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Managing Crisis

European and American Perspectives

Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major, Henning Riecke, Editors


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Preventing Conflict,

Managing Crisis

European and American Perspectives

Edited by

Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major, Henning Riecke


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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................... v

IntroductionChanging Scenarios in Transatlantic Conflict Prevention and

Crisis Management

Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major, Henning Riecke .....................................................1

Section I EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management

Chapter 1

Failed States and the International Community 10 Years After 9/11:A Shifting Paradigm? ................................................................................. 9

John Herbst

Chapter 2

Waiting for Soft Power:

Why the EU Struggles with Civilian Crisis Management ............................. 15Claudia Major and Martina Bail

Chapter 3

EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approachesand Future Trajectories ............................................................................ 37

Eva Gross

Section II Case Studies

Chapter 4

Did the Afghanistan War Change Germany? ............................................ 49

Niels Annen

Chapter 5

Protecting Civilians: The Politics of Intervention and Non-Interventionin Africa .................................................................................................. 55

Alex Vines


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Chapter 6

Western Crisis Response and the Question of Palestine ............................ 61

Alfred Pijpers

Chapter 7

Sudan: The Prospect of Intervention and its Implications .......................... 67

Jon Temin

Chapter 8

From Protecting to Rebuilding: The EUs Role in Libya .............................. 73

Patryk Pawlak

Chapter 9

From Afghanistan to the Arab Spring: A Critical Moment forTransatlantic Crisis Response ................................................................ 83

Glenn Nye

Section III The Crisis Management Toolbox

Chapter 10

The Crisis Management ToolboxFrom Civilian Crisis Prevention toPeacebuilding: Principles, Actors, Instruments ....................................... 91

Claudia Major, Tobias Pietz, Elisabeth Schndorf, Wanda Hummel

List of Abbreviations ................................................................................... 138

About the Authors .......................................................................................... 141

About the Partners........................................................................................ 145


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Introduction:

Changing Scenarios in Transatlantic Conflict Prevention andCrisis Management

Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major, Henning Riecke

e past two decades have witnessed signifi-cant transatlantic engagement with crisis man-agement. e wars in the Balkans challengedthe transatlantic community not only to inter-

vene militarily but also to engage in post-con-flict reconstruction and long-term institutionbuilding efforts. e Rwandan genocide dem-onstrated the moral costs of non-intervention,

just as the massacre in Srebrencia and otherwar time atrocities during the Balkan warsshifted the focus to the plight of individualsand civilians rather than the security of states.Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq high-lighted how state failure could affect regionalas well as global security, but also the limita-

tions of military instruments in post-conflictintervention. ese experiences collectivelyspurred the conceptual debate on the link be-tween state failure and insecurity and discus-sion about the appropriate mix of civilian andmilitary means in crisis management.

Both sides of the Atlantic also drew insti-tutional and operational lessons from theseexperiences. e EU created the CommonSecurity and Defense Policy (CSDP) and

amassed operational experience particularlyin the civilian aspects of crisis management.Since the launch of the first CSDP operationin 2003, the EU has conducted 28 civilianand military operations around the globe, andhas attained significant experience in civiliancontributions to crisis management rangingfrom police, justice and border reform to theintegrated rule of law. e U.S. for its partcame increasingly to recognize the value ofcivilian aspects of post-conflict reconstruction

in pursuit of a comprehensive or integratedapproach to crisis management. Consequently,the U.S. has developed capabilities withinState Department structures for planning and

coordinating conflict response to strengthenthe diplomatic and development componentsof its international capabilities. Both partnersalso increasingly work together, either throughU.S. participation in CSDP missions or theEU working alongside or in partnership withU.S. or NATO operations in the Balkans and

Afghanistan.

e ongoing Arab transition and transatlan-tic responses, particularly with regard to theintervention in Libya and its aftermath, havebrought full circle many of the conceptualdebates and operational challenges outlinedin the first paragraph. ey also reinforce theneed for the EU and the U.S. to tailor anddesign individual and collective responses; andto improve the framework for cooperation.

At the same time, the global and transatlanticcontexts have changed significantly since theearly 1990s and the post-9/11 environment.is also applies to geopolitical conditions in

the crisis regions. Both have important impli-cations for future transatlantic crisis responsebut also long-term engagement.

First, economic constraints resulting fromthe financial crisis and subsequent austerityprograms, limit the scope of possible crisisresponse missions in a long term perspective.Second, alternative models of transition as-sistance demonstrate that the transatlanticcommunity as a whole is no longer the only


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actor in crisis management. Along with thesechanging circumstancesor perhaps because

of themthere is a noticeable lack of appetiteon the part of the transatlantic community toengage as a full-bore crisis manager, partly dueto lack of political will to utilize the significantcapabilities that have been created over thepast two decades; and partly due to financialconsiderations.

e experience in Afghanistan, which hasprovided a broad canvas for lessons learnedin post-conflict engagement, also represents

a cautionary tale for future engagement. isapplies in particular to the sliding scale of in-ternational engagementbut without beingable to declare victoryand the implicationsfor future transatlantic engagement, a themethat is taken up by a number of authors in thisvolume. Beginning with a legitimate missionof self defense, and initially limited to an oper-ation to restore state power, coalition partnersprogressively expanded the scope of ISAF andNATO involvement throughout Afghanistan.

NATO has been faced with the insurmount-able task of stabilizing a country in turmoil,

with only few of the original goals achieved,with the threat of a re-emerging Taliban par-ticularly after the end of the ongoing transi-tion period, and with a Western public deeplycritical of the operation.

e collective experience of crisis managementover the past two decades has shown that crisisresponse through military instruments is less

conducive to creating stability than reliance oncivilian means and a focus on conflict preven-tion. A number of push and pull factors act onthe continuing efforts to create, maintain andapply conflict prevention and crisis manage-ment instruments. Normative shifts towardsthe Responsibility to ProtectR2Pand afocus on individual security, alongside theclearly perceived threat of state failure, ter-rorism and organized crime for regional andglobal stability, constitute a strong push factor

in favor of increasing efforts. e increasing

consensus in favor of a comprehensive ap-proach reflects the operational lessons of

post-conflict reconstruction. Lacking politi-cal will and leadership, along with financialconstraints on the other hand, represent thepull factorsboth at the level of nation-statesas well as international organizationsthatthreaten to undo the progress made over thepast decade. e chapters in this volume col-lectively address these questions.

Normative Shifts: Towards R2Pand Individual Security

e post-Cold War period, but particularlythe post-9/11 era, has witnessed an evolu-tion towards different modes and norms ofintervention. Rather than inter-state conflict,conflict drivers are weak and failing states andtransnational threats, including terrorism, butalso organized crime and more generally thepotentially destabilizing effects of migration.

John Herbst makes this point very clearlywhen he states that failing states and ungov-erned spaces are to remain part of the globalsecurity agenda. For Herbst, rather than mov-ing beyond the post-9/11 era the transatlanticcommunity will continue to face reconstruc-tion challenges, which run up against currenttendencies in the U.S. to cut budgets andfocus on different policy issues. e need forcontinued investment in civilian response ca-pabilities, as well as for partners who can share

the burden of civilian reconstruction, remainsas important as ever.

Along with this changing focus on state weak-ness and failure and the need to broaden suit-able instruments for intervention away frommilitary to civilian instruments, there hasemerged a doctrinal shift towards the protec-tion of civilians. e emerging norm of theResponsibility to Protect links closely to thethreat of state failure. It also provides the

ideational underpinning of the interventions


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Introduction

of the past decade. According to R2P propo-nents, states claiming sovereignty must accept

a responsibility to protect their citizens againstgross violations of human rights, genocide, orethnic cleansing. In cases where states do nothave the ability or the will to live up to thisresponsibility or, as in recent cases of Libya orIvory Coast, actively shun it, the internationalcommunity must act. According to the R2Pconcept, which was signed by the UN General

Assembly as a political, not legal obligation,the UN has the obligation to get involved.R2P thus departs from traditional humani-

tarian intervention in broadening the focus ofresponsibility from internal state actors but toexternal interveners as well. It can thus createthus legitimacy for international actional-though the operationalization of R2P rests ondecisions by UN member states that, accord-ing to their interests, take up the task to com-mand R2P missions.

Some argue that R2P has already seen its ze-nith: disputes over the implementation of UN

Security Council Resolution 1973 in Libya,which represents the clearest example of theimplementation of the R2P norm, have alien-ated the already critical UN Security Councilmembers Russia and China from accepting thenew paradigm. Emerging powersincludingbut not limited to UN Security Council mem-bers Russia and Chinacontinue to place ahigher value on sovereignty and have not beenpersuaded of the universal applicability ofR2P. is suggests that a future consensus to

exercise R2P, at least through military means,will be difficult to forge.

