problem to paradox

8/8/2019 Problem to Paradox

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forced to admit that there is evil in the world. There are, according to Swinburne, physical evil,

mental evil, state evil, and moral evil.vi Most of those who have crafted theodicies, however,

have not followed Swinburne=s categories of evil. Instead, such theorists have denominated evil

as moral and natural.vii Moral evil is the evil done by humanity and natural evil is that done by

nature.viii The existence of this evil is said to be prima facie evidence that either God does not

exist, is not omnipotent, is not omniscient, or is not perfectly good.

The theist says that the propositions about God are true and are compatible with the

existence of evil. However, the atheist attacks this position and argues that “if God exists, then

being omniscient, he knows under what circumstances evil will occur; ... and being omnipotent,

he is able to prevent its occurrence. Hence, being perfectly good, he will prevent its

occurrence.”ix Thus, according to the atheist, because evil persists in the world, one or more of

the propositions affirmed by theists are false. Theists respond by creating theodicies to prove that

their propositions about God are compatible with the existence of evil. That is the road traveled

by Swinburne.

Swinburne begins his theodicy with Plantinga's “free will defence.”x It had been

supposed that Plantinga's Free Will Defense had solved the problem of evil. The defense holds

that “it is not logically possible for an agent to make another agent such that necessarily he freely

does only good actions ... It is a good thing that there exist free agents.” xi Thus, because

humanity is created as free moral agents, and because making evil choices is a “necessary

consequence”of being free, it is not “logically possible” for God to have created humanity such

that humans always does that which is good.xii Hence, the existence of evil is compatible with the

theistic confessions about God because humans have free will to choose good or evil. Evil exists

because so often humans choose evil.

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Unfortunately, Plantinga's defense did not solve the problem of evil as many had hoped.

There are a number of problems with the solution worked out by Plantinga and some of these are

addressed by Swinburne and so they will not be repeated here. What Swinburne does is to

modify the free will defense by adding that as free agents, humans “do not have fully

deterministic precedent causes.”xiii By this, Swinburne means that it is not possible to create free

agents and at the same time insure that such agents never choose to do evil. The existence of evil

then, is a “logical price” to pay for humanity's freedom.xiv

For Swinburne, the price is not too high because evil assists humanity in building

character. Humans have been created immature so that they can “gradually make decisions which

affect the sort of beings they will be. ... And one of the great privileges which a creator can give

to a creature is to allow him to help in the process of education ...”xv Swinburne goes on to say

that “Evils give men the opportunity to perform those acts which show men at their best. A world

without evils would be a world in which men could show no forgiveness, no compassion, no

self-sacrifice.”xvi

To the critic who says the evil in the world is such as to suggest that God has gone too far

in God's system of education, Swinburne answers not so. There are limits “to the amount of pain

a person can suffer [and] from time to time God intervenes in the natural order which he has

made to prevent evil which would otherwise occur.”xvii Swinburne also argues that the universe is

incomplete – that humanity has the opportunity to participate with God in God's creative

process.

He concludes by adding another proposition to the equation, God has entered history and

suffered as a man to show that God asks no more of humanity than God asks of God. Swinburne

concludes his theodicy by saying that “A creator is more justified in creating or permitting evils















to be overcome by his creatures if he is prepared to share with them the burden of the suffering

and effort.”xviii

Swinburne fine tunes his theodicy almost two decades later but does not stray from the

main formulations. He adds the concept of “depravity” as inherent in humanity and this in part

explains humanity's inclination to evil.xix He argues that this depravity is a “necessary condition

of a greater good.”xx

D.Z. Phillips severely criticizes the theodicy Swinburne has constructed.xxi Phillips finds

Swinburne's conclusions “perverse.”xxii Phillips identifies rightly the flaws inherent in

Swinburne's theodicy. He sees the “difficulty of the metaphysical level at which the 'ensuing' or

'seeing to it' is supposed to take place, and ... the difficulty of knowing what it would be to see to

or ensure the formation of character.”xxiii Phillips notes that Swinburne has diminished the level

of human suffering to no more than opportunities for learning and that no matter how egregious

the harm, all evils are part of God's “finishing school.”xxiv It is a school from which one either

graduates or dies. And even those who might make it out of the school, often are so maimed and

wounded by the tests undergone that they find it difficult to attach any type of meaningful

analysis to the lessons learned and the costs nor is life anymore worth the living as a result of

their education.

