-. •

01 185/13/14

VZCZCCWA301 HH PP RAYJHol RAYBHQF RAYRNNM RAyWAA RAYWBB RAYWBBJ( RAYwEE RAYWMP DE RAYWAA 217 1730805 ZNY CCCCC P 22080SZ JUN 94 PM HQADFOPS TO RAyWAA/HQADF RAYW8B~/DIO C~ERRA

RAYRNNM/LHQOPS RAYWBEI AUSTUN UN NEW YORK RAVWEE/AUSTCOM NAIROBI RAYWMP/ARMYAC'l'.IVITIES CANB.ERRA INFO RAYWBB/DEFENCB CANBERRA P,AYWHP IHQSF CNmERRA RAYWEE/DFAT RAYWEE/AUSTCOH LONDON RAYWEE/AUSTEMB PRETORIA RAYWEE/AU~OM HARARE RAYBHQF11 DIV ENOOGERA

RAYllMM/3 BDE

RAYllMM/2/4 RAR

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SIC B3L/I40

HQADP FOR SGADF AND PERS ON

DEFENCE FOR FASIP AND DGPI

AUS:rcoH..LONOON FOR- HAnS· - - - -- - - - -)

tu&J :STRATEOIC RECONNAISSlINCE - RWANDAI ' __ . - _ - . . _ __ •••, 0 ' . ... 1':- 'HQADFOPS IS TO MOUNT A S'mATEGIC RECON TO RWANDA TO CONFIRM THE

STRATmIC FEASILBILITY OF ADF PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (ONAMIR) lIND TO CONFIRM STRATEGIC

PLANNING FOR UNAMIR AT UNHQ NEW YORK.

2 . ADF PARTICIPATION IN UN1.HIR, IF APPROVED, WILL BE CALLED

OPERATION TAMAR.

3: I' IART!JC~ WILLP. I~IPATION. FOL OFFICERS PARTICIPATE; '" COL W. P. RAMSEY, COL HEALTH LHQ AND COHASC DESIGNATE. B LTCOL R.W.SHOEBRIDGE, SOl LANDOPS, HOADFOPS. ~ LTCOL W.B.COATES, SOl JOINT LOOOPS, HQADFOPS.

L'l'COL P.F.MCINTOSH, CO 2/'RAR AND CONTINGENT CO DESIGNATE. E. D.A.~ERR, A/S01 OP SPT, ADFIC.

,. ITINERARY IS:

A. AM THU 30 JUN 9 •. ASSEKBLB ADFCC FOR OPS AND INT BRIEFINGS AND

PRE-OEPAR'roRE ADMIN. PASSPORTS WITH FOUR PHOTOS REQUIRED.

B. FRI 1 JUL. BRIEFINGS, PA'iMENT OF ALLOWANCES. COLLECT VISAS. C. HeN 4 JUL. DEPART CANBERRA FOR S'fDNEY-JOHANNESBURG-NAIROBI ON

SA 281/182.

D. 6-9 JUL. BRIEPINGS/RECON NAIROBI AND ONAMIR AO. TO INCLUDE CALL ON AHC NAIROBI. DA NEW YORK REQUESTED TO COORD ALL ASPECTS OF VISIT TO ONAMIR HQ. E. 9 JUL. NAIROBI-LONDON ON BQ66. F. 11 JUL. l.ONDON-NEW YORK ON BA179. G. 13-13 JUL. BRIEFINGS, UNHQ, SPONSORED BY DA NEW YORK. H. PH 13 JUL. NEW YORK-SYDNEY ON QF302/12. I . AM 15 JUL. CANBERRA BASED OFFICERS QFSOl, SYDNEY-CANBERRA.

S.TASJ(S. STRATEGIC 'RECON TO CFM:

A. ALL DETAIL OF 1.00 CONCEPT.

r

B. UNAMIR FORCE COMO CONCEPT OF OPS. C. pOSSIBLE ASC LOCA~ION AND TASKS. D. DETAIL OF UNAMIR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS REIMBURSEMENT. E. OFFICERS TO BE PREPARED TO COVER OWN SPECIALITIES ON RECON. F. RECON PLAN TO BE DEVELOPED BY LANDOPS, HQADFOPS. 6. REPORTING. RECON TEAM TO REPORT BY CABLE TO HQADFOPS DAILY ON DETJUL OF GROUND RECON. AUSTCOM NAIROBI REQUESTED TO MAKE COMMS FACILITIES AVAILABLE. DETAILED OVERVIEW REPORT WHEN TEAM REACHES NEW YORK. 7.ADMIN. ALL ADMIN ASPECTS, LESS VISIT TO UNAMIR, WILL BE COORD BY HQADFOPS. ACTIVITY CODE IS 0002018. DRESS FOR RECON IN AFRICA IS DPeU WITH UN ACCOUTREMENTS. DRESS FOR UNHQ BRIEFINGS IS LOUNGE SUIT. 8.POC IN HQADFOPS IS 501 LANDOPS ON (06)2650047. BT DRAFTING OFFICER LTCOL R.W.SHOEBRIDGE TELEPHONE 06-2650047 RELEASING OFFICER DJOPS FILE REFERENCE OPS 94/13771 MESSAGE NO.= 0134 USERID; J02 MONTH; JON YEAR 94 PART ::

PRINTOUT REQUE LANOOPS1 A L

C UNCj)55

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11\3

FOl185/13/14 Item 2

/.

....- Commonwealth A venue

r3 -ri- Canberra ACT 2600 Cc.... . ~/J

"':;'(f, z- r~ June 23, 1994 A ~ r----r -1uV:.~ ~/S ~ .

'. ,/; c.;... ,-.. ", lflo f:F /(. ,e: .-.,:~ \

'.'';"1 ~ .:~' Senator the Honourable Gareth Evans, Q~, -1

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. - .' .~.)';J:;r)

. 68 ...- ~i ,....... .J'

.-

Swte MG ..~, . I"~ "Parliament House v "'~ .. , (' /

',,- ..,..-----:", \ "/ Canberra ACT 2600 "',-..':.-;.~_}.:...>..-r

Dear Minister:

Given that the Australian Government is considering a commitment of ADF personnel to UNAMIR II in Rwanda, I thought you might be interested in the report submitted by our Deputy Minister of Defence to his Minister after a fact-finding visit to Rwanda. As you will see from the date and its content, the report was delivered prior to the Canadian Government decision to commit a further 350 personnel to UNAMIR.

As you may be aware, we are keeping in close touch with your officials and those in your Defence Department. I am therefore sending a copy of this note and attachment

.,J I '1 High Commissioner cc: Mr. Ri fifth, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defence

Mr. Bi1~her, FAS, International Organisations and Legal Division, DFAT

to your colleague Senator Ray.

P.2

Minister

FAC ."II:"I1..Tn'''I.:rrt

areas where

.,;,<

..i" !UN 22 '94 0S:taSPM f'.'lDMC·, 6 Jun 94(

l\1tEMQRANPUM

and I travelled to week, returning last anon in Rwanda you with the a fmal on the extent of the ,

Despite the ongoing war in Rwanda the logistical wandan are now by

international Cl'Pf'\,I"P

P.3

e President of Rwanda - and his ..""·......i~ .....

~ ~ "",' Jl...1N 22 '94 05: ~I3PM ~DM(,=OL 8. COMM)'(613)S92-4751

• Ecologists taking satisfac¥ori in the fact that might now be renewed bFuse the water of lake, miles in diameter (the seeond largest fresh water the polluted by the bodies wlli.ch pour from the Kagera River at a rate

Victoria is

eight per hour (and in~'ch smaller numbers from streams) that nobody . eat the fish.

Countless stories of peep e surviving for days with ... ,..,...",.. Wotln(iS of rotting corpses; in ond' two UNAMIR observers survivors for two days LI protect them from being ......,'"'u.....

III The large numbers of JhMS whose entire extended eliminated.. .

The increasing number 0 stories of mass that come to light in the last few days: Tutsi nuns priests tom covenants and seminaries - the Rwandarts proudly insist this is "the most Catholic country in Africa" - to be slaughter~ the at gunpoint from Red Cross vehicles to be dispatched and abandoned on the road.

.. The weapon of choice which the Hutu·Militias up to the shoot..aown of

but rather the "Panga" of,

personal. I

• How do you the genocide Canadians won't believ the.r, and manage the cons these realities.

. ... "tf..... l~' .... " to Rwanda (450 UN troops) compared to

UN troops) is deemed essentially racist by ~no ene.ral of the United Nations; and when Rwanda his sibly many times more) in 2 months than Bosnia 11 2

fong?

2/6

.... '.

is The "'''''

"'\ . ..A.. - ,.

, , v' JUN 22 "34 P.5 1', ..

(' . In contrast to the low morale of the RGF troops {evident even in the meeting we had with the RGF Chief of Defence}. that of the RPF troops is high and they are ready and able to continue the war; indeed, g~ven the massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus that have occurred (and are still occurring) m RGF-held territory, it may be difficult for the RPF troops to accept anything short of total rictory. An unacceptable level of atrocities have, of course. been committed by both sides to the conflict That said, it is clear that the intensity and death-tolls of the massacres inspire1 by hard-line Hutus have been, by far, the greatest.

