privatisation of commons for the poor: emergence of new agrarian issues

Privatisation of Commons for the Poor: Emergence of New Agrarian IssuesAuthor(s): Milind S. BokilSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 33 (Aug. 17, 1996), pp. 2254-2261Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4404525 .Accessed: 03/04/2013 01:09

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Pivatisation of Commons for the Poor

Emergence of New Agrarian Issues Milind S Bokil

In the literature on common property resources (CPRs) privatisation is often decried on the ground that it deprives the rural poorfrom a critical source of livelihood and only benefits the rich and powerful sections of society. The problem, however, gets complicated when the poor themselves encroach upon the commons for their livelihood needs. Such a situation has arisen in the Marathwada region of Maharashtra where the dalits have encroached upon the village common lands to establish ownership. A number of important agrarian issues arises in this context.

AN important agrarian issue in countries like India, where rural poverty is directly related to agricultural backwardness, is how do the poor secure their livelihood? The corollaries are, how do they establish access to important agricultural resources like land, water and trees and what strategies are adopted by them to retain the control? What are the consequences of their actions in terms of agrarian social relationships? What effects do changing environment and state policies have upon them? And so on.

An important characteristic of poor people in backward countries is that they are resource-less or resource-poor. In hierarchically organised societies like India they also belong to the low ranking castes. There is therefore a continuous striving on their part to acquire those crucial resources which will help them to secure their livelihood. In the traditional rural societies the poor have been often found to depend upon what is called as common property resources (CPRs). However, the CPRs are rapidly declining in terms of both quantity and quality. A variety of factors like growth in population, over-exploitation, ecological degradation, state intervention and commercialisation have been found responsible for their depletion. In the literature on CPRs, privatisation is often decried on the ground that it deprives the rural poor from a critical source of livelihood and only benefits the rich and powerful sections of the society. A strong case is made against private industries to whom vast tracts of commons are granted for captive cultivation. The usual appeal is to halt the process of privatisation and retain the commons as commons.

The problem gets complicated when the poorthemselves encroach upon thecommons and attempt privatisation for theirlivelihood interests. Such a complex situation has presently arisen in the Marathwada region of Maharashtra. Here, dalits have encroached upon the village common lands to establish private ownership and from time to time their encroachments have been regularised by the state government. This process has

given rise to a number of important agrarian issues. The study is an attempt to analyse some of them.

COMMON GRAZING LANDS

Grazing lands called as 'gairans'- in the vernacular is a common feature of villages in Maharashtra. Gairan literally means 'cow- land' (gai = cow, ran = land). These are common lands signifying open access common property resource. The extent of gairans all over Marathwada is 2,40,800 ha belonging to 7,786 villages. Thus each village has on an average about 30- ha of gairan. There are, of course, significant variations following the habitat, topography, size and population of the village as well as a number of historical and socio-political factors. The control and management of the gairans is vested with the gram panchayats.

Within a village there are other types of common lands also. These are classified as barren and uncultivable land, culturable waste, land put to non-agricultural use, and so on. Excepting the categories where the ownership is otherwise defined all the common lands are owned by the government and administered by the revenue department. The local people usually have usufructuary rights over them. Besides, there are forest lands also. In Marathwada, their extent is very small and they are greatly degraded (Tables 1, 2). The proportion of common lands to the total geographical area ranges from 9 per cent to 25 per cent in the seven districts of Marathwada with about 145 ha of common lands per village. This, however, also includes the land put to non- agricultural use, i e, land under roads, buildings, playgrounds, funeral and burial grounds, etc. If these are excluded, then the proportion of commons would range from 5.9 per cent in Beed to 21.65 per cent in Osmanabad (about H15 ha per village). The proportion of gairans to total commons ranges from about 12 per cent in Latur to 36 per cent in Beed (about 30 ha per village).'

A large body of literature on utilisation of common lands in India has accumulated

in the last 10 years. This literature empha- sises that the common lands satisfy a great deal of bio-mass needs of the villagers and it has been strongly reiterated that they are useful to the rural poor who cannot afford to pay for their bio-mass needs.2

In earlier times the gairans of Marathwada were no exception to this. But at present they are so degraded that they hardly satisfy any livelihood needs. They are used only as grazing lands and that too during the rainy season. Secondly, unlike the state of Rajasthan their extent is quite limited (about 30 ha per village). This being a dry region they are also subjected to the vagaries of monsoon. Hence neither the quantity nor the quality of grass is significant enough. The principal means for grazing are still the private lands which become free after the first and the only crop is over. Then on, there are no restrictions on grazing and the cattle graze freely on the crop stubble. This is symptomatic of the semi-arid regions in general where a significant percentage of villages depend primarily on rain-fed agricultural crops and are less dependent on CPRs [Arnold and Stewart 1991:81. There is a generic term for this phenomenon in Marathwada as 'ran sutya zalya' meaning lands have become free.

Encroachments over public lands is not a novel phenomenon, either in the country or in Maharashtra. Public lands being nobody's property have been encroached whenever suitable opportunities existed. In Maharashtra, the encroachments have a particular history though the trends are similar to those found in the country. Here, encroachments were primarily made by the tribals residing in the mountainous and forest areas. In rural area this trend was followed by dalits and other landless sections.

