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Posthumanism and Instrumental Eliminativism

Abstract:

I distinguish transhumanism from posthumanism in both speculative and critical forms. I

interpret posthumanism as a thesis regarding the possibility of the emergence of non-human

life as a result of human technical and scientific activity. I take the term ‘posthuman’ to refer

to hypothetical descendants of current humans who are no longer human in consequence of

some history of technical augmentation and argue that this might occur via technically-

induced changes in the structure of human cognition. In the remainder of this article I sketch

one such scenario for posthuman technogenesis. It assumes what I call the ‘linguistic

constitutivity thesis’: that language is a cognitive tool that is necessary for the possession of

structured propositional attitudes and their associated concepts. Given linguistic

constitutivity, I claim that an augmentation which obviated the need for public language by

replacing it with a more powerful non-symbolic medium would ipso facto remove the

preconditions for propositional and conceptual thought. Lacking these preconditions, human

minds would cease to exist. They would be replaced by posthuman minds with characteristic

repertoire of non-propositional attitudes exploiting non-linguaformal media for mental

representation.

Keywords:

Transhumanism, posthumanism, propositional attitudes, the extended mind, eliminativism,

continuous computation.



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1) Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Eliminativism

Contemporary transhumanists argue that human nature is an unsatisfactory 'work in progress'

that should be technically modified where the instrumental benefits for individuals outweigh

the technological risks. This technoprogressive ethic is premised on prospective

developments in Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive

Science – the so-called 'NBIC' suite. Pharmacological agents like amphetamines, modafinil

and dopamine agonists are already used to increase the efficiency of learning and working

memory (Bostrom and Sandberg 2006). Existing technologies such as genetic engineering

and transcranial magnetic stimulation are also liable to be used in increasingly targeted ways

to increase the efficiency of cognitive processes. More speculatively, micro-electric

neuroprostheses’ might eventually be used to interface the brain directly with non-biological

cognitive or robotic systems (Kurzweil 2005, 317)1. Such developments might bring forward

the day in which all humans will be more intellectually capable due to enhancements in their

native biological machinery or through seamless interfacing with supplemental cognitive

technologies.

Just how unrestricted and capable transhuman minds and bodies can become is hotly

contested since the scope for enhancement depends both on hypothetical technologies which

may turn out to be impossible or unrealistically dangerous – e.g. artificial general intelligence

or wide ranging nanotech manufacturing – and upon unresolved metaphysical issues

concerning the nature of mind, embodiment and the physical world.

1For a rather less sanguine commentary on the state of the art in non-invasive scanning see Jones 2009.



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The conceivability of a advanced post-biological intelligence – whether implemented entirely

on non-biological platforms or by a hybrid of biological and artificial system - indicates to

some that a convergence of NBIC technologies will not only enhance intelligence within the

normal human range but, beyond a critical point, contribute to a discontinuously rapid change

in the level of mentation on this planet. Virnor Vinge refers to this point as 'the technological

singularity' (Vinge 1993; Bostrom 2005, 8). Vinge, along with Ray Kurzweil and Hans

Moravec, argues that were a single super-intelligent machine created it could create still more

intelligent machines, resulting in a recursively generated growth in cognitive capacity to

levels that (lacking this capacity) we cannot even imagine. We could no more expect to

understand a post-singularity entity than a rat – lacking the capacity for refined propositional

attitudes - could be expected to understand human conceptions like justice, number theory or

public transportation.

The idea of a post-singularity intelligence provides a limit case of the posthuman, as opposed

to the transhuman. Whereas transhumans are humans that (by current standards) are

exceptionally gifted in virtue of their technical augmentations, a posthuman is a being whose

augmentation history renders it inhuman. Whereas some humans already exhibit cognitive

accomplishments of a kind that transhuman enhancements might open up to many – e.g.

memorizing very long lists of random data - the distinguishing accomplishments of the

posthuman would have no place in the current physical or cognitive horizon of humanity. The

rat-human analogy helps us understand the extent to which posthuman cognition might

transcend our intellectual capacities – though not a means of accessing posthuman thoughts

or experiences.