The most important poliJcal and strategic questions at this point are whether the leadership of the RPF will be ~g to stop the campaign before it pushcs the RGF completely out of the countty ~d! >~ve~ were it successful in doing that, whether, with only is % of the popUlation, a Tutsl-dommat:ed Government would be able to govern. RPF gains only increase the subsequent challenge ?f governing effectively and the RPF may therefore be forced into some sort of power·sharmg accommodation with moderatc elements of the Hutu population - assuming I that is, a Jufficient number of such elements stin exist if there6 is to be any kind of viable political solJtion over the longer term. For this reason, there have already been some indications tha~ the RPF will seek such an arrangement rather than attempt to set up some kind of separatel HTutsiland~. At this juncture, however, it is impossible to predict the precise point at which the RPF will be >willing to accept a ceasefue and begin the pro~s of politica.l re.contiliacion. It will certainly not be before they are convinced that effective measures can 'tie implemented to guarantee that the ongoing ma.ssacres of Tutsi people in RGF-held territory will be stopped and cannot again occur.

Without adequate UN forces to provide such assurances, there is virtually no possibility of an. early ceaseflre or any ~d of negotiated settlement. Overarching all of this, of course, is the distinct possibility [ha~ the conflict will spread to encompass Burundi, which would change the entire dynamics of tile crisis.

lJNAMIR II I

Meanwhile, with only a ~ery limited force in Rwanda., Dallaire continues his courageous attempts to mediate the ceaseflre that UN New York wants so badly - so far without success. Although its movemelnt, particularly in RGF-he1d territory, is very limite9, his small force is making a difference to the lives of the many people it is protecting in the Kigali area. The soldiers know tha.t th~y could save many more lives if they were given more resources, but they also know that without their presence in Kigali the death toll would be even higher. I .

During my stopover in ~gali, in addition to the airport area and UNA'MIR Headquarters, r visited ~~ IeRC Fieldl~ospita1 ru:d the Amah?!? ~tadium.and King Faisa! ,efugee camps. These :",'lIS left me lth ,orne pOIgnant and vIVld lmpreSSlons:

4/6

P.6 ~..o.. .. ,. .. o~ JI.J'l 22 ''34 0S: 10PM ADMCPOL 8. COMM)'(61:3)'3'32-47S1

'", .. " .

.' ,

•·r · They only kill UN and ex-patriot humanitarian assistance staff

inadvenently unless they "Tutsi-loving-neo-colorual-BelgiansM or they

simply get caught in the I-rn~ ..fi'~ as a Senegalese Major did on June 2.

• These folks torture and they don't steal. Oflen warehouses in Kigali everywhere; but althoug found intact whenever a

•

•

The day we spent at the vital dimension to the problem: the which is still growing by the thou 300,000 refugees; 200,000 of whom April 28. To date, the camp - an example of the successful \,.VlJ,l;lUV1Q.U.U' UNHCR and IFRC.

Now that the rainy improved to the point where the aid associated with surface transpon Many problems remain, including the areas (the pressure of the people on

women, men and small children on a whim, but s difficult to get to the many well stocked throughout the country. Food is a problem these storage facilities are ungarded, the supplies are

convoy can get to them.

did 7 tours of S weeks each into Sarajevo from were never shot at (others, of course, were, but

taken 3 hits in 3 weeks. The DeDS's Executive who led his regiment south from Croatia into former Yugo vets here. All agree this is serious

more horrible. None believe the mission should be the world community.

is the UN force's only lifeline and Dallaire does be - or would have been · sustainable without it.

I................... is part of the cost of being here, as long as 'Clo.'...... , and there is a war on.

refugee camp allowed us to witness another ve outflux of refugees from Rwanda. The camp,

each day, now accommodates the basic needs of over in the Ngara region over a 25 hour period on

city the size of Quebec or Ottawa - is a remarkable of 14 different NGOs under the leadership of

is ending, access to the area - still difficult - has o ..n,,..,·,,,( now appear to be resolving the problems

earlier had threatened the entire success of the eff~rt. to move a good proportion of the refugees to new

land at the present site is unmanageable, with daily

5/6

.... '. .~

'\ ........... ". • • ;0' ruN 22 '94 es: llF'M ADM(F'OL 8. P.?

(" r' '-. . , " ..

masses of refugees • including women children· walking 20-30 km to fetch wood for cooking fires in the cool to an effective security system (despite considerable discipline, there are signs f &rowin, problems with theft and violence, including widespread rape] within r community). There's no doubt that a number

Interahamwe Militiamen are inel i~ the population. They. of course, have the most to fear from the encroaching bent on revenge. The medical staff also are ve:ry alive to the possibilhy of an 0 a. epidemic such as cholera. The!,!! is some malaria, yellow fever, men.ingi kwashiorkor and dysentery in the camp; all, as yet, within manageable proportion.

The greatest threat b? t effectiveness of the camp at this point is the very possibility of another massive influx: of is coping nowJ but a. significant

increase could change the entire equati~ln response of the world . ...... , ............... y to such an event will have 0 be a.t least as swift and effective as it was at the ~nd

April. However, the relief agencies admit would unable to cope adequately. without Significant governmental • poss bly military· involvement. .

Robert Fowler

6/6

. " .

."" ............

.... "..

! ....... ., b4/;fA111l.

FOl185/13 1 IIem3 Sa 11

HEADQUARTERS AUSTRALIAN' DEFENCE FORCE, OPERATIONS

Land Operations Cell

Directorate of Joint Operations

Au'" otta.. CANBERRA. ACT 2IlOO FAX: 06-2485603

OISCON FAX: 26207

I __ _ __---J! I~~ JUN 94I:...P_r8C8daI IOe_:O: UT_I_NE PLEASE PASS TO:

AUSTON UN NEW YORK FOR COLONEL PRICKETT, LHQOPS FOR COLONEL RAMSEY, 2/4 RAR FOR CO.

I,FAX' AUSTUN. I

LHQOPS " 077-~~

TEL • ,...... ~

Pagea:

2

aq.ct

ITINERARY - STRATEGIC RECON I RWANDA

i "Remarks:

1. At1achecI Islhe conflnned Ilnerary tor the HQADFOPS NCOn tor UNAMIR. Allhls ataoe. all booklng8 are confirmed, .... the hotel' In New York which DA New York Is reqUMted to book.

2. The pertod In KenyalUgancllllRWMCla may c"ng. dlplndlng an lhe HQ UNArM Hlnera., and our &bUlly 10 gel 11110 KIgali and epNk 10 lhe FC and hlelt8ft. DANY II Nqueal8d to provide tbe propoeed UNAMR ......., ASAP.

3. Chang.. will be mild. In ....robl .. required.

4. ItlnetWy will be cabled 10 AHC NIIrobi.

We are pleased to advise the following travel arrangements for;

COATES W. LTCOL

SHOEBRIDGE R. LTCOL

RAMSAY W. COL

MciNTOSH P. LTCOL

>- l(.E:RQ, Do t'r\P\:S.

DEPART CANBERRA ARRIVE SYDNEY ANSETI AUSTRALIA

DEPART SYDNEY MON 4JUL 94 8.35 PM ARRIVE JOHANNESBURG TUES 5 JUL 94 5.20 AM SOUTH AFRICAN A W SA 281 J CLASS CONFIRMED

DEPART JOHANNESBURG TUES 5 JUL 94 9.00 AM ARRIVE NAIROBI TUES 5 JUL 94 2.05 PM SOUTH AFRICAN AW SA 182 J CLASS CONFIRMED

DEPART NAIROBI ARRIVE LONDON/HEATHROW BRI11SH AIRWAYS

DEPART LONDON/HEATHROW ARRIVE NEW YORKlJFK BRITSH AIRWAYS

DEPART NEW YORKlJFK ARRIVE LOS ANGELES OANTAS AIRWAYS

AN 140

BA 68

BA 179

OF 302

MON 4 JUL 94 MON 4 JUL 94 J CLASS

SAT 9 JUL 94 SAT 9 JUL 94 J CLASS

MON 11 JUL 94 MON 11 JUL 94 J CLASS

WED 13 JUL 94 WED 13 JUL 94 BUSINESS CLASS

5.35 PM 6.10 PM CONFIRMED

10.15 AM 5.00 PM CONFIRMED

6. 30 PM 9.10 PM CONFIRMED

6. 00 PM 8.52 PM CONFIRMED ·

OF 302 SERVICE OPERATED BY AMERICAN AIRLINES · DEPART LOS ANGELES OF 12 WED 13 JUL 94 10.30 PM ARRNE SYDNEY FRI 15 JUL 94 6.05 AM OANTAS AIRWAYS BUSINESS CLASS CONFIRMED

DEPART SYDNEY ARRIVE CANBERRA OANTAS AIRWAYS OF 501

FRI 15 JUL 94 FRI15 JUL 94 BUSINESS CLASS

8.10 AM · 8.50 AM CONFIRMED or

HOLIDAY INN LONDON· 11·13 JUL • BOO~_ED BEEKMAN TOWERS NEWYORK - 1315 JUL

HILTON NAIROBI - 5 • 6 JUL & 8 - 9 JUL - BOOKED

OANTAS AIRWAYS AIRWAYS ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE TERMINAL INFORMATION

- FOR AUSTRALIAN CITIES

OF 001 - OF 399 - INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL

OF 4oo-0F 999 - OANTAS DOMESTIC TERMINAl.

r f' ·

FOI 185/13/14 Item 3 Serial 2

r

HEADQUARTERS AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE,OPERAnONS Land Operations Cell

Directorate of Joint Operations

Rus68/t Offices, CANBERRA, ACT 2600 FAX: 06-2485603

DISCON FAX: 26207

~ia.__~___~_:_C_L_AS____~i I~IORITY IDa"';~ J1JN 9' PLEASE PASS TO: FAX • AUSTUN AND

02-3393556, pagaa:

AUSTON NEW YORK FOR COLONEL TEL. 2 C.R.PRICKETT. FOR INFO: LHQ FOR COLONEL W.P.RAMSEY. LHQOPS PLS PASS TO LTCOL P.F.MCINTOSH.