Resolutions along similar lines thus do notseem to be likely in the foreseeable future. Itmust be kept in mind, though, that the rangeof instruments for appropriate responses in-cludes civilian and preventative responsesand that military intervention represents aninstrument of last resort.

R2P broadens the focus not only on individu-als but also on the broad range of crisis man-

agement and conflict prevention measures.Still, protecting civilians in practice entailspolitical choices, and the decision to intervenehas to date been taken selectively. Westernstates could thus rebuild the frail consensusbehind R2P by both improving their crisisprevention capabilities and by seeking tostrengthen regional actors to work for the pro-tection of civilians in crisis regions.

Alex Vines argues that the massacres in

Rwanda and the atrocities in Somalia havechanged the African Unions attitude to inter-ventionit might be better for the course ofthe crisis if missions could be commanded by

African actors, particularly since Western mili-tary intervention does not have the intendedeffect on a crisis anyway. Jon Temin, writingabout Sudan, echoes this argument when hestates that the announcement of Western in-tervention will affect the conflict and mighteven expand the activities of parties hoping for

support.

Beyond highlighting the role of regional orga-nizations and the impact of looming decisionsto intervene on conflict dynamics, however,R2P also relies for its implementation on theinterest of states to intervene. Here, Teminalso points to the lack of interest of Westernstates to become engaged in Sudan.

e future application of R2P thus hinges ona pull factor outlined earlier: the reluctance ofindividual states to move from a non-interven-tionist stance towards one that would natu-rally consider intervention, including throughmilitary means. Domestic inhibitions and stra-tegic cultures act as filters for these emergingdoctrines, and do not necessarily lead to a shiftin fundamental positions.


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Changing Strategic Cultures?

Normative and doctrinal shifts towards morecomprehensive and integrated crisis responseon behalf of individual as well as state securityclearly have occurred over the past decade.e selectivity of response but also the toolschosen for such response, however, suggestthat national cultures do not necessarily reflectthese doctrinal shiftsrather, they can slowdown or otherwise affect the operationaliza-tion of crisis management operations.

e case of Germany illustrates this quite well:although Berlin has moved from its pacifist,non-interventionist stance during the Cold

War and engages militarily in Afghanistanand elsewhere, the abstention to the UNSCvote on the intervention in Libya has raisedquestions over the limits of Germanys inter-national actornessand, more fundamentally,Germanys strategic culture. Niels Annensanalysis of the way the Afghanistan engage-

ment has changed German thinking aboutthe use of force is instructive. Given Germanskepticism towards military means, in shor-ing up support for engagement in AfghanistanBerlin looked for moral justifications for itsmilitary engagement. In this particular do-mestic context, these justifications end upnegatively affecting collective implementa-tion through the resulting narrow operationalguidelines.

Adopting a transatlantic viewpoint, GlennNye argues that budget constraints hamperthe ability of Western governments to cre-ate support for crisis interventions. e gapbetween the transatlantic partners regardingmilitary capabilities, and the diverting strate-gies for post-conflict reconstructions add tothe problem. e Arab Spring has highlightedthe state of crisis response also in a transat-lantic context, including unequal willingnessand capability to respond. Decisions leading

up to the intervention in Libya and the actual

campaign itself signals a shift in the U.S. re-lationship with its partners. e U.S. made

it clear that it will reduce its commitment tointernational crisis management, redefine itsstrategic priorities, and expect the Europeansto assume greater international responsibilitiesparticularly in the Europes own backyard.

NATO has displayed a new way of doing busi-ness in Libyanamely, that the U.S. plays asupporting role while two European coun-tries take the lead. Despite the unfortunatecharacterization of the U.S. leading from

behind, Operation Unified Protector doesnot necessarily mark a point of departure forthe transatlantic alliance or security coopera-tion. Rather, U.S. capabilities will continue tobe crucial to sustain crisis interventions; andEuropean partners cannot be counted uponto agree to an intervention or to participate

when it comes to intervening. In a climate ofimpending and most likely severe budget cuts,this rather suggests less, not more interven-tionand the need to rethink transatlantic

approaches towards crisis management interms of selectivity and in terms of forgingpolitical and operational partnerships beyondthe transatlantic space. is applies equallyto the civilian aspects of crisis management.

Although the past decade has seen significantengagement with the civilian aspects of post-conflict reconstruction, increasing demandsfor contributions have increasingly conflicted

with limited resources and capabilities.

Expanding Conflict Preventionand Crisis ManagementCooperation

Changing strategic cultures in response tochanging international norms and doctrinesfor intervention have led to the creation ofcrisis management capabilities on both sidesof the Atlantic, and both partners increasingly

cooperate internationally.


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Introduction

On the EU side, although the first decade ofCSDP operations has seen significant growth

in this particular policy area, recent years haveseen a contraction in the size but also thenumbers of missions. As Claudia Major andMartina Bail argue, European civilian capabili-ties have not only reached a plateau but thepolitical will to launch, staff and fund opera-tions has decreaseddespite ongoing needfor small- and large-scale interventions, anddespite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty, whichentered into force in 2009, was supposedto strengthen the European Unions capac-

ity to act in the realm of foreign and securitypolicy. e crucial problem of civilian CSDPis the limited political will and interests ofthe member statesit blocks both efficientdecision-making and the appropriate provisionof resources.

Underlying strategic motivations in Brus-sels and Washington may be similarbutthe domestic and institutional contexts aresignificantly different, and this affects coop-

eration in practice. As Eva Gross argues, U.S.capabilities remain smaller than that of theEU, and bureaucratic innovations that focuson coordinating crisis response, planning andlessons learned have not been immediatelybeen accepted and absorbed in the larger dip-lomatic and development practice. And, whilethe U.S. government has embraced the needfor civilian contributions in post-conflict re-construction, the chapters by John Herbst andEva Gross both warn that the sustainability of

these structures is far from secure.

On the broader political level, transatlantic co-operation has intensified and this can reinforceongoing joint operational experience. DirectEU-U.S. cooperation may be limited to civil-ian aspects and be small in scope. However,

the contribution by Patryk Pawlak highlightsthe needas well as the opportunitiesfor

the EU and the U.S. to engage in a coordi-nated manner with individual countries in theMiddle East and North Africa. Alfred Pijpersmakes a similar case for transatlantic coopera-tion in the Middle East, highlighting a setof priorities for EU-U.S. approaches to thePalestinian-Israeli conflict.

Lessons Learned for Transatlantic

Cooperation in CrisisManagement

For transatlantic relations, the individualchapters in this book highlight a number oflessons. First, normative shifts towards R2P,

while taking place, remain contestedand thetransatlantic partnership no longer holds themonopoly on intervention or the capacity tobring about consent. Regional actors (in theongoing Arab transition this includes Turkey

but also the Gulf countries) participate butalso help shape, and can constrain, transatlan-tic political innovations.

Transatlantic capabilitieswhether in thecontext of NATO or EU-US relations - re-main limited, and are unlikely to grow in thenear future due to economic considerations.is places a premium on cooperation, andfine-tuning joint interventions as well astheir broader political context. It also places

emphasis on prevention rather than activemanagement of conflict. is in turn placesa premium on joint political in addition tooperational engagement so as to influencethe context of a specific conflict, or to engageregional and global partners in the search forsolutions both in the prevention and the man-agement of conflict.


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Section I

EU-U.S. Cooperation in

Crisis Management

Chapter 1

Failed States and the International Community 10 Years After 9/11:A Shifting Paradigm? ............................................................................. 9

John Herbst

Chapter 2

Waiting for Soft Power:Why the EU Struggles with Civilian Crisis Management ....................... 15

Claudia Major and Martina Bail

Chapter 3

EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: TransatlanticApproaches and Future Trajectories .................................................... 37

Eva Gross


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Chapter 1

Failed States and the International CommunityTen Years After 9/11: A Shifting Paradigm?

John Herbst1

When the Berlin Wall fell, thinkers in theglobal1community began to talk about theneed for a new, post Cold War conceptualframework. Who was going to be the next

George Kennan and identify 1) the definingproblem of the international system and 2)the right strategy to meet it?

Frank Fukuyama created a stir in the late1980s with the optimistic notion that historyhad ended with the victory of liberal democ-racy. is did not mean that there would nolonger be war or other international problems.It did mean that the great contest betweenCommunism and liberal democracy was over,

one champion was left standing and the worldwould be ordered in a liberal democratic way.Time has demonstrated the limitations of thisinsight.

Samuel Huntington created a large splash inthe mid-1990s with the view that we were ina clash of civilizations. His analysis was imme-diately both misunderstoodas a clarion callto the West to stand up against other civiliza-tionsand controversial.

The 9/11 Consensus?

