwhethertheusewasreasonablyforeseeablebytheseller."Kuisisv.Baldwin‐Lima‐HamiltonCorp.,319A.2d914,921n.13(Pa.1974)(pluralityopinion). TincheroverruledAzzarello’sbartostrict liability jury instructionsmentioningreasonablenessandforeseeability,104A.3dat389,andcitedKuisisfavorably.Id.at363‐64.Since plaintiffs must prove lack of abnormal use as an element of their prima faciecircumstantial defect case, a second, separate jury instruction on abnormal use isunnecessary.Wiggins,29A.3dat18‐19.

Themalfunctiontheoryisproperonlyinmanufacturingdefectcases.Rogersv.Johnson& JohnsonProducts, Inc.,565A.2d751,755 (Pa.1989) (acceptingmalfunction theory “asappropriateinascertainingtheexistenceofadefectinthemanufacturingprocess”);Dansak,703A.2dat495(“incasesofamanufacturingdefect,aplaintiffcouldproveadefectthroughamalfunction theory”);accordDucko v.ChryslerMotorsCorp., 639A.2d 1204, 1205 (Pa.Super. 1994); Smith v.HowmedicaOsteonicsCorp., 251 F. Supp.3d 844, 851‐52 (E.D. Pa.2017);Varnerv.MHS,Ltd.,2F.Supp.3d584,592(M.D.Pa.2014).

Indesigndefectcases,Tincheradopteda“composite”approachtoliabilitythat“requiresproof,inthealternative,eitheroftheordinaryconsumer’sexpectationsoroftherisk‐utilityofaproduct.”104A.3dat401.AlthoughTincherconsideredthemalfunctiontheory,id.at362‐63, it did not identify productmalfunction as a relevant factor for eithermethod ofprovingdesigndefect.Id.at387(consumerexpectations),389‐90(risk‐utility).Thus,underTincher, the malfunction theory cannot be a method of proving design defect. See alsoDansak, 703 A.2d at 495 n.8 (“to prove that an entire line of products was designedimproperly,theplaintiffneednotresorttothemalfunctiontheory”).

Awarned‐ofmalfunctionwouldnotbeunexplained.Thus,noprecedentsupportsuseofthemalfunctiontheory inwarningcases. SeeDolbyv.ZieglerTire&SupplyCo.,2017WL

16.90


781650, at *6, 161 A.3d 393 (Table) (Pa. Super. 2017) (plaintiffs ”only pursued a strictliability failuretowarncase, themalfunctiontheory isnotapplicable”)(unpublished);cf.Barnish,980A.2dat542(“factsindicatingthattheplaintiffwasusingtheproductinviolationoftheproductdirectionsand/orwarnings”defeatsmalfunctiontheoryasamatteroflaw).

Themalfunctiontheoryislimitedtonew,ornearlynewproducts,asthelongeraproductis used, themore likely reasonable secondary causes, such as impropermaintenance orordinarywear and tear, become. “[P]rior successful use” of a product “undermines theinferencethattheproductwasdefectivewhenitleftthemanufacturer’scontrol.”Barnish,980A.2dat547;accordKuisis,319A.2dat922‐23(“normalwear‐and‐tear”over20yearsprecludedmalfunctiontheory);Noblesv.Staples,Inc.,2016WL6496590,at*6(Pa.C.P.Phila.Co.Feb.9,2016)(threeyearsofsuccessfuluseprecludesmalfunctiontheory),aff’d,150A.3d110(Pa.Super.2016);Wilsonv.Saint‐GobainUniversalAbrasives,Inc.,2015WL1499477,at*15(W.D.Pa.Apr.1,2015)(malfunctiontheoryallowedwherenewproduct“failedassoonas[plaintiff]touchedit”);Banksv.ColoplastCorp.,2012WL651867,at*3(E.D.Pa.Feb.28,2012)(malfunctionon“firstuse”allowsmalfunctiontheory);Hamiltonv.EmersonElectricCo.,133F.Supp.2d360,378(M.D.Pa.2001)(“onetotwoyears”ofsuccessfuluseprecludesmalfunctiontheory).

Themalfunction theoryonly applies “where theallegedlydefectiveproducthasbeendestroyedorisotherwiseunavailable.”Barnish,980A.2dat535;accordWiggins,29A.3dat14;Wilson,2015WL1499477,at*12‐13;Houtzv.EncoreMedicalCorp.,2014WL6982767,at*7(M.D.Pa.Dec.10,2014);Ellisv.Beemiller,Inc.,910F.Supp.2d768,775(W.D.Pa.2012).

A plaintiff has the burden of producing “evidence eliminating abnormal use orreasonable,secondarycauses.”Barnish,980A.2dat541(quotingRogers,656A.2dat754);accordBeardv.Johnson&Johnson,Inc.,41A.3d823,830n.10(Pa.2012)(noting“plaintiff’sburden,undermalfunctiontheory,ofaddressingalternativecauses”).Thus,“aplaintiffdoesnotsustainitsburdenofproofinamalfunctiontheorycasewhenthedefendantfurnishesanalternativeexplanationfortheaccident.”Raskinv.FordMotorCo.,837A.2d518,522(Pa.Super.2003);accordThompsonv.AnthonyCraneRental,Inc.,473A.2d120,125(Pa.Super.1984) (jury findingproductoperatornegligentestablished “secondary cause”precludingmalfunction theory). A plaintiff must also “present[] a case‐in‐chief free of secondarycauses.”Rogers,565A.2dat755;accordStephensv.ParisCleaners,Inc.,885A.2d59,72(Pa.Super.2005)(malfunctiontheoryprecludedwhere“recordalsoestablishes”useofproductinexcessofwhat“itwaseitherdesignedormanufacturedtowithstand”).“Defendant’sonlyburden is to identifyotherpossiblenon‐defectorientedexplanations.” Long,700A.2dat515.

This instructiondiffers fromthePa.BarInstitute’sSSJI(Civ.)§16.90 in: (1)explicitlylimitingtheinstructiontomanufacturingdefect,and(2)using“reasonableforeseeability”language. The SSJI fails to followTincher. The “suggested” instructions “exist only as areferencematerialavailabletoassistthetrialjudgeandtrialcounselinpreparingapropercharge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273(Pa.Super.1992). TheSSJInotesarealsoobsolete,citingnoprecedentlessthan20yearsold,andinparticularomittingBarnish.


16.122(1) STRICTLIABILITY–STATEOFTHEARTEVIDENCE

UnknowabilityofClaimedDefectiveCondition

Youhavebeeninstructedaboutapplicabletest[s]forunreasonablydangerousproductdefect.

Under the risk/utility test,youmust considerknownorknowableproduct risksandbenefits.

Under the consumer expectations test, the plaintiff must prove that the risk[s] [was/were]

unknowablewhentheproductwassold.

[Omitconsumerexpectationsorrisk/utilitylanguageifthattestisnotatissue]

Thus,[undereithertest,]youmayonlyfindthedefendantliablewheretheplaintiffprovesthat

the [plans or designs] for the product [or themethods and techniques for themanufacture,

inspection,testingandlabelingoftheproduct]werestateoftheartatthetimetheproductleftthe

defendant’scontrol.

