pracframing decisions – practical reasoning and valuestical reasoning and values2

8/12/2019 PracFraming decisions Practical reasoning and valuestical Reasoning and Values2

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Framing decisionsPractical reasoning and values

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show the relationship between evaluative classificationsand practical reasoning, analyzing the various types of definitional criteria we use tojudge an action or a state of affairs as good or better. The problem of evaluativeclassifications leads to another crucial distinction, i.e. the difference between the type ofreasoning we use ideally and in ordinary life. When faced with everyday situations, wehave hardly time and efforts to spend in a systematic assessment of what is absolutely orrelatively good, taking into account all the possible information and scenarios. Weusually draw a fast and easy evaluative conclusion based on the most accessibleinformation. We rely on how a state of affairs appears more than how it is, i.e. on howreality and actions are presented and framed. For this reason, investigating the strategiesof framing and the types of evaluative reasoning they trigger can help understand thedefeasibility of the judgments grounded thereon, and the potential manipulative risk of

the strategies of shaping reality.

Practical reasoning can be considered as one of the crucial dimensions of the decision-making process. An agent selects the best means to achieve a desired result, whichcorresponds to a positively evaluated state of affairs that he commits himself to bringingabout. This type of reasoning from end to means has been analyzed as a defeasibleargumentation scheme in (Walton 1990), a form of argument that is provisionallyacceptable under condition of lack of knowledge, but that can be defeated if a strongerargument is advanced or new relevant knowledge is acquired. This pattern of argumentcan explain the quasi-logical structure of the process of selecting the best action toachieve a goal, but at the same time it opens up some fundamental problems concerningone of its essential aspects, the evaluative steps that it presupposes. Practical reasoning

presupposes that a state of affairs is evaluated as desirable, but what desirable meansand how is it possible to classify a state of affairs as such? The choice between variouscourses of action presupposes a classification of one of them as the best one.However, how can we establish what option is the best one? These issues bring to lightthe ethical and classificatory foundations of this type of reasoning. The logic ofselecting the means for an end lies on the complex classification of what is good andwhat is better, which brings reasoning and decision-making in the field of ethics andturns it into a problem of definition.

The purpose of this paper is to show how reasoning from evaluativeclassification is crucial in practical reasoning, and analyze the structure and the kinds ofclassification and classificatory criteria. This issue leads to another more practical

problem, i.e. the distinction between the ideal process of evaluation and the ordinaryone. When faced with everyday situations, we have hardly time and efforts to spend in asystematic assessment of what is absolutely or relatively good, taking into account allthe possible information and scenarios. We usually draw a fast and easy evaluativeconclusion based on the most accessible information. This difference between the idealand the real evaluative reasoning can be investigated by distinguishing between asystematic and a heuristic evaluative classification process. In particular, this latter typeof reasoning depends on how a state of affairs appears more than how it is, i.e. it relies

on how reality and actions are presented and framed. For this reason, framing becomesan instrument for shaping decisions. Different descriptions of an action or entity suggest


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distinct evaluations, and guide an agents actions accordingly. Extending or reducingthe paradigm of the possible means to achieve a goal affects differently the decision-making process. In order to understand how framing affects our decisions, we need toexamine first the evaluative classification mechanism that it triggers, i.e. on what is theheuristically simplified notion of good and better.

1. Commitment to actionsIn order to analyze the decision-making process from a (quasi-)logical point of view itis necessary to understand the structure of a decision-making process, linking a desire toa decision to act accordingly. A clear description of the relationship between desires anddecisions is represented by the following diagram (Rigotti 2005, 64):

Agent A

and activates

knows

singles out a desire

decides to pursue this

goal

the world

a new responding state

of affairs

a causal chain

realizing

Figure 1: The action model

The agent acts based on general desires (to have fun; to have a family, both regarded asgood), which are related to specific goals (to go to a party; to get married). In order toachieve such goals, he decides to act accordingly, i.e. he selects the productive ornecessary means to realize the wanted state of affairs (he looks for parties, drives to the

party, etc.; he finds a girlfriend, proposes to her, etc.). This apparently simplemechanism is actually complex if we examine it from a logical and philosophical pointof view. On the one hand, from a logical perspective it is problematic to take desires andintentions into account, i.e. intentional, psychological states. On the other hand, from a

philosophical perspective it is necessary to explain the role of the free will in thisdecision-making process. How is desire related to a goal and a decision?

A possible approach to this issue can be found in the notion of commitment,which links the modern inferentialist approach with the medieval ethical theories.According to Brandom, intentions can be understood in terms of commitments to bringabout a specific type of action (Brandom 1998b, 129):

The thought is that there are two species of discursive commitment: the cognitive (ordoxastic), and the practical. The latter are commitments to act. Acknowledgments of thefirst sort of commitment correspond to beliefs; acknowledgments of the second sort ofcommitment correspond to intentions. The first are takings-true, the second makings-

true. Practical commitments are like doxastic commitments in being essentially


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inferentially articulated. They stand in inferential relations both among themselves (bothmeans-end and incompatibility) and to doxastic commitments