SUbject:

UNAMIR II - STRA::'-=-:::T=E:-=G~I~C~R=E=C=ON 7 ___. ___ - - - - - - .- - ._ J

TELECON DA NY/S01 LANDOPS OF AM 21 JUN 94

r

r

.' Remarks:

1. The Minister has directed that a strategic recon to RwandalUNAMtR Is to occur as IOnn a8 possible. Government Is &till considering contribUtion to UNAMIR II. The likely date Of doclsion Is unknown.

2. Aim of recon Is to connnn etrateglc feas/billy of an ADF contrtbutlon to UNAMIR II and provide adVice to Govemment.

3. TO 'acllnate planning and concurrent activity, HQADFOPS Imend to deplOy a stral recan team to Rwanda and New York. Proposed itinerary Ia:

a. 4 Jul. Canberra· Sydney - JOhannesburg. Nairobi. b. 6 - 9 Jul. Bneflngh'econ Nairobi and Rwanda. H Is requested that HQ UNAMIR

coord this section of the racon, to Include call1brleflng wHh FC and senior planning staff, visit to propOMd Forward LogistIcS Base, vlalt to proposed loe for any ASC and other call8IVl8Its that you deem appropJ1ate. Temn will 8180 need time to call on AHC NaIrobi.

c. 9 Jut NairobI - london. d. 11 Jut. london - New York. e. 12 ·13 Jut. Brteflngs, UNHQ. Recan party will marry-up with MAJ J.Eddlngton,

Fin Rep deSignate who will be In New York as pan of ex-UNTAC visit. f. PM 13 JuL New York - Sydney. g. AM 15 Jul. Sydney - Canberra.

4. Fol Info Is required ASAP: a. Cfm that dates are eultable lor UNHQ and HQ UNAMIR II. b. Cfm that UN can sponsor team for period of visit In Africa, In terms of provision

of !pt, brleflngs, protection. temporary UN 10, acen In Kigali, visits to FHQ and Forward logistics 8888.

c. Cfm loe of HQ UNAMIR II. d. Team Is required to cfm:

- log concept. Incl all known detail of Force rned plan, Including AME; movt and finance.

- FC concept of operatIOns.

• oller of poena to ADF Officers on FHQ.

- dltalla of tp contributor reimbursement.

5. Team consl8t8 of: a. COL W.p.Ramaey, COMASC Designate. b. lTCOL R.W.Shoebrtdge, S01 Land Ops, HQADFOPS. c. LTCOl W.B.Coatee, S01 Joint logl8l1Cs Operations, HQADFOPS. d. LTCOL P.F.Mclntosh. COntingent CO Designate. e. MAJ D.A.Kerr, AlS01 Operational Suppan. ADFIC.

6. It Is again emphaSised that the racon Is to acquire InfO 8IIU needed by Government to 8881st In their deliberations. Detailed questions for UNHQ will be passed to you as soon 8S posafble.

7. Australian participation In UNAMIR Is stili subject to Govenvnent consideration.

8. Grateful for an early response.

Regards.

From: SOl LAND 06547F LTCOL OPERATIONS 2650047IR. SHO:::lOOE

Position Phone No.

-', -, ·1"'_ oI"l FOI 18511.:1I

\,)"'",., \ ,"" II rn 3

Senal '3

Headquarters AuatraUan Defence Force

MINUTE ACOPS BP 3199/94

OPS 94/13771

CO JSHC

SOl HP (CP4-6-22)

For Information:

DJOPS

LTCOL W.B. Coates

MAJ D.A. Kerr

CONTINGBNCY PREPARATION - rHMONISATION

References:

A. Telecon LTCOL Paterson/MAJ Heath of 14 Jun 94 B. Telecon GPCAPT Harrex/MAJ Heath of 15 Jun 94

1. HQADF is required to maintain a team ready to undertake strategic reconnaissance for possible ADF deployments. Due to the long lead time required, ACOPS has directed that the following personnel are to undertake an immunisation regime in preparation for a possible deployment to Rwanda:

LTCOL R.W. Shoebridge, RAAC;a. LTCOL W.B. Coates, RAAOC; andb. MAJ D.A. Kerr, Austlnt;c.

2. CO JSHC is requested to organise a program of immunisation ensuring that the above personnel would be ready for deployment by 12 Jul 94.

3. SOl HP is requested to provide CO JSHC, by NLT 16 Jun 94, a list of those medical countermeasures required for Rwanda.

4. Your assistance is appreciated.

47F .. SHOEBRI

UI'COL SOl LAND OPS M-B-22 Ext 50047

IS Jun 94

J

..

HEADQUARTERS AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

Directorate of Joint Operations

Russell Offices, CANBERRA, ACT 2600

Classification: Dateffime:Ip-UNCLAS PRIORITY 151130K JUN 94

IPLEASE PASS TO: f-1~_~_:_2_6_5_5_22_9_~11:'~ CO JSHC

Subject:

CONTINGENCY PREPARATION IMMUNISATION

RefefBnce:

Telecon: LTCOL Patterson/MAJ Heath of 14 Jun 94

Remarks:

Sir,

Attached is request for support to a rapid program of

immunisation. SGADF will advise you on the countermeasures

required by AM 16 Jun 94.

Please advise when you can start the program.

Regards.

From: MAJ S02 LAND (06) J.M. HEATH OPERATIONS 2650045

Name Position Phone No.

iI

I

HEADQUARTERS AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

Directorate of Joint Operations

Russell OffICeS, CANBERRA, ACT 2600

ClasslHcation: Dalemme:I-~ UNCLAS PRIORITY 151130K JUN 94

PLEASE PASS TO: FAX # 2663933

501 H P (CP4-6-22) TEL # EJ Subject: Reference:

CONTINGENCY PREPARATION Telecon: GPCAPT HarrexlMAJ IMMUNISATION Heath of 15Jun 94

Remarks:

Sir,

Attached is requ~~ for support to a rapid program of immunisation. I discussed with GPCAPT Harrex yesterday, please provide CO JSHC with a list of countermeasures required by AM 16 Jun 94.

!

Regards.

MAJ S02 LAND (06) J.M. HEATH OPERATIONS 2650045

Name Position Phone No.

/ .. r".

f'

FOI 185/13/14 Item 3 Serial 4

VZCZCCWA588 HH RR RAYRNNM RAYWBB RAYWEE DE RAYWAA 273 1780039 ZNY RRRRR R 27.0039Z JUN 94 FM HQADFOPS TO RAYWEE/AUSTCOM NAIROBI INFO RAYWBB/DEFENCE CANBERRA RAYRNNM/LHQOPS RAYWEE/DFAT RAYWEE/AUSTUN UN NEW YORK BT RES T RIC TED SIC E3L/I40 DEFE~E FOR F.ASIP SUBJ:~QADFOPS STRATEGIC RECON - RWANDA' A. HQADFOPS SIC E3L/I4b OF 220805Z -JUN 94 1. REFERENCE OUTLINED TASKING, COMPOSITION AND PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR HQADFOPS STRATEGIC RECON TO RWANDA. IT IS AGAIN EMPHASISED THAT TASK IS TO CONFIRM STRATEGIC FEASIBILITY OF ADF PARTICIPATION IN UNAMIR II, PRIOR TO FURTHER GOVERNMENT CONSIDERATION. 2. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO RECON TEAM DURING ITS TIME IN KENYA. IF POSSIBLE, COULD TEAM BE MET ON ARRIVAL NAIROBI? ETA IS 1405HRS TUE 5 JUL ON SA182 EX JOHANNESBURG. 3. RECON WOULD BE ASSISTED IF FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE: A. CONTACT WITH UNAMIR LIAISON OFFICE IN NAIROBI, IF ONE EXISTS. B. INITIAL CONTACT WITH CANADIAN AIRLIFT CONTROL ELEMENT OF UNAMIR, THROUGH CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION. C. ANY DETAIL ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF RWANDA, INCLUDING ROAD MAPS. D. IF POSSIBLE, CONFIRMATION OF ITINERARY WITH UNAMIR. 4. AS THE TEAM HAS A REPORTING SCHEDULE TO MEET, GRATEFUL IF YOUR COMMS FACILITIES COULD BE USED. 5. TEAM IS BOOKED INTO NAIROBI HILTON. 6. WOULD APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO CALL ON HIGH COMMISSIONER ON ARRIVAL AND EXIT. 7. HQADFOPS POC IS LTCOL ROB SHOEBRIDGE, (06)2650047 (WORK) . BT DRAFTING OFFICER LTCOL R.W.SHOEBRIDGE TELEPHONE 50047 RELEASING OFFICER LTCOL R.W.SHOEBRIDGE FILE REFERENCE OPS94/13771 MESSAGE NO.= 0135 USERID = J02 MONTH = JUN YEAR = 94 PART

_, U JMI"A

FOl18S/13/14 Item 4 Serial 1

OUTWARD CABLE

PAGE lof3 O.NAOOO702 PRTACSN 154 1640 06.07.94

0.NA702 1632 06.07.94 CLA

TO.