“Stateoftheart”meansthatthetechnical,mechanical,scientific,[and/or]safetyknowledge

wereknownorknowableatthetimetheproductleftthedefendant’scontrol.Thus,youmaynot

considertechnical,mechanical,scientific[and/or]safetyknowledgethatbecameavailableonlyby

thetimeoftrialoratanytimeaftertheproductleftthedefendant’scontrol

RATIONALE

Thisinstructionistobegivenwherethejurymustresolveadisputeoverwhethertheproductriskthattheplaintiffclaimshascausedinjurywasknowable,giventhetechnologicalstateoftheartwhentheproductwasmanufacturedorsupplied.

InTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328(Pa.2014),thecourtrejectedthestrictseparationofnegligenceandstrictliabilitytheoriesthathadbeencharacteristicofPennsylvaniaproductsliabilitylitigationunderAzzarellov.BlackBrothersCo.,391A.2d1020(Pa.1978).TincherreplacedAzzarello‐eradefectstandardswitha“composite”testutilizingboth“risk/utility”and“consumerexpectations”defectapproachesderivedfromBarkerv.LullEngineeringCo.,573P.2d443(Cal.1978).See104A.3dat387‐89.

Therisk/utilityprongofTincher’s“composite”defecttestprovides“anopportunitytoanalyzeposthocwhetheramanufacturer’sconductinmanufacturingordesigningaproductwasreasonable,whichobviouslyreflectsthenegligencerootsofstrictliability.”104A.3dat389. Theconsumerexpectationsprongisexplicitlylimitedtorisksthatare“unknowableandunacceptable”to“averageorordinaryconsumer[s].”Id.at335,387.Tincherdid“notpurporttoeitherapproveordisapprovepriordecisionallaw,”onissuessuchasstateoftheart.Id.

Likewise, Restatement §402A, reaffirmed in Tincher, limits the duty to warn toinformation that the manufacturer or seller “has knowledge, or by the application ofreasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge,” thus rejectingliability forunknowableproductrisks. Restatement(Second)ofTorts§402A,comment j(1965).

TincherreliedheavilyonDavidG.Owen,ProductsLiabilityLaw(HornbookSeries2ded.2008). 104A.3d at 387‐402 (twelve separate citations). TheOwenHandbook supportsadmission of state of the art evidence, dismissing liability for unknowable defects as a“dwindlingidea.”OwenHandbook§9.2at587.Thestateoftheartisrelevanttoconsumer

16.122(1)


expectations“todeterminetheexpectationoftheordinaryconsumer,”andtorisk/utility,sincetherisk‐utilitytestrestsontheforeseeabilityoftheriskandtheavailabilityofafeasiblealternativedesign.”Id.§10.4,at715(emphasisoriginal).“[T]hegreatmajorityofjudicialopinions” hold that “the practical availability of safety technology is relevant andadmissible.”Id.at717.Likewise,Barkerrecognizedthat“theevidentiarymatters”relevanttoitstest“aresimilartothoseissuestypicallypresentedinanegligentdesigncase.” 573P.2dat326.Thus,theAzzarello‐erarationaleforexclusionnolongerexistsaftereliminationofthestrictseparationofnegligenceandstrictliability.

Tincherheldthat,“strictliabilityasitevolvedoverlapsineffectwiththetheoriesofnegligenceandbreachofwarranty.”104A.3dat401.Accordingly,Tincherrejectedtheviewthat“negligenceconcepts”instrictliabilitycouldonly“confuse”juries.

[A] strict readingofAzzarello isundesirable. . . . SubsequentapplicationofAzzarello elevated thenotion that negligence concepts create confusion in strict liability cases to a doctrinal imperative,whosemeritswerenotexaminedtodeterminewhethersuchabright‐linerulewasconsistentwithreason....[T]heeffectoftheperserulethatnegligencerhetoricandconceptsweretobeeliminatedfromstrict liability lawwas tovalidate thesuggestion that thecauseofaction, soshaped,wasnotviable.

Id. “Even a cursory reading of Tincher belies th[e] argument” that Tincher “overruledAzzarellobutdidlittleelse.”Renningerv.A&RMachineShop,163A.3d988,1000(Pa.Super.2017). Rather, in Tincher, “the Supreme Court rejected the ‘per se rule that negligencerhetoric and conceptswere to be eliminated from strict liability law.’” DeJesusv.KnightIndustries&Associates,Inc.,2016WL4702113,at*6(E.D.Pa.Sept.8,2016)(quotingTincher,104A.3dat381).

Duringthenow‐repudiatedAzzarelloperiod,theSuperiorCourtheldthatstrictliabilityallowed liability for scientificallyunknowableproduct risks,because “inviting the jury toconsiderthe‘stateoftheart’...injectsnegligenceprinciplesintoaproductsliabilitycase.”Carrecterv.ColsonEquipmentCo.,499A.2d326,329(Pa.Super.1985).Bothpre‐Azzarellostrict liabilityandnegligence liabilityrejectedliabilityforunknowableproductrisks. SeeLeibowitzv.OrthoPharmaceuticalCorp.,307A.2d449,458(Pa.Super.1973)(“[a]warningshouldnot beheld improper because of subsequent revelations”) (opinion in support ofaffirmance);Mazurv.Merck&Co.,964F.2d1348,1366‐67(3dCir.1992)(defectdependson“thestateofmedicalknowledge”atmanufacture)(applyingPennsylvanialaw);Frankelv.LullEngineeringCo.,334F.Supp.913,924(E.D.Pa.1971)(§402A“requiresonlyproofthatthemanufacturerreasonablyshouldhaveknown”),aff’d,470F.2d995(3dCir.1973)(percuriam).

Post‐Tincher,technologicalinfeasibilityhasbeenrecognizedasrelevant.Igwev.Skaggs,258F.Supp.3d596,611(W.D.Pa.2017)(risk“cannotbereasonablydesignedoutbasedonthe technology used at the time of production”). Pennsylvania cases also supportadmissibilityofstateoftheartevidencegenerally.SeeRenninger,163A.3dat1000(“alargebodyofpost‐Azzarelloandpre‐Tincherlaw"isnolongerbindingprecedent);Webbv.VolvoCars, LLC, 148 A.3d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. 2016) (the Azzarello “strict prohibition onintroducingnegligenceconceptsintostrictproductsliabilityclaims,isnolongerthelawinPennsylvania”);Amatov.Bell&Gossett,116A.3d607,622(Pa.Super.2015)(defendantsmaydefendon“state‐of‐the‐art”groundsafterTincher),appealdismissed,150A.3d956(Pa.2016).“Aproductisnotdefectiveiftheordinaryconsumerwouldreasonablyanticipateandappreciatethedangerousconditionoftheproductandtheattendantriskofinjuryofwhichtheplaintiffcomplains.”Meyersv.LVDAcquisitions,LLC,2016WL8652790,at*2(Pa.C.P.MifflinCo.Sept.23,2016),aff’dmem.,2017WL1163056(Pa.Super.March28,2017).