The world in which most humans live, exist and have their being is a world beset by

natural and moral evils. It is a world where disaster can strike at any time without “... rhyme or

reason. Where, if much can be done to influence character, much can also bring about such

influence over which we have no control.”xxv It seems to Phillips, and to this author, that

Swinburne's God is one who is morally insensitive to the pain and suffering of God's creation




















and who asks “... a lot of his creatures. [Consequently, if such a God as Swinburne describes was

to visit] our world, those who said that there was no room at the inn would be right.”xxvi

FOUNDATIONAL PROBLEMS

In 1980, three years after the debate between Swinburne and Phillips took place, Holland

sounded the alarm that something was shaky about the foundation on which theodicies had been

constructed. He charged that theodicists purport “to establish the existence of a solution-space

without putting anything in it.”xxvii Holland noted that those who attempted to solve the problem

of evil, always started by “ providing an extra thesis.”xxviii He quotes Mackie as having listed four

of the most popular of these extra thesis:

1. Good cannot exist without evil; or Evil is a necessary counterpart to good;

2. Evil is necessary as a means to good;

3. The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil;

4. Evil is due to human free will.xxix

Holland uses Mackie's term “havering” to describe this process of adding another thesis or two

to the theistic propositions as a way of demonstrating that the problem of evil has been solved.xxx

Holland labels the results achieved by havering as “fallacious.”xxxi He concludes that the

problem of evil is insoluble. He deconstructs the theodicy project but offers nothing by way of

reconstruction. The main value of his work is in pointing out that if the problem of evil is to be

solved, it must be worked out based on the propositions out of which the problem emerges. It

cannot be resolved adding a new thesis for this can be done ad infinitum.

It has been shown above how Phillips' critique of Swinburne points out some of the

problems with the theodicy project. Of course, Phillips initial response is to merely show that

Swinburne's solution is no solution at all. The concepts of Swinburne border on the bizarre and

















do more harm than good to the image of God. It is almost two decades later that Phillips begins

to see a problem with the framework in which the problem of evil debate is being carried out. In

“On Not Understanding God,” Phillips suggests that the “limits of human existence are beyond

human understanding.”xxxii After reviewing the traditional problem of evil debate, Phillips

concludes that “[W]hat we need is to put theodicies aside, and thereby come to see the sense in

which God is said to be beyond human understanding.”xxxiii Phillips, like Holland, points out that

there is an inherent flaw in the form of the question and the reasoning used in attempts to answer

it. He notes that theodicies “have the immoral audacity to try to impose a false order on life's

contingencies.”xxxiv

Another failure among those who engage in theodicy making is that such persons appear

as if they have some insight into the nature of God that is denied the rest of us. They speak of

“ best possible worlds” and the eschaton as if they are privy to the workings of God in a way no

other person is. The problem of evil presumably has been approached as “it arises within the

context of biblical religion.”xxxv However, seldom do those who construct theodicies, with the

exception of Stephen H. Davis, appeal to the biblical authority to reveal something about God

and just what it is God is doing in creation. For instance, in the Adams' book, neither Mackie,

Pike, Wykstra, Allen, Chisholm, Penelhum, Plantinga, nor Rowe quote scripture. Marilyn

McCord Adams quotes scripture once in her introduction and none in her own essay. Robert

Merrihew Adams quotes scripture once and Hick quotes it three times. How is it possible to carry

on a debate regarding a subject without referring to the best evidence of the nature and purpose

of that subject? Moreover, of what benefit is a theodicy if its basic premise is opposed by the

Bible?












For instance, the Bible speaks of most of human suffering as flowing from the original

sin of Adam and Eve. This is a far cry from the “character building” purpose that Swinburne

ascribes to suffering. Moreover, Plantinga's free will defense fails to appreciate the reality of

Satan and the influence Satan has in a fallen world. It is no wonder then that theodicies have

been called “perverse” and “fallacious.” The time has come to bring the enterprise of theodicy

making to an end.

A MODEST PROPOSAL

What is proposed here is that the problem of evil no longer be viewed as a problem. A

problem typically suggests that a particular question can be answered or matter resolved. A

mathematical problem is one that can be solved once one learns certain mathematical principles.

The problem of teenage pregnancies can be debated and answers proffered along social, political

and family dimensions. Of course, there are problems, like acid rain, poverty, and crime that

seem to have a solution but which persists nevertheless. And of course, there are problems like

traffic congestion that persist because no one wants to be the first to do what the solution

demands.