Among the ex-untouchables, the mahars (and neo-Buddhists) are relatively advanced. In the traditional village society they were village servants (watandars or balutedars). They performed a number of duties and were compensated either in kind (baluta) or through a grant of land (watan). The practice of mahar watans was continued by the British

2254 Economic and Political Weekly August 17. 1996


along with theotherwatans granted to village accountants, clerks, revenue collectors, etc. A prominent feature of the watan lands was thatthey were inalienableand only hereditary transfercould take place. Afterindependence the watans were abolished by the, state government as the traditional services had become redundant. This was also a demand of the mahar leaders as the watans perpetuated social servitude and bondage. When the watans were abolished the previous holders were given an option to repurchase the land by paying the charge prescribed by the government (called as 'nazarana' - usually a multiple of the annual cess). Most of the superior watan lands were therefore, retained by their holders but the mahars could not take advantage of this fact because of illiteracy, ignorance and absence of proper records. Those who could do so received only a fraction of the total land as by then the watan land was fragmented due to successive partitions. As village servants the mahars were compensated in kind and hence had never taken to farming seriously. The fractional and uneconomic holdings further discouraged them from doing so. Their uncaring and parasitical lifestyle formed over centuries also came in their way. As a result the watan lands were soon. mortgaged to upper caste landlords and moneylenders. For all practical purposes the mahars lived as landless labourers. The other sections of dalits, particularly the Mangs, had traditionally not owned the land and had lived mostly as bonded labourers. This practice was widely prevalent in Marathwada because of the feudal setting. According to a survey of dalits undertaken in Maharashtra, the proportion of landless dalits in Marathwada ranged from 85 to 90 per cent [Gare and Limaye, 1973].

In other parts of Maharashtra the encroachers on common lands belonged to various communities including the dominant upper castes. But in Marathwada the proportion of dalits has been higher. The most prominent reason behind why dalits started encroaching is this factor of landlessness. The other landowning castes in Marathwada have not felt the need to resort to encroachments. The main agriculturist castes like maratha and lingayats have sizable landholdings whereas brahmins, marwadis and dhanagars have not been interested in farming. The latter have also not been as localised as the dalits. After marathas it has been only dalits who had traditional skills and experience in farming as they worked as agricultural labourers once the traditional duties were abolished.

The usual motive behind any encroachment on common land is to bring the land under cultivation and increase the food security of the household. In the present

case another motive has been operational as well: earning a better social status. It has been a common feature of backward societies that social status is equated to ownership of land. Throughout the past, the dalits literally lived at the mercy of the landowning upper castes. Even when they had watan lands it was more a form of obligation than a piece of property. To own land and to be on par with other agriculturist sections of the village has been a constant obsession with the dalits.

In order to achieve this a quiet social action was pursued since the 1950s. This action was a part of the wider dalit or backward class movement. The dalit movement in India has been considered as an important expression of protest and change. The major thrust for this movement came from Maharashtra since Babasaheb

Ambedkar was instrumental in organising and mobilising the depressed classes (in Maharashtra the movement is often termed as Ambedkar movement). It has been noticed by scholars studying this movement that 'dalit consciousness is a complex and com- pound consciousness which is a product of inhuman conditions of material existence, powerlessness and ideological hegemony' and the response pattern has been first to rise against the socio-cultural oppression (social reforms movement); secondly, to strive for political disenfranchisement and thirdly, to bargain for better economic conditions [Oommen 1990:255].

It has been also observed in the case of the backward class movements that these movements passed through two stages: in the first, the low castes concentrated on acquiring the symbols of high status whereas

TABLE 1: THE LAND USE PArrERN IN MARATHWADA Name of Total Proportion Common Net Area Net Area Inhabited the Geographical of Forest to Lands (ha) Under Under Villages District Area (ha) Total Area with Cultivation Irrigation (No)

(Per Cent) Proportion (ha) (ha) to Total

Area (ha) Aurangabad 1013000 7.84 205000 728000 77000 1250

(20.23) Jalna 773000 0.66 130000 638000 56000 900

(16.81) Parbhani 1097000 3.48 180000 879000 91000 1420

(16.40) Osmanabad 748000 0.54 187000 613000 74000 704

(25.0) Latur 667000 0.04 115800 551400 31000 885

(17.36) Beed 1043000 2.08 95000 926000 270000 1202

(9.1) Nanded 1033000 8.92 221000 720000 31000 1425

(21.39) Total 6374000 1133800 5055400 630000 7786 Source: GOM (1990).

TABLE 2: EXTENT OF COMMON LANDS IN MARATHWADA Name of Area Not Available Other Uncultivated Land Fallow Lands the for Cultivation Excluding Fallow Land District Land Put Barren Permanent Land Culturable Current Other

of Non- and Un- Pastures Under Mis- Waste Fallow Fallow Agri Use cultivable and Other cellaneous (ha) (ha) (ha)

(ha) Land (ha) Grazing Tree Crops, Lands etc, Not (ha) Included

in Area Sown (ha)

Aurangabad 57000 16000 42000 5000 20000 55000 10000 Jalna 28000 10000 -29000 6000 8000 22000 27000 Parbhani 39000 17000 35000 2000 53000 12000 22000 Osmanabad 25000 11000 23000 5000 34000 24000 65000 Latur 17100 11500 13800 1700 19800 20600 31300 Beed 33000 15000 34000 3000 4000 2000 4000 Nanded 41000 21000 64000 5000 25000 30000 35000 Total 240100 101500 240800 27700 163800 165600 194300 All

Maharashtra 1079000 1725000 1523000 180000 1024000 959000 1014000 Source: GOM (1990).

Economic and Political Weekly August 17, 1996 2255


in the second the emphasis shifted from the symbols to the real sources of high status, i e, possession of political power, education and a share in the new economic opportunities [Sriniwas 1991:319]. In this regard, among all the scheduled castes of India, the mahars of Maharashtra have been particularly dynamic and effective as they used political means most consistently and unitedly in their attempt to better their economic condition [Zelliot 1992:86]. Being traditionally involved in the village system the mahars were more attached to the land (despite urban shifts) and always came back to their villages. When some advances were made in removing the stigma of untouchability and when they emerged as a vote-bank in the political sphere, the next logical step was to establish control over productive resources. Encroachments on public lands was the direct outcome of this aspiration.