The idea of treating intentions in terms of commitments (see von Wright 1972: 41)leads to investigating the relationship between the agents will and the different

passages constituting the structure of a decision-making process (Searle 2001: 13). Inparticular, two steps (or as Searle called, two gaps, see Searle 2001: 15) are offundamental importance: 1) the passage from a desire and the knowledge of a specificobject or state of affair to an intention; and 2) the relationship between a specific goaland the means to bring it about. Both passages, which involve the freedom of the will(Searle 2001: 13), can be explained in terms of commitment, or rather as the decision toassent to a specific action. Desire is causally moved by what is good, or what seemsto be good or desirable. As Thomas Aquinas put it, the desirable moves desireas itsfinal cause, as the desirable has the nature of an end and every efficient cause acts forthe sake of an end and some good (Thomas Aquinas, On Evil. Q. 1., art. 1., 53, 58; seeid., Q. 3, art. 3, 152). The good, or the desirable, is an object or a state of affairs that is

classified as such (Nicomachean Ethics,1113a15) correctly or incorrectly, i.e. accordingor not to reason. However, in order to be considered as an end, i.e. a goal, it needs to beassented to (or acquiesced, see On Evil, Q. 1, Article 3, 71) by the will (On Evil. Q. 3art. 3, 151):

For we say that the apprehended object moves the will, and we say that one whocommends or persuades moves the will in this way, namely, inasmuch as such a onemakes something seem good. And the will is moved by something internal, forexample, what produces the very act of the will. And the object proposed to the willdoes not necessarily move the will, although the intellect sometimes necessarily assentsto a proposed truth.

The commitment to an end, i.e. an object that is classified as good by the reason ,becomes the final end which needs to be brought about by an efficient cause. Thecommitment to bring about a goal is linked to the possible causes as the latter onesconstitute the reasons (prima facie reasons) for acting in a specific way (Brandom1998a, 244-250).

The other crucial passage of practical reasoning is the step from the generalintention (commitment to pursue a goal) and the commitment to the inference providingthe reasons for acting to a commitment to a specific action (Brandom 1998a, 237;Broome 2001). This specific commitment is an act of will, which Abelard would callthe consensus, i.e. the decision to engage in a specific (good or bad) activity, aimed at

pursuing a specific (good or bad) goal (Abaelardus,Ethica, 636 A):

It shows us, in short, that in such matters also the will or desire to do that which is notlicit is not at all to be called sin, but rather, as we have said, the consent itself. Andindeed, we consent to that which is not licit at the point at which we do not at all drawback from doing it, and are inwardly prepared to carry it out if given the opportunity.And anyone who is found in this resolve incurs full guilt, nor does the performance ofthe deed added to this add anything to increase the sin. Moreover, before God he whostrives to accomplish it, and he who actually does accomplish it as far as he has it inhim, are equally guiltyjust as if, as the blessed Augustine reminds us, he too had alsobeen caught in the act.

The idea of consensus (or acquiescence), which corresponds to a kind of practicalcommitment, can explain the passage from a desire to a goal and a decision to act


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accordingly. The reasoning involved in the choice of the means to achieve a goal leadsto the selection of actions that are necessary or sufficient causes of the wanted effect. In

both cases, the agent needs to decide to commit himself to such actions. When they aresufficient means, the agent is simply provided with a reason to commit himself to theaction. In case the actions are necessary means, the transfer of commitments from the

goal to the action seems to be direct (Brandom 1998a, 237-238). However, as Cicerounderscored in hisDe Inventione(II, 57), practical necessity needs to be understood as aconditional, in which the commitment to the action needs to be evaluated against thecommitment to the consequences of a non-action:

For we say in very different senses:--"It is necessary for the people of Casilinum tosurrender themselves to Hannibal;" and, "It is necessary that Casilinum should comeinto the power of Hannibal." In the one case, that is, in the first case, there is thisaddition to the proposition--"Unless they prefer perishing by hunger." For if they preferthat, then it is not necessary for them to surrender. But in the latter proposition such anaddition has no place; because whether the people of Casilinum choose to surrender, orprefer enduring hunger and perishing in that manner, still it is necessary that Casilinummust come into the power of Hannibal. []when a thing is only necessary provided wewish to avoid or to obtain something, then it will be necessary to state what advantageor what honour is contained in that addition.

An agents commitment to his goal leads to the commitment to the necessary means toachieve it, which needs to be assessed and upheld or discarded by comparing it with

possible conflicting commitments (Brandom 1998a, 237-238). This structure of desires,reasoning, and commitments can be quasi-formalized using the argumentation schemes,which can bring to light the types of warrants used in the different steps of decision-making.

2. Values and evaluationsAs noticed above, Thomas Aquinas pointed out how the desirable moves the desire,which is the ground of the voluntary assent to a goal. On this view, the decision-making

process is based on what is classified as desirable () or objectionable (),or more desirable or less objectionable. As Aristotle put it, everything aims at thegood (TopicsIII, 1, 116a 18). The decision making process can be described in this

perspective as the reasoning at the basis of action, in which an agent is lead to action onthe basis of reasons grounded on what he considers desirable. The first and fundamentalstep of reasoning in decision-making is the classification of an object or a state of affairs

as good or desirable, absolutely or relatively. We can formalize this type of reasoning asa kind of classification (Macagno & Walton 2010; Walton & Macagno 2009),represented as follows (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 319):

Argumentation scheme 1: Argument from classification


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PREMISE1:

If some particular thing acan be classified as falling

under verbal category C, then ahas propertyP(in virtue

of such a classification).

PREMISE2: a can be classified as falling under verbal category C.