The problem of evil does not fit into any of the aforementioned categories of problems.

That is because, quite frankly, as Mackie and Holland say directly and Phillips suggests, the

problem of evil cannot be solved in its present form. Moreover, any attempt to solve the problem

of evil in its present form requires the addition of another proposition which makes the problem

other than what it is. Thus, the problem with theodicies, inter alia, is that they start out

attempting to solve the problem of evil but end up altering the problem as posed and thus at best

resolving a problem of their own making and not the problem which they set out to solve. It is

like deciding to take a bus as a way of solving the lack of mileage one gets with one's



automobile. One has in fact solved a problem, but one has not solved the problem presented

initially by an automobile that gives low gas mileage.

The best approach to the problem of evil is to recast it as a paradox. According to

Merriam-Webster 's Collegiate Dictionary, a paradox is “a statement that is seemingly

contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet is perhaps true.” There are well known

paradoxes in mathematics and other areas of knowledge that we need not enumerate here. There

are many others in the Judeo-Christian tradition such as in Matthew 8:22 where Jesus says to “let

the dead bury the dead.”

Therefore, it will not be odd or perverse to add another paradox to a tradition in which

paradoxes play a prominent role. Shifting attention from a problem of evil to a paradox of evil

will not diminish the suffering of humanity nor play metaphysical games with reality. Nor will

the approach proposed here result in “ perverse” and “fallacious” arguments or results. When

those who are suffering ask why they suffer, people of faith can be silent and hold them and be

present with them. They need not strain for some explanation or try to espouse some theodicy or

defense of God.

Moreover, when the atheist or those unenlightened followers of other faith traditions tries

to make sport of those who hold onto such a paradox, believers can in faith and confidence resist

the temptation to follow such naysayers down a road that takes them farther away from God and

their fellow suffering brothers and sisters. Rather than engaging the atheist in a struggle of the

atheist's own making (since what the atheist perceives as a problem is no longer a problem),

those who once espoused theodicies can avail themselves of the wisdom that Christ gave for

such occasions, “Do not give what is holy to dogs, nor cast your pearls before swine ...”xxxvi





1Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, eds., The Problem of Evil,

Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press (1990), 1-2.

i.Professor Davis has raised the emotive problem of evil (EPE)in his work, “Free Will and Evil,”

in Encountering Evil, 2d. ed., ed. D.Z. Phillips (2001); however, the vast majority of the

literature concerns the logical problem of evil (LPE) and so the LPE will be the focus of this paper. I am of the opinion that what I say about the LPE can be said as well about the EPE.

ii. R.F. Holland, “On the Form of 'The Problem of Evil',” chap. in Against Empiricism, Tolowa,

NJ: Barnes and Noble (1980).

iii. Davis & Davis, supra., J.L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 37.

iv. D.Z. Phillips, “On Not Understanding God,” chap. in Wittgenstein and Religion, London:St. Martin's Press (1993), 154.

v. D.Z. Phillips, “Theism Without Theodicy,” chap. in Encountering Evil (2001), 1.

vi. Richard Swinburne, “The Problem of Evil,” in Reason and Religion, ed. Stuart c. Brown,

Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press (1977), 83.

vii. In an update of his theodicy, Swinburne adopts the moral/natural evil analysis. Richard

Swinburne, “Why God Allows Evil,” in Is There A God? New York: Oxford Univ. Press (1996),

97.

viii. Davis 9.

ix. Swinburne 81.

x. Ibid. 84, footnote 6.

xi. Ibid. 85.



























xii

. Ibid.

xiii. Ibid. 86.

xiv. Ibid. 88.

xv. Ibid. 89.

xvi. Ibid. 90.

xvii. Ibid.

xviii. Ibid. 102.

xix. Swinburne Why God 101.

xx. Ibid.

xxi. D.Z. Phillips, “The Problem of Evil,” in Stuart C. Brown, ed. Reason and Religion, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press (1977).

xxii. Ibid. 112.

xxiii. Ibid. 106.

xxiv. Ibid. 112.

xxv. Ibid. 119.

xxvi. Ibid. 121.

xxvii. Holland 230.

xxviii. Ibid. 231.

xxix. Ibid. 232.

xxx. Ibid. 234-35.

xxxi. Ibid.

xxxii. Phillips “On Not Understanding God” 153.

xxxiii. Ibid. 154.

xxxiv. Ibid. 162.

xxxv. Adams & Adams 2.



















































xxxvi. Matthew 7:6, NKJV.



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