PP CANBERRA/

D.

PP UN NEW YORK/

FM. NAZROBZ/ DB /MAN

RBSTRZCTED

HQADFOPS FOR ACOPS, DGJOP AND DJOPS DBFBRCB rOR DZO AND FASZP DFAT AUSTON UN NEW YORK

RBSTRZCTBD

RBCON TEAM SZTRBP NUMBER 1

START OF SUMMARY

1. RBCON TEAM ARRZVED SAFETY ZN NAZROBZ. PM 5 JUL HAVE BAD BRZBFZHGS/DZSCUSSZONS WZTH HOM, ORAMZR CIVZLZAH REPS ZH NAZROBZ AND CANADZAH DBl"EHCB FORCB lU!:CON TEAM. LAHDOPS AND ADrZC REP ALSO HELD DZSCUSSZONS WZTH COMASC UNOSOM ZZ.

END OF StJllMARY

CALL ON HZGB COMHl:SSZOHER

2 • HOM BRIBFKD ON TEAM TASKS. TEAM WAS BRZEFBD ON LZKBLY DEVELOPMDlTS ZN RWANDA, RELATZOHS BB'l'WEEN RPP AND tnDNZR, CURRENT SZ'l'UATZON ZH BURUHDZ. ZH ESSENCE, RPF AND ORAMZR HAVE GOOD WORKZHG RELATZOHSHZP AND SZ'l'tJATZOH ZH BURUHDZ ZS RELATZVBLY CALM.

3. PROBLEM OF MOMBASSA AS A POE NAB :RAJ:SED. PORT CANHOT CUl\RBNTLY HANDLE VOLUME 01" TRAPFZC AND DB!.~YS COULD BB EXPBCTED zr ORAMZR WAS TO USE THZS AS ZTS HAm MARZTnm POE. MJ:SSZOH REQUESTED TO PROVZDB ZNFORMATZON ON :INPRASTRUCT'O'RE m RWANDA, ROUTES ZH'l'O RWANDA, L OF C DATA FOR MOMBASSA, DAR ES SALAAM AND ROUTBS ZR'l'O RWANDA.

4. LANDOPS RA:ISBD PROVZS:ION OF AN ADF LO ZF{tmDERLnmD ONE) PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO UNAMZR. TH:IS OFFER WAS WELCOMBD BY HOM. RECOMMEND THAT ACT:ION BE ZH:ITZATED HOW TO ZDEmTZFY AN On':ICBR FOR A SHORT TERM A'l"1'ACBMEN'l'. OFFZCER SHOULD, PRBFBRABLY, BE A MOVEMENTS MAJOR (E) •

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OUTWARD CABLE

PAGE 2 of3 O.NAOOO702 PRTACSN 154 1640 06.07.94

UNAMJ:R C:IVJ:L:IAN STAFF

5. TEAM HAD A BR:IEF MEET:ING W:ITB UNAMI:R CIVI:L STAFF. TEAM WAS .ADV:ISED THAT ENTRY :INTO RWANDA ON 6 JUL Wl:LL BE UN' A:IRCRAF'l' TO EHTEBBB, UN' HEL:ICOPTER TO UGANDAN/RWANDAN BORDER AND THEN BSCORTED CONVOY INTO KIGALI. KIGALI IS NOW IN RPF BANDS. GOOD RELATIONSHIP RPF AND UNAMIR WAS AGA:IN HIGHLIGHTED, W:ITH THE NEED TO GIVE RPF 24 HOORS NOTICE TO MOVE UNAMl:R PERSONNEL THROUGH RPF HELD AREAS.

6. FOLLOWING INFORMATION WA PROVIDED IN RELATION TO UNAMIR FORCE STRUCTURE:

A. CURREN'l'LY 60 MILITARY PERSONNEL, 20 UN' CIVJ:LIAN STAFF AND 450 MBMBBRS OF GHANIAN BATTALION ARE IN KI:GALI.

B. CONFIRMED FOLLOW ON BATTALIONS ARE FROM 'l'UHISI:A, ZAIRE, THE CONGO .AND NIGERI:A. ALL WILL COME W:ITB SIGNIFICAN'l' EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS. OVERCOMING THIS LOGISTICS PROBLEM WILL NOT SEE THEM DEPLOY BEFORE LATE AUG 94.

C. EHTBBBE TO BE USED AS MAIN AIRHEAD, THEN ROAD INSERTION OF FE INTO KIGALI.

7 • SITUATION WAS DESCRIBED AS "FLUID" W:ITH A CLEARER SITUATION DEVELOPING IN THE NEXT 'l'WO WEEKS.

CANADIAN DEFENCE FORCE RECON TEAM

8. ADP TEAK HAD THE OPPOR'l'UHITY TO SPEAK WITH THB CADF RECON TEAM, LED BY LTCOL M. HANRAHAN', CO DESIGNATE. FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PROVJ:DED:

A. ADVANCED PARTY ON 481DlS NTM FROM 16 JUL. CONTXHG&:J.n' TASK W:ILL BE AS THE FORCE COMMUNICATIONS UN%T.

B. CONTINGENT W:ILL BE LOGISTICALLY SELF-SUSTAIHING,RESUPPLYIHG THROUGH EN'l'EBBE AND DEPLOYING W:ITB 60 DAYS SUPPLIES.

C. VERY KEEN TO SEE AN AUSTRALXAN :INVOLVEMENT.

D. THEY WILL DEPLOY W:ITB EHG:IHEBR TROOP TO PROVIDE IH:ITIAL SURGE CAPACITY.

9. WITH THE FALL OF KIGALI TO THE RPF, THEY ASSESS THE SITUATION THREAT AS LOW TO MEDIUM, RISING TO MEDIUH OUTSIDE KIGALI.

10. INDIV:IDUAL ADF TEAM MEMBERS WERE BRIEFED ON THEIR SPECIALIST AREA, INFORMATION PROVIDED W:ILL BE CONFIRMED AFTER RECON INTO RWANDA.

http:06.07.94

r FOI 185/13/14 Item 4 Serial 2

FAX TO 61-6-2485603

FM: HQADF UNAMIR RECON TEAM UNAHIR TO: HQADFOPS I 9~ JUL - b .20 . 2 q I

DEFENCE CANBERRA DIO CANBERRA DFAT AUSTUN UN NEW YORK AUSTCOM NAIROBI

HQADFOPS FOR ACOPS, DGJOP AND DJOPS DEFENCE FOR FASIP

FOR ADFCC. PLEASE TRANSMIT TO .oTHER ADDRESSEES

HQADFOPS RECON TEAM - SITREP NO.2, 6 JUL 94

START OF SUMMARY 1. RECON TEAM ENTERED RWANDA, VIA ENTEBBE, AND COMMENCED BRIEFINGS AT HQ UNAMIR. SITUATION IN RWANDA HAS DRASTICALLY CHANGED WITH THE REAL PROSPECT OF AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFlRE. BRIEFINGS WILL CONTINUE ON 7 JUL, WITH TEAM DEPARTING KIGALI FOR NAIROBI AM 8 JUL 94. END OF SUMMARY

ENTRY TO RWANDA AND PROPOSED UNAMIR MSR 2. TEAM ENTERED BY CANADIAN C-130 FROM NAIROBI TO ENTEBBE, CANADIAN CIVIL CONTRACTED HELICOPTER (BELL UH MODEL) AND UNARMED, ESCORTED ROAD CONVOY RWANDAN/UGANDAN BORDER TO KIGALI. 3. CURRENTLY, FORCE COMMANDER (Fe) UNAMIR PLANS TO USE ROAD ENTEBBE-KIGALI AS HIS MSR. THE ROAD IS A VERY GOOD, SEALED, ALL WEATHER TWO LANE ROAD, WITH GOOD ROAD-SIDE DRAINAGE. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF ANY ROAD DAMAGE OR POT-HOLING. SHOULD TAKE UP TO SEMI-TRAILER. THERE ARE NO BY-PASSES OR ALTERNATE ROUTES. LATERAL ROADS ARE DIRT. 4. NORTHERN AREA OF ROUTE IS THROUGH NATIONAL PARK, OPEN UNDULATING SAVANNAH, 5. AREAS OUTSIDE NATIONAL PARK, ON THE MSR, ARE SPARSELY POPULATED, WITH NUMEROUS UNOCCUPIED VILLAGES. POPULATION APPEAR TO BE WELL FED AND HEALTHY. LITTLE EVIDENCE OF MILITARY AGE MEN IN THE VILLAGES. 6. RPF PRESENCE. RPF PRESENCE IS OBVIOUS THROUGHOUT THE AREA TRAVERSED, IN THE FORM OF ROADBLOCKS/CHECK POINTS AND ROAD MOVEMENT OF RWANDAN "TECHNICALS". ROAD BLOCKS ARE AT ROAD INTERSECTIONS OR VILLAGES. FORCES ARE IN EVIDENCE IN ALL POPULATION CENTRES AND ARE GENERALLY WELL TURNED OUT. ALTHOUGH THERE APPEARED TO BE A VARIETY OF WEAPONS, AK-47 WERE THE MOST COMMON. TYPICAL UNIFORM WAS GREEN SHIRT AND TROUSERS WITH BLACK BERET OR GREEN FORAGE CAPS OR CLOTH BERETS. RPF APPEARED TO BE WELL DISCIPLINED AND TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH UNAMIR PERSONNEL. NO PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED BY THE TEAM AT THE BORDER CROSSING OR ROAD BLOCKS. HOWEVER, IF NAMES DO NOT APPEAR ON THE RPF/UN BORDER CROSSING MANIFEST, CROSSING IS DENIED. 7. LOGISTICS . POINTS. INFRASTRUCTURE APPEARS TO BE RELATIVELY UNDAMAGED. WATER IS EXPECTED TO BE RESTORED TO HQ