September 11 appeared as a clarifying event.History was not over. Maybe Huntington was

1 is opinions expressed herein are solely those of thespeaker and do not necessarily reflect those of the NationalDefense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government.

right, some said, though many disagreed. iswas not a clash of civilizations. It was a war ofterroristslater, violent extremistsagainstcivilization. Or it was a war within the Mus-

lim world to determine its future direction.

Whatever the interpretations of Huntingtonsthesis, there was no disagreement that we hadentered a new world disorder. e Cold Warmay have put us on the edge of Armageddon,but the post-Cold War world was exception-ally messy, and dangerous in new ways.

In this new world disorder, failed and failingstates and ungoverned spaces represented a

new challenge. anks to the interconnected-ness of global societyin economics, trans-portation and communicationand the de-structive power of modern technology, it wassuddenly possible for sub state actorsterror-ist groups or criminal syndicatesto wreakenormous damage on countries at a distance.

Since sub-state actors can nest in ungovernedspaces, countries in turmoil can become ma-

jor threats to distant lands. ings seemed

very clear in the fall of 2001, as the UnitedStates built an international coalition to drivethe Taliban from power and Al-Qaeda from

Afghanistan. ings were less clear two yearslater as the U.S. built another, more contro-versial coalition to topple Saddam Hussein,but found itself facing a real insurgency by thefall of 2003.


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Are We Leaving the Post 9/11

Period?

Seven years latertodayinternational forcesare still on the ground in both countries. eU.S. has lost nearly 6000 troops and spenthundreds of billions of dollars in these coun-tries. e U.S. troop presence is drawing downsteadily in Iraq and, with the failure to sign aStatus of Forces Agreement, the withdrawalshould be completed soon.

Against this backdrop, it is not uncommonto hear in Washington that such massive na-tion building operations are not part of ourpolicy future. According to some skeptics,such operations are inherently impractical,and expensive. e popular blogger AndrewSullivan hosted several posts along these lines.Columnist George Will, once an enthusiasticbacker of the Iraq adventure, also turned souron nation building.

Moreover, we are also starting to hear thatthe U.S. is moving out of the September 11

world. To support this point, commentatorPeter Beinart in a 2010 blog notes that in thatyears mid-term elections, Iraq/Afghanistanplayed no role; the only foreign policy issueraised by Congressional candidates was Chinabecause American voters are worried aboutthe impact here of Chinese economic policies.Beinart also pointed to President Obamas No-vember Asia trip (India, Indonesia, Japan and

South Korea) as evidence that we are turningour attention properly to the Pacific.

Implications for Policy towardFailed and Failing States

Why, you might ask, are we taking this quicktwenty-year review of thinking on the in-ternational system? Because such thinking,

especially in influential circles in Washington,

will influence what we can and will do in un-governed spaces. is is especially true in tight

budget times and following a mid-term elec-tion in which the American people apparentlyvoted to put government on a diet.

To be honest, this is a problem that I havebeen expecting for a long time. I spent mylast four years at the State Department (2006-2010) trying to build the Civilian ResponseCorps (or CRC).

My near enemy in that mission was the bu-reaucrats at State and other agencies, andtheir Hill allies, who thought that there wasno need for a new structure to work in thisfield. ese were people who believed thatour civilian operations in Iraq and Afghani-stan were adequate or that some other part ofthe government, their part, should have thisresponsibility.

But the far enemy was always that distantspecter, that following frustrating operationsin Iraq and Afghanistan, the American politi-cal system would decide that it never, ever

wanted to do that again. And it would zeroout funding for any capacity associated withthat effort. ere is historical precedent forthis. After Vietnam, Congress removed vitalcapacity from USAIDand the CIA and thePentagonthat would have been extremelyvaluable to our operations in Iraq and Afghan-istan. e CRC was and is an effort to restorelost capacity.

anks goodness, we have not reached thatcritical stage. And while Washington may bedevoting more time to East Asia, it is prema-ture, with the Iranian nuclear issue continuingto loom, to conclude that we are turning ourattention from the Middle East. And if the ad-vocates of military action have their way, theremay be an urgent need for the expeditionarycivilian capacity represented by the CivilianResponse Corps. Yet even with that caveat,


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Failed States and the International Community Ten Years After 9/11: A Shifting Paradigm? 11

the rumblings against nation buildingaregrowing.

e sudden, belated attention Washington isfinally giving to our runaway deficit spend-ing compounds the problem. Our long-termfinancial health and, therefore, our nationalsecurity require that we find a way to reducethe deficit sharply. at will require majorspending cuts and it would not be surprisingfor near-sighted Congressional budget hawksto see our modest, new civilian capacity forstability operations as an unnecessary expense.

A Prudent Response

In this environment, how do we protect whatwe have built and build further? First, we needsome clarity on the breadth of the danger. eU.S. Government impetus to build civilian

capacity for ungoverned spaces was certainlya response to our unsatisfactory civilian op-erations in Iraq in 2003. But the problemthat such civilian capacity addresses is muchbroader.

ere are 40-plus states with major gover-nance problems around the globe. While atsome point our political system may decidethat we no longer want to invest in Iraq or

Afghanistan or Iraq-and Afghanistan-like situ-

ations, those 40-plus countries are not goingaway; and some of them will pose threats to usbest dealt with by the civilian capacity of theCRC. While the factors I cited at the begin-ning make distant ungoverned spaces poten-tially dangerous for us, close by chaos is alwaysa threat.

We saw again in the winter of 2009 that wedo not yet have the civilian experts and systemto manage the crises that erupt periodically

in Haiti. We have seen over the past severalyears the growing danger to the U.S. coming

from the under-governed city streets of north-ern Mexico. However tired we are of nationbuilding, we will need civilian capacity toaddress the danger of chaos-induced refugeeflows from Haiti or drug flows and drug-fu-eled violence from Mexico.

Moreover, despite our budget woes and frus-trations with Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011

witnessed once again the American inter-ventionist impulse. is time in Libya. Yes,

the Obama Administration placed limits onour involvement and chose to work throughNATO. But there is no question that through

whatever mechanism we engaged, the U.S.Government has some responsibility for ensur-ing that post-Qaddafi Libya does not fall intochaos. To have a chance of doing this right, weneed our new civilian capacity.

Second, we need to explain the different usesof this capacity. Yes, it was created for large

stability operations, but it can and far moreoften will be used in small and conflict pre-vention operations. is capacity really doesrepresent smart power, that ounce of preven-tion that can save the lives of American sol-diers by stabilizing a situation before there is aneed for troops.

We have a good example of this in SouthernSudan, which held a referendum in January of2011 in which it voted for independence fromSudan. In July it declared its independence.is turn of events was not a surprise.

e U.S. and the global community have alarge stake in what happens in South Sudan.Roughly speaking, there are three possibleoutcomes: a relatively smooth transition toindependence, a civil war or the emergence ofa failed, independent state, ie, a new ungov-erned space.


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Either of those last two outcomes would leadto a humanitarian catastrophe and refugee

flows that would further destabilize East Af-rica, including Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya.e chaos could provide cover for extremistgroups to move into new areas in East Africa.

To avert this, the U.S. Government beganworking with the UN, the AU, the EU andother international partners months beforethe January 2011 referendum. Initially underthe direction of Special Envoy for Sudan ScottGration (who is currently the U.S. Ambassa-

dor to Kenya), the Office of the Coordinatorfor Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)has put the CRC into the field to develop thecapacity of our small Consulate in Juba, tohelp identify/address problems that increasethe chance of north-south friction and to en-hance state capacity in the South. e CRCestablished a presence in the 10 South Sudanstate capitals and other key locations in thecountry.

is is just the sort of expeditionary diplo-macy that the Obama Administration hasbeen trumpeting since coming into office. eUN has also made an extraordinary effort toplace its personnel in all state and provincialcapitals. While South Sudans transition to in-dependence has faced some difficulties, it hasthus far averted the two dire outcomes of civil

war or the emergence of another failed state.e preventive work of the U.N., the U.S. andotherplacing trained civilians throughout

South Sudanhas played an important rolein preventing the transition to independencefrom spiraling out of control.

is Sudan operation is the first soup-to-nutsCRC mission that will demonstrate the utilityof this new capacity. us far, the results havebeen very good.

The Need for Focus and

Humility

e third thing that American practitionersof civilian response must do to protect theirbaby in the months ahead is to be focused andrealistic. Focus means that we must limit ourattention to problems that have a clear impacton the national interest. We must be able toexplain in a simple way why the missions weundertake are important for American in-terests. Why we should spend our time and

money there despite astronomical budget defi-cits and high unemployment at home?

Realism or humility means that we must un-derstand our own limits as we consider anoperation. Can we truly stabilize a totteringfriendly government? Will our interventionboth relieve/avert a catastrophe and allow usto get out before our public grows weary withthe operation?