CONCLUSION: ahas propertyP.

This pattern of inference can describe the process of evaluation and in particular the stepleading to an evaluation of a state of affairs as desirable or not. However, thedefinitional premise that is presupposed by premise 1, which makes the relation

between CandPreasonable, needs to be adapted to a predicate, desirable, which isvague, extremely hard to define, and whose definition is contested. The crucial problemis to establish what is good, and how to classify something as good absolutely andrelatively.

In the Aristotelian tradition, the idea of good is related to function. In thissense, an entity can be classified as such if it fulfils its function well (see Vendler 1964).However, this type of definition is hard to apply to everyday reasoning, and is hard touse in specific instances. In order to classify something as good or not, other types ofdefinitional statements can be more useful. For instance, Aristotle provides in the

Rhetoricand in the Topicsa set of topics setting out operational definitions of what isgood or desirable, such as the following ones (RhetoricI, 7):

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as thatfor the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by allthings, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any

things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual byreason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individualgood;

This type of definitions also applies to the classification of what is better, i.e. what isdesirable relatively to a certain situation (Topics116a 28-34):

That which is desired for itself is more desirable than that which is desired for somethingelse; e.g. health is more desirable than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself, thelatter for something else. Also, that which is desirable in itself is more desirable thanwhat is desirableper accidens; e.g. justice in our friends than justice in our enemies: forthe former is desirable in itself, the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies

should be just per accidens, in order that they may do us no harm.

Aristotle provides other definitional criteria in the Topicsand theRhetoric. In particular,he provides definitions by listing the various species of what is good, i.e. byenumerating its essential parts. For instance, the following topics include different typesof good states of affairs, objects, or dispositions (Rhetoric, 1362b 2-18):

The virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in agood condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must beseverally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since itis the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful thingsmust be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautifulthings some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves. The following is a


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more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself andsufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Alsojustice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as beingexcellences of the soul. Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellencesand productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both ofpleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two thingswhich it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinarypeople.

The various species of good, i.e. what is to be chosen for its own sake, can beconsidered as specific reasons for acting, i.e. values. However, the abstract specieshardly provide useful criteria for evaluating entities or states of affairs immediately.More heuristic and immediate definitions need to be provided, which list the variousinstances of what can produce what is good. Such heuristic criteria of classification setout possible things that are good relatively, i.e. when they are considered as instrumentsfor achieving what is desirable in itself. Such relative values, however, when areconsidered as absolutely become subject to personal choices, i.e. they are organized inhierarchies (Nicomachean Ethics1095a 18-27). For someone culture is the ultimategood; for others it is not desirable in itself, as only money matters. Therefore, theseheuristic criteria for classifying the principles of action need to be applied to mensdispositions, characters and hierarchies of values:

Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: loversof victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money-loving men for money,and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our meansof persuasion about Good and Utility. (Rhetoric1363b 1-5)

In the same way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one's father, e.g.among the Triballi, whereas, absolutely, it is not honourable. Or possibly this may

indicate a relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same wherever they maybe: for everywhere it will be held honourable among the Triballi themselves, just becausethey are Triballi. Again, at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines, e.g. when

one is ill, but it is not so absolutely (Topics115b 19-27).

These heuristic and specific relative criteria for classifying what is goodplay a crucialpart in the decision-making process and the description, or framing, of a situation inorder to elicit a specific action. Depending on the way a situation or an entity isdescribed, it can be classified as desirable in relation to certain relative values, which itinstantiates. The importance of the value judgment for the decision-making processdepends on the further steps of reasoning, linking the assessment to the commitment to

a goal and to the means to achieve the latter.

3. Values and commitmentsThe classification of an entity or a state of affairs as desirable or not does notcorrespond to the decision, or rather commitment, to obtain it or not, or to bring it aboutor not. A dangerous person or situation can be negatively judged as not desirable, but asubsequent step is needed to link a judgment with a commitment, or a potentialdisposition, i.e. with the decision to make the avoidance of such a person or situation anagents goal. The type of reasoning providing this passage describes the voluntaryassent to a goal based on a value judgment is called argument from values and can berepresented as follows (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008, 321; see also see Bench-Capon2003a; 2003b):


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Argumentation scheme 2: Argument from Values

PREMISE1:The state of affairsxispositive/negative as judged by

agentAaccording to Value V(value judgment).

PREMISE2:

The fact thatxispositive/negativeaffects the

interpretation and therefore the evaluation of goal Gof

agentA(Ifxisgood, it supports commitment to goal G).

CONCLUSION:The evaluation ofx according to value V is a reason for

retaining/retracting commitment to goal G.

The reasoning from classification mentioned in the section above describes themechanism that is implicit in the first premise of this type of argument. The evaluationof a state of affairs, made based on values, leads to the evaluation of a goal, i.e. a

situation, related with the agent, which can be brought about by him. For instance, sincetraffic jam is unpleasant (time consuming), it is bad for the agent. This evaluation leadsto the individuation of the related goal, i.e. the agent commits himself to avoiding thetraffic jam. Similarly, if a person is described as untrustworthy, he is consequentlyclassified as bad or undesirable based on the value of trust (or other reasons such asnegative consequences). This evaluation leads to the specific goal of avoiding certaintypes of relationships with this person (such as friendship or other relations based ontrust).