ThecontrarySSJI (Civ.)§16.122doesnotrelyonPennsylvania law,butratheronthe“Wade‐Keeton test” that would impute all knowledge available at the time to themanufacturer/supplier. Id. at Subcommittee Note. However, that test has never beenadopted in Pennsylvania, and was criticized by Tincher. 104 A.3d at 405 (“Imputingknowledge ... was theoretically counter‐intuitive and offered practical difficulties, asillustrated by the Wade‐Keeton debate.”). See Owen Handbook §10.4 at 733 (“modernproductsliabilitylawisquitesurelybetteroffwithoutadutytowarnorotherwiseprotect

16.122(1)


againstunknowablerisks”).The“suggested”instructions“existonlyasareferencematerialavailable to assist the trial judge and trial counsel in preparing a proper charge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273(Pa.Super.1992).Here,theSSJIignoreTincher’s“significant[]alter[ation of] the common law framework for strict products liability.” High v. PennsySupply,Inc.,154A.3d341,347(Pa.Super.2017).



CompliancewithProductSafetyStatutesorRegulations

Youhaveheardevidencethatthe[product]compliedwiththe[identifyapplicablestatuteor

regulation].Whilecompliancewiththat[statuteorregulation]isnotconclusive,itisafactoryou

shouldconsiderindeterminingwhetherthedesignoftheproductwasdefectivesoastorender

theproductunreasonablydangerous.

RATIONALE

Thisinstructionistobegivenwherethejuryhasheardevidencethattheproductatissuecompliedwith the requirementsof anapplicableproduct safety statuteorgovernmentalregulation.

InTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328(Pa.2014),thecourtrejectedthestrictseparationofnegligenceandstrictliabilitytheoriesthathadbeencharacteristicofPennsylvaniaproductsliabilitylitigationunderAzzarellov.BlackBrothersCo.,391A.2d1020(Pa.1978).TincherreplacedAzzarello‐eradefectstandardswitha“composite”testutilizingboth“risk/utility”and“consumerexpectations”defectapproachesderivedfromBarkerv.LullEngineeringCo.,573P.2d443(Cal.1978).See104A.3dat387‐89.Barkeralsorecognizedthat“theevidentiarymatters”relevanttoitstest“aresimilartothoseissuestypicallypresentedinanegligentdesigncase.”573P.2dat326.

Therisk/utilityprongofTincher’s“composite”defecttestprovides“anopportunitytoanalyzeposthocwhetheramanufacturer’sconductinmanufacturingordesigningaproductwasreasonable,whichobviouslyreflectsthenegligencerootsofstrictliability.”104A.3dat389. Theconsumerexpectationsprongisexplicitlylimitedtorisksthatare“unknowableandunacceptable”to“averageorordinaryconsumer[s].”Id.at335,387.

Tincherdid“notpurporttoeitherapproveordisapprovepriordecisionallaw,”onissuessuchasstateoftheart.Id.at409‐10.However,theAzzarello‐erarationaleforexclusionofregulatorycomplianceevidencenolongerexistsaftereliminationofthestrictseparationofnegligenceandstrictliability.“[S]ubsequentapplication”ofwhat“bright‐line”or“perse”rules against “negligence rhetoric and concepts” is neither “consistent with reason” nor“viable.”Tincher,104A.3dat380‐81.Courtsexcludingsuchevidence“reliedprimarilyonAzzarellotosupportthepreclusionofgovernmentorindustrystandardsevidence,becauseitintroducesnegligenceconceptsintoastrictliabilityclaim.”Webbv.VolvoCars,LLC,148A.3d473,483(Pa.Super.2016).Thus,“alargebodyofpost‐Azzarelloandpre‐Tincherlaw”cannolongerbeconsideredbindingprecedent.Renningerv.A&RMachineShop,163A.3d988,1000(Pa.Super.2017).

TincherreliedheavilyonDavidG.Owen,ProductsLiabilityLaw(HornbookSeries2ded.2008). 104A.3d at 387‐402 (twelve separate citations). TheOwenHandbook supportsadmissionofregulatorycompliance:

Theruleastoamanufacturer’scompliancewithagovernmentalsafetystandardsetforthinastatuteorregulationlargelymimicstheruleonviolation:compliancewitharegulatedsafetystandard...iswidelyconsideredproperevidenceofaproduct’snondefectivenessbutisnotconclusiveonthatissue.

Id.§6.4,at401(footnoteomitted).


[A] strict readingofAzzarello isundesirable. . . . SubsequentapplicationofAzzarello elevated thenotion that negligence concepts create confusion in strict liability cases to a doctrinal imperative,whosemeritswerenotexaminedtodeterminewhethersuchabright‐linerulewasconsistentwithreason....[T]heeffectoftheperserulethatnegligencerhetoricandconceptsweretobeeliminatedfromstrict liability lawwas tovalidate thesuggestion that thecauseofaction, soshaped,wasnotviable.

16.122(2)


Id. “Even a cursory reading of Tincher belies th[e] argument” that Tincher “overruledAzzarellobutdidlittleelse.”Renninger,163A.3dat1000.Rather,inTincher,“theSupremeCourtrejectedthe‘perserulethatnegligencerhetoricandconceptsweretobeeliminatedfromstrictliabilitylaw.’”DeJesusv.KnightIndustries&Associates,Inc.,2016WL4702113,at*6(E.D.Pa.Sept.8,2016)(quotingTincher,104A.3dat381).

Duringthenow‐repudiatedAzzarelloperiod,theSuperiorCourtheldthatstrictliabilityprecludedevidencethatthedefendant’sproductcompliedwithgoverningsafetystatutesorregulationsbecause“theuseofsuchevidenceinterjectsnegligenceconceptsandtendstodivertthejuryfromtheirproperfocus,whichmustremainuponwhetherornottheproduct...was‘lackinganyelementnecessarytomakeitsafeforitsintendeduseorpossessinganyfeaturethatrendersitunsafefortheintendeduse.’”EstateofHicksv.DanaCos.,984A.2d943, 962 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). Hicks used the now‐repudiated Azzarello defectstandardtooverrulepriorprecedentthatheldregulatorycomplianceadmissible instrictliability actions. See Cave v.Wampler Foods, Inc., 961 A.2d 864, 869 (Pa. Super. 2008)(regulatory compliance “evidence is directly relevant to and probative of [plaintiff’s]allegationthattheproductatissuewasdefective”)(overruledinHicks);Jacksonv.Spagnola,503 A.2d 944, 948 (Pa. Super. 1986) (regulatory compliance is “of probative value indetermining whether there is a defect”) (overruled in Hicks); Brogley v. ChambersburgEngineering Co., 452 A.2d 743, 745‐46 (Pa. Super. 1982) (negligence case; courts have“uniformlyheldadmissible...safetycodesandregulationsintendedtoenhancesafety”).