...And Friends

We also need friends and partners. e expertsin this room are very familiar with TransAt-lantic relations, including the old bugbear ofburden sharing. is concept grew out of thedefense burdens of maintaining the Alliance,but the concept has broader application. As weanticipate the American political class taking

a more jaundiced view of stability operations,it is important for its advocates to be able topoint out that the U.S. has many partners inthis field. at we are not doing this alone.

Fortunately, this is not a problem. ere area dozen countries active in this field, andthe number is growing. We have close ties

with all of them, and with the UN, the EU,the AU, and others. In fact, peacebuilding is


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one area where our partners are outspendinguswhether we are talking about Australia,

Canada, Germany the Netherlands or the EU.is forum is a good example of the coopera-tion between the EU and the U.S. in this field,though I believe we canand mustenhancethat cooperation in practical ways.

QDDR

ere is one more thing that we need to make

sure that the CRC is a permanent part of theU.S. national security structure. e Adminis-tration must embrace it, deploy it and resourceit. It appears to be the intention of Secretaryof State Clinton, having worked through herfirst Quadrennial Diplomacy and Develop-ment Review (QDDR), to do just that.

ere is some irony in the Administrationshandling of this issue. It arrived in office withthe correct notion that the field of conflict

prevention and response was critical and newresources were needed to do it. It placed thisissue as one of the centerpieces of the QDDR;but it also decided to take a blue sky look atthe problem that paid, initially little attentionto the work that S/CRS had done. e result

was 1) months-long paralysis on this issuewithin the QDDR as different parts of thebureaucracy tried to claim the responsibilitiesthat belonged to S/CRS and 2) a reluctanceto use S/CRS and the CRC as crises emerged

and CRC capacity became available. is wasevident as S/CRS was largely shut out of theplanning for post-earthquake reconstructionin Haiti.

e cloud placed over S/CRS and the CRC bythese short-sighted decisions had unintendedand unwelcome consequences. e Senate

appropriations subcommittee marked downS/CRS 2011 budget request from $160 mil-

lion to $50 million, pointedly noting thatthere was no reason to fund a capacity thatthe Department was not using in a crisis likeHaiti.

Fortunately, the QDDR team came to itssenses and the final report recommended theempowerment within State of the CRC andan S/CRS successor organization. Unfortu-nately, the QDDR has yet to implement thesedecisions. As this article is editedearly No-

vember, 2011State Department officials aresaying that the QDDR will implement thesedecisions by the end of the year. Lets hopethat happens.

Secretary Clinton has let it be known that shewill be a one-term Secretary of State. atmeans that even if President Obama wins asecond term, there will be a new Secretary ofState in 2013. ere is no reason to supposethat the new Secretary will have an interest in

Secretary Clintons QDDR. If the QDDR isto have any meaning it must be implemented

while Secretary Clinton still has the author-ityto ensure that its changes are institution-alized. If the decisions related to the CRC andS/CRS are not implemented for another six oreight months, they are not going to be firmlyin place by the time a new Secretary takes of-fice, which means that this capacity will be ina state of flux through the new Presidentialelection.

If the QDDR is implemented in a timelyfashion, if high level support for the CRCis evident and if the force is used in currentoperations, its future prospects become muchbrighter. Even if we turn away from large op-erations in the near future, there should alwaysbe room for an efficient mechanism that pro-motes order, relieves misery and reduces theburden on our troops.


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Chapter 2

Waiting for Soft Power: Why the EU Struggles withCivilian Crisis Management

Claudia Major and Martina Bail

The journey from war to sustainable peace is not possible in the absence of

stronger civilian capacity () Without this capacity, there may be breaks in the

fighting, but resilient institutions will not take root and the risk of renewed violence

will remain.

-- Jean-Marie Guhenno, former UNUnder-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations.

States and international organizations increas-ingly insist upon the crucial importance of civil-ian instruments for sustainable crisis solution.e lessons from recent operational experiences

with fragile or failed states, whether in Afghani-stan, Somalia or the Balkans, have brought

home to the international community thatno conflict can be resolved by military meansalone. For a sustainable and comprehensivecrisis solution, civilian instruments that addressthe political, social and economic dimensionsof a conflict are crucial. e European Union(EU) prides itself on having developed a usefultool for exactly these tasks with the inception,in 1999, of the civilian component of the Com-mon Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).1CSDP was meant to enable the EU to achieve

the aims that were codified later on in the Eu-ropean Security Strategy (ESS), namely ward-ing off security threats to the EU, stabilizing

1 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009,the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) wasrenamed Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).For better readability, the authors exclusively use the term

CSDP.

the neighborhood, and strengthening effectivemultilateralism.2

However, the 17 civilian missions deployedsince 2003 have only partly allowed the Unionto reach these goals. While some of these mis-

sions have yielded success, most have been toosmall in size, ill-prepared, and under-resourcedto bring about enduring change und sustain-ably stabilize crisis regions. e key players ofthe CSDP, the member states, manifestly failto take the necessary political decisions for ef-fective missions and to materialize them. Asign of the decreasing capacity to act might bethe fact that no single new civilian mission hasbeen deployed since 2008, although several op-portunities came up. At the same time, member

states hold on to their 2008 Level of Ambition,whereby the EU wants to be able to conduct 12civilian missions in parallel plus various civil-military operations.3e apparent slow-down

2 European Union,A Secure Europe in a Better World e European Security Strategy(Brussels: EU, December12, 2003).

3 Council of the European Union, Declaration onStrengthening Capabilities(Brussels: EU, December 11,

2008).


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16 P C, M C: E A P

of the civilian CSDP is even more surprisinggiven that since the first civilian mission in

2003 the EU had been starting one or evenseveral new missions each year. In addition,the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in2009 was supposed to strengthen the capacityof the Union to act in the realm of foreign andsecurity policy.

e limited capacity to act under the civilianCSDP clashes not only with the Unions ownlevel of ambition. It is also challenged by thegrowing demand for civilian crisis manage-

ment capacities worldwide. EU instrumentscould indeed offer useful support, for exampleto the developments in North Africa or Sudan.However, the Union can only pretend to be astrategic actor in international security policy

when it is able to improve its capacity to act.

is chapter seeks to identify and analyze thefactors that determine the Unions capacity toact with regard to civilian CSDP. It aims to ex-plain the mechanisms, structures and processes

at both the national and European levels tograsp the dynamics that explain why the EUssoft power hasnt yet lived up to the expecta-tions the EU outlined for itself in the ESS andthe 2008 Level of Ambitions.

Civilian Crisis Management inthe EUs Common Security andDefense Policy

In June 1999, in the wake of the KosovoWar, EU member states launched the CSDPwith the goal to enable the Union to conductautonomous crisis management. Still act-ing under the shadow of the Balkan Wars,states initially concentrated their efforts onthe development of military capabilities forEU missions. But already in December 1999they agreed on complementing the military

conception with civilian instruments.4ecivilian CSDP deploys missions composed of

civilian experts to crisis regions to carry out awide range of tasks, from police training andsecurity sector reform (SSR) to rule of lawmissions. Such missions can be deployed inboth situations related to conflict preventionand resolution, but first and foremost in post-conflict consolidation, when weak state struc-tures need to be strengthened or rebuilt afterarmed conflicts.

Changing Parameters for Civilian

CSDP

Various European and international develop-ments demand reflection on how the EU andits member states use civilian CSDP:

Increasing Demand: Cooperation and Com-petition. Both the demand for civilian expertsand their presence in international operations

have been increasing in recent years.5Statesand international organizations increasinglyview civilian instruments as a key element forsustainable conflict regulation and expandtheir capacities. e Pentagon established itsCivilian Expeditionary Workforce in 2009.France started to establish inter-ministerialstructures to improve the recruitment of

4 For comprehensive chronological and historical sur-veys on civilian CSDP, see Reinhardt Rummel, DeutscherEinfluss auf den Ausbau ziviler Krisenintervention derEU(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July2006 (SWP-Diskussionspapier 03/2006); AgnieszkaNowak, Civilian Crisis Management within ESDP,in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), Civilian Crisis Management:e EU Way, Chaillot Paper 90 (Paris: EU Institute forSecurity Studies, June 2006), pp. 15-37.

5 Jens Behrendt, Zivilpersonal in Friedenseinstzen:von der Improvisation zur Systematik?, Zentrum frInternationale Friedenseinstze, Berlin, January 2011

(Policy Briefing).


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Waiting for Soft Power: Why the EU Struggles with Civilian Crisis Management 17

civilian experts in 2010.6NATO announcedthe set up of a modest civilian planning and

conduct capability in its 2010 Strategic Con-cept. If the EU wants to play a role in civiliancrisis management, it must decide what line totake with the other organizations with whichit is both cooperating and competing for spe-cialized personnel.

