preparing, engaging and prevailing in 21st century conflict

The past decade has been shaped by the ground wars, but under the influence of events in Europe and the Middle East, an evolving pa>ern of 21st century conflict is emerging. It is a pa>ern in which state and non-‐state actors are working to reshape the global order in their favor by generaDng conflicts against the interests of the democracies but which the democracies are slow to react. The assumpDon of ISIS terrorists and PuDn’s Russian Ukrainian adventure and the Chinese leadership relying in part on the PLA to expand the domain of Chinese sovereignty is that the slow decision making cycles of democracies can be exploited to make gains. And gains can be achieved on a piecemeal basis, rather than going for the big grab which can provide a dramaDc event usable by democraDc leaders to mobilize public opinion and generate resources to respond.

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A mix of non-‐kineDc, kineDc and informaDon warfare elements are blended into an asserDve adversary poliDcal-‐military policy against democraDc interests. In effect, the democracies are working together in either an explicit or implicit set of alliances to protect their interests. The US is certainly a key player in this system, but what might be called a lead naDon approach is emerging within which the key regional players are taking primary responsibility for their own interests and allies are in a posiDon to support the lead naDon or naDons. The US might be the “first” among equals within this dynamic, but it is just that: in the lead someDmes, but in support more oWen than not.

With regard to the Pacific, the US is a key player in providing either leadership or support of the defense of the Pacific. To deal with 21st century challenges and operaDons, the US is shaping a scalable presence force structure. This structure operates within a strategic geography which can be broken down into a force generaDon strategic triangle and an operaDonal strategic quadrangle. The US is shaping a deterrence in depth strategy to ensure that the US naDonal command authority has opDons to deal with threats in the Pacific and allies can have confidence in the viability of a vibrant US combat force in the Pacific.

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Under Xi, domesDc stability and war avoidance remain guiding principles, but a more aggressive asserDon of sovereignty over Chinese territory is encouraged. It has become evident that some senior Chinese have been closely a>enDve to the evident agility of President PuDn and the slow pace of President Obama to mulDple Russian probes in differing geographic locaDons. The PRC is seeking to enforce rules that are different from standard rules for an air idenDficaDon zone. The Chinese authoriDes require reports from all aircraW that plan to pass through the zone, regardless of desDnaDon. Enter the PRC and its a>empt to declare an Air Defense IdenDficaDon Zone or ADIZ. This is clearly a significant gambit to take a bit out of the strategic quadrangle and to foment discord among allies. We have placed the ADIZ down upon the strategic geography we have idenDfied and a key reality quickly emerges. Just by chance the zone covers reinforcements to Taiwan. This is clearly a backhanded a>empt to promote the PRC’s view of the nature of Taiwan and the South China Sea in their defense calculus.

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There are a number of key stakeholders in the opening up of the ArcDc, with both convergent and conflictual elements at play. Any Dme conflict is part of the equaDon, defense capabiliDes come into play, and they come into play in reinforcing so-‐called soW power as well. 21st century military power is clearly interwoven with 21st century security and diplomacy. It is not to be understood primarily as the sledgehammer but as a key contextual element integrated within diplomacy and security efforts to protect naDonal operaDonal sovereignty. Because each of the key five stakeholders in the ArcDc all have different perspecDves as well with regard to even something as simple as “collaboraDon,” conflict can be built into a cooperaDve process. But defense in the ArcDc is a contextual capability. To develop the ArcDc requires shaping infrastructure for communicaDons and situaDonal awareness in an area with limited “tradiDonal” infrastructure. It is about leveraging air breathing and space systems, and craWing appropriate land based towers and systems, which can create a grid for development and safety operaDons.

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The Russians have been map-‐making in Crimea. With the Ukraine in play, close observers of Russian behavior are taking their measure of what such behavior might mean elsewhere. Clearly, an area of note is the BalDcs. With PuDn’s emphasis on Russian ethnic solidarity trumping internaDonal borders, the BalDc area is an area ripe for scruDny. For the Danes, Norwegians and Swedes what this means is that BalDc defense comes into focus. Notably, if one would look at the map, the Russian challenge in the BalDcs and the ArcDc requires integrated air and naval forces to defend Nordic interests, whether in NATO or not. Russia being on both sides of the Nordics as a BalDc region power and an ArcDc power focuses one’s a>enDon. The Russian European ports can look forward to be directly connected with the Pacific ports and with it the growth of infrastructure, ports, faciliDes and shipping, along the way. This transforms the Russian defense and security challenge to one of securing the trade and resource development belt. It also will see a significant upsurge over the next thirty years of traffic, commercial and military, through the area. It will be in Russia’s interest to build air and naval assets, which can provide for the