EvenHicks, however, recognized that regulatory compliance would be relevant to aconsumerexpectationstestfordefect,because“evidenceofwideuseinanindustrymayberelevanttoproveadefectbecausetheevidenceisprobative,whilenotconclusive,ontheissue of what the consumer can reasonably expect.” 984 A.2d at 966. Likewise, therisk/utility test “reflects the negligence roots of strict liability” and “analyzes post hocwhetheramanufacturer’sconduct...wasreasonable.”Tincher,104A.3dat389.Sincetherisk/utility inquiry involves “conduct,” regulatory compliance is admissible evidence.“Pennsylvania courts permit[] defendants to adduce evidence of compliance withgovernmentalregulationintheireffortstodemonstrateduecare(whenconductisinissue).”Lancev.Wyeth,85A.3d434,456(Pa.2014).

Post‐Tincher Pennsylvania cases support admissibility of state of the art evidencegenerally. SeeWebb, 148 A.3d at 482 (the Azzarello “strict prohibition on introducingnegligence concepts into strict products liability claims, is no longer the law inPennsylvania”);Amatov.Bell&Gossett,116A.3d607,622(Pa.Super.2015)(defendantsmaydefendon“state‐of‐the‐art”groundsafterTincher),appealdismissed,150A.3d956(Pa.2016).SeeRapchakv.HaldexBrakeProductsCorp.,2016WL3752908,at*3(W.D.Pa.July14,2016)(the“theprinciplesofTinchercounselinfavorof[the]admissibility”ofcompliancewith“industryorgovernmentstandards”);Morellov.KencoToyotaLift,142F.Supp.3d378,386(E.D.Pa.2015)(expertregulatorycompliancetestimonyheldrelevantinstrictliability).

The contrary SSJI (Civ.) §16.122 would perpetuate the Lewis per se exclusion ofregulatorycomplianceevidence. Id.atSubcommitteeNote(relyingsolelyupontheLewislineofcases).The“suggested”instructions“existonlyasareferencematerialavailabletoassistthetrialjudgeandtrialcounselinpreparingapropercharge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273 (Pa. Super. 1992). Here, the SSJI ignore Tincher’s “significant[] alter[ation of] thecommonlawframeworkforstrictproductsliability.”High,154A.3dat347.

© 2017 Pennsylvania Defense Institute/Philadelphia Ass’n of Defense Counsel September 2017



CompliancewithIndustryStandards

Youhaveheardevidencethatthe[product]compliedwiththedesignandsafetycustomsor

practicesinthe[typeofproduct]industry.Whilecompliancewiththeseindustrystandardsisnot

conclusive,itisafactoryoushouldconsiderindeterminingwhetherthedesignoftheproductwas

defectivesoastorendertheproductunreasonablydangerous.

RATIONALE

Thisinstructionistobegivenwherethejuryhasheardevidencethattheproductatissuecompliedwithindustry‐widestandards.

InTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328(Pa.2014),thecourtrejectedthestrictseparationofnegligenceandstrictliabilitytheoriesthathadbeencharacteristicofPennsylvaniaproductsliabilitylitigationunderAzzarellov.BlackBrothersCo.,391A.2d1020(Pa.1978).TincherreplacedAzzarello‐eradefectstandardswitha“composite”testutilizingboth“risk/utility”and“consumerexpectations”defectapproachesderivedfromBarkerv.LullEngineeringCo.,573P.2d443(Cal.1978).See104A.3dat387‐89.Barkerrecognizedthat“theevidentiarymatters”relevanttoitstest“aresimilartothoseissuestypicallypresentedinanegligentdesigncase.”573P.2dat326.

Therisk/utilityprongofTincher’s“composite”defecttestprovides“anopportunitytoanalyzeposthocwhetheramanufacturer’sconductinmanufacturingordesigningaproductwasreasonable,whichobviouslyreflectsthenegligencerootsofstrictliability.”104A.3dat389;accordRenningerv.A&RMachineShop,163A.3d988,997(Pa.Super.2017)(Tincherrisk/utilitytest“isderivedfromnegligenceprinciples”).Likewise,compliancewithindustrystandardswouldberelevanttoconsumerexpectationstestfordefect,because“evidenceofwideuseinanindustrymayberelevanttoproveadefectbecausetheevidenceisprobative,whilenotconclusive,ontheissueofwhattheconsumercanreasonablyexpect.”EstateofHicksv.DanaCos.,984A.2d943,966(Pa.Super.2009)(enbanc).

Tincherdid“notpurporttoeitherapproveordisapprovepriordecisionallaw,”onissuessuch as state of the art. 104 A.3d at 409‐10. However, theAzzarello‐era rationale forexclusion of industry standards evidence no longer exists after elimination of the strictseparationofnegligenceandstrictliability.“[S]ubsequentapplication”ofwhat“bright‐line”or “per se” rules against “negligence rhetoric and concepts” is neither “consistent withreason”nor “viable.” Id. at380‐81. Courtsexcluding suchevidence “reliedprimarilyonAzzarellotosupportthepreclusionofgovernmentorindustrystandardsevidence,becauseitintroducesnegligenceconceptsintoastrictliabilityclaim.”Webbv.VolvoCars,LLC,148A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2016). Lewis, whichTincher recognized as “in harmonywithAzzarello,”ispartof“alargebodyofpost‐Azzarelloandpre‐Tincherlaw”thatcannolongerbeconsideredbindingprecedent.Renninger,163A.3dat1000‐01.

TincherreliedheavilyonDavidG.Owen,ProductsLiabilityLaw(HornbookSeries2ded.2008). 104A.3dat387‐402(twelveseparatecitations). TheOwenHandbookviewstheLewisblanketinadmissibilityruleis“anoutmodedholdoverfromearly,misguidedeffortstodistinguishstrictliabilityfromnegligence,”andrecognizesthata“greatmajorityofcourtsallow applicable evidence of industry custom.” Id. §6.4, at 392‐93 (footnote omitted).Industrystandardsare“someevidence”concerningdefectand“doesnotaloneconclusivelyestablishwhetheraproductisdefective.”Id.at394‐95(footnoteomitted).


[A] strict readingofAzzarello isundesirable. . . . SubsequentapplicationofAzzarello elevated thenotion that negligence concepts create confusion in strict liability cases to a doctrinal imperative,whosemeritswerenotexaminedtodeterminewhethersuchabright‐linerulewasconsistentwithreason....[T]heeffectoftheperserulethatnegligencerhetoricandconceptsweretobeeliminated

16.122(3)


fromstrict liability lawwas tovalidate thesuggestion that thecauseofaction, soshaped,wasnotviable.

Id. “Even a cursory reading of Tincher belies th[e] argument” that Tincher “overruledAzzarellobutdidlittleelse.”Renninger,163A.3dat1000.Rather,inTincher,“theSupremeCourtrejectedthe‘perserulethatnegligencerhetoricandconceptsweretobeeliminatedfromstrictliabilitylaw.’”DeJesusv.KnightIndustries&Associates,Inc.,2016WL4702113,at*6(E.D.Pa.Sept.8,2016)(quotingTincher,104A.3dat381).