Repercussions of the Financial Crisis Re-quire Common Action. As a result of theausterity programs that were implementedby virtually all EU governments as a response

to the financial crisis, contributions to crisismanagement are decreasing, at least temporar-ily. e member states must reflect on howto keep EU structures efficient in times ofrestricted budgets. Reportedly, demand for ci-vilian missions is stable and may be increasing.Crisis management tasks cannot be fulfilled byone state alone: it is only through the poolingof contributions from different states that anydeployment (in regards to both equipmentand personnel) is possible. e EU plays an

important role here, as it bundles the variouscontributions of the member states into oneEU package.

Civilian Crisis ManagementWhich RoleShould It Play for the EU? Despite the factthat CSDP has been in existence for ten years,EU member states still struggle to agree onmilitary action: the divergent strategic culturesare still strong. e Libyan crisis in the springof 2011 affirmed this. A pragmatic perspec-

tive, taking into account what EU states andEU partners can really rely on, begs two ques-tions: if not in the military realm, is the Unionat least capable of acting in the civilian sector?;and will the Union out of feasibility rather

6 Claudia Major and Elisabeth Schndorf,Comprehensive Approaches to Crisis Management ComplexCrises Require Effective Coordination and PoliticalLeadership(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,

September 2011 (SWP Comments 2011/C 23).

than out of conviction in future concentrateon this civilian dimension, because it is more

consensual and thus more likely to lead to ac-tion, i.e. EU missions?

Mixed Results: CSDP Between Aspirationsand Reality. Since 2003 EU member stateshave launched 17 civilian missions, ten of

which are ongoing.7eir principal tasks werethreefold: develop police forces, build rule oflaw structures, and perform monitoring mis-sions, (at border control stations, for instance).e EU initially undertook many missions

at a rapid pace, most of which being civilianrather than military. However, the contribu-tion of civilian missions to sustainable stabili-zation, peace, and security of the crisis regionsis controversial.8

Increasing Expectations for the EU as a Se-curity Actor. At the same time, internationalexpectations are increasing for the EU to as-sume greater international responsibilities.First of all, the United States is reducing its

commitment to international security. Duringthe 2011 mission in Libya, the U.S. govern-ment exercised restraint, stemming both frompolitical intent and financial considerations.Statements made by President Obama andoutgoing defense secretary Gates in the springof 2011 confirmed this approach. Second,some EU member states are less and less

7 See www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=en, accessed August 29, 2011.

8 Giovanni Grevi/Damien Helly/Daniel Keohane(eds.), European Security and Defense Policy. e First TenYears(Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009);Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds.), The EU asa Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? ASystematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December2009 (SWP-Studie 32/2009), pp. 164-177; ChristopherS. Chivvis, EU Civilian Crisis Management: e RecordSo Far (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010);Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, Can Europe RebuildFailing States?(London: European Council on Foreign

Relations, October 2009).


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18 P C, M C: E A P

capabledue to financial and political is-suesof shaping security policy unilaterally.

e EU offers the necessary structures to bun-dle capacities and act jointly. Finally, some askthe question whether the loss of U.S. militaryforce can be compensatedeven partiallybyEuropean soft power.

New Framework through Lisbon. e Lis-bon Treaty altered the framework of the civil-ian CSDP as of 2009. Especially the EuropeanExternal Action Service (EEAS) was supposedto make the EU foreign and security policy

both more coherent and efficient, and thusimprove the EUs capacity to act. As post-Lisbon structures did not become operationaluntil 2010-11, EU member states have scopefor action in three dimensions: first, they canshape and interpret the structures and tasksof the embryonic institutions and processesby every day routines; second, they may makerecommendations for the scheduled evalua-tion in 2013-14; and third, they can take ad-vantage of the general dynamics of change for

new initiatives.

Defining Actorness in CivilianCSDP

If European countries define civilian crisismanagement as a major political objective,they should develop ideas on how to efficientlyuse civilian CSDP and to optimize its results.

Strategic actorness is a highly fashionableterm, and its sloppy and inflationary use easilyobscures its meaning. e debates in the Eu-ropean and strategic studies community haveyielded numerous attempts to define the termfrom which three central criteria emerge.9ey guide the present analysis:

9 Concerning the academic debate on European ornational strategic actorness, see Charlotte Bretherton

and John Vogler, e European Union as a Global

1. Existence of a shared strategic culture:the convergence between conceptions and

preferences, i.e., to what extent do actorspresent a common vision of the aims andmeans of civilian crisis management andconsider the EU to be an appropriateforum for common action? e strategicculture of a country is a distinctive bodyof beliefs, attitudes and practices regardingthe means (civilian vs. military), partners,frameworks of action, etc. of a countryin foreign, security and defense policies,

which has developed gradually over time

through a unique protracted historicalprocess.10A strategic culture is persistentover time, tending to outlast the era of itsinception () It is shaped and influencedby formative periods and can alter ()at critical junctures in a collectivesexperience.11Large differences betweenthe strategic cultures of EU member statescomplicate the emergence of a Europeanstrategic culture.12

2. Political and administrative decision-making ability: the ability to assign political

Actor (London: Routledge, 1999); Fritz Scharpf,Interaktionsformen. Akteurszentrierter Institutionalismusin der Politikforschung (Opladen: Leske + Buderich,2000); Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, estrategic culture of the European Union: a progress re-port, International Affairs,No. 4 (2005), pp. 801-820;Claudia Major, Its a long way to...regional strategicactorness. Assessing the EUs ongoing (r)evolution in

strategic and regional affairs, in Kathrin Brockmannand Bastian Hauck (eds.), Security in a Globalized World:Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships(Berlin, German Council on Foreign Relations, 2007),pp.19-32.

10 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force:the Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 17.

11 Ibid., p. 17.

12 On the debate on strategic culture and the pos-sibility of a European strategic culture, see ChristophO. Meyer, e Quest for a European Strategic Culture:


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and strategic priorities, overcome conflicts,develop a conceptual framework, gather

requisite information and analyze it jointly,formulate and make decisions.

3. Provision of resources: to develop capacitiesin conformity with decisions taken andsupply financial and material resources.

is chapter seeks to identify the factors thataffect the capacity to act, that is, the actornessof civilian CSDP. e analysis focuses on thedecision-making level in Brussels and in Euro-pean capitals.

Civilian Crisis Management in

European Security Policy

Even though the term civilian crisis manage-ment has been included in official EU docu-ments and discourse since 1999, for a long

time EU member states could not agree ona definition. Civilian crisis management wasoften simply described as non-military crisismanagement as opposed to military (crisismanagement) in EU documents. In the mean-time, a genuine understanding has establisheditself.

Civilian CSDP is a dimension of EU securitypolicy which primarily targets acute crisis situ-ations. e goal is to make civilian personnel

contribute to stabilization, conflict prevention

Changing Norms on Security and Defence in theEuropean Union(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,2006); Frdric Mrand, Social Representations in theEuropean Security and Defence Policy,Cooperationand Conflict,41 (2) 2006, pp. 131-152; Longhurst, op.cit.; Bastian Giegerich, European Security and StrategicCulture. National Responses to the EUs Security andDefence Policy(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006); Emil

J. Kirchner/James Sperling (eds.), National SecurityCultures: Patterns of Global Governance (London:

Routledge 2010).

and resolution in crisis areas. Civilian crisismanagement can be used when states are not

able or willing to fulfill their functions, suchas the protection of their territory, population,state institutions and services. In many casesthe states in question are weak or failed andcannot settle an acute crisis, prevent the escala-tion of a situation, elaborate and comply withpeace agreements, or reconstruct statehood

without external help. Whereas military opera-tions can freeze a conflict by use or threat ofmilitary force, civilian crisis management aimsat sustainable conflict transformation that sta-

bilizes the region in a long- term perspectiveand prevents it from suffering a relapse intoconflict. Tasks such as security sector reformand the strengthening of civilian administra-tion and of the rule of law fall within thisambit. Stabilization accomplished by suchcommitments also contributes to keep securityrisks to the Union at bay.

Hence, civilian CSDP complements estab-lished financial, diplomatic and economic

means of both CFSP and the European Com-mission, such as sanctions or trade agree-ments. It flanks the Commissions long-termdevelopment and cooperation policy, whichis predominantly meant to support long-termstructural change.

e coming into effect of the Lisbon Treatyin 2009 transferred the structures of civilianCSDP into the EEAS.13ey directly reportto High Representative (HR) Catherine Ash-

ton, who coordinates EU foreign and security

13 On the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, see ClaudiaMajor,Auen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik derEU nach Lissabon(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik, January 2010 (SWP-Aktuell 7/2010); Nicolaivon Ondarza, Koordinatoren an der Spitze. PolitischeFhrung in den reformierten Strukturen der EuropischenUnion (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April2011 (SWP-Studie 8/2011); SWP-Dossier Die EU nachLissabonwww.swp-berlin.org/de/swp-themendossiers/die-

eu-nach-lissabon.html, accessed August 29, 2011.