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The acDons in Ukraine have included seizure of territory, the use of Special Forces, informaDon war, the use of indigenous Russian armed and trained “separaDsts,” and other techniques. Vladimir PuDn was a young KGB Officer who was acDve when President Reagan won the IW against the Soviet Union trying to stop the US and NATO successfully placing tacDcal nuclear cruise missiles in Europe as a major deterrence move. In the Euromissile Crisis he learned how not to lose an InformaDon War. Consequently he is shaping a 21st century blend of combining military moves with successful propaganda. By seizing Crimea, Russia set in moDon internal pressures aided by direct support to conDnue map wriDng in Ukraine and to reduce the size of the territory under the country of the government in Kiev. The Crimean intervenDon was destabilizing, and the enhanced role of Russian “separaDsts” aided and abe>ed by Moscow within the remainder of Ukraine is part of the Russian 21st century approach to warfare.

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The reform of the military has been designed to ensure local military superiority, which has been demonstrated in the Crimea. And ensuring a viable tacDcal and strategic nuclear arsenal underwriDng the protecDon of the homeland is also part of the effort. And shaping a way ahead to enhance relevant power projecDon is crucial as well It is oWen noted that the current state of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean is not first rate, and is populated with many aging assets. This is largely true, but misses the point that the Russians have set in moDon a major naval and air modernizaDon effort, and by laying down a solid geographical infrastructure, when capabiliDes are added, then they have tools to go with the infrastructure to shape regular influence in the region.

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The port of Tartus provides a key port for the Russian navy in the area. It is a relaDvely small facility for repairs and support for operaDons, but is an important foothold in the region, notably when combined with other faciliDes in the region over Dme. The Russians would clearly like regular access to Alexandria, but this is more aspiraDonal than real for the moment. A Russian warship did dock at Alexandria in November 2013 as part of preparaDon for the visit of a Russian official to negoDate with the EgypDan government. This was the first port visit to Egypt by a Russian warship since 1992. With regard to the Western Mediterranean, Cyprus is the key target of the Russian effort. With acDvity on both flanks of the Mediterranean, the moves in Crimea come into focus. Whatever the cause of the seizure of Crimea and its inclusion in Russia, the impact on the Russian navy is clear. By ending the treaty and taking full control of Sevastopol, the Russians can now focus on the expansion of faciliDes in the area and preparing for a significant modernizaDon effort. Russians sources throughout 2013 made it clear that they viewed the Ukrainians as pujng obstacles in front of the desired modernizaDon of the Black Sea fleet. Obviously, this obstacle is removed.

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The Russian Mistral is being opDmized for Northern missions. Given the tensions within the Euro zone, sejng in moDon another set of tensions between those European states in the Euro zone and those who are not, is hardly a prescripDon for strengthening Europe’s role in the world, saying nothing of its impact on NATO. The French helicopter-‐carrier Mistral class ships are all-‐electric ships with a length overall of 199 meters and displacement of 21,300 tons. The Mistral’s concept combines a landing helicopter deck, a floaDng hospital, an amphibious assault ship can carry up to 16 heavy helicopters, more than a dozen tanks, and one third of a mechanized regiment, plus two hovercraW or four landing craW. It also could ideally serve as a command vessel. Furthermore, the Mistral class ship could serve as a very powerful anD-‐submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter vessel to detect enemy submarines. Thus it can contribute to amphibious, ASW, and helicopter operaDons in any theater. Northern Europe is a key part of the New Europe, and clearly focused on both BalDc security and ArcDc development, safety, security and defense. The Mistral ships will be used for both BalDc and ArcDc missions by the Russians, as the Russians are focused on ice hardening the hulls of the Mistral.

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ISIS is shaping a brand via its military successes and its ability to eliminate religious opponents; it is a kineDc force using informaDon war to spread the murderous fanaDcal brand to shape their evolving influence in the region. The leader does not dress in black or fly a black flag by accident; it is part of the branding effort and the religious informaDon war against their enemies. ISIS is a rapidly moving target and needs a response that is not measured in the months and years of a return of the US Army to Iraq to re-‐start training an Iraqi Army which the Obama AdministraDon has already clearly recognized as part of the problem not the soluDon. The total collapse of the Iraq Army aWer a decade of US investment is a tesDmony to failure, regardless of who is at fault in US planning and execuDon of Iraq NaDon Building. A neglected aspect of the ISIS assault is in the domain of informaDon warfare. IW is even more central to US capability than is cybersecurity. Yet IW remains in the fallow ground, while US and Western compeDtors hone their skills.