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The idea of the singularity suggests that posthumanism should be viewed as a speculative

metaphysical position distinct from the normative thesis of transhumanism. One can be a

transhumanist while denying the ontological possibility of posthuman transcendence.

Similarly, speculative posthumanism is consistent with the rejection of transhumanism. One

could hold that a posthuman divergence is a significant possibility but not a desirable one.2

I prefer to call this position ‘speculative posthumanism’ in contradistinction to the ‘critical

posthumanism’ currently in vogue in the humanities. Critical posthumanists such as

Katherine Hayles and Rosi Braidotti claim that current technoscientific change ‘deconstructs’

the philosophical centrality of the human subject in epistemology, ethics and politics (Hayles

1999). However, if it is logically or metaphysically possible for our augmented descendants

to transcend our cognitive or phenomenological horizons, there must be some set of

capacities distinctive of human beings – a ‘human nature’ if you will - to transcend - which

the mere fact of our changing technical and scientific horizons leaves pretty much in place.

The idea of the posthuman to which speculative posthumanists can be summarized as

follows: Posthumans are hypothetical ‘descendants’ of current humans that are no longer

human in consequence of some augmentation history. This schema captures the idea that

posthumans would not be like superior aliens, gods or angels. They would have ‘wide human

lineage’ in that their emergence would be a result of formerly human technological or cultural

activity.

Given the acknowledged difficulty of predicting the qualitative nature of future technological

change over relatively short time-spans, any prognostic accounts of the emergence of

2 Although some hold that the singularity is ‘beyond good or evil’, one might hold that certain posthumans would be worse off than even the most miserable human; a possibility that could warrant anti-transhumanist policies such as

technological relinquishment or pre-emptive species suicide.



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posthumans need to be approached with incredible caution. However, if speculative

posthumanism qua metaphysics is even plausible, it makes theoretical and political sense to

explore whatever areas of the possibility space for the emergence of posthumans are within

our ken so that we can better understand the implications of our current technoscientific

activities. In this paper I wish to consider a speculative scenario for the emergence of the

posthuman. This hinges on the claim that our cognitive nature is accurately described by the

claim that typical humans have structured propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, wishes,

hopes, thoughts, etc.) and that our capacity for the attitudes depends upon the linguistic

acculturation made possible by species typical capacities for language acquisition. The idea,

then, is that language is a cognitive tool and that this tool equips us with distinctively human

minds. If this is right, then were our technologically advanced descendants to produce

cognitive tools that resulted in the natural language becoming obsolete or vestigial, their

minds would cease to be human and would become posthuman in the sense outlined.

The linguistic constitutivity thesis (as I shall refer to it) makes possible the instrumental

elimination of propositional attitudes or at least linguaformal conceptual thinking.

Instrumental eliminativism, of course, must be sharply contrasted to the theoretical

eliminativism championed by Paul Churchland and others. It presupposes that folk

psychology is actually a good and true theory of our minds as they are currently constituted

but assumes that this constitution supervenes on our using culturally available tools that

might cease to exist at some point in the future.

2) Linguistic Constitutivity



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Following assorted 'linguistic turns', philosophers and social scientists from Marx to

Heidegger, Habermas, Dennett and Davidson have claimed that capacities we take to

distinguish humans from non-human animals are predicated our command of natural

languages. For example, it has been claimed that the ability to use language is essential for

thinking with abstract concepts, the possession of propositional attitudes, developing the 'folk

psychological competence' to attribute propositional attitudes to others, serially ordered

consciousness, the understanding of truth, objectivity or Being.

Any version of the 'linguistic constitutivity thesis' entails that a global loss of language

capacities would efface the transmissible cultural forms that equip our minds to be

distinctively human.3

A conflagration that caused humans to lose the capacity to speak, parse

or interpret the speech of others, or to engage in verbal thought, would result in a population

whose mental life was no longer recognizably human. These would not be posthumans

according to the criterion advanced in the last section since no augmentation history would

have been involved. However an augmentation history that eventuated in a post-linguistic

intelligence for which language either plays no cognitive role or, at best, a vestigial one,

would result in the technogenesis of a posthuman life form.