Duringthenow‐repudiatedAzzarelloperiod,thePennsylvaniaSupremeCourtheldthatstrict liability precluded evidence that the defendant’s product complied with industrystandardsinLewisv.CoffingHoistDiv.,528A.2d590(Pa.1987).“‘[I]ndustrystandards’”gotothenegligenceconceptofreasonablecare,and...underourdecisioninAzzarellosuchaconcepthasnoplaceinanactionbasedonstrictliabilityintort.”Id.at594.Lewisthususedthenow‐repudiatedAzzarellodefectstandardtodepartfrompriorprecedentthathadheldindustrystandardsadmissibleinstrictliability.SeeForryv.GulfOilCorp.,237A.2d593,598&n.10(Pa.1968)(industrystandards–“thecustomandpracticeinthe[relevant]industry”heldrelevanttoestablishingproductdefectunder§402A).

Post‐Tincher Pennsylvania cases support admissibility of state of the art evidencegenerally.SeeHighv.PennsySupply,Inc.,154A.3d341,350n.5(Pa.Super.2017)(expertindustry standards compliance testimony relevant to product’s “nature” in consumerexpectations approach); Webb, 148 A.3d at 482 (the Azzarello “strict prohibition onintroducingnegligenceconceptsintostrictproductsliabilityclaims,isnolongerthelawinPennsylvania”);Amatov.Bell&Gossett,116A.3d607,622(Pa.Super.2015)(defendantsmaydefendon“state‐of‐the‐art”groundsafterTincher),appealdismissed,150A.3d956(Pa.2016);Mercuriov.LouisvilleLadder,Inc.,2018WL2465181,at*7(M.D.Pa.May31,2018)(followingCloudandRapchak);Cloudv.ElectroluxHomeProducts,Inc.,2017WL3835602,at*2(E.D.Pa.Jan.26,2017)(“AfterTincher,courtsshouldnotdrawabrightlinebetweennegligencetheoriesandstrictliabilitytheoriesregardingevidenceofindustrystandards”);Rapchakv.HaldexBrakeProductsCorp.,2016WL3752908,at*3(W.D.Pa.July14,2016)(the “theprinciplesofTincher counsel in favorof [the]admissibility”of compliancewith“industry or government standards”); Sliker v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 2015 WL6735548,at*7(Pa.C.P.ClarionCo.Oct.19,2015)(industrystandardsevidenceadmissibleas“particularlyrelevanttofactor(2)”ofTincher’srisk/utilityapproach).

ThecontrarySSJI(Civ.)§16.122wouldperpetuatetheLewisperseexclusionofindustrystandardsevidence.Id.atSubcommitteeNote(relyingsolelyupontheLewislineofcases).The“suggested”instructions“existonlyasareferencematerialavailabletoassistthetrialjudgeandtrial counsel inpreparingapropercharge.” Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997). They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A.,604A.2d270,273(Pa.Super.1992).Here,theSSJIignoreTincher’s“significant[]alter[ationof]thecommonlawframeworkforstrictproductsliability.”High,154A.3dat347.


16.122(4) STRICTLIABILITY–PLAINTIFFCONDUCTEVIDENCE

Youhaveheardevidenceaboutthemannerthattheplaintiff[s]usedtheproduct. Youmay

consider this evidence as you evaluatewhether theproductwas in adefective condition and

unreasonablydangeroustotheuser.However,aplaintiff’sfailuretoexercisecarewhileusinga

productdoesnotrequireyourverdicttobeforthedefendant.

[Iftheevidenceisthattheplaintiff’sconductwas“highlyreckless”andcreatesajuryquestion

whetherthisconductcouldbe“asoleorsupersedingcause”oftheplaintiff’sharm,thenthejuryshouldalsobeinstructedonthatconductasasupersedingcause.]

RATIONALE

Thepre‐TincherdecisionReottv.AsiaTrend,Inc.,55A.3d1088(Pa.2012),heldthataplaintiff conduct, such as productmisuse,was admissible in strict liabilitywhen “highlyreckless”andtendingtoestablishthatsuchconduct“wasthesoleorsupersedingcauseoftheinjuriessustained.”Id.at1101.Evidencethatshowednothingmorethan“aplaintiff'scomparative or contributory negligence” was not admissible. Id. at 1098. Under thePennsylvaniaFairShareAct,plaintiffconductcannotbeapportionedtoreducerecoveryinstrict liability – liability is reducedonlyby the conductof “jointdefendants.” 42Pa.C.S.§7102(a.1).

However,Tincheralsoviewedplaintiffconductasrelevanttowhetheraclaimedproductdefect creates an “unreasonably dangerous” product, particularly under the risk/utilityprongofits“composite”test.Tincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104A.3d328,401‐02(Pa.2014).Thefifthrisk/utilityfactoris,“Theuser’sabilitytoavoiddangerbytheexerciseofcareintheuseoftheproduct.”Id.at389‐90(quotingfactors).Post‐Tinchercourtsapplyingtherisk/utilityprongutilizethesefactorstodetermineunreasonablydangerousdefect.Punchv.DollarTreeStores,2017WL752396,at*8(Mag.W.D.Pa.Feb.17,2017),adopted,2017WL1159735(W.D.Pa.March29,2017);Rapchakv.HaldexBrakeProductsCorp.,2016WL3752908,at*2‐3(W.D.Pa.March15,2016);Lewisv.Lycoming,2015WL3444220,at*3(E.D.Pa.May29,2015);Capecev.HessMaschinenfabrikGmbH&Co.KG,2015WL1291798,at*3(M.D.Pa.July14,2015);Meyersv.LVDAcquisitions,LLC,2016WL8652790,at*3(Pa.C.P.MifflinCo.Sept.23, 2016),aff’dmem., 2017WL 1163056 (Pa. Super.March 28, 2017);Sliker v.NationalFeedingSystems,Inc.,2015WL6735548,at*4(Pa.C.P.ClarionCo.Oct.19,2015).

Plaintiffconductevidencethushasbeenheldrelevant,regardlessofcausation,wheresuchevidencewouldmaketherisk/utilityfactorofavoidanceofdangerthroughexerciseofcareinusingtheproductmoreorlessprobable.Cloudv.ElectroluxHomeProducts,Inc.,2017WL3835602,at*2‐3(E.D.Pa.Jan.26,2017)(plaintiffconductinnot“heedinginstructions”that“areasonableconsumer”wouldhavefollowedisadmissible);Punch,2017WL752396,at *11 (“a jury could conclude that thePlaintiffsmighthave avoided the injuryhad theyexercised reasonable care with the product”); Sliker, 2015WL 6735548, at *4 (plaintiffconduct“mayberelevanttotherisk‐utilitystandardarticulatedinTincherandisthereforeadmissibleforthatpurpose”).Exerciseofcareasriskavoidance,however,isjustonefactorintherisk/utilitydetermination.

Contributory fault, in and of itself, is not a defense to strict liability. 42 Pa. C.S.§7102(a.1);seeKimcoDevelopmentCorp.v.MichaelD’sCarpetOutlets,637A.2d603,606(Pa.1993). In cases where plaintiff conduct evidence is admitted as relevant to defect, theplaintiff would be entitled to request a cautionary instruction to prevent the jury fromconsideringsuchevidenceforanyotherpurpose.Spinov.JohnS.TilleyLadderCo.,696A.2d1169,1172(Pa.1997);Bialekv.PittsburghBrewingCo.,242A.2d231,235(Pa.1968).