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The classic dichotomy of boots on the ground versus airpower really does not capture the evolving capabiliDes of either airpower or the evolving capabiliDes of ground forces capitalizing on those evolving capabiliDes to provide for more effecDve and more lethal inserDon forces. In both the Ukrainian and Iraq cases, the ability to insert force empowered by airpower is crucial. What is oWen forgo>en about Drones and Special Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is the need for very large ground-‐based grid of support necessary to move the ground forces (helicopters) , feed ground forces, provide medical assistance to ground forces to support Special Forces and also the vast targeDng appeDte for the Drone fleet. The USMC can easily setup a TEMPORARY FOB for 22nd MEU with their MV-‐22s somewhere in Kurdistan to conduct missions into Iraq proper to rescue ChrisDans and eliminate any ISIS fanaDcs in the way in the process and then leave. USS Bush CBG could provide a real combat punch when ISIS mass their forces-‐or SOCOM/CIA idenDfies isolated groups. Just like they could have secured the crash site in Ukraine. This is not about long term occupaDon and training; this is about ready now USMC sea based Dltrotar MV-‐22 assault forces coming to the aid of the Kurds and ChrisDans, and sejng up a forward operaDng base that can influence events in the

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Lt. General Jouas, 7th USAF Commander: We have a tough problem with North Korea, obviously. You have to understand that this is a different type of adversary with capabili>es that concern us, and we need the best tools possible in order to contend with it. We should not mirror image when we consider the North Korean nuclear strategy. North Korea has seen what happened in Libya, and with Kaddafi, and that’s reinforced their strategy. And while this may be a North Korean problem right now, there’s a strong possibility it won’t remain so. And that creates real danger to our allies and our homeland. We have to think about a world in which we have more than one North Korea, in which those capabili>es are held by other na>ons whose interests and strategy are very different from ours.

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The U.S. has inserDon forces able to engage and withdraw, rather than sejng up long-‐term faciliDes and providing advisers as targets. The ability to establish air dominance to empower mulD-‐mission USMC inserDon force able to operate effecDvely, rapidly and withdraw is a core effort that now exists in US way of war for emerging 21st century conflicts Buying strategic maneuver space for the immediate period ahead, and pulverizing ISISs military capabiliDes – trucks, cars, arDllery pieces, etc. — are the crucial objecDves and is an airpower strike mission. It is about the ISR strike grid in the air rather than relying on the previous US Army way of war building an extensive and expensive operaDonal grid on the ground.

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MG Hedelund: We are only talking now a few years, but the changes in that Dme have been truly stunning. And we are taking that operaDonal experience and marrying it with a wide range of innovaDve thinking as well, with regard to anDcipaDng the F-‐35, to the use of UAVs, to the integraDon of electronic warfare, and with regards to digital integraDon of the assault force. For us, innova,on is blended with a combat culture that innovates for a purpose – to succeed in difficult circumstances. With the Osprey we are not thinking rotorcraW terms. We are thinking in big chunks of opera,onal space and figuring out how to operate more effec,vely within the expanded baBlespace. When I say speed is life, I think that you can do things with a force that is relaDvely light by being ahead of them as far as situaDonal awareness and reach so you can get in, get something accomplished and get out before the adversary knows that you’re in their backyard.

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•  This airplane’s different because with the data being fused, I’m not using mul>ple different displays to perform my air to air and CAS missions.

•  The main difference that I see between federated and fused systems is in the F-‐18, not only was it all in different displays, but each sensor had its own uncertainty volumes and algorithms associated with it.

•  It was up to me as an aviator knowing the capabili>es and limita>ons in my system to decipher and draw the line between the mission sets.

•  In the F-‐35, the fusion engine does a lot of that in the background, while simultaneously, I can be execu>ng an air-‐to-‐air mission or an air-‐to-‐ground mission, and have an air-‐to-‐air track file up, or mul>ple air-‐to-‐air track files, and determine how to flip missions.

•  Because the fidelity of the data is there right now, which allows me to determine if I need to go back into an air-‐to-‐air mindset because I have to deal with this right now as opposed to con>nuing the CAS mission.