This type of argument describes a reasoning step and an act of free will. Ageneric evaluation concerning an entity or a state of affairs is specified by relating it tothe agent. In this fashion, a bad (or good) situation becomes a situation that can be bad(or good) for the agent; a bad (or good) person (or object) becomes a person (or object)that can be bad (or good) for the agent. The evaluation is projected onto a future state ofaffairs that represents a possible instantiation of it concerning the interests of the agent.This specific projection becomes a goal when the agent commits himself to bringing itabout or avoiding it. In order for a goal to become a decision to act accordingly, anotherreasoning step is required. The goal needs to be related to the means to bring it about,i.e. the possible efficient causes need to be found. However, this is not sufficient. Theagent needs to assess them considering them as actions, i.e. evaluating them as good orthe best actions.

4. From goals to actionsThe reasoning from goals to actions is the basis for the assent, or commitment, to aspecific action, i.e. the decision to act. It can be thought of as a pattern of reasoningconnecting a desired goal, or commitment to bringing about a state of affairs (vonWright 1972: 41), with the means to achieve it (Anscombe 1998, 11). This reasoning

provides a reason for acting, which becomes a decision when the agent assents to it.Von Wright (1963b, 161; 1963a, Ch. VIII) distinguished between two distinct types ofreasoning that can be used to reason about actions: reasoning from goal to means, andreasoning from a consequence to its causes.

The first type of reasoning proceeds from a commitment to bring about a

specific state of affairs, and specifies means that are necessary for or productive of tothe desired situation. The generic pattern of reasoning can be represented as follows:


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Argumentation scheme 3: Practical reasoning

Premise I (an agent) have a goal G.

Evaluation Carrying out this actionA is a means to realize G.

Conclusion ThereforeAshould (not) be brought about.

This scheme needs to be further specified by taking into account the distinction betweenthe necessary and productive means. In the first case, the reasoning can be representedas follows (adapted from Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008, 94-95):

Argumentation scheme 3a: Practical reasoning necessary condition

Goal premise My goal is to bring about G.

Alternative premise

I reasonably consider on the given information that bringing

about at least one of [B0,B1,,Bn] is necessary to bring about

G.

Selection premiseI have selected one memberBias an acceptable, or the most

acceptable necessary condition for G.

Practicality premiseNothing unchangeable prevents me from bringing aboutBi as

far as I know.

Conclusion Therefore I should bring aboutBi.

Side-effect premise Bringing about G is more acceptable to me than not bringingaboutBi.

In this scheme, the agent needs to act in a specific fashion (according to the possiblealternatives) if he wants the state of affairs to occur. Unless he acts according one of the

possible alternatives, the desired state of affairs will not be brought about. We cansimplify the scheme by reducing the alternatives to the one possible necessary means. Adifferent type of reasoning is the sufficient scheme (adapted from Walton, Reed &

Macagno 2008, 96):

Argumentation scheme 3b: Practical reasoning sufficient condition


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Goal premise My goal is to bring about G.

Alternative premiseI reasonably consider on the given information that each one of

[B0,B1,,Bn] is sufficient to bring about G.

Selection premiseI have selected one memberBias an acceptable, or the mostacceptable sufficient condition for G.

Practicality premiseNothing unchangeable prevents me from bringing aboutBi as

far as I know.

Conclusion Therefore I should bring aboutBi.

Side-effect premiseBringing about G is more acceptable to me than not bringing

aboutBi.

In this latter scheme it is not possible to reduce the possible alternatives to one means.The paradigm of the possible efficient causes of the desired state of affairs remainsopen. For this reason, the two patterns have different criteria of evaluation. In thenecessary condition scheme, the agent needs to assess whether acting is more desirablethan non-acting, i.e. whether the quality of the action is better than the quality of thesituation characterized by not bringing about the desired state of affairs. In this sense,the choice of non-acting needs to be considered as an omission, i.e. a kind of actionconsisting in the the intrinsic voluntary decision not to bring about the sufficient (ornecessary) cause of the occurrence of a specific consequence at a later time (von Wright1963a, 130; Aqvist 1974; Chisholm 1976; Walton 1980, 317). In both cases, it dependson the agent whether a certain state of affairs (resulting from the action or the non-

action) will occur. However, in the necessary scheme, the agent needs to evaluate thequality of an action in comparison with the quality of its omission. In the sufficientscheme, the agent needs to assess whether the action is good or not without comparingit with the quality of its omission. This type of distinction can be shown by taking intoaccount an application of this type of reasoning (Foot 1967, 9):

A party of potholers has imprudently allowed the fat man to lead them as they maketheir way out of the cave, and he gets stuck, trapping the others behind him. Obviouslythe right thing to do is to sit down and wait until the fat man grows thin; butphilosophers have arranged that flood waters should be rising within the cave. Luckily(luckily?) the trapped party have with them a stick of dynamite with which they can

blast the fat man out of the mouth of the cave. Either they use the dynamite or theydrown.

In this case, the killing of a person is the necessary condition for the survival of severalothers. The reasoning needs to take into account the evaluation of an action comparedwith the evaluation of its omission. The decision of killing a man needs to be comparedwith another decision, i.e. to let many people die. However, in a scenario in which it is

possible that the miners survive in the cave, or that they can find a way out in time, thedecision to act in this way needs to be assessed in itself, and not as an alternative to thecontrary choice. These distinct types of evaluation need to be analyzed together with athird one, which is involved in both patterns. In both schemes, the agent can or needs to

choose between alternatives, and select the best possible action.