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UNAMIR SOON. FEW CIVILIAN VEHICLES WERE SEEN. THOSE SEEN RANGED FROM SMALL UTILITIES TO ARTICULATED LORRIES. 8. TEAM IS ACCOMMODATED AT UNAMIR HQ IN THE HOTEL AMOHORO.

INITIAL BRIEFING UNAMIR HQ 9. THE TEAM WAS BRIEFED B FMF, CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER. AFTER AN ENTHUSI , HE PROVIDED A BRIEF SITUATION UPDATE: A. GENERAL KAGAME HAS INDICATED TO UNAMIR THAT HE IS READY

TO NEGOTIATE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. HE BELIEVES THAT HE HAS ACHIEVED HIS OBJECTIVE AND DOES NOT WISH TO MILITARILY CAPTURE ALL OF RWANDA.

B. HE SUPPORTS AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE ARUSHA ACCORDS AND THE INSERTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL COMMISSION.

C. IT IS LIKELY THAT KIGALI AIRPORT WILL OPEN FOR OPERATION ON 7 JUL AND BE USED TO INSERT THE REMAINDER OF THE GHANAIAN BATTALION. AFTER THAT INSERTION, FC PRIORITY IS TO USE THE AIRFIELD FOR HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT OPERATIONS. FC, AT HIS LATER BRIEFING, REQUESTED THAT THE SOFA (REFERRED TO AS THE STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT) ESTABLISHED WITH THE RGF/INTERIM GOVERNMENT, BE REVISITED WITH THE RPF.

D. UNAMIR IS LIAISING WITH FRENCH FORCES TO CONFIRM THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF PROTECTED ZONES. UNAMIR IS ACTING AS THE CONDUIT BETWEEN THE RPF AND FRENCH FORCES.

10. THESE DEVELOPMENTS WILL OBVIOUSLY IMPACT ON THE FC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED LOGISTICS PLANNING. 11. FOLLOWING IS CURRENT DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE: A. MID-JUL. GHANAIAN BN AND TUNISIAN COY. B. MID TO END JUL. ZIMBABWE BN. C. END JUL. ETHIOPIAN BN. D. END JUL. CANADIAN FORCE COMMUNICATIONS UNIT. 12. TEAM BRIEFED ON THE REASON FOR THE HQADFOPS MISSION.

BRIEFING BY FC, MAJGEN DALLAIRE 13. TEAM ATTENDED EVENING "PRAYERS". 14. FC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, BASED ON CURRENT RPF/FRENCH DEVELOPMENTS, IS: A. CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS WITH RPF, INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND

FRENCH ON 7 JUL. POSSIBILITY OF CEASEFIRE ON 10 JUL. B. CONCEPT IS FRENCH PROTECTION ZONE IN THE SOUTH,

EVENTUALLY FRENCH TO BE REPLACED BY THE SECOND DEPLOYED UNAMIR BN. INTERIM GOVERNMENT/RGF NORTHERN ZONE WITH GHANAIAN BN.

C. THIRD ZONE IS AREA CURRENTLY HELD BY RPF. D. UNAMIR TO OPERATE BEHIND "GREEN LINE". 15. TEAM WILL HAVE SEPARATE BRIEFING WITH FC AM 7 JUL.

COMMENT 16. TEAM HAS BEEN VERY WELL RECEIVED. UNAMIR ARE VERY KEEN FOR AUSTRALIA TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MISSION AND PROVIDE MEDICAL SUPORT GROUP AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. FROM CURRENT INFORMATION, THE REQUIREMENT FOR A CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE. 17. THE Fe CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS IS AS ACHIEVABLE NOW AS IT WILL EVER BE. IN SUMMARY, A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT PRECONDITIONS OF UNAMIR SEEM TO BE ~CHIEVABLE.

.' I' 0,. r · 1

FUTURE INTENTIONS 18. PLANNED ITINERARY IS: A. AM 7 JUL. MISSION BRIEFS. B. PM 7 JUL. VISIT KING FAISAL AND KIGALI HOSPITALS AND

DISCUSSIONS WITH UNAMIR BRANCH HEADS. C. FURTHER REPORT PM 7 JUL. D. .AM 8 JUL. DEPART FOR NAIROBI, HOPEFULLY BY AIR FROM

KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. 19. FAX FROM LANDOPS 2 RE CANADIAN REPORT ' RECEIVED. PLEASE HOLD UNTIL OUR RTA.

RAMSEY/SHOEBRIDGE/KERR

FAX ENDS

--

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"--'> lJI\IA"'~- ;7... l ~-...,).0 .~ ·

[ "y.n" .. ~r;.... oJl r; / o-Il~}- _r N ~M !M> F-r h.-~Lc~:.--,PLEASE PAX TO. 61-6-2485603 --r s47F I . FOR ADFCC:

PL8A.SE TRA!lSHIT ON Olm BJm.ALlP TO OTHER ADDRESSEES. REGARDS,

LTCOL ROB SHOBBRIDGE.

HQADFOPS FOR ACOPS, DGJOP AND DJOPS DEFENCE FOR 010 AND FA5IP DFAT AUSTUN UN NBW YORK AUSTeOM NAIROBI

HQADF UNAMIR RECOK TEAM - SITREP NO.3, ? JUt 94

START OF SUMMARY

FOl185/13/14 Item 4 Serial 3

, • 'T'F.A.N 'AF.CF.TVF.n .l. 1U.NC:F. OF nR'T'.l.TT.F.n ~'ATT;!1i'TNC~ nr .l.M .l.Hn THEN A TOUR OF l(IGALI IN PM AND FINAL DISCUSSIONS WITH FC~"---DURING THE AM BRIEF WITH FORCE COMMANDER (FC), HE STRESSED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF A VIABLE, ABa TYPE MEDICAL FACILITY IS • ESSENTIAL FOR THE SCHEDULED DEPLOYMENT, AND CONTINUINGOPERATION OF UNAHIR. HE INDICATED THAT THE _NON-AVAILABILITY -; OF THIS FE WOULD SLOW FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS, WITH SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL IMPACT ON UNAMIR'S ABILITY TO ACHIEVE ITS MANDATE •• THIS THEME OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AUSTRALIA 'S CON'l'RIBU'l'ION, AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, WAS A . CONSTANT THEME DURING THE BRIEFINGS. BRIEFINGS ON THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND THE LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN, INDICATE THAT BOTH ARE: WORKABLE. 2. WITH THE LIXELIHOOD OF A CEASEP' IRE , AND WORKABLE CONCEPTS, APE PARTICIPATION IN UNAKIR IS VIABLE. 3. FC P~S CONFIRMED THAT AN ASe WOULD FUNCTION AS A COHESIVE'

GROUP AND HE HAS OFFERED A NUMBER OF HQ POSITIONS TO

AUSTRALIA.

END OF SUMMARY

FC MORNING BRIEFING 4. Fe CONFIRMEDt A. A5C WOULD OPERATE AS A COHESIVE GROUP, PREFERABLY FROM A

PERMANENT HOSPITAL STRUCTURE III ~IGALI • A NtJMBER OF SITES WERE VISITED DURING THE AFTERNOON RECON.

B. TAS1

· r

BASE:D ON ZONE CONCEPT KEHTIONED IN SITREP NO.2. CONCEPT IS THREE ZONES, WITH UNAMIR SUPERIMPOSED. ZONES ARE RGF/INTERIK~GOVERNMENT, RPF AND FRENCH PROTECTED ZONE. 9. THE UNAMIR HISSION REMAINS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. USING P'l:VE BNS. CURRENTLY, ONLY THREE COUNTRIES (GHANA, ZIMBABWE; AND ETHIOPIA) HAVE KADE PIRM OFFERS OF TROOPS. MORB'INFORMATION MAY BE AVAILABLE AFTER THE 7 JUL TROOP. CONTRIBUTORS MEETING IN NEW YORK. UNAMIR HAS STILL NOT:O RECEIVED OfFERS FOR ENGINEERS OR HELICOPTERS. 10. IN THIS CONCEPT, GHANAIAN BN WOULD DEPLOY INTO RGF :tl!:crcm, ~Z:;CC"D OIC I:n'TO l"lUiJfCn .:5l:CTOR ArID Rl:J'IAI1'fI1'fG I:IJf~ Zln'O, RPt' SECTOR. COO REMARXED THAT ' EVEN IF CUSEFIRE HOLDS, THE' POTSNTIAL STILL EXISTS 70R GUERILLA WARFARE TO OCCUR. ~ 11. WITH THE LIKELY COMMENCEMENT OF A CEASEFIRE, THIS CCNCEP~ 01" O~J:!:!(A'l'~ONS J.S ASSl!:SSl:lJ AS Sl:HfG WOH.KAHLJ!:.