To put bones on this technogenesis scenario, it would help to sketch out a philosophical

framework for linguistic constitutivity. I have chosen to articulate it from within the Extended

Mind Thesis (EMT) - a position that combines wide acceptance by a range of pragmatically-

oriented cognitive scientists, psychologists and philosophers with a peculiar ease of

3Some object that language cannot be synchronically constitutive of human thought since many aphasics can

perform a range of high-level cognitive tasks such as passing false-belief tests. Much depends on the details and strengths

and claims made in any particular version of the linguistic-constitutivity thesis. For example, we could defend a central

diachronic role for language in the development and sculpting of cognition and brain structure without subscribing to the

synchronic claim that language actually vehiculates high level thought. In what follows, I shall set out a position within

which language has both synchronic and (more generally accepted) diachronic roles, though I acknowledge the problemswith this view in passing (Carruthers 2002).



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integration within the technogenesis scenario. EMT holds that that mental process don’t just

happen in brains, but in the environments of embodied thinkers. Proponents of the extended

mind thesis like Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue from a principle of 'parity' between

processes that go on in the head and any functionally equivalent process in the world

beyond.4

The parity principle implies that mental processes need not occur only in biological

nervous systems but in the environments and tools of embodied thinkers. If I have to make

marks on paper to keep in mind the steps of a lengthy logical proof, the PP states that my

mental activity is constituted by these inscriptional events, as by the knowledge and habits

reposing in my acculturated neural networks.

EMT is more congenial to the technogenesis of new human (and prospectively posthuman)

forms of cognition because it allows that I can augment my cognitive structure by altering

affordances in my extra-bodily environment to produce new cognitive resources (e.g. new

type of representation).

According to the EMT-perspective, public languages have structural properties which furnish

a shared 'workspace' for thinking, allowing symbol users to shrug off their dependence on the

idiomatic features of different neural connectivities. Non-linguistic representation play a part

in this model: e.g. implementing symbol-using capacities or furnishing a raft of non-symbolic

recognitional powers (See section 3). Nonetheless, we ‘Natural born cyborgs’ – to cite

Clark’s book of the same name – are dealers in hybrid mental representations which exploit

both a linguistically mapped environment and our multifariously talented brains (Clark 2003).

4 'Parity Principle. If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in

the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for thattime) part of the cognitive process'.(from Clark and Chalmers (1998) p.XX)



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In order to better appreciate how language might furnish extended cognition and the

implications of obviating it though cognitive enhancement, we need to specify in sufficiently

broad terms the key features of language which might plausibly warrant attributing a human-

constitutive role to it:

1) Linguistic behaviour consists in the production of symbols. Symbols are articulated (or

finitely differentiated). If it is not possible to determine which symbol type a given mark

belongs to, it can’t be a symbol.

2) Just as importantly, a given symbol can be employed by different users in different times

and places for different purposes. Some philosophers analyze this in terms of a type-token

ontology, where tokens are particular instances of symbols and types are the syntactic or

semantic essence instantiated on each use. This analysis is not uncontroversial (MacClelland

2002). However, it is worth emphasizing that the 'ideality' of symbols – their repeatability in

different contents - is essential both to the function conventional linguistic signs or the

hypothetical 'symbols in the head' postulated by proponents of classical computationalist

accounts of mental processing.

3) Linguistic symbols also exhibit compositional structure. Complex symbols like sentences

or predicate expressions are composed according to the grammatical rules of the language.

Rules governing logical connectives or embedded clauses, for example, allow symbols of

arbitrary complexity to be composed recursively by reapplying them to their own output.

Compositional structure with recursion intuitively furnishes a huge representational gain over

sign systems with minimal constituency – particularly those lacking recursion. Not only does



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it allow the rule governed generation of arbitrarily complex grammatical strings, it allows

inference rules to be defined in terms of the syntactic structures of those strings.