•  And I have a much broader set of integrated tool sets to draw upon. •  For example, if I need an electronic warfare tool set, with the F-‐18 I have to call in a

separate aircraQ to provide for that capability. •  With the F-‐35 I have organic EW capability. The EW capability works well in the

aircraQ. From the >me it is recognized that such a capability is need to the >me that it is used requires a push of a buUon.

•  It does not require that a suppor>ng asset be deployed.

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The USS America is the seabase from which ,ltrotar innova,on receives a significant boost and the newly enabled GCE will operate, with an ability to sustain and support the force at much greater distance from the objec,ve area, if needed. With the coming of the F-‐35B to the USS America, the Dltrotar-‐enabled force adds significant capability. This can work a couple of different ways. The ship can hold more than 20 F-‐35Bs, but more likely when F-‐35Bs are being featured would have a 16 F-‐35B flying with 4 Osprey combinaDons. The Ospreys would be used to carry fuel and or weapons, so that the F-‐35B can move to the mission and operate in a distributed base. This is what the Marines refer to as shaping distributed STOVL ops for the F-‐35B within which a sea base is a key lily pad from which the plane could operate or could move from. AlternaDvely, the F-‐35B could operate as the ISR, C2 and strike asset to work with the rest of the assault force. The beauty of the F-‐35B for the Marines is that it allows them to operate off of an amphibious ship with a plane which can do C2 or provide forward leaning ISR. And in a recent experiment where the Marines assaulted San Clemente Island in an exercise, the Marines began to sketch out a new way to think

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h>p://www.sldinfo.com/special-‐report-‐on-‐italy-‐and-‐the-‐f-‐35/ It is also difficult to argue with the proposiDon that the Mediterranean and the Middle East will not be a busy operaDonal area for NATO and allied forces. The F-‐35 fleet that rolls out from a diversity of users will need the kind of operaDonal and maintenance support which can be provided at Cameri. The Italians have built major warehouse faciliDes to hold parts for the F-‐35 as well as maintenance bay accommodaDons secured to collateral SECRET, and, with the IT system which can manage the parts which are stamped with common parts idenDfiers, it will be straightorward to manage the inventory coming in and out of these warehouses to support an allied fleet. A way to look at this would be the shape a graphic as follows with Cameri as the hub to support the Western and Eastern Mediterranean and the enDre sweep of allied F-‐35 fleet operaDons. This could include the USAF, the USN, the USMC, the Italian forces, the BriDsh forces, the Norwegian forces, etc. The Italians have understood the F-‐35 fleet concept and have laid down an infrastructure to support it AT THE SAME TIME as they built their FACO and wing

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•  JERICHO is not just about modernisaDon – it is about modernisaDon and transformaDon informed by the envisaged future state of the Air Force

•  CAF is focused on the themes of breaking down the barriers within Air Force and

across the Service – he is focusing on Joint Force IntegraDon

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•  This invitaDon by the Chief is a significant change over the current Defence / Industry engagement model.

•  The challenge will be how to have classified partnering above the project platorm level

•  The issue of above and below the line in terms of bidding for projects will need to be addressed in the partnering agreements.

•  The DSTO /Industry alliance and RPD&E models may provide some ideas on how this can be addressed

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•  BY providing an updated context and “system of systems” perspecDve, the CAF intends to ensure that all capabiliDes are fit for purpose in terms of future force

integraDon.

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As the crises in Europe and the Middle East heat up, the debate quickly turns on which path is crucial to deal with evolving threats: boots on the ground or airpower with no boots on the ground. The specter of responses to the 9/11 a>ack and the various engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq naturally shade perspecDves. Yet changing capabiliDes and concepts of operaDons are overcoming the classic disDncDon as the USMC has become the only Dltrotar enabled force in the world, as the USAF and USN have shaped highly integrated air grids, and advances in both the lethality and effecDveness of manned and unmanned aviaDon have grown. And the past decade’s experience of the need to shape a very large and expensive ground grid from which to feed Special Forces and ground operaDons is not one the US is going to repeat anyDme soon. The U.S. has inserDon forces able to engage and withdraw, rather than sejng up long-‐term faciliDes and providing advisers as targets. The ability to establish air dominance to empower mulD-‐mission USMC inserDon force able to operate effecDvely, rapidly and withdraw is a core effort that now exists in US way of war for emerging 21st century conflicts

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preparing, engaging and prevailing in 21st century conflict

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