ENGINEER BRIEF. 1::1. TEAH WAg aIU~FED ON ,MINE THREAT IN NOR'l'HElUl RWANDA.: r · BRIEFING NOTES WILL RTA WITH THE TEAM. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 13. TEAM WAS BRIEFED BY eSIEP OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CELL, COL YAACHE (GHANA). HE BRIEFED ON ONAMIR SUPPORT FOR' DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA, PARTICULARLY RIGALI. CURRENTLY, UNAMIR ONLY HAS ACCESS TO NORTHERN CCAHPS IN RPF HELD AREAS. 14. UNAMIR IS PROVIDING PRTECTION AND FEEDING, STAFFED THROUGH AN OPS AND LIAISON CELL IN ONAMIR HQ. THIS CELL LINKS· INTO THE UN RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE (UNREO). 15. A LIMITED NUMBER OF NGO'S CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN NORTHERN' RWANDA. 16. A COpy OF THE BRIEF WILL RTA WITH THE TEAK.

MILITARY OBSERVERS GROUP 17. 222 UN MILITARY OBSERVERS ARE ASSIGNED TO UNAMIR. CURRENTLY 94 ARE DEPLOYED IN RWANDA PERFORMING ESCORT AND. LIAISON TASKS. IT IS PLANNED THAT THEY WILL ' DEPLOY INTO THE" ZONES NOTED ABOVE AS BNS DEPLOY.r LOGISTICS 19. LOCISTICS SUPPORT IS TO BE CO)lll'RACTED TO BROWN AND ROOT. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIS SUPPORT WILL 8E ;H COtnrrRy BY AUG 9_4. BROWN AND ROOT WILL PROVIDE:

••_------ -- --- ----- .. - -.------ ? B. WATER. C. INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT. D. ELECTRICITY. E. WAREHOUSING. F. SECOND AND THIRD LINE TRANSPORT. G. BASIC ZNGINEER SUPPORT. H. A ROAD CONSTRUCTION TEAM. I. VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE FOR UN SUPPLIED

VEHICLES. 19. RATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY KAHDY(UK). 20. Ase WOULD STILL NEED TO DEPLOY WITH 60 DAYS COMBAT' RATIONS. 21. Fe DOES NOT SUPPORT THE USE OF DAR ES SALAAM AS A POE, AND RECOMMENDS THE MAXIKUH USE OF AIR FOR INSERTION.

• CURRENT TJlR..EAT FROK RPF IS LOW ALTHOUGH POTENTIAL

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22. NO VEHICLES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR ANY ABC AS THEY WILL BE ALLOCATED TO DEPLOYED SNS. 23. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH ANY ASC WOULD NEED TO DEPLOY WITH 60. DAYS SELF-SUFFIC7ENCY, FOR CLASSES OF SUPPL7ES, THE

CITY RECOK 24. TEAM VISITED KING FAISAL HOSPITAL, ICRC HOSPITAL, CENTRAL HOSPITAL IN KIGALI AND THE AIRPORT. THE RECOH WAS A SOBERING;

• CXRCUMSTANCES OF KIGALI HIGHLIGHT TKB NEED FOR· ONAMIR AND ITS TASK OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

liPF ASSESSMENT

36. RPF WERE NOTED IN STRENGTH THROUGHOtJT CITY. NO FIRING HAS BEEN HEARD 1:0 DA1:S AND RPF ARE CLEARLY IN CON'l'ROL OF KIGALI. RECOH TEAM ENCOUNTERS WITH RPF HAVE CONFIRMED THE

EXISTS FOR XNcxrUUfT TO occua OKCI:! :nn:Tl:1\I.i l'lVl"HO'l!'I.XA 01" 2\P1" vXCToa-r' SUBSIDES. IT IS LIl

2. ADA

the ulrement

t.

-"')

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

885 SECOND AVENUE. HEN YORK. N.Y. 10017 TELEPHONE 212 421-6910

Date: 12 Jul 94

R.eferenc~ No: From Fl1e:

MAl 247 609/32

No of pages Including cover:4

To: MAJ J. Heath S02 LANDOI>S DJOPS. HQADF

Outgoing Fax No: 011 61 6 248 5603

From: COL C.R. Prickett Defence Attache (Fax No: I 212 371 5843)

UN: UNAMIR: AOE BECON PARTY SITREP NO 4

1. fnclosed 1s SITREP No 4 from the ADE Reton Party coverIng their actlvttles In New York. Please retransmit tt to th~ adr,sse~s 1 I sted on t t .

t we provide an update to the CDF tn We are sendt'ng htm copIes of all the

m report from the recon party. Thl,s should

C.R. PRICKETT Colonel Defence Attache

FOl185/13/14 Item 4 Serial 4

FM: HQADFOPS UNAMIR II RECON TEAM

TO: HQADFOPS FOR ACOPS, DGJOP AND DJOPS

DEFENCE FOR FASIP

OIO CANBERRA

DFAT

AUSTCOM NAIROBI

LHQOPS

PRIORITY

UNAMIR It RECON REPORT - SITREP NO.4 OF 12 JUL 94

1. THIS REPORT COVERS UNAMIR BRIEFINGS RECEIVED B~ THE RECON TEAM AT UNHQ AND FROM THE AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UN. IT IS THE REPORT REQUESTED BY THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE FOR WED 13 JUL 94.

START OF SUMMAR~ 2. THE TEAM RECEIVED BRIEFINGS FROM: A. DPKO STAFF, COVERING FORCE STRUCTURE, LOGISTICS, LEGAL,

FINANCE, MEDICAL AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING. B. INDIVIDUAL TEAM MEMBERS WERE BRIEFED ON LOGISTICS,

MEDICAL AND FINANCE MATTERS. J. COMASC DESIGNATE AND SOl LANDOPS ATTENDED LUNCH HOSTED BY HOM, AND ATTENDED BY USG RIZA, HOMS FROM CANADA, N2, GHANA AND US, AND SENIOR DPKO STAFF. MATTERS OF INTEREST WILL BE RAISED IN SEPERATE AUSTUN UN NEW YORK CABLE.

DPKO BRItf.~~GS - FORCE STRUCT~RE 4. FIRM COMMITMENTS, AS AT 6 JUL, HAVE BEEN RECEIVED ,FROM: A. GHANA, ETHIOPIA, ZIMBABWE, TUNISIA AND ZAMBIA FOR BNS.

r' ALL WILL ARRIVE WITH SIGNIFICANT' EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS. B. MALAWI, MALI AND NIGERIA FOR INF COYS. C. FORCE COMMUNICATIONS UNIT FROM CANADA. D. ACFT FROM ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS. E. S.AFRICA 50 VEHICLES, NOT CREWED. F. UK 50 TRUCKS. G. US LEASE OF 90 APCS. H. FRANCE 20 FUEL/WATER TRUCKS. 5. DPKO STAFF ARE HAPPY WITH ANY Ase FUNCTIONING AS A COHESIVE GROUP AND CONFIRMED THE OFFERS MADE FOR HQ PERSONNEL WHILE THE TEAM WAS IN KIGALI. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POSITIONS: A. CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION, RANI< OF MAl

AND A FRENCH LINGUIST. THIS COULD BE FILLED BY THE INT OFFICER ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE ASC ORBAT.

B. CHIEF PLANNING OFFICER, RANK OF LTCOL. THIS WOULD BE A VALUABLE POSITION TO FILL AND SHOULD BE NECOTIATED WITH LHQ WITHIN THE AGREED CEILINC.

~ C. THE oFFER FOR LOGISTICS PLANNING OFFICERS STANDS, BUT IS NOW TWO MAJORS AND ONE CAPT.

D. UNMOS. UNAM!R IS SEEKING A LTCOL AND UP TO 30 UNMOS.

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ALTHOUGH OFFERED BEFORE! THIS WOULD BE A PROFESSIONALLY REWARDING AND CHALLENGING POSTING FOR YOUNG OFFICERS.

6. THE POSSIBILITY OF USING OUR CURRENTLY DEPLOYED UNOSOM II MCU PERSONNEL FOR THE LODGEMENT OF UNAMIR II WAS RAISED AT LUNCH. THIS MAY COME AS AN INFORMAL REQUEST FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION, BUT REFLECTS A UNHQ PERCEPTION THAT THERE IS SPARE CAPACITY IN UNOSOM II THAT SHOULD BE REDIRECTED TO UNAMIR. 7. DA NEW YORK WOULD LIl

OF THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT TO . PROVIDE SUITASTJE MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO.THE FORCE. 1.5. THE MATTER OF THE UN FUNDING ALLOCATION FOR UNAMIR II SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY END JUL.