Classical computationalists like Jerry Fodor propose that comprehending public language

involves translation into a language of thought (‘mentalese’). Thinking is the manipulation of

mentalese symbols according to structure sensitive algorithms which reflect the brain’s

physical dispositions analogously to the way in which software loaded in a digital computer

reflects its physical state at compile time.5 For CC, mentalese rather than public language is

the medium of thought, whereas public or natural languages are media for their

communication (Fodor 1987, 1990).

However some argue that public language is, if not a language of thought per se, a

prerequisite of richly articulated propositional thinking; not merely a public medium for its

expression. A psychological plausible – if contentious - way of establishing this position is to

tie the capacity for propositional or conceptual thinking to the capacity for representing

propositional attitudes like beliefs or desires, then to identify language as the medium of

meta-representation. Propositional attitude psychology and the full-dress conceptual thinking

that goes with can then be attributed to the 'linguistic hybridity' of human cognition.

Donald Davidson's work in semantics provides a powerful schema for this strong version of

the linguistic constitutivity thesis. Davidson argues that the ability to have beliefs requires a

grasp of what belief is and the relationship of belief to other propositional attitudes (e.g.

thoughts, intentions and desires). Understanding belief requires that one 'understands the

5Where these rules are rational or truth-preserving so are the thoughts they implement. CC thus

reconciles physicalism with the claim that psychological explanations rationalise or justify. It explains the apparent

'systematicity' of conceptual thought by identifying concepts with predicate expressions in the mentalese lexicon. If one hasa concept in one’s mental lexicon, then it can enter into any grammatical combination with other parts of one's lexicon. If I

can think that John loves Mary and Mary killed Ned, I can think that Ned loves John or Ned killed Mary.



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possibility of being mistaken' and a recognition that others might have true or false beliefs

about its topic. Belief is an attitude of 'holding true' that which is believed and cannot be

intelligibly adopted without a grasp of what this implies for the evaluation of one's own

others' mental states (Ibid., p. 170).

Suppose that we know Fred to have an obsession with tiger hunting and are aware that a large

dog is prowling the vicinity. Seeing Fred stalking with a sense of nervous anticipation around

his garden while holding a rifle might lead us to attribute to his anomalous behaviour to the

(false) belief that a tiger is in the area, plus the (true) belief that there is a predator in the area.

Distinctions such as between the belief that tiger is around the the belief that predator is

around require a grasp of the truth conditions and inferential consequences of said beliefs.

For Davidson, only a semantic understanding that relates arbitrary sentences to their truth

conditions on the basis of some interpretation of their sub-sentential components (which

could reoccur in other sentences about tigers, dogs, hunting or predators, or snow) can furnish

this since only speech behaviour provides the intensional distinctions relevant to the

explanatory description of action:

Our manner of attributing attitudes ensures that all the expressive power of language

can be used to make such distinctions. One can believe that Scott is not the author of

Waverley while not doubting that Scott is Scott; one can want to be the discoverer of a

creature with a heart without wanting to be the discoverer of a creature with a kidney.

One can intend to bite into the apple in the hand without intending to bite into the only

apple with a worm in it; and so forth. The intensionality we make so much of in the

attribution of thoughts is very hard to make much of when speech is not present. The

dog, we say, knows that its master is home. But does it know that Mr Smith (who is



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his master), or that the president of the bank (who is that same master), is home? We

have no real idea how to settle, or make sense of, these questions (Ibid. 163).

Compositionality and the repeatability of linguistic symbols also play a role in the familiar

linguistic device of embedding sentences as grammatical complements of sentences

attributing beliefs, desires or indirect speech. Davidson calls this repeatability 'the autonomy

of meaning'. Linguistic symbols are 'autonomous' with regard to their usage insofar as they

retain an identity across divergent uses. Thus while the sentence 'There is a tiger in the

woods' can be used in a blunt assertion, it can also be embedded in an utterance that attributes

the belief that there is a tiger in the woods to Fred or used sarcastically or ironically (Ibid, pp.

164-165).6

So the autonomy (or ideal repeatability) of linguistic symbols provides the meta-

representational device by which we evaluate our own or others' utterances and attitudes in

the course of interpreting them. Given the assumed tie between evaluating and having

attitudes, then, we could not qualify as true believes without the reflexivity afforded by

complex linguistic structures.