The contrary SSJI (Civ.) §16.122 does not mention the Tincher risk/utility factor ofavoidanceofdangerthroughexerciseofcare.Id.atSubcommitteeNote(discussingplaintiffconduct solely in the causation context). The “suggested” instructions “exist only as a

16.122(4)


referencematerialavailabletoassistthetrialjudgeandtrialcounselinpreparingapropercharge.”Commonwealthv.Smith,694A.2d1086,1094n.l(Pa.1997).They“havenotbeenadoptedbyoursupremecourt,”are“notbinding,”andcourtsmay“ignorethementirely.”Butlerv.Kiwi,S.A., 604A.2d270, 273 (Pa. Super. 1992). Here, the SSJI, ignoreTincher’s“significant[] alter[ation of] the common law framework for strict products liability,”specificallyTincher’srecognitionofanewtestforproductdefect.High,154A.3dat347.


16.150 STRICTLIABILITY–COMPONENTPART

Acomponentpart,usedtomakeacompletedproductassembledbythecompletedproduct’s

manufacturer, is not in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous if the

[manufacturer/seller/distributor] of the component produced a component that met the

requirementsofthemanufacturerofthecompletedproduct,unlessyoufind:(1)thecompleted

productmanufacturer’srequirementswereobviouslydeficient,or (2) thecomponentsupplier

substantiallyparticipatedinthe[design/preparation]ofthecompletedproduct.

A[manufacturer/seller/distributor]ofacomponentpartwhoproducedacomponentthatmet

thespecificationsandrequirementssetforthbytheassemblerofthecompletedproduct,isnot

liableforharmresultingfromunreasonablydangerousdefectsinotherpart(s)ofthecompleted

productthatthecomponentpart[manufacturer/seller/distributor]didnotproduce,unlessyou

findthatthecomponentpart[manufacturer/seller/distributor]substantiallyparticipatedinthe

[design/preparation]ofthoseotherpart(s)ofthecompletedproduct.

RATIONALE

Restatement(Second)ofTorts§402A(1965),asadoptedbyTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), does not address liability considerations involving componentparts. Id. §402A comment q. Pennsylvania law has recognized special considerationsconcerningcomponentpartsonnumerousoccasions.SeeJacobiniv.V.&O.PressCo.,588A.2d476,479(Pa.1991)(“untenable”toimposedutiesofacompletedproductassemblerona“manufacturer[that]suppliesamerecomponentofafinalproductthatisassembledbyanotherparty”);Wenrickv.Schloemann‐SiemagAktiengesellschaft,564A.2d1244,1247(Pa.1989)(componentnotdefectivewhere“theplacementofthe[relevantcomponents]werealldecisionsmadeby[thecompletedproductassembler]inmanufacturingthe[completedproduct]”).

[T]heappellant’sargumentonthisappealamount[s]tonomorethananassertionthatknowledgeofapotentialdangercreatedbytheactsofothersgivesrisetoadutytoabatethedanger.Wearenotpreparedtoacceptsucharadicalrestructuringofsocialobligations.

Id.at1248.

Componentpartsuppliersarestrictlyliablefordefectsthatrenderthecomponentstheysupplyunreasonablydangerous,E.g.,Waltonv.AvcoCorp.,610A.2d454,456‐57(Pa.1992);Burbagev.BoilerEngineering&SupplyCo.,249A.2d563,566(Pa.1989);Kephartv.ABB,Inc.,2015WL1245825,at*11(W.D.Pa.Mar.18,2015)(post‐Tincher).

Acomponentpartsupplier’scompliancewiththespecificationsorrequirementsoftheassemblerofthecompletedproductordinarilyshieldsthecomponentsupplierfromliability.E.g. Wenrick, 564 A.2d at 1246‐47 (compliance with assembler’s decisions precludedliability); Stephens v. Paris Cleaners, Inc., 885 A.2d 59, 70 (Pa. Super. 2005) (same withrespect toassembler’scontractualspecifications);Summersv.GiantFoodStores, Inc.,743A.2d498,508‐09(Pa.Super.1999) (componentpurchaser’s refusal tobuynon‐defectivecomponentheldsolecauseofinjury);Taylorv.PaulO.Abbe,Inc.,516F.2d145,148(3dCir.1975) (compliance with assembler’s specifications precluded liability) (applyingPennsylvanialaw);Willisv.NationalEquipmentDesign Co.,868F.Supp.725,728-29(E.D.Pa.1994)(same),aff’dwithoutop.,66F.3d314(3dCir.1995);Lesnefskyv.Fisher&PorterCo., 527 F. Supp. 951, 955 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“no public policy is served by requiring thecomponentmanufacturertohireexperts,atgreatcost,toreviewspecificationsprovidedbyanexperiencedpurchaserinordertodeterminewhethertheproductdesignwillbesafe”).Liabilityisallowedwherethecomponentpartsupplier,ratherthanthecompletedproductassembler,preparedthecomponent’sspecifications.Stecykv.BellHelicoptersTextron,Inc.,1996WL153555,at*12(E.D.Pa.Apr.2,1996).

16.122(4)


Themakerofanon‐defectivecomponentpartcouldnotbeliablewheretheplaintiff’s“injury [was] caused by another component part, manufactured by another company”andthecomponentpartsupplier“didnotparticipateinthedecisionsregardingthedesign[ofthecompleted product] or the location of” any other component. Petrucelli v. Bohringer&Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1302, 1310 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying Pennsylvania law);accordSchwartzv.AbexCorp.,106F.Supp.3d626,654&n.75(E.D.Pa.2015)(“acomponentpartisaseparate‘product’forpurposesofapplicationofSection402A”)(post‐Tincher).

Theexceptionsstatedinthisinstruction,fortransparentlyinadequatespecificationsandsubstantialparticipationindesignorpreparationofother,defectivepartsofacompletedproduct,arerecognizedbyRestatement(Third)ofTorts,ProductsLiability§5&commente(1998).WhileTincherdeclinedtoadopttheThirdRestatementwholesale,itdidnotaddress,letalonecriticize,theThirdRestatement’sapproachtocomponentpartliability,whichhaswonwidespreadacceptance.E.g.Ramosv.BrenntagSpecialties,Inc.,372P.3d200,204(Cal.2016) (Restatement §5 “accurately reflect[s]” the law); In re New York City AsbestosLitigation, 59 N.E.3d 458, 478 (N.Y. 2016) (applying Restatement §5 substantialparticipation standard);Gudmundson v.DelOzone, 232 P.3d 1059, 1073‐74 (Utah 2010)(collectingcases).Similarrulesexistinnegligence.SeeRestatement(Second)ofTorts§404,commenta (“chattels areoftenmadeby independent contractors.... In sucha case, thecontractorisnotrequiredtositinjudgmentontheplansandspecificationsorthematerialsprovidedbyhisemployer.”)