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policy. Nevertheless, civilian CSDP remainsintergovernmental in nature. Here, member

states did not transfer decisive power to theEU as they did in other areas such as develop-ment policy within the Commission frame-

work: relevant decisions, for instance whetheror not a mission is deployed, are made by EUmember states.

National, European andInternational Obstacles to an

Efficient Civilian CSDP

e commitment of member states, the ef-ficiency and coherence of the interplay of theBrussels institutions, as well as EU interaction

with international partners all enable or limitthe actorness of civilian CSDP.

EU Member States: Big Influence, Big

Differences

Decisions in CSDP are taken unanimouslyand thus require agreement among EU mem-ber states. Such agreements indeed occur quitefrequently, but are due less to a convergenceof the strategic cultures of member statesthan rather to the limited interest in civilianCSDP. e successful deployment of a missionparticularly depends on the commitment ofpersonnel and thus (once more) on the back-

ing of states. However, in most states there islittle support because of a lack of interest, butalso because states have not created the neces-sary administrative settings. Member states aretherefore part of the weak actorness problem,but also prerequisites for its solution, as theycan initiate improvements at a national level.

Intergovernmentalism and Strategic

Culture

e intergovernmental CSDP decision-mak-ing process illustrates that EU states are not

willing to abandon their sovereignty in therealm of security and defense: EU institutionsmight prepare decisions, but states enact them.

Also, the commitments states undertake at EUlevel, for instance for the capability develop-ment in the framework of the Headline Goals,are merely political self-commitments. Non-compliance can only be sanctioned throughrhetorical and moral pressure.

e institutional and political influence ofmember states manifests itself in various ways.ey decide whether a mission is launched,define its mandate, decide whether they takepart in it or not and whether they allocatepersonnel to it. e Foreign Affairs Council,

where EU foreign ministers meet under HRchairmanship, is the highest decision-makinglevel and decides on the planning and de-ployment of missions by a unanimous legalresolution.14

As decisions about deployments have to betaken unanimously, a common understandingof the issue at hand is vital for CSDP actor-ness. A minimum level of coherence in howmember states perceive civilian crisis manage-ment is hence needed to make CSDP work.

e conceptions and the priority states at-tribute to civilian means are defined by theirstrategic cultures. If they contrast so stronglythat they cannot be brought down to a com-mon denominator, states cannot take a de-cision at EU level. As a matter of fact, big

14 Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, theseresolutions were called Joint Actions. rough resolu-tions, the EU gets operational: they contain objectives,scope, funding, conditions and, where applicable, the

timeframe of the mission.


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differences exist with regard to security policyand civilian means. But this is rarely prob-

lematic, as civilian missions seldom cause thecontroversies military operations have the po-tential to. Many states do not explicitly rejectcivilian CSDP, but just attribute little priorityto it. Disagreement usually leads to the adjust-ment of mission mandates, with the result thatmissions are guided less by the specific needsof the crisis region than by member states po-litical and material willingness to contribute.

Yet, states usually do not oppose missions, butrather express their limited interest with re-

stricted contributions of personnel. As a con-sequence, missions frequently are too small,ill-prepared, and badly equipped. Moreover,they then enjoy little political support andtherefore have only limited impact on conflictresolution on the ground. One example isthe not very successful security sector reformmission in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, 2008-2010).

Another example, EULEX Kosovo, illustrates

on the one hand that EU member states arecapable of initiating missions despite differ-ences of opinion. Although five EU memberstates (Spain, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia,Greece) did not recognize the independenceof Kosovo, they accepted in 2008 the deploy-ment of a EU rule of law mission to supportstate building. is succeeded because EUmember states defined the mission as a techni-cal solution and tried to circumvent the politi-cal question about the status of Kosovo. As all

EU member states agreed on the necessity ofstabilizing Kosovo, that an independent andefficient judicial system was indispensable tothat aim, and that the future of Kosovo andthe Western Balkans could only be found inEurope, the EU was able to get involved inthis area. Ultimately, no state voted against themission and, with the exception of Cyprus,all states contributed personnel. On the otherhand, however, the ambivalent basis of themission undermines its daily work, because in

reality it is hard to promote rule of law with-out state building.15

e various and often conflicting goals andpriorities of states not only impact on theEUs political decision-making ability, theyalso shape the administrative decision-makingability of member states, which is essential forpreparing and supporting civilian crisis man-agement. ese structures underline the cred-ibility of an engagement. ree broad groupsof countries can be distinguished: states thatsignificantly campaign for civilian crisis man-

agement and have created support structuresand concepts on the national level, like theNordic states, Germany, and the United King-dom; those countries that recently steppedup efforts, like France, or are in the process ofdoing so, such as Slovakia; and finally thosestates that barely support civilian crisis man-agement, like Greece or Estonia.

A few states systematically supported the ci-vilian dimension from the start, for instance

by submitting conceptual guidelines for thebuilding of EU institutions and by setting upexemplary structures that embed and supportcivilian crisis management at the national lev-el.16e German government realized suchmeasures in the aftermath of the passage ofthe Civilian Crisis Prevention action plan

15 Solveig Richter, Promoting Rule of Law withoutState-building: Can EULEX Square the Circle in

Kosovo? in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds.),e EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Securityand Defence?, op. cit., pp. 32-49; David Cadier, EUMission in Kosovo (EULEX): Constructing Ambiguity orConstructive Disunity?, Transatlantic Security Paper, 3(2011), Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique, Paris;Emily Haber, Primat der Stabilitt. Der Pragmatismusaller Beteiligten ebnete den Weg fr den Aufbau rechts-staatlicher Strukturen im Kosovo, Internationale Politik,64 (2009) 7-8, pp. 83-89.

16 Rummel, op. cit.; Folke Bernadotte Academy,Swedens Contribution to Civilian ESDP Operations Structures, Routines and Experiences, Seminario LItalienelle Missioni civili dellUE. Criticit e prospettive,

Rome, November 4-5, 2009 (Background Paper).


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in 2004: the Interministerial Steering Groupon Civilian Crisis Prevention in the German

Foreign Office coordinates the governmentsactions in this field. e Advisory Boardfor Civilian Crisis Prevention (establishedin 2005) seeks to assure the involvement ofnon-state actors and advises the Interministe-rial Steering Group. e German BundestagsSubcommittee on Civilian Crisis Preventionand the Comprehensive Approach (estab-lished in 2010) provides an opportunity forparliamentary initiatives. e Center of In-ternational Peace Operations (ZIF) organizes

the recruitment and training of personnel.Also conceptually, Germany has become en-gaged on the EU level and in its 2007 TrafficLights Paper submitted precise suggestionshow to increase the effectiveness of civilian cri-sis management.17

e UK established in 2004 an innovativecoordinating body, the interministerial Sta-bilization Unit. Its main task is to recruit,train and deploy civilian personnel. e Nor-

dic states are equipped with similar structuresand have equally positioned themselves withconceptual initiatives, like Sweden did when itsubmitted its Guiding Lines in 2009.18

By contrast, France exhibited a more reluc-tant commitment in the early days of civilianCSDP. As its strategic culture is more military-oriented, it had no clear vision how and to

what end civilian CSDP was to be employed.is had repercussions for the provision of

resources, as France indeed provides manypolice personnel, but is underrepresented inother areas. But at the same time, France is thebiggest provider for military CSDP missions.19

17 Non-paper, Further Improving the Effectivness ofCivilian Crisis Management, Brussels 2007.

18 Non-Paper, Civilian Capability Planning andDevelopment Guiding Lines for the Second Semester of2009, Brussels, July 2009.

19 Grevi/Helly/Keohane, op.cit., pp. 414-415.

Meanwhile, France has started emphasizingthe relevance of the civilian dimension in stra-

tegic documents (2008 French white book),has set up a civil-military coordination unitin its Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and is cur-rently developing a training system for civilianexperts and an adjacent personnel pool.20

In other countries such as Greece, no compa-rable approaches can be discerned at present.

Provision of Resources

Resources for a mission include the generalmission budget, equipment and personnel.e CFSP budget covers the mission budget,

which finances a part of the equipment andinfrastructure. Personnel are provided for al-most exclusively by member states. To a lesserextent, the states also supply equipment, suchas vehicles.