One might object that even granting the constitutive tie between the capacity for evaluating

attitudes and for having them, it is prima facie as plausible to suppose that these are meta-

represented in mentalese or some other neural medium of representation (Bermudez 2003, p.

158). This issue is, in part, an empirical one and has received considerable attention from

psychologists concerned with the role of language in children's development of folk-

psychological competences such as the ability to infer behaviour from false-belief attributions

6 Davidson's paratactic analysis of direct and indirect discourse actually denies that s in attributive sentences like'Fred believes that s' is a semantic constituent. Davidson prefers to treating 'that' as an indexical device. However, this is still

consistent with compositionality so the details of his theory of direct and indirect speech need not concern us.



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(Pyers and Senghas 2009)7. However, linguistic hybridity arguably confers benefits on

thinkers that a purely 'inner' medium such as mentalese or non-linguaformal 'neuralese'

cannot afford. In saying or writing some text we turn it into a relatively persistent articulate

structure which we return to for further evaluation and reflection (Clark 1996, 177). Jose

Bermudez argues that this renders structured thoughts accessible for conscious or personal

recapitulation and reflection, a feature which is arguably absent in the case of mentalese or

Churchland-style higher-dimensional brainstates, or any other hypothesized inner medium

(Bermudez 2003). If so, then language appears to be in a unique position to supply what

Clark refers to as 'second order cognitive dynamics' (Clark 1996, 177): a suit of self-

monitoring capacities which, as he avers, furnish the 'distinctly human capacity' to think

about our thoughts.

This opens up two routes to linguistic constitutivity. Firstly, as emphasized by Bermudez, it

allows us to represent complex concepts via the articulate structures of public language. If

Bermudez is right, then Clark is surely on the right track in proposing that we treat

representations of natural language strings (whether neural or textual) as proper parts of

hybrid mental representations, for these representations derive their capacity for refined

logical articulation from a juxtaposition public-discursive representational resources with

native discriminative powers (Clark 2006). This implies that a considerable portion of human

conceptual-space is essentially of a hybrid nature.8

Secondly, if these self-monitoring tools

are essential for the evaluation of propositional attitudes and (following Davidson) evaluating

attitudes is a precondition for their possession, then language use must also be a precondition

7Rules governing sentential embedded clauses allow language users to form sentences about

linguistic or propositional objects such as 'Joan believed that Bill is the culprit' or 'Nick said “Bill is falsely accused”' ().

These rules can be applied recursively (as in 'Nick hoped that Joan's belief that Bill is the culprit was mistaken').8

Working within a modular approach to cognitive architecture, Peter Carruthers has argued that

competence in natural language furnishes the means to integrate the output of domain-specific modules (e.g. those for tracking color or geometric relationships) using abstract representations with no appurtenance to a cognitive or sensory

modality (Carruthers 2002).



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for a distinctively propositional attitude psychology. The second, Davidsonian, position is

arguably the stronger since one might envisage beings possessing a similar propositional

attitude psychology to humans but which – due to the dearth of language – are incapable of

accessing the space of human culture opened up by the external representation of conceptual

and discursive relationships.

3) The Technogenesis of the Posthuman

Both strong and weak forms of linguistic constitutivity make significant areas of human

cognition dependent on the existence of public language. It should be emphasized that even

the stronger version does not entail that the attitudes are a mere abstracta posited for the sake

of prediction or interpretation. Nor, as emphasized in Section 1, does it entail that they

posited in a moribund folk theory. However, it does opens up a prospect of instrumental

eliminativism. If linguistic hybridity is constitutive of propositional thought (strong

constitutivity) or refined conceptual thought (weak constitutivity) we don’t have to

theoretically defeat folk psychology to eliminate the mental. We can eliminate the mental by

eliminating (the need for) language.

Could this occur as a consequence of some or other augmentation technology?