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These three types of evaluation, i.e. the evaluation of an action in itself, incomparison with its omission, and in comparison with its possible alternatives, lead tothe problem of how to assess an action. Von Wright underscored how in the evaluationof an act, the assessment of the intentions underlying it are not enough (Von Wright1963a, 129, 130):

If the intention in acting is morally good but the good, which is for its own sakeintended, fails to materialize--either because the intention fails in regard to its factual orin regard to its axiological object--then the act is not morally good (but morally neutral).If, on the other hand, the intended good materializes, then the act too may be calledmorally good. Similarly, if the intention in acting is morally bad but the harm, which isforeseen, does not come about, then the act is not morally bad (but morally neutral). If,on the other hand, the foreseen harm comes about, then the act too is morally bad.It is a noteworthy asymmetry between moral goodness and moral badness that the firstpresupposes that some good should be intended and, moreover, intended for its ownsake, whereas the second only requires that some bad should beforeseen to follow fromthe act.

An action (or an omission) needs to be evaluated by taking into account its foreseeableconsequences (the wanted effect and the side-effects). However, its intended effectneeds to be compared with all its possible negative consequences, which, even ifunintended, determine whether the act is good or not. The unavoidable harm (ornegative consequences) needs to be compared and minimized; the avoidable harm needsto be simply avoided (von Wright 1963a, 131). According to this criterion, the agent inthe necessary scheme needs to assess the possible good and harm resulting from

performing and forbearing an act, while in the sufficient scheme he needs to consideronly the intended and foreseeable consequences of the act. Finally, the choice betweenthe possible means to bring about a desired state of affairs needs to be made consideringthe possible harm resulting from each option, and the good and negative consequencesresulting from the choice of the ones that minimize the harm.

This type of evaluation corresponds to a pattern of reasoning linking actions andgoals different from the practical reasoning. It proceeds from an action to its effect,evaluating it as the necessary or productive cause of a desirable or undesirable state ofaffairs. We can represent this type of reasoning as the argument from consequences(from Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 332):

Argumentation scheme 4: Argument from consequences

Premise If action Qis brought about, good (bad) consequences willplausibly occur.

EvaluationGood (bad) consequences are (not) desirable (should (not)

occur).

Conclusion Therefore Qshould (not) be brought about.

For instance, the choice of blasting the man blocking the exit from the cave (in ascenario without raising water) can be evaluated in comparison with other possibleoptions (waiting until help comes, finding another exit, etc.). Each one of them has a

more or less positive outcome, and more or less positive consequences. However, thechoice of blasting the man has the consequence that it harms another human being,


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while not performing this action results in no harm for anyone. For this reason, it needsto be excluded (reasoning from negative consequences). On the contrary, in a water-raising scenario, the choice of blasting the man needs to be assessed relative to thechoice of letting many people die. In this case, the positive consequence of saving many

peoples life (intentional effect of the action) needs to be balanced against the negative

consequence of killing a man (unintentional but foreseen and necessary consequence ofthe action) (Foot 1967, 5).

In everyday reasoning, other types of choices are more frequent than the one ofblasting people to exit a cave. More frequently, ordinary moral dilemma concernchoices of actions whose classification is blurred (Ariely 2009, 196), or whoseassessment is difficult because of lack of sufficient information. Is cheating insurancecompanies by filing higher insurance claims a fraud? Is cheating on tax return stealing?In these cases, the assessment concern an action whose classification is commonlyconsidered as controversial (a smart act or a little deceit to an abstract entity such as thestate), and for this reason it is regarded as a means that can do directly little or no harmon other people, but whose positive direct and intended consequences are extremely

positive (money gained or saved). If stealing and committing frauds is less common,much more frequent is making a decision based on what is the better product. How toassess goods for whose assessment we lack the sufficient information or knowledge?Depending on our criteria of evaluation, we consider a good product a cheap one, or ahigh-quality one. However, how to determine the value of a good whose manufacturing

process is unknown or difficult to understand and assess? In such cases, thequalitatively better becomes the more expensive (Ariely 2009, 180-184). The blurredclassification is also crucial when the assessment of an action is focused on the positiveconsequences of its side-effects. Is saving money avoiding waste or buying an unneeded

product for less? All these issues of classification and definition show how the decision-making process is guided and determined by the way we define the components of an

action. The other side of the coin is that our decisions can be guided and conditioned bythe way the possible options and actions are framed.

5. Heuristic value judgmentsThe schemes mentioned above represent the complex pattern of reasoning that leadsfrom a desire to an evaluation, from an evaluation to a goal, and from a commitment toa goal to a reason to act, i.e. a reason to commit to perform a certain action. What iscrucial in this process is the evaluation. The agent needs to assess a state of affairs asdesirable or not through more or less complex types of definitions, and then, once he is

committed to a goal, he needs to assess the possible actions he can perform to bring itabout, and whether it is better to act or not to act. The definition of a good action is theground for this latter type of classification, which presupposes the assessment of the

possible consequences. These evaluative steps are often complex, subject to potentialcontroversies and, therefore, time and effort consuming. Moreover, they often requireadditional information in order to establish whether the entity, the action or the state ofaffairs can or cannot fall within the evaluative judgment. This model is ideal, as itdepicts how the reasoning can be explained based on the rational steps needed to

provide reasons for a decision. And ideal rationality is often quite different from reality.We do not always have time and patience enough to go through all the steps ofreasoning to decide on every issue. We rely on patterns of reasoning that are more

effective, i.e. that allow us to come to a fast conclusion (Chen & Chaiken 1999). Thisdifference between ideal reasonableness and effectiveness in decision making can be


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understood by taking into account the distinction between systematic (or central) andheuristic (or peripheral) reasoning, and between systematic and heuristic patterns ofclassification.