COMMENT 16. BRIEFINGS IN UNHQ HAVE CONFIRMED MANY OF THE ISSUES COVERED IN KIGALI. MEDICAL DATA IS NOT YET AVAILABLE AND WILL BE PROVIDED ON RTA. 17. FOR DJOPS. PLEASE ADVISE DETAIL OF ANY PROPOSED MINISTERIAL:BRIEFING/REPORT PROGRAM ON THE TEAM'S RTA. 1.8. FOR LHQOPS. PLEASE NOTE THAT S01 LANOOPS AND SOI JLO WILL ATTEND ·OPG ON FRI 15 JUL.

SHOEBRIDGE

BT

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0tJI\-1\I\'~' fIt:-- - - - ..., ACOPS ~t!-,-_ ,-.. SUPPORT CELLi

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I IFOl185/13/14 I

REPORT OF THE HQADF RECONNAISSANCE TEAM TO litem 5 RWANDAIUNAMIR (UN ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA) n '-----.-------I

.4·15 JUL 94

OPS 94/13771

Minister for Defence CDF

For Infonnation:

lAOc..OES. J FASIP

References:

A. Ministerial Submission dated 17 Jun 94 B. HQADFOPS Recon Team SITREPS 1 to 4 C. HQADFOPS Recon Team Interim Report dated 10 JuI 94

INTRODUCTION

1. As the result of Ministerial direction, HQADFOPS deployed a strategic fact-findinglreconnaissance team to RwandalUNAMIR and UN Headquarters in New York to clarify:

a. that a ceasefire existed, or was achievable, between the warring parties in the Rwandan conflict;

b. that the UNAMIR concept of operations is workable; c. that the Force logistics concept is workable; d. that any deployed Australian contingent would be able to operate as a

cohesive group; and e. that Australia would be offered a number of staff positions on HQ

UNAMIR II.

2. The composition of the team and its itinerary are at Annex A. The team was able to evaluate UN operations in Rwanda and to assess UNHQ views in regard to the future of the Mission.

AIM

3. The aim of this report is to report on the questions indicated in the-Introduction and to provide information for Cabinet consideration of any contribution to UNAMIR II.

RWANDAN CEASEFIRE AND POLmCAL SITUATION

4. On 17 May 94 the UN Security Council approved the deployment UNAMIR II as a UN Charter Chapter 6 (Peace Keeping) operation to facilitate provision of humanitarian assistance, protect that assistance, protect Displaced

and facilitate negotiations between the parties to lead to a political resolution to the conflict. UNA:MIR, through conduit of the current Force

MAJGEN R.A.Dallaire (Canada) the General's Special Representative (SRSG), MR (Pakistan), has attempted to meet this UN mandate.

At the time that the team departed from Rwanda on 8 Jul it appeared that a was achievable, within the of a number of conditions imposed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). This now been achieved by a unilateral declaration of a by the

6. the assessment at Annex B indicates, negotiations will conceivably lead to a political solution in Rwanda with the establishment of a broad-based coalition government. The potential for the start of a cohesive government reinforced by the establishment of a new Rwandan Cabinet on Ju194, will assist UNAMIR II in achieving its mandate.

UNA:MIR II CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

7. As in References B and C, UNA:MIR concept of operations is that Elements (FE) will deploy into the three zones established on implementation of a That is, a North Western zone dominated by the RGP. a South Western "protected under of the intervention

and remaining Rwandan territory. approximately three fifths of the country, controlled by the RPF. ,

8. Initial deployment of elements of a Ghanaian Battalion and UN Military Observers(UNMOs), commencing on 9 Jul 94, conforms to this CO(lCel:>t

more FE enter the UNA:MIR Area of Operations, they will deploy into these zones. This is a viable concept to achieve the Missions mandate.

1 ,

•~EDU -3- IAL ~

9. As at 13 Jul 94, UNAMIR had received the following commitments from UN member states:

a. infantry battalions from Ghana, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tunisia. To date, only Ghana has deployed into the Area of Operations(AO);

b. infantry companies from Malawi, Mali and Nigeria; c. a Force Conununications Unit from Canada; d. aircraft from Italy and the Netherlands, with the possibility of an

aircraft from NZ; e. vehicles from South Africa, UK, US and France; and f. UNMO's from a number of countries.

10. These FE are sufficient for the Force Commander to fulfil his tasks. A copy of the current UNAMIR Operations Order is at Annex C.

11. The ADF team has assessed that the concept of operations is workable, with the FE promised by member states. A clear shortfall in the current composition of UNAMIR is the provision of medical support.

12. Australian Contingent (ASC) Force Structure. The ASC will comprise a contingent HQ, a Medical Group, a Logistics Support Company and a Rifle Company. To protect the proposed medical location and provide security to medical elements that will be required to deploy into the hinterland, a rifle company is essential. The total number of personnel is approximately 300. Since the return of the reconnaissance team, the UN has offered the following staff positions on the Force HQ to Australia:

a. the Force Senior Medical Officer (a Colonel) and two supporting staff officers (Majors). These positions are already included in the 300 figure;

b. three Majors and one Captain as a Logistics Planning Cell, I

commanded by a Canadian Lieutenant Colonel; and c. a Lieutenant Colonel as the Chief Planning Officer.

13. Australia should fill these positions. They would c.ontribute to the efficiency of the Force, provided valuable professional training in combined operations in a difficult situation, and enhance Australia's standing in Peace Support Operations.

14. Employment of an Australian Medical Support Group. The Force

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This approved by Government, will be supplemented by

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16. Legal n"ln.......a. J::j.nlgagement have been developed by HQ UNAMIR II are l"'u......... tI A Status of Forces A21reelnerlt{ the RPF. development of a SOFA with

by the legal branch of UNHQ. yet to be confnmed between the UN and

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19. It is the assessment of the team that the UNAMIR II concept of operations is workable.

CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

20.' As reported in Reference B and C, logistics support for UNAMlR IT will be provided by the US company, Brown and Root. This is the company currently providing logistics support to UNOSOM IT in Somalia. It has a proven ability to provide logistics support and has the capacity to support UNAMIR. II. Brown and Root will be contracted to provide, in Rwanda, water purification, infrastructure improvement, electricity, warehousing, second and third line transport, basic accommodation, road construction and vehicle and equipment maintenance. In Uganda, they will provide a staging facility at Entebbe. Rations will be provided by Kandy (UK).

21. The team assesses that, within the requirement for the ASC to deploy with set limits of national stock holdings, support from Brown and Root is a viable logistics concept. To achieve initial self-sustainability the ASC would need to deploy with its own vehicles, 60 days of combat rations, 90 days of medical supplies, 360 days of ammunition, 360 days of repair parts, 14 days of POL and limited quantities of engineer/construction stores. These stores are moved at UN expense and are reimburseable by the UN, with equipment and vehicles attracting a UN depreciation reimbursement.

22. Financial Aspects. UN budget allocation for UNAMIR was considered by the Security Council on 15 Jul 94. An initial allocation of $US 6m has been made for Force insertion. The details of Letters of Assist and reimbursement figures are being confinned by an ADF representative visiting UN Headquarters. The UN have advised that Australia would be reimbursed for the consumption of consumables and depreciation of vehicles and equipment. Final cost estimates are being developed for the Cabinet Submission.

23. Force Deployment. If approved by Government, an Advance Party of 36 personnel, including a medical section, could deploy 14 days after approval (D-Day). The Main Body could deploy at D+28. The duration of any ASC deployment needs to be clearly indicated to the UN.

ASC COHESION

24. The FC confmned to the ADF team that the ASC will operate as one group, in a fixed location in IGgali.

CONUUSION

25. The team had the opportunity to assess all aspeers of UNAMIR's operations and the conceptS for its future operational and logistics development. The team is satisfIed that the concept of operations and logistics suppon plan are workable and that any deployed ASC would function as a cohesive group.

RECOMMENDAnONS

26. It is recommended that Australia agree to the UN request to deploy '8 medical suppon group to UNAMIR, supplemented by appropriate Force HQ staff officen.

s47F

R.W.SHOEBRIDGE Lieutenant Colonel for HQADFOPS Reconnaissance Team Leader ;i I J0194

Annexes:

A. B. C. D.

Team Composition and Itinerary ADFIC Assessment UNAMIR Operations Order Medical Reconnaissance Repon

I

ANNEX A TO HQADFOPS

UNAMIR II RECON REPORT DATED 19 JUL 94

HQADFOPS STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE TO UNAMIR n

TEAM COMPOSmON AND ITINERARY

Team Composition

1. The team consisted of:

a. COL W.P.Ramsey, CSc, COL MED Health, Land HQ. b. LTCOL R.W.Shoebridge, HQADFOPS. c. LTCOL W.BMcIntosh, CO 2/4 RAR. d. LTCOL W.B.Coates, HQADFOPS. e. MAJ DA.Kerr, DIO.

Itinerary

2. The itinerary was as follows:

a. 4 JuI. Departed Sydney for Kigali, via Johannesburg and Nairobi. b. 5 Jul. UN and AHC briefings in Nairobi. c. 6 - 9lul. Visit to Rwanda/UNAMIR II HQ, included briefings and a

tour of Kigali. d. 9 - 11 luI. Transit to New York, via Nairobi and London, for

compilation of Interim Report. e. 11 - 13 Jui. Visit to New York for briefings and discussions with the

Australian Mission and staff at UNHQ. f. 13 - 15 Jui. transit, New York to Sydney.