The most characteristic feature of the encroachments has been that mainly gairans were encroached. It can be seen from Table 4 that of the total 28,902 ha of public lands regularised in Marathwada, 28,874 ha were gairans (99.9 percent). The extent of revenue and other lands has also been significant in this region but mainly gairans have been targeted.This happened because gairans were being controlled by the village gram panchayat which has been a weak political body compared to the organised revenue or forest departments. Traditional village authority was strong but when it was replaced with elected representatives its characterwas altered. Though the encroachments by dalits were later resisted, in the initial years the gram panchayats did not take a strong view. TMey also did not have any judicial powers. In many cases the village level power equations were taken advantage of. For the encroachers, it was both a means of securing livelihood as well as an act of defiance.

PPIVATISAnON OF GMRANS

As mentioned earlier encroachments on public lands have been occurring steadily over the past 40 years. Though it is a punishable offence under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, the attitude of the revenue administration has never been uni- form. It has been tinted with anomaly, ambiguity, indifference, favouritism, ineffi- ciency, laxity as well as corruption. When the 'Grow More Food' campaign was popu- larised in the 1950s and early 1960s a lenient view of the encroachments was taken. Afterwards also encroachments were tolerated for a number of years and then suddenly noticed and evicted. On many occasions the local revenue officials took bribes and turned a blindeye towards the encroachments. Such

bribes had been a good source of extra income for the officials. Excepting the years 1974-76 when internal emergency was imposed in the country, the government never took clear position against the encroachments. The elected representatives generally adopted a populist stance and the encroachments were regularised from time to time.

After emergency, the then progressive leftist state government regularised the encroachments on a wide scale [Revenue and Forest Department GR/1078/3483-42 dated December27, 19781. Though this was termed as a progressive legislation, there were a number of flaws. It was subsequently amended on September 12, 1979 by another GR (No.FLD 1079/1366-F3) which regularised the encroachments from April 1, 1972 to March 31, 1978. The most salient feature of this GR was that it prescribed eligibility criteria for regularisation and thereby sought to regularise the encroachments only of the weaker sections. Its provisions read as follows.

All subsisting encroachments on government waste lands. gairan lands, revenue forest land and forest lands in charge of the Forest Departments made for cultivation which existed on 31st March 1978 should be regularised. Provided: (i) The encroacher is -

(a) a person belonging to backward class that is scheduled castes. scheduled tribes, nomadic tribes, vimuktajatis or neo-buddhist, or (b) a person whose total annual income including the income of members of his family does not exceed Rs 3,600.

(ii) The usual place of residence of the encroacher is within the radius of eight kilometres from the land encroached upon,

(iii) The encroacher is a landless person or the total land lawfully held by him in any capacity is less than two hectares of jirayat land. and

(iv) The encroachment to the extent of an area equal to 2 ha of jirayat land shall only be regularised. Where the encroacher is holding some jirayat land either as ownerorin any othercapacity the regularisation shall be limited to such areas as would bring his such landholding equal to 2 ha of jirayat land.

A number of action groups/non-governmental organisations/ voluntary agencies which were active in getting the encroachments regularised strove for its imple- mentation and though numerous difficulties and obstacles were encountered more than 5,000 cases were regularised in the subsequent years. While enacting this GR the government declared that henceforth no encroachment in whatsoever form would be

regularised and attempts to do so would be sternly dealt with.

However, the tempo of encroachments did not stop. In fact, in certain areas where common lands were still vacant, more encroachments were made. These were overtly supported by the organisations of dalits and other activist groups. The in- stability and weakness of the state government in the late 1980s was also taken advantage of. As a result, the government once again passed a resolution in 1991 regularising the encroachments of 84,230 persons on 1,08,915 hectares of government waste lands and gairan lands (No LEN 1090/ 172/1 dt November 28. 1991). In its content this GR was similar to the 1979 GR as it specified the eligibility criteria for regularisation. But a notable thing was that for the first time it provided the statistics collected in various district headquarters. The GR however did not regularise the encroachments over the forest lands as the state government did not have the authority to do so (following the Forest Act of 1980 these powers have been vested with the union government).

The most serious implication of privatisation of gairans has been in terms of the social conflict generated in Marathwada. This region, which was under the dominion of the nizam of Hyderabad till 1950, has been predominantly rural and agricultural and the society has been characterised by feudal and hierarchical caste relations. In the past, i e, before 1979 encroachments on gairans were treated with indifference but after the issue of renaming the Marathwada University the situation altered. For a number of years the dalits in Marathwada were demanding to rename the Marathwada University (campus at Aurangabad) after theirleaderBabasaheb Ambedkaras a tribute to his contribution to Marathwada and as a symbol of social equality. This was accepted by the then state government (led by the Progressive Democratic Front, a combine of leftist and secularist parties) in 1978 and a resolution to that effect was passed in the Legislative Assembly. However, this decision could not be implemented because the non-dalit organisations, rightist associations and even the neutral educational bodies protested strongly. It was argued by them that the term Marathwada was a matter of cultural identity and hence the name should not be changed. On the other hand the progressiveand leftistorganisations launched a movement for enactment of the government decision and hundreds of activists courted arrests on a number of occasions. Both the parties made this issue a matter of prestige. The resulting confrontation assumed abloody form in 1979-1980 and large scale violence against dalits erupted in Marathwvada. In

2256 Economic and Political Weekly August 17, 1996


many villages the dalits were beaten to death and their houses and property were burnt to ashes.

This intense and widespread expression of anger against dalits was an unprecedented event in the history of Marathwada. Caste hierarchy and thenotion of superior.ty among the upper castes and subsequent ill treatment to dalits were prevalent but the kind of caste conflict witnessed during the riots was unheard of. A number of reasons were responsible to this. There was a general feeling of resentment against the dalits because of the policy of reservations in government service and educational institutions. This was fuelled by the frustrations experienced by the unemployed youth of the middle and upper castes. It was conveniently believed that the root cause of unemployment was the preferential treatment granted to dalits. The abandonment of traditional lowly duties like scavenging, carrying dead animals, tanning hides, running errands, etc, had previously put the villagers to inconvenience. The political mobilisation of dalits and the assertion of equality by theirmilitant organisations were annoying to the feudal psyche of Marathwada villagers. As a result, there was a widespread feeling to 'teach a lesson' to dalits.