16.175 CRASHWORTHINESS–GENERALINSTRUCTIONS

Theplaintiffhasallegedacrashworthinessdefect.By“crashworthiness”Imeantheaccident

thathappenedwasnotcausedbyanydefectinthe[product]/[vehicle].Insteadtheplaintiffalleges

thatadefectenhancedinjuriesthat[he]/[she]sustainedinthataccident,makingthoseinjuries

worsethaniftheallegeddefectdidnotexist.

Inacrashworthinesscase,thefirstquestioniswhetherthe[product]/[vehicle]wasdefective.

Only if you find that the design of the [product’s]/[vehicle’s] [specific defect alleged] was

unreasonablydangerousanddefective,under thedefinitions Ihave justgivenyou,shouldyou

proceedtoexaminetheremainingelementsofcrashworthiness.

RATIONALE

“Crashworthiness,”inPennsylvania,hasbeenconsideredadesigndefect‐related“subsetof aproducts liabilityactionpursuant toSection402A.” Kupetzv.Deere&Co., 644A.2d1213,1218(Pa.Super.1994);accordParrv.FordMotorCo.,109A.3d682,689(Pa.Super.2014) (post‐Tincher). Cf. Harsh v. Petroll, 887 A.2d 209, 211 n.1 (Pa. 2005) (noting“continuing controversy” about “whether crashworthiness claims ... are appropriatelyadministeredas a subsetof strict liability and/ornegligence theory”). “Theeffectof thecrashworthinessdoctrineisthatamanufacturerhasalegaldutytodesignandmanufactureitsproducttobereasonablycrashworthy.”Kupetz,644A.2dat1218.

“[T]hecrashworthinessdoctrineisuniquelytailoredtoaddressthosesituationswherethedefectiveproductdidnotcausetheaccidentbutservedtoincreasetheinjury.”Colvillev.CrownEquip.Corp.,809A.2d916,925‐26(Pa.Super.2002).Crashworthinessthusisnotmerely “anadditional theoryof recovery thataplaintiffmayelect topursue.” Id. at926(“disagree[ing]”with that proposition). Rather crashworthiness requires “particularizedinstructionstojurorsconcerningincreasedharm.”PennsylvaniaDep’tofGen.Servs.v.U.S.MineralProd.Co.,898A.2d590,602(Pa.2006).Thesecrashworthinessinstructionsaretobegiveninanycaseinvolvingenhancedinjuriesfromadesigndefectnotallegedtocausetheaccidentitself.

While the crashworthiness doctrine in Pennsylvania applies most commonly in thecontextofmotorvehicles,itisnotlimitedtothatscenario.Colville,809A.2dat923(standuprider). Theprincipleunderlying thedoctrine iscompensation for injuries thatresultnotfromaninitialimpact,butfromanunnecessaryaggravationorenhancementcausedbythedesignoftheproduct.Id.Forexample,aclaimthatthestructureofanautomobilefailedtoprevent an otherwise preventable injury in a foreseeable accident would fall under thecrashworthiness doctrine. Harsh, 887 A.2d at 211 n.1. The crashworthiness doctrinelikewiseappliestosafetydevicessuchashelmetsthataredesignedtoreduceormitigateinjury in foreseeable impacts. Svetz v. Land Tool Co., 513 A.2d 403 (Pa. Super. 1986)(motorcycle helmet); Craigie v. General Motors, 740 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1990)(characterizingSvetz).

Although the crashworthiness doctrine is sometimes described in terms of “secondcollision,”thisterminologyisdisfavored.Crashworthinessisfrequentlyinvokedwherenoliteral“secondcollision”or“enhancedinjury”ispresent.Colville,809A.2dat924;Kupetz,644 A.2d at 1218. The doctrine applies, for instance, not onlywhen a vehicle occupantsustains injurieswithin thevehicle itself,butalsowhenanoccupant isejectedorsuffersinjurywithoutanactualsecondcollisionor“impact.”Colville,809A.2dat924.

Likewise,whilethedoctrinereferstothe“enhancement”ofanoccupant’s injuries, itsapplication is not limited to instances of literal “enhancement” of an otherwise existinginjury.Rather,thecrashworthinessdoctrineextendstosituationsofindivisibleinjury,suchasdeath.Harsh,887A.2dat219.Thedoctrinealso“include[s]thosecircumstanceswhereanindividualwouldnothavereceivedanyinjuriesintheabsenceofadefect.”Colville,809

16.175


A.2dat924‐25;seeKolesarv.Navistar Int'lTransp.Corp.,815F.Supp.818,819(M.D.Pa.1992) (permitting plaintiff to proceed on a crashworthiness theory where the plaintiffwouldhavewalkedawayuninjuredabsentthedefect),aff’d,995F.2d217(3dCir.1993).

Thisinstruction’s“unreasonablydangerous”languagerecognizesthatTincherv.OmegaFlex,Inc.,changedthedefecttestinall§402Astrictliabilityactionsbyreturningtothejurytheinquiryofwhetheraproductis“unreasonablydangerous.”104A.3d328,380389‐91(Pa.2014).SeeRationaleforSuggestedInstruction16.20(1).Theconsumerexpectationstestfor“unreasonablydangerous”willordinarilynotapplytoproductsofcomplexdesignor that present esoteric risks, because an ordinary consumer does not have reasonablesafetyexpectationsaboutthoseproductsorthoserisks.Tincher,104A.3dat388.AstheTinchercourtexplained:

[A]complexproduct,evenwhenitisbeingusedasintended,mayoftencauseinjuryin a way that does not engage its ordinary consumers’ reasonable minimumassumptionsaboutsafeperformance. Forexample, theordinaryconsumerofanautomobilesimplyhas‘noidea’howitshouldperforminallforeseeablesituations,orhowsafeitshouldbemadeagainstallforeseeablehazards.

Id.(quotingSoule882P.2dat308).Thecrashworthinessdoctrineexiststoaddressexactlysuch products and scenarios. Cf. Harsh, 887 A.2d at 219. Accordingly, the consumerexpectationsmethodofproofshouldnotbepermitted,andthejuryshouldnotbeinstructedontheconsumerexpectationstestincrashworthinesscases.


16.176 CRASHWORTHINESS‐ELEMENTS

Iwillnowinstructyouontheplaintiff’sburdeninacrashworthinesscase.Inordertoprove

thedefendantliableina“crashworthiness”case,theplaintiffhastheburdenofproving:

1.Thatthedesignofthe[product]/[vehicle]inquestionwasdefective,renderingtheproduct

unreasonablydangerous,andthatatthetimethe[product]/[vehicle]leftthedefendant’scontrol,

analternative,saferdesign,practicableunderthecircumstancesexisted;

2.What injuries, ifany, theplaintiffwouldhavesustainedhadthealternative,saferdesign

beenused;and

3.Theextenttowhichtheplaintiffwouldnothavesufferedtheseinjuries ifthealternative

designhadbeenused,so that thoseadditional injuries, ifany,werecausedby thedefendant’s

defectivedesign.

Ifafterconsideringalloftheevidenceyoufeelpersuadedthatthesethreepropositionsare

moreprobablytruethannot,yourverdictmustbeforplaintiff.Otherwiseyourverdictmustbe

forthedefendant.