5.1. Heuristic classifications

Aristotle pointed out that the desirable is not only what is sought for its own sake, butalso what appears to be good, i.e. what is perceived as such. Moreover, as mentionedabove, there are various ways of classifying something as desirable or not. Sometimeswe simply use more defeasible types of classification (Walton &Macagno 2010).Instead of analyzing whether a state of affairs is desirableper seor is productive ofsomething desirable in itself, we can simply rely on what is usually, or often productiveof happiness. This latter type of definition by examples, or inductive definition, isclearly more defeasible, as the examples are not exhaustive, and the case may not fit theexample (Macagno & Walton 2014: 100). For instance, if goodness is defined using theexamples of its possible productive causes, such as money, beauty, etc., such qualities

and possessions are good only inasmuch as they are often productive of happiness. Aclassification of a state of affairs as good based on such definitional criteria risksleading to considering a relative good as an absolute one. Moreover, providing instancesof a category leads to other potentially weak forms of reasoning. An example such as a

prototypical case can be used to guide classifications of entities that do not correspondto the prototype, but are similar to it. In this case, the central and highly abstractreasoning by classification is replaced by a faster one, more accessible, based on what isor appears similar to an easily accessible model.

The heuristic definitions of good can account for the distinction between whatis good and what appears to be so. It can also explain why the reasoning based on themis faster and easier. Heuristic, or peripheral reasoning, can be described as a fast type of

reasoning based on easily accessible information, namely mental contents thatimmediately come to mind (Kahneman 2003, 699; 706), and aimed at providing themost immediate conclusion, without considering possible alternatives or itsdefeasibility. Such accessible contents, constituted by prototypes, stereotypes (namelygeneralizations accessible because of their emotional valence) or changes affectingones emotions, spare the individual the effort of acquiring and evaluating information,and are used to trigger a heuristic judgment (Kahneman 2003, 716). Instead of acquiringand processing information and drawing a conclusion based on the abstraction of the

properties characterizing the classification, the agent can simply reason relying on thesimilarity of an object with a prototype, which result in similar judgment on the entity to

be assessed (Kahneman 2003; Clore & Gasper 2000, 26; Petty et al.2004, 86). Insteadof evaluating a state of affairs (or an action) based on its desirability relative to theagents goals (or the possible negative foreseeable consequences), which would result ingreat effort, a person may resort to a much less complex judgment, grounded on aheuristic attribute that comes more readily to mind (Kahneman 2003, 699, 707). Heuristics is of fundamental importance when we have not the information andthe knowledge needed for the correct evaluation of a product or a state of affairs, or wedo not want to spend effort and time on the task of acquiring the needed information.How can we choose between two different drugs, if we do not have any medicalknowledge? How can we judge whether an unknown product is precious or not (Ariely2009, Ch. 2)? In such cases, we rely on what is most accessible (Kahneman 2003, 699),

i.e. the possible sign of effectiveness and preciousness, the price. Similarly, in asituation in which we do not have much time for deciding (a special deal ending soon


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for the purchase of a product), we make our decision establishing the goodness of thegood not based on the analysis of our present and future actual needs (saving definedas avoidance of waste), but on the much more accessible equations higher price =higher quality and discount = saving.In conditions of lack of adequate informationwe act on the basis of any possible accessible information that can guide our judgment,

such as possible signs or similarities, even if not directly related to the judgment(Tversky & Kahneman 1982, 14).

5.2. Heuristic classifications and systematic evaluations

The distinction between heuristic and systematic classifications can shed light on themechanisms involved in some apparent irrational judgments, which underscore the highdefeasibility of the fast routes used in decision-making. A clear example is given inthe following case (Ariely 2009, 19-20):

to buy a new pen, and the second is to buy

a suit for work. At an office supply store, you find a nice pen for $25. You are set to buyit, when you remember that the same pen is on sale for $18 at another store 15 minutesaway. What would you do? Do you decide to take the 15-minute trip to save the $7?Most people faced with this dilemma say that they would take the trip to save the $7.

[] You find a luxurious gray pinstripe suit for $455 and decide to buy it, butthen another customer whispers in your ear that the exact same suit is on sale for only$448 at another store, just 15 minutes away. Do you make this second 15-minute trip?In this case, most people say that they would not.