Qualified personnel are the key resource incivilian CSDP. When a mission is to be de-ployed, it is a question of timely provision ofappropriately trained civilian experts, suchas police forces or legal experts, in adequatenumbers. Civilian operations differ frommilitary operations in that their deployabilityrelies on different aspects: personnel/soldiers,their equipment and a specific organizationalstructure.

e EU almost exclusively draws on secondedexperts and hires only few experts on a directcontractual basis (contracting). Secondmentmeans that member states recruit nationalexperts, make them available for deploymentand pay them. In 2009 for example, of a totalof 2334 civilian experts, 1976 were secondedand only 358 contracted.21

20 Major and Schndorf, op cit.

21 Grevi/Helly/Keohane, op. cit., p. 415.


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EU member states possess great resourcesof civilian expertise, a fact illustrated by aninventory of existing civilian experts in bothmember states and the Commission that theCouncil published in December 1999, shortlyafter the inception of CSDP.22However, thislist provided little information about the avail-ability of personnel and did not build uponstandardized criteria for recruitment and

training.

In order to guarantee flexibility, professional-ism and specialization of the civilian person-nel as well as the rapid deployment of specificgroups of experts, EU member states decidedto concentrate their efforts first and foremost

22 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency,Helsinki, November 24, 1999 (doc. 12323/99 for mem-

ber states, doc. 11044/99 for the EU).

on six priority areas.23erefore, states agreedupon two Civilian Headline Goals (CHG) in2000 and 2004 to fix how many experts theEU would like to have at its disposal in theconcerned areas (see Table 1).24

According to national pledges, states havealready fulfilled these numeric CHG tar-gets.25In case of deployment, however, states

routinely experience difficulties in satisfyingthe demand for personnel, ensuring the re-

23 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency,Santa Maria de Feira, June 19-20, 2000; Council of theEuropean Union, Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Brussels,December 7, 2004 (doc. 15863/04).

24 Ibid.; table updated and adapted from Rummel,op. cit., p. 8-9.

25 General Affairs Council, Final Report on the CivilianHeadline Goal 2008, Brussels, EU, November 19, 2007

(doc. 14807/07).

Table 1. The Six Priority Areas for EU Civilian Capabilities24

Areas of Expertise Numbers and Tasks (as agreed on in CHG 2010)

Police 5761 policemen substitution tasks (substitution of local police forces) and rein-

forcement tasks (support to local forces)

Rule of Law 631 expertsjudges, prosecutors, penitentiary personnel, administrative clerks

Civil Administration

565 experts, available on short notice general administrative tasks (i.e. civil registration, local

administration) social tasks (i.e. education, public health) infrastructure (i.e. water and energy supply)

Civil Protection 579 experts and 4445 aid workers assistance in civil protection, pandemic preparedness, migratory

flows

Monitoring 505 experts for monitoring, situation analysis and evaluation

Support to EU SpecialRepresentatives (EU SR)

444 experts to support EUSRs in areas such as human rights,politics, gender, Security Sector Reform (SSR)


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quired speed, and supplying personnel thatcan cope with complex mission tasks. Almost

all missions have experienced difficulties inobtaining the required manpower. is prob-lem is especially felt when several large mis-sions need to be staffed simultaneously, as

was the case in 2008, when EUMM Georgia,EUPOL Afghanistan, and EULEX Kosovo

were all seeking staff. EUPOL Afghanistanand EULEX Kosovo, the biggest missions innumbers so far, did not reach their plannedstrength, even if pledged numbers of theCHG suggest they would have been able to.

When EULEX Kosovo advertised positionsin 2010/11, it only received applications for60% of advertised posts.26Specialized profilessuch as logisticians and legal experts as well assensitive posts, such as in the management, areespecially hard to staff. ings prove to be lessdifficult for posts that require less specific ex-pertise, such as general monitoring, mentoringand advising tasks.

ese problems with provision of personnel

stem from five challenges:

First, civilian experts do not form a homo-geneous professional group.e term ci-vilian personnel comprises a multiplicity ofprofiles: from judges to engineers to customsor gender experts. is results in a range ofproblems, especially because different param-eters and institutional contacts for deploy-ment exist, which rarely cooperate. Whereasin the military national defense ministries act

as coordinating hubs, in the civilian realmthere is a multiplicity of institutional contacts.In the case of Germany, they are to be foundboth in the state and private domain: on theone hand, there are several ministries (MFA,Interior, Justice, Economic Cooperation andDevelopment). e ministries in turn do not

26 Interview in the EEAS in May 2011; see GiovanniGrevi: EULEX Kosovo, in Grevi/Helly/Keohane, op.

cit., pp. 353-368.

all possess the same structures: whereas theFederal Ministry of the Interior has a working

group for international police missions, one islacking in the Federal Ministry of Justice. Inaddition, competencies are split between thefederal and the regional state level, for instancein the police forces.

On top of that, the different systems and pro-fessional backgrounds complicate cooperationin the field. Here, too, differences with themilitary realm are evident: NATO member-ship has meant that most EU member state

military forces have been trained in coopera-tion and been socialized in common standardsand conceptions. is facilitates internationalmilitary cooperation and increases mutual un-derstanding. But there is no comparable struc-ture in the civilian realm.

EU-wide training standards have now beendeveloped, however. Between 2001 and 2009representatives of numerous EU member statesdeveloped training programs for civilian EU

missions in the European Group on Training(EGT) for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Manage-ment.27e results of the Commission-fundedEGT considerably contributed to the creationof Europes New Training Initiative for Civil-ian Crisis Management (ENTRi), chairedby ZIF, within the framework of which 13European partner institutions have since Janu-ary 2011 been jointly conducting a trainingprogram for civilian crisis management.28eCommission bears 80% of the costs (2.5

million), and the 13 partner institutions sharethe rest. With regard to police forces, the Eu-ropean Police College (CEPOL) attempts toharmonize education. But these trainings haverestricted utility, because they are not obliga-tory and not all countries participate.

27 www.europeangroupontraining.eu, accessed June29, 2011.

28 www.entriforccm.eu/, accessed June 29, 2011.


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Second, there is no European recruitmentsystem.is means that the quality of person-

nel cannot be guaranteed. As EU provisionsonly apply to quantitative (CHG objectives)and not qualitative standards, considerable dif-ferences persist with regard to recruitment interms of institutions, procedures and criteria.

A few states have developed institutions andprograms that deal with recruiting, selecting,advising, preparing, supervising, de-briefingand evaluating personnel. Frontrunners in-clude Germany (ZIF, established in 2002),Sweden (Folke Bernadotte Academy, estab-

lished in 2002), and Finland (Crisis Manage-ment Center, established in 2007). ey are incharge of civilian personnel contributions toEU, UN, and OSCE and probably eventuallyNATO (if it decides to turn civilian). At thesame time, they ensure the quality of candi-dates. In case of doubts about a candidates ap-titude, the agencies can decide not to supporthis or her application for a position in an EUmission. Some states also established a legalbasis for deployment, dealing with practical

issues such as medical insurance. e Germanand the Finnish models are here seen as ex-emplary. e 2009 German Secondment Actguarantees the legal and social protection ofcivilian personnel in international missions.29

e majority of EU member states, however,are just in the process of systematically orga-nizing their recruiting and training, as wellas establishing some legal groundwork for it.

Whereas the recruitment of police forces is

already frequently centralized and backed bytraining programs, things look rather bleak forother civilian experts. Recruitment centers arevery rare. Poland, for example, has no centraldatabase; decisions on deployments are takenon an ad hoc basis in the individual agencies

29 Gesetz zur Regelung von Sekundierungen imRahmen von Einstzen der zivilen Krisenprvention(Sekundierungsgesetz SekG), 17. Juli 2009 (BGBl. I

S. 1974).

or ministries. However, Poland started tochange legal requirements in order to harmo-

nize deployment conditions among civilianexperts. Slovakia developed a correspondingdraft bill that is likely to be adopted by parlia-ment by the end of 2011. e bill creates acoordinating committee for deployment ofcivilian personnel and defines deploymentconditions. In general, a trend towards a moresystematic organization of recruitment can bediscerned.

ird, civilian experts cannot be enlisted.

e principle of voluntary participation holdsboth for the expert and the seconding agencyor company. In principle, experts can volun-teer to participate in missions, yet in case ofdeployment decide on short notice whetherthey want to take part in this very mission ornot. Private reasons, security concerns or ca-reer considerations can play a role here. evoluntary character explains the gap betweenpledged numbers and actually available expertsin civilian CSDP. In order to close that gap,

member states and the EU set up preselectedpools of experts. ey can improve availabil-ity and actual willingness for deployment bymeans of better preparation and information,and by greatly clarifying administrative ques-tions in generic contracts in advance. esepools can thus help by creating a sense ofcommitment, but ultimately cannot guaranteethe experts willingness to deploy. e CivilianResponse Teams (CRT), that are supposed toensure rapid reaction to crisis situations are an

example of such EU-level pools.30However,results have been meager so far: CRT havebeen deployed, but in other staff compositionsthan those pledged.