These events coincided with the regularisation of encroachments (the GR of 1979) and the phenomenon which was till then neglected or tolerated suddenly came to the fore. The encroachments over common lands provided a concrete opportunity to the village upper castes to give vent to their anger. Dalit families were physically beaten and evicted from the gairans, their crops were destroyed and stocks were razed to ground. In many villages where there was no other issue of discontent, regularisation of encroachments created the conflict. Though the administration took quick steps to ensure law and order and in some cases the rioters were punished, dalits suffered great losses and more misery was added to their life.

The situation cooled down afterwards but the renaming could not be performed till 1993. In the meanwhile another GR was passed (1991) and encroachments were further regularised. However, this decision did not cause the same degree of tension as the earlier one. By then the local villagers had accepted the fact that the government was in favour of the dalits and would take a pro-poor and populist stance in order to win over the backward classes. The uni versity was renamed on December 6. 1993. It was thought that this decision would cause fresh riots but the government maintained strict vigil and enforced law and order. Excepting a few sporadic instances, the situation remained under control.

Though the 1991 GR regularised a large number of encroachments, the problem was not solved in its entirety. In the first place the statistics collected by the revenue department was erroneous as it did not correctly enumerate all the encroachers. In many villages only a section of them was benefited, the encroachments of the others were not recognised. This fact created a greatdegreeof anomaly and disparity among the encroachers. Secondly, though land grant certificates were issued this step was not followed with measurement and demarca- tion of the plots. Thus, in almost all the villages the beneficiaries were uncertain about the exact location of their plot and cultivated the same piece which was in their custody. The lack of demarcationcreated the obvious problems of equity as some of the encroachers had retained bigger plots than two hectares. Thirdly, though encroachments were regularised the criminal and civil suits filed against the dalits at various levels were not automatically withdrawn. This factor caused considerable harassment to the beneficiaries even after 1992. Finally, though lands were granted to provide a source of livelihood, the decision was not followed by appropriate arrangements of -redit, agricultural inputs and land development. As a result the beneficiaries could not take advantage of any of the agricultural development programmes.

This whole phenomenon of encroachment and regularisation has brought to the fore a number of important agrarian issues. These could be broadly classified as follows.

(a) What is the outcome of this phenomenon in terms of agrarian relationships? In particular, what changes have been brought in the pattern of landownership as well as in the corresponding social relationships due to the creation of a class of small land owntrs from landless labourers.

(b) How has this activity helped the poor in securing livelihood?

(c) What has been the effect on the CPRs in land? What processes have been set in motion with regard to the sustenance and management of commons?

(d) Could this be a strategy for poverty alleviation'? Would it ensure equity, productivity and sustainability?

(e) What could be the alternatives? In order to seek answers to these questions

a study was conducted in Latur district of Marathwada in collaboration with a grass roots level organisation called 'Sarvangin Vikas Sanstha' (SVS - organisation for all- round development). SVS was founded by a dalit activist (Tatya Kamble) and since its inception in 1984 had consistently worked on the issue of equality and social justice for dalits. It was one of thlose organisations

which had taken up the present cause but unlike the others had sustained its interest in resolving the issue.

The inquiry was conducted in 30 villages - selected randomly - of Udgir and Ahmad- pur talukas. The tools of data collection included two proformas, one for the village and another for the individuals. Out of the total 366 beneficiaries from these villages, 260 beneficiaries (71 per cent) were contacted. Most of the qualitative information was, however, collected from informal discussions in each village with both beneficiaries as well as non-beneficiaries (Table 5).

As could be seen from Table 5, the number of beneficiaries varied from village to village. This number is not significant in comparison to the total size of the village but it assumes significance in terms of labourrelationships, Almost all the beneficiaries were previously employed on the farms of the upper caste landowners. The peasantry in Marathwada could be broadly categorised in four classes: landlords, large land owners, middle peasants and small peasants (poor peasants with ijneco- no nic holdings). The pattern of operational holdings in Latur district has been as in Table A.

This differentiation would roughly coin- cide with the categories mentioned above, Of these the first category could be kept aside as this is a class of the traditional landlords (deshmukhs) and who are present only in a few selected villages. They have preferred to operate. in the larger political arena. It is the second category which mattered the most. Before the encroachments almost all the dalits used to be employed by the large landowners on annual bonds. This kind of labour relationship was dramatically altered once dalits started establishing access to land and began retaining those plots despite adverse socio-juridical conditions. It was

TABLE A.

Size Class Percentage of (ha) Operational Holdings Above 20 l 5 to 20 30 2to 5 38 upto 2 31

TABLE B

Type of Yield in Market Value Crop Quintal Price Per of the

Quintal Produce (Rs) (Rs)

Cereals 5.5 500.00 2,750.00 Pulses 1.1 1400.00 1,540.00 Qilseeds 0.6 1100.00 660.00 Miscellaneous 0.5 950.00 475.00 Total 5,425 (X) Fodder 2,000.Q00



found during investigation that only a negligible proportion of the beneficiaries (4 per cent) were at present engaged by the annual contracts. The annual contracts were nothing but a kind of bonded labour and involved all those hardships, obligations and servitude that the labourers had to undergo during feudal times. As observed by Breman, this has been the strategy of the landowning castes to establish complete control over the socially and economically weaker groups of the village and to monopolise their labour permanently (as bonded labourers) or periodically (as tenants and sharecroppers) [Breman 1974:6]. This practice was substantially altered (though not completely abolished) as the encroachers accorded primacy to cultivating the encroached lands and preferred to work as wage labourers as and when required. It was found that one of the major reasons behind the resentment and anger against the dalits was this altered labour relationship. It was this class of large landowners in a village (which also controlled the socio-political positions of power) that was instrumental in harassing the dalits in the initial period. The small and middle peasantry as such did not oppose the encroachments, though they were often instigated by casteist appeals. What regularisation, or state intervention, did was to end the uncertainty under which dalits lived and put a final seal on the changed relationships.