Well, for any such technology to count as an augmentation it would have to render language

vestigial while providing at least equivalent scope for sophisticated cognition. For example,

we would expect our hypothetical posthumans to be capable of non-symbolic analogs of the

'second order cognitive dynamics' that Clark attributes to linguistically-mediated cognition:

e.g. sophisticated conceptual thinking, reflection and interpretation.



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In his seminal ‘Eliminativism Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’, Paul Churchland

discusses an inter-cranial commissure thought on analogy with the thick trunk of nerve fibers

which links our right and left cerebral hemispheres. Churchland supposes that a high

bandwidth microwave connection between brains might allow two or more people to

‘coordinate their behaviour with the same intimacy and virtuosity displayed by your own

cerebral hemispheres’. Churchland speculates that were such a commissure to become widely

available: ‘language of any kind might well disappear completely, a victim of the “why crawl

when you can fly?” principle. Libraries become filled not with books, but with long

recordings of exemplary bouts of neural activity’ (Churchland 1981).

However, while this vision of microwaved bliss was a nice rhetorical flourish; there are

technical problems integrating it into the vector-coding model that Paul and Patricia

Churchland later adopted. If the vectors corresponding to activation states in neural networks

are the primary determinants of content identity or similarity, then two networks can only be

in states with the same content if their state spaces are at least mathematically equivalent

(Churchland 1998; Garzon 2000). If they have different numbers of neurons, for example,

any total state will have a vector of different length and thus a different content. As Jerry

Fodor and Ernest Lepore argue, given reasonable assumptions about human neural

idiosyncrasy, this proposal has the counter-intuitive consequence that no two individuals

could share the same concepts (Fodor and Lepore 1992; Garzon). Churchland later argued

that the dimensionality problem could be obviated by a similarity measure which the content

of activation states/prototypes in terms of a) correlations between their Euclidean distances

from other states within the hidden layer of the network and b) the causal relationships



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between hidden layer activation states and the sensory ‘input’ layer (Churchland 1998). This

would still present a problem for conceptualizing direct neural communication, however.

Firstly, sufficiently richly connected brains would intuitively constitute a single network.

Even allowing for a detailed knowledge of the brains and their interactions, what principles

preclude treating two people linked by the commissure as a single coupled system with some

representations distributed between crania?

More pertinently, if linguistic constitutivity is right, coupled brains might also lack the

capacity for second order cognitive dynamics identified by Clark. Their bouts of neural

activity would lack the embedding in a transcultural system of implication and meaning

required for refined conceptual thought.

Still, it seems to me that we can propose a cognitive prosthesis in the context of the EMT that

would have a similarly eviscerating effect on libraries. Rather than describing how brains

might talk to one another, we can envisage a cognitive augmentation which could be

conceivably adopted by humans or augmented transhumans which adds sufficient

functionality to be considered an augmentation but which inclines its users to employ non-

symbolic vehicles for thinking, communicating, interpreting, etc. in preference to symbolic

vehicles such as linguistic entities.

To ensure that these are non-symbolic we can specify initially that they should have a non-

symbolic syntax. One of the syntactic requirements of a symbol system such as a language is

that it is possible in principle to determine unambiguously which disjoint symbol a given

token belongs to (finite differentiation). Contrastingly, we can specify that our proposed



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augmentation should use vehicles which do not have to belong to definite representational

types and which are subject to a far wider class of computational processes than symbols.

The dropping of the articulation requirement is the syntactical basis for Brian MacLennan's

distinction between a Discrete Formal System (DFS) and a Continuous Formal System (CFS)

or 'simulacrum' and this provides a model for understanding what a reflective system of non-

propositional thinking might be like. MacLennan calls the representational vehicles of CFS's

'images'. Even where some kind of representational typology exists for a CFS, an image's

membership of a correlative type is a matter of degree and subject to continuous variation

(MacLennan 1995, p. 2). It follows that there may be cases where a given image belongs to

one or more types to varying degrees. Similarly, whereas interpretability is a binary matter in

an DFS's (only grammatically well-formed strings can be interpreted) the interpretation

function for an image in a simulacrum can map onto superpositions of continuously varying

semantic values within a vector space defined by the semantic dimensions along which the

image can be evaluated. An image can be a slightly more true than false, but also a 'bit'

undefined compared with a truer or less indefinite image (Ibid. p.6). Similarly, two images

might refer to an object to greater or lesser degrees.