RATIONALE

Theburdenofprovingtheelementsofcrashworthinessrestsontheplaintiff.Schroederv.Com.,DOT,710A.2d23,27n.8(Pa.1998);Parrv.FordMotorCo.,109A.3d682,689(Pa.Super.2014)(post‐Tincher);Gaudiov.FordMotorCo.,976A.2d524,532,548,550‐551(Pa.Super.2009);Raskinv.FordMotorCo.,837A.2d518,524(Pa.Super.2003);Colvillev.CrownEquip.Corp.,809A.2d916,922‐23(Pa.Super.2002);Kupetzv.Deere&Co.,644A.2d1213,1218 (Pa. Super. 1994). InStecherv.FordMotorCo., 812A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. 2002), theSupremeCourtreversedasdecidingamootissueaSuperiorCourtrulingthatpurportedtoshifted the burden of proof in crashworthiness cases to defendants. All post‐Stecherappellatedecisionsimposetheburdenofproofonplaintiffs.

Although some federal cases predicting Pennsylvania law listed four elements ofcrashworthiness(breakingelementone,above,intotwoelementsatthe“and”),seeOddiv.FordMotorCo.,234F.3d136,143(3dCir.2000);Habeckerv.ClarkEquip.Co.,36F.3d278,284(3dCir.1994),thegreatmajorityofPennsylvaniaprecedent,includingallrecentstateappellateauthority,definescrashworthinessashavingthreeelements.SeeSchroeder,710A.2dat27n.8;Parr,109A.3dat689;Gaudio,976A.2dat532,550‐551;Colville,809A.2dat922‐23;Kupetz, 644A.2d at 1218. This instruction follows the controllingPennsylvaniacases.Itisbasedonthecrashworthinesschargeapprovedas“correct”inGaudio,976A.3dat550‐51,towhichisaddedthe“unreasonablydangerous”languagerequiredofall§402Ainstructions byTincher v.Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 380 399‐400 (Pa. 2014). SeeRationaleforSuggestedInstruction16.20(1),supra.

Crashworthiness “requir[es] the fact finder to distinguish non‐compensable injury(namely, that which would have occurred in a vehicular accident in the absence of anyproduct defect) from the enhanced and compensable harm resulting from the productdefect.” PennsylvaniaDep'tofGen.Servs.v.U.S.MineralProd.Co.,898A.2d590,601 (Pa.2006).Crashworthinessallowsrecoveryof“increasedorenhancedinjuriesoverandabovethosewhichwouldhavebeensustainedasaresultofaninitialimpact,whereavehicledefectcanbeshowntohaveincreasedtheseverityoftheinjury.”Harshv.Petroll,887A.2d209,210n.1(Pa.2005).Theseinstructionsdirectthejurytoapportiontheplaintiff’sinjury,inordertolimitrecoverytocompensableharm.Kupetz,644A.2dat1218.Thus,“[t]hesecond

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oftheseelementsrequiredtheplaintiff todemonstrate“what injuries, ifany, theplaintiffwouldhavereceivedhadthealternativesaferdesignbeenused.”Colville,809A.2dat924(emphasisoriginal).

The“preceptofstrictliabilitytheorythataproduct’ssafetybeadjudgedasofthetimethatitleftthemanufacturer’shands,”Duchessv.LangstonCorp.,769A.2d1131,1140(Pa.2001), is recognized throughoutPennsylvania strict liability jurisprudence, including the“subset”ofcrashworthinessdoctrine.


16.177 CRASHWORTHINESS–SAFERALTERNATIVEDESIGNPRACTICABLE UNDERTHECIRCUMSTANCES

Indeterminingwhethertheplaintiff’sproposedalternativedesignwassaferandpracticable

underthecircumstancesatthetimethe[product][vehicle]leftthedefendant’scontrol,theplaintiff

mustprovethatthecombinedrisksandbenefitsoftheproductasdesignedbythedefendantmade

it unreasonably dangerous compared to the combined risks and benefits of the product

incorporatingtheplaintiff’sproposedfeasiblealternativedesign.

Indeterminingwhethertheproductwascrashworthyunderthistest,youmayconsiderthe

followingfactors:

[Instructontherisk‐utilityfactorsfromSuggestedInstruction16.20(3)]

RATIONALE

Crashworthiness involves a risk‐utility test that compares the defendant’s design with theplaintiff’sproposedalternative.Gaudiov.FordMotorCo.,976A.2d524,548‐50(Pa.Super.2009).WhileTincherv.OmegaFlex, Inc., permits a plaintiff in an ordinary §402A claim to prove that aproduct isunreasonablydangerousanddefectiveundereitheraconsumerexpectations testorarisk‐utilitytest,104A.3d328,335,388,406‐07(Pa.2014);seeSuggestedInstructions16.120(2)&16.120(3), supra, the comparison between themanufacturer’s design, present in the challengedproduct,andtheplaintiff’sproposedalternativedesign,isanessentialelementofcrashworthiness.E.g.,Schroederv.Commonwealth,DOT,710A.2d23,28n.8(Pa.1998);Parrv.FordMotorCo.,109A.3d682(Pa.Super.2014)(post‐Tincher);Gaudio,976A.2dat532;Colvillev.CrownEquip.Corp.,809A.2d916,922(Pa.Super.2002);Kupetzv.Deere&Co.,644A.2d1213,1218(Pa.Super.1994).Thisinstructionthereforeutilizesthesamerisk‐utilityfactorsastherisk‐utilityprongofthe“composite”defecttestfromTincher,104A.3dat389‐91.

PriortoitsTincherdecision,theSupremeCourtrecognizedthatrisk‐utilityanalysisencompassesallintendedusesofaproduct,notlimitedtothenarrowlydefinedsetofcircumstancesthatledtotheinjuryatissue.Beardv.Johnson&Johnson,Inc.,41A.3d823,836‐37(Pa.2012)(scopeoftherisk‐utilityanalysisinastrict‐liabilitydesigndefectcaseisnotlimitedtoaparticularintendeduseoftheproduct).Becausethereallikelihoodexiststhatanincreaseinsafetyinoneaspectofaproductmayresult inadecrease insafety inadifferentaspectof thesameproduct,Pennsylvaniacourtshaverecognizedthatamanufacturer’sproductdevelopmentanddesignconsiderationsarerelevant, inthecontextofarisk‐utilityanalysis,toassessaplaintiff’scrashworthinessclaim.Gaudio,976A.2dat 548 (“If, in fact, making the [product] in question ‘safer’ for its occupants also created an‘unbelievable hazard’ to others, the risk‐utility is essentially negative. The safety utility to theoccupantwouldseeminglybeoutweighedbytheextrariskcreatedtoothers.”)(quotingPhatakv.UnitedChairCo.,756A.2d690,694(Pa.Super.2000)).Forthesereasons,juriesconsiderthesameset of factors in evaluating a proposed alternative design that are used to evaluatewhether thesubjectdesignisunreasonablydangerous. Justaswhenthe juryassessesoverallproductdesign,some,orallofthefactorsmaybeparticularlyrelevant,orsomewhatlessrelevant,tothejury’srisk‐utilityassessment.SeeRationaleofSuggestedInstruction16.120(3),supra.

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