The two situations involve the same saving (7$) and the same effort (a 15 minute trip).However, the evaluation of the same state of affairs is radically different in the two

distinct situations. In both cases, the criterion used for the evaluation is not the ratiocost/benefit, i.e. saving money vs. wasting time. Instead, a much more accessiblecriterion is used, i.e. the ratio between cost and time effectiveness. If the difference incost is higher, the saving will be bigger. We can represent the evaluation criteria in fig.2 below:


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Choice:B

Purchase

pen X(15$) inshopA

Purchasepen X

(10$) inshop B

Better=CheaperBis much better

thanA

Shop A:

28% MoreexpensiveCloser

Shop B:39% cheaper

FartherBetter=Lesstim

e

Ai

sbetterthanB

A = B

Purchasesuit X (455$) /pen X (25$)in shopA

Purchasejacket X (448$) /

book X (18$)in shop B

Good:Avoiding waste

Shop A:7$ More

expensiveCloser

Shop B:7$ cheaper

Farther

Good:

Timeefficient

Choice:

A

Purchasesuit X

(455$) inshopA

Purchasesuit X

(448$) inshop B

Better=CheaperB is only a bitbetter thanA

Shop A:1,5% Moreexpensive

Closer

Shop B:1,6% cheaper

FartherBetter=

Lesstime

A

isbetterthanB

Better as being cheaper/closer Better as a costs/benefits ratio

Figure 2: Heuristic and systematic evaluative classifications

This figure shows how the heuristic and the systematic types of reasoning can lead todifferent evaluations. The heuristic criterion of evaluation is more accessible than thesystematic one. A cost/benefit ratio would require calculating the absolute difference

between the products, and see whether the saving is worth the time wasted relative to

the agents goals. On the contrary, a relative difference does not need to be calculated,as it appears immediately as bigger or smaller, and provides an absolute criterion(bigger relative saving equals greater good) independent of any other consideration. Forthis reason, big saving (defined as a saving relative to the comparison) is alwaysextremely good, while a small one is a much a lesser good. This criterion of evaluationis highly defeasible, as it is based on a criterion of classification that can be defeated byseveral stronger definitional criteria of what is good.

5.3. Triggering heuristic classifications

The heuristic dimension of our reasoning opens up the possibility of triggering the fast

and easy way to assessing a complex situation by providing only the most accessibleinformation. These strategies are often grounded on emotional appeals, i.e. descriptionsthat, by depicting a state of affairs similar to the audiences potential experiences andconstituting the cognitive component of an emotion (Elster 1999, 56; Pugmire 2005, 16;Keltner & Lerner 2010, 324), can trigger an emotional response. Emotions can beconsidered as instrument for activating heuristic reasoning, as our thinking is driven byemotional urge. As Clore and Gasper (2000: 30) put it,

Once an emotion is experienced, the system no longer operates as a scientist, carefullyweighing the pros and cons of the belief implied by the emotion. Instead, the emotionalperson acts like a prosecutor or a defense lawyer seeking by any means to find evidence

for the belief. Presumably, the experiential aspect of the emotion is itself responsible for


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this process of interrupting the flow, providing information, and, through associated

beliefs, guiding attention.

Emotions provide us with extremely accessible information (Frijda & Mesquita 2000,67) and lead us to make a decision not grounded on a sufficient assessment of the

information available (Keltner & Lerner 2010, 331).This mechanism of emotions and heuristic reasoning can be used for guiding and

manipulating judgments and choices. A complex state of affairs such as a war can bepresented and depicted only through highly accessible and emotional descriptions,productive of a stereotypically extremely good consequence. Thus, a war can become afight for freedom, or a battle for saving childrens lives. The choice of how we depict asituation becomes an instrument for guiding and influencing our choices, depending onwhether the description is aimed at representing or distorting the actual state of affairs.This fundamental relationship between classification and choice leads us to taking intoaccount the reasoning mechanisms underlying such apparently irrational inferences, andthe ways to drive them.

6. Framing choicesThe strategy of describing or distorting a situation by pointing out some aspects that canguide or trigger an evaluative conclusion is commonly addressed under the label offraming.Framing can be considered as a goal-directed description aimed at makingspecific features of a complex state of affairs more accessible (Entman 1993, 52):

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspectsof a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such away as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral

evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

A piece of information is made accessible and meaningful, i.e. salient (Entman 1993,53), to the audience, so that the interlocutors rely mostly or only on it in assessing thestate of affairs (see Lakoff 2010; Heink and Jaz 2014). Some of its characteristics thatcan support the desired evaluation are amplified or stressed, while others elicitingunwanted judgments are omitted. For instance, the same event of cutting down a treecan be differently framed according to the purpose of the speaker (Schiappa 2003, 152):

1. A cylindrical organic object is being rotated from a vertical to a horizontal position.2. A tree is being murdered.3. A mean old man is cutting down that nice shady tree.

The state of affair is the same in every description, but different judgments areencouraged by choosing not to specify the action and the entities involved in it (case 1),introducing inexistent properties by means of metaphors (case 2), or irrelevant anddoubtful qualities leading to a value-judgment (case 3). Framing provides an appearanceof reality, and like all appearances, it can mirror it or conceal and distort it, by excludingessential information and providing other details irrelevant for making a groundeddecision (Petty et al. 2005: 108). The process of framing is directly related with theaforementioned criteria for evaluating reality, i.e. classifying a state of affairs asdesirable or not. However, the passage between underscoring certain properties and

triggering the correspondent judgment is not immediate. As mentioned above, this stepis based on reasoning from classification, i.e. systematic or heuristic argument


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proceeding from definitions or classification criteria. Depending on how a choice isframed, i.e. how it is described, the heuristic value judgment can be affected and guided.