A material instantiation of a CFS would be syntactically dense – more like pictorial than

symbolic representation - since any change in the morphology of an image could be

accompanied by a change in meaning. Similarly, computation in simulacra could involve the

continuous evolution of images rather than the discontinuous transitions between states

involved in classical or discrete conceptions of computation. Importantly, MacLennan shows

how the idea of a program can be generalized so that they can be represented by further

images. For example, the method of gradient descent (employed in variants of the Delta Rule



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in the theory of Neural Networks) can be conceptualized as the use of an error surface (the

'program' image) to define the rate and direction of change in some continuous variable

corresponding to the computed image (Ibid, 9-10). A similar principle can be applied to a

generalized grammar where well-formedness is a matter of degree and maximally well-

formed images correspond to some sink region on a guiding surface (Ibid, 11-13).

MacLennan's theory of simulacra allows us to envisage a representational format which is a)

non-symbolic and b) has computational resources unavailable to symbolic systems and c) is

capable of representing its own computational procedures and grammatical structures in

terms of its own imagistic resources. Moreover, since the semantic values of DFS's can be

treated as points along the continua calculated by the interpretation functions and grammars

of simulacra, it is possible for an computational system described by some CFS to

approximate any system describable by an DFS to an arbitrary degree of accuracy (Ibid. 14).

Let us suppose, then, that a radical cognitive enhancement becomes available that implements

or closely approximates styles of continuous computation associated with simulacra, which

includes not only imagistic representations of non-images (entities in the world outside the

system) but images of programs and images which 'parse' other images by representing their

grammatical derivation. Presumably, the this non-symbolic workspace (NSW) would have to

be represented for its users in some form or other - perhaps through some immersive virtual

reality technology in which images of varying orders could be manipulated and shared (we

need not concern ourselves with precisely how it does this). Is there any reason to expect that

the NSW could instrumentally eliminate typically human forms of propositional and

conceptual thinking?



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For this to occur, the kind of thinking which typifies human propositional/conceptual

thinking: a) must be or must closely approximate computational processes where state

transitions mediate between cognitive states that are constitutively symbolic; b) must be

eliminable through the use of the NSW.

Condition b) might be satisfied if this discrete style of cognitive dynamics is linguistically

constituted. For if the NSW were to replace the dominant symbolic medium of thought and

communication with a non-symbolic medium, current humans or their descendants might

cease to use language altogether or employ it as a vestigial instrument (e.g. for speaking to

unaugmented humans, if any are still around). If language constitutes distinctive human

cognition in this way, our augmented successors would cease to have distinctively human

cognitive states and would (given linguistic constitutivity) have ceased to be human. Since

this becoming-non-human would have derived from a technological augmentation, these

hypothetical non-symbolic cognizers would satisfy the requirement for posthumanity

introduced above.

A number of objections can be leveled against this scenario for the technogenesis of

posthumans:

1) Why suppose that an NSW could be so powerful and comprehensive a thinking tool

as to prompt a transition from linguaformal to non-linguaformal modes of cognition?

2) Why assume the linguistic constitutivity thesis?

3) Even assuming linguistic constitutivity, do we know that human cognition is not

already better thought of as implementing a CFS than a DFS? (How do we know that

condition a) applies?).



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Assumptions about the power and generality of an NSW are supported by the mathematical

claim that DFS's can be approximated by CFS's. If this is right, then for any discrete

computer there ought to be a possible continuous computer that is at least as capable. This

does not suffice to show that our posthuman descendants will have hybrid thoughts or

attitudes mediated by a NSW that are strictly unavailable for humans. However, given that a

NSW would be at least as flexible as any current system, it seems reasonable to allow that

they might.