As we have seen earlier the initial resistance and anger on the part of the villagers gradually subsided and dalits were allowed to cultivate the gairans. It was realised during investigation that another subtle social process was responsible for this change. One of the appeals of Ambedkar movement to dalits was to leave the village and migrate to cities in order to get out of the oppressive social relationships. This was followed by dalits which subsequently had created a scarcity of labour in the village market. The peasantry on the whole was upset with the fact that dalits were not available for agricultural operations. The latter's abandonment of menial and filthy tasks like removing the carcasses or tanning the hides was somehow reconciled with but the shortage of agricultural labour was quite distressing. It was very cleverly realised by the peasantry, especially by the middle and small peasants who formed the bulk, that dalits would stay in the village if they were allowed to cultivate small pieces of land. It was anybody's guess that the new lands acquired by them would not be self-sufficient and they would be forced to seek wage labour after the harvest. It was because of this reason that the villagers adopted a more lenient attitude afterwards. It was also a reasonable stand as the new reality considerably reduced the imbalance

between labour supply and demand in any given village. It was noticed during investigation that excepting a few cases (15 per cent), most of the villages had accepted the fact of privatisation and no serious social tension prevailed.

Another feature of the changing relationship was that the beneficiaries acquired a certain sense of pride in becoming farmers. This was not necessarily recognised by the upper caste villagers nor did it automatically result in elevating the former's social status. Nevertheless, the beneficiaries felt that they had climbed a step upwards and had come closer to the poor upper caste farmers. It was reported by the beneficiaries that a few of them had begun to earn the respect and admiration as hard working farmers. Tradi- tionally, they ( and the brahmins) were never considered good farmers and were often ridiculed as 'land parasites' by the peasants.

During investigation, an attempt was made to collect the details of cropping pattern and crop yield of each beneficiary. The inquiry yielded substantial information but with great variations. As a result it became difficult to draw any conclusions. Productivity varied from case to case because land holdings differed in terms of size, location and quality of the soil and crop yields were affected by a number of factors like the volume of labour and inputs applied, timeliness of rains, availability of implements and so on. Secondly not all the lands were cultivated every year. At the time of inquiry about 25 per cent of the beneficiaries had kept the lands fallow. The tendency on the part of beneficiaries to underestimate the produce and giveevasive answers also posed a serious obstacle to rigorous quantification.

Excepting a very negligible proportion, all of these were dry landholdings cultivated once a year. Only a small proportion of beneficiaries (I 1 percent) had their own pair of bullocks and the necessary agricultural implements. The others hired these services or borrowed the implements from their

neighbours. The typical crops included kharif hybrid jowar, bajra, oilseeds like sunflower and safflower, a variety of coarse millets, pulses, soyabean and in some cases rabbi jowar and chick-peas.

In order to arrive at some approximation we computed the average yield per unit of land. The figures in Table B were obtained.

Asmentionedearliertheproductionfigures varied greatly from family to family. The real question, however, was to what extent this produce satisfied the food requiremwent of the family. In order to find out the exact level of food security, an attempt was made to work out the cost of production. Though exact quantification could not be made due to a great degree of individual variations, it was found that the average value of labour for cultivating one ha of land was between Rs 1,750 and Rs 2,000. The cost

.of inputs was around Rs 1,500. Thus the net income earned ranged between Rs 1900 and Rs 2200. At the prevailing daily wage rate of Rs 25 this meant that the beneficiaries had real food security for 70 to 90 days. The fodder was primarily used for domestic cattle. Though bullocks were maintained by only II per cent of the beneficiaries about 40 per cent of them had a cow or a buffalo. The milk was an additional source of income.

Prior to establishing the access to land the beneficiaries worked as wage labourers throughout the year. They had a precarious existence as year round employment was not available. Many of them migrated to cities and irrigated areas in search of employment. Almost all the beneficiaries reported that previously they experienced a critical period of about two to three months in a year (i e. five to six days a month) during which they virtually starved. This criticality was over- come after they started cultivating the lands. The additional food security not only enabled them to sustain during the lean period but also helped to improve their bargaining strength.

TABLE 3: DETAILS OF ENCROACHMENTS MADE FROM APRIL 1, 1978 AND ExISTING ON APRIL 14, 1990 IN MAHARASHTRA

Name of the Persons of Others Total Encroached Encroached Total Administrative Backward Government Gairan Encroached Division Classes Waste Land Land Area

(No) (No) (No) (ha) (ha) (ha) Konkan 1225 2026 3251 1702.88 338.86 2041.74 W Maharashtra. Nasik division 3580 1652 5232 4021.30 4539.31 8560.61 Pune division 203 1039 1242 932.61 156.21 1088.82

Vidharbha Nagpur division 20172 20867 41039 24917.69 32076.85 56994.54 Amaravati division 8347 1181 9528 757.71 10570.05 11327.76

Marathwada 19852 4086 23938 27.54 28874.53 28902.07 Total 53379 30851 84230 32359.73 76555.81 108915.54 Source: GOM (1991).

2258 Economic and Political Weekly August 17, 1996


EFFFcr ON COMMON LANDS

Following the 1991 ordinance of the government, 28,875 ha of gairans were privatised in Marathwada. This was 12 per cent of the total gairans. In Latur district, 1,575 ha of common lands were privatised, all of which were gairans (I 1.4 per cent). Table 5 shows that of the total 2,366 ha of common lands in the study villages only about 400 ha ( 16.7 per cent) were privatised in 1991. In no village the commons were completely privatised.