3. The success of the reconnaissance was assisted by the support provided by the Australian High Commissions in Nairobi and London, the Australian Mission to the United Nations in New York and the Australian Contingent to UNOSOM II.

co~SS1AED

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. . (2) n.o CWRIIt fcn:e itnIc:tme is bucct 011 a wry o.itI:d IClf-de1ieWII ap8bmty of" ' UN MalJada.. iw;Jgdi"l drc GrfieJd. "'IO'riUYia& dispCecect ,..... camtM ja IipU. Jimaa wittI all facIiou ad ......ftarim ...... iDgI....scuceUilb. 1k __ forc:es c:oaq In-o. diedacrc baft., P'OChniml tnUiII& IDd aaJy 10 APCI are f¥fti Ik1ui . ill ElpJi. "'ird .'Cs dririq adcaUa;dTt IIIIICbplzOtlrailltllC will be ou-soiaa u ~ 11 Jtdy ~ far die aa! 3 to 4 wec:b -* u.e Ct:I'J lcft1 oaroU1ia. . . .

(2) . 'I1Ic SocuritJ 0 .....°._ .... Ned to ~_e* fan:e IU1ICDre wiD _ ezpewded ••....".. . 'l1ID jgaa.! streaada will' Jap. two ........Iacd bU. 1bnIe IIMMDria:d _ofwtlicll.., coy wiD be JBCII. 320 l1NMoa.. 90 UNClVPOLI, • FaR:e SUMat Ba, 'HeJk.opW WJac.

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Ii v cofl will be dc:plaJcd aDder Mll..OB Sc:1or HQ CODlDIUd. Bas mIUnI will c1cp1oy iD coy lDcuiaas tbroagboat tIII:ir IQPCCtivc s.octon ud be empJoyed ia pea ipMnJlt.-airarian ICCUrity tub. MILOB GrotIp ad CIVPOL wiD hayO W:ir O'IiD Sector HQ ad wiU either be widI the Sector BQ or co-located widJ Be Sector HQ esbllliskd by tJIc: Baa. All Sec:tors will be· commapdrd by Sa. Commanders. cxapt for die MUI...lHDIIBYUMBA ScQor wbidl will be comm.gdcd by tbc MILOS Sedor Coal. 1k priorities of the deplo,meat c.ffon 1rill rontiuIM to be die "he 'meat of OHANBA1T ultIGAU ad Secto£ 1.. tfIo rIpid baild-up of tao md«imd Do for Secwr 4 (th F~kd HnmmitariaD PrIlCKdoa z.o.c) aDd die DedI BII taro ~ S (Ik ROil ZOGC). T1Ie critiaJ rJemem tbat IIlVIl be ..m..;.,.,. lUIdcr cao.wtlnl mmai&oriq is die FToadafRPA poaiJIlc~. 0Im::IIdy, tltc PJ'CllCb-lcd cc-IiQon forc:es In CODdIlCtia; 1iatitcd pUrob aDd prutectiDa rub ill IDe JlGP (Sec:tar ,> ZmIe .ad an: C'M"V'i-ny rc··j"iq well __ of RUHENGfilU. Tbeir' d.eploymall iD tIae HlI1II1Initarian ProaIctioa Zoac (Sc:c:tm 4) ia cate_he bat deIIils aR DOt fordIcotmq. 1'1Ie ttoua) of Ibc Hmwagjtarian Prococ:ticII Zoac bat bc:ca ~ tIIroap UNAMIR ......diq to :Pftaclt. RPF ad (JlI(AMIR iapns. Tbc RGP b.,e beea iJormcd be. un DOt responded, except ~ cIariq a medial betweaa JtGP Chief of s.atr _ PC with DO pa:rtic8IIIr (.('WI"". n.e lU'F han SIIte4 tlIII dIey IIavc aoucd ddI UM ... QlXOKQOa.O aad. 111ft 1bcy will gfft 111 tkir foe: wad U. 1IJOIICIt. naar 1tmctkmi ul is eacatia1 to P1rid c:oafi:OId:&doa. We: cauot ordc:r RPF bKt '- we bopa to n:dIu:c Ikir~ u JaIda u pcaible. 1'bc ar-i.,., d.ep&O,..... at liUIoa tea-. bctwcea 1bII Frc:IIdI-kd c;oetidun HQ ..* lIeGe SQ. die dIIily pcnoaJ CIldtactJ Itelweaa pc:rIOIIIICl of Opanticnl TUllQU01SR a8d UNAMD.1CIIiol' IIaff (OPS) IDd tho ~-.-kn an: beida wdI .....iacd aDd t.ft proyed to be Clff'er.tm:. 'I1Ie ..........., of die rd~ betlJeua !he Fn:acJl..1ed aJIIUtioa .... UNAMDl before tile RP A, tbo limoJy puASC IDd fuUow-ap ' of opaatioaal ad Jm••"irarJaa ilafonuI:ioD ..,... aU daeIe tt.roap UNAMlll', jIIi'fO'fal role, Ik IIIIIIII!!di.Qe clqlluyDlClllt at UNMO .... is tbc R...aaitwiaD ~UIIeaioIII :z.oae (Sedor 4) for die ..uartD& of die oa-aomc Frad .:dou lkr'e-bi _ tile )lGP ad .mtia ~ ia cxdcr to ........... .. poslibly iDf'hIaIco die opaatiuaal terd'odl a.pJoycd bJ die Preadt-Ial maljtj.. , die ....OP·aoc of efta (al1IOUI 1mb witl die llOP tUoqtI oar ac-l j-j..,.. Team. AD db:sc IdiI-. guide ov ........tr:rDI oper8tiou.

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I UN~ ,, .';., ANNEXD TO

HQADFOPS UNAMIR II RECON REPORT DATED 19 JUL 94

UNAMIR 11- MEDICAL RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

Background

1. It appears that most nations contributing to UNAMIR II will deploy with a very limited medical capability. At present there is only one military medical officer in Rwanda, with the Ghanaian Battalion. Following discussions with the Canadian reconnaissance team in Naiobi it is anticipated that the Canadian Signals Regiment will deploy with Level one and two medical support in the fonn of a Medical Platoon. This platoon will be capable of holding casualties for a limited period and will provide road evacuation with two ambulances. The Canadian Medical Platoon will have a strength of 35 during the lodgement phase but will decrease to a medical section of 10 after the deployment of a Force Medical Unit.

2. The ICRC and Medicin Sans Frontieres provide the only humanitarian relief surgical teams in Rwanda. The RPF may have a surgical team for battle casualties in South West Rwanda ( it appears that an RPF doctor applied external flXation to a wounded French journalist ).

3. The Force Commander argues strongly that without adequate medical support UNAMIR II will be ineffective because he will be unable to deploy troops away from the Kigali area. His argument is well justified because the nearest appropriate surgical facility is located in. Nairobi. The evacuation time for a soldier injured in Kigali to initial wound surgery ( IWS ) in Nairobi is at least six hours, this length of delay is associated with an increased mortality rate.

UNAMIR II Concept of Medical Support

4. Following discussions with the Force Commander, the following concept of medical support to UNAMIR II has been accepted. The concept of medical support includes the establishment of a Force Medical Unit with the following capabilities:

a. The Force Medical Unit will provide limited level three medical support to the force by establishing a facility in Kigali, probably in the partly damaged Kigali Hospital .. This facility should include a surgical team, 10 bed medium and high dependent surgical ward, 25 bed medium dependent medical ward; pathology services including a blood bank; X-Ray; and a Regimental Aid Post for HQ UNAMIR II. ~

b. The Force Medical Unit should also have the capability of deploying Casualty Collecting Posts following the establishment of two Force Forward Support Bases. These Casualty Collecting Posts should be mobile and will require a resuscitation team and be capable of holding

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10 low dependent patients for up to 48 hours. They will also require infantry protection during deployment.

c. A Health Officer is required to provide advice to the Force Chief Medical Officer. Two Preventive Medicine Sections are also required. One Section will provide preventive medical support to the Kigali area. A second Preventive Medicine Section is required for regional support to deployed UN personnel.

d. Two Dental Sections are required for dental support (UN policy of field dental support is limited to Level one dental care of pain relief and dental extractions ). One dental Section will provide dental support to UN personnel in the Kigali area. The other Dental Section will provide support to deployed personnel and will operate in conjunction with the deployed Preventive Medicine Section.

5. Casualty evacuation. Priority one casualties will be evacuated by air to the Force Medical Unit in Kigali. One civilian contracted Bell 4/12 helicopter will be dedicated for AME, however the Force Medical Unit will be required to provide the AME team. Most priority two and three casualties will move by road, the Force Medical Unit will be required to provide six ambulances for this task. Strategic AME from Kigali to Nairobi will be provided by a Canadian AME team and C130.

6. All casualty evacuation will be co-ordinated by the HQ UNAMIR Health Branch.

Summary

7. Without adequate medical support UNAMIR II will be ineffective because of an inability to deploy UN troops away from the Kigali area. The proposed AS Medical Support Force is capable of providing adequate health support to UNAMIR n.

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