A famous example of the effect of framing on decision-making is the followingdescription of the possible options for dealing with a deathly disease. The first set ofoptions is described according to its positive consequences, while the second one,

identical to the first one, according to the negative outcomes (Kahneman 2003, 702

Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are asfollows:

If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there isa one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probabilitythat no people will be saved. Which one of the two programs would you favor? []

If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program B is adopted, there is aone-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600people will die.

When confronted with the first paradigm of options, the majority of respondents choseProgram A, while in the second scenario they chose Program B, even though it wasexactly identical to Program B. The difference lies in the criteria of classification(Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein 1988, 157-158). In the first case, what is better isdecided according to the option that leads to the positive consequences, and certainty ofsaving people is a better consequence than the risk of saving no one. In the second one,the framing changed the criteria. What is better is established based on the negativeconsequences, and what leads to a certain negative consequence is worse than an optionleaving the possibility of avoiding deaths at all.

Framing does not involve only the representationof a situation or an action. It isalso possible to guide the evaluation process by simply modifying the possible

alternative means to achieve a goal, i.e. the paradigm. By solely altering the number orthe type of options, without changing their description, the agents decision can bedriven towards a particular option. The principle underlying framing paradigms is that

people have difficulties settling on a single selection when there are too many choiceoptions (Kimmel 2013, 112). Choosing what is better among goods that can be assessed

by taking into account several criteria is a complex operation, and for this reason thiseffort is often avoided by not choosing at all (Kimmel 2013, 110-113). Judging whichcity is better for a weekend among the European capitals, or what jam is better among aselection of 24 choices is much more difficult than choosing between two options thatcan be compared using the same criterion (for instance, price). A solution for facilitatingthe choice is to construct a paradigm of options that provides the agent with highly

accessible criteria of classification. The agent is confronted with a set of options thatalready suggests a value judgment, so that he is guided in his decision by a heuristicclassification. A famous example is the one illustrated in the advertisement below (fig.3), in which the agent is confronted with a paradigm of three options, of which thesecond one is apparently unreasonable (it offers for the same price of the third option aservice less) (Ariely 2009, 1):


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WORLD

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FINANCE & ECONOMICS

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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BOOKS & ARTS

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84%

Figure 3: Framing paradigms of choice

Clearly, the agent chose either option 1 or option 3, with a large majority (84%) optingfor the last one. The second option, apparently useless, was inserted in order to framethe paradigm and trigger a heuristic classification. As a matter of fact, without such anoption, the majority of the agents (68%) chose the first option, which was cheaper. Theapparently useless option provided a criterion for evaluating the possible actions basedon a unique criterion, the services provided, without taking into account the otherdifferent criterion, price. Instead of evaluating the options comparing two distinct values(or attributes), the agent is led to make a decision by using only one of them, which ismuch easier. In this sense, the modification of the paradigm of choices affects the

paradigm of evaluation: instead of taking into account a ratio between two incomparablevalues (Keeney 1988), the agent establishes what is better based only on the mostaccessible criterion, the one providing a hierarchy already. We can represent thismodification of the classification in figure 4 below (adapted from Ariely 2009, 9):

A

BAttribu

te1

Attribute 2

A

-A

BAttribut

e1

Attribute 2

Figure 4: Framing the paradigms of evaluation


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The second option provides a hierarchy between option 3 and option 2 based only onone value, number of services. The comparison between the first and the third option isavoided, as more complex and involving an analysis of the agents needs and goals.

Conclusion

The decision-making process can be described as a combination of reasoning and freewill, in which the agent rationally selects what is desirable for him and the best meansto achieve it, but then needs to assent to such a goal and such an action to bring the goalabout. Argumentation theory can contribute to the debate on actions and decisions bydescribing the mechanisms involved in the choice, both of the goal and the meanstherefor. By formalizing the steps of reasoning using argumentation schemes, it is

possible to understand the crucial role played by the reasoning from classification. Anagent needs first to determine whether a certain state of affairs is desirable or not, inorder to commit himself to bring it about. He then needs to assess the possible means toachieve such a goal, and choose the best one.

In this complex process, reasoning from classification plays a fundamental role.Both the aforementioned reasoning steps presuppose a classification of a state of affairsor an action as desirable (or rather good), or more desirable (or better). Theseclassifications can be based on a systematic type of classification, grounded on abstractdefinitional criteria of desirable,resulting in a complex analysis of the availableinformation and a comparison between different principles of classification. Or suchevaluations can be made by relying on heuristic processes, proceeding from moreaccessible definitional criteria for establishing what is good. In this latter case, the agentcan reach an easy and fast conclusion, which is, however, more defeasible.

The heuristic classifications depend on how a state of affairs is represented, i.e.which dimensions and aspects are made more available to the agent. These

classificatory processes can be also guided by framing strategies, i.e. the representationof a complex state of affairs through a deliberate selection of specific aspects of it,aimed at triggering an immediate evaluation. Also the paradigms of the possible choicesor courses of actions can be framed. In this case, the number of options can be limitedand their evaluation guided or manipulated by reducing criteria of evaluativeclassification to the one made more accessible to the agent. The strategies of framingaffect the evaluative classification by simplifying the classification of a goal or anaction as desirable or more desirable, reducing the classification criteria to only one orfew ones. The complexity of comparing values and hierarchies of values is avoided, butthe risk of jumping to a hasty conclusion and becoming subject to easy manipulations

becomes extremely high.

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