30 Council of the European Union, MultifunctionalCivilian Crisis Management Resources in an IntegratedFormat Civilian Response Teams, Brussels, EU, June

23, 2005 (doc. 10462/05).


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Fourth, civilian experts frequently are scarceresources in their own country.Agencies

thus often are reluctant to support deploy-ment and accept absences in their own staff.e same applies for the private sector.

Fifth, individual incentives are low to par-ticipate in deployment abroad.For the ma-

jority of experts, deployment abroad is neithera career move nor financially attractive. Ontop of that, returning to work after a missionoften proves difficult. Consequently, manycivilians are reluctant to undergo (more or

less, depending on country) time-consumingtraining or deploy to a faraway and potentiallydangerous crisis region without the prospect ofgarnering some professional or financial profitfrom it.

Increased contracting of experts could proba-bly resolve current problems with deploymentof seconded experts. While seconding gener-ally allows for swift recruitment and deploy-ment (often less than three months), the num-

ber of applicants is low. is is mainly due tothe fact that some countries limit secondmentsto the civil service. e EU has received nomore than 3,500 applications for a total ofabout 1,800 posts in 2010.31Contracting fre-quently and significantly increases the numberof applicants. Also, expenditure and costs forthe states would drop substantially if appli-cants could apply to and be paid by the EU.

On the other hand, states would lose theirquality assurance mechanism, because therecruiting agencies that are now active, suchas Folke Bernadotte Academy or ZIF, wouldnot necessarily be involved in selection andtraining. Moreover, states would be left witha potentially reduced ability to exercise influ-ence over missions: bypassing their personnelrecruitment programs also undermines the

31 Behrendt, op. cit., p. 3.

ability of state attempts to influence a missionor to emphasize its commitment to a region

symbolically. Under specified conditions,it seems reasonable to uphold secondment,

while increasing incentives and improvingprocedures.

As long as states hold on to secondment, prob-lems with the provision of personnel can onlybe resolved on the national level. Given thedifferences concerning legal systems and insti-tutional practices, no universal model for re-cruitment, training, deployment and adminis-

tration of civilian personnel can be developed.However, the EU level can provide support forchange by generating a general framework.

In July 2009 the Political and Security Com-mittee (PSC), a permanent Brussels-basedbody of EU member states representatives,defined four priority areas for improvementof the provision of civilian personnel: de-velopment of national frameworks; budgetlines; national databases (rosters); and train-

ing. In order to make progress in these areas,the PSC recommended developing nationalcoordinating institutions, national conceptsand instruments, such as the Goalkeeperdatabase. Goalkeeper is a software programthat is supposed to give an (interconnected)overview over available posts in missions withstandardized job descriptions, training coursesand resources of EU states. It is still underconstruction.32

Furthermore, the Crisis Management andPlanning Directorate (CMPD), the EEASagency for the coordination of civilian andmilitary planning, conduct and capabilitydevelopment, organizes periodical workshops

32 Council of the European Union, Civilian HeadlineGoal 2010: Outline of Goalkeeper Software Environment,Brussels, EU, April 2, 2009 (doc. 8096/09); interview inthe CMPD in May 2011. As of this writing Goalkeeper

is not fully operational.


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that serve as forums where states can exchangeexperiences and best practices.33 Ideas and

assistance concerning the improvement ofstaff supply stem from both the EU level andadvanced member states. But as these arerecommendations rather than obligations,and because states lack interest, they are fre-quently not or only in a very modest wayimplemented.

The EU Level: Fragmentation and

the Challenge of Coordination

e interaction between states and the EUlevel is characterized by disparate assumptionsabout their respective responsibilities and pri-orities in the realm of crisis management, andoften proves to be inefficient. e same holdstrue not only for cooperation within EEAS,but also between EEAS and the Commission.is confusion has negative effects on civilianCSDPs political and administrative actorness,

because initiatives are hampered, decisionsdelayed or insufficiently equipped in materialterms. Because of opaque internal distributionof competences and the resulting disputes, theBrussels Machine cannot pool expertise andprovide coordination as effectively as it should.

Inefficient Interaction between States

and the EU Level

CSDPs administrative decision-making capac-ity depends on the efficient and goal-orientedcooperation of EU-level CSDP structures withthe EU member states. e Lisbon Treaty pro-vided a new framework for this interaction.So far, however, this has not contributed to

33 Hungary consequently organized a study trip toFinland in the framework of the creation of its nationalcrisis management strategy; Polish experts have visited

ZIF.

the strengthening of civilian CSDP: the HRshows little interest in civilian CSDP and has

not yet launched noteworthy initiatives sinceassuming office in November 2009. Stateshave less access to EU structures and fewer op-portunities for visible actions. Hence, civilianCSDP finds itself with progressively less lead-ership to guide it.

Two provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in par-ticular had the potential to improve the greatlycriticized lack of coherence, continuity and ef-ficiency of EU security policy: first, the aboli-

tion of the rotating 6-month-presidency of theCouncil; and second, and linked to that, theintroduction of a High Representative (HR)for EU foreign and security policy.

e HR was intended to be a leadership figurewith numerous competences: coordinatinginternal EU decision-making processes; bun-dling resources of the states; creating a coher-ent security policy profile for the Union; andsupporting member states in their role as driv-

ing forces in CSDP. For that reason, the postmerges CFSP domains that were formerly splitbetween the Commission (supranationallyorganized) and the Council (intergovernmen-tally organized). is bridging function is sup-ported by the HRs role as Vice President ofthe Commission: the HR leads CFSP/CSDP,but is also responsible for the EUs externalaction in the Commission. is merger wassupposed to overcome problems that previ-ously resulted from the fragmentation between

the EC and CFSP pillars, such as competence-based squabbles in the civilian area (in whichboth Commission and CSDP are active).

e High Representatives potential influ-ence on CSDP results from the fact that he/she can lead the whole decision-making pro-cess, from the initiative to deliberation inthe working groups through to the decisionin the new formation of the Foreign AffairsCouncil (FAC). e HR chairs this council


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28 P C, M C: E A P

formation, which has put an end to the rotat-ing Council presidency. A representative of

the HR also leads the PSC and the Commit-tee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management(CIVCOM). In the PSC, representatives ofmember states discuss international securitypolicy developments and prepare the meetingsof the FAC. CIVCOM is the expert commit-tee that advises the PSC on civilian matters.It formulates recommendations, accompaniescapacity-building, develops strategies for singledomains and supports both intra-EU and EU-member states cooperation. e principle of

unanimity in PSC and CIVCOM still applies,but the HR sets the agenda and chairs themeetings. Most importantly, she/he now pos-sesses a formal power of initiative and her ownapparatus, the EEAS.

Two years into the Lisbon Treaty, however, ci-vilian CSDP appears weakened and leaderless.is is due both to the current High Repre-sentatives lack of leadership and the limitedcommitment of member states.

e HR has so far failed to distinguish herselfas a driving force.34 Whether or not the Lis-bon provisions are effective depends to a greatextent on the commitment of the High Repre-sentative. To date, her capacities in generatingmomentum, exerting leadership and repre-senting have proven to be far from convincingin the realm of civilian CSDP. at is in partbecause she enjoys little support from mem-ber states. But she also has not yet shown an

ambition to put her stamp on civilian CSDP.is is all the more striking, as there was noshortage of opportunities for profile-making,such as the chance to define the EUs responseto the Arab Spring in early 2011. But theHR acted with reserve, whereas some mem-ber states, such as France and Great Britain,

34 Interviews in the EEAS in May 2011, in the French,German and Polish Foreign Ministries in May, June and

August 2011

promoted themselves and explicitly refrainedfrom acting within the EU framework.

e reasons for Ashtons lack of commit-ment are manifold. First, the beginning ofher tenure was complicated by the fact thatshe had to set up the service (EEAS) that wasessentially supposed to support her work.is undertaking was hindered by the powerstruggle among member states, the EuropeanParliament and the Commission, which werecontending for authority, influence and fi-nancial means.35 During the start-up phase,

the working capacity of the EEAS was limitedand missing posts were not staffed. Addition-ally, the Lisbon Treaty has vested competencesin the HR, but not always the correspondingsupport structures: one of Ashtons representa-tives may now head CIVCOM, but does notdispose of proper working groups, as doeshis military counterpart, the EU MilitaryStaff. us, the HR is expected to lead andinitiate, but is equipped with few of her ownresources and remains dependent upon mem-

ber states for support. is principle applies,for instance, in the provision of personnel formissions. is contradiction between supra-national leadership tasks for the HR on onehand, and unvaryin

preventingconflict ks

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