As mentioned earlier a majority of the gairans were degraded lands. Only four villages (13 per cent) were such that some vegetation, mainly small bushes, was seen over the gairans. It was informed by the older folks that about 30 to 35 years before some vegetation existed but at no time in their lives they obtained fuel wood or timber from the gairans. The gairans were dry, barren patches of land where some grass grew during the rainy season. While measuring the benefits from the gairans an attempt was made to quantify the benefits from grazing but no meaningful figures could be obtained because (a) gairans were but a part of the total village commons, (b) the exact quantity of grass or other produce could not be ascertained as it was an open access resource subject to the vagaries of nature, (c) the villagers grazed their cattle over an extensive area including private lands which became open after the first and only harvest, and (d) no correlation could be established between the area of the gairans and the number of animals.

It was found during the study that the gairans in their present degraded form did not supply fuelwood. It was gathered from the roadside bushes (the omnipresent pro- sopis juliflora), irrigated fringes and field bunds. Otherproducts like fruit, small timber and minor forest produce were virtually absent. Sisal fibre which is required by the rope-makers was found mainly along the field bunds and it was thus obtained from the private farmers. In the regions of Konkan and Western ghats the common lands yield substantial produce.' However, that has not been the case with the common lands in Marathwada.

However, the real question that has emerged out of privatisation is what processes have been set into motion with regard to the commons. In 1979 it was given to understand that future encroachments would not be permitted. Despite this, they were regularised in 1991. The 1991 resolution has also categorically mentioned that future encroachments would not be entertained. But this has not been heeded. It was noticed during the study that in about 70 per cent villages fresh encroachments have been made after 1991.

The process that has partially countered this trend has been that of afforestation. The gram panchayats have been handing over the commons to the forest department to plant trees. The panchayats' motive in transferring the lands has been mainly to prevent future encroachments than to augment the local biomass. As a result, though afforestation has been attempted it has not involved community participation. Without exception this has remained the

programme of the forest department. The obvious effect has been that at only a few places good plantations have been raised. In most of the villages the landscape has remained as before. A notable fact has been that the dalit encroachers have not dared to encroach upon the lands in the custody of the forest department. The plantations have been unsuccessful mainly because the local villagers have not taken part in their conservation.

TABLE 4: ENCROACHMENTS FROM APRIL 1978 TO APRIL 1990 IN MARATHWADA

Name of the Persons of Others Total Encroached Encroached Total District Backward Government Gairan Encroached

Classes Waste Land Land Area (No) (No) (No) (ha) (ha) (ha)

Aurangabad 3321 1037 4358 26.37 4533.55 .-4559.92 Jalna 2107 226 2333 - 2658.50 2658.50 Parbhani 3489 438 3927 - 4601.56 4601.56 Usmanabad 95 18 113 1.17 111.14 112.31 Latur 1257 136 1393 - 1575.00 1575.00 Beed 1932 106 2038 - 2405.74 2405.74 Nanded 7651 2125 9776 - 12989.04 12989.04 Total 19852 4086 23938 27.54 28874.53 28902.07

Source: GOM (1991).

TABLE 5: DETAILS OF STUDY VILLAGES

Name of the Total SC Village Culturable Area No of No of Area Per Village Popula- Popula- Area Waste Privatised Benefi- Dalit Benefi-

tion tion (ha) (ha) in 1991 ciaries Benefi- ciary (1991) (1991) (ha) ciaries (ha)

Tal Ahmadpur Rui 1313 178(13.5) 936 106.00 7.44 8 0 0.93 Sindgi Kh 749' 187(24.9) 720 52.00 21.60 42 42 0.51 Ujana 2433 435(17.8) 2021 56.00 13.26 9 9 1.47 Kalegaon 1064 238(22.3) 869 155.00 45.00 30 30 1.50 Himpalner 1771 228(12.8) 1305 190.00 32.00 16 14 2.00 H Jawalaga 1418 194(13.7) 658 61.00 28.00 14 13 2.00 Zari Bk 2660 467(17.5) 1474 96.00 43.50 29 29 1.50 Wadval 6439 1506(23.4) 2650 78.00 58.00 29 29 2.00 Mahalungi 1821 526(28.9) 1958 188.00 3.00 3 3 1.00 Naigaon 1627 495(30.4) 2160 400.00 8.20 20 20 0.41 Varavanti 456 158(34.6) 586 50.00 17.00 17 17 1.00 Hangaraga 691 277(40.0) 286 34.00 3.50 10 0 0.35 Belgaon 926 286(30.9) 585 1 6.00 2.40 2 2 1.20 Sumthana 876 85(9.7) 443 49.00 2.00 2 2 1.00 Hali 2076 358(17.2) 1264 58.00 5.05 6 6 0.84

Tal Udgir Karwandi 770 191(24.8) 689 22.00 2.40 3 3 0.8 Tondar 4187 1173(28.0) 1479 78.00 13.52 9 9 1.5 Loni 2599 819(31.5) 91 30.00 14.00 10 10 1.4 Lohara 5070 1660(32.7) 2363 36.00 8.40 7 7 1.2 Banshalki 1611 468(29.0) 1302 38.00 13.50 15 15 0.9 Netragaon 984 332(33.7) 602 210.00 7.20 9 9 0.8 Dewarjan 3048 797(26.1) 2425 30.00 2.70 3 3 0.9 Honalee 1603 355(22.1) 629 6.00 2.80 2 2 1.4 Tondchir 1908 438(22.9) 1391 90.00 19.30 14 9 1.37 Moga 1683 244(14.5) 1255 82.00 7.20 12 3 0.6 Jaknal 454 97(21.4) 401 13.00 4.80 8 8 0.6 Lasna 2050 258(12.6) 1328 46.00 18.00 10 9 1.8 Gondgaon 1566 204(13.0) 714 13.00 12.00 10 10 1.2 Limbgaon 518 213(41.1) 486 75.00 14.40 12 12 12 Kawathala 1880 452(24.0) 831 8.00 7.50 5 5 1.5

Total 2366.00 395.37 366 330 34.88 Average 1.16

Source: Census 1991 and primary survey.