The linguistic constitutivity thesis I simply take as a working assumption for developing the

technogenesis scenario. I have argued that it is independently plausible. However, variants on

this scenario are possible which do not assume it. Supposing that our thinking is performed in

mentalese and that this is an innate and not culturally acquired feature of our neural

organization. It remains possible that our dependence on mentalese could be obviated through

the use of an NSW. One could postulate an imaginary technology that reformats the brains of

its users so as to render them capable of using only its proprietary non-symbolic scheme for

mental representation. The capacity for propositionally structured thought would ‘be

overwritten’. Such a technology hard to envisage in the absence of a convincing story about

how nervous systems are shaped to think linguaformally. It would arguably presuppose the

near-posthuman capacity to turn brains of one kind into brains of a completely different kind

by directly manipulating synaptic connections.

It is even harder to see why anyone would wish to use it. If you were told that after fixing

some gadget to your head, all your beliefs, desires would be erased and you would lose the

capacity to understand fellow humans, you might be unimpressed by the hazy prospect of



20

being able to engage in some form of non-symbolic cognition beyond the ken of flat-footed

symbol users. You might be forgiven for regarding its effects as a form of wholesale

cognitive mutilation rather than enhancement.

Alternatively, one might envisage the NSW as added connectivity, providing a non-

propositional option for sophisticated mental representation. This product would offer people

a choice of coding schemes for complex thinking where none currently exist. As in the first

option, though, any shift from propositional to non-propositional coding would require

altering the structure of human brains in ways that no culture or technology has done to date.

For example, assuming some kind of modular architecture, every mentalese output or input to

a module would need to have a non-symbolic duplicate. By contrast, assuming linguistic

constitutivity has the advantage of allowing us to visualize the technogenesis of posthumans

as a cultural process involving no substantial alterations in human biology beyond that

required for the use of the NSW.

Objection 3 is perhaps the most serious. Many cognitive scientists and philosophers deny that

human cognition is most usefully conceptualized in terms of structure-sensitive algorithms

applied compositionally structured representations. One of MacLennan's motivations for

formulating the notion of a CFS is that the rules and structured representations approach does

not seem likely to capture the context-sensitivity of much human and animal thinking, which

is liable to resist any summation within a finite rule set (See MacLennan 2002, pp. 7-8). As is

well known, other philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that the classical

computationalist model of structure sensitive algorithms applied to syntactically structured

representations cannot explain phenomena such as the holistic nature of belief-fixation, the

temporal structure of experience or our capacity for relevance-addressable memory. In its



21

place and have proposed a range of more or less breaks with the classical computationalism

such as vector-coding models or entirely representation-free dynamical models. If any of

these non-classical alternatives are right – or significantly near right – then, the objection

goes, it is likely that humans are already implementations of CFS's. Thus the implementation

of a CFS via a non-symbolic shared workspace would simply be augmenting a cognitive

architecture that is already non-algorithmic in terms of the state transitions it implements or

non-symbolic in its representational vehicles, or both (See for example, Horgan and Tienson

1994 and 1999).

The hybrid conception of representation developed in the EMT model already acknowledges

that some recognitional and inferential capacities supporting the intelligent use of public

symbols are not best modeled as operations on syntactically structured strings. Jeffrey

Elman's work on connectionist language-learning suggests that grammatical distinctions

between sentences with different degrees of grammatical embedding could be represented in

terms of distances between hyperplanes within the activation space of a recurrent neural

network rather than, say, the syntactic structure of linguaformal internal representations

(Elman 1995). However, the instrumental elimination scenario only assumes that human

conceptual thinking or propositional attitude psychology has an essential symbolic

component, not that it is symbolic 'all the way down'.

Clearly, if the Churchlands’ theoretical eliminativism or radical anti-representationalists like

Van Gelder are right and symbol-use is largely extrinsic to the content or dynamics of

cognition, then the non-symbolic cognitive augmentation envisaged would be ‘more of the

same’ and no discontinuity between human and posthuman cognition could be inferred.

However, if language usage is constitutive of our psychological nature in the manner outlined



22

in Section 2, then a non-symbolic cognitive augmentation might conceivably prompt a

transition from a human to a posthuman psychology.

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