As we have seen earlier, privatisation of the common lands has certainly helped the beneficiaries to acquire a better food security. The important question is whether this could be treated as a potent means of poverty alleviation. After consolidating all the individual details it was found that though a relatively better food security was obtained it had not brought the beneficiaries above the poverty line.4 The poverty line in the present context (without getting into the complexities of its definition) is roughly the dividing line between employment and unemployment. If a person receives year round employment at the minimum wage rate, his/her family could be considered as above the line of absolute poverty during the year. This basic question has not been solved by the process of privatisation. As shown earlier, access to a piece of land has provided food security only for two to three months. For the remaining months the beneficiaries still had to search for wage employment. The poverty conditions have only been ameliorated and hence, in its present form, privatisation could not be considered as the most efficacious strategy for poverty eradication.

This has happened because the beneficiaries have to cultivate uneconomic holdings. The holdings have been uneconomic primarily because of (a) small size of the land, (b) dry land farming dependent upon the vagaries of monsoon, (c) lack of credit resulting into inadequate application of labour and inputs, (d) lack of basic agricultural assets like bullocks and implements, and (e) absence of improved methods of farming.

Any strategy itn the backward economies, aiming at improving the livelihood of the poor. needs to consider three important aspects. namely, equity, productivity and sustainability. What is expected is that the benefits or gains should be equitably distributed, the strategy should ensure optimum productivity so as to become a viable proposition and it should be sustainable so as to permit continuation and growth.

If the present measure is assessed on these criteria, it could be seen that in the present form it does not satisfy any of these requirements. The question of equity has not been taken care of by privatisation as not all the dalits in any given village have been endowed with land. The cultivation of dry landholdings have not been productive due to the reasons mentioned above. Sub- sequently, this could not be termed as a sustainable strategy as it would soon become a loosing proposition. The danger of the commons getting lost in this process would also be apparent. The search for alternatives thus becomes necessary.

The search for alternatives needs to be carried out within the limits of two factors.

Firstly, the private property rights con- ferred upon the individuals would be irrevocable and secondly, individual small dry landholditngs would be permanently unviable.

In such situations, the alternative adopted in the past has been that of joint or collective farming societies where the members pooled their lands together and practised collective cultivation. In India this measure was greatly propagated in the 1950s and early 1 960s and a large number of such societies were established with active state support. Many of them were exclusively for the weaker sections. However, the single most conclu- sion of their performance has been that they have failed miserably. Barring a few excep- tions the joint or collective farming societies have been unsuccessful because of the in- herent problems of pooling the land together, labour participation, income distribution and in many cases the basic unviability of the proposal apart from the problems of weak member loyalty, lack of interest, dissension and disorganisation [Deshpande 19771]. The failures of the societies of the weaker sections have been particularly striking because of lack of institutional support, opposition from vested interests and absence of community spirit. In Maharashtra alone there were 327 joint and 892 collective farming societies in 1979. The nuumber came down to 74 and 243,

respectively, in 1987 [Commissioner for Co-operation, GOM, 19871.

If the land cannot be pooled together, the next alternative is to share other critical resources like waterin a co-operative manner. The merit of a co-operative arrangement is that the members come together without sacrificing their individual or private interests. This institutional arrangement is more suitable in the present context. The scholars studying the institutional aspects of collective action have concluded that co- operative management of natural CPRs is the most appropriate of all forms of management in mostl situations [Singh and Ballabh 1992]. As for the cultural ethos Maharashtra offers the most conducive environment as there has been a long- standing and successfuil ce-operative movement in the state.

The productivity of gairans has been low mainly because these are unirrigated lands. A variety of experirnents in the semi- arid tropics have shown that annual precipitation as low as 500 mm could be effectively harnessed to satisfy local water requirements.5 The region under concern is more favourably placed as the average annual rainfall is around 800 mm. In comparison with the land sharing arrangements, those sharing water have been found to be more sustainable and efficacious. If proper

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impounding and harvesting structures are undertaken then at least protective irrigation could be provided which would incrcase the productivity two to three times.

The productivity of gairans could also be increased if, along with cereal crops, a mix of trees, grasses, legumes, herbs and bushes could be grown. This was the produce the gairans used to yield earlier and their phvsical characteristics are extremely suitable for a combination of trees and grasses. It was noticed that agro-climatically fruit trees and orchards could be more favourably grown which would also have commercial value. In tropical countries agro-forestry has been found to be more beneficial than mere farming. While growing trees the problem of gestation period could be solved by assured wage-labour under the employment guarantee scheme (EGS). Since its inception in 1977, a massive public works programme was undertaken ill Maharashtra which not only provided wage labour to millions of workers but also created capital assets like percolation tanks which helped in reducing the severity of drought conditions. The EGS in its current torm has only been a lean season guarantee. This cover could be extended throughout the year.

Once an institutional arrangement is established (preferably for sharing water) then othercrucial inputs like seeds, manures, fertilisers, insecticides, agricultural implements as well as agricultural expertise in production and marketing could be shared. This would not jeopardise the present private property foundation and would leave plenty of room for individual initiative and enter- prise in a collective setting.

In practical terms this would mean that the privatised plots of gairans should be treated as 'Agro-Forestry Plots' granted to the members of weaker sections. W ith proper protection, conservation and regeneration these plots would yield much more than what the gairans used to yield earlier or what they are yielding at present.6 During the course of investigation a rough estimate was prepared for five villages and it was found that through this technique gairans could generate surplus bio-mass produce that could be shared with other niembers of the community. Thus the aspect of equity could be also taken care of. It was in fact realised that it would be possible to involve ail the poor in such a sharing arrangement which would be productive as well as sustainable.

The premise of this strategy lies in the belief that poor people can come together and utilise their natural resources to their advantage. This of course would need considerable motivational and organisational inputs. In the present context these could be ideally provided by voluntary organisations (NIGOs). Maharashtra has been known for

a tradition of social reforms and voluntary social service. At present a number of voluntary organisations are operational at trie grass roots level. The present issue provides an ideal opportunity to all voluntary organisations. The issue is related to the core process of agricultural production and deals directly with the livelihood interests of the poor. If these organisations decide to provide motivational inputs in selected villages, then it is quite possible to establish institutional arrangements for sharing the benefits of the commons in an equitable and sustainable mannler. After the earthquake, considerable amount of funds have come to Marathwada, from bothi governmental and non-governmental agencies. This inflow of capital could be meaningfully used for undertaking the constructive measures mentioned above. It would thus serve both the pragmatic and long-term interests. The sense of deprivation experienced by dalits could also be mini- mised as they would be involved in the mainstream process of social and economic development.

Notes (This is a concise version of the paper presented at the International Congress on Agrarian Questions held at Wageningen Agricultural University (NL) in May 1995. 1 am thankful to H Bedi of Community Aid Abroad, Pune for financial support and to Tatya Kamble of Sarvangin Vikas Sanstha, Latur for field assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.] I This is symptomatic of the general trend found

in the arid and semi-arid regions where land allocation have reduced CPR lands to a small area (on an Average 20 ha per village) which is typically heavily degraded and under open access usage [Arnold and Stewart 1991:21].

2 The seminal contribution in this regard is by Jodha( 1986) but there are other studies as well.

3 lt is a countrywide fact that common property resources in dry regions are considerably smaller in area than those in wet mountainous regions (Arnold and Stewart 1991:8].

4 A person holding less than 2 ha of dry land equivalent is considered poor in the literature on CPRs [Jodha 1986:1171].

5 This has been the rallying point of the pani panchayat experiment in Pune district of Maharashtra. Its mnain argument is that water should be treated as common property and should be distributed in terms of per capita requirement and not in terms of rights in land. The technical and social viability of the pro- gramne has been well established [Bokil 1990].

6 The community fodder farms in Kheda district of Gujarat are a good example where the previous grazing lands (gouchars) are converted into a more etficient system of providing the biomass needs [Shah 19891.

References Arnold, J M and W C Stewart (1991): 'Common

Property Resource Management in India,' Tropical Forestry Paper 24. Oxford Forestry Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford.

Bokil, Milind (1990): 'Collective Management of Water Resources in Rural Development', unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Pune (India).

Breman, Jan ( 1974): Patronage and Exploitation: Changing Agrarian Relations in South Gujarat, India, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Commissioner for Co-operation (GOM) (1987): Co-operative Movement at a Glance in Maharashtra State-i 987, Office of the Commissioner forCo-operation and Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Pune.

Deshpande, S H (1977): Some Problems of Co- operative Farming, Himalaya Publishing House, Bombay.

Gare, Govind and Shirubhau Limaye (1973): Maharashtratil Dalit: Shoddh ani Bodh, Sahadhyan Prakashan (Marathi), Bombay.

GOM (1990): Socio-Economic Review and Statistical Abstracts. (Marathwada Districts 1989-90), Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Bombay.

-(1991 ): Government Resolution No LEN-1090/ 172/1 dt 28.11.91, Revenue and Forest Departnent, Mantralaya, Bombay.

Jodha, N S (1986): 'Common Property Resource and Rural Poor in Dry Regions of India', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol XXI. No 27, pp 1169-81.

Oommen, T K (1990): Protest and Change: Studies in Social Movements, Sage, New Delhi.

Shah, Tushaar (1989): 'Collective Action on Village Commons: Community Fodder Farm in Kheda District, Gujarat', Case Study No 5, Institute of Rural Management, Anand.

Singh, Katar and Vishwa Ballabb (1992): 'Co- operatives in Natural Resources Management: Experiences, Issues and Agenda for Future Research', paper preserted at the International Symposium on Co-operative Management, December 92, Institute of Rural Management. Anand (Gujarmt).

Sriniwas, M N (1991): 'Mobility in the Caste System' in Dipankar Gupta (ed), Social Stratification, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Zelliot, Eleanor (1992): From Untouchables to Dalits: Essays on Ambedkar Movement, Manohar, New Delhi.

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Article Contentsp. 2254p. 2255p. 2256p. 2257p. 2258p. 2259p. 2260p. 2261

Issue Table of ContentsEconomic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 33 (Aug. 17, 1996), pp. 2197-2264Front Matter [pp. 2197-2253]Letters to EditorS. C. Dube [p. 2198]Withdraw Ban Order [p. 2198]

Small Change for Banks [pp. 2199-2200]Confusing Decision [p. 2200]Remote Control [pp. 2200-2201]Shadow Is Substance [pp. 2201-2202]Uttarakhand Card [p. 2202]Current Statistics [pp. 2203-2204]CompaniesPlanned Diversification [p. 2205]Higher Turnover [p. 2205]Business Restructuring [pp. 2205-2206]

CommentaryIndian Power Policy, Enron and the BoP [pp. 2207-2214]Bonded Agricultural Labour in India of 1996: Case of Hallia Block in UP [pp. 2215-2217]State Level Scheduled Caste Corporations in India: Promise and Performance [pp. 2217-2219]Water Crisis in Port Blair [p. 2222]Gendering Justice [pp. 2223-2225]Growing Regional Income Disparities in Russia [pp. 2226-2227]

PerspectivesGay and Lesbian Movement in India [pp. 2228-2233]

ReviewsReview: American Colonialism and Puerto Rican 'Criminality' [pp. 2236-2238]Review: Government and Industry [p. 2238]

Special ArticlesConvergence in Regional Growth Rates: Indian Research Agenda [pp. 2239-2242]Diversification of Economic Activities and Non-Agricultural Employment in Rural Gujarat [pp. 2243-2245+2247-2251]Privatisation of Commons for the Poor: Emergence of New Agrarian Issues [pp. 2254-2261]

DiscussionMisinterpreting Unfree Labour in Contemporary Haryana [pp. 2262-2264]

Back Matter

privatisation of commons for the poor: emergence of new agrarian issues

Documents